Four Dimensions of Rules and

Their Correspondence to
Rule-Governed Behavior:
A Taxonomy
Martha Pelaez
Florida International University
and
Rafael Moreno
University of Seville
The taxonomy presented takes into account dimensions
of an entire contingency arrangement specified in the
rule and how these dimensions relate to the listener's
behavior. The classification is made according to rule:
(a) explicitness, (b) accuracy, (c) complexity, and (d)
source. It is argued that the probability that the listener
will behave according to a rule depends on the type of
rule provided, the context in which the rule is provided,
and listener's history with that or other similar rules.
Even though manipulations of other types of rules have
been conducted in studies of stimulus equivalence, relational frames, and derived stimulus relations, a systematic study of the differential effects of the proposed
16 types of rules on the listener's behavior is recommended.
Behavior analysts have distinguished rule-gov
erned behavior from direct contingency-shaped
behavior on the bases of different sets of controlling contingencies (e.g., Galizio, 1979; Reese, 1989;
Verplanck, 1992; Zettle & Hayes, 1982). However,
the contingency-specifying verbal stimuli (i.e., the
rules), whose function is to control behavior and
that have function-altering effects (Schlinger &
Blakely, 1987) have not been systematically analyzed and classified in terms of both form and
function. The classification of rules offered here
may contribute to an advancement in the structural and functional analysis of rule-governed behavior.

On the Meanings
Behavior

of Rule-Governed

Rule-governed behavior has been distinguished theofetically and experimentally from behavior that is shaped and maintained by its direct consequences (e.g., Catania, 1985; Catania, Shimoff, &
Matthews, 1989; Cerutti, 1989; Hineline &
Wanchinsen, 1989; Vaughan, 1989; Zettle & Hayes,

1982). Skinner (1953, 1957, 1966, 1969) distinguished between behavior shaped by direct consequences, naming it contingency-shaped behavior,
and behavior controlled by verbal antecedents,
'naming it rule-governed behavior. In his account,
contingency-shaped behavior is maintained by direct consequences and comes under the control of
discriminative stimuli. In contrast, rule-governed
behavior, is controlled by verbal behavior, and only indirectly maintained by its consequences. In
this sense, Skinner (1966) identified rules as contingency-specifying verbal stimuli-as stimuli that
specify, either directly or indirectly, consequences
for the behavior.

Rules and Rule-Governed Behavior As

Useful Concepts
A concept of rule-governed behavior can be
useful if it accommodates the description of complex behavior that is under the control of contingencies and can be modified by antecedent verbal
stimuli (i.e., rules). The primary function of a rule,
then, is to influence or guide the 1:>ehaviorof the
listener--controlling the listeners' behavior in ways
specified by the verbal behavior of the speaker.
Such control can include producing novel ways of
behaving.
Although the control of rules in governing behavior has been demonstrated, the distinction between contingency-shaped behavior and rule-governed behavior, at times, is unclear. Theoretical inconsistencies in the distinction qetween notions of
contingency-shaped and rule-governed behavior
have been discussed (e.g., Cerutti, 1989; Pelaez-No
gueras & Gewirtz, 1995; Ribes, 1992).
We should emphasize that although both are
established by consequences, the controlling variables and functional properties of contingency-sha
ped and rule-governed behavior differ. The particular functions of verbal stimuli, as controlling
rules, are to specify (either explicitly or implicitly)
the entire contingency array among antecedent
stimulus, response, and consequence, in a given
context. A rule must be understood in terms of
the descriptions it makes of contingent relations
among the three-term contingency (four or five
term) in context. Such relations might or might
not be present in the very situation where the rule
is given, which imply more complexity of the entire contingencies embedded in the rule. The
transmission of these "non-present complex contingent relations" can be achieved only through
language. Clearly, the ultimate controlling charac-

