Cario v.

CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged
failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They
complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in
fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on
said matter, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do
so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain
specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and
resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No.
90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that
in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission(PRC)

issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions
during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec.
8, Art.III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. On October 16, 1986, herein
petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
scheduled on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a
complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
and to declare the same unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on
October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court
declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission
from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court.
Said petition was granted in theDecision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 13,
1987.
ISSUE:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission
so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this
Commission lawfully prohibit the examinees from attending review classes, receiving
handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination?
HELD:
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its
basis that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal
bodies. The respondent court erred when it placed the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Professional Regulation Commission in the same category. As already mentioned,
with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide
with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the
other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to
question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo,thisrule was
thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
I
n so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no
questionbut that the power of judicial review should be upheld.

In view of the foregoing, we find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by
therespondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the
generaljurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends

that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg.129, it is the Court of Appeals which has
jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction.
The intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except thosefalling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, theprovisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourthparagraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
theCourt of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to
be a finalorder or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body
involvedexercised its quasi-judicial functions. This does not cover rules and regulations of
generalapplicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative
policies andfunctions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a
measure topreserve the integrity of licensure examinations. In view of the foregoing, we hold
that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain CivilCase No. 86-37950 and enjoin
the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. The unreasonableness is more obvious in
that one who is caught committing the prohibited actseven without any ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations conducted by therespondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have awatchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before the examination period.It is an axiom in
administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily andcapriciously
in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations mustbe
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. Resolution No. 105 is not only
unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees'right to liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on thereviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations.

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers
premises A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR
addressed to the Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other
personal property of Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer.
The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender,
transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of
the National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt.
Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcons custody. For this
reason, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code. Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the
BIR as a depositary of distrained property?
HELD:
Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes. Azarcon obviously may not
be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as a
custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the
prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to
preserve a distrained property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a
public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual
to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. The charge against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.