1

1.

In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, Etc. 92 SCRA 1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES.
JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K.
TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE
LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS
ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip,
who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names
of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or
the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the
relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics
of a "trade name." 3

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3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries
in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law
firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased
partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including
in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957,
stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce
Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the
continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their
firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view
of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and
the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception.
Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

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A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of
living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.
In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name
under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be
held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus,
Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and
heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division are not lawyers
and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. "
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the
death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names of
deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will
have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first
factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding
Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which
continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part thereof.
What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers.
9
t.hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the
members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be
distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and

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reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or
for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the
use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice
of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession,
(The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of
men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, no less
a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in
support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom
but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom,
Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history

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of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom
this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety
of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the
familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased partner's
name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm
name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because
the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and
was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory
provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the
American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as
follows: "The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local custom. Many
firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department
has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use
of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners.
18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence
of such statute. Not so with the latter.

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Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the
Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which
no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law
which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not be
considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A
trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial
to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self
assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely
competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's
good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not
regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the
farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians'
strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for
a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession
even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the
profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of
justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely, organization
and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that
spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal
and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP"
and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the
contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned,

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and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last
sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their
petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm
which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on
May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in
1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an
institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the
continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons
of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is
to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law
firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year
when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being of the
contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned,

8
and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last
sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their
petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm
which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta &
Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm
name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on
May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in
1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an
institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the
continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons
of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is
to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to
benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That
is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law
firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross,
Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year
when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.

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2.

Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect
of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:

10
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate.
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of

11
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
[1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who
are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the
clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies
and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

12
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work.
And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority
of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in

13
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the
public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose
concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench
and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of
law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon.
I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine
can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of

14
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at
the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate
legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In
short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in
the running of the business.

15
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while
the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and
the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the
nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of
seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

16
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both
to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and
risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's

17
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he
feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former CoChairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use
of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and

18
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper
No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when
the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They
carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo,
"The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

19
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. .
. . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two
or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

20
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For
one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.

21
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of
what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

22
3. Geeslin v. Navarro, 185 SCRA 230

Lll
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990

E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R. RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pea & Marcos for complainants in AC No. 2033.
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.

PER CURIAM:
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R.
Rodriguez in Administrative Case No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in
Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for
malpractice and gross misconduct.
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the Office
of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law during the pendency of these cases. 3
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our resolutions of February 14, 1975
and September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With
commendable thoroughness and attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly
portray the scope and magnitude of respondent's operations and how he was able to perpetrate the
anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are sustained by
the evidence of record.

23
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally stemmed from the letter of
a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975
which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots on
installment basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision
as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a "Contract of
Sale".
Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company
claim that although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree
No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is almost won in their favor
and are just waiting for your final decision within a couple of months or
even less.
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring
to your attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the event that
any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated February 14,
1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the Solicitor General for "investigation
of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for
suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action." The
resolution reads as follows:
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975 of
Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been
furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for respondents) and
RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of
the cases at bar.
It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling
the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the public (among
them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this contract of legal
services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of Sale), which lots
are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in Atty. Navarro's name
and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that 'the case is
almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's letter), the Court
RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's said letter with its
attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1, 3, 4
and 5 for investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed

24
with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record
is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or
removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate action.
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to
communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the law
firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg.
Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, 1974 on file in
Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available documents
in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of
properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling
price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6 million.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking him to submit his affidavit
embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated
January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr.
Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for the reason that the
addressee had moved to another address.
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to
Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing the
sales made by respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in L-39386 and L39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) referring the
letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the
existence of sufficient grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for
suspension or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr. Ortigas,
Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said letter
and all its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme Court as
selling properties titled in the name of this Company.
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro showing
that the lots he is now selling to the public include those titled in the
names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal and this Company in
Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his activities despite
recent detention by the Military. As could be seen from the attached
"plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property (actually
titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by
Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains Road and R.
Rodriguez Avenue, comprising approximately of 260 hectares.

25
As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be the
owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in
virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in
Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer.
He contends that whereas his squatters-clients occupy only about a
hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with
them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are allegedly0
covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell these
properties.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover
properties already with buildings and other improvements. He has
nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when
he sold lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country
Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this
Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas,
copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is
now again openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have
provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the
Solicitor General and we hope that formal administrative charges can
now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further perpetrating a
large scale fraud upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most of which were
presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and in the various civil cases before the said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. Complainants' sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various
documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a certain Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for short) filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2
hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two
(22) families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to Judge Emilio
Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge Pedro Navarro. All the
twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On
behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged
nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which it emanated
actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which he
claims to be non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven (11) cases,
Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the
HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction of the defendants-squatters clients of
respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as
follows:

26
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this
Court finds that most of the documentary evidence submitted by
defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants
claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of the
property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters.
This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants
are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the
issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the one-year period
from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it
becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43
Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791;
Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G., p. 2186, April
15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53 O.G., p. 2822,
May 15, 1957).
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by
adverse possession is without merit considering that title to land
becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp.
Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot be
defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession. Registered
title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription. The
title, once registered, is notice to the World. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil.
590, 595).
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property in
question when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite & Housing
Corporation wherein they sought the latter's intervention for the
acquisition of the property and for the subdividing thereof into small lots
to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition defendants not only
named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but they also
indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. We quote hereunder the
pertinent facts and data concerning the property in question in
defendants' petition submitted to the General Manager of the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa,
Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043

27
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh
G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of
the opinion that defendants cannot assail the validity of said title in this
proceeding, which is for recovery of possession. Any attack on the
decree of registration of title must be direct and not by collateral
proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of said decree
cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a
collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). In the
case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951,
our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial court where the
registered owner was considered disqualified to acquire land under the
Constitution and consequently was denied the right to constitute his title,
said: "That the disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in the
light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collateraly attacked. That
issue can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for that
purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November 23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No.
L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964,
Feb. 29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our
opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons claimed
by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in the name of
plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322,
8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages
6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in favor of the
defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In his decision dated May 26,
1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge Navarro stated as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing
an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna,
Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which
is covered by, and more particularly described in, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the
sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the
Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City
against several persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered in
favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these
decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit before this
Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a partydefendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made part of
the evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven cases for
whatever the same may be worth as aid in the determination of the
merits of the issues raised herein.

28
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein
assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious
and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was
based as also null and void. The Court sustained the herein plaintiffs
claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO
Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all
original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4)
all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of title
declared void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate
of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5)
that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the
herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed
findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored.
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings
leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and, as an
inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue of such
void proceedings as well as the original certificates of title issued as
consequence thereof.
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things,
found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on
April 25, 1905, the survey of the property subject matter of therein
application was not made until June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some one
year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the
application for registration being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey of
the property was not made until a year after the rendition of the judgment
the technical descriptions appearing in the original certificates of title
issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425, could not have been
those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if any. Publication of
accurate technical description being an essential jurisdictional
requirement which cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with
this requirement renders the proceedings and the decision and decree
and titles issued arising therefrom null and void.
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross
who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917, never
was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the time the decision
was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official for the year 1905
does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land
Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity.
Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of
Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he signed
it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed decision in that
proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since the decree
which was supposedly issued by a person who was not the Clerk of
Court at the time and which decree did not contain the description of the

29
property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the survey of
the property was only made some one year later and that said decree
cannot now even be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack
of jurisdiction.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too ponderous
to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original certificate of title
cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of title and a void
judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and cannot give source to
any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in the
herein eleven cases in which their properties are also involved. Since the
case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings by
virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over
the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a
derivative from such decree, it is the considered opinion of this Court that
until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set
aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven
defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they
occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become
premature. It goes without saying that if said decision of Branch XV will
be finally affirmed, or that the same becomes final and executory, all the
claims of rights to ownership and possession of properties embraced in
the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become
absolute nullities. Possessions by actual occupants of all these
properties had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil Case
No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil
Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and
8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO,
issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over her property in question and directing
the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321,
8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with
costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of Deeds of
Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of the
defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of Attorney
Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the "Kasunduan Hinggil
sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for
clarification and/or modification of the decision.
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).

30
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order,
and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that
its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch
XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs
title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said
decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in
their possessions of the land.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new trial
was set only for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.
The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now under
review by order of our Appellate Court.
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June
21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also
adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities like the
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein,
because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO
917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and Company, Limited
Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever
orders or decisions are made in this case cannot be made to affect the
said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June
21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision
of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside.
However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the
ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the defendants-clients of
respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of
June 21, 1971 was not appealed by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the decision rendered
by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent
NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

31
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY
OUR SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND
LATIFUNDIO COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG,
MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26,
1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND
ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS
AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is
considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with
a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in
support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor
may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign
ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the
final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion
necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing
Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil
Code)
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED
PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER
THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF
LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR
REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH FOR:
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of
property. One of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of
property acquires not only that which it produces but that which it united
to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or sown on
the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon,
belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter, builder or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view
of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and
equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper
rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option
because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he
is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing." Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia
Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).

32
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are
ready to ask for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a
scire facias Ordinary prudence requires that those involved may please
make some kind of arrangements with the undersigned before execution
by calling through the following telephones:
xxx xxx xxx
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF
OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE
PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG,
MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY,
SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO.
61 AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG,
RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH
CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties originally covered by
Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot buyers of
ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were derived from Decree No.
1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners,
ORTIGAS caused the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the
following:
WARNING
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila
Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all original
certificates of title and transfer certificates of title derived from Decree
No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership wishes to announce
that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by
the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES
DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY
AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.
The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands
and/or rights to lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership.

33
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements
and/or persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership on such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is claimed
to be "final and executory."
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO filed with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2) complaints for libel against the officers of
ORTIGAS and the officials of the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought
to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his failure to
consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the above notice. In
support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in
his various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by
ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel
for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the libel cases, the
complainants also presented documents relating to Civil Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin ORTIGAS from
ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1)
there was no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no
survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct
Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said Court was also
fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
declares and/or orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant
to the judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 were
utter nullities;
4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates
of title declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but not exclusively,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, were and are null
and void;

34
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are
the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being as indicated in
Exhibit P;
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the
plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective
landholdings;
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court,
Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II,
City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company,
Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and any and all
persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and
perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases
Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by
the herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;
8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the
suit; and
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On November 21, 1971,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and
ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence. The
case was then remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A.
Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from the service by the
President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente 917 and all titles
emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant Company:

35
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from the time of the
filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender
the possession thereof to defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons
acting in their behalf, who are found to be in possession of defendant company's land to
vacate the same and remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs
expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in the amount of P
1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant company, with interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the approval of the record
on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment. After exchange
of pleadings by the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Ortigas upon filing a bond in
the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order. Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who
was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for
reconsideration and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order
of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid
case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the
respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set
aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate
execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the respondent judge to
fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the petitioner's
bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of execution. The
restraining order issued at the inception of this action is hereby (sic)
permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by respondents Del Rosario, et
al., but the same was denied. So also with the motion for reconsideration filed with the
Supreme Court (Annex "A" of Exhibit FF)

36
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties, ORTIGAS also
filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI,
entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of
Ortigas as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in
claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees.
This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and value of the
property involved and the nature of the case.
Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a result
of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in the
amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.
Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this court
can only treat it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages.
Under the same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs
claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages
he had suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed
for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining order was
proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim for damages.
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition
and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the most from
defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all probability are
middle class people who themselves wanted to make money out of the
apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the plaintiff.
It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of the
NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in
life.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer
Certificates of Title over the land in question;
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the
defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or
persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally,
or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from asserting any
claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over the said
property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and

37
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
No. L-53125-R.
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid
case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal (G.R. No. L-50156).
Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Consequently, the issue brought forth in the sala of
Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. His
testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez,
one of the complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of
Lands. His documentary evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present charges are the
same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154, entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro, respondent", which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation. He further declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said
administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is terminated.
Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the identification
of his Exhibits 1 to 9.
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the counsel for the
defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio
Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands not
occupied by his clients by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 7678, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for legal services,
which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as follows:
KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA
KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT
MAKARATING
Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa
serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa
lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425)
sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917,
etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain defunct Court of
Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na
siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim
(26) ng mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig

38
at nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa
kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang bisa
at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324, 340) dahil sa
kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa mula't
sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at
ibang mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang
nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang
hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting the
genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct Court
of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na
sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o
mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at
mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila nang
pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang
paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa
mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-ininterest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang maigawad ang
mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain kailanmay di naging
pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang
may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa mga nabanggit ng mga
pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di
lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang
karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang
aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na
kinakailangan upang ang nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin
ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242;
Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45
Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga
nag-aangkin ng mga lupain at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay
na ito upang ang Hukuman magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo
sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng
Rule 39 ng Rules of Court. Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay
ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari
nito ng makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito
man ay walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina
at sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na
maaring nasa bagay na iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi
nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa
tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na
walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat
na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan sapagkat ang
lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa pamamagitan ng
pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang hadlang
na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi
makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).'
Hindi maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa
pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang lupain
o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang huwad na titulo upang
masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi ito maaring maganap
sapagkat ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi maaring maging batayan ng
panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili
sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng bumili ng karampatang halaga ng

