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3. Testimony
a. Qualifications and disqualifications of witnesses

Qualifications
RULE 130, sec. 20, 36
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

MOLINA v. PEOPLE

Child Witness Rule, sec. 6

Sec. 6. Competency. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall
conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds
that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.
(a) Proof of necessity. A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity
of competency examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency
examination.
(b) Burden of proof. To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging his competence.
(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a
competency examination:
(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;
(2) The counsel for the parties;
(3) The guardian ad litem;
(4) One or more support persons for the child; and
(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his
absence.
(d) Conduct of examination. Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only
by the judge. Counsel for the parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in
his discretion, ask the child.
(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. The questions asked at the competency examination
shall be appropriate to the age and developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the
issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember, communicate, distinguish
between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.
(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. The court has the duty of continuously assessing the
competence of the child throughout his testimony.
PEOPLE v. CHAVEZ

Well-settled is the rule that when there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that such witness
was not so moved and that his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

Simply because Agripina was a common-law wife of the victim, it does not necessarily
follow that her testimony is biased, incredible or self-serving. There is no legal provision
that disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying, being otherwise
competent, regarding the facts and circumstances of the crime. Mere relationship of
witnesses to the victim of a crime, whether by consanguinity or affinity, does not
necessarily impair their credibility as witnesses. This is specially so when the witnesses
were present at the scene of the crime.

In his affidavit, complainant Homer Tabuzo affirmed that he had actually delivered the
hospital supplies to the JA Memorial Hospital and tha thte payment therefor was borrowed
by Rafael Molina. Tabuzo explained the reason why he testified in the manner he did at the
trial by saying that at the time of trial the amount taken by Molina had not been paid by the
latter and hat he was no RECANTING his testimony (in his SWORN STATEMENT) because he
had already been paid in full and was no longer interested.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who had given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another
for such rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused is unreliable,
deserves scant consideration.
Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now
says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No
such reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may
be impeached by a previous contradictory statementnot that a previous statement is
presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true.
Contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous
testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained.

PEOPLE v. NARCISO

A few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor

details and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their
credibility. The inconsistencies being trivial and minor, they cannot blunt the impact of
complainants testimony especially because at the time she testified, complainant was a
mere 15-year old lass who was unaccustomed to public trial. In fact, she was expected to
fall into minor lapses in her testimony considering that she was recounting details of an
experience so harrowing, humiliating and painful to recall.

PEOPLE v. FERNANDEZ

(Co-accused) Santiagos statement on this matter, as related to the trial court by PO3 San
Pedro, are mere hearsay, which even if not objected to, as in this case, nevertheless do not
deserve credence. However, this is not sufficient to exonerate accused-appellant. The
positive identification of accused-appellant by Dr. Delfin Tolentino who is untainted by any
motive to falsely testify, sufficiently established the guilt of accused-appellant, for the law
does not require that positive identification be corroborated to obtain conviction.
There was no proof that Dr. Delfin Tolentino, at the time of the incident, did not possess the
proper mental and physical faculties as to make him a less than credible witness.
Dr. Tolentinos categorical, clear and consistent answers during the intensive cross-exam all
the more indicated that he possessed all the faculties required of a qualified witness, that

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the was telling the truth, and that his declarations and answers established, beyond
reasonable doubt, the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION v. NLRC

CEQUEA V. BOLANTE

Catolicos dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed
to her by Valdez. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value.

PEOPLE v. PORRAS

The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution

witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, if only in minor details, reinforce rather
weaken their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see
differently some details of a startling occurrence. Discrepancies on minor details, which do
not destroy the substance of the witness testimony show that the witness was not
rehearsed.

Disqualifications
1.

Mental incapacity

Rule 130, sec. 21

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that
they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
2.

Marriage

Rule 130, sec. 22

Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latters direct descendants or ascendants.
3.

Death or insanity of adverse party

4.

Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Mans Statute, the offeror must show (a) that
the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact
cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware
that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable
the existence of any motive to falsify.
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who
testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is
not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such declarant should be
confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.
Privileged Communication

Rule 130, sec. 24

Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure.

Rule 130, sec. 23

Cf. Parental and Filial privilege

Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.

Rule 130, sec. 25

Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
Family Code, art. 215

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No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by
one parent against the other.
5.

As to Hadji Muin Salihs claim that before she died, Pianang Salih was able to identify the
men who fired at her, it must be stressed that the rule on the admissibility of dying
declarations does not determine their weight and credibility. These matters must be
determined under the same rules used in testing the weight and credibility of any other
testimonial evidence.

In this case, while Pianang Salihs ante-mortem statement allegedly given to Hadji Muin
Salih may satisfy the requirements of Rule 130, 37 for admissibility,[26] it is doubtful
whether the same was actually made, in view of the fact that according to the prosecutions
own evidence, Pianang Salih was so seriously injured that she could not talk anymore.

