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Structural Engineering
Forensic Engineering: Structural Evaluation and Retrofitting of Structures
CE 72.62
Instructor: Dr. Thanakorn Pheeraphan
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Overview
Background
Objectives
Problem
Design and Construction
Investigation
Causes of Failure
Prevention of the Failure
Conclusion
Lessons Learned
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Background
The Harbour Cay Condominium, a 5 story flat-plate reinforcement
building, was under construction at Cocoa Beach, Florida.
LOCATION
Objectives
To determine what causes the failure.
To suggest a way to prevent this type of failure.
Problem
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Construction Rate 1 floor per week (with each floor cast in two halvestwo days apart)
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Legend
Killed in collapse
o Surviving Workers
Investigation
( NBS)
Site Investigation
Slab had broken away from the column at the slab column
interfaces, so the failure node appeared to be a punching shear
failure type.
There was no evidence of overturning.
Measurement of outside dimension of column and slab section
indicated conformity with structural drawing.
Some columns in first story did not meet
the clear spacing requirement of ACI Code.
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Laboratory Investigations
Property
Description
Remarks
Quantities of ingredients
Insufficient documentation
o.k.
Reinforcing steel
Grade 60
o.k.
Cement Content
o.k.
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Structural Analysis
At the time of collapse, gravity loads were only significant.
Finite Element Analysis for response measurement.
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Causes of Failure
Collapse of Harbour Cay Condominium (NBS findings)
Design errors + Construction errors
Design Errors
Slab thickness = 8 in.
Minimum slab thickness required by ACI code to resist punching
shear for the given loads, spans, and column sizes= 11 in.
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After the collapse, many of the columns remained standing with the
floor slabs stacked on top of each other on the ground. This showed
further strong evidence of a punching shear failure.
Standing
Columns
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A punching shear failure happens when the concrete floor slab cracks
and breaks away from its column connection.
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Vc = 4((fc)^(1/2))(b0)(d)
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The structural engineer was a retired NASA engineer who hired another
retired NASA engineer to perform the calculations.
Overall, design errors included:
There were no calculations for deflection or minimum thickness provisions.
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Construction Errors
The top reinforcement steel was placed too low, which reduced the
effective slab depth and hence the punching shear capacity of the slab.
The top reinforcement bars were placed on chairs that were only 4 high,
which reduced the effective slab depth d from 6.3 in. to 5.3 in. Hence, the
top cover was increased to 1 5/8 whereas it was designed to be .
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Bottom slab bars were not placed through many columns and that the
slabs broke away from the columns where the slabs and columns meet.
In addition, some vertical reinforcement was found to have been severely
bent during fabrication.
Also
Many workers stated that, The spider-web-type cracks were noticed
once the flying forms were removed.
Most cracks were located near mid spans and around columns, and
some were said to have extended 4 to 5 inches into the floor slabs.
Excessive deflections were reported once the forms were removed. A
1 (44 mm) deflection was noted and the structural engineer was
requested to recheck the design, which he did, reporting back that it
was O.K.
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Workers also noted that some of the concrete from the on-site batch
plant had a non-uniform consistency and was difficult to finish .
One worker stated, Twenty-two years Ive been pouring concrete
and theyve never pulled the forms in two days like they did here.
They usually set there for a week or 10 days.
Shores and reshores initially supported the dead loads of the
structure and transferred the loads to the ground. Once the reshores
below the first floor level were removed, the concrete slabs were
forced to carry the weight of the structure through their punching
shear capacity at the columns.
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In addition,
Paying attention to warning signs of a potential collapse is critical. All
work on the building should have stopped after the excessive
deflections and spider-web-type cracks had formed. Instead, work on
the building continued without properly addressing these obvious signs
of possible failure.
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Conclusion
The Harbour Cay Condominium collapse due to both improper design
and construction procedures.
A punching shear failure on the fifth floor initiated a progressive
collapse of the entire structure.
Punching shear calculations were omitted by the structural engineer
when the structure was designed.
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Reinforcement bars were placed too low in the concrete slabs, which
reduced the effective depth of the slabs and hence reduced the
overall strength of the slabs as well.
Warning signs of a potential failure were brought to the attention of
supervisors and the structural engineer but were basically ignored.
The Harbour Cay disaster could have easily been prevented had
simple design checks and careful construction techniques been
performed.
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Lessons Learned
Punching shear strength must be checked when designing flat slabs, for
punching shear is the most common mode of failure for concrete flat slabs.
Minimum depth of a flat slab much be checked to account for deflection
and strength requirements.
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References
1. Delatte, Norbert J. Beyond Failure: Forensic Case Studies for Civil
Engineers, ASCE Press, 2009, p. 149-155.
2. Feld, Jacob and Kenneth Carper, K. Construction Failure. 2nd Ed., John
Wiley &Sons, New York, N. Y., 1997, p. 271-274.
3. Kaminetzky, D. Design and Construction Failures: Lessons from Forensic
Investigations. McGraw-Hill, New York, N. Y., 1991, p. 72-78.
4. Lew, H. S. et al. Investigation of Construction Failure of Harbour Cay
Condominium in Cocoa Beach, Florida. Rep., U.S. Dept. of Comm., Nat.
Bureau of Standards, S/N 003-003-02405-8, Washington, D. C., 1982
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Thank You.
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