39
lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, 439). Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na
sila ay 'constructive trustees, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampasbisa (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244249). Subali't dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng
mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang
naganap na pangyayari ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di naman ito
naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng
rentas o alkila at ang ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay
sila ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425
(Decree No. 1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga
ng gawa-gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit
kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40)
milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa buong
bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan sapagkat sakop
ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang bahagi ng
Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon,
kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng
Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng
Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng
Commonwealth Act No. 502 na pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at
sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey
nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng San Juan patungong
dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging
matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa
patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng
Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog
Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina
at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang
sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw hanggang sa
pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog
ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybaysukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino mang may sapat ng
kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo ng ni isa man lamang
maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba
ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang
Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung
kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak
at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng mga
makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa
paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man
niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming minana o
pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't ipinaubaya na namin kay
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang
serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng
kasunduang ito maliban na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais
naming mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at
sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang halaga sa
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng
kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na magaganap sa pagpapatitulo ng
aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala sa mga gastos o kabayaran ay si

40
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat
(survey) ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga
sukat upang mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands),
paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha
ng mga katibayan ng pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado
(filing fees), pagpapatala (registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan
(documentation), pagsalin ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay
(certifications) at iba pang mga kinakailangang bayaran at
pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na
pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang
nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay na hangarin ay ang
mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa
aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling
iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa pamamagitan ng
kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian o nabibigkisan ng
kasunduang ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu't Limang Piso
(P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming
pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado ay aming magiging paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito
ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang
dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro
kuwadrado ay aming babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng
lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang
ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa
halagang natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigaypalugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang
kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasangayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang isangla ang
aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad at pinagtibay
ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad sa mga
paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang ang
natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o
tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat
metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang naayon sa batas. Sumasangayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming nakalagda
sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng paunanghalaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't metro kuwadrado ay
bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa
bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o dalawampung (20) taon sangayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng lupain ay
ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin nito kung mababayaran
na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama na
ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito ngunit kinakailangan
magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang
panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan (monthly installment
condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung matutupad ng buong
katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly
installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00)
hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawat buwan nang naayon sa
laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas.
Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na
habang panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at

41
tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito
sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod
sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA
KASUNDUANG ITO
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng
isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang manananggol
na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay mapagkalooban ng Hukuman ng
titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang
isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga
pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming
kani-kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at
petsa na kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay sa
aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng
napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that he has sold, and
is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the names of ORTIGAS & CO.,
Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles of said parties are null and void
because they emanated from Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the properties
sold by him except the contract of legal services which his clients allegedly signed; that
he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he
has not obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the National Housing
Authority; that he has not declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of
prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina, allegedly
owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly attacking the title of ORTIGAS
and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the "25-Billion-peso-case"
before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XVI, Quezon City"; that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig,
Marikina and Quezon City including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n.,
July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the Ortigas Transfer
Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said
title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming that
the said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed. (pp. 33-34, t.s.n.,
Sept. 9, 1977). 4
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as
complainant, praying that respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to lift the order of suspension. 5
Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension . 6 Respondent Navarro
reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a resolution dated September 2, 1980,
this Court denied the motion to lift the order of suspension. 8

42
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex parte motion praying for the lifting of the
order of suspension 9 which was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his prayer
in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of
January 22, 1981. 12
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the
spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent
Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's
Oath. Said letter was thereafter referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now
Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss
on June 29, 1979. 15 The corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the
case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its report, with the following findings
and recommendation:
CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged respondent with deceit,
malpractice and gross conduct in office, and blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for
having deliberately misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for the
defendants in the following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land subject of the cases
mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is
in the name of one Leopoldo Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the final
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q-18221
entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring
the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru
falsification; and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the
reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in said case
are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C", respectively.
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our clients' title was
rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our
clients' title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary succession from the late
Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership therefore of our clients
is protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student,
knows that the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers
cases where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr. Navarro is
either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for
facts, the law of the land and for the Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title covering the land
subject of the above cases had been declared null and void in the "final and executory"
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the
title of the case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious reason that the case
he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-42709) is still
pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be "final and executory."

43
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases heretofore
enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court and hence the
court has no jurisdiction. Further, that title thereto having described the land to be part of
the Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge however
of the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part
of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when the latter was
created on 14 June 1950. In the light of this fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false
and malicious.
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic norms of honesty and
decency in that having prejudiced the interest of his clients because of his gross neglect
to appeal in a timely manner from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong
remedy, in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing
a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva Genovea The case is obviously calculated to harrass
and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his
respect for the law and the courts.
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not stop before the City
Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the petition he filed before the Honorable
Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs.
Hon. Minerva Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's
Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E", respectively. (pp. 2-4,
Record)
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned respondent was
never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the
complaint is clearly intended to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in
defending his clients' cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.
Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.)
still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow complainants to harass
respondent while the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is an act in contempt of
court for which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al. gave his
entire devotion to the interest of his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
their rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for his
clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the
complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the several clients of the
undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent's
Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the Complaint,
respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are
citizens of the United States of America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on
December 31, 1970 by TCT No. 180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco

44
both of which TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings before
the City Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz
and twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon.
Minerva C. Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the defendants Victorino
Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20) other defendants did his bounden duty in
defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law
allows that at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts as stated
above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must have been resorted
to by the complainants at the instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat
the defendants of their God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other
conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the respondent is 'pure'
harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor General, the parties
agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of the case. Hence, they were granted a
period of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so
desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in fact admitted
during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the Solicitor General that there is no
dispute as to the facts of this case, it follows that the specifications of the charges against
him, which are duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire devotion to the
interest of his clients" and that he "did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
exerted his utmost learning and ability.
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the misrepresentations
specified by complainants, as quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION
Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148 entitled Ortigas vs.
Navarro and has been suspended from the practice of law since May 5, 1980. His
suspension is still in effect.
The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro be
likewise suspended from the practice of law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19

45
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as respondent Navarro failed to deny the
material allegations in the complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative Case No. 2148 are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the
consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or
disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated
March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled
"Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379,
8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."
Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land (including those of Ortigas
& Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of
Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject
properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in
Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal
directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No.
1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof. These
original certificates of title include the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
and Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over
said Branch XV rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals which
set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973, Judge
Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming the validity of Decree No.
1425 and all titles emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the Court of Appeals
when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming in toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory on
May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are concerned. The plaintiffsappellants Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari
which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The denial became final and executory on April 10,
1985. Thereafter, the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339)
became the basis of the decision rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which
dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent Navarro.
However, Judge Navarro in his decision categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court
that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or set aside by final judgment,
plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which
they occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become premature." This condition was
reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:

46
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate that its decision in
this case was mainly predicated on the decision of Branch XV of this Court that the
certificate of title emanating from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and
void and plaintiffs title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said
decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in their possessions
of the land. 21
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set aside by the Court of Appeals
which remanded the case for new trial and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on
November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a consequence
thereof. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the
March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed the former decision to
the Court of Appeals. In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to invoke the
decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the name of
the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the
contract for his legal services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated September
15, 1972, which provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of June 21, 1971,
sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 in favor of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other
persons and entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a
party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO
917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, derives
titles over wide tracts of land. Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a
party in this case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be made to
affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June 21, 1971, must be
reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of Branch XV is now being the
subject of further proceedings and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the
interest of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside. However, the
decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants
of the land as stated in the decision stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set aside, the inescapable conclusion
is that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title
of Haberer. And, since respondent Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere
transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of the above properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his clients, the
defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property
covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract was executed pursuant to the
ejectment cases filed against respondent Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or
less. It appears that the defendants assigned rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did
not actually occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued under

47
Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any
document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to their lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that respondent's pretended ownership rights over
the parcels of land covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it
is an assault on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and
misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on the degree of integrity and
respectability required and expected of the law profession. There is no denying that membership in the
legal profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability
the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that
the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual
standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed
an officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been judiciously stated by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Supreme Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be
lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should
be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion, ought to be
exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not
meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect
the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 25 Its objectives are to
compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney. 26
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges until the contrary is
proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 27
Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. 29
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these two administrative cases and we
cannot but find that strong and unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the
ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal services, executed by his clients
whom he represented in the twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court
of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches of the trial court made no finding
as to the validity of the claim of ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge
Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the
premises.

48
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was dismissed merely on the ground that
"since the evidence is uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of their respective parcels dating back since their predecessors in
interest, their possession must be maintained and respected. 30
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and
the Register of Deeds was thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of
plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of
herein respondent in accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set aside in the order of September 15,
1972, "because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership,
which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May 26, 1971 insofar as it denied the
ejectment of the present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the defendants in the ejectment cases were
declared the true owners of the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled upon,
and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants' right of possession. They, therefore, never
become the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration to that
effect, by reason of which they could not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to
herein respondent. Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on their part was
finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the
trial court correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the rights of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said court specifically excluded the title of said partnership
from the effects of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients agreed to convey to
respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the
attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants
except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more. That respondent
acquired no better right than the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further
confirmed in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new certificates of
title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the
defendants therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably
illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the puerile theory that his title is his contract
of legal services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely premised
on the award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication,
respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception. Furthermore, it will be recalled that the
land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is claiming
ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling, up to the present, the entirety of
the land covered by Decree No. 1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as the titles
derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro recognizing the defendants' right
of possession is subject to the final outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified
Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was
pending appeal. This is precisely the reason why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time
by setting aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the defendants. He could not properly
rule on the ownership rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said

49
decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of possession. Besides, a mere declaration of
nullity cannot, per se justify the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name of other
persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970
has been reversed and set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425,
which latter decision has long become final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs. Navarro," herein respondent
was enjoined from selling, offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have
seen that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name
of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after respondent's petition for
review was denied by this Court. However, respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in
blatant disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by respondent himself during the
investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the pendency of the appeal
therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions
of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal
transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz declaring as null and
void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No. 1425 was reversed and set aside.
He knew that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas
& Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of
the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates
of title of Ortigas & Company. Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness
thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the name of
Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his
suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other things that the
complaint against respondent could not prosper if respondent's manifestation dated
March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. L-42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief
Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed dismissed
pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are granted, are NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's typical distortion of facts. On the
contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly
denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of respondent Navarro from the
practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same. Thus, the records of
this Court disclose that in G.R. No. L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a
Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private respondents therein questioned herein
respondent Navarro's personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to which
respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R.
No. 85973, entitled "Hilario Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on

50
December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as counsel for
therein petitioner. Said petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over his expostulation that his
suspension had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to
enforce the same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said
respondent for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent Navarro appeared before the Court as
counsel for petitioners therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and
decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on
January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said cases show that he also
appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original
records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also appeared before the
different courts a quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and
illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has proven
himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his
deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent. This resolution is
immediately executory.

51
4. Marcelo v. Court of Appeals , 242 SCRA 352
Dfd
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129296

September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about September 25,
1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture
seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs
maybe (sic) manufactured or derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated and cultured shall
be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer
about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya.3 The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R.
Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify
the report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot
said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." 4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the
site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant

52
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven
(7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. 5 PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were
his.6 The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. 7 The police took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.8 Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090
kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis.9 Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana.10 She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She
found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed inside a white
sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the
land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block
B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. 12 This lot was part of the
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of
Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock A.M., September 25,
1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not
know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." 14 This unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. 15 Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew
anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at
him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning
the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot
five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing next to a
bundle of uprooted marijuana plants.18 The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the
way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua,
who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities,
threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." 19 At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. 20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of his kaingin, the
nearest house being 100 meters away.21 The latter house belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the
barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located
between his house and Carlito Pascua's.22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut appellant's claim
that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating.23 Tipay presented a sketch he made,24 which
showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest
neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250
meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied
him when he made the measurements.26 He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner or

53
planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and the proximity of appellant's
hut to the location of said plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation and ownership of
marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana plants punishable
under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal
injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7)
MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL
SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND
WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA. 29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than
ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling
of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the
protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places.

54
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search
made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in
an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately
spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the
police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view"
doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a
verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view
of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the
area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search
warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence
which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no
search warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial
warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.32 Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day
to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a
judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We
need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under
specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.34 The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was
arrested without a warrant.36 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot
the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.37 Clearly, their discovery
of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area,
they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. 38 Patently, the seized marijuana
plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

55
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot,
appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the
State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.39 The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" 40 of the
individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are
persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead
to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his
home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street
as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used
as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove
appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must
now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that
appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following
observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the
absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification;
under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the
constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any
counsel."42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against
him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to
have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers
was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant
theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have
assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants.
Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported
voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel
during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial
investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and
independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive for
the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 43 An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e.,
when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.44 The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a

56
person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives
the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.45
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the
location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was
supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter
was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. 46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we
just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking
him..."47 In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At
this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been
arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed
policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest him.50 From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had
already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even
before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be
admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. 51 The records
show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an
accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his
formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence,
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. 54
The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, 55 it must likewise be
credible and competent.56 Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence, in turn, is
evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." 58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense
charged.1wphi1 These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of
ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to
link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted
both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is
doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted
without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or
the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be
utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police during
investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made
without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession

57
cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a
criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of
the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved..."59 To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of
evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on
its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. 60 Absent the required
degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking
appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible
"for any purpose in any proceeding." 62 Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled investigation be
used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him." 63 Without these proffered but proscribed
materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence
necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his
acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring
his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what
the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law." 64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

58
5.

