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Author(s): P. J. Bicknell
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1967), pp. 1-5
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181789 .
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Refutation
Parmenides'
of Motionand an Implication
P. J. BICK NELL
It
26.
oair(p CxLvJy7ovLyckxwv
ae?cv
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e(TaLV aVMpXOV
e7re tyeVet
TiX
30.
&rwaMGTov,
oCTaCC
4McX' eTrXxXO7)aV,
XcOct 6)?SOpoC
7tratLq
a-0'1
o(vxEv
33.
8a
9 Ce,
[LLV Oap4 L
?c pyCeL,
8ezro
-0
yap
ou/ao a,
t)K
[I'J8eV.OV8?XLVELtzL U0ox pCa yap OUx
Et p&V y&p XeVeOViV, u'7reX)PCL &V 4g T0 XeVOV' XeVO5 8?
9XCL 6Xnf U'pY
cxv
v
atv.
EOVTO4 ox
a5eL.
C.
In a fairly recent article G. S. Kirk and Michael C. Stokes jointly
maintained' that Parmenides rejected local motion on ontological
grounds alone. The main support for this view was derived from
fragment 8 lines 26-30. The co-authors took it that lines 29 and 30
guaranteed that CXLvTqovin line 26 covered locomotion as well as
'starting and stopping'. In their view, the invalidity of both species
of motion is deduced from Parmenides' previously argued2 interdiction
of coming-to-be and passing-away. Motion is a kind of change, and all
change involves these illegitimate concepts.
For Kirk (although not for Stokes)3 an important consequence of
this is that Parmenides did not employ the physical argument against
motion based upon the impossibility of void; this argument was added
by Melissus (fragment 7.7). In Kirk's view this affords further support
for the fairly common view4 that Melissus was the true precursor of the
atomic theory of Leucippus. Leucippus, he argues, reacted to an
argument against motion put forward not by Parmenides but by
Melissus.
I believe that the interpretation placed upon the Parmenidean lines,
and therefore the deduction about Melissus and atomism which is
based on it are false. Lines 26-33 do not, surely, contain an omnibus
ontological disproof of two varieties of motion, followed by an argument
concerned only with the limitedness of so owv,as Kirk would presumably
maintain, but two arguments each concerned with a different type of
motion. Lines 26-28 reject alteration, or passing from one quality to
another, which certainly does fall within genesis and phthora, while
lines 29-33 constitute an entirely separate disproof of locomotion. This
is confirmed by fragment 8 lines 36-41, which sum up the results of
I G. S. Kirk and Michael C. Stokes, 'Parmenides' Refutation of Motion', Phronesis
5 (1960) pp. 1-4.
2 DK.28.B.8. 5ff.
3 Kirk and Stokes, op. cit., p. 4 note 4.
4 For Melissean influence on atomism see most recently D. McKibbon, 'Melissus
and the Atomists', Mnemosyne 17 (1964) pp. 248-255. For an explicitly contrary
view, see H. Diller, 'Die Philosophiegeschichtliche Stellung des Diogenes von
Apollonia', Hermes 76 (1941) pp. 359-381. The importance of early Eleaticism
for atomism is implicit in K. von Fritz, Philosophie und Sprachlicher Ausdruck
bei Demokrit, Platon und Aristoteles, New York, Stechert, 1938. C. Mugler's
('L'isonomie des atomistes' R. Ph. 30 (1956) pp. 231-50) emphasis on the
atomistic invocation (Simplicius Phys. 28.10 and 25) of Parmenides' 'Principe
d'indifference' (DK.28.B.8.9-10; 22ff.; 44ff.) has similar implications.
the way of Truth so far. According to line 41 it has been proved both
that change of bright colour is impossible (the most conspicuous
example of qualitative change) and that change of position cannot
occur. If lines 26-28 were an ontological disproof of locomotion as well
as alteration, so that lines 29-33 constituted an argument in its own
right for the peiras of what is, rather than a sub-proof, then the
summary must surely have included a referenceto the proof of peiras,
as to all the other proofs. The fact is that until line 33 Parmenides is
concerned purely with denying certain attributes to what-is, that is
with a negative part of the way of Truth. Peiras and its implications
are only dealt on their own account in the constructive, positive part
of the way of Truth (fragment8 lines 42-49) which is only commenced
when the negative part has been carefully summarised.
The argument of lines 29-33 can be paraphrasedas follows. What-is
could only change its position if there were vacancies into which it
could move. If, however, there were such vacancies then what-is
would be incomplete. But what-is could not be incomplete for if it
were then it would fall short of completeness by what is not (literally,
'what is not would be lacking from the whole'), and what is not is
inconceivable and unutterable.
Simplicius (Phys. 40.7-9) constructed the last line somewhat
6v, cynatv,eva
differently and paraphrasedas follows: ; yap To tq%
7nThv
?cv,
O1 GT)
SL
eXeLVOU 8at O XltVeOC
*
rO OV av6v8Md
'voV
O'CppX
xoc"t 'rXeLOV.
rG%8 XLVOU)LeVOV CVaeiq
xwveZrat.Ultimately both explanations
UO7tOXYWP 'aeL
T'0 0V
X V0V ae npoxnkoet;
8e
words.
Although, then, Parmenides, unlike Melissus, does not use the term
xevOv, his interdiction of locomotion is hardly less 'physical' than that
7raV,
xoci 7CS?pSOCC
yoxp eV xOCL &xLVTnTOVXOCL&y6v-yTov
OV pLYae\ (eYCWV C
XOCL To Vn
@pOU"VT@V OUTo4
VOQV TCOLOUVrCOV
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