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TABLE OF CONTENTS
BRIEF IN SUPPORT .......................................................................................................... 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 4
PROPOSITION I The Court should dismiss DeLongs Unlawful and Wrongful
Termination claim .............................................................................................................. 5
PROPOSITION II The Court should dismiss DeLongs retaliation claim..................... 7
A.
B.
PROPOSITION III The Court should dismiss DeLongs Section 1983 claims (due
process, free speech and free assembly) ............................................................................ 12
A.
The Department and The Board Are Not Liable Under Section 1983. ....... 12
B.
C.
D.
B.
The Department and The Board Are Immune under the Tort Claims
Act. .............................................................................................................. 20
C.
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Adams v. Neubauer,
195 F. Appx 711 (10th Cir. 2006) .......................................................................... 12
Allen v. Justice Alma Wilson Seeworth Acad., Inc.,
2012 WL 1298588, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 2012) ......................................................... 20
Asojo v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,
2012 WL 3679539 (W.D. Okla. 2012) ............................................................. 20, 22
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, (2007) .......................................................................................... 4, 19
Benedix v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-007 of Oklahoma Cnty., Okla.,
2009 WL 975145, at *2 (W.D. Okla. 2009) ..................................................... 19, 20
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad.,
492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 16
Cobb v. Pozzi,
363 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2004) .................................................................................... 18
Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist. 500,
750 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................. 9
Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006) ......................................................................................... 15, 16
Khalik v. United Air Lines,
671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................. 4
Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Cnty. of Santa Fe,
654 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 17
Murphy v. Spring,
2013 WL 5172951, at *9 (N.D. Okla. 2013) .......................................................... 13
Myles v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
267 F. Appx 898 (11th Cir. 2008) ......................................................................... 18
N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999) ..................................................................................... 19
Parker v. Salazar,
431 F. Appx 697 (10th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................... 11
Polson v. Davis,
895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................ 20
Robbins v. Oklahoma,
519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................ 4
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Rural Water Dist. No. 1, Ellsworth Cnty., Kansas v. City of Wilson, Kansas,
243 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................. 13
Salazar v. City of Commerce City,
535 F. Appx 692 (10th Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 15, 16
Shephard v. Compsource,
209 P.3d 288 (Okla. 2009) ................................................................................... 5, 6
Smith v. Stuteville,
2014 WL 3557641, at *4 (D. Kan. 2014) ......................................................... 21, 22
Stewart v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Office of Juvenile Affairs,
2013 WL 6670291, at *7 (W.D. Okla. 2013) ......................................................... 20
Stokes v. City of Mount Vernon, N.Y.
2012 WL 3536461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ...................................................................... 16
Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n,
125 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 10, 11
Trant v. Oklahoma,
426 F. Appx 653 (10th Cir. 2011) .................................................................. 4, 5, 12
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) ............................................................................................. 9
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) ................................................................................................. 12
Statutes
25 O.S. 1350 ............................................................................................................. 23, 24
51 O.S. 155 ..................................................................................................................... 20
Rules
42 U.S.C. 1983 ............................................................................................... 3, 12, 14, 16
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DeLongs claims are virtually, although not completely, identical to those filed by
Plaintiff Kimberly Poff in Case No. CIV-14-1438-C, recently removed to this Court. See
Plaintiffs Petitions, attached as Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2. Accordingly, the arguments
submitted in support of this Motion to Dismiss will be asserted in a separate Motion to
Dismiss filed in the Poff case. DeLongs multiple claims against various Defendants are
referenced in a chart attached as Exhibit No. 3.
2
The Department was established in 1953 by the Oklahoma Mental Health Law. Since
that time, the Department has provided services, assistance, and resources to hundreds of
thousands of Oklahomans affected by mental illness and substance abuse. While
Plaintiffs Petition is replete with errors and untruths that sully the Departments
reputation, Defendants are mindful that, due to the applicable standard of review, this
Motion to Dismiss is not an appropriate vehicle for rebutting those errors and untruths.
However, to the extent any of Plaintiffs claims survive the pleading stage, Defendants
look forward to responding factually to Plaintiffs remaining allegations.