In re: Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14

Dfd
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of
office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special

59
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which
we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice
comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed
to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to

60
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and
it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications
in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance
so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the
practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The
possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the
public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes
the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that
his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his
community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be

61
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding,
and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission
upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at
the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of
the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

62
6.

Fernandez v. Benjamin Grecia, June 17, 1993

Dfd
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES
MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors
Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center
(hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The respondent is
charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical
chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors
and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re Almacen, 31
SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his
immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business
firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro
and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his promise
to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he

63
was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice. Apparently, the
earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are Judge
Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St. Luke's
Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with
vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a
cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild preeclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was
discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27, 1990,
she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his three (3)
minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of his
wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled: "Attorney Damaso B.
Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles
Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another hearing of
the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs.
Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records. The
respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple
the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately returned the folder to Mrs.
Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered Sandico to
follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man
(presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car). When the man
approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned
to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge
Capulong. The three of
them Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to
Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical folder
of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney
Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong
confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man
at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared that she saw
Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket and gave them

64
to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to
Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead
faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining
the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she
directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to submit a formal
report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was known
only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the
premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and asked for the
latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed that
Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so much so
that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge
Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of the late
Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of
the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder which lay
among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went
outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the
building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward,
Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged that
the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record was actually
"planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was
fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly
9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did not
leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark
blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute
falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart
was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered
why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical
chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never seen
him before.

65
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel,
accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man
remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie
Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable
guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p. 11,
Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms.
Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record,
was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the
presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to
recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to testify falsely
against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver," her
swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical
chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was
fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the pages
from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it
directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to mention it
during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was
present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he would
have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain his
identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the investigator,
Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that
while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July 16,
1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that has
no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For
instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was
held on that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a
court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart
be left with the clerk of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for the
entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that
after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to stabilize
her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge
against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and
passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

66
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty
tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of
justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice of his
profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To
this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend
to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part
of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of
the bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe
the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for judicial disciplinary
control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor
Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal
profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity
of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or
an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the business of others in
the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr.,
A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of
the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT.
His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to
strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

67
SO ORDERED.

68
7.

Bautista v. Gonzales, February 12, 1990

Dfgd
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was
charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court
to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars
asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a
resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file
an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment,
alleging that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred
to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a
contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in
litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said
case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil
Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados,
which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a
contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public

69
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with
the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was
his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal
basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon
City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976,
denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29,
1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent
appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to
submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long
delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due
process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment
to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was
due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the
motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2;
Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a
resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon
A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the
following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of
the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution
of said agreement; and

70
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent
manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989,
respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to
bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the
determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule
139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that
the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in
this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct
disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the
report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.
The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the
investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B
[June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially
completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not
been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this
case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B.
Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the
investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion
to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a
thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the
respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but
also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13)
years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the
case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was
given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own

71
fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent
appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his
contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against
him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this
Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed
by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the
properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No.
T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the
time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject
of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since
he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12;
Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself,
respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil
Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a
breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920);
Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that
"[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis
supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an
oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the
role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a
lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case,
respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to
society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with
the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because
of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be
claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16
provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his

72
possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code,
the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property
in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the
land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere
is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to
respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of
the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon
City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and
convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns,
one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all
the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis
supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be
absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was
implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the
land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already
been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while
the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request
of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant
was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land
development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the
back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so
that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the
back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of
the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing,
respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a
premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client
of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact
pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development
agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so
that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking.
This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and
failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113,
February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be
true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.

73
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by
respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land
development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor
T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on
December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only
respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and
the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself
admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote
them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back
to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover,
respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had
not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's
Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when
respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his
Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into
believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct
constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with
the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law
[Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10,
Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by
respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation,
p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the
Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro
T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]
Editha
T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]
Nestor
T.
Fortuna
do
[signed]
C
O
N
F
O
R
M
E

74
Ramon
A.
Gonzal
es
[signed]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the
same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados,
however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An
agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is
champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public
policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense
in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures
Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the
same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with
the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his
acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The
affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when
respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo,
p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is
where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel
[Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel
(I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency
of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used
by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending
resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by
respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060
was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no
basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass
complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion
on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and
the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration
of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a

75
member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647].
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by
respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the
Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the
date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.

76
8.

Licuanan v. Melo, 170 SCRA 100

Dsfsd

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989
LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 5 February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics,
alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the
rentals collected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the
receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned over his
collections to complainant after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had
demanded the same.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainants
tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the
purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.
We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were conducted and the parties presented their respective evidence.
After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following Findings and Recommendation:
Findings:
The issue to be resolved is whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in accounting for the
funds collected by him for his former client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct respondent
should be disciplined.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report
promptly the money of client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his private property
or use it for his personal purpose without his clients consent viz:
Money of the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported promptly,
and except with the clients know and consent should not be commingled with his private or be used by him.

77
And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and
fidelity to private trust:
But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to
public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.
In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is undisputed that the relation of attorney and
client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question took place. The records disclose that
on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanans attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanans favor against Aida Pineda
whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October,
1978 and succeeding months thereafter.
When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter
on February 4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to
take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client (Exhibit A, p. 8, record). On
February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondents office and paid him P3,060.00
for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said amount representing her rental payments for October, 1978 to
February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month (Exh. B, p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980, Pineda again
went back to respondent and paid the rentals of her apartment for the months of March and April, 1980 in the sum of
P360.00 (Exh. C p. 10, Ibid.). Not only that, respondent again received from Pineda on June 30, 1980 rental
payments covering the months of May, June and July, 1980 in the total sum of P540.00 (Exh. D p. 11, Ibid.). And,
on September 29, 1980, he received and issued Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental payments for the
months of August, September and October, 1980. (Exh. E, Ibid.). After four months had elapsed, or on January
23, 1981, he collected again from Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of October, November,
December, 1980 and January 1981 (Exh. F, p. 12, Ibid.).
During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did
not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money.
He allowed the money to accumulate for a year and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of the case. He
did not even attempt to tell her about the money that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact that
complainant used to call him and inquire regarding the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985).
It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on
May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. H, p. 15, Ibid.).
But this was rather late because as early as April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been
receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief
of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of moral turpitude arising from her alleged failure to pay the
rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has
ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh. G, p. 14, Ibid.).
This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her (Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida Pineda), since as borne
out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan, herein respondent (pp.
48-52, record). Clearly, this unfortunate incident would not have happened had respondent been only true to his oath
as a lawyer, i.e., to be honest and candid towards his client.
Thus, we find it hard to believe respondents defense that he kept the money of complainant for a year merely
because he wanted to surprise her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the contrary, it
is very much discernible that he did not surrender immediately the money to complainant because he was using it for
his own benefit. Common sense dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the money of complainant for such
length of time, respondent deprived her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to believe his
explanation, which is flimsy and incredible. Respondents actuation casts doubt on his honesty and integrity. He
must know that the highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the attorney

78
should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the clients benefit, and failure to do
so constitutes professional misconduct, as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Fermina
Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304, to wit:
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his
possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his
clients consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of
Legal Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).
xxx xxx xxx
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any
violation of the lawyers oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential in character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that
special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on
money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds
received. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has he
degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re
Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit;
thus, instead of being a help to his client, he became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a severe
punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy, et al., vs.
Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.)
Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
not less than one (1) year, and that he be strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his duties to his
clients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo)
We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the same but differ with the recommendation.
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00
received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information
on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyers Oath to which he swore observance,
and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly:
11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his client.

79
Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should
be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be
used by him. *
Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has
shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the
practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for nonpayment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant
against her. By force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel
in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her.
Respondents unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not
to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself
unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment.
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession
and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty.
Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and spread on the personal record of
respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo.
SO ORDERED.

80
9.

Castillo v. Taquines, 254 SCRA 554

Kj;klj
[A.C. No. 2024. March 11, 1996]
SALVADOR T. CASTILLO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO M. TAGUINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this rather ancient disbarment complaint, this Court reiterates the rule that a lawyer must at all times
conduct himself with honesty and integrity and deal with his clients, as well as other people, in a manner beyond
reproach. Pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility, he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
By a Resolution dated November 20, 1995, the First Division of this Court transferred this case to the Third.
Thereafter, after careful deliberations and consultation on the submissions of the parties, the undersigned ponente who took his oath as a member of the Court on October 10, 1995 - was assigned to write this Decision.
The Facts
The complainant alleged that respondent Atty. Pablo M. Taguines failed to deliver to him P500.00 representing the
monetary settlement of a civil suit. The, complaint-affidavit, filed on April 25, 1979, reads:
That I am one of the plaintiff (sic) in Civil Case No. 115265 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXXIX, entitled Salvador T. Castillo, et al(.) versus Dolores Licup, et al(.), a copy of the complaint is here to (sic)
attached as Annex A and made integral part hereof;
That sometime in the second of (Sic) week of December 1978, a settlement of the case was agreed upon between the
plaintiff and the defendant which was submitted in court and as a consequence of which the case was dismissed;
That in the settlement, defendant Mrs(.) Dolores Licup, represented by her counsel, Atty. Pablo Taguin es (sic) has
to pay me the amount of P500.00 as full payment of the consideration for dismissing the case against the defendant;
That as per agreement, Mrs. Dolores Licup will give the P500.00 to her counsel Atty(.) Pablo Taguin es (sic) who
will in turn give said amount to me or my counsel;
That while the case against the defendant was already dismissed, and while Mrs. Licup has already given the
P500.00 to Atty. Pablo Taguine s (sic) and received by him, said Atty(.) Pablo Taguines, for reasons known only to
himself for his personal benefit, and violation of our agreement, the trust and confidence of his client, Mrs(.) Licup
and me as plaintiff, did not give to (sic) me the P500.00 which was legally due me even as the case against his client
was already dismissed;
That it was only sometime in the second week of January, 1979 when I discovered from Mrs. Dolores Licup herself
that as of December 16, 1978 she had already given the P500.00 to her counsel Atty. Pablo Taguines and she
showed to me a certification signed by Atty. Taguines which is self(-) explanatory, a xerox copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex B of this affidavit complaint;
That I went personally several times to the address of Atty. Taguines at 55-B Scout Castor, Quezon City to demand
for my money, but I was informed that he was in Tarlac, Tarlac, his home province; when I failed to contact, I even

81
went to complain in Malacaang at Malacaang Assistance Center for confrontation but despite notices to him, he
did not appear in said office;
That Atty. Taguines knows the office of my counsel, he knows the telephone number, but despite that knowledge he
did not even called (sic) up or see my lawyer about the P500.00 which he received from Mrs. Licup to be paid to
me;
That the act of Atty. Taguines is undeserving and unethical as a lawyer for having embezzled the P500.00 which
does not belongs (sic) to him, considering that the case against his client has been dismissed by me already, and for
which I can no longer re-file in court;i[1]
The complainant alternatively prayed that the respondent be either reprimanded, suspended or disbarred for acts
unbecoming of (sic) a lawyer.
On the other hand, the Commentii[2] of the respondent had attached to it the counter-affidavit he submitted in the
criminal case of estafa (I.S. No. 79-11822) filed against him by the complainant, in which counter-affidavit he
traversed the above-quoted accusations of the complainant, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2.
That at the outset, I wish to deny vehemently as I hereby deny vehemently that I have neither (sic)
embezzled the amount of P500 which I received from my client, Mrs. Dolores Licup in connection with Civil Case
No. 115265 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXIX nor refused to give the same to complainant
Salvador Castillo in the aforementioned I.S. No. 79-11822 for estafa;
3.
That I wish also to deny vehemently as I hereby deny vehemently, for lack of knowledge and awareness as
well as for lack of notice, the alleged confrontation at the Malacaang Assistance Center in connection with the
amount of P500 that is the subject matter of said preliminary investigation;
4.
That I admit having received from Mrs. Dolores Licup the amount of P500 to be given to Mr. Salvador
Castillo but I never bound or committed myself to go out of my way to personally deliver the said amount to the (sic)
Mr. Castillo or to his lawyer; I do not know personally Mr. Castillo his address or residence in Silang, Cavite; I do
not also know where he holds office here in Metro Manila, if he ever holds office here;
5.
That, per our agreement, Mr. Castillo or his lawyer will call, or visit me to (sic) my office at Room 451,
Republic Supermarket Bldg., Manila to inquire whether I was able to get some money from Mrs. Licup for Mr.
Castillo in connection with the above-mentioned Civil Case; at that time a joint motion to dismiss signed by all the
counsels (sic) has already been filed in said civil case after the parties have agreed to settle it amicably among
themselves. Mr. Castillo has already received some money from my other client, Mr. Alex Sy, and he is requesting
me to ask some money from Mrs. Licup as additional consideration for the settlement of the said case;
6.
That both Mr. Castillo and his lawyer knew where I hold office at the time for they once held their office
also at the same building: Room 430;
7.