Guardian ad litem in child abuse cases

Child Witness Rule, sec. 5 (e)

The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information, statement, or
opinion received from the child in the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds
it necessary to promote the best interests of the child.
See also: Rule 132, sec. 3 (rights & obligations of witnesses)

PEOPLE v. MOLINA

Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer questions, although his
answer may tend to establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense unless
otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be to the very fact
at issue or to a fact from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must
answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an offense.

The requisites for the admissibility of dying declaration have already been established in a
long line of cases. Thus, in the case at bar, the victims ante-mortem statement is entitled
to much probative weight since it has been proven that: (1) at the time the declaration was
made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration
refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates
to facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and
(5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject
of the inquiry.

Indeed, a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Thus, it has
been held that when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced
and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth.

PEOPLE v. BAUTISTA
Dying Declaration

Rule 130, Sec. 3

Section 3.
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a)
When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

Dying declaration--- The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

(c)
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d)
When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. (2a)
PEOPLE v. ANG-GUHO

The general rule is that [A] witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception xxx.[8] Any other
testimonial evidence outside the witness personal knowledge is hearsay and downright
inadmissible. In fact, hearsay evidence, even if not objected to during trial and thus
admitted, should carry no probative value whatsoever.[9] Nevertheless, the Rules and
jurisprudence provide certain well- recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule among which
is a dying declaration found under Section 37, Rule 130:

[1]

There are two (2) obvious reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration: (a) necessity
and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death renders impossible his
taking the witness stand. And trustworthiness, since the declaration is made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every
motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and awful is considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court,[10] There are
four (4) requirements for the admissibility of a dying declaration, to wit:
That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;

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[2]

That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;

[3]
[4]

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and
That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.

Accused-appellant maintains that the testimony of Zenaida Yarza to the effect that the
victim told her that it was accused-appellant who stabbed him should not be admitted as a
dying declaration simply because it was not made under a consciousness of impending
death, which is the most important and decisive requisite for a statement to qualify as a
dying declaration.
We do not agree. While it is true that the victim, Rodel Yarza, did not explicitly mention that
he knows or feels that he is about to die, this does not negative the fact that the victim,
who was already pale, weak from a fatal wound, and perspiring profusely, was conscious of
his impending death at the time he declared to his wife who attacked and stabbed him.

PEOPLE v. EUBRA

PEOPLE v. PADAO

The statement of the victim Perlito Jarmin is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.
The Court in a number of cases had consistently upheld the admissibility of a dying
declaration, the requisites of which are present in the case at bar:

1.

That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;

2.

That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;

3.

That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to;

4.

That the declarant thereafter dies; and

5.
That the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject
of inquiry.

Appellant was clearly identified by the victim himself in his dying declaration given to
Arnulfo Lacay. On this, the trial court stated that

"Subsequently, the Court also considers the instance when Perlito told Arnulfo that he was stabbed
by Sunny. Under Rule 130, Sec. 31, of the Rules of Court, as an exception to the hearsay rule, that
evidence can be admitted as a dying declaration. It appears that Perlito, in great pain suffering from
the multiple wounds inflicted on his body, bleeding and weakening, probably apprehensive all the
way that his injuries might prove fatal, identified the accused as his assailant (People vs. Mision, 194
SCRA 432). The Court believes that Perlito's statement as declared by him to Arnulfo, is entitled to
credence and constitutes sufficient basis that he had positively identified his assailant. On the basis
of the serious nature of Perlito's wounds, as would engender a belief on his part that he would not
survive therefrom, especially were he died an hour thereafter, his declaration will be deemed as
having been made under the consciousness of imminent death.

Said declaration pertains to the identity of the declarants assailant and the instances that
transpired concerning what happened to him. At the time that declaration was made, the
declarant was hospitalized, wounded on the throat, and was very weak.[28] Combining
these circumstances with the victim-declarants aversion of pain creates upon the latter
impression that his death is imminent and immediate. The enigma of contemplating of a
death-at-hand produces the most powerful consideration that impels and induces the mind
to speak the truth a situation so solemn and awful as to be considered by law as creating
an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.
Dying Declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

On the matter of the supposed dying declaration of the victim, we agree with appellant that
the same cannot here be given weight, even assuming that the requisites for its admission
are present. Admissibility is one thing, and weight is another. A dying declaration of the
victim identifying his assailant will not be given probative value if the victim was not in a
position to identify his assailant as he was shot from behind.

PEOPLE v. SANTOS

The evidence on record does not at all support appellants contention that the victim died
instantaneously as to render a dying declaration physically impossible. Despite the
statement in the victims Certificate of Death that the interval between onset and death
was instant, the undisputed fact as positively and categorically testified to by Corazon
and Lolita is that the victim remained alive for a few seconds during which he was able to
say Pare Pran. This view is bolstered by the expert witnesses, Dr. Hufana and Dr. Longid
himself who was presented by the defense, who both testified that a bullet that had hit the
heart and lungs did not necessarily result in instantaneous death.