2
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claim was investigated. As set out in the separate Propositions in the Brief in Support, all
of DeLongs claims are legally barred, factually insufficient, or both. The Propositions
are summarized as follows:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
3
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claim cannot be based on 25 O.S. 1350, and DeLong does not identify
any other basis for his public policy claim.3
BRIEF IN SUPPORT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In examining whether the allegations in a petition are sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss, it is well established that only well-pleaded facts, as distinguished
from conclusory allegations are accepted as true. Trant v. Oklahoma, 426 F. Appx 653,
659 (10th Cir. 2011). A petition must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671
F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
(2007)). A claim that is merely conceivable is insufficienta plaintiff must nudge his
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Id. If the allegations are so
general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the
plaintiff has not nudged his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Robbins
v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). Mere labels and conclusions and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555.
In the present case, DeLongs Petitionlike that of his co-Plaintiff Kimberly
Poffbears the hallmarks of labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations. Furthermore,
the facts that DeLong does allege reveal that several of his claims are barred under
3
DeLong asserts a Civil Conspiracy claim at page 12 of his Petition but does not name
the Department or the Board in that claim. That claim is not the subject of this Motion
since it does not apply to these Defendants. Thus, this Motion seeks dismissal of all
claims alleged against the Department and the Board.
4
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PROPOSITION II
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS
DELONGS RETALIATION CLAIM
The Court should dismiss DeLongs retaliation claim (found at page 9 of the
Petition) because there is no statutory basis stated and there is no basis in Oklahoma or
federal law for a generic retaliation claim. Further, to the extent the claim can be
construed as a retaliation claim under Title VII, it should still be dismissed because
DeLong did not engage in protected activity under Title VII.
A.
Petition, which are nearly identical to those in Poffs retaliation discrimination cause of
action:
49. Mr. DeLong was terminated on August 23, 2013 from Oklahoma
Department of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Services, because of his
knowledge of case sensitive information which illustrates multiple
improprieties within the Department.
***
53. Leadership terminated Mr. DeLong & Ms. Poff in an attempt to
orchestrate investigations and manipulate outcomes to its desired
conclusion, to protect the department from media and governmental
scrutiny, and to show it in the best possible light.
54. When Mr. DeLong and Ms. Poff refused to bow to the demands to
manipulate investigative findings, Leadership decided to render the
Inspector General's office powerless by terminating the two most senior
members of the department, Ms. Poff and Mr. Delong, and placing an
investigator with four months of experience in charge of these sensitive
investigations.
55. Mr. DeLong and Ms. Poff opposed the acts of the Department and
Department Leadership and engaged in whistle blowing activity by
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reporting the inappropriate and potentially illegal conduct within the office
of ODMHSAS and upon doing so, Leadership at the department retaliated
by terminating his employment.
56. The ODMHSAS retaliated against Mr. DeLong by firing him when he
would not tow the party line with regards to the investigation into sensitive
claims.
57. Mr. DeLong and Ms. Poff were terminated for engaging in lawful
activity of reporting unlawful and illegal conduct within the Department.
Careful examination of the allegations made in support of DeLongs retaliation
claim shows that he believes he was retaliated against because of his work on an
investigation involving Narconon4 and because of his knowledge of a consensual
romantic relationship between two Department employees. His allegations (all of which
are factually baseless) include claims that he was discharged because:
he did not tow the party line with regards to the investigation into sensitive
claims (paragraph 56), and
Even if Plaintiffs claims about Narconon were correct and his investigation found
sufficient evidence to establish Narconon had violated the Department rules, the
Administrative Code does not require the Department to take any action, such as
revocation. The decision to revoke a license in such cases is discretionary and, therefore,
the Department is exempt from liability under the GTCA. 51 O.S. 155(5) & (12).
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DeLong Does not Have a Colorable Retaliation Claim under Title VII
Although DeLong does not identify any statutory basis for his retaliation claim,
he may try to belatedly assert that the claim arises under Title VII, since he attached to
his Petition a Charge of Discrimination with a box checked for retaliation. To state a
Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) he engaged in protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) his protected activity was
a but-for cause of the alleged adverse employment action. Davis v. Unified Sch. Dist.
500, 750 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013)).
DeLongs allegations reveal he did not engage in protected activity under Title
VII. DeLong claims at paragraph 57 of his Petition that he and Ms. Poff were terminated
for engaging in lawful activity of reporting unlawful and illegal conduct within the
Department, but DeLong does specify what the allegedly unlawful conduct was. The
closest DeLong comes to stating a retaliation claim in his Petition is his allegation that he
received a third party sexual harassment claim . . . regarding alleged preferential
treatment shown to the direct report of Mr. Moore. See Petition at 25. Although
DeLongs Petition does not go into detail about the basis of the third party sexual
harassment claim, his statement to the EEOC does:
Prior to my termination I was in the process of initiating a sexual
harassment claim made by another subordinate of Mr. Moores. This
employee complained to me of a hostile work environment based on the
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affair between Mr. Moore and [an alleged paramour]. The employee
having an affair with Mr. Moore was being treated better than other
employees and received a promotion while employees who were not
engaged in a sexual relationship with the boss were not.5
Even if DeLongs allegations could be broadly construed to include a claim of
Title VII opposition connected to his knowledge of the details of an affair
involving co-employees, his claim is still deficient under extant law. The Tenth Circuit
has made it clear that a supervisors preferential treatment of a paramour does not support
a cause of action under Title VII.
