/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

11:22:23 AM

VIVARIUM
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11:22:23 AM

Introduction

RUSSELL L. FRIEDMANAND CHRIS SCHABEL*

Over the last threedecades, the studyof the philosophyand theologyof

the period runningroughlyfromthe death ofJohn Duns Scotus (1308)
untilthe Black Death (1348) has reallycome into its own. Figuresfrom
thisfruitful
time,men likePeterAuriol,WalterChatton,Adam Wodeham,
Thomas Bradwardine,Gregoryof Rimini,and, perhapsabove all, William
of Ockham and JohnBuridan,have been well servedwithcriticaleditions
of theirwritingsand detailedstudiesof theirthoughtand influence.The
of the period as well
unique philosophicaland theologicalcontributions
as the generadcontoursof the intellectualdebate are becomingmore and
more evident.As the bibliographyappended to thisIntroductionreveals,
the Italian Franciscan Francis of Marchia has also benefitedfromthis
renaissancein earlyfourteenth-century
studies.In 1990 Marchia's works
were nearlytotallyuneditedand mostlyunexamined,and studiesof his
of hisrole
thoughtwerefewand farbetween,and dominatedby expositions
in the creationof the theoryof impetus
and in otherissuesin naturalphilosophy.Today, fivevolumesof Marchia's writingshave been editedand
printed,along with many editionsof individualquestions;detailed studies of the structure
and the manuscripttraditionof Marchia's workshave
appeared; and thereare ambitiousplans to edit Marchia's Frenchoeuvre.
Moreover,while Marchia's naturalphilosophyis stillan importantobject
- it was the
of study
topic of the only book yet to have been devotedto
* ForhelpwiththeIntroduction,
we thankPaulJ.J.M.Bakker,
Girard
J. Etzkorn,
Roberto
and TizianaSuarez-Nani.
AllHarvard
are to the
Lambertini,
stylereferences
to thisIntroduction.
We havethefollowing
addenda
etcorrigenda
to
bibliography
appended
our2001article
on Marchia's
Sentences
and Schabel2001).On
commentary
(Friedman
tobookI recorded
formsM is incorrect
Vat.lat.
p. 72 theexplicit
(M hasno explicit);
toPelzer's
an abbreviation
ofMarchia's
II Sent.,
901,f.8v,contains
(according
catalogue)
d. 1; msAssisi,
Biblioteca
delSacroConvento
di S. Francesco
includes
180,ff.16r-17v,
III Sent
Marchia's
in GerardOdonis'III Sent.
to V. Doucet
., q. 8, inserted
According
surlesSentences:
au rpertoire
deM. Frdric
Florence
[Commentaires
supplment
1954,
Stegmueller.
to III Sent,
found
in msVat.Barb.lat.791is HughofNovoCastro's
31)theprologue
andnotFrancis
ofMarchia's.

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2006
- www.brill.nl/viv
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
44,1

11:22:37 AM

RUSSELL
ANDCHRISSCHABEL
L. FRIEDMAN

Marchia (Schneider 1991)- , dozens of articleshave been publishedin

the last fifteenyears coveringmany other facetsof Marchia's thought:
politicalphilosophy,epistemologyand philosophyof mind, metaphysics,
philosophicaltheology.These studieshave revealed that Marchia was a
creativeand interesting
thinker
on a wide rangeof topics,and thisundoubtannual
increase in the numberof published
has
contributed
to
the
edly
articlesdealing with his thought.It seems that Francis of Marchia is a
figurewhose time has come.
It is likelythatFrancisof Marchia was born around 1290 in the town
of Appignano del Tronto (near Ascoli). Becoming a Franciscan,he rose
throughthe order's educationalsystem.Evidence recentlyuncoveredby
GirardJ. Etzkornindicatesthat Marchia probably studied theologyat
.* Thereafter
Paris beforeteachingat one of the order'sprovincialstudia
in
he returnedto Paris to read the Sentences
most
,
likely 1319-20, and
in
Paris
until
around
1324. It was duringthese
appears to have remained
yearsthatmanyof his scholasticworkswere probablyput together.These
include his two Metaphysics
commentaries(a long and a shortone) and
as well as his mostimportantworkin terms
his literalPhysics
commentary,
comof the breadth of its subject matterand its impact: his Sentences
mentary,survivingin several versionsand many manuscripts.Marchia
was in Avignonbetween 1324 and 1328, teachingat the Franciscancondates fromthis period. In 1328, Marchia, in
vent; possiblyhis Quodlibet
the companyof the FranciscanMinisterGeneral, Michael of Cesena, as
well as Bonagratiaof Bergamoand Williamof Ockham,fledfromAvignon
and Pope John XXII. The very next year Marchia wrote his Improbatio
againstthe pope, and thistract,as Roberto Lambertinishowsin his article in this volume, had an influenceon Ockham's political writings.
Marchia, like Ockham, took refugein Munich with Emperor Louis of
in Munichin 1347,Marchia
Bavaria.But whereasOckham died impenitent
was capturedby Church authoritiesin 1340 and made a confessionof
faith and retractionof errorsbefore the Inquisitionin 1343 (see esp.
Wittnebenand Lambertini1999, 2000, and Lambertini'sarticlebelow).
We hear nothingmore of Marchia after1344.
1 Vat.lat.943,f.8vb:"Adsextum
mododiciquodvisioetauditio
sunt
secundo
posset
Itislikely
meoParisius."
sicutaudiviteneri
ab unodoctore
essentialiter
tempore
respectus,
version
of
thefirst
thatMarchia
is hererecording
theviewofDurandofSt. Pourain,
wasavailable
at Parisin the
whoseSent,
commentary
by 1308,andwhoreadtheSent,
oftheology
actaregens
at Paris1312-13).
(hewasmaster
periodca. 1308-10

11:22:37 AM

INTRODUCTION
FrancisofMarchia:Datingand Influence

Marchiawas activein a greatera of Franciscantheology.Many Franciscan

survivefromthisperiodfrombothParis(see Schabel
Sentences
commentaries
we can
2002) and Oxford,a fact that presentsus with an opportunity:
undertakedetailed doctrinalstudiesthat cover a number of years and
the datingof medievalwritingsas well
authorsin the hope of confirming
as tracingtheirreception.Marchia'sParisianSentences
lectures,as mentioned
above, have been dated to the academic year 1319-20, but we have, in
fact,verylittledirectevidenceforthis,reallyjust an explicitin one manuscript(Naples BN VII C. 27) saying that Marchia was reading the
at Paris in 1320. Since we have good reason to assign Francis
Sentences
lecturesto 1320-21, it would seem that
of Meyronnes'Parisian Sentences
antequernof Marchia's lecturesis 1320. (Marchia may have
the terminus
continuedto revisehis work until 1323 or even later, however.)There
are severalothermajor Franciscanfiguresfromthe period whose works
lecturesand commentary.
may help us with dating Marchia's Sentences
Peter Auriol's Parisian lecturesare very securelyfixed at 1316-18, and
lecturesprobablydate to 1317-19,
Williamof Ockham's OxfordSentences
while forLandulph Caracciolo two dates have been proposed: 1318-19,
to find
whichwe have supported,and 1321-22. It is important,therefore,
or correctingour hypotheses.
evidencecorroborating,
clarifying,
On a number of issues Marchia clearlyrespondsto Auriol (see e.g.
Friedman2002, Schabel 2000 and 2002), as could be expectedgiventhe
provocativenature of many of Auriol's views and the fact that he was
Franciscanregentmasterin theologyin Parisfrom1318-20,whenMarchia
there.What is more, Paul Bakkerhas
was probablyreadingthe Sentences
his Sentences
in
IV
of
book
that
foundevidence
commentaryMarchia also
respondsto Ockham on the issue of the accidentsof the Eucharist:2
2 TheOckham
VII, ed.R. WoodandG. Gl,StBonaventure,
textisin Opera
Theologica
is
to Ockham
NY 1984.Another
(1999,p. 404,n. 275)seesas referring
passageBakker
estunusmodusdicendi
ad primum
d. 13,q. 1, a. 1: "Quantum
IV Sentences,
Marchia,
enimquodquanDicunt
suntsinesubiecto.
paisqueibiapparent,
quodomniaaccidencia
ab aliisgeneribus,
realiter
ymorescuiuslibet
titas,
ipsarei,nondiffer
que estextensio
nonalicoalioa se,sedse ipsa.
habens
estextensa
[et]extrapartem,
partem
predicamenti
Et itaomniaaccidencia
putacolor,sapor,etc.,suntsinequolique suntin sacramento,
rem
nondiffert
istorum
cuiuslibet
extensio
betsubiecto,
aliquomodosecundum
quoniam
in
fundari
accidencia
istoshuiusmodi
secundum
Necestintelligendum
eorum.
a quolibet
- quandosuntin ea- mediante
itaquodsubiectum
sedimmediate,
substancia
quantitate,
estsubstancia."
saltem
cuiuslibet
immediatum
absoluti,
accidentis,

11:22:37 AM

ANDCHRISSCHABEL
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN

IV Sentences
, q. 6 (ed.Wood
Ockham,
and Gi,pp. 71.6-72.12)
estquidsitquanIdeoprimo
videndum
titas.Dico hic,tenendo
quodquantitas
nullam
aliamremabsolutam
velrespectivama substantia
et a qualitate
dicit.
nonestaliud
Dico tuncquodquantitas
reihabentis
nisiextensio
partesa quarumuna ad aliampotestesse motus
localis.Ita quod sicutin secundodicnihil
tumestde duratione
quodduratio
dicitultraremdurantem,
sed
positivm
estquaedamvox vel conceptus
significansprincipaliter
ipsamremdurantemetconnotat
successionem
actualem
rem
velpotentialem,
itaquodsignificai
coexsistentem
successioni
vel
actualiter,
successioni
si esset,
ita
quaecoexsisteret
extensio
nondicitaliquam
velquantitas
remabsolutam
vel respectivam
ultra
substantiam
etqualitatem,
sedestquaedamvoxvelconceptus
significans
princivel
putamateriam
palitersubstantiam,
vel qualitatem
et
formam
corporalem,
connotatmultasalias res interquas
potestessemotuslocalis.

d. 13,q. l,a. 1
Marchia,IV Sentences,
(Bakker1999,pp. 404-05,n. 276)
Pro illa opinione,
putaquod quelibet
resse ipsasitextensa
ethabeatpartem
extrapartem,
nonalicoalioa se,arguiturprimosic: omneilludquod habet
eiusdem
racionis
situlocaliter
dispartes
tantesestextensum
et perconsequens
quantum;sed substancia
separataab
omnialioa se realiter,
etperconsequens
a quantitate,
si sit ab ipsa distincta
habetpartesextrapartessitu
realiter,
localiter
distantes;
ergoipsa estperse
idempotest
ipsamextensa.Preterea,
arguide qualibetqualitatesensibili.
Maioresteuidens.
Sed minorprobatur
in effectu
sic: Deus potestconseruare
in tanto
alicamsubstanciam
extensam
loco existente<m>
absquequocumque
motulocaliconcomitante,
corrumpendo
ueladnichilando
accidens
quodcumque
ab ipsa,et ita
eiusdistinctum
realiter
destruendo
perconsequens
quantitatem,
si ponatur
<quod> realiter
distinguitur
in eodem
ab ipsa;sed ipsa remanente
loco,etin tantoin quantoeratprius
aliasiamibiconcurreret
motus
uelmuta- <habet necessario
cio localis
partes
inloco>;ergosequitur
extra
partes
quod
substancia
est extensa,separatoquorealiter
ab ipsa.
cumquealio distincto
Peridemarguitur
de qualitate.

