DR. LORNA VILLA, vs.

HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ALTAVAS,

Facts:

Issue:

November 26, 1997 Respondents Enrique Altavas II and Maria de Jesus, in their capacity as heirs of Enrique Altavas filed an complaint for ejectment against Dr.
Lorna Villa (petitioner) together with Virginia Bernejo and Rolita Roxas
Respondents alleged that Enrique was the registered owner of two parcel of fishponds and that they have been in actual possession through their administrator,
overseer and representative, the late councilor Mussolini Bernejo (husband of Virginia)
After the death of Mussolini, Virginia took over the possession of the premises in question without the consent of respondents and that she leased a portion of about 5
hectares, without any right to do so , to the petitioner
October 21, 1998 respondents counsel sent demand letters to Virginia and petitioners to vacate the portion occupied by them, however the latter continued to
remain on the premises
Petitioner argues that she is a possessor in good faith and that the lot was leased to her by a person who was in possession and represented herself as the owner
The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents; RTC dismissed petitioners appeal; CA affirmed RTCs decision
Whether or not respondents who did not have actual, physical possession of the lot in question for years recover possession thereof through the
summary remedy of ejectment? Will an action for ejectment lie against petitioner?

Petitioners argument:

Petitioner avers that respondents failed to establish that they are in actual possession of the lots in question; that, in fact, they have not proven that they are the
owners of the said properties; and that petitioner has a valid contract of lease with Virginia which entitles her to the possession of Lot No. 2817.
Ruling:

The petition is unmeritorious

Respondents' predecessor, Enrique Altavas, was not divested of his ownership of the subject lots; that the titles over the subject properties remain in his name; that,
not being the owner or administrator of the said lots, Virginia has no right to enter into any contract for the lease of the said properties; and that petitioner's possession
of portions of the disputed properties is merely upon tolerance of respondents.
Evidence: Respondents attached, as annexes to their Complaint, the Original Certificates of Title Nos. RO-4326 and RO-4327 in the name of Enrique, covering
Lot Nos. 2816 and 2817, respectively, as evidence of their ownership and right to possess the disputed properties.

ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN vs. ANICETO SOMERA
Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

March 10, 1998 Soledad Manantan filed a complaint for ejectment and damages against respondent Somera and certain
Presentacion Tavera
Manantan alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a 214- square meter parcel of land located in Fairview Subdivision,
Baguio City as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54672, issued in her name by the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City
After causing a relocation survey, Manantan learned that respondent and Tavera are occupying certain portions of the land.
Manantan advised the two to vacate the land as soon as she would decide to sell the property
A buyer came but refused to continue with the purchase until Manantan would cause respondent and Tavera to vacate the premises
Respondent however, despite several demands, refused to vacate the land thus a civil case was filed
Respondents argue that:
o
MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10467, because it was neither an action for forcible entry nor for unlawful
detainer. The Complaint did not allege that Manantan was deprived of possession of the disputed portions by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for forcible entry. It also did not state that respondent
and Tavera withheld possession of the disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession of the same by virtue of an express or implied contract, which would build a case for unlawful detainer .
o
Moreover they state that it would be unjust to prohibit them from using the disputed portions which serve as their only
means of ingress or egress to or from their respective residences from or to the main road.
o
Further they assert that in case Manantan would be declared as the lawful owner of the subject property, the MTCC
should not disregard the fact that they were "builders in good faith." As builders in good faith, they should be allowed to
pay a reasonable price for the portions of the subject property on which their driveway/access road, and other
improvements were situated.
The MTC ruled in favor of Manantan and ruled further that the respondents were not builders in good faith. RTC affirmed MTCs
decision in toto.
CA however set aside both the decision of the lower courts: The allegations in the Civil Complaint of petitioner merely presented a
controversy arising from a boundary dispute, in which case, the appropriate remedy available to Manantan should have been the
plenary action for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
MTCC had no jurisdiction over the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467.
WON the Complaint is in the nature of an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC had jurisdiction.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.16 This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.17
A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court within one year from unlawful
withholding of possession. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real
property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.19
However, the Complaint of petitioner does not allege facts showing compliance with the prescribed one year period to file an action for
unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates that would have established that it was filed within one year from the date of Manantans
last demand upon respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional and crucial, because if the complaint
was filed beyond the prescribed one year period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC can
exercise jurisdiction
Further, since respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot
family Clearly, respondents possession of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and,
resultantly, respondents right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that
respondents possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan. 27
1avvphi1

Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the
Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should have dismissed the same.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA

Facts:

Issue:

Respondent filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City against the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)
Heirs of Santos alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-square-meter parcel of land located
in Tandang Sora, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 57272.He had been in possession of the owners
duplicate of said title and had been in continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died on February 9,
1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and
adverse possession of the property, and of the owners duplicate of said title.
Sometime in February 1996, heirs of santos learned that iglesia ni cristo was claiming ownership over the property. They alleged that Enrique
Santos, during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death, never encumbered or disposed the property. In 1996, Santos had the property fenced
but Iglesia ni Cristo deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property. Thus, Santos filed for the quieting the title of plaintiffs over
and/or recover possession of their said property in the name of deceased Enrique Santos.
Petitioner argues that the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had prescribed, the same having been filed only
on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year period therefor
Trial court and CA later ruled in favor of Private Respondents. CA stated that as to the issue of prescription, the appellate court held that the
prescriptive period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner claimed ownership and barred respondents from fencing the property.
Hence this petition.
Whether or not respondent judge gravely erred and abused her discretion when she held that the action for quieting of title and/or
accion reinvindicatoria (civil case no. Q-01-45415) has not yet prescribed

Petitioners argument:

That the action of respondents, whether it be one for quieting of title or an accion reinvindicatoria, had prescribed when the
complaint was filed on October 24, 2001. Petitioner asserts that this is because when respondents filed their complaint, they were
not in actual or physical possession of the property, as it (petitioner) has been in actual possession of the property since 1984 when
TCT No. 321744 was issued to it by the Register of Deeds
Ruling:

As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for quieting of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Article 476 of the New Civil Code. The latter provision reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in land appearing in some legal form but
which is, in fact, unfounded, or which it would be inequitable to enforce. 38 An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible until the
claimant is ousted of his possession.
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is
belied by the allegations in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the
time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. It bears stressing that an accion
reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an
action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 41 Thus, the owner of real
property in actual and material possession thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a
parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their complaint against petitioner on October
24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure
TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984.
Thus, petition is denied. CAs decision is affirmed

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA
Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose, owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, executed a
special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023
into a residential subdivision
Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to
vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which
included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents
Private respondents then filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner, alleging that they have occupied and tilled their
farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.They further alleged that that on August 15, 1983
and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and
destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other
crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and
threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583,
815, and 1028.
MTC and RTC dismissed the complaint of private respondents
CA on the other hand ruled in favor of private respondents, stating that, since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Hence, this petition
1 - Whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without
giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer
2 - Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner
1 - The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on
February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the
Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover,
the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
2 - Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private respondents, as actual
possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively
address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession,
if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.10

MTC and RTCs justification of self-help is not tenable: Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property

Petition denied

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO
IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and
MARTINA RIETA,
Facts:

Issue:

On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract
and reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners before the RTC, Imus, Cavite
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August 23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now both
deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land
located at Kawit, Cavite. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period
of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate of the donors.
Respondent alleged that petitioner, RC bishop of Imus, on or about June 30 and while still within the prohibitive period to dispose of
the property, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.
Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000. 00.
Petitioners filed their response on the complaint alleging that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal
capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action and (3) that the cause of action has prescribed.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed
However CA ruled otherwise, holding that the action has not yet prescribed. Hence this petition
1 - WON the action to reconvey the property due to the donees failure to meet the condition has prescribed.
2 - WON the case should be dismissed due to the fact that private respondent has no legal standing
3 WON the resolutory condition of the donation is valid

Petitioners argument:

It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of herein private respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article 764 of
the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs
Ruling:

1 - Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4)
years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation
involved herein expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence
a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary.
Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donationsinter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on contracts and
obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the
matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express provision that the same shall be considered ipso
facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in
question
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years
2 - Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same
should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
3 - Further, Said condition (prohibition to sell within 100 years), in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising
from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction
on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition
against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time
Consequently, since the condition is impossible and is contrary to public policy, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No
reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the
deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter
hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must fail.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) and MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR.,
Facts:

Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995 square meters located in the vicinity of the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City
Sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein
respondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their
properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others,
including Gopuco, refused to do so.

Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its
neighboring realties

CFI ruled in favor of the expropriation proceeding and such became final and executor.

Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then President
Corazon C. Aquino
On 16 March 1990, Gopuco wrote 8 the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot
and offering to return the money previously received by him as payment for the expropriation. This letter was ignored. 9

Respondents argument: Gopuco maintained that by virtue of the closure of the Lahug Airport, the original purpose for which the property
was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned, and title to the property had therefore reverted to him.

Trial court dismissed respondents petition. However, CA overturned the decision and ordered the herein petitioners to reconvey Lot
No. 72 to Gopuco upon payment of the reasonable price as determined by it, and deleted the award to the petitioners of exemplary
damages, litigation expenses and costs
Hence this petition

Issue:

Ruling:

WON a private land, which was previously expropriated for a particular public use, be a subject to a cause of action for recovery of
property of the former owner upon the abandonment of such particular public use.
The answer to that question (issue) depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator
When real property has been acquired for public use unconditionally, either by eminent domain or by purchase, the abandonment or non-use
of the real property, does not ipso facto give to the previous owner of said property any right to recover the same ( Fery vs. Municipality of
Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28).

Further, When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase,
the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner (Fort Wayne vs. Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18
L.R.A., 367.)

Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements (that former land owners would be able to repurchase the same when these
would no longer be used by the airport), he cannot legally invoke the same. Also, neither has Gopuco, in the present case, adduced any
evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.

Petition granted.

HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO and MARIA ROTEA, vs. MACTAN - CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Facts:

In 1949 National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) wanted to
acquire lands for the proposed expansion of Lahug airport. To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government assured them
that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport. Petitioners refused the
offer because the payment was perceived to be way below the market price.
Expropriation was granted and petitioners predecessors were paid P7,065.00 for Lot No. 916 and P9,291.00 for Lot No. 920 with
consequential damages by way of legal interest from 16 November 1947. No appeal was taken and the judgment of condemnation became
final and executory

At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to MCIAA, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was
opened for incoming and outgoing flights. 8 Lots Nos. 916 and 920 which had been expropriated for the extension of Lahug Airport were not
utilized. Hence, petitioners wrote then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging them for the exercise of their alleged right to
repurchase Lots Nos. 916 and 920.11 Their pleas were not heeded.12

Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with RTC of Cebu City against respondent MCIAA to compel the repurchase of
Lots Nos. 916 and 920.

On 12 April 1999 the trial court found merit in the claims of petitioners and granted them the right to repurchase the properties at the amount
pegged as just compensation in Civil Case No. R-1881 but subject to the alleged property rights of Richard E. Enchuan and the leasehold of
DPWH.

On 20 December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the assailed Decision on the ground that the judgment of condemnation in Civil Case
No. R-1881 was unconditional so that the rights gained therefrom by respondent MCIAA were indicative of ownership in fee simple.

Hence this petition

Respondents argument:

there is only one instance when expropriated land may be repurchased by its previous owners, and that is, if the decision of expropriation itself
provides [the] condition for such repurchase." Respondent asserts that the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 is absolute and without
conditions, thus, no repurchase could be validly exercised.
Petitioners argument:

Fery v. Municpality of Cabanatuan does not apply to the case at bar since what was involved therein was the "right of reversion" and not the
"right of repurchase" which they are invoking.

Finally, petitioners allege that their right to equal protection of the laws would be infringed if some landowners are given the right to repurchase
their former properties even as they are denied the exercise of such prerogative.
Issue:

Ruling:

WON a private land, which was previously expropriated for a particular public use, be a subject to a cause of action for recovery of
property of the former owner upon the abandonment of such particular public use.
"If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust
by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the
reconveyance of the property to him." In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the government with the latter obliging
itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the government can be compelled by petitioners to
reconvey the parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not
conceived nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.
The only problem of great importance in the field of constructive trusts is to decide whether in the numerous and varying fact situations
presented to the courts there is a wrongful holding of property and hence a threatened unjust enrichment of the defendant.

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos.
916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, "When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to
give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x x x In case of the loss,
deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return

Hence, respondent MCIAA as representative of the State is obliged to reconvey Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to petitioners who shall hold the same
subject to existing liens thereon, i.e., leasehold right of DPWH. In return, petitioners as if they were plaintiff-beneficiaries of a constructive trust
must restore to respondent MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the expropriation