A victim who has sustained injury to the heart may still be capable of a volitional act like
speaking, thus:
Sometimes it is necessary to determine whether a victim of a fatal wound is still capable of
speaking, walking or performing any other volitional acts. A dying declaration may be presented by
the prosecutor mentioning the accused as the assailant; the offender may allege that the physical
injuries inflicted by him while the victim was inside his house and that he walked for some distance
where he fell, or that the victim after the fatal injury made an attempt to inflict injuries to the
accused which justified the latter to give another fatal blow. The determination of the victims
capacity to perform volitional acts rests upon the medical witness.

Furthermore, the interval between the shooting and

not preclude the possibility of a dying declaration.
place for a short time only.
Furthermore, the interval between the shooting and
not preclude the possibility of a dying declaration.
place for a short time only.

the utterance of appellants name did

Corazon testified that all these took
the utterance of appellants name did
Corazon testified that all these took

UGADDAN v. CA

Dying declaration though generally hearsay are admissible in evidence as an exception to

the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 37 of Rule 130.

A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. As an exception to the
hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made

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by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at
the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case
wherein the declarants death is the subject of inquiry.

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent
that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is
at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred
from the nature and extent of the decedents wounds, or other relevant circumstances.

The deceaseds condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant

deserves full faith and credit and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

Furthermore, the same declaration was also properly admitted in evidence by the trial court
as part of res gestae, and rightly so. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling
occurrence is deemed as such when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[36] The utterance of the victim satisfies these three
requisites. Clearly, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.

The requisites for the admissibility of the victims ante-mortem statement as part of the res
gestae and also as a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same should be
admitted under both exceptions to the hearsay rule. While the admissibility thereof would
naturally not be affected whether viewed under either or both consideration the advantage
of resting the issue on the aforesaid dual bases is that its admission would be invulnerable
to a theorized absence of an element of one of said exceptions.
Furthermore, alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the offense, or when there is an antemortem declaration
received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of res gestae, or both.

Declaration against interest

Rule 130, sec. 28

with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.

With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it
is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds
of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to

wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against
the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant
was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant
had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with
Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence [13] because no sane person will be
presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

Act or declaration against pedigree

Rule 130, sec. 39
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree"
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
TISON v. CA

Section 38.
Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at
the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. (32a)
PEOPLE v. BERNAL

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the

perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to
support a conviction. Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Teodoras niece.[16] Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for
analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in
evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her

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lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is
necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship
of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of
said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:

Section 40.
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
Common reputation

One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from,
the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimants
pedigree, he may not do so by declarants own statements as to declarants relationship to
the particular family. The reason is that declarants declaration of his own relationship is of
a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that
declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise
the requirement to admissibility that declarants relationship to the common family must
appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to
claim directly from the declarant or the declarants estate, the situation and the policy of
the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose
estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible
without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then
disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive
their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid
in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have noted is
sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are
competent from reasons of necessity.

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarants estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be
proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an
exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant
as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant
himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some
other member of the family.

Rule 130, se. 41

Section 41.
Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or
moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation.
Part of the res gestae
Rule 130, sec. 42
Section 42.
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE v. PIRAME

PEOPLE v. SILVANO

In the case at bench, there is no dispute that appellant is the father of the victim, a fact
which he even admitted during his direct examination and is further corroborated by the
victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth which indicates appellant as her father.
Moreover, such admission is sufficient to establish paternity without further proof. This is so
because, acts and declarations about pedigree which includes relationship is an
admissible hearsay under the rules. Besides, appellant interposed no objection to the
victims testimony when she positively identified the former as the one who raped her on
January 23, 1996.

Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree

Rule 130, sec. 40

Appellant makes much of the testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Atupan. This witness
testified that in the course of police investigation, Demetrio Cleopas, father of accused
Teodorico and Epifanio Cleopas, said that his two sons were responsible for the killing,
Demetrio reiterated the same allegation in a sworn statement made before the Ubay Police
on March 24, 1993, which appellant also relies upon to support his claim of innocence. This
particular allegation in the sworn statement, appellant urges, should be considered as part
of the res gestae, as it "grew out of the main fact, shed light upon it, and which are ( sic)
unpremeditated, spontaneous, and made at a time so near, subsequent to the main act, as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
This assertion made by Demetrio Cleopas in his sworn statement is not part of the res
gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement. The allegations made by Demetrio Cleopas in his sworn statement were not
made immediately after the killing of the victim. They were made on March 24, 1993, or six
days after the killing of the victim on March 18. As we have held that a statement given a
day after the incident in answer to questions propounded in an investigation cannot be
considered part of the res gestae, so too with the declarations of Demetrio Cleopas in his
sworn statement.

PEOPLE v. NAAG

Rule 130, 42 provides that "[s]tatements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

thereof, may be considered as part of res gestae." It was in the context of a startling event
that Rosita Fontelera was shouting "Edwin, Edwin, Novaliches." In that context, her words
can only mean that accused-appellant was her attacker. After all, she did not just name
accused-appellant when she staggered into the pizza parlor seriously wounded but also as
she was fleeing from her assailant. Rosita Fontelera became hysterical and shouted
accused-appellants name and place of residence. That is why, in panic, accused-appellant
fled.