As one can see, althoughthe positiondescribedis the same, the textsare

not clearlyparallel. This can be explained, however.First,Ockham is
speakinghere in the contextof Eucharistiepresence,and since Ockham's
in his questionon the accidents(q. 8) is brief,perhapsMarchia
treatment
does not cite any specificpassage fromthat questionbut ratherapplies,
in a generalway, Ockham's statementson presenceto the issue of accidents.Second, Ockham's viewsin some contextsprobablyarrivedin Paris

11:22:37 AM

INTRODUCTION

beforehis actual Sentences

commentarydid.3Thus, not only was Marchia
one of the firstscholarsto react to Ockham's theologicalviews,but the
evidence shows that Ockham's theories crossed the Channel to Paris
almost immediatelyafterhis Oxford lectures,just as Auriol's Parisian
ideas reached England and Ockham soon aftertheywere publicized.
Even more than Marchia, Caracciolo respondedto Auriol's commentary,but Paul Bakkerhas also found evidence in the same contextthat
reasonto date Caracciolo's
Marchia criticizedCaracciolo,whichis further
lecturesto 1318-19, i.e. immediatelyprecedingMarchia's:
IV Sentences
, d. 12,q. 2
Caracciolo,
n. 272)
1999,
403,
(Bakker
p.

IV Sentences,
d. 12,q. 1,a. 1
Marchia,
(Bakker1999,p. 403,n. 272)

super
Quintaproposicio:
quodinherencia
acciditpositiuum,
nonabsoluaccidens
extrinsecus
tum,sed quo sitrespectus
... Etpreterea,
adueniens
quiainherenscilicet
enticia requirit
duo extrema,
etillamcuiinheret,
tatemquae inheret
uideturrenullumautemabsolutum
ex hoc infertur
quirereduo extrema,
relaimportare
quodomnisuniouidetur
extremaduo
cionemex quo requirit
extremaexistencianecessario.Quod
adueextrinsecus
autemsit respectus
niensprobatur,
quia ille est respectus
extrinsecus
adueniens
qui nonsequitur
fuit
necessario,
positisfundamentis-ista
est
sepiusprobata;sed ille respectus
huiusmodi;
ergoetc.Probaciominorisi
etpositoaccidente,
quiapositosubiecto
possetnonsequiinherencia.

Terciusmodusdicendiest quia illud

ab
pereiusseparacionem
quodtollitur
accidentibus
etsubiecto
nonestaliquid
sed quidam respectus
predictorum,
extrinsecus
adueniens,
potest
quiquidem
licetnonillequi
esseterminus
actionis,
est intrinsecus
adueniens.Huiusmodi
adueniens
autemrespectus
extrinsecus
actualis
estipsainherencia
qui tollitur
ad subiectum,
accidentis
que non est
Illudenimcuius
nisiquedamhabitudo.
esseestin ordinead aliud,nec potest
concipinisiin ordinead aliud,uidetur
sivehabiessequidamrespectus
precise
accidentisnon
tudo.Sed inherencia
in ordinead
potestconcipinisitantum
subiectum.
Ergoetc.Estenimrespecaduetusnonintrinsecus,
sedextrinsecus
niens,quia non poniturnecessario,
positisextremis.

Finally,Maier has arguedthatMeyronnesrejectedMarchia's teachingon

commenprojectilemotion,also propoundedin book IV of his Sentences
tary.Althoughit is possiblethatMeyronneswas reactingto GerardOdonis
or others,as Schabel relatesin his articlein this issue, it is most likely
3 Thanks
communication.
whoinformed
us ofthisfactviapersonal
to PaulBakker,

11:22:37 AM

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
ANDCHRISSCHABEL

thathis opponentwas Marchia,whichreinforces

Marchia'sand Meyronnes'
relativedating.In sum, the evidence supports1319-20 as the academic
lectures.
year of Marchia's Sentences
At the presentstateof research,thisseems to be as faras we can take
the use of doctrinalcomparisonsas an aid to datingMarchia's own works.
A second use to which doctrinalstudiescan be put is in the tracingof
Marchia's influence.Althoughthe main focusin the articlescollectedin
thisvolume is on Marchia's thoughtper se, an importanttaskforfuture
Marchia studieswillbe to showhis impacton othersas well.That Marchia
in fact had an impact can be surmisedjust fromthe numberof manucomscriptcopies that have survivedof his major work, his Sentences
mentary:we have some 16 copies of the firstbook of his Sentences
commentary,17 copies of the second book, 13 of the third,and 10 of
the fourth,along witha not inconsiderablenumberof fragments.
In what
follows,we would like to offera sketchof some of the ways in which
Marchia's impact can be traced in the fourteenth
century,and how this
can help us withcontextualizing
Marchia's own work.We make no claims
whatsoeverabout exhaustiveness
quite the contrary merelywantingto
illustratethat Marchia's receptionis both complex and significant,
and
hence deservingof much more attention.
NaturallyMarchia's Franciscanconfrres
paid attentionto his doctrine.
BesidesMeyronnesand Ockham,as witnessto thiswe can name Marchia's
Parisian reportator
com, William Rubio, whose own enormous Sentences
mentaryfromthe early 1330s was publishedin Paris in 1518 (see e.g.
Schneider1991, 250-52, 313-20; Schabel 2000, 210-14). But the influence
of Marchia's philosophyand theologywas not limitedto his own order.
While verylittlesurvivesfromParisian Dominicans in the decades after
Marchia's Sentences
lectures,we do have worksfromseveralAugustinin
if
most
not
all of whom employedMarchia explicitlyon several
Hermits,
as
Damasus
occasions,
Trapp's work clearlysuggests.4Sometimesthese
were extremely
uses of Marchia. Michael of Massa (d. 1337),
sophisticated
forinstance,structures
around Marchia's defenseof the univocityof the
conceptof being betweensubstanceand accidenta greatdeal of his own

4 A.D. Trapp,Augustinin
onEditions,
Notes
, Opinions
Theology
ofthe14thCentury.
Marginalia
andBook-Lore
6 (1956),146-274,
forcitation
listsofthesefigures
, in:Augustiniana,
(among
on Massainparticular,
seeidem,
onSome
Notes
Michael
others);
Manuscripts
ofthe
Augustinin
deMassa(f 1337),in:Augustinianum,
5 (1965),58-133.

11:22:37 AM

INTRODUCTION

treatmentof the issue, presentingFrancis' view in fourconclusions.5In

additionto Massa's explicitmentioningof Marchia, on severalissues he
is a silent"Marchist,"for example in futurecontingents(Schabel 2000,
214-20, and below) and in some aspectsof trinitarian
theology(Friedman
Similar
attention
to
the
detailsof Marchia's
11,
Forthcoming,
lb).
Chapter
in
can
be
found
the
Sentences
of
position
commentary Gregoryof Rimini
d.
(read Sent.,1343-44; 1358), Prologue,q. 1, whereMarchia's view about
the statusof theologyas a science is subjectedto veryclose scrutiny.6
A
fewyearslaterHugolinoof Orvieto(read Sent
. 1348-49) tookup Marchia's
positionin the same context.7But among the AugustininHermits,the
is AlphonsusVargas
championfordiscussingMarchia's positionsexplicitly
of Toledo (read Sent.1344-45),who mentionsMarchia at least thirteen
times,once to declare that the Oxford FranciscanJohn of Rodington
(read Sent.ca. 1328-29) had stolenMarchia's words. All in all, Marchia
is the tenthmost cited author in Vargas, before the likes of Thomas
Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.8Finally,James of Pamiers (fl. ca. 1330)
citesMarchia on occasion,once to reportthat"MasterFrancisof Marchia"
determineda question at the Papal curia in Avignon,perhaps a reference to Marchia's Quodlibet
.9
Thus, Marchia was a relativelyimportantfigurein Augustinintheology at Paris in the firsthalf of the fourteenth
century.But thereis evidence of further,
As
influence.
mentionedabove, one
quite widespread,
of the thingsthat has attractedmodern scholars to Marchia's Sentences
5 Trapp,Notes
onSome
d. 22, q. 1 = msBologna,
Biblioteca
, 85 (I Sent.,
Manuscripts
ff.193r-195r).
Massais replying
2214(1084),
toMarchia's
treatment
as pubUniversitaria,
lishedin N. Mariani
deMarchia
sivdeEsculo,
cumquaestioniOFM,Quodlibet
(ed.),Francisci
busselectis
excommentano
inlibrum
Grottaferrata
I
Sententiarum,
1997,487-92(= Scriptum
super
Sent.,
q. 28 = d. 8, q. 2, art.3).
6 See Rimini's
Lectura
etsecundum
Sententiarum
, vol. 1, ed. D. Trappand
super
primm
V. Marcolino,
Berlin-New
York1981,40-49,andcf.Lang1930,esp.192-93,
andZanin
2004.
7 Hugolinus
de UrbeVeteri,
inquattuor
libros
Sententiarum
OESA,Commentarius
, vol.1,ed.
W. Eckermann,
1980,72.
Wrzburg
8 Cf.Trapp'slistin Augustinin
, 220-22,withAlphonsus
Theology
VargasToletanus,
Sententiarum
Venice1490(rpt.Cassiciacum.
, ed.Thomasde Spilimbergo,
OESA,Inprimum
inSt.Augustine
Studies
andtheAugustinin
vol.2; NewYork1952).SeeMichalski
Order,
andespecially
a
1926,40-41,on Rodington,
1930,whoonpp.59-60presents
Krzinger
listof 17 mentions
ofMarchia's
and
(someofwhichareveryclosely
related),
position
dealswithVargas'rejection
ofMarchia's
viewsoftheology
as a science
on pp. 141-46,
158-63.
9 SeeTrapp,
inSententias
TheQuaestiones
, 174,andW.J.Courtenay,
Augustinin
Theology
Michael
deMassa,OESA:A Redating
45 (1995),191-207,
at 195n. 13.
, in:Augustiniana,
of

11:22:37 AM

ANDCHRISSCHABEL
RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN

commentaryare the theoriesin natural philosophyhe presentedthere.

In fact by the 1310s and 1320s Sentences
commentarieshad become so
large and broad that they provided ample space and opportunityfor
reflectionon physicsand metaphysics,as well as philosophicaltheology.
Conversely,since theologians,especiallyParisian theologians,were conto findfrequentrefsideredthe top mindsof the day, it is not surprising
commentariesof arts
erencesto theirtheologicalworksin the Aristotelian
masters.John the Canon's Physicscommentaryis a case in point.John
the Canon- Juan Marbes- was a Catalan artsmasterat Toulouse. Given
that the latestfigurehe cites is Gerard Odonis (d. 1349), whom he calls
simply"Frater" four times but "Generalis MinisterOrdinis Minorum"
twice,it is probable thatJohn wroteat the end of the 1320s or the early
1330s.10Despite the fact that he was a Toulouse arts master,almost all
of his citationsof scholasticsactive after1250 are of Paris theologians:
John Duns Scotus, OFM, 59 citations
Peter Auriol,OFM, 53
Francis of Marchia, OFM, 25
Thomas Anglicus(Wylton),12
Landulph Caracciolo, OFM, 9
Gerard Odonis, OFM, 9
Francis of Meyronnes,OFM, 9
Others with 3 citationsor fewer,1711
10Whatfollows
ofJohn's
is basedon a direct
butfora detailed
text,
reading
descripsee P.J.J.M.
Bakker
andD.-J.Dekker,
Antoine
Andre
ouJeanle
tionofthecommentary,
Chanoine
de philosophie
42 (2000),101-31.Forthecontroversy
mdivale,
?, in: Bulletin
and datingofJohntheCanon,see Schabel's
article
overtheidentity
below,note14.
Internal
evidence
clues.He mentions
"nostra
at onepointhe says
Cathalonia";
provides
doesnothold:"Johannes
estalbusetestcanonicus,
thatthefollowing
ergoestalbuscanonihe says:
cus"(i.e.he is a canon,butnota Premonstratensian
motion,
canon);discussing
ab istolocoqui estTholosaead
enimquodaliquodmobiledebeatmoveri
"Supposito
. . healsorefers
to"opinio
doctoris
locum
cuiusdam
quiestParisius
quaeapudTholosanos
whichaddthathe wasa canon
articulus
fideireputatur."
Thisis confirmed
byexplicits,
ofTortosa
andBarcelona
andnamed
he is alsowrongly
calleda
JohnMarbes,
although
andexplicit
oftheVenice1520edition.
Franciscan
at leastin theimplicit
11Walter
Ockham
ofGhent
doctor
3; Henry
), 2; William
(frater),
(magnus
(magister),
Burley
ofViterbo,
theCarmelite
I, q. 1),2; GilesofRome(II Physics
2; Gerard
(Quodlibet
), 2;James
1; Alexander
1; ThomasAquinas
1; PeterofAuvergne
(IX Metaphysics),
(Summa
(magister),
contra
subtilis
bacchalarii
Cathelani
gentiles
I), 1; opiniocuiusdam
qui ita superprimum
1; Francis
Bleth(?),1. Thereis alsoa reference
Sententiarum
. . . (Antonius
Andreas?),
ponit
onEucharistie
tocondemned
article
194of1277andonetoJohnXXII'spronouncement
in relation
to Ockham).
accidents
(probably

