Canon 10

1. Director of Lands v. Adorable

Facts:
Adorable files a land claim before the Director of Lands.
The case went to the CA for appeal. However, the war broke
out. After the war, Adorable files a reconstitution case before
the SC believing that the case was not resolved by the CA.
Atty. Zamora, counsel of the appellee of the case informed
the Court that the case was already settled by the CA in
favor of Adorable.
Issue:
WON the conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
Held:
Yes. The conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
The Court in this case praised Atty. Zamoras conduct
as the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
as becomes of the deserving member of the bar.
Hence, the act of Atty. Zamora is proper.
2. Carlet v. CA and Zarate
Facts:
Carlet who is the Special Administrator of the Estate of
Sevillo through Atty. Jimenez files before the Trial Court an
action for reconvenyance of property of Sevillo. Zarate then
moved to dismiss such action invoking res judicata since it
was the same facts that had been settled by the trial court,
CA and SC. The action was then dismissed by the Trial Court
and ordered Atty. Jimenez regarding forum-shopping. Atty.
Jimenez then appealed it before the CA, but to no avail.
Issue:
WON the action of Atty. Jimenez is proper.
Held:

No. The action of Atty. Jimenez is not proper.

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court.
In the case at bar, the action of Atty Jimenez of filing a
reconveyance case despite his knowledge that there is
finality of the case shows that he does not have good faith
towards the court.
Hence, his conduct is not proper.
3. Allied Bank v. CA and Galanida
Facts:
Galanida was terminated from Allied Bank due to his
refusal to be transferred to other branch. Hence, he filed an
action before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter then
rendered a decision in Galanidas favor citing the Dosch
case, lifted from the syllabus of the SCRA.
Issue:
WON the conduct of the labor arbiter is proper.
Held:
No. The conduct of the labor arbiter is not proper.
Rule 10.02 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority.
In the case at bar, the fact that the labor arbiter quoted
in their decision a syllabus from the SCRA is an act of
misrepresenting the decision of the Supreme Court since
such syllabus is not part of the decision, instead a note of
the author of such report.
Hence, such conduct is improper.
4. Del Rosario v. Chingcuanco and Imperio
Facts:
The CAR rendered a decision evicting Del Rosario from
the land which he leases from Imperio. However, the former

refused to vacate the land since the latter does not want to
refund him of the improvement he had done to the property.
Del Rosario, further, filed a motion before the SC to stay
such execution. Due this, Imperio filed a petition to cite Del
Rosarios counsel in contempt since said counsel quoted a
non-existing SC decision. However, it was discovered that
such belief was brought by a mere typographical error.
Issue:
WON the conduct of Del Rosarios counsel deserves a
disciplinary action.
Held:
No. The conduct of Del Rosarios counsel does not
deserve a disciplinary action.
In this case, the Court ruled that the name of the case
was given correctly and there was clearly no deception on
the part of the counsel.
Hence, the conduct of said counsel does not deserve a
disciplinary action.
5. Munoz v. CA and Sutton
Facts:
Sutton made some misrepresentations in the facts of
the case where she seeks a review before the SC.
Issue:
WON such conduct deserves disciplinary action.
Held:
Yes.The conduct of Atty. Sutton deserves disciplinary
action.
Under the Canon 10 of the CPR, a lawyer shall owes
candor and honesty to the court.
In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Sutton made false
facts in her pleading for review in SC is a clear manifestation
that she lacks candor for the court.
Hence, her conduct warrants a disciplinary action.

6. Adez Realty v. CA
Facts:
Atty. Dacanay made some intercalation in the decision
of the Court of Appeals when he appealed before the SC.
Due this, the Court had suspended him indefinitely. Dacanay
argued that it was his client who made the intercalation and
later on he admitted that his secretary made the
intercalation on the document.
Issue:
WON the conduct of Dacanay warrants a suspension.
Held:
Yes. The conduct of Dacanay warrants suspension.
Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of the
paper, language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the
text of a decision or authority.
In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Dacanay made the
intercalation on the CA decision makes him liable under such
rule.
Hence, his conduct warrants a disciplinary action.
7. The Insurance Life Assurance Co. Employees Assoc.
v. Insular Life Assurance Co.
Facts:
The Employees Assoc. Files before the CIR a complaint
for unfair labor practice against the Company. The CIR then
dismissed such complaint. In its decision, CIR Judge Martinez
misquoted a SC decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle
Publication Employees Assn: (1) 60 words of the paragraph
quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the original;
(2) Martinez used For it is settled that...; the original reads,
For it must be remembered... (3) Last sentence in the
quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually part of the
immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision.
In the respondents brief, counsels for respondents quoted