ter of a rule is based on ready-made discriminative

attributes that, by virtue of the listener's verbal
history, do not require new conditioning in every
new situation in which the rule is provided.
Moreover, individuals can behave from the outset
in accordance with rules that they have never before encountered.
Zettle and Hayes (1982) stress that rule-governed behavior involves two sets of contingencies:
those related directly to the behavior of interest,
and those related to the verbal antecedents of such
behavior (i.e., tracking and pliance). From our perspective, the emphasis is in the analysis of the two
sets of the entire contingencies involved in terms
of both form and function. The two sets of contingencies we are interested in analyzing are those
specified in the rule (SD--R--SR) and those in
which the listener's behavior is embedded (Sd--RSR) -the latter contingencies resulting from directacting. Rules and rule-related behaviors can be
meaningfully understood only when analyzed as
an interdependent unit.

tingencies embedded in rules result from the

speakers' verbal behavior. We should clarify that,
we examine rules in terms of the contingencies
they specify, although we do not analyze the behavior of the speaker per se (the behavior of the
rule-giver), nor the history of contingencies and
variables maintaining the speaker's rule-giVing behavior. Rule-following behavior is controlled by
the results of rule-giving behavior and it is in this
sense that we are only indirectly interested in the
behavior of the speaker.
Our main purpose in the remainder of this paper is to analyze: (a) the form and function of the
contingency specifying verbal stimuli that can controllistener's behavior, and, (b) the related listeners' rule-following behavior.

There exists a co-dependent relation between

the rule and the behavior of the listener. A rule's
function can only be identified in terms of its relation to rule-governed behavior, and rule-governed
behavior makes sense only in reference to a rule,
or set of specified contingencies. A rule's form or
structure, however, can be identified a priori, before identifying the behavior of the listener.
We should stress, though, that the verbal character of rules must not be understood in a strictly
morphological sense (i.e., in terms of rule form or
structure), given that verbal stimuli of different
forms can have an identical functions (e.g., red
traffic light, the word "STOP"). In studying rules
we must consider both their structure and function. Functionally speaking, then, each contingency set involves a mutually dependent relationship
between environmental stimuli and the individuaI's responses. Each set is influenced by its current
and historical context (Kantor, 1924/1926; Morris,
1988; Pelaez-Nogueras, 1994). In sum, the probability that the listener will behave according to a
rule depends on (a) the contingencies specified in
the speaker's rule, (b) the context within which the
rule is provided, and (c) the listener's history with
that or other similar rules.
In our present analysis, we focus on rules and
on the set of contingencies that they specify for the
listener (Skinner, 1989). The specifications of con-

complexity, and (d) source.

Dimensions
Behavior

of Rules and Their Related

A functional identification or classification

among different types of rules and their correspondence to rule-governed behavior has been
limited. The classification is made according to
four dimensions: (a) explicitness, (b) accuracy, (c)

Explicitn~ss of the Rule

Explicit versus implicit rules. Rules can be
distinguished based on the completeness or specificity of the contingencies expressed by the speaker. The explicit rule clearly identifies the components of the entire contingency and its context.
Such explicit rules incorporate all the contingency
components, comprehensively specifying readily
identifiable contexts. In contrast, in the implicit
rule, the contingencies may not gain verbal expression, either because some of the components are
unnamed or because they are expressed in a way
not identifiable in time and space. An example of
an implicit rule omitting components of the entire
contingency would be: "Keep your eyes on the
road while you are driving." in which the consequence is not specified. In studies of matching-tosample and stimulus equivalence, subjects often
follow rules where the antecedent stimulus-response relations are omitted in the instructions
provided by the experimenter. Some maxims and
proverbs represent examples of implicit rules that
name components without assigning them concrete identification. For instance, "A peaceable
person is a long-lived one."

Explicitly versus implicitly rule-governed behavior.