11:22:37 AM

INTRODUCTION

Perhapsbecause he was writingfroma ScotisticperspectiveafterThomas

to Aquinas
Aquinas' canonizationin 1323,Johnhas fewexplicitreferences
or Thomistae
the
edition
identifies
instances
of
1520
(4), although
many
doctoris
as referring
to SanctusThomas.In contrast,sometimes
opiniocuiusdam
John mentionsthe opinioScotica(3) or Scotizantes
(4), and at least once
while
Scotus
himself
receives
about
30%
of the totalcitations.
Formalizantes
,
Of the almost 200 explicitcitations,about 85% are of Franciscans,and
Parisiantheologiansactivefrom1315 to 1330 have over 60% of the overall references.
Where he is more explicit,John refersto theologicalworks
I and II of Sentences
books
but he also citesScotus'
(usually
commentaries),
Theoremata
and Tractatus
deprimo
Auriol's
deprincipiis
Tractatus
nat,
principio
urae
AlexanderofAlessandria's
, Wylton'sQuaestiones
, and, apparently,
physicae
On
the
basis
of
this
and
otherevidence,we are
Metaphysics
commentary.
entided to say that Francis of Marchia was active in one of the peak
periods of the Paris Facultyof Theology,when a seriesof famousmasters,mostlyFranciscan
Wylton,Auriol,Caracciolo,Marchia,Meyronnes,
and Odonis held interesting
and influentialdebates over a wide range
of theologicaland philosophicaltopics.
Afterthe DoctorSubtilisand the magnusdoctor
Peter Auriol, Francis of
Marchia is the most cited scholasticin John the Canon's work.John the
Canon is in factillustrative
in European thought
of Marchia's significance
in the decades afterhis Parisian Sentences
lectures.John's 25 directcitations speak to Marchia's impact.John refersto Marchia as magister
and
as doctor
reverendas
, citingboth Marchia's commentaryon I Sentences
fiater
once
distinction2) and his commentaryon book
times,
(three
specifying
VII of the Metaphysics
which
Fabrizio Amerinitreatsin his articlein the
,
volume.
But
Marchia's
influenceon John was much greaterthan
present
this. Notker Schneider found thatJohn copied entire questions from
Marchia'scommentaries
on boththeMetaphysics
and the Sentences
(Schneider
in
and
1949
Anneliese
Maier spottedJohn bor1991, 27-28),
already
rowingheavilyfromMarchia in the contextof futurecontingents(Maier
1949, 245-47).
John the Canon's borrowingin that contextwas in fact even more
extensivethan Maier knew.In his book on the receptionof PeterAuriol's
solutionto the problem of divine foreknowledge
and futurecontingents
in these years (Schabel 2000), Schabel identifieda "Marchist School"
among theologiansthatincludedthe FranciscansAufredusGonteriBrito,
WilliamofBrienne,and WilliamofRubio,and mostnotablytheAugustinin
HermitMichael of Massa. Interestingly,
all of these authorswere silent

11:22:37 AM

10

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
ANDCHRISSGHABEL

about theirdebt to Marchia, whose unacknowledgedimpactin thiscontextcontinuedat least to the end of the 15th century.It turnsout that
John the Canon was anothermember of this silent"MarchistSchool."
Book II of the Physicsprovidesa forumfor discussingcontingencyand
fortune,but John the arts masterasks a theologicalquestion (II, q. 4):
"UtrumDeus habeat certamet infallibilem
notitiamcuiuscumqueobiecti
In
futuricontingentis." articleoneJohndeals withfuturecontingent
propositions,notingthat a "certaindoctor", i.e. Auriol, followsAristotleand
denies theirtruthand falsity.Since John will oppose this position,one
wonderswhy he does not name his adversary,as is his usual procedure
withopponents.The reason is thatJohn is not readingAuriol at all, but
ratherFrancisof Marchia's presentationof Auriol,and since Marchia did
not name Auriol,neitherdoes John. But John does not name Marchia
either,and this time it is because John goes on to adopt, oftenverbaand future
tim,Marchia's solutionto the problemof divineforeknowledge
contingents.In fact,it is only toward the end of the articlethatJohn
- with
offers
approval what Marchia says "in alia quaestione," apparently an inadvertentrevelationof his source. John mentionsMarchia
again twicein the thirdof the threearticles,firstto give Marchia's argumentsagainstJohn's positionand then to refutethe arguments.This is
particularly
deceptive,because whatJohn actuallydoes is give Marchia's
hypothetical
objectionsto his own positionand thenMarchia's own refutationof theseobjections!In truth,
John is almostin fullagreementwith
Marchia, and over halfof the questionis a paraphraseor verbatimquotationfromMarchia's commentaryon book I of the Sentences
, mixedwith
Scotisticadditionsand briefmentionsof Thomas Wylton'sPhysicscommentaryand of Francis of Meyronnes.
in thiscontextJohn does not employthe Scriptum
version
Interestingly,
of the relevantpart of Marchia's commentary,survivingin 13 manuscriptsand perhapsthe productof revisionsdone as late as 1323 or 1324,
but rathera reportatio
versionthatis preservedin onlytwo witnesses,BAV
Ross. lat. 525 and Naples BN VII C. 27, dated (as mentionedabove)
1320. This is also the case with the Sentences
commentaryof William
Marchia's
known
and
it
Rubio,
,
only
reportator
suggeststhatJohn the
Canon was also close to Marchia.12It serves to remindus that reporta12Dekker
discusses
inan intertoMarchia
2002,227-30,
JohntheCanon'srelationship
onJohn's
oftimeandmotion,
in
article
theories
where
toPeterAuriol
Johnreacts
esting
inthisvolume
Ourfindings
hereandinSchabel's
article
Dekker's
particular.
modify
slightly

11:22:37 AM

11

INTRODUCTION

in fewor no manuscriptwitnesses,frequently
tiones
, oftensurviving
played
an importantrole earlyon, whilescripta
or ordinationes
circulatingin many
copies were more importantin the long term. Thus, Caracciolo and
of AurioPs lectures,Himbert of
Marchia were familiarwith reportationes
of Meyronnes'Sentences
and othGarda employeda reportatio
commentary,
ers used a reportatio
of Odonis's Toulouse lectures,now lost.
This shortsketchof some of the ways in which Marchia's influence
was feltin the yearsfollowinghis activityat Paris can serveto show that
Marchia was indeed a significant
figureat the Universityof Paris in the
century.It also shows quite clearlythat in order
earlyto mid fourteenth
and
to traceespeciallythe positiveimpactMarchia had on contemporary
later thinkers,furtherstudiesof Marchia's own thoughtand editionsof
his worksare an absolute prerequisite,since so oftenpositiveinfluence
goes unmentioned.We hope that the articlespublishedhere, in subjectintellectual
ing aspectsof Marchia'swide-ranging
pursuitsto close scrutiny,
will help demonstratenot only the inherentphilosophicaland theological interestof Marchia's thought,but also bring us one step closer to
seeing how his influenceplayed out in the later medievalperiod.
This Volume
works
The articlesin thisvolume focus on Marchia's most influential
his Sentences
commentary,his Metaphysics
commentary,and his political
- and on various themeshe took
tract
up in them. It is perhaps fitting
thatthefirstthreeof the six articlescollectedhere are devotedto Marchia's
naturalphilosophy.As mentionedabove, until recentlyMarchia's work
was discussedprimarilyby historiansof science. Indeed such important
scholarsas PierreDuhem, AnnelieseMaier, and Marshall Clagetttreated
Marchia at some length,he is discussedin standardhistoriesof medieval
sciencelike those of Edward Grant or David C. Lindberg,and his name
shows up even in broader surveys.Two of Marchia's positionsabove all
The firstof thesewas his
were singledout as being of greatsignificance.
derelicta
an
version
of
use of virtus
,
, to explain how projecimpetus
early
tilescan continueto move even aftertheyare no longerin contactwith
anddating,
assertions
onJohn'sidentity
andalsosuggest
thatwe needto see
however,
incontexts
isviaMarchia
other
whether
reaction
toAuriol
thanfuture
John's
contingents.
Foryetanother
ofJohnlifting
from
seeKraus1936,372,andthelitMarchia,
example
erature
referred
to there.

11:22:37 AM

12

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
ANDCHRISSCHABEL

the source of theirmotion:Marchia claimed that a forceis leftbehind

by the moverand thatthisforcegraduallyexhaustsitself,withthe effect
thatthe projectileceases its motion.The second of Marchia's mostnoted
view thatterrestrial
positionswas his rejectionof the generalAristotelian
and celestialmatterare of two fundamentally
different
types,Marchia
instead claimingthat the heavens and earth are composed of the same
basic kind of matterand that in principlethey obey the same laws of
cause and effect.It is on preciselythesetwo viewsthatarticleshere focus.
In his article,Mark Thakkar looks at the distinctionbetween matter
in the sublunarand in the supralunaryworlds. Thakkar's articlereally
showshow farMarchia studieshave come, since it can best be described
as revisionist.
He analyzesand evaluatesthe argumentsthatMarchia puts
forwardforhis claim that these mattersare of the same basic type.But
thenhe showsthatMarchia attenuateshis claim so drasticallythatit has
no consequenceswhatsoeverforthe workingsand conductof naturalphilosophy. Marchia's view was purely theoretical.Two points mightbe
made about Thakkar'sresults.First,as Thakkarhimselfpointsout it will
be interesting
to see whetherotherthinkersfromthe period priorto and
with
contemporary Marchia had the same sortof critiqueof theAristotelian
divisionbetweencelestialand terrestrial
matter;this researchhas yet to
be done. Second, in a certainsense Marchia's rejectionof the Aristotelian
view is put into greaterreliefgiven Thakkar's results:Marchia had the
same basic information
that all other medieval thinkershad- the heavens appeared to followunchanging,uniformcircularmotion,while the
earthwas a place of change and varied motion.From an empiricalpoint
of view, Marchia's big idea could only be theoretical,and to that extent
the conceptualbreakthrough
(if it was his) appears to remainintact.
As mentioned,perhapsMarchia's mostfamouscontribution
to natural
was
the
notion
of
virtus
derelitta
to
other
philosophy
explain,among
things,
projectilemotion. Two articlesin the presentcollection,one by Chris
Schabel, the otherby Fabio Zanin, take up this issue. The two articles
are rathercomplementary.
Schabel exploresthe historicalbackgroundto
and the receptionof virtusderelicta
, concludingthat the theorydid not
arise in a vacuum nor was it adopted immediately.Moreover,Schabel
looks at virtusderelicta
in the contextof Marchia's own philosophyand
that
Marchia used the tool to explain many different
theology,showing
phenomena over and above projectilemotion. Zanin's article,on the
otherhand, is primarilyconcernedwith a theoreticalconsideration:was
Marchia's idea a break with Aristotelianmechanicsand a harbingerof