That his lawyer never called me or went to my office to get the money for Mr. Castillo;

8.
That, however, I recall that, a few days after I received the P500 from Mrs. Licup, when I was out of the
office, according to Mr. Angelito B. Yabut, who is the Treasurer of Philwide Cinema Corporation where I hold
office at the said Room 451, a big man(,) by his description(,) came looking for me and introduced himself as Buddy
but because I was out at the time, he left with a message that he will return after lunch or late in the afternoon;
9.
That, having received the message when I came to the office that day, I wanted (sic) for this Buddy who,
however, never returned that day;

82
10.
That, although I have never seen the man, I surmissed (sic) that he was complainant Mr. Castillo because of
Mr. Yabuts description, his name Buddy - I have heard his lawyer call him by that nickname - and because I have
been expecting him to be dropping by my office anytime in connection with the P500;
11.
That I waited for him the following day as I was in the office preparing and finalizing some pleadings and
other paper works in connection with some of my cases; but Mr. Castillo never came that day;
12.
That, in view thereof, I gave to Mr. Angelito B. Yabut the P500 because he is the employee of Philwide
Cinema who is always at the office and instructed him to give the money to one Mr. Salvador Castillo or his lawyer,
Atty. Diosdado Dapucanta and to issue a receipt therefor; Mr. Yabut was in possession of the money for more than a
week;
13.
That from that time up until the end of January 1979, neither Mr. Castillo nor his lawyer called or went to
the office to get the money given by Mrs. Licup to me;
14.
That beginning February 1979, we (Philwide Cinema Corporation) transferred our office from Room 451
Republic Supermarket to Room 312, Regina Bldg., Escolta, Manila; up to the present time, I still hold my law office
at the said office address;
15.
That I transferred to the above office address in good faith and without any intention to abscond with the
money;
xxx

xxx

xxx

20.
That if only Mr. Castillo or his lawyer took the pains of contacting me or coming to my office to get the
P500 or if only Mr. Castillo exercised some degree of prudence of leaving a message regarding the date and time of
his coming back to get the money, such unfortunate incident like as (sic) this one would have been avoided;
21.
That the mere fact that I executed and signed the certification acknowledging receipt of the money is
evidence that will regate (sic) any criminal intent to abscond with the money for, as a lawyer, if ever I had the
intention of embezzling or misappropriating the same, I would not have made said certification;
22.
That I am not too miserable a lawyer as not to be able to produce, upon demand, the measly sum of P500;
but the truth of the matter is that neither complainant nor his lawyer came to my office at Room 451, Republic
Supermarket Bldg., Sta Cruz Manila to get the money although both knew that I was holding office there;
23.
That I have, likewise, not received any letter from either complainant or his lawyer, demanding delivery of
the said amount to either of them; (Italics supplied)
In his reply to respondents Comment, complainant further contended, among other things:
1.
That I vehemently deny for being false, the allegation of Atty. Pablo Taguines contained in paragraph 2 of
his counter-affidavit attached to his comment x x x, the truth of the matter being, that sometime in July, 1979, before
the dismissal of my complaint for estafa by the fiscal, Atty. Taguines had a talk with my lawyer in (sic) the
telephone, my lawyer telling him that I am willing to accept the P500.00, and that I am ready to execute affidavits of
desistance for all the cases I filed against him. Atty. Taguines agreed and even set a day, a Wednesday, for us to
meet, but he failed to see or call my lawyer, instead, a woman from his office at Rm. 312, Regina Building, Escolta,
Manila, called up my lawyer that Atty. Taguines was in Tarlac and would not be able to see us, but he would do so
the coming Monday. Come Monday, he did not see us nor call my lawyer.
2.
On August 13, 1979, I sent a letter addressed to his office at Rm-312 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila,
requesting him to remit the amount to me or to my lawyer, but he did not remit or even answer my letter, or even
called (sic) us up despite the fact that my said letter was duly received by his office that same day. A xerox copy of

83
said letter is hereto attached as Annex A of this reply. Again I sent him two more letters dated September 17, 1979
and October 1, 1979, but he did not claim them so they were returned to me. Xerox copy of my said two letters are
hereto attached as Annex B and C of this reply.iii[3]
Investigation by Solicitor General
In a Resolution dated January 21, 1980, this Court resolved to refer this administrative case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Office of the Solicitor General set the case for hearing almost every month from August 1980 to August 1982,
but no hearing was ever had, because most of the time the respondent could not be notified of the date of hearing, or
the complainant failed to appear. At the hearings scheduled on August 21, September 30, November 26, 1980 and
January 15, 1981, respondent appeared since he was duly notified thereof, but just the same, the hearings were all
postponed because either the respondent or the complainant was not feeling well. Thereafter, the respondent never
appeared at the scheduled hearings and all notices of hearing sent to him by registered mail at his former and
probable addresses were always returned unserved. Worse still, the respondent never informed the Office of the
Solicitor General and, later, the IBP of his changes of address. In short, the respondent, if still alive, could not be
located.
Investigation, Report and Recommendation by IBP
When the case was referred to the IBP around September of 1991, the Investigating Commissioner set the case for
hearing five (5) times, but all notices of hearing sent to respondent by registered mail at his former or probable
addressees were invariably returned unserved. On March 27, 1992, the complainant was finally able to present his
evidence, but without the assistance of counsel.
In its Resolutioniv[4] dated March 23, 1993., the IBP Board of Governors took note of the admission made by
respondent that he received from his client Dolores Licup the amount of P500.00 for turnover or delivery to the
complainant, as well as his vehement denial that he misappropriated such a paltry sum when thousands or tens of
thousands of pesos were being entrusted to him by his clients, along with his contention that he had always been
waiting for the complainant to come to him at his office to get the money. The IBP Board further remarked:
However, from the documentary exhibits offered by the complainant himself, it appears that the respondent has not
paid or turned over the P500.00 to the complainant despite repeated demands. Respondent even fooled the
complainant by paying the P500.00 with BPI Check No. 193489 (Exh. B) payable to Cash dated January 20, 1981,
with the respondent as drawer or maker x x x, but the same bounced for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED (Exh.
C). When respondents check was dishonored, the complainant made two formal demands on the respondent to
make good his dishonored check. The first demand letter dated January 20, 1981 (Exh. D) was received by the
respondent on January 23, 1981 (Exhs. D-1 and D-2) and the second one dated February 9, 1981 (Exh. E) was
received by the respondent on February 19, 1981 (Exhs. E-1 and E-2). But still the respondent refused to
pay.v[5]
The Board concluded as follows:
From all the foregoing, it could be safely concluded that the respondent misappropriated the P500.00, a trust
property, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant. However small is the amount misappropriated by him, the
respondent just the same has shown his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Governors hereby recommends that ATTY. PABLO M.
TAGUINES be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.vi[6]
The Courts Ruling

84
A thoroughgoing review of the affidavits, pleadings and other papers as well as the documentary evidence submitted
by the parties convinces this Court of the correctness of the foregoing findings and conclusion of the IBP Board of
Governors. They are consequently adopted and approved.
Respondent expressly admitted having received the sum of money intended for complainant. Despite various and
repeated demands by complainant, and complainants resort to the filing of criminal and administrative charges, and
notwithstanding that respondent had innumerable opportunities, over the course of so many years, to turn over and
deliver the P500.00 to the complainant, he nevertheless persisted in refusing to do so. Thus we cannot but agree with
the IBPs conclusion that respondent misappropriated the sum. But respondent made matters even worse, not only
by his contumacious refusal to comply with a valid obligation for nearly eighteen (18) years, but also by fooling the
complainant through the issuance of a bouncing check - in short, piling one offense on top of another. This is
simply appalling. If the P500.00 was indeed such a measly sum by his own estimation, his conduct with respect to
satisfying the lawful demand of the complainant betrayed his own declarations. Calling respondent unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar is putting it very mildly.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityvii[7] explicitly provides that (a) lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession, while Rule 16.03 of the same canon
provides that (a) lawyer shall deliver the funds or property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x On the
other hand, Rule 1.01 provides that (a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It is obvious that respondent has no concern whatsoever for the property rights of others nor for canons of
professional responsibility, not to mention, any respect for the Solicitor General, the IBP or this Court. That being
so, suspension from the practice of law for one year, as recommended by the IBP, is the minimum penalty that
respondent deserves for his outrageous conduct under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the respondent Pablo M. Taguines is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective upon notice hereof. Let copies of this Decision be spread
upon his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

85
10. Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239

dfsd

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-92-904 December 7, 1993

DR. NORBERT L. ALFONSO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON, Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent.
Nicanor B. Padilla and Roberto A. Demigillo for complainant.
S.N. Barlongay and W.B. Lachica for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On 15 September 1992, the complainant, a doctor of medicine by profession, filed with this Court a sworn complaint charging the respondent
with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife, Sol
Dinglasan Alfonso. The complainant and his wife were married on 10 December 1988 and their union bore them three children, all boys,
ages 3 years old, 2 years old, and 4 months old, respectively. He alleges that their married life was peaceful and happy until the discovery of
the sordid affair, which came about in this manner:
Sometime in February 1991, the complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent who informed him that Sol and her
husband (respondent) have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to
the complainant. Although he did not believe the information and even berated Mrs. Juanson for trying to ruin his family, he, nevertheless,
told Sol about it. Sol assured him of her love and concern for the family and claimed that the respondent was just a client of
her former office, the Banco Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch). Two weeks later, Mrs. Juanson called him again to inquire if he had received the
photocopies of Sol's love letters to the respondent. He again scolded Mrs. Juanson and told her not to call him up anymore. On 12 June
1992, he and Sol left for the United States of America (USA) for a vacation. He stayed there up to 19 July 1992; however, Sol returned ahead
of him on 10 July 1992. During his absence, specifically on 17 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson called up his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso, and
divulged to the latter the illicit affair between the respondent and Sol. On 20 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson sent to Atty. Alfonso photocopies of
Sol's love letters to the respondent. During their pre-arranged meeting on 25 June 1992, Mrs. Juanson delivered the original copies of Sol's
alleged letters to
Atty. Alfonso who was accompanied by the complainant's sister, Celestine A. Barreto.
When Sol arrived in the Philippines on 10 July 1992, Atty. Alfonso decided to hire a private investigating agency to undertake an inquiry on
the alleged illicit affair between Sol and the respondent. Through surveillance conducted by its private investigators, the agency found that
Sol had met with the respondent on 11 and 17 July 1992 at Unit 412-A of Citihomes at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
and that they stayed inside the unit for two to three hours.
Complainant further alleges that on 25 July 1992, five days after his arrival from the USA, his sister Celestine told him about the illicit
relationship between Sol and the respondent. Celestine showed him the pictures taken by the private investigators and the alleged love
letters of Sol. In the evening of the said date, in the presence of their respective parents, the complainant confronted Sol and showed her the
proofs; Sol still denied the affair and insisted that she was just discussing some business with the respondent. Later, however, at about 1:30
a.m. in their house, Sol finally admitted to having an illicit affair with the respondent since late 1983 when she was an employee of Banco
Filipino (EDSA Cubao Branch) and that before they left for the USA, she met with the respondent at Unit 412-A Citihomes.

86

As a result of this revelation, the complainant sent his wife out of the house. He and Sol have been living separately since 26 July 1992. He
also subsequently discovered from the statement of the billing from Pacific Bell for overseas calls which he and Sol made while they were in
the USA that on 17 and 25 June 1992 Sol had made calls to the respondent's office at the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Complainant submits that the respondent is undeserving of the noble office of the judiciary and prays that he be meted the appropriate
administrative sanction for immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.
In compliance with this Court's Resolution of 22 October 1992, the respondent filed his Comment on 21 December 1992. He admits that he
knows Sol and that "they have been communicating with each other casually and innocently," but denies that they are lovers and were
having an illicit affair, that Sol has been sending love letters to him, and that, except for the 11 and 17 July 1992 meetings, he and Sol had
been going to the apartment situated at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and staying there for hours. He asserts that he
came to know Sol sometime in 1987 when she engaged his professional services in connection with five criminal cases filed by her in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal and the in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the course of their attorney-client relationship, Sol
sought legal advice from him and during those occasions they usually talked over the phone and not in the office. In June 1992, he received
an overseas call from Sol who was then in the USA. Sol asked for advice concerning her problem with her employer, the Security Bank and
Trust Co. (Dau Central Branch). They agreed that Sol would see him upon her return to the Philippines. On 11 July 1992, shortly after her
arrival from the USA, he ad Sol met at the aforementioned apartment, which was leased not by the respondent but by Celestino Esteban.
After discussing her problem, with Celestino and two other persons present, he and Sol left the apartment and took a late lunch at Fastfood,
Robinson. He reassures the complainant "that his wife has always been faithful to him and that he would do nothing as would tarnish their
warm relationship, much less destroy the complainant's family."
On 4 May 1993, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice
Lourdes T. Jaguros of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Jaguros conducted a full-blown investigation. At the hearings on 17, 18, 21 and 29 of June 1993 and 6, 8, 9 and 12 of July 1993, the
parties submitted testimonial and documentary evidence. On 4 October 1993, she submitted her Report and Recommendation dated 30
September 1993. Pertinent portions of her findings of facts read as follows:
As culled from the evidence of this case, Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso and Sol Dinglasan were married at Sta.
Ana Catholic Church on December 10, 1988 as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exh. "N"). Three children were born
of this marriage, John Jason, three (3) years old, Jan Norbert, two (2) years old, and the youngest Jan Joseph, four (4)
months old. Complainant and his family lived a happy and normal life with their Sundays spent on outings after the
Sunday mass. (p. 9, tsn, June 29, 1993).
In February, 1991, Complainant received phone calls from a woman introducing herself as a concerned friend telling
that complainant's wife is having an illicit affair with her said woman caller's husband. Said caller did not identify herself
but only said she was in possession of love letters of complainant's wife Sol to said caller's husband. After two weeks,
said "concerned friend" called up the Complainant again to ask him if he had received said caller's registered mail.
Complainant after both calls asked his wife Sol about her having an affair with another man, and in both instances, Sol
assured him of her love. Then the calls stopped for the rest of the year 1991 and early part of 1992 although
Complainant noticed that his wife Sol used to go out alone every Saturday.
On June 12, 1992, Complainant and his wife Sol went to the U.S.A. for a vacation but the latter decided to return to
Manila ahead of the former on July 10, 1992 (Exh. "O"). Complainant followed in returning home only on July 19, 1992
(Exh. "O-1").
On July 25, 1992, Complainant was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to his sister Celestine Barreto's house,
and there his father showed him five (5) love letters written by Complainant's wife Sol with envelopes addressed to
Atty. Modesto C. Juanson (Exhs. "A" to "E" and submarking), and pictures taken by private investigators of
Complainant's wife and respondent Judge in company of each other
(Exhs. "F-5" to "F-22", "G-2" to "G-14"). Complainant recognized the handwriting of his wife Sol in said love letters,
specifically the GAIN memo pad paper used by Sol in her love letter (Exh. "D") which is a prescription pad of
Complainant to his patients. Likewise, in the pictures, Complainant recognized his wife Sol holding a "Payless" bag
(Exh. "F-6") with the Respondent Judge holding the same bag later on (Exh. "F-14"). In practically all the pictures,
Complainant identified his wife Sol and the respondent Judge. The Respondent Judge was no stranger to Complainant
as the latter knows said Judge personally. Said Judge is one of the best friends of Complainant's parents-in-law and
was even a sponsor in the wedding of Complainant's sister-in-law. Both Complainant and Respondent Judge had met
thrice and talked with each other.
The five love letters, including a picture of the Respondent Judge (Exh. "K") were handed to Complainant's father, Atty.
Norberto Alfonso by a lady who introduced herself, as Mrs. Ceferina Juanson in the presence of Complainant's sister,
Celestine Barreto. The three met at the front entrance of the Sto. Domingo Church, Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
and proceeded to the City Diners Restaurant in the same city where the three had a talk and where Mrs. Juanson
handed to Atty. Alfonso the five love letters with a picture, at about 10:30 to 11:30 a.m. in late June 1992. Prior to said
meeting on June 17, 1992, at about 11:00 a.m. a "concerned woman" had called up Atty. Alfonso at his home and in
the vernacular had said "Tinataihan ang ulo ng anak mo ng babaeng iyan" referring to Complainant's wife. To clear
Atty. Alfonso's doubt, the woman promised to send proofs which Atty. Alfonso received by LBC in a parcel containing
the xerox copies of Complainant's wife's love letters to Atty. Modesto C. Juanson.