In this case, the foregoing requirements are undoubtedly present. First, Sixto's statement
that "they were three (3) but I recognize[d] only Alex Garma," is a statement of the
surrounding circumstances of his death as the same refers to the identity of his
assailants. Second, Sixto gave such declaration under the consciousness of an impending
death as shown by the serious nature of his wounds,which in fact resulted in his death
several hours later. Third, prior to his death, Sixto was competent to be a witness in court.
And fourth, Sixto's dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where
he was himself the victim.

On the other hand, there can be no plausible objection against its admissibility as part
of res gestae even if said statement was uttered by Sixto in response to a question posed
by Herminigildo about the identity of the assailants. This is because, the record bespeaks
that such statement was made right after the shooting incident and before Sixto had the
opportunity to contrive or devise a falsehood.

PEOPLE v. VALLA

The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in
exchange for his crime[18] may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means "things done". There are three
requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2)
the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body
was found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and
killing the victim, and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.

PEOPLE v. QUELIZA

Teresitas testimony is further strengthened by Loreta Cabangons narration of events,

particularly the fact of hearing Teresita Cabangon utter the statement Nay awan ni
Victoriano pinatay ni Danny Queliza (Mother, Victoriano is already gone, he was killed by
Danny Queliza). This emotional lament is significantly part of the res gestae.

In a long time of jurisprudence, the requisites of res gestae as an exception to the hearsay
rule were laid down: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.

Any delay on Teresita Cabangons part to identify her husbands assailant is emphatically
overcome by the aforestated statement which was correctly considered by the trial court as
part of the res gestae.

PEOPLE v. GARMA

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Sixto uttered shortly after the
assault and hours before his death identifying the appellant as one of the assailants,
qualifies both as dying declaration and as part of res gestae. To elaborate, there are four
(4) requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible in
evidence, to wit: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration
was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the decedent was
the victim.

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO

Notwithstanding, VERONICAs testimony was in fact corroborated by Benjamin Montanejos

(hereafter MONTANEJOS), who testified that VERONICA told him and his companions upon
their arrival at the scene of the crime that LEONARDO, together with ESTELITO and ALEX,
were responsible for RICARDOs death.[28] Her statement to MONTANEJOS may be
considered as part of the res gestae. The requisites of res gestae as an exception to the
hearsay rule are (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2)
the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.[29] When VERONICA told MONTANEJOS and
his companions that the three accused killed RICARDO she must have still been in a state of
shock from having personally witnessed the brutal killing of her husband. Her state of mind
at this point would not have permitted her to fabricate a story regarding the event which
had just transpired.
Entries in the course of business
Rule 130, sec. 43
Section 43.
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
Entries in official records
Rule 130, sec. 44
Section 44.
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
PEOPLE v. MEJIA

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the police blotters of the
police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants
had declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did not report the incident to the
police authorities. They had no participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in
the police blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are
normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for want of
suggestion or inquiries. The entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars. At
the very most, they only recorded the impression that the appellants were suspects.

Appellants argument is not convincing. True, the corruption of out-of-court identification

contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial. In this case, however,
we find no flaw in the complainants out-of-court identification of appellant.

It has been held that in resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying this
test, the Court is convinced that appellant was properly identified by the complainant
before the trial.

Commercial lists and the like

Rule 30, sec. 45
Section 45.
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and
relied upon by them therein.

PEOPLE v. FAUSTINO

Learned treatises

(1) The witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

Rule 30, sec. 46

Section 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if
the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert
in the subject.
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

PEOPLE v. CABILES

In evaluating out-of-court identification, we have adopted the totality of circumstances test

where the following factors are considered: (1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Against this test, we find that Estelita Pamarangs identification of appellants is of doubtful
value. In this case, the crime allegedly took place at the door of the Pamarang residence,
amply lit by a fluorescent bulb. In her testimony, Estelita pointed out that there was
sufficient light for her to identify a person up to a distance of 12 to 15 meters. She also
claimed that she had talked with Cabiles for 5 minutes before the shooting and could
recognize him very well. She also noticed that Cabiles had a beard from the level of the
ear down his chin. Yet, when initially confronted with him at the police station, she could
not identify Cabiles who at that hour was sporting a beard, not common among Filipino
males. Estelita also admitted that she knew appellant delos Reyes very well because his
farm lot fronts the farm of the Pamarangs. But when first asked to identify delos Reyes, she
could not make a positive identification.

Rule 30, sec. 47

Section 47.
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

PEOPLE v. NAVALES

Appellant contends that the impartiality of the identification process was violated
because no other suspect was present at the time. He bewails the absence of an impartial
screening process like a police line-up. Furthermore, he avers that complainant had not
been able to identify him earlier that morning when he was inside the factory with 50 other
workers.

In assessing an out-of-court, as well as in-court, identification of suspects, court ought to be

guided by the totality of circumstances test. Under this standard, various factors figure in
the appreciation of the testimony of the witness, to wit:

PART THREE
Presenting Evidence

& ALAGBAN
I.

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

Order of trial

II.

Presentation of evidence

Rule 30, sec. 5, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

A.