11:22:37 AM

13

INTRODUCTION

the modern theoryof inertia?Zanin argues that Marchia's view does

break decisivelywith several essentialprinciplesin Aristotelianphysics;
derelicta
does not pave the way forinerhe claims that virtus
nevertheless
mechanics.Althoughhe considersit to be
tia and seventeenth-century
"one of the most importantcontributionsto the renewal of Western
forZanin the best way to look at Marchia's position,
scientific
thinking,"
and itsdescendantsinJohnBuridan,Nicole Oresme,and Albertof Saxony,
wentundeveloped.Interestingly,
is as a new theoryof motionthatultimately
views of the relationshipbetween
Schabel and Zanin take verydifferent
Marchia and John Buridan on the topic of impetus.
Schabel, lookingat
dereand
Marchia's wide-ranging
uses, theological
philosophical,forvirtus
litta,claimsthatBuridanrestricted
(i.e. to local motion)theuse of Marchia's
derelicta
and its descendant,
much broadertheory;Zanin, examiningvirtus
a
of
view
of
from
the
more
,
theoryof motion,sees
point
strictly
impetus
Buridan as having furtherdeveloped and extended Marchia's theory.
Appended to Schabel's articleis the firstcriticaleditionfromall manuderescriptsof the centraltextforthe studyof Marchia's theoryof virtus
1.
licta
: IV Sentences
, q.
The remainingarticlesdeal withtopicsthathave receivedfarless scholarly attention.Fabrizio Amerinilooks at Marchia's view on the nature
of accidentand accidentalbeing.What is an accident?How does it exist?
And how does it relate to the substancein which it inheres?These are
the questionsthat Amerini'swide-rangingpaper addresses. In the first
part of the paper, Amerini canvasses the thirteenth-and fourteenthcenturydebate over theseissues,isolatinga discussionamong artsmasters
that took its point of departurein a difficult
question of Aristotleintera
discussionamong theologians,especiallyAquinas and
pretation,and
Scotus, which in addition had to account for the complex case of the
Eucharist.In the second part of his article,Amerinilooks at Marchia's
commenand his Sentences
treatmentof the issues in both his Metaphysics
as
a develbe
seen
Marchia's
stance
can
taries.From thisinvestigation,
opmentof Scotus' view: he holds that accidentsare absolutebeings and
inherencein a subjectis not an essentialfeatureof them (drawingthese
conclusionson accountof the Eucharist).In additionto his valuable study,
book
of Marchia's Metaphysics
Amerinioffersthe editio
commentary,
princeps
VII, q. 1.
One topic thathas recentlybeen at the centerof attentionin the study
of medieval philosophyis weaknessof will. Thus, Andrea A. Robiglio's
studyof Marchia'sview on the relationbetweenwilland intellectis timely.

11:22:37 AM

14

RUSSELL
L. FRIEDMAN
ANDCHRISSCHABEL

Robiglio studiesMarchia's solutionto the questionof whetherit is possible forthe will to have its act eitherbeforeor againstthejudgmentof
reason, analyzingcloselyMarchia's arguments,e.g. those based on the
will as a freepower and on the factthat therewas a firstsin. From this
Marchia emergesas a voluntarist,convincedof the will's
investigation,
to
act
capacity
againstreason'sbestjudgment.Moreover,althoughMarchia's
view is set in contrastto more "intellectualist"
theoriesof action(i.e. those
of Aquinas and Godfreyof Fontaines),nevertheless
Robiglio stressesthat
Marchia shares with these and other later medieval thinkersa view of
mind and selfthat is not descended fromAristotleor any other Greek
philosopher.For Marchia, therecan be concurrentacts in the same faculty,and theseacts can be at odds withone another.This, Robiglio contends,is somethingnew to the later Middle Ages. Robiglio's articleis
also because it presentsa greatdeal of hithertouneditedtext
noteworthy
fromboth versionsof Marchia's commentaryon book II of the Sentences.
The volume rounds out with Roberto Lambertini'sstudyof the relationshipbetweenMarchia and William of Ockham. Lambertinifirstdiscusses Marchia's apparent rejectionin the fourthbook of his Sentences
commentaryof Ockham's view of quantity(see on thisalso above). Most
of his paper, however,focuseson the interaction,
both personaland texbetween
Ockham
and
Marchia
their
time in Avignonand
tual,
during
thereafter.In particular,Lambertiniexamines several examples of the
influencethat Marchia's Improbatio
appears to have had on some of
Ockham's politicalworks.This influencewas complex. Thus, in his discussion of the nature of dominium
in the prelapsarianstate (whetherit is
the same as the type of dominium
had after the Fall), Ockham took
Marchia's basic positionbut modifiedit in severalsignificant
ways. In his
discussionof the causal originsof propertyin human "iniquity,"according to Lambertini,Ockham makes Marchia's view "a cornerstoneof his
politicalthought."In general,Lambertinipaints a picturein which on
variousissuesMarchia's ideas played an importantpart in the genesisof
the Venerable Inceptor's politicalthought.
* * *
The guesteditorswould like to thankthe editorialboard of Vivarium
both
for acceptingwith enthusiasmour suggestionof a special issue devoted
to Francisof Marchia and fortheircommentsand suggestionsregarding
the articlescontainedherein.

11:22:37 AM

15

INTRODUCTION
TotalMarchiaBibliography

neither
The bibliography
aimsto be exhaustive
, exceptthatwe haveincluded
encythe
mentions
Marchia
entries
nor
mere
, particularly dozens,
of
perhapshunclopedia
to impetus
to Marchia'
s virtusderelictacontribution
dreds,of studiesreferring
we
have
added
to
that
have
since
In
addition
studies
2002,
quitea
appeared
theory.
in Friedman
and Schabel2001. The bibliogbitofolderliterature
to thatreported
to indicate
editions
annotated,
fromMarchiai works(all
primarily
raphyis lightly
and Schabel2001).
siglaare taken
fromFriedman
manuscript
Works
(with
editions)
major
published
ofMarchiai
Catalogue
andSchabel2001,andtheliterversions.
See Friedman
In IV libros
Sententiarum
several
deMarchia
siue
deEsculo
Commentarius
should
beaddedFrancisci
ature
citedthere,
towhich
etPrologus
Petri
Lombardi.
inIV libros
sententiarum
, ed.N. Mariani,
Quaestiones
praeambulae
deMarchia
OFM (Spicilegium
2003,andFrancisci
Bonaventurianum,
31),Grottaferrata
Distinctiones
libri
a
sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi.
Commentarius
inIV libros
sivedeEsculo
primi
OFM(Spicilegium
addecimam,
ed.N. Mariani,
Bonaventurianum,
32),Grottaferrata
prima
at
workin advanced
2006.Editorial
(boththeA andB versions)
stageon II Sent,
ofFribourg,
Switzerland
theUniversity
(TizianaSuarez-Nani).
- Francisci
cum
selectis
sivedeEsculo,
deMarchia
OFM,Quodlibet
Quodlibet
quaestionibus
(1324-28?)
OFM(Spicilegium
excommentario
inlibrum
Sententiarum
Bonaventurianum,
, ed.N. Mariani,
1997.
29),Grottaferrata
- Francisci
etcompilatio
libros
deMarchia
sivedeEsculo,
In libros
OFM,Sententia
super
Physicorum
OFM (Spicilegium
Aris
toteIis,ed.N. Mariani,
Bonaventurianum,
30),GrottaPhysicorum
ferrata
1998.
- Marchia's
tobe datedtobefore
inMetaphysicam
I-VII;presumably
Quaestiones
1323)
(books
inParis,Bibl.Mazarine,
Cod.
found
commentary.
Mosdyunedited,
largeMetaphysics
di Spagna104,ff.48r-102v
3490,if.l-57r,andBologna,
(butforeditions
Collegio
and
forFolge
fromtheworksee belowtheentries
r-Fonfara,
Knzle,Schneider,
in thisvolume).
article
as wellas Amerini's
Zimmermann,
- Marchia's
smallMetaphysics
cometsecundum
librum
Quaestiones
Metaphysicorum
super
primum
an abbreviation
ofthefirst
twobooksofthelarger
commentary.
mentary,
probably
in Florence,
Bibl.Mediceo-Laurenziana,
Fesul.161,ff.67ra-73ra,
found
Unedited,
as wellas several
andBAV,Vat.lat.3130,ff.29ra-36vb,
cQuiavir
3 fragments.
- Francisci
deEsculo,
Domini
contra
libellum
reprobus
(1330)
Johannis
quiincipit
Improbatio
(Quiavir
contra
libellum
Domini
' ed.N. Mariani,
OFM,Improbatio
reprobus
Johannis
quiincipit
1993.
OFM (Spicilegium
Bonaventurianum,
28),Grottaferrata
works
Studies
ofMarchia's
volontario
nelpensiero
diFrancesco
amare
Dio?Libert
e contingenza
dell'atto
G.,E' necessario
Alliney,
suFrancesco
del3Convegno
in:D. Priori
Internazionale
,
d'Appignano
(ed.),Atti
dAppignano,
delTronto,
forthcoming.
Appignano
come
diPaoloVeneto.
Il casodegli
accidenti
eucaristici
, in:
Amerini,
F, Francesco
fonte
dAppignano
Picenum
forthcoming.
Seraphicum,
etle miracle.
Lesdoctrines
Bakker
1999= Bakker,
La Raison
(c. 1250eucharistiques
P.J.J.M.,
c. 1400),Nijmegen
1999,vol.1,86-94and399-408.

11:22:37 AM

16

RUSSELL
ANDCHRISSCHABEL
L. FRIEDMAN

dehocdixerit
etCommentator
and
Balena,M., andD. Priori,
, in:Priori
Quidquid
Philosophus
Balena2004,77-96.
desNominalismus
derSptscholastik
nach
demtraktat
Borchert,
E., DerEinfluss
aufdieChristologie
de communicatione
idiomatum
desNicolaus
Oresme.
undTextausgabe
,
Untersuchungen
ms.W) and82 (III Sent.,
Mnster
i. W. 1940,65-66(III Sent.,
qq. 1,3, 7, 10from
ms.W).
q. 5 from
inthe
Middle
Madison
526-30(partial
M., TheScience
1959,519-21,
ofMechanics
Ages,
Clagett,
in Maier1940).
trans,
ofIV Sent.,
q. 1,basedon theedition
deFranois
deMarchia.
A propos
d'unlivre
in:Bulletin
de
Counet,
rcent,
J.-M.,La cosmologie
34 (1992),215-20.
mdivale,
philosophie
theCanon
A CaseStudy
Dekker
onTime
andMotion.
inAristotelian
2002= Dekker,
D.J.,John
andEarly
in:C. Leijenhorst,
C. Lthy,
andJ.M.M.H.
Natural
Scotism,
Philosophy
Thijssen
totheSeventeenth
Natural
(eds.),TheDynamics
ofAristotelian
Philosophy
from
Antiquity
Century,
Leiden2002,225-48,
esp.227-30.
derAkzeptations-und
Verdienstlehre
vonDunsScotus
bisLuther,
mit
W.,DieEntwicklung
Dettloff,
derFranziskanertheologen,
besonderer
Mnster
i. W. 1963,190-92.
Bercksichtigung
onthePhysics
inErfurt
, Cod.Amplon.
Donati,S., TheAnonymous
Q. 312andRichard
Commentary
in:Recherches
de Thologie
etPhilosophie
72.2(2005),
mdivales,
Rufus
ofCornwall,
232-362,
esp.269-83.
sull'Immacolata
in: Prioriand Balena2004,
Duba,W.O.,Francesco
Concezione,
d'Appignano
59-75.
diMarchia
sullaconoscenza
intuitiva
mediata
e immediata
Duba,W.O.,Francesco
(III Sent.,
q. 13),
in:Picenum
all
ed. ofthequestion
from
22-23(2003-04),
121-57(with
Seraphicum,
mss).
onChrist's
Human
in:M.C. Pacheco
Duba,W.O.,Francis
ofMarchia
Cognition
oftheWord,
andJ.F.Meirinhos
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zurMetaphysik
Zimmermann,
A., Verzeichnis
ungedruckter
Leiden1971,37,140-45
listforthelargeMetaphysics
which
(full
question
commentary,
is listed
as anonymous).
'ens'nacheinem
undunivoke
desTerminus
Zimmermann,
A., Analoge
Bedeutung
anonymen
des14.Jahrhunderts,
in:Deusethomo
ad mentem
I. DunsScoti.
Acta
Metaphysikkommentar
tertii
Rome1972,723-30(suggesting
Marchiawrotethelarge
Scotistici,
Congressus
Metaphysics
commentary).
Anselmi
ineinem
des14.Jahrhunderts
Zimmermann,
A.,DieRatio
,
anonymen
Metaphysikkommentar
in:Analecta
Anselmiana
4, Frankfurt
1975,195-201
(basedon VI.13).