For th~ most part, correspondence between rule-governed behavior of the listener and
the rule provided by the speaker will be determined by the explicitness of the contingencies contained in the rule. The more explicit the elements
of the contingency expressed in the rule, the more
direct the influence upon the listener's behavior
(Martinez, Gonzalez, Ortiz, & Carrillo, in press;
Martinez, Moreno, Ortiz, & Carrillo, in press;
Trigo, 1998). Nevertheless, the subject can learn to
respond to classes of rules characterized by incomplete contingency specification, such as when the
subject complies with the rule "Don't do it!,'"even
though entire elements of the contingency and its
context lack description. This is possible due to
the listener's learning history in a given context.

Accurate versus inaccurate rules. An accurate

rule specifies contingencies that, when followed,
match certain event-consequence relationship in
the environment. Here, accurate rules specify contingencies that may occur. An inaccurate rule describes contingencies that do not correspond to
those encountered in the environment. An example of the former is "If you keep looking away
while you are speeding, you may have an accident." A rule of the inaccurate case is "If you keep
speeding you are going to be rewarded by the police."When the programmed contingency corresponds to the feedback provided by the experimenter, we speak of accurate rules. Conversely,
when programmed contingencies do not correspond to or contradict the experimenters' feedback
or rules, then we speak of inaccurate rules.
Adjusted versus non-adjusted rule-governed
behavior. The listener's behavior may adjust to
the speaker's rules when the contingencies specified in the rules are accurate or correspond to the
programmed
(or direct)
contingencies
(Degrandpre & Buskist, 1991). Rule-governed behavior is sensitive (or adjusted) to the prescribed
contingencies only to the extent that these prescriptions are consistent (or correspond) with the
programmed contingencies. Following inaccurate
rules may desensitize the listener to the effects of
programmed contingencies (Buskist & Miller,
1986; Catania, Matthews & Shimoff, 1982; Martinez & Ribes, 1996; Michel & Bernstein, 1991),
Hence, in addition to the degree of accuracy in a
given contingency-rule prescripHon, the listener's

history and current context significantly affect the

extent to which rules will govern behavior.

Lower versus higher rule complexity. The contingencies specified in a rule always include at
least one relation among behavior, its antecedent
stimuli, and its consequences. In our analysis, rule
complexity refers to the number of dimensions of
the antecedent stimuli and their relations (Pelaez,
Moreno, Martinez, Trigo, & Qiang, in review). Dimensions are characteristics or attributes of stimuli
employed, for instance, in matching procedures.
Colors, shapes, sizes, and positions represent dimensions of stimuli and can be related to one another. The taxonomy of rule complexity offered
here is organized
hierarchically
and is
inclusionary, meaning that each lower level of
complexity forms part of the next higher level.
A rule's lowest level of complexity specifies at
least one dimension of a sample stimulus. For example, the instruction: "Name the colors of the figures appearing on the screen" specifies only one
dimension (where green, red, and blue are instances of the color dimension). The following example
specifies two dimensions of the stimuli: "Indicate
the color and shape of the figures appearing on the
screen" (where green, red, and blue are instances
of color dimension, and triangles, squares and circles are instances of the shape dimension). However, a more complex level of the rule specifies a
relation among two or more dimensions, each relation
forming a relational frame (Trigo, Martinez, &
Moreno, 1995). For example, in the instruction
"Give me the apples that are smaller than the oranges," the speaker implies a relation between apples and oranges in terms of size dimension. This
level of relationship is equivalent to the typical
first order matching-to-sample procedure where
behavior
of the subject
comes under
discriminative control of a fourth-term--as in
Sidman's four-term contingency (SD {SDR-SR)) (1986).
Rules of higher level of complexity, however,
involve a secondary or higher-order class of relation. A second-order response then involves abstracting a relation from other relation(s). Thus, a
higher order relation includes a second-order
stimulus control of rules and associates one relation to other dimensions (or to other relations).
This level seems to correspond to Sidman's five-te
rm contingency (5--SD-{SD-R-SR}).
There is
no limit to the complexity embedded in the rule