Testimonial

Section 5.
Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the
court for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pretrial order and shall proceed as follows:

1.

Procedure

(a)

The plaintiff shall adduce evidence in support of his complaint;

(b)
The defendant shall then adduce evidence in support of his defense, counterclaim, crossclaim and third-party complaints;
(c)
The third-party defendant if any, shall adduce evidence of his defense, counterclaim, crossclaim and fourth-party complaint;
(d)
The fourth-party, and so forth, if any, shall adduce evidence of the material facts pleaded
by them;
(e)
The parties against whom any counterclaim or cross-claim has been pleaded, shall adduce
evidence in support of their defense, in the order to be prescribed by the court;
(f)
The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for
good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original
case; and
(g)
Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless
the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further
pleadings.
If several defendants or third-party defendants, and so forth, having separate defenses appear by
different counsel, the court shall determine the relative order of presentation of their evidence.
Rule 119, sec. 11, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Section 11.

Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a)
The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the
civil liability.
(b)
The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from
the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c)
The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d)
Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e)
When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Rule 132, secs. 1, 2, 15

Section 1.
Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the questions calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Section 2.
Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing,
including the questions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by
the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded
by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or
recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such
proceedings.
Section 15.
Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or hearing, the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the
testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to be
prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.
Rule 132, secs. 34-36
Section 34.
Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
Section 35.
When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n)
Section 36.
Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made
as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Cf. PEOPLE v. CAWALING

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such
proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to
the rule, which find no application in the case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express
provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending
before its enactment.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a
negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial
and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
2.

Order of Presentation of Witnesses

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence

of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or
was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not
the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Rule 132, sec. 4

We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. In People
vs. Lagnas, the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado described this rule, as follows:

(a)

Direct examination by the proponent;

(b)

Cross-examination by the opponent;

(c)

Re-direct examination by the proponent;

(d)

Re-cross-examination by the opponent.

Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of the
preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds application in this case, that is, if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which
is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.

Section 4.
Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order in which the
individual witness may be examined is as follows;

a.

Direct Examination

Rule 132, secs. 5, 10

In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As
amplified in the discussion above, the Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the
appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 119, sec. 21
Section 19.
When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense
and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In
such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Rule 133, sec. 7
Section 7.
Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but
the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
Cf. RA 8493, sec. 7 (2)
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which
the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered,
the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within
thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.

Section 5.
Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-in-chief of a witness
by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.
Section 10.
Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a)

On cross examination;

(b)

On preliminary matters;

(c)
When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d)

Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or

(e)
Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.
b.

Cross examination

Rule 132, secs. 6, 10

Section 6.
Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.
Sec. 10, supra
Impeachment of witnesses
1.

Generally

Rule 132, sec. 11

Section 11.
Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the
party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that
he has been convicted of an offense.
Rule 132, sec. 12, par. 1 vis sec. 10 (d) and (e)

Rule 132, sec. 13

Section 13.
How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown
to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
PEOPLE v. DE GUZMAN

It is universally accepted that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory

or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been duly laid
by the party against whom said witness was called. The American rule on laying the
predicate is embodied in Rule 132 (sec. 13) of our own Rules of Court.

Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary examination
was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court, complainant cannot
now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which were not brought to
her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged
contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of
a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given
an opportunity to explain them.

In People vs. Resabal, this Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the prior
declarations of a witness without the same having been read to the witness while he was
testifying in court is insufficient for the desired impeachment of his testimony. As explained
therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations of the witness before the
former justice of the peace court and those before the then court of first instance was
insufficient to discredit him since he was not given ample opportunity, by reading to him his
declarations before the lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.

The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of
inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to
protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries,
which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and to show that they were made
under a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.

It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as a

result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by appellant. It is evidentiarily proscribed to
discredit a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent statements which were
not called to the attention of that witness during the trial, although the same are
supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered and admitted in its entirety
without the requisite specifications.

Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently offer in evidence
at the trial the whole document containing allegedly variant statements and then point out
much later on appeal the supposed contradictory statements which were not specified,
intentionally or otherwise, in the same trial. That sub silentio gambit would necessarily
deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming divergencies, which is the
paramount consideration of the rule mandating the laying of the proper predicate.

Section 12.
Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the
adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-inchief.
Section 10.
Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the
answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a)

On cross examination;

(b)

On preliminary matters;

(c)
When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d)

Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or

(e)
Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the witness, or
contrary to that which he has previously stated. It is not allowed.
2.

Prior inconsistent statements

& ALAGBAN

3.

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the
supposed differences in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether
plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the
rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling
his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached. As things stand before us
and the court a quo, therefore, complainants credibility remains unimpeached.
On the foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine articulated by the
Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs. Bascon that, unless the proper predicate is laid during the
trial by calling the attention of a witness to his alleged inconsistent statements given
outside of his testimony in court and asking him to explain the contradiction, the supposed
inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of destroying the
credibility of the witness.
Hostile or adverse witness

Cf. Rule 132, sec. 21 (when not necessary)

Section 21.
When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Where a
private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion,
no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
3.