11:22:37 AM

FrancisofMarchiaon theHeavens
MARK THAKKAR

Abstract
Francisof Marchia (c. 1290-fl344)is said to have challengedAristotelian
realmsin a way thathas
orthodoxy
by unitingthe celestialand terrestrial
forthe practiceof naturalphilosophy.But thisoverimportant
implications
whichis actualizbetweenbare potentiality,
looksMarchia'svitaldistinction
able onlyby God, and naturalpotency,whichis the concernof the natural
and to its implicaphilosopher.If due attentionis paid to thisdistinction
tions,Marchia'spositionno longerseemsto be revolutionary.
1. Introduction
innovations
of the matureGalileo was the
"One of the mostimportant
realmsare made of the same
assertionthatthe celestialand terrestial
matterand therefore
followthe same basic naturallaws.
fundamental
in his commentary
on
Francisof Marchiaput fortha similarhypothesis
Aristotelian
to
bookII [oftheSentences],
29-32.
Contrary contemporary
qq.
theory,Marchia arguesthat the heavensare not made up of a fifth,
the supranoblerelement,which radicallydifferentiates
incorruptible,
the basic matter
lunarrealmfromthe sublunarone. On the contrary,
is thesame everywhere,
and just as Marchiaconsidersthenaturalworld
to followpredictablepatterns,
he also thinksthatthosepatternsare uniforthe
These
two
tenetshave important
implications
versallyapplicable.
of
natural
philosophy."1
practice
Or so we have been led to believe. Francisof Marchia's writingson the
natureof the heavenshave been in printforthe past fifteen
yearsthanks
to NotkerSchneider'sproductionof a criticaleditionwitha commentary.2
But that commentaryhas not yet been supplementedby independent
1 C. Schabel,
Francis
, in:E.N.Zalta(ed.),TheStanford
ofPhilosophy
ofMarchia
Encyclopedia
2001edition
), 3 (URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/
(Winter
francis-marchia
>).
2 N. Schneider,
deMarchia:
undUntersuchungen
DieKosmologie
desFranciscus
Texte,
Quellen
des14.Jahrhunderts
zurNaturphilosophie
, Leiden1991.
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2006
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

Vivarium
44,1

11:22:44 AM

22

MARKTHAKKAR

claims- thatMarchia deniedAristotle's

studies,and itsmain interpretative
radical distinctionbetweenthe sublunarand supralunarrealms,and that
this allowed him to apply to the heavens physicallaws discoveredon
earth- have percolatedthroughto the tertiaryliteratureunchallenged.3
This articleunderminesthose claims.
In his concludingchapter,Schneidergivesa summaryof what he calls
the importantand fundamentally
innovativeresultsof Marchia's cosmolthat
the
whole
cosmos
is
unifiedand essentiallyhomogeneous,
ogy: (1)
inasmuchas essentiallythe same principlesand causes are to be found
so
throughoutit; (2) thatthe whole cosmos can be interpreted
uniformly,
that thereis no need for a special physicsof the heavens as a separate
realm; and (3) that all discoveredand confirmedobservationsand laws
are in principletransferable
and applicable to all eventsin the cosmos,
so that, as a matterof methodology,we can make well-foundedstatementsabout thingswhich elude our directgrasp.4This would of course
be in starkcontrastto the standardmediaeval view, derivedultimately
fromAristotle,that the sublunarand supralunarrealms are fundamentallydifferent.5
Marchia's own viewsare expressedin his commentaries(henceforth
'S'
and 'M') on PeterLombard'sSentences
and on Aristotle's
where
,
Metaphysics
he asks whetheror not celestialmatteris of the same nature{ratio)as the
matterof inferiorgenerablesand corruptibles(S II.32.iv) or the matter
of the elements(M III. 9). His answer,to put it briefly,
is thatyes, celestial and terrestrial
matterare of the same nature.But the devil is in the
details,and it is to these that I now turn.

3 See forinstance
R.L. Friedman,
Francis
GraciaandT.B. Noone
, in:J.J.E.
ofMarchia
toPhilosophy
intheMiddle
Oxford
2002,254,and3 ofSchabel,
(eds.),A Companion
Ages,
Francis
ofMarchia
(cit.n. 1 above).
4 Schneider,
Die Kosmologie
sollnurgezeigt
(cit.n. 2 above),326-27:"imAugenblick
welche
Resultate
dieseEntscheidung
. . . schonbeiihmzeitigte.
Formal
lassensich
werden,
vorallemdreiwichtige
die allesamt
fundamentale
benennen,
Ergebnisse
Neuerungen
bedeuteten
... 1. Der Kosmosistin seiner
. . . eineinheiiches
und
ganzenErstreckung
indemanjederbeliebigen
wesentlich
Stelle
wesentlich
Ganzes,
homogenes
gleiche
Prinzipien
undUrsachen
anzutreffen
sind.2. DieserGesamt-Kosmos,
dasUniversum,
kanneinheitlich
werden
... es istnichtntig,
frbesondere,
Bereiche
eine
interpretiert
ausgezeichnete
besondere
miteigenen
zu schaffen
'HimmelsPhysik
(z.B.einespezielle
Erklrungsmustern
For(3),seen. 47 below.
physik')."
5 See e.g.E. Grant,
inthe
Middle
, in:D.C. Lindberg
, Chicago
Cosmology
(ed.),Science
Ages
1978,286-88.

11:22:44 AM

ON THE HEAVENS
FRANCIS
OF MARCHIA

23

2. MarchiaiArguments
There is, as one would expect, a significant
overlap between the arguments Marchia gives for his position in the two commentaries.Three
argumentsare more or less common to both works,and S providesa
furtherone of its own. I label these fourlines of argumentas follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The
The
The
The

ArgumentfromComparativeNobility
ArgumentfromMaterial Incorruptibility
ArgumentfromMaterial Potentiality
ArgumentfromCelestial Quantity

(S
(S
(S
(S

59, M 11)6
60)
61, M 10)
2, M 12)

Let us now examine each of these in turn.

2.1

TheArgument
(S 59, M 11)
fromComparative
Nobility

Marchia's firstargumentmakes extensiveuse of the concept of nobility

(nobilitas
). Roughly speaking,something'snobilityis its closenessto God
in the cosmichierarchy.7
The precisesense of the conceptis unimportant
here; what mattersforus is the use to which Marchia puts it.
ad absurdum
of the notion that
The argumentpurportsto be a reductio
and
elementalsubcelestial
and
incorruptibles corruptibles specifically,
that
this
notionis cornatures.
stances have matterof different
Suppose
naturescannot
rect.Then, on the tacitassumptionthatthingsof different
mattercannot be equally noble.
be equally noble, celestialand terrestrial
But Marchia argues that neithertype of mattercan be nobler than the
other.So the notion mustbe incorrect.
The difficult
part of this argumentis the lemma that neithertype of
mattercan be nobler than the other. In order to prove this,Marchia
helps himselfto some data about comparativenobility:that nobler matter is in potencytowardsnobler form,that (living)intellectivesouls are
celestial
nobler than (non-living)celestialforms,and that (incorruptible)
formsare nobler than (corruptible)elementalforms.He also uses the
matteris in potencytowards
observationthat terrestrial
straightforward
both intellectivesouls and elementalforms.His overall strategyis then
6 Section
and
inSchneider's
edition
ofS 11.29-32
refer
tothehelpful
divisions
numbers
forms
'S ' and'M n'to refer
M III.9 inDieKosmologie
(cit.n. 2 above).I usethebrief
to section
n ofS 11.32andM III.9 respectively.
7 The idea was derived
See A.O. Lovejoy,
TheGreat
Chain
fromAristotle.
,
ofBeing
MA 1936(reprint
1964),58-59.
Cambridge,

11:22:44 AM

MARKTHAKKAR

24

to employa pincer movementagainstany supposed difference

in nobilbetween
celestial
and
terrestrial
matter.
The
manoeuvrecan best be
ity
explainedwith the help of a diagram:

jo

Matter

Form

Celestial?

Intellective

Terrestrial

Celestial

Celestial?

''

Elemental

Terrestrialmatter,Marchia argues,cannot be nobler than celestialmatter,because thatwould violatethe matter-form

nobilitycorrelationwhen
comparingelementalformto celestialform,which is nobler.8And celestial mattercannot be nobler than terrestrial
matter,because that would
violatethe matter-form
correlation
when
nobility
comparingcelestialform
to intellectivesouls, which are nobler.9(These correlationviolationsare
representedin the diagramby crossingsof the matter-form
lines.) So the
heavens- whose formis wedged in betweenthose of livingmen and the
- must themselveshave
matter
elements,both of which have terrestrial
terrestrial
matter.
Schneiderpraises the clarityand decisivenessof this argument,and
defendsMarchia againstan anticipatedchargethatthe yardstickof nobilityis "mediaevalin the worstsense", claiminginsteadthatit is an excellent way of orderingdisparateobjects by the one thingthat theyhave
in common,namely,being.10But as I see it the argumentfaces at least
threepossible lines of objection.
8 5 59,11.448-450;
M 811,11.66-68.
9 S 59,11.451-455;
M 11,11.68-76.
10See Schneider,
DieKosmologie
andinparticular
n. 271:"han302-03,
(cit.n. 2 above),
deltes sichumeinwegen
seiner
Relativitt
anhand
dessen
Kriterium,
ganzausgezeichnetes
sichtatschlich
Verschiedenstes
miteinander
undin einerelative
vergleichen
Zuordnung
denaberall'diesVerschiedene
lt,undzwarhinsichtlich
bringen
genaueinesParameters,
besitzt:
hinsichtlich
desSeins."
gemeinsam

11:22:44 AM

FRANCIS
OF MARCHIA
ON THE HEAVENS

25

The firststemsfroma distinction

betweennobilitysimpliciter
and nobilsecundum
a
certain
that
in
Marchia
makes
S
whilst
11.29
ity
quid(in
respect)
arguingthatthe heavensare inanimate.He considersthe followingobjection: livingthingsare nobler than non-livingthings;the heavens,being
are nobler than many livingthings;so the heavens must
incorruptible,
be livingand thus animate.11He responds:
I say thatone thingcan be noblerthan anothersimpliciter
, and yet be
less noble thanit secundum
formis nobler
quid.Example:any substantial
thanprimematterwithrespectto its degreeof being,because
simpliciter
formis a being simplyin actuality,while matteris a being only in
potency.And yet,contrariwise,
primematteris noblerthan [a given
formsecundum
, e.g. withrespectto some measure(jmodus
substantial]
quid
)
of necessity.
For primematteris unbegotten
and incorruptible,
whereas
formis corruptible.
For everything
is as such
[substantial]
incorruptible
noblerthan [anything]
corruptible.
Likewise,I say in responseto theproblemthatas faras degreeof being
is concerned,everylivingthingis noblersimpliciter
than any non-living
and
hence
than
the
but
secundum
heavens;
thing,
quidthe oppositeis the
as
has
been
said
about
matter
and
form.12
case,just
Now, the argumentfromcomparativenobilityrelies on two supposed
and
impossibilities:
corruptiblescannot be nobler than incorruptibles,13
the heavens cannot be nobler than intellectivesouls.14But the firstinvolvesnobilitysecundum
quid, while the second appears to involvenobility
11S 11.2915.
12S 11.2918: "Dicoquodaliquidpotest
essesimpliciter
nobilius
alio et tarnen
esse
eo secundum
forma
substantialis
estnobilior
simignobilius
quid.Exemplum:
Quaelibet
materia
ad gradum
cumforma
sitensinactusimpliciter,
entitatis,
pliciter
primaquantum
materia
autemensin potentia
tantum.
Et tarnen
e contrario
estnobilior
ipsamateria
forma
secundum
ad modum
necessitatis.
quid,putaquantum
aliquem
Ipsaenimmateria
estingenita
etincorruptibilis,
forma
autemcorruptibilis.
Omneautemincorruptibile
utsic
estnobilius
Consimiliter
dicoin proposito
ad
corruptibili.
quodomnevivumquantum
entitatis
estnobilius
nonvivo,etperconsequens
gradum
simpliciter
quocumque
ipsocaelo,
tamen
secundum
sicutde forma
etmateria
dictum
est."Aquinas
quideste contrario,
gave
a similar
solution
to a similar
in Summa
Theoloae
1.70.3ad 2.
argument
13To be moreprecise,
M 11(11.67f.)callsitabsurd
forthematter
ofcorruptibles
to
be nobler
thanthematter
ofincorruptibles,
whileS 59 (11.449f.)saysthatcorruptible
forms
arenotnobler
thanincorruptible
forms.
(Stricdy
speaking,
corruption
appliesonly
to substances,
thatis,to composites
ofmatter
andform.
Butin a difficult
S 6,
passage,
- -forma
- is corruptible
Marchia
thata material
substantial
form
substantialis
materialis
argues
inasmuch
ithaspartswhich
remain
after
division
itdoesnot.)
as,beingextended,
though
14S 59,11.45If.;M 11,11.70f.