In Taken v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997), the Tenth
Circuit examined a claim of sexual harassment premised on allegations that a
supervisors paramour received more favorable treatment than other employees. Even if
the allegations were true, the Court said, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief
under Title VII:
[Plaintiffs] assert that their employer is liable under Title VII solely
because a supervisor preselected his paramour for a [promotion] even
though she was less qualified than either Plaintiff. Taking plaintiff's
allegations as true, we conclude that they do not state a claim for relief
under Title VII because they are based on a voluntary romantic affiliation,
and not on any gender differences. Plaintiffs were in the same position as
all men and all other women would have beenonly Ms. Preston was
considered for the promotion because of her special relationship with Mr.
Burnett. Favoritism, unfair treatment and unwise business decisions do
not violate Title VII unless based on a prohibited classification.
Because we decline to extent Title VII to include consensual romantic
involvements, we conclude that the promotion was not base[d] on a
prohibited classification.
Taken, 125 F.3d at 1370 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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This principle was affirmed in Parker v. Salazar, 431 F. Appx 697, 698-99 (10th
Cir. 2011). In Parker, the plaintiff alleged he was terminated for reporting that two
coworkers were flaunting their affair.
Id.
plaintiff reported was the type of sex discrimination that would support a retaliation
claim under Title VII, the Parker court noted that the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
disparate treatment of men and women. The court explained that Title VIIs reference
to sex means a class delineated by gender, rather than by sexual affiliations.
Therefore, to constitute protected activity, the reported discrimination must be genderrelated. Id. Because the plaintiff reported discrimination based on sexual affiliations
and not gender, he did not have a viable retaliation claim under Title VII.
The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed Taken in Clark v. Cache Valley Elec. Co.:
Mr. Clark presented no evidence that Cache Valley treated women more
favorably than men, and no circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination. Indeed, as the district court concluded, Mr. Clark merely
provided evidence that Mr. Perschon extended preferential treatment to one
female employee: Ms. Silver, a co-worker with whom Mr. Perschon
allegedly was having an affair or some other form of improper
relationship. Favoritism of a paramour is not gender discrimination.6
As the Tenth Circuit explained in Taken and Clark, favoritism of a paramour is
not gender discrimination, and a promotion based on such favoritism cannot serve as the
basis for a claim under Title VII. Consequently, DeLong did not engage in protected
activity and he has failed to state a claim for any kind of retaliation, whether based on
Title VII or some other generic basis. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.
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PROPOSITION III
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS
DELONGS SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
(DUE PROCESS, FREE SPEECH AND FREE ASSEMBLY)
The Court should dismiss DeLongs claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (found at
pages 11 and 13 of the Petition), because a state is not (and hence the Board and the
Department are not) persons for purposes of 1983; further, all three prongs of
DeLongs 1983 claim should be dismissed because (1) DeLong has no property
interest in his admittedly at-will employment and, thus, no due process rights; (2)
DeLong cannot state a claim for free speech since he was admittedly speaking pursuant
to his duties as an Investigator for the Department; and (3) DeLong has not alleged any
basis for a free assembly claim.
A.
The Department and The Board Are Not Liable Under Section 1983.
First, neither the Department nor the Board is a person who can be found liable
under 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding
that a State is not a person amenable to suit under 1983). The Tenth Circuit has
reiterated this holding on many occasions. See, e.g., Adams v. Neubauer, 195 F. Appx
711, 713 (10th Cir. 2006) (A state agency is not a person under 1983 and is immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.).
B.
at-will employee.
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Therefore, DeLong did not have a property interest in his position sufficient to trigger
due process protections, and his due process claim fails as a matter of law. Id. at 663.
C.
violations under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 2, Sections 3
(Free assembly) and 22 (Free speech), of the Oklahoma Constitution. None of these
provisions provides a legal basis for a 1983 cause of action under the facts alleged.
First, 1983 claims may not be based on violations of state constitutional rights.