Electronic

RA 8792, secs. 5 (1), 7, 10, 11, 14, 15

Sec. 5 (f) Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which
a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
SECTION 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. Electronic documents shall have the legal
effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and -

2.

Private

Rule 132, sec. 19, pars. 1-3

Section 19.
Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)
The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)

Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c)
Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
Rule 132, secs. 20, 27
Section 20.
Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a)

By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b)

By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Section 27.
Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be
authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that (i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and in
the light of all relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether
the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained in its
original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if i) There exist a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it was first
generated in its final form; and
ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented:
Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing laws
on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic data messages
or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence.

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SECTION 10. Original Documents. (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or
retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic
document if:

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication
system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be
established in any legal proceeding -

(a.) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as an
electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and

(a) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or other similar
device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data message or
electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the
information and communication system;

(b.) where it is required that information be presented, that the information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether
the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or retained in its
original form.
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete and
unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal
course of communication, storage and display; and (b) the standard of reliability required shall be
assessed in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
the relevant circumstances.
SECTION 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents. Until the
Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic data
messages and electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and
validating a claimed identity of a user, device, or another entity in an information or communication
system, among other ways, as follows:
(a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof that a letter, character, number or other
symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and attached to or logically associated
with an electronic data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or
security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by a person and executed or
adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data
message or electronic document;

(b) By showing that the electronic data message or electronic document was recorded or stored by a
party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or
(c) By showing that the electronic data message or electronic document was recorded or stored in
the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who
did not act under the control of the party using the record.
SECTION 14. Proof by Affidavit. The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section
9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an affidavit given
to the best of the deponents knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest as defined in the
following section.
SECTION 15. Cross-Examination. (1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has
been introduced in evidence may be cross-examined as of right by a party to the proceedings who is
adverse in interest to the party who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be
introduced.
(2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in Section 11,
paragraph 4, sub-paragraph c.
Rules 5, 6 Electronic Evidence Rule
RULE 5
AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of electronic
notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on
printed or hard copies of the electronic documents or electronic data messages by electronic
notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification authorities.

SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic

document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided
in this Rule.
SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
SEC. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A document electronically notarized in
accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public
document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message or electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding
that the electronic data message or electronic document is what the person claims it to be.

RULE 6
ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

(b) The electronic data message or electronic document shall be authenticated by proof that an
appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the purpose of
verifying the originator of an electronic data message or electronic document, or detecting error or
alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document or electronic data
message from a specific point, which, using algorithm or codes, identifying words or numbers,
encryptions, answers back or acknowledgment procedures, or similar security devices.

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SECTION 1. Electronic signature. An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate din the
manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature
of a person on a written document.
SEC. 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. An electronic signature may be authenticate in any
of the following manner:
(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity the
same;
(b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic
signature.
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. Upon the authentication of an
electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or
approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such persons consent to the
transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without
error or fault.
SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the authentication of a digital
signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding
section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was
signed; and
(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein
c.

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Handwriting

Rule 132, sec. 22

Section 22.
How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting
the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
Section 50.
Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding
(a)

the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b)

A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c)

The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of
a person.
SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. v. TRIUMPH LUMBER & CONSTRUCTION CORP.

Then, too, the proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not
observed. The initial step in such investigation is the introduction of the genuine
handwriting of the party sought to be charged with the disputed writing, which is to serve
as a standard of comparison. The standard or the exemplar must therefore be proved to be
genuine. For the purpose of proving the genuineness of a handwriting Section 22, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court provides:

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, Tabo could by no yardstick be considered to
have adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures on the
questioned checks were claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be obtained either by
(a) seeing the person write some other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b)
seeing documents otherwise known to him to have been written by the person in question
(ex scriptis olim visis); or (c) examining, in or out of court, for the express purpose of
obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to have been written by the person in
question (ex comparatione scriptorum). Tabo could not be a witness under the first and the
second. She tried to be under the third. But under the third, it is essential that (a) certain
specimens of handwriting were seen and considered by her and (b) they were genuinely
written by the person in question. Now, as stated above, Tabo had no adequate basis for
concluding that the alleged specimen signatures in the long bond paper were indeed the
signatures of the parties whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged.

PEOPLE v. PAGPAGUITAN

Pagpaguitan now asks whether or not it is permissible or proper for the trial judge to
receive and examine a specimen writing, written at his order by a party who alleged that
she was not the writer of other documents submitted in evidence? He argues that the task
of comparing the handwriting on the documents in question was one for experts and not
the judge. On this point, we find the judges comparison proper and permissible.