11:22:44 AM

26

MARKTHAKKAR

5 Marchia is
Heiter.1
simp
rightthat the only way to forcethe comparative
of
celestial
and
terrestrial
matterinto a simultaneouscorrelation
nobility
withboth of these different
hierarchiesof formwould be to lump celestial and terrestrial
mattertogether,but his distinctionbetween nobility
and nobilitysecundum
simpliciter
quiddissolvesthe need for such a simultaneous correlation.To put it anotherway, the diagramconceals a third
dimension:Marchia's pincersare skew,and thereforecannot close.16
On the otherhand, the hierarchyof nobilitysimpliciter
is supposed to
to
of
is
and
not
determined
correspond degrees being,
simplyby the presence or absence of life. (The above passage, for instance,places form
above matterbecause actualitytrumpspotency.)So Marchia mightbe
- intellective
entitledto use a single hierarchyof forms
(men), sensitive
celestial
and
elemental
(animals),vegetative(vegetables),
(heavens),
(minerals) withoutrecourseto nobilitysecundum
quid.But in thatcase Marchia
would need to argue explicidyforthishierarchy,which he has not done
here.
The second objectionconcernsthe detailsof Marchia's argumentthat
the celestialmatterof incorruptibles
cannot be noblerthan the terrestrial
matterof corruptibles:
[Supposethatit is.] Nobler matteris in potencytowardsnoblerform.
But celestialformis notmorenoble,but ratherlessnoble,thanan intellectivesoul. Thereforecelestialmatteris in potencytowardsintellective
towardsthe dispositions
whichprecedetheintelsoul,and consequently
lectivesoul in matter,e.g. towardsactiveand passivequalities.But this
is false,because in thatcase the heavenswould be corruptible.17

15I say"appears
toinvolve"
inneither
version
oftheargument
does
because,
although
Marchia
hisassertion
thatcelestial
form
is notnobler
thanintellective
saywhatgrounds
thatitis theinanimation
oftheheavens.
soul,theabovepassagestrongly
suggests
16Thepicture
becomes
evenmorecomplicated
ifwe takeintoaccount
thefullrange
ofsouls.Intellective,
andvegetative
forms
arenobler
thancelestial
and
sensitive,
simpliciter
elemental
celestial
andintellective
forms
arenobler
secundum
forms;
quidthansensitive,
vegandelemental
forms.
etative,
(Cf.S 11.297 andS 37.)
17S 59,11.451-455:
"Nobilior
materia
estinpotentia
ad nobiliorem
formam.
Sedforma
caelinonestnobilior,
immoignobilior
animaintellectiva.
caeliestinpotenErgomateria
tiaad ipsamanimam
etperconsequens
ad dispositiones
intellectivam,
ipsamin materia
activas
etpassivas.
Hocautem
estfalsum,
praecedentes,
putaad qualitates
quiatunccaelum
essetcorruptibile."
reads'ad dispositiones
(Schneider
ipsas'.)

11:22:44 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ON THE HEAVENS

27

The troubleis that an opponentcould deny that celestialmatterwould

have to be in potencytowardsintellectivesoul if it were noblerthan terrestrialmatter.Marchia himselfsays elsewhere:
If celestialmatterwere of a different
nature,thenit would not be in
soul,because the same formcannotinform
potencytowardsintellective
severalmattersof different
natures.18
But the positionof his opponentsis preciselythat celestialmatteris of a
different
nature.
The thirdobjectionis thatMarchia's reductionof all matterto essentiallyone type casts doubt on one of his premisses,namely,that nobler
matteris in potencytowardsnobler form.The most obvious motivation
forthispremisswould be the claim that not all matteris equally noble,
so thatforinstancethe matterof a man mightbe nobler than the matter of a mineral;but Marchia has takenit forgrantedthat all terrestrial
matteris of the same nature and thus equally noble.
In order to be clear about this,we must distinguish"between what
the scholasticscalled matena
, the absolutelyundeterminedsubstrate,
prima
and materia
secunda
The objec, likewood, whichhas definiteproperties."19
tion can then be put in the formof a dilemma.If Marchia is concerned
withprimematter(as is stronglysuggestedby the next threearguments),
his reductionof all terrestrial
matterto essentiallyone typeis admissible,
but his nobility-correlation
premisshas lost its obvious motivation.And
if he is concernedwith second matter,his nobility-correlation
premissis
admissible,but its obvious motivationis incompatiblewith his reduction
of all terrestrial
matterto essentiallyone type.
Decisive or not, theseobjectionssuggestthat the argumentfromcomparativenobilityshould not,pace Schneider,"win us over by the clarity
withwhich it proves that the matterof the heavens and that of the elementsmustbe equally noble and thus of the same nature."20
18M 11,11.72-75:"Sedsi materia
caeliessetalterius
tuncmateria
caelinon
rationis,
essetinpotentia
ad animam
nonpotest
informare
intellectivam,
quiaeademforma
plures
materias
alterius
rationis."
19M.L.Gill,Aristotle's
Reconsidered
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
, in:Journal
Metaphysics
43.3(2005),235n. 54.SeealsoJ.Owens,TheDoctrine
inthe
Aristotelian
ofBeing
Metaphysics:
A Study
intheGreek
, 3rded.,Toronto
Background
ofMediaeval
1978,334-35.
Thought
20Schneider,
DieKosmologie
. . . Beweis
besticht
durch
die
(cit.n. 2 above),302:"Dieser
mitderaufindirektem
dadieMaterie
desHimmels
Klarheit,
wird,
Wegenachgewiesen
undderElemente
. . . gleichwertig
unddamitgleichartig
seinmssen."

11:22:44 AM

28
2.2

MARKTHAKKAR
TheArgument
(S 60)
fromMaterialIncorruptibility

The second argument,by contrast,is verysimple.If the matterof incornature to the matterof corruptibles,
Marchia
ruptiblesis of a different
be
a
then
there
to
difference
between
their
corresponding
argues,
ought
forms,because "even accordingto my opponent,mattersare distinguished
in form
in accordancewiththeirforms."21
And presumablythe difference
has to do withcorruptibility.
betweencorruptiblesand incorruptibles
So,
the matterof corruptiblesought to be corruptibleand
correspondingly,
But Marchia has already
thatof incorruptibles
oughtto be incorruptible.
is itselfincorruptible.
Therefore
shown(3-7)thatthematterof corruptibles
and the matterof corruptiblesmust be of
the matterof incorruptibles
the same nature.
At firstblush,thisargumentlooks double-edged.For givensuch a corin matterand differences
in form,we
respondencebetween differences
could turn the argumenton its head and question Marchia's assertion
is also incorruptible:
shouldn'tthe difference
thatthe matterof corruptibles
in formbetweencorruptibles
and incorruptibles
correspondto a difference
in matter?
in formcorAn initialrejoinderis that obviouslynot everydifference
in form
in
man
an
difference
a
is
different
essential
matter;
respondsto
matter.22
But in thatcase whywould
to a mouse,but both have terrestrial
in matterhave to correspondto a difference
in form?Why
a difference
matternot be different
fromcelestialmatter,and yet still
could terrestrial
be just as incorruptible?
My tentativeansweron Marchia's behalfis that
of terrestrial
once we have accepted the incorruptibility
matter,we no
to
that
the
matters
are different,
have
reason
any positive
suppose
longer
and inferred
because it was onlythe observedimmutability
incorruptibility
to us in the firstplace.
of the heavens that suggestedsuch a difference
We thereforeneed to look at Marchia's argumentfor the incorruptmatter,which he gives in S 3-7. The argumentis
ibilityof terrestrial
less complexthan its lengthmay suggest;much of it is devotedto rebuttingthe facile objectionthat matteris corruptiblebecause materialsubstancesare divisible.Marchia deals with this objectionby distinguishing
21S 60,11.457-58:
inordine
ad formas
etiam
"Materiae
perte."Schneider
distnguuntur
is herequoting
and(b)Marchia
reads'parte',
but(a) itis hardtomakegoodsenseofthis,
in 53.I thank
meto this
ChrisSchabelforalerting
from
a notional
verbatim
opponent
misreading.
22Marchia
in53.
inS 63,inreply
toanopposing
makes
a similar
given
argument
point

11:22:44 AM

FRANCIS
OF MARCHIA
ON THE HEAVENS

29

betweentwo sensesof corruption,of which the one used by the putative

objectorcorrespondsto divisionor resolutioninto constituentparts. He
definesthe proper sense of corruptionas follows:
if it disintegrates
in such a way that
Somethingis corruptedsimpliciter
one of its componentsdoes notremain:thereremainsonlythe subject
or matterin whichthe resolutionoccurs,and not the form.And corFor annihilation
is
ruptiontakenin thissenseis similarto annihilation.
thatby whicha thingis totallycorruptedin such a way thatnothing
of it remains;but corruption
is thatby whicha thingis corruptedin
such a way thatsomething
of it remains,such as its matter,and somethingdoes not remain,viz. its form.23
And in thissense,Marchia argues,mattercannot be corruptedbut only
annihilated.But annihilation,unlike corruption,is the preservenot of
naturalagentsbut of God alone.
An obvious responseto thisargumentwould be to complain thatit is
question-beggingindeed, thatit is not an argumentat all. Marchia has
simplydefinedcorruptionin a way that explicitlydenies its applicability
to matter.Likewise,in 4 he had simplydefinedmatterin a way that
to corruption:
explicidydenies its susceptibility
whichis corruptedis corruptedintosome being [whichwas
Everything
in potency.Thereforeif matteris naturallycorruptible,
one
previously]
can give some being which is in potencytowardsthat matter.I ask
whetherthat being is corruptible.
Because if it is, then one can give
anotherbeingprior[to it], and eitherthiswillgo on ad infinitum
[which
is impossible],or we can arriveat a firstincorruptible,
which I call
'matter'.24
But such a complaintwould be ignorantof the context.Marchia was not
beggingthe question,but merelyhelpinghimselfto common definitions
23S 5,11.40-46:"Illudautem
corrumpitur
simpliciter,
quodsicdissolvitur
quodalterum
nonmanet,
tantum
manetsubiectum
sivemateria
in quamfitresolutio,
componentium
nonautemforma.
Et istomodocorruptio
annihilationi.
sumpta
appropinquai
Ipsaenim
annihilatio
estqua ressiccorrumpitur
totaliter
autem
quodnihileiusmanet.
Corruptio
estqua ressiccorrumpitur
sicutmateria,
etaliquidnonmanet,
quodaliquideiusmanet,
videlicet
ipsaforma."
24S 4,11.29-33: . . omnequodcorrumpitur
inensaliquodinpotentia.
corrumpitur
naturaliter
estcorruptibilis,
estdarealiquodensinpotentia
ad ipsam,
de
Ergosi materia
quo quaero,si estcorruptibile.
Quia si sic,estdarealiquodaliudpriuset itavelibitur
in infinitum
velestdevenire
ad incorruptibile
Hoc autemdicoessemateriam."
primum.