87

After the meeting with the lady who identified herself as

Mrs. Ceferina Juanson, Atty. Alfonso got an overseas call from Complainant that his wife Sol was coming home to
Manila earlier so that Atty. Alfonso engaged the services of a private investigating agency, Truth Verifier System, Inc.,
to conduct surveillance of the activities of Complainant's wife, Sol upon her arrival from the U.S.A. Sol Alfonso did
arrive on July 10, 1992, and on July 11 and 17, 1992, the Truth Verifier System, Inc. through Marjorie Juinio and
Edgardo Tamayo, licensed private detectives conducted surveillance operation on Mrs. Sol Dinglasan and respondent
Judge Modesto Juanson. On said date of July 17, 1992, said private detectives together with Raymond Tabangcura
and Edgar Naquilla, saw, Sol Dinglasan Alfonso go out of her house carrying a bag, take a tricycle and alight at
Lamayan St., walk towards Sta. Ana Church then board a taxicab. Following said taxicab, the taxi stopped at City
Homes, San Francisco Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Sol went inside Unit 412-A Citihomes, and stayed inside for
about three hours. Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson came out first of said unit, wearing blue walking shorts and
light colored polo and carrying the plastic bag which Sol was seen carrying earlier, and then followed by Sol. At around
1:00 p.m., the Respondent Judge and Sol were inside said Respondent's Wrangler jeep on their way to Robinson
Galeria at EDSA. The two ate at Mongolian Restaurant and at Gusto Unico, then they proceeded to Robinson's
Supermarket. Inside the supermarket, Marjorie Juinio saw the Respondent Judge put his arm on the shoulder of Sol,
and they were also seen holding hands (pp. 23-26, tsn, June 21, 1993). Then the two, Respondent Judge and Sol
boarded the Wrangler jeep. At about 3:45 p.m., Sol alighted at the corner of Suter and Roxas Streets and then boarded
a tricycle while the jeep left. The formal report of the Truth and Verifier System, Inc. has
been offered by Complainant as Exhibit "F-1" to "F-4" while the many pictures taken of Respondent Judge and Sol
were marked and offered as Exhibits "F-5" to "F-22".
The other team of the Truth Verifier System, Inc. led by Edgardo Tamayo practically corroborated the findings of the
Marjorie Juinio team. A formal report marked and offered as Exhibit "G" to "G-1", and pictures taken of Respondent
Judge and Complainant's wife Sol marked and offered as Exhibits "G-2" to "G-14" were presented before the
Investigator.
Five days after the arrival of Complainant Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, he was invited by his father, Atty. Norberto Alfonso to
Norbert's sister's house in San Juan, Metro Manila. In the house of Celestine Alfonso Barreto, Atty. Alfonso showed his
son, Norbert the love letters written by his wife Sol to Respondent Judge (Exhs. "A" to "E"). Complainants recognized
the handwritings of his wife Sol and even the GAIN memo stationery which complainant was using as his prescription
pad for his patients (Exh. "D"). He recognized his wife Sol and Respondent Judge in the pictures taken by the private
detectives. On said day, Complainant Norbert Alfonso experienced the greatest shock of his life and wondered what
happened to his life. His father, Atty. Alfonso, however, advised him not to hurt his wife Sol. In that same party,
Complainant showed Sol the pictures and the love letters which made Sol turn pale and stammer when talking. Sol's
own parents were embarrassed and walked out of the party.
On the same night at about 10 in the evening, Complainant
Dr. Norbert Alfonso confronted his wife Sol as to the truth of her relationship with Respondent Judge. Before the
Investigator said Complainant made the following testimony on direct examination:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q What else did your wife tell you during that confrontation, her exact words ?
xxx xxx xxx
A She took a deep breath again and told me, "Sweetheart, I am very, very, very sorry, I made a
mistake." I asked, "What mistake is that ?" She replied, "I had sexual intercourse with the Judge."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else, if any, happened during that confrontation?
A I asked my wife "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with the Judge"?
Q Was there any response?
A She answered five times and then right away I said, "Putangina mo, five times lang. Alam mo
ba kung ilan beses kitang naganyan? Tarantado ka." With my voice not so loud because the door
and the windows were opened. If I shout the neighbors will hear and then the yayas will go down
right away.
Q What was your wife doing at that time?

88

A My wife was crying and saying, "Sweetheart, I am very, very sorry. Forgive me." She was
kneeling before me and begging forgiveness. "Forgive me, sweetheart, I love you."
I told my wife, "you do not love me, you love your stupid Judge."
Q Is there anything else that you discussed during that confrontation aside from the admission?
A After that admittance of my wife having sexual relationship with the Judge, reminiscing the past
events when we were together I told my wife, "That's why pala every Saturday umaalis ka dito.
Sinong pinupuntahan mo?" And definitely, she admitted to me, "To the Judge." (pp. 35-41, tsn,
June 29, 1993)
The confrontation between Complainant and his wife Sol ended at about 5:00 a.m. of the following day, July 16, 1992
with Complainant asking Sol to leave the house.
Sol also admitted to the Complainant that when she went to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29,
1989 she was with Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both
Sol Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on December
26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 (Exhs. "P" and "P-1").
Also, Complainant received from his sister in California, U.S.A., a Pacific Bell Statement of Telephone Calls reflecting
two calls made by his wife Sol to Manila, at numbers 632 476120. Number 632 is the country code while number
476120 is the phone number of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, where Respondent Judge is the Presiding Judge.
As of now, Complainant Dr. Norbert Alfonso and his wife Sol live separately, and their three children are alternately in
the custody of Complainant or Sol for certain number of days.
Upon the other hand, Respondent Judge main defense is denial as he advances the position that Sol Dinglasan
Alfonso was a former client when Respondent Judge was still a practicing lawyer, and that from time to time Sol would
consult him regarding her cases. As to the Hongkong trip, Respondent Judge simply accompanied a former client who
was looking for a house to buy in Hongkong and as to the visit in the Citihomes unit, Respondent Judge claimed that
he was only visiting his godson George Zari who spent a vacation in the Philippines for a month.
Some elaboration of the respondent's version is necessary. He is now 56 years old. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 31). He and his wife, Ceferina, were
married in 1961 and have two sons. Ceferina is eight years his senior. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 4-5). From 1967 to 1969, he was the Chief Legal
Officer in the Office of the City Mayor of Quezon City and from 1969 to 1982 he was the Second Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City. After
that and until November 1990, when he was appointed Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Urdaneta Pangasinan, he was in private practice
of law. In April 1992, he was assigned to Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (TSN, 8 July 1993, 32). He first came to know Sol
when she hired his services as her counsel in six criminal cases involving dishonored checks she filed against Santiago Maramag and
Evangeline Maramag. (Id., 33-39). In 1989, he saw Sol at the wedding of her sister Jennifer to Romeo Dizon; he stood as sponsor for the
groom then. In June 1992, Romeo saw him at his office at the City Hall in Manila and sought advice regarding the letter Sol had received
from the Security Bank requiring her to explain why she should not be declared absent without leave (AWOL) for leaving her work without an
approved leave of absence. He told Romeo that he would not be able to give any advice unless he saw the letter and talked with Sol. A few
days later, he received an overseas call from Sol who said that she left the Philippines sometime after 10 June 1992. He told her that he
could not give any written or oral advice until he read the letter and talked with her. This overseas call might have been the 17 June 1992 call
referred to in the Pacific Bell Statement. (Exhibit "Q"). He was not able to talk to her in the second overseas call referred to in Exhibit "Q."
Two or three weeks alter, he received local call from Sol who told him that she was back and that she has the letter. Sol begged to see him
at his office. He, however, told her that he was busy; besides, it was already late in the afternoon. She got frantic and so he told her that they
could meet the following day at Unit 412-A, Citihomes, at 130 San Francisco St., Mandaluyong, since he was to meet his godson, George
Zari, in the said place. They did meet there at 11:00 o'clock in the morning the following day
11 July 1992, a Saturday. Sol gave him the letter from the Security Bank and after interviewing her he promised to prepare a draft of a
"reply." Present at that time were Celestino Esteban, lessee of the unit who is his friend, George Zari, and his live-in partner, Marissa. Fortyfive minutes later, he decided to go home. Sol requested for a ride in his vehicle in order to alight at the place of her employer along EDSA
and Shaw Boulevard to which he obliged. While on their way, Sol invited him for lunch and they went to the Mongolian Restaurant at
Robinson's where they had lunch. They had coffee nearby and then parted ways. Thereafter, on separate days, Sol called him by phone to
ask about the draft of the reply. On the second call, he told her that since he would meet George Zari on the 17th of July at Unit 412-A
Citihomes, she might just as well meet him there. She acceded and on that date he left his office at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and
arrived at Unit 412-A thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Sometime after Sol arrived, he gave to her the draft of the reply and
instructed her to type the letter, date and sign it, and then send it to her employer. He also referred her to Atty. Lachica to whom she should
henceforth communicate because he, respondent, is busy at his office. When he was
about to leave, Sol asked if she might ride in his vehicle in order to alight at EDSA-Shaw Boulevard to which he agreed. After that he did not
meet Sol again. (TSN, 9 July 1993, 3-15).
Respondent denies having gone to Hongkong with Sol on 26 December 1989 and having seen her in Hongkong. According to him, his
traveling companion was Cua Sen. (Id., 16-23). Cua Sen corroborated him on this point. (TSN, 6 July 1993, 5-10). When confronted about
the charge of immorality and unethical conduct for having illicit relations with Sol, he answered: "I deny it very strongly, your Honor." (Id., 32).