Murphy v. Spring, 2013 WL 5172951, at *9 (N.D. Okla. 2013) (citing Rural Water Dist.
No. 1, Ellsworth Cnty., Kansas v. City of Wilson, Kansas, 243 F.3d 1263, 1275 (10th Cir.
2001)). Therefore, Sections 3 and 22 of Article 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution cannot
serve as a basis for DeLongs 1983 claims. And, as explained below, neither can the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
DeLong alleges two sub parts of his 1983 First Amendment claim: free speech
and freedom of association. Below are Plaintiffs factual allegations in support of
these claims (numerical references are paragraph numbers in Plaintiffs Petition):
34. No reason for given for Mr. DeLong's termination. In a letter received
from the attorney for ODMHSAS, the Department claimed that Mr. DeLong
attempted to intimidate a witness.
35. The alleged act of intimidation arose out of Mr. DeLong standing in the
back of the room at a training seminar where the "witness," who was an
employee of ODMHSAS, was putting on a training class.
36. The "witness" in question was on suspension from ODMHSAS because
another employee had had accused him of sexual harassment. On
information and belief, the "witness" was the only employee of ODMHSAS,
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statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
DeLong alleges that his duties as an investigator were to investigate misconduct,
not only within State Operated facilities, but also within management and staff of
ODMHSAS. See Petition at 18 (emphasis added). DeLong then alleges he was
terminated for speaking in connection within his official duties, i.e., investigating
misconduct in the Department. Consequently, DeLongs alleged speech falls outside the
ambit of First Amendment protection as a matter of law.
The Tenth Circuits opinion in Salazar v. City of Commerce City, 535 F. Appx
692, 699 (10th Cir. 2013) is instructive.
terminated from her position as Director of Economic Development because she spoke
out regarding discrimination against herself and others. The trial court ruled that the
plaintiffs complaints of discrimination failed to support a First Amendment claim
because her complaints were related to her position or to her own job performance. Id.
at 700. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Tenth Circuit explained that the
First Amendment does not protect a public employees speech if the speech reasonably
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contributes to or facilitates the employees performance of [an] official duty. Id. at 701
(quoting Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir.
2007)). Because the plaintiffs communications were made pursuant to her official
duties, she was not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. Id.
Likewise, in a similar factual context, an Inspector General for the City of Mount
Vernon, New York brought a 1983 claim, alleging the City violated his free-speech
rights when it fired him for reporting improper actions within certain City programs.
Stokes v. City of Mount Vernon, N.Y. 2012 WL 3536461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court
dismissed the claim, finding that, as Inspector General, reporting wrongdoing was his
official duty:
Here, there is no question plaintiff was not acting as a citizen when
performing his duties as Inspector General. According to the City Charter,
the Inspector General is empowered to investigate allegations of corruption,
fraud, criminal activity, or abuse by any Mount Vernon official or
employee and make public written reports of the investigations. Plaintiff's
[reports] were all issued pursuant to plaintiff's investigation . . ., which he
conducted in his capacity as Inspector General. Therefore, when he went
to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, plaintiff acted as a
government employee. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 422.
Stokes, 2012 WL 3536461, at *5 (emphasis added) (internal alterations omitted).
Under the holdings in Garcetti, Salazar, and Stokes, DeLong cannot base a First
Amendment claim on speech connected to his official duties. And Paragraph 63 of
DeLongs Petition makes the connection between his speech and his official duties
crystal clear:
Defendants . . . retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his right to free
speech under the 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the United States and Oklahoma
Constitutions. This retaliation occurred when he made statements on a
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PROPOSITION IV
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS DELONGS
NEGLIGENT TRAINING/SUPERVISION CLAIM
The Court should dismiss DeLongs negligent training/supervision claim (found at
page 15 of the Petition) because (a) it is unlikely the Oklahoma Supreme Court would
recognize such a claim in the context of alleged harm to a co-employee, (b) the claim is
based on discretionary activities for which there is immunity under the Governmental
Tort Claims Act and (c) the claim is nothing more than a formulaic recitation which
fails the pleading standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.
A.
DeLong Likely Does not Have a Cognizable Claim Under Oklahoma Law
Under Oklahoma law, a claim for negligent training/supervision against an
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The Department and The Board Are Immune under the Tort Claims Act.