because it is always possible to add one more dimension or to add more relations. For instance, a
third order conditional relation would include at
least one second order relation, and so on.
Simple versus complex rule-governed behavior. Correspondence between the level of rules
and verbally-controlled behavior is likely. Less
complex rule-governed behavior more often corresponds to simpler rules; in turn, more complex behavior adjusts to higher-level contingency arrangements. For the listener to adjust or respond
according to a specified rule, his or her optimal
performance should ultimately correspond to the
complexity of the verbal stimuli controlling his
/her behavior. A concept similar to maximizing
may help here. Given two or more rules provided,
an individual will follow the rule with higher
probability of reinforcement. In addition to the
level of rule complexity, the probability that the
listener will follow a rule ultimately depends on
the context within which the rule is provided and
the listener's history with other similar rules. Listener's history may explain the disparities in behavior among recipients of similar rules in comparable contexts. For instance, a listener may interpret an algebraic rule of moderate complexity to
be simple or complex, depending upon his or her
knowledge of mathematics.

Rules provided by others versus self-provided

and self-generated
rules.
Rule identification
should consider the source of the antecedent stirnulus control. In cases of rules provided by others,
the speaker (other than the listener) specifies, implicitly or explicitly, the criterion for the listener's
behavior. In the case of self-provided rules, the
speaker and the listener are the same individual.
Also, self-provided rules can be taught by others or
self-generated or abstracted by the subject from
learning experiences. In the first case, although
the rule is self-provided, it does not originate in
the behavior of the subject (e.g., problem solving
behavior), but in the behavior of others. The
speaker/listener may have no understanding of
how to arrive at, or derive such a rule, because he
or she may "know that" but not "know how or
why" the contingencies specified in such rules are
related. Rules taught by others are often learned
via imitation processes (i.e., immediate, delayed
and pervasive or generalized imitation processes,
see Pelaez-Nogueras & Gewirtz, 1995).

In the case of "seW-generated rules (or rule

generated by the subject), a developmental history
of direct experiences with at least some of the related contingencies specified in the verbal rule is
required. (The term "self" as used here, does not
imply the initiation of a behavior by an autonomous internal agent or by some imaginary part of
the individual, it refers to the individual's behavior repertory.) The verbal contingency specifications produced by the individual allows him or
her to arrive, derive, or abstract other relations.
Rule generation (rule derivation or rule emergence) can occur through transfer processes of
learning, as in transitivity (Sidman, 1986) and
combinatorial entailment (Hayes, 1991; Hayes &
Hayes, 1992). Only after having acquired a receptive understanding of a rule and expressed an explicit rule, can the listener emit rule-corresponding
behavior. When an individual can state or describe to others the orderliness of the environmental relations (the contingencies) we assume he or
she "knows" the rule.
Conforming versus complying behavior. With
rules provided by others, the speaker specifies the
criterion for the listener's behavior, expecting the
listener to adjust, conform, or behave according to
rule descriptions (e.g., as in the mand). With selfprovided rules, whether previously taught by others or self-generated, the subject's ability to verbalize the rule seems to affect his or her subsequent
performance on a transfer task (Pelaez et al., in
progress). The ability to self-state or self-provide a
rule, however, may not be the sale cause of the
rule-following behavior. This is due to the influence of the listener's experience with reinforcing
contingencies and the nature of the specific contexts involved.
The distinction made in the literature between
complying with and conforming to rules may be pertinent here (Verplanck, 1992). Rule compliance denotes following and behaving according to rules
that have been either stated to the listener, or selfprovided. Rule-conforming denotes behavior
consistent with the rule, although the listener may
remain unable to verbalize or self-generate the
rule.