89

Respondent further suggests that it was impossible for him to have sexual intercourse with Sol because he was suffering from two
debilitating diseases diabetes mellitus, for which he has been "taking insulin" since 1987, and prostatitis which have seriously affected
his sexual potency. In his own words, he "could hardly make it," and that he has "no erection whatsoever."
(Id., 29-32; Exhibits "11" and "12").
Justice Jaguros gives full faith and credit to the complainant's version for she finds no reason not to believe the complainant. According to
her, "[n]o man in his correct mind would come forward and claim that his honor and good name have been stained by an adulterous wife,
doubt the paternity of his children, and in the process destroy his family and home." She ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
respondent Cua Sen, Celestino Esteban and former Judge Zari do not inspire belief.
Justice Jaguros then concludes that the immoral conduct of the respondent has ruined two families his own and that of the complainant.
Respondent "cannot escape from the blame and sin of what he has caused Complainant's once happy family." More pertinently she adds:
But beyond the domestic confines of these two families, Respondent Judge is no ordinary mortal who can live the life
he pleases having two women at the same time his wife and worst [sic], another man's wife. He is a Judge who
symbolizes the law and the highest degree of morality in the community. The citizens look up to him as the
embodiment of justice and decency, as he decides cases brought to his court. He can be no less.
And invoking our decision in Leynes vs. Veloso (82 SCRA 325 [1978] ) and Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991] ) as precedent and
moral compass, she asserts that she has no other alternative but to find respondent "GUILTY as charged of Immorality and Violation of
Judicial Conduct" and to recommend his "DISMISSAL . . . from office."
In the light of the conclusions of the Investigating Justice and her recommendation for the imposition upon the respondent of the severest
administrative penalty dismissal from the service it is all the more imperative to conduct as assiduous examination and evaluation of
the records and the evidence.
There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant's wife. For one, there are
the cards or notes, which the complainant and the Investigating Justice described as love letters. These five "love letters" are marked as
Exhibits "A." "B," "C," "D," and "E," and dated 3 July 1987, 23 May 1988, 15 February 1988, 11 January 1989, and 7 March 1989,
respectively. For another, if we were to give full credit to the complainant's testimony that during their confrontation Sol had admitted having
sexual intercourse with the respondent on five occasions (TSN, 29 June 1993, 39-40), it would appear that the relationship had developed
into an extra-marital liaison. It was furthermore established that both Sol and the respondent took the same flights of Cathay Pacific aircraft to
Hongkong on 26 December 1989 and back to the Philippines on 29 December 1989. There is, however, no evidence that they stayed
together in the same hotel in Hongkong. On the other hand, there is the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Cua Sen that he, a client of the
respondent, was the latter's travelling companion.
From the foregoing, it is clear that their affair began before Sol and the complainant were married on 10 December 1988 and might have
blossomed from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. Her marriage to the complainant did not diminish Sol's love for
the respondent, for even after she committed herself to the complainant alone and made a vow of fidelity to him till death at the solemn
ceremony of marriage, she still sneaked out her love notes to the respondent.
It must, however, be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the
judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol
continued their extramarital affair. No love notes written by her after November 1990 were presented in evidence. If she did, they could have
been kept with Exhibits "A" to "E" in some secret place which was not, however, unknown anymore to the respondent's wife. Sol's admission
or confession to the complainant that she had carnal knowledge of the respondent on five occasions made no reference to specific dates and
is hearsay. In his direct examination, the complainant's counsel exerted no further effort to obtain clarifications as to the dates thereof. He
perhaps realized its futility because the narration by the complainant of the information clearly indicated that the complainant did not ask Sol
to elaborate on the five illicit sexual acts. On cross-examination, counsel for the respondent carefully avoided any entanglement with the
details of the admission not only because it might have provided an occasion for the complainant to elaborate thereon, but because it would
have operated as a waiver of his objection to the testimony as hearsay. The transcripts of the stenographic notes discloses that the counsel
for the respondent objected and entered a continuing objection to questions directed to elicit or which tended to elicit statements or
admissions supposedly made or given by Sol on the grounds that any such statements or admissions would be hearsay or otherwise barred
by the res inter alios acta rule. Justice Jaguros recognized the merit of the objection; hence, she allowed the answers to be taken merely as
part of the narration nut not as evidence of the truth thereof. Thus:
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q. What was her response to your exhortation?
A. After a few minutes she took a deep breath and said, "Sweetheart, patawarin mo ako,
nagkaroon ako ng kasalanan sa iyo."
ATTY. BARLONGAY:

90

At this juncture, Your Honor, we would like to register our objection as to the issue of the truth of
the statement as purported to be answered by her wife for two reasons: One, it is hearsay. We
have no opportunity to cross-examine the . . .
COURT:
As part of the narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Yes, as part of the narration, but just for the purposes of record we would like to register our
objection as to the truth of the statement itself. First, it is hearsay; second . . .
COURT:
Precisely, admitted only as part of his narration.
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
That is alright. Second, it is . . . on the basis of the inter-alia [sic] rule, the admission of a party
should not prejudice the rights of another.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DEMIGILLO:
Q. What was the exact statement of your wife?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Again, subject to the observation of this Honorable Court, we
would register our objections on these two grounds: Hearsay and res inter-alia [sic] rule.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Excuse me, I have some manifestations . . .
COURT:
You have a continuing objection?
ATTY. BARLONGAY:
Yes, I am not going to do this at every turn. I just want to say that our objection is a continuing
one. (TSN, 29 June 1993, 36-39).
If they were then allowed by the Investigating Justice as merely "part of the narration," they should only be considered as independently
relevant statements, i.e., proof that Sol made statements or admissions, but not as proof of the truth of facts revealed in the said statements
or admissions. Elsewise stated, the admission in evidence of the words spoken by Sol is not to be used in determining the issue of their truth.
(FRANCISCO, V.J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. VII, Part I, 1973 ed., 438). This being so, the acts of sexual
intercourse admitted by Sol cannot, insofar as the respondent is concerned, be deemed proven by the said admission or confession. While it
is true that technical rules of evidence should not be applied in administrative cases, however, since the Investigating Justice herself had
specifically allowed the hearsay answers merely as part of the narration, or more specifically as independently relevant statements, it would
be unfair and arbitrary to thereafter disregard the ruling. All told, there is in this case no direct and competent evidence against the
respondent that he had illicit sex with Sol.

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But even if the admission of Sol were to be taken as proof of the truth of the facts so admitted, considering, however, that Sol's admission
that she engaged in sexual intercourse on five occasions made no reference to specific dates, that their affair antedated Sol's marriage, that
their last proven tryst was in Hongkong in 1989, and that there is an absence of positive and competent evidence to show that any of the five
acts of sexual intercourse took place after the respondent's appointment to the judiciary , it cannot be safely presumed that the respondent
committed any of the sexual indiscretions after he became a judge. Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his
appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent may
have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn
realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987
Constitution). It would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could
never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond reformation and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for
the exalted position of
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor his private and official conduct must at all times be free
from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]). And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must
perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety. The imputation of
illicit sexual acts upon the incumbent judge must be proven by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in administrative
cases. This the complainant failed to do. The meetings of the respondent and Sol at Unit 412-A of Citihomes on 11 July and 17 July 1992 do
not by themselves prove that these were trysts for libidinal gratification. Evidence was offered by the respondent to prove otherwise.
However, considering their prior special relationship, the respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its
continuance or revival and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. In short, the respondent suddenly became indiscreet;
he succumbed to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for his legal advice on a matter which
involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach," and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities." It has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. (DiaAonuevo v. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975] ). The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
faith of the people in the judiciary. (Candia vs. Tagabucba, 79 SCRA 51 [1977] ).
It is to be noted that 17 July 1992 fell on a Friday. On that date, the respondent left his office at the City Hall of Manila at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning and arrived at Unit 412-A Citihomes thirty minutes later. (TSN, 12 July 1993, 25). Per report of the private detectives (Exhibit
"G"), the respondent and Sol left the unit as 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon on board a vehicle and that twenty-five minutes later, Sol alighted
near the crossing overpass at United Street. It is, therefore, clear that on 17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours
and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible
for him to have reached his office if at all he did proceed to it in time for the commencement of the official session hours in the
afternoon,
i.e., 2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization of
1981). Thus, for purely personal sessions, he violated the rule regarding the official sentence. Such violation amounted to neglect of duty.
Finally, a word on the respondent's defense that he not have sexual congress with Sol because he was suffering from diabetes mellitus and
prostatitis. The claim is both self-serving and irrelevant. No expert testimony was presented to prove the stage, extent or degree of
seriousness of the diseases and their effects on his capacity to copulate. The physicians who purportedly issued the medical certificates did
not testify thereon. Besides, immorality for which the respondent is charged is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled
that:
immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare. (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the rule on official time, respondent JUDGE
MODESTO C. JUANSON is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

92

11. Talens-Dabon v. arceo

Df

[Adm. Matter. No. RTJ-96-1336. July 25, 1996.]

JOCELYN TALENS-DABON, Complainant, v. JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO,
Respondent.
SYLLABUS
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; SHOULD NOT ONLY POSSESS
PROFICIENCY IN LAW BUT SHOULD LIKEWISE POSSESS THE HIGHEST
INTEGRITY, PROBITY AND UNQUESTIONABLE MORAL UPRIGHTNESS. The
integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice
but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run
the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law
may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people
that justices indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people
who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must
possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in
their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system. The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality
and decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat v. Alcantara, 161
SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his
private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized (Junio v. Rivera,
225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should
likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright
man.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Once again, this Court must strike hard at an erring member of the Judiciary.
The base before us stemmed from a sworn-complaint filed by Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon,
Clerk of Court V of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga, charging

93

Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Executive Judge thereat with gross misconduct. The
complaint was later amended to include immorality. Judge Arceo filed his answer with
counter-complaint to the main complaint and his answer to the amended complaint. He
likewise submitted the affidavits of his witnesses.
After considering the answers, we issued a Resolution dated February 1, 1996 referring
the case to Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the same time, placing Judge Arceo
under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation (p. 61, Rollo).
After requests for postponement from both parties, hearings were held on March 4, 19,
20, 21, 22, and on April 1, 8, 10 and 18, 1996. Both parties presented their respective
witnesses. Except for Atty. Arnel Santos and Prosecutor Ramon S. Razon, all of Judge
Arceos witnesses were court employees assigned at either the Office of the Clerk of
Court or Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga.
In due time, the Investigating Justice submitted her Report and Recommendation with
the following findings:
chanr ob1es virtual 1aw libr ary

The evidence shows that complainant Atty. Jocelyn "Joy" C. Talens-Dabon, 29, a
resident of Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga, is the Assistant Clerk of Court of the
RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga which item she assumed on August 10, 1995, after
working for more than a year as Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Kalookan City under
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. At the time of her assumption to office, she was about to
get married to Atty. Dabon, a lawyer who work at the Court of Appeals. She is a
Methodist, the same religion as that of respondents wife and family.
Respondent Judge Hermin E. Arceo, 54, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan is the
Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 43 in San Fernando, Pampanga. He was newly
designated Executive Judge therein vice Judge Teodoro Bay who transferred to
Quezon City. His wife is ailing and on dialysis, and has been residing in the U.S. with
their daughter since 1989. His family is in the printing business and his translations of
some laws and books have been published (Exhs. 15-23). He has pursued further legal
studies abroad either as participant or guest. He is President of the Pampanga-Angeles
City RTC Judges Association and was designated Presidential Assistant for Operations
of the Philippine Judges Association (PJA)
Three days after complainant first reported at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Elenita Quinsay, she was summoned by Respondent. He was typing when she came in
and at this first meeting, she was surprised that without even looking up at her, he
asked her in a loud voice what she wanted. When he did look at her she was bothered
by the way he looked at her from head to foot "as if he were undressing her."
Respondent told her that she was going to be detailed to his office as his assistant, a
situation which she did not welcome having heard of respondents reputation in the
office as "bastos" and "maniakis" prompting her to work for her transfer to Branch 45
under Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina.

94

On August 21, 1995, complainant received respondents Executive Order No. 001-95
(Exh. H) requiring her to report to the office of the Executive Judge effective August 28,
1995. Her work was to draft and file memos and circulars, pay telephone and electric
bills and other clerical duties assigned to her by Respondent. At one time she was
designated to act as Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 43 in the absence of OIC
Bernardo Taruc. She observed respondent to be rude and disrespectful to her and the
other court personnel. He talked in a loud voice and shouted at them; used offensive
words such as "walang isip", "tanga" ; told green jokes and stories; made harsh and
negative comments about court personnel in the presence of others. Whenever he had
the opportunity he would make bodily contact ("chancing") with her and certain female
employees. Twice as she was about to go out the door respondent would approach it in
big strides so that his body would be in contact with hers and he would press the lower
part of his body against her back. When complainant introduced her fiance to him,
respondent asked her why she was playing with her forefinger, at the same time
gesturing with his to signify sexual intercourse. Sometime in November 1995,
respondent kissed complainant on the cheek, a fact admitted by him in his testimony.
He also admitted kissing witnesses Marilyn Leander, Ester Galicia and other female
employees.
Sometime in October 1995, the Courts of San Fernando transferred to the Greenfields
Country Club due to the inundation of their regular offices with lahar. Ester Galicia
whose house was also affected was allowed to house her appliances in the staff room
of RTC Branch 43. These included a VCR on which, as testified by witness Bernardo
Taruc, a VHS tape entitled "Illegal in Blue" brought by respondent was played at
respondents bidding. The tape contained explicit sex scenes and during its showing
respondent would come out of his chamber and tease the female employees about it.
Taruc further related that at one time respondent brought and showed to the employees
a picture which when held in some way showed figures in coital position.
Adding to complainants apprehensions about respondents sexual predilection were the
revelations of Marilyn Senapilo-Leander, 23, a stenographer of Branch 43. Testifying on
her own experiences with respondent, Leander stated that respondent wrote a love
poem to her (Exh. A) and that many times while taking dictation from respondent in his
chamber, he would suddenly dictate love letters or poems addressed to her as if
courting her (Exhs. B to E). He kissed her several times, pointedly stared at her lower
parts when she wore tight pants and made body contacts ("chancing"). At one point
bursting into tears which prompted this Investigator to suspend her testimony; she
was so agitated Leander testified of the time that respondent summoned her to his
chamber and she found him clad only in briefs. When she turned around to flee,
respondent called after her saying "why are you afraid. After all, this is for you" .
Leander took into her confidence the most senior employee in Branch 43, OIC Clerk of
Court Bernardo Taruc who then took it upon himself to accompany Leander in
respondents office whenever he could or ask other female employees to accompany
her. Taruc asked Leander to report the matter to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo

95

Suarez but Leander expressed fear of retribution from Respondent. When Leanders
wedding was set in late 1995, respondent taunted her by saying "Ikay, ang dami ko pa
namang balak sa yo, kinuha pa naman kita ng bahay sa isang subdivision, tapos
sinayang mo lang, tanga ka kasi!" This is admitted by respondent who said it was only a
joke. Asked why she did not file any complaint against the respondent for sexually
harassing her, Marilyn Leander explained:
jgc:chanrobles .c om.ph

