Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]

FACTS:
1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and
qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.
2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of
the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
3. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of Judges/Justices?
HELD:
The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil
552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such
income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitution protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so
violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed
discarded.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices
and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency
that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2009

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO - A case digest

PHILIPPINE

JUDGES

ASSOCIATION,

ET

AL.

vs.

PETE

PRADO

Direct

Filing

Facts;

Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC,
MTCC,

and

other

government

offices

were

withdrawn

from

them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law.

Issues;

WON

RA

7354

is

unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed

in

the

title

thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall

be

taken

immediately

thereafter,

and

the

yeas

and

nays

entered

in

the

Journal.

Violative

of

the

Equal

protection

clause

Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms
prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive

as

to

cover

every

single

detail

of

the

measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of
the

Therefore,

franking

RA

7354

is

privilege.

declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo

Roxas
17 SCRA 756 Political Law Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect
and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law
and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred
that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the

PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of
the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may
arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to
the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President
or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to
the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as
may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial
branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the
judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal,
respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs
for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for
violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said
controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the
Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the
courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon
the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the
determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

Case Digest: G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970. 32

SCRA 188
Teodoro C. Santiago, JR. minor, represented by his mother, Angelita C.
Santiago, petitioner-appellant, vs. Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca
Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino, Luna Sarmago,
Aurora Lorena, Soledad Francisco and Mr. Flor Marcelo, respondentsappellees.
Facts: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public
school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year
1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee on the Rating of Students
for Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the
purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista,
Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida
Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee
deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro
C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's
graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days
before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the
"ranking of honor students."
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual cause of action for petition for
certiorari.
Ruling: No. The court held to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from
for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of

Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's
failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the
provision of that Rule but by precedents as well.