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence
for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a
comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and dissimilarities
thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth. Thus, it has been held that,
where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of
expert witnesses. The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to
write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is
characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered
writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact
who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts. Our rules on evidence having
been drawn mainly from American sources, decisions of American courts have persuasive
effect. The general rule is that where a local rule is patterned or copied from that of
another country, then the decisions of the courts in such country construing the rule are

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[ATTY. GRANDEA]

entitled to great weight in interpreting the local rule. Following cited precedents, we find no
reversible error on this score.
PEOPLE v. AGRESOR

The size and proportions of letters do not have much significance in the identification of
handwriting for the simple reason that they can be appreciably changed according to the
circumstances.
The mood and the relative importance of the document may also unconsciously affect the
handwriting, and may account for the variations therein. The handwriting in the notebook
was obviously produced in school where students are given a limited time to take down
notes. They are subject to scrutiny by both teachers and classmates. Love letters, on the
other hand, are usually written in a more relaxed environment and in a more leisurely
manner, with much time for contemplation. They are usually meant only for the eyes of
letter-writer's lover.
In any case, the test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of
letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed
on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent
course, and is, therefore, itself permanent. The identification of handwriting should not rest,
therefore, on the apparent similarity or dissimilarity of one feature but should be based on
the examination of all the basic characteristics of the handwriting under study.
It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the
courts, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can
form its own opinion. Ultimately, the value of the expert testimony would still have to be
weighed by the judge, upon whom the duty of determining the genuineness of the
handwriting devolves. Nevertheless, the handwriting expert may afford assistance in
pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection
from an unpracticed observer. There is no doubt that superior skills along these lines will
often serve to direct the attention of the courts to facts, assent to which is yielded not
because of persuasion or argument on the part of the expert, but by their own intrinsic
merit and reasonableness.

As there was a dispute regarding the genuineness of the handwriting, it would have been
more prudent if the trial court allowed the presentation of a handwriting expert by the
defense. The denial of the request for time to file a motion to have the handwriting
examined in effect rendered the right of the accused to have compulsory process to secure
the production of evidence in his behalf nugatory.

SECTION 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. An electronic signature on the electronic

document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if the signature is
an electronic signature and proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the
parties interested in the electronic document, existed under which a.) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said partys access to
the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature;
b.) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document was
generated or communicated, in the light of all circumstances, including any relevant agreement;
c.) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order to proceed further with the transaction,
to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and
d.) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to make the
decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same.
SECTION 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. In any proceedings involving an
electronic signature, it shall be presumed that,
a.) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
b.) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the
electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document
knows or has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic
signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.
SECTION 14. Proof by Affidavit. The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section
9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an affidavit given
to the best of the deponents knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest as defined in the
following section.
2. Alterations
Rule 132, sec. 31
Section 31.
Alteration in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as
genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration
was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected
by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning
or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in
evidence.
3. Documents in unofficial language

RA 8792, secs. 5 (e), 8, 9, 14

Sec. 5 (e) Electronic signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in
electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the
electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or
adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or
approving an electronic data message or electronic document.

Rule 132, sec. 33

Section 33.
Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to
have such translation prepared before trial.
4.

Effect of Seal

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[ATTY. GRANDEA]
done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground.
Consequently, the trial court committed no error in considering the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such testimonies had not been
offered before they were given.

Rule 132, sec. 32

Section 32.
Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private
documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned.
III.
A.

ALONTE v. SAVELLANO, JR.

Offer and appreciation of evidence

Offer of evidence; effects of offer or lack of offer

The admission of private complainants affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in
response to respondent judges questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent judge
used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it formally
offered before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide that
the court shall consider no evidence which has not formally offered. Evidence not formally
offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of
the case. Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected.

B.

Objections to offer of evidence; ruling

Rule 132, secs. 34, 35

Section 34.
Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Section 35.
When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
DELA TORRE v. CA

Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not
formally offered as required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in
People v. Java:

Rule 132, secs. 36, 38

Cf. Rule 132, sec. 37
Section 36.
Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after
the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made
as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be
considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. . . .

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a
different period is allowed by the court.

Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became
effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence
at the end of the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is
put on notice whether the witness to be presented is a material witness and should be
heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already
testified to by other witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying further.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)

. . . Section 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the
oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the
court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.

Section 38.
Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is
made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented;
but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against
whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling.

Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his
objection by his failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the prosecution
evidence in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from
December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which
required that the offer be made at the beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner
should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
if not before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were
formally offered at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not having

The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is
based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must
specify the ground or grounds relied upon.

Section 37.
When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonably
apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of
the same class as those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or
overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party
to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a)

C.

Remedies from exclusion of evidence

Rule 132, sec. 40

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[ATTY. GRANDEA]

Section 40.
Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are
excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
D.

Weight and sufficiency of evidence

Rule 133, secs. 1-5

Section 1.
Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number.
Section 2.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral
certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Section 3.
Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
Section 4.
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a)

There is more than one circumstances;

(b)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored,
including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as
programming errors;
(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and
information system;
(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information
system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or
(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic
document or electronic data message.
SEC. 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. In any dispute involving the
integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic document or
electronic data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following
factors:
(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a
manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other
reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system;
(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with
interest adverse to that of the party using it; or
(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of
business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of
the party using it.
E.

PEOPLE v. OBELLO

RULE 7
EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. - In assessing the evidentiary weight of an
electronic document, the following factors may be considered:
(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated,
including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and
reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as
any relevant agreement;
(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;

The appreciation of and the weight accorded to the testimony of witnesses are better left to
the sound discretion of the trial judge whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal, unless
the defense shows that he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which, if properly considered, may affect the result of the case.