"I am afraid considering that I am just an ordinary employee. And I know for a fact that
Judge Hermin Arceo is a very influential person, he is very rich. I know he has lots of
friends in Pampanga like the Governor. I know I cannot fight by myself alone." (TSN,
March 20, 1966, p. 30).
For the complainant, these personal and vicarious experiences hit bottom with the
incident that happened in the afternoon of December 6, 1995. As testified by
complainant, corroborated in parts by Bemardo Taruc, Yolanda Valencia and Rosanna
Garcia, complainant was summoned at about 1:30 p.m. to respondents temporary
chamber at Greenfields Country Club by respondent who himself came to the Staff
room. By this time, only the Office of the Clerk of Court and RTC Branch 43 had been
left at Greenfields; the other RTC branches had returned to their usual offices at the Hall
of Justice. The Sangguniang Panglalawigan which had also occupied Greenfields had
likewise vacated the building only the day before.
At his temporary chamber at Greenfields, respondent occupied two (2) small adjoining
rooms while the personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court and RTC Branch 43
occupied a bigger room called the Maple Room (Please see Exhs. "J", "K" and "2"). In
respondents Floor Plan marked Exhibit "2" it appears that from respondents chamber,
one had to pass a chapel and bar lounge before reaching the staff room. The door to
the outer room of the chamber was equipped with a knob and an automatic door closer.
When locked from inside, it could not be opened outside except with a key. Since there
was no airconditioner, this door was usually held open for ventilation by a chair or a
small Table. The outer room had filing cabinet and sacks of rice lined up on two (2)
sides of the wall. The inner room also had a door but without a knob. Respondent had
his desk here. The window in this room opened to the lawn of the Country Club.
Amid this backdrop in what may have been a somnolent afternoon at Greenfields,
complainant entered respondents office. Already made cautious by respondents
reputation and Mrs. Leanders experience, she took care to check the outer door and
noted the chair which prevented it from closing. Her apprehension increased because
the hallway was clear of people and only the personnel of Branch 43 and the Office of
the Clerk of Court were left holding office there. She entered the inner room, and sat on
a chair in front of respondents desk. They talked about the impending construction of
the Hall of Justice. Their conversation was interrupted when Bemardo Taruc dropped by
to tell respondent of a phone call for him. Respondent left the room but told complainant
to remain for the signing of her Certificate of Service which she was then bringing. After
a few minutes respondent returned and they resumed their conversation. When the talk
veered to his wife, complainant became uneasy and directed respondents attention to

96

her unsigned Certificate of Service. After respondent signed it, complainant prepared to
leave the room. At this juncture, respondent handed to her a folded yellow paper
containing his handwritten poem (Exh. M; p. 22, Record).
Hereunder quoted is the poem and complainants interpretation of it as contained in her
Memorandum:
jgc:chanrobles .c om.ph

"Dumating ka sa buhay ko isang araw ng Agosto

Ang baon mo ay yong ganda at talinong abogado
Ang tamis ng yong ngiti ang bumihag sa puso ko
Malakas na pampalubag sa mainit kong ulo."

cralaw virtua1aw libr ar y

"Indeed, the last two lines of the first stanza are consistent with complainants claim
regarding respondents rude manner and erratic mood swings.
"The second stanza of respondents poem also jibes with his own testimony that he
would often look for complainant whenever he would not see her, and with
complainants testimony that respondents behavior towards her his propensity to
utter remarks with sexual connotations, his acts of making physical contact with her,
among others
"Ang akala koy gayong lamang magiging pagtingin sa iyo
Ako itong amo at ikaw ang empleyado
Bakit habang tumatagal isip koy nagugulo
Pag di ka nakikitay laging nagagalit ako."

cralaw virtua1aw libr ar y

"The third stanza is most descriptive of respondents attitude towards complainant which
complainant and her witnesses described as rude. It is also consistent with the
testimonies of witnesses that respondent would shout at complainant and would crack
green jokes towards her:
jgc:chanrobles .c om.ph

"Damdamin kong sumusumpling pilit kong itinatago

Sa malalakas na mga tinig asik at mga biro
Ngunit kung nag-iisa puso koy nagdurugo
Hinahanap ng puso ko ang maganda mong anyo.
"The fifth stanza jibes with complainants testimony that respondent gave her an

97

unexpected kiss on at least two occasions:

jgc:chanrobles .c om.ph

"Bawat patak ng luha koy mga butil ng pag-ibig

Na siya kong kalasag sa pagnanakaw ng halik
Sa pisngi mo aking mahal, aking nilalangit
Patak ng ulan sa buhay kong tigang ang nakakawangis."

cralaw virtua1aw libr ar y

"Finally, the fourth and last paragraphs of the poem provides the context of the
lascivious acts committed by respondent against complainant on 6 December 1995:

jgc:chanr obl es.c om.ph

"Sawingpalad na pagibig nabigong pangarap

Na ikaw ay maangkin, mahagkan at mayakap
Pag-ibig moy ibinigay sa higit na mapalad
Ako ngayoy naririto bigong-bigong umiiyak."

cralaw virtua1aw li brar y

Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik

Sa ngayon o bukas pagkat di mo ibig
Aangkinin kita kahit sa panaginip
Ganon kita kamahal Joy, aking pag- ibig."

cralaw virtua1aw li brar y

(Complainants Memorandum, pp. 32-33)

Complainant found the poem repulsive (obscene) particularly the line saying "Kapalaran
ay malupit, di kita makatalik sa ngayon at bukas pagkat di mo ibig." In her testimony,
complainant said she considered the poem malicious because they were both married
persons, and he was a judge and she was his subordinate. Although outraged,
complainant respectfully asked permission to leave while putting the poem in the pocket
of her blazer. She then proceeded towards the outer room where she was surprised to
find the door closed and the chair holding it open now barricaded it. The knobs button
was now in a vertical position signifying that door was locked.
Complainant was removing the chair when respondent walked to her in big strides
asking her for a kiss. Seconds later he was embracing her and trying to kiss her.
Complainant evaded and struggled and pushed respondent away. Then panicking, she
ran in the direction of the filing cabinets. Respondent caught up with her, embraced her
again, pinned her against the filing cabinets and pressed the lower part of his body
against hers. Complainant screamed for help while resisting and pushing Respondent.

98

Then she ran for the open windows of the inner room. But before she could reach it
respondent again caught her. In the ensuing struggle, complainant slipped and fell on
the floor, her elbows supporting the upper part of her body while her legs were
outstretched between respondents feet. Respondent then bent his knees in a
somewhat sitting (squatting) position, placed his palms on either side of her head and
kissed her on the mouth with his mouth open and his tongue sticking out. As
complainant continued to struggle, respondent suddenly stopped and sat on the chair
nearest the door of the inner room with his face red and breathing heavily. Complainant
angrily shouted "maniac, demonyo, bastos, napakawalanghiya ninyo." Respondent kept
muttering "I love you" and was very apologetic offering for his driver to take her home.
Complainant headed for the Maple Room where, when she entered, she was observed
by Bernardo Taruc and Yolanda Valencia to be flushed in the face and with her hair
disheveled. Yolanda particularly found surprising complainants disheveled hair because
complainant considered her (long straight) hair one of her assets and was always
arranging it. Rosanna Garcia in her testimony observed that complainant was really
angry as shown by the way she grabbed her bag "talagang galit."
cralaw virtua1aw libr ary

It is to be noted that Mrs. Rosanna Garcia, 36, was a most reluctant witness. When first
subpoenaed, she did not appear and sent a medical certificate (p. 120, Record) that she
was suffering from hypertension. She testified that she was asked by respondent to sign
an affidavit (Exh. F, pp. 56-57, Record) prepared by him and that eventually, she
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay in her own handwriting (Exh. G) wherein she stated
that some of the statements in her earlier affidavit were false and that she was only
forced to sign because respondent shouted at her when she refused; that she was
afraid of respondent who was her boss. She corroborated complainants declaration that
respondent went to the door of the Maple Room in order to call her (complainant),
adding that his call could not be made from his office because he could not be heard as
his office was far from the Maple Room. This is in direct contrast to respondents
testimony that he did not summon complainant but she came to him to get the poem
that she asked him to make for her.
When complainant angrily left the Maple Room, Yolanda Valencia followed and walked
with her outside. On the road, complainant told Valencia "napakawalanghiya ni Judge,
bastos, demonyo and vowed that she would tell her family about what respondent did
to her so that her father would maul him. As testified by Yolanda Valencia, complainant
was so angry "nagdadabog talaga siya" (TSN, March 19, 1996, p. 194). But as they
were already on the road, complainant did not tell Valencia what happened.
The next day complainant related her experience to Bernardo Taruc with whom she
rode to the office. As testified by Taruc:
jgc:chanrobles .com.ph

"A She was telling me about the incident which happened that afternoon of December 6,
1995.
Q Can you tell us what she told you about the December 6, 1995 incident?

99

A She told me that she was kissed by the Judge inside his office.
Q What else did she tell you, if any?
A She said that she was pushed on the floor and she was very disorganized in relating
the incident it was as if she was trying to say all things at the same time. But what I got
from her was that she was kissed by the Judge in the office on December 6 on the lips
and she was fuming mad.
Q What was your reaction when you heard that from Atty. Talens-Dabot?
A I was . . . I was shocked . . . I dont know the proper term. I was shocked.
Q What did you say or do upon learning the incident?
A When she later on was pacified, she asked me, what am I going to do? Am I going to
press charges?
Q What did you say?
A I told her it is up to her and before doing it she has to weigh all things, the
consequences if she would file a case.
Q Was that the end of the conversation?
A No, she kept on retelling it all over again till we reach the office."

cralaw virtua1aw libr ar y

(TSN, March 20, 1966, pp. 127-128).

Complainant also related what happened to witness Atty. Elenita Quinsay but, as
testified by Atty. Quinsay, complainant did not want anybody (else) to know about the
kissing incident at that point. Atty. Quinsay advised complainant to talk with respondent
and ask for a transfer.
On December 12, 1995 complainant went to the Hall of Justice where respondent was,
and as he was about to board his car, approached him and verbally broached her
request for transfer. He acceded. Thus in the morning of December 18, 1995,
complainant brought her written request for transfer dated December 12, 1995 (Exh. N)
for respondents signature, reminding him of his earlier verbal approval. He refused
saying he needed her for two (2) administrative cases that he was investigating. When
she insisted, he shouted at her saying it was his decision and had to be obeyed.
However, he eventually signed the memorandum (Exh. O) transferring her later that
morning.
Two days later, on December 20, 1995, complainant, after consulting her family,
reported the matter to the police and filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San

100

Fernando, Pampanga criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness (Exh. 3), Violation of
Anti-Sexual Harassment Law (Exh. 5) and this administrative case the following day.
For his part, respondent mostly denied complainants allegations. He presented his
version of some specific incidents or conduct such as that he was merely imitating
complainants gesture with her forefinger as she nervously introduced her boyfriend to
him. He admitted that he kissed her ("November incident was not the first but it was the
last") and other female employees; admitted the pre-wedding incident where he told
Mrs. Leander "tanga ka kasi" but said it was only a joke; admitted that his voice is
louder than others but he does not shout; admitted that he tells green but "never vulgar"
jokes. Denying Marilyn Leanders allegations and disclaiming any knowledge of Exhs. A
to E, he described Leander as a "very young funny person, always laughing." In his
testimony he never showed why Marilyn Leander, Rosanna Garcia or Yolanda Valencia
would testify against him to corroborate complainants testimony, reserving his venom
for Bernardo Taruc. He said Tarucs research work were "not usable." He insinuated
that Taruc perjured himself because he was jealous about Marilyn Leander with whom
he (Taruc) has a relationship.
He declared that nothing happened on December 6, that it was complainant who
entered his room to get the poem she herself asked him to make. He called the
December 6 incident a "mere fabrication" of complainant in vengeful retaliation of four
(4) incident that he either scolded or humiliated her namely: in September 1995 when
he reminded, but did not scold, her to report to Branch 43; in November 1995 when he
reproached her for not reflecting in her Certificate of Service that she had gone to
Hongkong; in the first week of December 1995 when she committed an error in the
notice for a judges meeting; and finally on December 18, 1995, when he scolded her for
insisting to allow her to return to the Office of the Clerk of Court. He asserted that he
never noticed any change of complainants behavior towards him and that he was never
attracted to her.
He dismissed the poem marked Exhibit "M" as nothing more than an intellectual
creation "too apocryphal to be true", that it was exaggerated and meant only to praise
and entertain complainant. He declared that he had in fact written other poems (Exhs.
25 to 30) including the one published through a certain Fred Roxas-(Exh. 25). Belying
the kissing incident, he contended that there had been a gardener working at 3:00 to
5:00 that afternoon on the lawn just outside the window of his office, implying that if
indeed complainant had screamed, it would have been heard by the gardener. But it is
to be noted that this alleged gardener was never presented.
(pp. 11-31, Report and Recommendation)
Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice made the following
conclusions: a) that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that
respondent committed the acts complained of, especially the violent kissing incident
which transpired last December 6, 1995; b) that complainant and her witnesses are
credible witnesses who have no ulterior motive or bias to falsely testify against

101

respondent; c) that respondents denials can not prevail over the weight and probative
value of the affirmative assertions of complainant and her witnesses; d) that
respondents poem has damned him, being documented proof of his sexual intentions
towards the complainant; e) that by filing her charges imputing to respondent a crime
against chastity and with her background as a lawyer and a court employee,
complainant was well-aware that her honor would itself be on trial; f) that it is
unbelievable that complainant, a demure newly-married lady and a religious person,
would fabricate a story with such severe implications on respondents professional and
personal life just to get even with respondent for an alleged simple scolding incident;
and g) that by doing the acts complained of, respondent has tempted the morals of not
only complainant but also the other court employees over whom he exercised power
and influence as Executive Judge. The Investigating Justice thereupon, recommended
that respondent be dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-appointment in any
other government position and with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges appertaining
him, if any.
The Court has reviewed the record of this case and has thereby satisfied itself that the
findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in truth adequately
supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles. The Court
agrees and adopts such findings and recommendations.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people
who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the
law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people
that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people
who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must
possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in
their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, we have the
following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
chanr ob1es virtual 1aw libr ar y

Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.