the CIRs decision

Issue:
Whether or not the Judge and the respondents counsel
are liable for contempt.
Held:
No. The Judge and the respondents counsel are not
liable for contempt.
In citing SCs decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the
same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation
mark. This
is because only the decisions of this Honorable Court
establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.
(Miranda v. Imperial).
However, there was good faith in both the Judge and the
respondents counsel, hence their action is not liable for
contempt.
Canlas vs. CA
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
and
FRANCISCO
HERRERA,respondents.
G.R. No. L-77691
August 8, 1988
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of land located
in Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He
secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds
of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of the
same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an
extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question after
private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private
respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said
foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two
years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L

and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement

that renders the former to be insured another year for the
said properties. Included in the stipulations were the
attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private
respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came
to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the
attorneys fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was
discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a
document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the
same to his name.
Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming
the parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the
properties were already registered under the petitioners
name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the
court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said
certificates for the properties consolidated by the
redemption price he paid for said properties. The private
respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the
reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity
of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to
extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price
of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00
attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a
development that should have tempered his demand for his
fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and
above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to
"conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to
[his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that
lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The

petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own

client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not
speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's
own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily,
we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has
not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To hold
Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must
then set off their obligations against the other.
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA
SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the
execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No.
C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner,
considering that the issues raised in this second petition for
review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues
which have already attained finality. We now write finis to
this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17)
years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br.
15, Ozamis City: [1]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration
of justice that once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived
of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard
themselves against any scheme to bring about that result,
for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final
and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes

rei publicae ut finis sit litium.

The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondentspouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central
Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of
nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942)
issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil
Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, [2]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null
and void.
Dismissing
counterclaim
of
defendant
without
pronouncement as to costs."
The aforesaid decision was affirmed [3] by respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and
eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on
November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March
5, 1992. [4]
The RTC decision, having become final and executory,
private respondents moved for execution which was granted
by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the
trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between
private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true
and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from
Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents
motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by the
trial court holding that the judgment was binding on
petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant

Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the

Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which
read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no
compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property
from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in
Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision
rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment
because the action or suit may be continued for or against
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee [5]
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court
of Appeals on February 18, 1993. [6]
On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. [7] Upon finality
of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated
October 21, 1993. [8]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the
issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court
which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration.
Petitioners motion was initially granted [9] on August 29,
1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However,
upon motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994 [10] by Judge Emilio L.
Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias
writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for
the second time, filed a petition for certiorari [11] with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be

executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case

No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of
the property to the private respondents; that certain facts
and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the
judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and
inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of
execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents title is being
questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment [12] dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297
had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the
respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of
execution and possession could have been implemented a
long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of
petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x
Petitioner Eternal
Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final
judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled
upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere
continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs,
although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a final
judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is
obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the assessment
of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142
of the Revised Rules of Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents, the instant petition has already become moot
and academic as the property in question was already turned
over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of
execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully,
putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
January 30, 1996. [13]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention

reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused

in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment,
all the issues between or among the parties before it are
deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to
any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an
end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and
the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between
private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797 when it ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property
from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in
Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision
rendered therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment
because the action or suit may be continued for or against
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee. [14]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993. There is,
therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioners contention that a determination of the
issue of possession should first be resolved before the
issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence
of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as
the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, they do not have to institute
another action for the purpose of taking possession of the
subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and

circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in

Civil Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the
said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency
of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include
the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the
pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification
why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of
possession of the subject property should be permanently
stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final
resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of
titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will
not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment
in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners
title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942)
was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed,
and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote
possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by
petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate
TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of
the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted
merely to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be disturbed,
desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the
judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of
the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of
the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot
owners have been taken into account by the trial court when
it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights
could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13,
1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.,
stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely
without recourse or remedy because they can still go after

the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in

question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And
should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiffrespondents to be placed in possession of the subject
property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the
same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it
should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to
negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash
of the property subject of their complaint to avoid demolition
or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the
burial lots." [15]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive
was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to
the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are
given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so
that they can have access to the property. But as to the
demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by
the defendant with the former owner so that cash payment
or cash settlement be made." [16]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his
Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation
on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas
within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many
persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the
grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the
interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the
writ of possession and break open order should be applied
only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the
eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where
the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid
disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves
spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial
park." [17]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the
issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been
properly addressed.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and

academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ of
Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs
Return, [18] dated March 31, 1995, with the attached Turn
Over Premises [19] indicating therein that private
respondents took possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution
of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the prejudice
of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner
has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has
long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally
terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with
tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the
real owners 33333332of the property. This is a mockery of
justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of
the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. They should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends
of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes. [20] In Banogan et. al.
vs. Cerna, et. al., [21] we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add
to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which
is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts
and the law should advise them when a case such as this,
should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the
already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the
cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the
courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,concur