Taxonomy of Rules
The taxonomy is based on four different dimensions of rules and its corresponding rule-governed behavior. Each dimension stresses different
aspects of rules and describes its potentially- rela-

ted behavior. We examine the different dimensions of a rule in terms of accuracy, explicitness,
complexity level, and source. Specifically, a rule
should be described by analyzing all four dimensions involved, which will allow for a more systematic approach to the study of rule-governed behavior.
Figure 2 shows all possible types of rules (a total of 16 rules) resulting from combinations among
the four different dimensions. The dimensions of
a rule are presented in dichotomous fashion, even
though they can operate along a continuum occurring within the four dimensions: (a) explicit vs. implicit, (b) accurate vs. inaccurate, (c) lower vs
higher complexity, and (d) provided by others vs.
self-provided. By deconstructing rules into their
elements and examining each rule dimension individually, we attempt a more precise developmental approach to be employed in experiments where
different types of rules are manipulated to determine their impact on rule-governed behavior and
its progression.
The following are the 16 rules derived from a
combination of the four basic dimensions discussed above:
(a) Explicit, Accurate, Lower Complexity, and
Provided by Others
(b) Explicit, Inaccurate, Lower Complexity,
and Provided by Others
(c) Explicit, Accurate, Higher Complexity,
and Provided by Others.
(d) Explicit, Inaccurate, Higher Complexity,
and Provided by Others.
(e) Explicit, Accurate, Lower Complexity, and
Self-Provided
(f) Explicit, Inaccurate, Lower Complexity,
and Self-Provided
(g) Explicit, Accurate, Higher Complexity,
and Self-Provided
(h) Explicit, Inaccurate, Higher Complexity,
and Self-Provided
(i) Implicit, Accurate, Lower Complexity,
and Provided by Others
(j) Implicit, Inaccurate, Lower Complexity,
and Provided by Others
(k) Implicit, Accurate, Higher Complexity,
and Provided by Others
(1) Implicit, Inaccurate, Higher Complexity,
and Provided by Others.
(m) Implicit, Accurate, Lower Complexity,
and Self-Provided
(n) Implicit, Inaccurate, Lower Complexity,
and Self-Provided
(0) Implicit, Accurate, Higher Complexity,

and Self-Provided
(p) Implicit, Inaccurate, Higher Complexity,
and Self-Provided.
For example, cell (a) represents an explicit, accurate rule, of lower complexity, provided by a
speaker other than the listener. The parental order: "Pick up these toys now if you want to watch
TV" exemplifies such a rule. This example posits a
clear specification of all the components of the
three-term contingency in context (is of lower
complexity and lower developmental level). In
this case, the verbal descriptions are provided by
the parent (speaker other than the listener), and
the contingencies correspond to (are congruent
with) the actual contingencies encountered by the
child (the listener). The last type of rule (see the
right bottom cell (p) in Figure 2), represents an implicit, inaccurate, of higher complexity level and
self-derived rule (the speaker and the listener being the same). A rule of this type can be found, for
example, in the self-instruction, "At the party, I
should approach Linda the same way that Juan
approaches Mary when they are dancing--not how
he approaches her when they are at school." This
represents a self-provided rule, which the subject
assumes to contain implicit positive consequences
(Le., acceptance). But Linda's aversion to guys
renders the rule inaccurate and the real consequence will be rejection. The complexity of this
rule is high because it involves a second-order
conditional discrimination (Le.,it first requires approaching Linda during dancing and not approaching her during school, and second, it requires matching, that is, to behave just as Juan towards Mary). This relation requires that the subject abstracts the rule from the couple's relation
(the sample stimuli) and applies it during his interaction with Linda, and only in a specific context. This type of rules represents higher complexity and developmental level.
The rule-governed behaviors derived from
this taxonomy are labeled according to each type
of rule governing. We are starting a program of
research that focuses on investigating these taxonomy of rules from a developmental perspective,
that is, in determining their hierarchical organization in learning. Our assumption is that the taxonomy of rules offered here, by ranging from explicit
to implicit, lower level to higher level of complexity, accurate to inaccurate, imposed by others to
self-generated, can organize behavior by increased
level of difficulty, compliance, and adjustment to
the contingencies they specify.