11:22:44 AM

30

MARKTHAKKAR

of matterand corruptionderivedultimately
fromAristotle.Matter,in the
Aristoteliantradition,just is the subject that persiststhroughdifferent
kindsof change,includingsubstantialchange(generationand corruption).25
In sum, then: Marchia has shown that terrestrial
matteris incorruptible by definition,
and it is takenforgrantedthatcelestialmatteris incorruptible.So, his second argumentruns, there is no reason to suppose
that matterdown here {hie)and matterup there {ibi) are of different
natures.This argumentcan only succeed if thereis no alternativeway
to distinguishbetweenthe naturesof celestialand of terrestrial
matter.
2.3

TheArgument
fromMaterialPotentiality
(S 61, M 10)

The thirdargumentis givenin a compressedformin S and a littlemore

fullyin M. Prime matteritself that is, matterin the mostproper sense
of the term has no actual substantialform,but instead is in potency
towardsevery substantialform."Therefore[all] matteris of the same
naturein those thingsthat have matter."26
In otherwords,since matter
has no essentialnature (except perhaps pure potentiality,
which might
howeverbe describedas the lack of an essentialnature),the answer to
the questionis straightforward
and incontrovertible:
theresimplycannot
be essentiallydifferent
of
matter.27
types
Schneidersays that the argumentfrommaterialpotentiality
"pursues
an entirelysimilarthought"to the previous one,28but it seems to me
that there is an importantdifferencebetween the two. The argument
frommaterialincorruptibility
leaves open the possibility
thatcelestialbodies differfromterrestrial
ones in other ways (besides corruptibility)
that
25See Owens,TheDoctrine
Aristotle's
ownconception
ofBeing
(cit.n. 19above),344-45.
ofmatter,
which
is notourconcern
ofmuchdebate.
Foran overview,
here,is thesubject
seeGill,Aristotle's
Reconsidered
seealsoL.M.de Rijk,
233-37;
(cit.n. 19above),
Metaphysics
Aristotle:
Semantics
andOntology
, vol.2, Leiden2002,384-95.
26M 10,1.63: "Ergomateria
esteiusdem
inhabentibus
rationis
materiam."
Theother
version
concludes
with"ergoetc."(S 61,1. 467);thisis common
forthe
prematurely
Doctor
Succine
is itas abrupt
andunhelpful
as itis here.
tus,butrarely
27Schneider,
inDieKosmologie
as saying
(cit.n. 2 above),259,n. 174,quotesMarchia
inM VII.5 thatprime
matter
"hassomeactuality,
inasmuch
as itisnotinpotency
towards
natural
actualitatis
nonestinpotentia
ad corruptionem
natu{habet
corruption"
aliquid
inquantum
ralem
hasmoreto itsessential
nature
thanpurepotentiality.
Butifthe
*),so thatmatter
ofmatter
is a conceptual
thisis surely
itaddsnothing
to
corruption
impossibility,
wrong;
nature
thatitis notinDotencv
towards
something's
beinea roundsauare.
28Schneider,
DieKosmologie
304:"Einenganzhnlichen
Gedanken
ver(cit.n. 2 above),
dasArgument".
folgt

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FRANGIS
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31

in theirrespectivematter.29
But the argumentfrom
point to a difference
- which is undenimaterialpotentialityis not so lenient:its conclusion
able, given an Aristotelianconceptionof matter is that anydistinction
in naturebetweencelestialand terrestrial
matteris doomed to be a distinctionwithouta difference.
2.4

TheArgument
(S 2, M 12)
fromCelestialQuantity

The fourthargumentis givenfullyonlyin M, thoughS containsa shorter

versionwith similarwording.The general premisson which it relies is
thataccidents(inessentialproperties)of the same naturecan only belong
to subjects(property-bearers)
of the same nature.But quantity,which is
an accident,is of the same nature in the heavens and on earth (and,
Marchia adds in the fullerversion,in the sea). So the subject of quantityin the heavens must be of the same nature as the subject of quantityon earth. And what is the subject of these quantities?It cannot be
natureto terrestrial
forms.
form,because celestialformsare of a different
On the implicitassumptionthat it mustbe eithermatteror form,then,
it mustthereforebe matter.30
If the generalpremissworksat all, it mustbe at a veryhigh level of
generality.A man and a mineralboth have colour (and can even have
exactlythe same colour),but only in a veryfundamentalsense could we
conclude fromthisthat men and mineralsare of the same nature.This
observationsupportsthe notionthatMarchia's concernis withprimeand
not second matter.
The othercrucialpremisshere is thatquantitas
esteiusdem
rationis
omnibus
in
caelo
et
in
terra
et
in
in
man.But neitherversionof the arguquantitatibus
mentdoes Marchia argue forthis.Moreover,the selfsameassertionundergirdsthreeof his fourargumentsforthe veryexistenceof matterin the
heavens(S 30-32),whereagain it is statedwithoutargument.We might
thinkthatat least the existenceof quantityin the heavensis obvious,but

29Onesuchwaymight
be thatcelestial
bodiesareonlycapableoflocomotion,
whereas
terrestrial
bodiesarealsocapableofaugmentation,
andalteration;
cf.Aristode,
diminution,
VIII 4, 1042b5-6.
Metaphysics
30Marchia
doesnotconsider
thepossibility
thatthesubject
ofquantity
be submight
stance
rather
thanmatter
or form.
Butthispossibility,
withhisgeneral
together
premiss,
wouldleadtotheconclusion
thatcelestial
andterrestrial
substances
areofthesamenature,
which
he wouldsurely
reject.

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MARKTHAKKAR

Schneidertells us that Siger of Brabant had maintainedthat "in celestial bodies thereis no quantity."31
I am not sufficiently
familiarwithmediaevaldebates on celestialquantityto be sure of this,but it seems to me that Marchia's fourthargument is not strongenough to establishhis conclusion.32
3. Interpreting
Marchia'sTheory
From the argumentsexaminedabove, we can extracta more preciseversion of the thesisforwhich Marchia is arguing:that celestialand terrestrialmatterare of the same natureinasmuchas theyare equally noble,
equally incorruptible,
possessedof the same bare {nuda,S) or pure {pura,
and
M) potentiality, equallyquantified.What I now hope to show is that,
in advancingthisthesis,Marchia is not assertingan innovativeand exciting homogeneitybetween the two realms. The reason for this is conin the above summary:celestialand terrestrial
tainedembryonically
matter
share the same bareor purepotentiality,
but forMarchia, as we will soon
is so emptyas to be of no consequencewithsee, thistypeof potentiality
of the firstagent {agensprimm
out the intervention
), God.
Marchia uses the distinction
betweenbare potentiality
and natural(naturalis
to
deal
with
four
based
on
differences
between
) potency
objections
celestialand terrestrial
matter.33
He does not deny that these differences
in naturebetween
exist,but he does deny thattheypoint to a diffrence
matter.Instead,he says,theypointto a difference
celestialand terrestrial
in the aptitudes(<aptitudo
) or dispositions(<iispositio
) which are added (superto
the
common
nature
of
celestial
and
terrestrial
matter.It is in
additus)
his responseto the firstobjectionthatMarchia is mostexplicitabout this:
Matterof the same natureis followedby potencyof the same
Objection.
nature.From this it followsthat mattersof the same natureare in
potencytowardsformsof the same nature.But elementalmatteris not
31Questions
onthe
DieKosmologie
(cit.n. 2 above),
Metaphysics
q. 20,quotedin Schneider,
nonestquantitas."
autemcaelestibus
254:"incorporibus
32Note,though,
in Quaestiones
thatAquinas
hadwritten
dePotentia
Dei, q. 7
Disputatae
a. 10,that"sincethenature
ofquantity
is abstracted
from
sensible
every
thing,
quantity
in all natural
is ofthesamenature
bodies"(cumquantitatis
ratiositab omnisensibili
in omnibus
eiusdem
rationis
estquantitas
naturalibus
abstracta,
corporibus).
33S 64-68.

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FRANGIS
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33

in potencytowardscelestialform,and celestialmatteris not in potency

towardselementalform.Thereforeetc.34
Reply.The potencyof matteris of two sorts.One is simplepotency,
and essenceof matterwithoutany addiwhichis the bare potentiality
tionaldisposition.The otheris naturalpotency,whichincludessome
additionalaptitudebesidesthe essenceof matter.
Then withregardto the objectionthatmatterof the same natureis
of the
followedby potencyof the same nature,thisis barepotentiality
same nature.And [in thissense]I say thatcelestialmatteris in potency
towardselementalform,and elementalmattertowardscelestialform.
But thatpotencyor bare potentiality
relatesonlyto the firstagent,for
God Himselfwouldhave been able in the beginning(just as in factHe
is now able) to place celestialmatterunderelementalform,and converselyelementalmatterundercelestialform.
But natural
whichincludesa dispositionor aptitude,does
potency,35
not followimmediately
fromthe bare essenceof matter,but onlyvia
an additionaldisposition.
And therefore
such potencyof matterdiffers
to
the
different
of
according
dispositions matter.36

34S 54: "Potentia

rationis
Ex quo
eiusdem
materiam
eiusdem
rationis.
consequitur
eiusdem
rationis
suntinpotentia
ad formas
eiusdem
Sed
rationis.
sequitur
quodmateriae
materia
elementorum
nonestinpotentia
ad formam
caeliad formam
caeli,necmateria
elementi;
ergoetc."
35Thetwosections
herearetheonlyonesedited
inwhich
Marchia
bySchneider
quoted
usestheword'potentialitas'
instead
of 'potentia'
It seemsclear
(potentiality)
(potency).
from
hisusagethattheformer
covers
theoretical
whilethelatter
covpurely
possibilities
ersgenuine
Schneider's
criticus
showsthatcertain
MSS have
indeed,
potential;
apparatus
Ifmyinterpretation
instead
of'potentialitas'.
is correct,
thenI think
Schneider
'possibilitas'
'
is wrong
here(1.485)tochoosetheincongruous
naturali'
B) overpotenjbotentialitate
(with
tianaturali'
(with
ACLW).Hencemytranslation.
36S 64-65:
"Dicoquodpotentia
materiae
estduplex,
et haecest
quaedamsimplex,
nudapotentialitas
etessentia
materiae
sineomnidispositione
etaliaestpotensuperaddita,
tianaturalis
essentiae
materiae.
Tuncad
quaeincludit
aliquam
aptitudinem
superadditam
rationem
eiusdem
rationis
eiusdem
haecest
rationis,
quodmateriam
consequitur
potentia
nudapotentialitas
eiusdem
rationis.
Et sic,istomodoloquendo
de potentia
dico
materiae,
caeliestin potentia
ad formam
elementi
et materia
elementi
ad formam
quodmateria
caeli.Istatamen
sivenudapotentialitas
solumrespicit
potentia
agensprimum.
Ipseenim
a principio,
deuspotuisset
sicutetiamposset
modoponere
materiam
caelisubforma
eleet e contrario
materiam
elementi
subforma
caeli.Loquendo
autemde potentialimenti,
siveaptitudinem,
talis
[cf.n. 35 above]naturali,
tate/potentia
dispositionem
quaeincludit
nonconsequitur
nudamessentiam
materiae
sedmediante
immediate,
potentia
dispositione
Et ideohuiuspotentia
materiae
diversificatur
secundum
diversitatem
superaddita.
dispositionum
materiae."