CANON 11
IN RE SOTTO
Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt in connection with his
written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the
matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila
Times and in other newspapers in the locality.
Sotto was given ten days more besides the five
originally given him to file his answer, and although his
answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time
given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny
the authenticity of the statement as it has been published.
He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to
impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can
only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and
has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the
Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the
exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the
press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of
offending any of the majority of the honorable members of
this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided
the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to
attack the honesty or integrity of any one.
Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.
HELD:

The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly

published false imputations against its members. He accused
them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and
injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to
be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a
constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite
of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines
judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an
intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better
qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any
to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word
can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed
that the imputations are based on fact.
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct.
In re Almacen G.R. No. L-27654 (In the Matter of
Proceedings for Disciplinary Action against Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen vs. Virginia Yaptinchay)
Facts of the Case:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil
case. They lost in a civil case but Almacen filed for a Motion
for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said
motion but failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of
said motion.
He appealed to the Court of Appeals but motion was
denied. He filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.

Atty. Almacen called such minute resolution as

unconstitutional.
He filed before the Supreme Court a petition to
surrender his lawyers certificate as he claimed that it was
useless to continue practicing his profession when members
of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.
He argues that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120,000.00 without knowing the reasons why
and that his client became one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy.
He also contends that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens
petition as the Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually
surrender his certificate.
Almacen, however, did not surrender his lawyers certificate
though he now argues that he chose not to.
Issue:
Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court clarified that minute
resolutions are needed because the Supreme Court cannot
accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they
reject.

The Supreme Court must decide only on cases which

present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved.
The Supreme Court regarded Almacens criticisms as
uncalled for. His right to criticize the decision of the courts
has always been encouraged, but it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety.
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
FACTS:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution filed by the
Petitioner : a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in
Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against
public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707
and G.R. No. 80578. and a Resolution of this Court dated 2
May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.
The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez
in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan;
and
(2)
issuing
certain
allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the
proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter,
petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news
article which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine Daily Globe."
ISSUE: Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of
freedom of speech towards the Court?
RULING:
No. The Court begins by referring to the authority to
discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The
authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice

of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the

practice itself of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of
the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected
in any manner with a case before the Court.
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in
the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first
and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of
rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, and that a lawyer's right of
free expression may have to be more limited than that of a
layman.
While the Court may allow criticism it has In Re: Almacen
held: Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to
render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion
of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel
G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444
PONENTE: Mendoza
FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel,
Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the
respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge
found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition
filed by complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of
direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment
for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge
denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993.
HELD: The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only

occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect

without which the administration of justice will fail.
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the
abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's
finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the
allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and
while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were
bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could
not overstep. Based on
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous
allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty.
Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his
client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others"
and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by
the record or have materiality to the case."
Montecillo vs Gica
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander.
Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he
successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar
was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court
ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals
where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then
filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled
threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he
thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust
decision and judgment has been rendered through
negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from
using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second

MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del

Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for
contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a
letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking
the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did
not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case
against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower
court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay
damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty.
Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC
to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the
Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire
of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme
Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an
explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar
in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even
stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts
in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have
continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his
explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme
Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court
justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in
violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court
so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge
the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly

rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that

they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance
of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.
Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22,
1988)
FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA) to opening of several streets to the general public,
after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but
Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition
later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the
gates of said street for public use. The area ceased to be
purely residential. Action for damages was brought against
Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract,
to maintain the purely residential status of the area. Other
similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were
dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the said dismissals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and
Ayala Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for
public use.
HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence
nothing was violated.
RATIO:
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise
by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence along Jupiter
[street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of

Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall

between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming
there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the
passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why
Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed
non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is
secondary to the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious
or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed.
Paragas v cruz
Facts: In asking for reconsideration of the Courts dismissal
of his petition for certiorari in the present case, counsel for
the petitioner, Atty. Jeremias Sebastian, used derogatory
expressions against the dignity of the Court in the language
of his motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is administratively
liable for his actions/language.
Held: The expressions contained in the motion for
reconsideration penned by the counsel of the petitioner are
plainly contemptuous and disrespectful and he is hereby
guilty of direct contempt of court.
As remarked in People vs. Carillo: Counsel should conduct
himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never

will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to

intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts require.