Our taxonomy is not exhaustive; when employing other criteria, other taxonomies can be
identified. Ply and track rules (Zettle & Hayes,
1982) were not included in our classification because, according to our analysis, a rule should first
be defined in terms of the contingencies it specifies
regardless of whether the listener obeys or violates
such rule. Thus, given that ply and track rules are
exclusively defined in terms of their correspondence to pliance and tracking, rule-dimensions in
plys and tracks cannot be identified nor manipulated (i.e., as independent variables)--independently of the specific behavior of the listener. This
posits serious problems for an experimental situation, where the types of rules to be studied must
be defined first. In such circular cases, an investigator would be unable to isolate and define a priori a rule and its dimensions for the purpose of experimental manipulations.
We have excluded Skinner's (1957) mand and
tact from our rule taxonomy for similar reasons.
Just like plys and tracks, mands and tacts are defined exclusively in terms of the listener's responses- these types of rules can not be properly identified a priori or independently of the history of the
listener. Another distinction made in the literature
is that between normative and normal rules (Reese,
1989;Reese & Fremow, 1984). In our analysis, we
are only concerned with normative rules. Normal
rules are not considered due to their lack of contingency specification and their dismissal of the
listener's behavior, both necessary conditions in
our taxonomy.

We offered a classification of 16 types of rules derived from four dimensions (i.e., explicitness, accuracy, complexity, and source) and their differential effects on listeners' behavior. Even though we
assume a functional co-dependence between rules
and rule-governed behavior, the taxonomy requires a separate analysis of the contingencies
specified in the rule and of those related to the
rule-following behavior. In studying the control
that a rule exerts on rule-following behavior, one
must first adequately define and identify separately the rule and the rule-following behavior. In
studying behavioral development, when analyzing the various effects each rule exerts on the listener's behavior, one must consider the four dimensions of rule, the contingency history of the

listener, and the context within which the rule is

provided. Even though manipulations of some
types of rules have been conducted in studies of
self-instruction, relational frames, and derived relations, we believe that a more systematic study of
the differential effects of the proposed four dimensions of niles on the listener's behavior is needed.

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Authors' Note:
Portions of this article were first reported in a paper
titled The Development of Rules that Control Behavior delivered by the first author at the annual meeting of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Group, London, UK,
April, 1996. The taxonomy here reported was originally published in the Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis,
24/1998. Appreciation is extended to Carlos Bruner, Editor of the Kfexican Journal, for granting permission for
publication in this Bulletin of a version of the original article. We thank Bryan Midgley, Peter Nogueras, and
John Visconti for their critical reviews of an earlier version of this paper. Correspondence on this article
should be addressed to Dr. Martha Pelaez, Department
of Educational Psychology & Special Education, College
of Education-EB 242B, Florida lnternational University,
Miami, FL, 33199, USA. (E-mail: marthapn@aol.com)

1999 Developmental
SIG Dinner at ABA
The SIG Dinner will take place on Friday, May
28/ starting around 6:00p.m. and terminating before 9:00p.m. It will be held in REZA'S RESTAURANT, 432 West Ontario, Chicago.
The cuisine
great Persian and great. A family style dinner will
be served for $22.45 (tax & gratuity included). The
appetizers
will include
a vegetarian
plate,
hummos, and grilled mushrooms.
The entrees
will be filet mignon, shish kebab, seasoned ground
beef, and chicken breast kebab. Tea, coffee, soft
drinks and dessert are included. A cash bar for al
coholic drinks will be set up in the room. The restaurant 14-seat bus will leave at approximately
10min intervals, beginning
at 5:45 p.m., from the
North side of the Hilton Towers.
There is no
charge for the service. Please make reservations
and provide advan~e payment to Jack Gewirtz,
2025 Brickell Ave. # 1802, Miami, FL 33129.
We hope you can make the dinner.
It was
memorable two years ago.