But Cf. PEOPLE v. CLOPINO

Section 5.
Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Rule 7, Electronic Evidence Rule

Appreciation of evidence

It may be that a judge who tried the case and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses has an advantage over another who did not have such an opportunity. But
such lack of opportunity does not necessarily prevent him from determining from the
transcript of stenographic notes whether a witness was forthright and frank. How often has
this Court itself found the testimony of witnesses to have been given in a straightforward
manner on the basis solely of the records of the case.
While the trial judge who presided over the trial of the case would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The full
record was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and analytical decision he
has written that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before
him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned
perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge.

3. Object

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a.

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

Injuries

PEOPLE v. VILLALUNA

The delay in reporting the incident made any physical findings of the rape inconclusive. The
medico-legal expert who examined complainant a year after the rape incident could only
conclude that the complainant was impregnated and had delivered a baby but could not
say definitely whether she was a victim of a sexual intercourse by force. In any case,
absence of external signs or physical injuries on the victim does not negate the commission
of rape, 41 specially in this situation where complainant filed the rape case a year after the
incident, when the injuries have healed.

PEOPLE v. BORREROS

Neither did the trial court err in rejecting appellant's theory of self defense considering the
nature and number of gunshot wounds of the victims. The deceased Danilo Almario
suffered four (4) gunshot wounds on the left side of his back below the scapula, on the right
forearm, on the left thigh and on the lower left femur, all fired by the assailant from behind.
The deceased, Federico Medina, suffered two (2) gunshot wounds, one on the head and
another on the left forearm. Verily, the nature, location and number of the wounds
sustained by the victims make appellant's theory of self-defense implausible. As held in
People vs. Guarin, the presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the deceased is
physical evidence that strongly militates against appellant's stance. If appellant shot the
victims just to defend himself, it defies reason why he had to inflict several wounds on
them. Irrefutably, the multiple and serious injuries sustained by the victims evinced a
determined, effort on the part of appellant to kill them.

c.

VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS

The sole legal issue from the admitted facts is whether the compelling of a woman to
permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that
portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure
which find their origin in the Constitution of the United States and practically all state
constitutions and in the common law rules of evidence, providing that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
"The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." The Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands, in two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The constitutional limitation was said to
be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips,
against his will, an admission of his guilt."

d.

Drug Sample

PEOPLE v. ZHENG BAI HUI

A sample taken from one (1) of the packages is logically presumed to be representative of
the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.
Therefore, a positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram
of drugs in the plastic package from which the sample was taken. If it is then proved,
beyond reasonable doubt, x x x that accused appellant transported into the Philippines the
plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as prohibited
drugs, then conviction for importing "shabu" is definitely in order.

e.

Forensic DNA evidence

PEOPLE v. ACALA

b.

As the victim was no longer a virgin when she was raped on January 19, 1996, no new
injury on her hymen could be expected. The fact that the lacerations were already healed
points to the conclusion that the victim was repeatedly raped before January 19, 1996,
consistent with the accusation against accused-appellant. In People v. Espinoza, it was
held that healed lacerations do not negate rape. In fact, lacerations, whether healed or
fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
Hair

PEOPLE v. RONDERO

Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands
were taken from him without his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in
violation of his right against self incrimination.
What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence
when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused
may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced
out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently,
although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Physical Condition

DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS

TIJING v. CA

The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother,
the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually,
as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of
DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would
be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

PEOPLE v. VALLEJO

DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion).
This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be
repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

4. Facts
a.

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva
which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the
assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or
assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of
the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Age

PEOPLE v. PRUNA

PEOPLE v. YATAR

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert,
were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including
the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.

No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying.
The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness. It
is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive
and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of
relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a)
at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct
impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those
facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show
that the child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false
swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states
that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or
that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false
swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity
renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of
relating them truthfully.
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient
under the following circumstances:
a.
If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b.
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c.
If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.

b.

Resignation from office

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO; also Resolution on MR

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation
is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can
be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his
acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on
the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m.
of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the
transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the
petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name
of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.
-Resolution on MRx x x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the
element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on
by government action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the
following elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the result of
coercive acts of the opposite side. The view has also been expressed that a resignation may be
found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employers conduct
in requesting resignation effectively deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors
to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to
resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3)
whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she
was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the
circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged by an
objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective evaluation; that the employee
may perceive his or her only option to be resignation for example, because of concerns
about his or her reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is
between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or facing
disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by
duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only alternative
to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good
cause to believe that grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that a
resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings for dismissal is not
tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time
and opportunity for deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer
charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has already
determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such authority has the legal authority
to terminate the officers employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to
threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by
law and the circumstances of the case.
In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than
resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress a written
declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced to resign because immediately
before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he
still had a choice of whether or not to leave.

& ALAGBAN

[ATTY. GRANDEA]

To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to
believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners
resignation.