102

Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency
which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat v. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284
[1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals,
to the extent that such private morals are externalized (Junio v. Rivera, 225 SCR A 688
[1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess
moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. v. Tapucar (102 SCRA 493 [1981]), the
Court laid down the rationale why every judge must posses moral integrity, thusly;
The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond
reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the people in the
administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not
equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely continues
to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a
necessity in the judiciary.
(at p. 504.)
In Castillo v. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991], it was emphasized that:

chanr ob1es virtual 1aw librar y

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a
judges official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus:
chanr ob1es virtual 1aw libr ar y

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion.
(at p. 93.)
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a
manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the
peoples high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in
general.

103

We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by respondent
judge in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The audacity
under which the same were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were
perpetrated shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that
respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the
judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the judiciary,
fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form
of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive
judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and
lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees,
respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
Noteworthy then is the following observation of the Investigating Justice:

chanr ob1es virtual 1aw li brar y

But the very act of forcing himself upon a married woman, being himself a married man,
clearly diverts from the standard of morality expected of a man of less than his standing
in society. This is exacerbated by the fact that by doing the acts complained of, he has
tempted the morals of not only the complainant but also the young Mrs. Marilyn Leander
and the other employees in the court over whom he exercised power and influence as
Executive Judge.
(pp. 36-37.)
Respondent may indeed be a legally competent person as evidenced by his published
law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and his legal studies abroad, but he
has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without any
hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction dismissal
from the service.
As a reminder to all judges, it is fitting to reiterate one of the mandates of the Court in its
Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, to wit:
chanr ob1es virtual 1aw libr ar y

Finally, all trial judges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictly in accordance
with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Ethics that they be
exemplars in the communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of
Law.

104

WHEREFORE, Judge Hermin E. Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the service for
gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of
the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

12. Terre v. Terre, 221 SCRA 7

SDS

TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)

105

PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with grossly immoral conduct, consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting No judicial action having
been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant.
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this
fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void
ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their marriage license, despite her
objection, he wrote single as her status. After getting the complainant pregnant, Atty.
Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainants evidence
as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second
place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he inveigled complainant
into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void
ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free
to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a
lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

13. BARRIENTOS V. DAAROL, 218 SCRA 30

DFDS

106

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing in the province
of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together
with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a
teenager and first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to
their house being a friend of her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent as being
single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at
Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's
convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her
parents, which respondent did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served as usherette in the
convention and respondent picked her up from her residence every morning and took her home from the convention
site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep
and then they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that
respondent told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance;
complainant told respondent that she would think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their
house almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her decision on respondent's proposal;
that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his usual visitations
almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez
Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp.
119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking
her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked
the jeep by the beach where there were no houses around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep,
respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his hand kept on moving

107

to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this Trans?", but he
answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near,
the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid"
(ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty; that she told him that
she was afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have sexual
intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated
his promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went
home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in
Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the airport where they would have
sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or three
times a week, and she consented to all these things because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred
during the second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no
menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent and respondent
suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to
worry because they would get married within one month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her parents about their marriage; it was
agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a scandal as complainant was already
pregnant; complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by
plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to
Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent
told them that he could not marry complainant because he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother
got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.).
Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant not to worry because respondent had been separated from his
wife for 16 years and he would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139,
tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00
(p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support; he came back to Manila
in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March 1974 and
told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers
the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and
instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and,
her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at
the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her
brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to
Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come to see her
(tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it
was dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1).
Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that
he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of
incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and
thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952 because he was his teacher;
likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were former classmates in high school; that he became
acquainted with complainant when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends and
often talked with each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being
estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him
to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was during this occasion that they
became close to each other and after the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of
courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair, complainant

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complained to him of a headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy
ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them,
they started the usual kisses and they were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made love; that
before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went
on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that
the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's
talk with the parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but estranged from his
wife; that when complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could
not marry again, otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as
he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have sexual intercourse with him
because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed
against him by complainant because of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for
the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for
medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old
during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952;
while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative,
and 41 years old at the time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was
solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo,
Parish Priest thereat; and that said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his
relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been a former student of
complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in
Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other sisters,
Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant
and who became a close friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the
Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in
the morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on
July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock
that evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love twice or three times a week; that as a
result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant
would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there on
the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to
deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took
her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the
Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she
went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of
her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration;
which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings against
respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol
be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor General.

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From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married
individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then,
respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out
that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is
not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from him.
He never introduced his son and went around with friends as though he was never married much less had a child in the same locality. This
circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his
courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense
of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is,
her father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong with
this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly,
respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1
[1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing
is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages and has
inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam
religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office
of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he was already married and would
open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives,
as he is now claiming, why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He said while
he was a moslem, but, having been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil
ceremony without committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant,
then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant because he knew the existence of a
legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced
the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec.
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules
of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda,
181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda,
Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in
such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains
the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior marriage to
another man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her
in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July
3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor,
knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by
deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is
therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. Respondent
having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action disbarment.

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The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to
aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re
Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of
the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a
manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21,
26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and learned
profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar and is
hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of
the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.

14. BANOGON V. ZERNA, 154 SCRA 593

GHJ

111

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental (Branch III).

CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court
way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision
was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on
March 26, 1957. On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the
petition was filed. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for
reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on
certiorari to question the orders of the respondent judge. 2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and
lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926
on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches,
it was held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory
because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private
respondents. The said judgment would become so only after one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private
respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in
their the pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926,
became final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the
petitioners during that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it
occurred to them to question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the

112

1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein
petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition
for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet
become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been
registered, the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of reopening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same
party be denied this remedy before the decree is issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now
pretend that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been
registered and the one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran 7 where it was
held:
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the
Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds
of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving this provision a
literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be
presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious
that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant
would have been better expressed by stating that such petitioners must be presented
before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a
reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.
We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any
time the rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the final decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).

A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this
doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was
not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their
position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon
any attempt to prolong them." 8
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary,
much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away by efforts, far
from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially
so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9

113

This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft

of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a technicality.
From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to our disapproval of
such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law.
Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.
Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended
deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so again. 10

Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for
the dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto
had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition.
11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of
waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the
parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of
the land in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their
purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen
popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not
to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of
them are only honest errors, this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and
intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that
only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened
enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a
case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already
congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by
commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is
immediately executory. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

15. RAYOS-OMBAC V. RAYOS, 285 SCRA 100

114

JK
71. Ombac vs. Rayos
Facts:

petition for disbarment filed by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and
moral fitness set up for members of the bar
Atty. Rayos induced 85 year old Mrs. Ombac to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to
him for safekeeping
o if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded from the estate of her
deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it
o withdraw Php 588,000
o advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he was working. He also
urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from
tracing the same
o offered to pay 2 second hand cars and Php 40,000

Issue: WON respondent violated Code of Professional responsibility

Held: Yes
Ratio:

he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return
the same despite demand
aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw
the disbarment case she filed against him

DISBARRED.

16. Millare v. Montero, 246 SCRA 1

115

LKL

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer
it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be
suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which
ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals
adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and
Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review
and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the
decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300%
the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be
allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on
November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the
MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On
December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the
defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by
fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were
secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral
Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on
April 14, 1988.

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In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the
motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC
in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December
12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and
therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of
execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of
execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690)
was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in
SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and
Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary
Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The
Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to
allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his
client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous
appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time
for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he
filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of
the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because
of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the
decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was
no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases
were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):

117

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was
already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is
ministerial only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction
either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court,
Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions
filed with the Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory
Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum
shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one
forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272
(1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the
lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to
be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed,
respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be
truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing
a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of
professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.

4. MUN. OF PILILIA, RIZAL V. CA, 233 SCRA 484

118

KKKK

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and
PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
Felix E. Mendiola for petitioner.
Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation.

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner questions and seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 27504 dated March 31,
1992, dismissing the petition for having been filed by a private counsel, as well as its succeeding resolution dated June 9, 1992, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1

The records show that on March 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered
judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of plaintiff, now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal,
against defendant, now herein private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC, for short),
ordering therein defendant to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on
business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said
municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983, inclusive, plus such amount of tax as may accrue until final
determination of the case; (2) storage permit fee in the amount of P3,321,730.00 due from the defendant
under Section 10, paragraph Z(13)
(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance for the period from 1975 to 1986, inclusive, plus the amount
of said fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; (3) mayor's permit fee due from the
defendant under Section 10, paragraph (P) (2) of said municipal tax ordinance from 1975 to 1984,
inclusive, in the amount of P12,120.00, plus such amount of the same fee as may accrue until final
determination of the case; (4) sanitary inspection fee in the amount of P1,010.00 for the period from 1975
to 1984, plus the amount of this fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; and (5) the costs
of suit. 2
On June 3, 1991, in G.R. No. 90776 this Court affirmed the aforesaid judgment, with the modification that
business taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC because the same have prescribed, and
that storage fees are not also to be paid by PPC since the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by
the municipality and, therefore, cannot be the bases of a charge for service by the municipality. 3 This
judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court
for execution.

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On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal* for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the
purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended. On October
21, 1991, defendant corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor
Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the abovementioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents
executed by said mayor. Accordingly, on October 31, 1991 the court below issued an order denying
plaintiff municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment
in question had already been satisfied. 4
Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's
aforesaid order of October 31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff
municipality amounted to P24,176,599.00, while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim
executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor could not waive the balance
which represents the taxes due under the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law
firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees
of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million.
On January 28,1992, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. 5
On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality, filed a
petition for certiorari with us, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and
was docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 27504. 6 On March 2, 1992, respondent PPC filed a motion
questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. 7 Consequently, on March 31,
1992 respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality
of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. 8 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of June 9, 1992. 9
Petitioner is once again before us with the following assignment of errors:
1. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to consider private respondent's new issue raised
for the first time on appeal, as it could no longer be considered on appeal, because it was
never been (sic) raised in the court below.
2. It is an error for the Court of Appeals in dismissing (sic) the instant petition with
alternative remedy of filing similar petition as it is a departure from established
jurisprudence.
3. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the filing of the instant petition by the
private counsel is in violation of law and jurisprudence. 10
We find the present petition devoid of merit.
The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of
and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private
attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 12 where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province
or municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in
litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or

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municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government
and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of
the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. 13
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy
Law, 14 only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in
their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. 15
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on
record. 16 In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the
provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the
municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a
special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in
court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. 17
It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel,
Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's
motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality. 18
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack
of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, 19 the issue of lack of
authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings
for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that
case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly
authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through
the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with
herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed
personally with the court below two pleadings
entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim". 20
A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly
dismissed his lawyer. Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the
municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law and
under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any

121

stage of the proceedings, and there is nothing

to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. 21
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. 22 Even
the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for
disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned
can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of
Court, but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement. 23
The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition,
considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative, is not only
conjectural but without factual basis. Contrary to his pretensions, there is presently a manifestation and
motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the
"Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim" 24 previously filed in the case therein as
earlier mentioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

5. LEDESMA V. CLIMACO, 57 SCRA 473

122

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as

Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the
defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the
conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise
noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his
designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel
could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is,
however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into
consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work
is likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an
obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is
clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for
the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its
duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent
Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he
also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of
the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of
petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the
challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel
de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17,
1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then

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respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of
the prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the
accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on
Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the
stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for
the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964
that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense
obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November
27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4
Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H.
Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9,
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed
at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5
After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to
the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission
on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as
counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that
counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is
indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why
a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is
found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting
standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid
in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any
frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do
compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high
degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying
cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel,
the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10
Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a courtappointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as
one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his
best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective
assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation.
For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of
social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance
was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases

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there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right
to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and; without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It
is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he
is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even more emphatic.
For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15
there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such
a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For
he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He
did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse
could be availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on
his time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would
exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only
to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition
is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of
them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., JUNE 17, 1993

125

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of
the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave.,
Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for
Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1

Tel. 521-7232; 521-

7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

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In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening
to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx

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A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the
very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.

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By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto.
It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by nonmembers of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession

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will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also,
and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers
of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work
is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all

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indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services
through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for
malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2
to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

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Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

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Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations.
He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures
he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our

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knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct

not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the law.
This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage
a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code
and the like, then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been preempted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the
lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of
the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of
the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from
their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful,
or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by
our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to
his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work,

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he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the

bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone
may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed rightof-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of
the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination
or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party
the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.
Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.

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1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication
of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text
may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is
the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN
A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person in a particular situation in their publication and sale
of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to
the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition
in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for
the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in
the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in

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connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation

agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice
or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only
"paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice
of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

15

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

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Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to

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clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3
[1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has
been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals
to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the
extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating
parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas;
giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an
insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what
the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic

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situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in
various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a
simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you
had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

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The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support
for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide.
25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all
the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized
by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those
not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of
the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons
over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever
may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of

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legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising
or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of

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changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public
opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the
Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from
lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law
and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

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The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of
the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action
as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Quiason, JJ., concur