The Department and Board are immunized from DeLongs negligence claim by
the discretionary function exemption of the GTCA. 51 O.S. 155(5). See Benedix,
2009 WL 975145, at *4 (Plaintiff's claim against the school district for negligence in his
hiring, supervision and retention is barred by the discretionary function exemption of
155(5).); Allen v. Justice Alma Wilson Seeworth Acad., Inc., 2012 WL 1298588, at *2
(W.D. Okla. 2012) (granting the defendants motion to dismiss after holding that
decisions involving the training, supervision, and retention of upper-level administrators
are the sort of discretionary decisions to which [Section 155(5)] appears to be directed).
C.
WL 3679539 (W.D. Okla. 2012), this Court was faced with a comparable situation to the
one presented in the case at bar: generic allegations of a negligent failure to train or
supervise but no plausible basis on which those claims were based. This Court found
the State of Oklahoma (sued as the University of Oklahoma) was not liable based on
immunity and based on the absence of plausible pleadings:
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negligence against the Board, the Department and the Commissioner for failing to
investigate alleged sexual harassment and misconduct which was shown, in Proposition
II of this Brief, to involve a matter not legally recognized as a violation of Title VII.
Even if there was conduct which was actionable, there are no facts showing the
Department or the Board (who are not tasked with responsibility for investigations)
were negligent. Moreover, Plaintiff does not claim the alleged negligent investigation
was the proximate cause of his termination; instead, he claims he was terminated for
speaking out about the investigation.
training/supervision claim must fall like a house of cards under the weight of even the
lightest legal scrutiny.
PROPOSITION V
THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS DELONGS
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM
Plaintiff advances a claim entitled Violation of Oklahoma Public Policy at page
15 of his Petition but interweaves threads of various causes of action in this claim,
ranging from due process to public policy to statutes to negligence:
83. Plaintiff . . . has a property interest in his job.
84. The actions of Defendants violate Oklahoma Public Policy and
Oklahoma Statutory law.
86. On November 1, 2011, 25 O.S. 1350 went into effect creating a
statutory remedy for employment-based discrimination and Mr. DeLong
has a claim against the Defendants under same.
87. As a result of the negligence of the Defendants, Mr. DeLong has
suffered damages . . . .
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Regardless of the wide ranging allegations, there simply is no Public Policy claim that
Plaintiff can assert here.
The only statute Plaintiff cites in support of this claim, Section 1350 of Title 25,
specifically abolishes common-law causes of action (like Plaintiffs Public Policy
claim). See 25 O.S. 1350(A) (A cause of action for employment-based discrimination
is hereby created and any common law remedies are hereby abolished.). Subsection
(B) of Section 1350 enumerates the protected categories for a statutory cause of action
for discriminationnone of which are alleged in Plaintiffs Petition:
In order to have standing in a court of law to allege discrimination arising
from an employment-related matter, in a cause of action against an
employer for discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, disability, genetic information with respect to the employee, or
retaliation, an aggrieved party must . . . .
If the Court were to give Plaintiffs Petition the most generous reading possible, it
might conclude he is attempting to assert a statutory claim for retaliation under Title
25, but he cannot assert a common law cause of action for public policy violation. As
the Oklahoma Supreme Court opined this year in MacDonald v Corporate Integris
Health, 321 P.3d 980, 985 (Okla. 2014):
Section 1350 became effective November 1, 2011, and was in effect on
May 4, 2012, the date of plaintiff's termination. This statute expressly
creates a cause of action for employment-based discrimination and
abolishes common law remedies for such wrong. In the place of common
law remedies for employment-based discrimination, section 1350
authorizes a court (1) to enjoin unlawful discrimination employment
practices, (2) to grant affirmative relief such as reinstatement, (3) to award
back pay, and (4) to award an additional amount for liquidated damages.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 20th day of January 2015, this Motion to Dismiss was filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, and that a true and
correct copy of said Motion to Dismiss was served, via ECF, upon the following:
Rachel L. Bussett, OBA #19769
Bussett Law Firm, PC
3555 N.W. 58th Street, Suite 1010
Oklahoma City, OK 73112
Telephone: (405) 605-8073
Facsimile: (405) 601-7765
rachel@bussettlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Jeremy Tubb, OBA #16739
Matthew S. Panach, OBA #22262
FULLER, TUBB, BICKFORD & KRAHL
201 Robert S. Kerr, Suite 1000
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
Telephone: (405) 235-2575
Facsimile: (405) 232-8384
jeremy.tubb@fullertubb.com
panach@fullertubb.com
Attorneys for Defendants
Terri White, Durand Crosby,
Cratus Dewayne Moore, and Ellen Buettner
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