11:22:44 AM

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MARKTHAKKAR

Marchia says nothingfurtherhere about these dispositionsor aptitudes,

but thereis a slighthint in an earlierpassage, where he uses the same
to argue thatthe existenceof celestialmatterwould not make
distinction
the heavens corruptible:
I replythatit is of twosorts.One
Concerningpotencyof contradiction,
is bare [potentiality]
of matter,by whichmatterof itselfis able to exist
underthisor thatformor underthe privationthereof;and thissortis
absolute,not comparedor in relationto (inordine
ad) thisor thatagent.
The othersortis naturalpotencyof contradiction,
by whichmatteris
in potencytowardsa givenformbecause it has a certaindisposition
or
inclination
towardsthatform.And thissortof potencyof contradiction
a naturalagent.37
relatesto (respicit)
This tells us that a disposition,aptitudeor inclinationsomehowpredisposes mattertowardscertainforms.But wheredo thesedispositionscome
from,and how strongare they?Marchia does not say.
Schneidergives only a briefmentionof this omission,and then only
His discussionof the argumentof
at the veryend of his commentary.38
that
it
seemed
had
concluded
successful",allow"extraordinarily
64-65
ing Marchia to assertthe fundamentalhomogeneityof celestialand terrestrialmatterwhilstdenyingthe possibility
of "unregulatedand arbitrary
transmutation".39
But Marchia's stance is more restrictive
than that: all
is naturallyimpossible,and can occur
celestialterrestrial
transmutation
The reason forthis,whichwe
onlywithGod's supernaturalintervention.
now know to involve superadded dispositions,can also be expressedin
substances"have matthe intriguing
phrase that celestialand terrestrial
ter of the same naturedissimilarly":40
37S 44: "De potentia
contradictionis
dicoquodpotentia
contradictionis
estduplex:
Una nudamateriae
de se estpossibilis
essesubistaforma
vel
qua quidemipsamateria
subiliaet subprivatione
nonin comparatione
sivein ordinead
eius,et hocabsolute,
istudvelilludagens.Aliaautemestpotentia
contradictionis
naturalis
estsic
qua materia
inpotentia
formam
velinclinationem
ad ipsam.
ad talem
quodhabetaliquam
dispositionem
Et talispotentia
contradictionis
respicit
agensnaturale."
38Schneider,
DieKosmologie
sichallerdings
darber
(cit.n. 2 above),312:"erschweigt
oder'aptitudines',
das unterschiedliche
aus,aufwasdie unterschiedlichen
Dispositionen
'Haben'derMaterie
zurckzufhren
ist."
39Schneider,
DieKosmologie
erscheint
aueror(cit.n. 2 above),308-09:"DieseLsung
undihre
. . . Andererseits
istda, wo Prozesse
die Materie
dendich
stattfinden,
gelungen
daeineungeregelte
undbeliebige
Potentialitt
somodifiziert,
Umwandlung
ausgeschlossen
Wesensbeschaffenheit
berhrt
wre."
ist,ohneda diegleichartige
40Schneider
DieKosmologie
callsthisphrase"hardtounderstand":
(cit.n. 2 above),312
zu verstehen").
("schwer

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FRANGIS
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35

Againstthe argumentof the Philosopher,when he says that things

whichhave matterof thesame natureare transmutable
intoeach other,
etc.,41I say. . . thattwo thingscan have matterof the same naturein
two ways,thatis, similarly
or dissimilarly.
To have matterof the same
naturesimilarly
is to have it in thesame arrangement/manner
and
(ordo)
I
And
concede
that
those
which
have
matter
of
the
same
equally.
things
naturein thissense do act when theyare acted upon and are transmutableintoeach other.But thosethingswhichhave matterofthesame
naturedissimilarly
are not
, thatis not in the same arrangement/manner,
transmutable
intoeach other,nor is it necessarythatone of
necessarily
themacts on the otherwhenit is acted upon by it. And so it is in the
case of the matterof corruptibles
and incorruptibles,
whichis what is
beingasked about here.42
If thisis supposed to be a dramaticrejectionof the Aristotelianposition
thatthe sublunarand supralunarrealmsare fundamentally
different
and
have different
it
calls
to
mind
Austin's
remark
about
physics,
J.L.
wry
the theoryof perceptionas takingplace indirectlyvia sense-data:
One mightwellwantto askjust how seriously
thisdoctrineis intended,
and literallythe philosophers
who propoundit mean
just how strictly
theirwordsto be taken. . . for,strangethoughthe doctrinelooks,we
are sometimestold to takeit easy- really,it'sjust whatwe've believed
all along. (There's the bit whereyou say it and the bit whereyou take
it back.)43
In Marchia's defence,thereis no obvious reason to believe that he did
take his theoryto involvea radical break with the Aristoteliantradition.
SchneiderhimselfreportsGiles of Rome (d. 1316) as havingargued that
if thereis matterin the heavens at all, it mustbe of the same natureas
41Marchia
raised
thisobjection
onAristotle's
behalf
in58;cf.OnGeneration
andCorruption
I 7,324a34f.,
and10,328a19-22.Forsomediscussion
ofwhatAristotle
himself
meant,
seeC.J.F.Williams,
Aristotle's
De Generatione
et Corruptione,
Oxford
1982,148-49.
42S 69:"AdilludPhilosophi,
materiam
eiusdem
quandodicitquodiliaquaehabent
rationis
sunttransmutabilia
ad invicem
etc.Dico. . . quoddupliciter
possunt
aliquahabere
materiam
eiusdem
veldissimiliter.
Haberemateriam
eiusdem
rationis,
quia velsimiliter
rationis
similiter
esthabereipsameodemordine
et aequaliter.
Et quaeistomodohabent
materiam
eiusdem
rationis
concedoquod aguntrepatiendo
et suntad invicem
transmutabilia.
Sed istaquaehabent
materiam
eiusdem
rationis
nonsimiliter,
seddissimiliter,
hocestnoneodemordine,
nonoportet
ad invicem
necquod
quodsunttransmutabilia
unumeorum
ab ipso.Sic autemestinproposito
de materia
coragitad aliudrepatiendo
etincorruptibilium,
ruptibilium
quarequaeritur."
43J.L.Austin,
Sense
andSensibilia,
Oxford
1962,2.

11:22:44 AM

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MARKTHAKKAR

terrestrial
matter,and as having claimed that only some "more modern
teachers"take refugein the compromiseof matterof a different
nature.44
If Marchia did make an originalcontribution,
then,I thinkit must lie
in his attemptto explain the traditionaldistinction
betweenthe sublunar
and supralunarrealms in the followingway: matterneeds superadded
dispositionsof some kind in order to have naturalpotencies,and celesmatterhave superaddeddispositionsof different
kinds.
tial and terrestrial
If I am right,then in order to assess Marchia's contributionwe must
naturalis
, nuda/
purapoteninvestigatethe lineage of the notionsof potentia
in
and
the
ordo
which
substances
tialitas,
,
aptitudines/
dispositions
superadditae
have theirmatter.
One finalsuggestionconcerningMarchia's theoryof the heavens.Chris
Schabel has writtenthat "Schneiderhas shownhow [Marchia] did away
withthe notionof the Quintessenceof the supralunaryrealm".45But not
once in the textsedited by Schneiderdoes Marchia mentionthe quintessence,the aether,or the fifthelement;moreover,his theorydoes not
preclude celestialsubstancesfrombeing made up of the fifthelement.
and celestialmatterhave the same bare
Marchia takes it that terrestrial
but differradicallyin their natural potencies. One consepotentiality,
mattercan
is that,naturallyspeaking,terrestrial
quence of thisdifference
and does receiveelementalbut not celestialform,whereascelestialmatform.I hope it is
ter can and does receive celestialbut not terrestrial
not too far-fetched
for me to suggeston Marchia's behalfthat whereas
matternaturallycombineswithelementalformto give the four
terrestrial
terrestrial
elements,celestialmattermightnaturallycombine with celescelestialelement.46
tial formto give a fifth,
4. Methodological
Consequences
ofMarchia'sTheory
claims 'the methodI shall call the thirdof Schneider's interpretative
and laws
all
and
confirmed
observations
claim':
that
discovered
ological
and applicable to all eventsin the cosmos,
are in principletransferable
44DieKosmologie
See alson. 46 below.
(cit.n. 2 above),159-60.
45C. Schabel,
onResistance
andInfinite
Mass?Francesco
OntheThreshold
ofInertial
d'Appignano
suFr.Francesco
Internazionale
,
, in:D. Priori
d'Appignano
Convegno
(ed.),AttidelPrimo
Velocity
DieKosmologie
delTronto2002,176.Cf.Schneider,
(cit.n. 2 above),339-40.
Appigliano
4bRichard
andtheearthhavethe
thatthispositionthattheheavens
Sorabji
suggests
- wasactually
inthefirst
matter
Aristotle's
elemental
sameprime
matter
butdifferent
place.
inAntiquity
andTheir
andMotion:
Theories
See hisMatter
, London1988,15.
, Space,
Sequel

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FRANCIS
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37

so that, as a matterof methodology,we can make well-foundedstatementsabout thingswhich elude our directgrasp.47The aim of this section is to test this claim- firstly
in general,by seeing whetherit would
hold forany contemporary
who accepted Marchia's theory,and secondly
forMarchia himself,by examininga passage that seems to confirmthe
claim.
A 14th-century
naturalphilosopherwho accepts Marchia's arguments
knowsthat,deep down,thereis somethingin commonbetweenthe heavens and the earth,namely,their(prime)matter.48
But as a naturalphilosohe
is
in
interested
how
behave
pher
things
naturally,ratherthan in how
and he knowsthat
theymightbehave under supernaturalintervention;49
celestialand terrestrial
substancesdo not behave in the same way simRather,ifhe is to underplybecause theyhave the same (prime)matter.50
stand the behaviourof celestialand terrestrial
substances,he must take
into account the superadded dispositions,aptitudesor inclinationsthat
differentiate
the mattersof the two realms. For instance,he must take
into account the factthat celestialsubstances,unliketerrestrial
ones, are
and
of
or
naturallyincorruptible
naturallyincapable
qualitative quantitativechange.51But thisputs him in the same position,methodologically
naturalphilosopher.
speaking,as any other 14th-century
As for Marchia himself,one aspect of his cosmologythat mightinitiallyappear to supportthe methodologicalclaim is his theoryof celestiallocomotion,in whichhe applies to the heavenshis terrestrially-derived
But a
theoryof the virtusderelicta
(roughly,a self-expending
impetus).52
47Schneider,
DieKosmologie
sichaus
(cit.n. 2 above),327:"3. Methodologisch
ergibt
deruniversalen
dieprinzipielle
undAnwendbarkeit
allergefunKonzeption
bertragbarkeit
denenundbesttigten
undGesetze
aufjedesEreignis
imKosmos,
so da
Beobachtungen
auchbersolches
werden
das sichdemdirekten
knnen,
begrndete
Aussagen
gemacht
entzieht."
Zugriff
48S 62.
49"Physics
in theMiddleAgesconcerned
thenormal
courseofnature
and notthe
or whatGod might
do miraculously."
ThusE.D. Sylla,Physics
supernatural
, in: F.A.C.
Mantello
& A.G.Rigg(eds),
Medieval
Latin:
AnIntroduction
andBibliographical
Guide
, Washington
DC 1996,359.
50S 8664-69.
51Marchia
allowsin S 31thatcelestial
substances
haveactiveandpassive
as
qualities
wellas quantity,
buthe deniesin 59 thattheyarein potency
towards
activeandpassivequalities.
The upshot
musttherefore
be that(again,naturally
speaking)
theycannot
- or,presumably,
in quality
in quantity.
change
52In thisconnection,
FabioZaninwrites
ofMarchia's
ofunifying
celestial
and
project
terrestrial
andkinematics.
See 2.1.1ofhispaperLa Rielaborazione
delConcetto
di
dynamics

11:22:44 AM

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MARKTHAKKAR

closer look at the details of this application shows that,if anything,it

disconfirms
the methodologicalclaim.
Marchia argues in S 11.30 that celestialbodies are moved not by an
internalprinciple,such as theirform,but by an externalmover,such as
an intelligence,53
and thatthisexternalimpositionof motionon the heavens is contingent.54
His argumentsreston commonlyaccepted premisses,
such as thatnaturalmotionhas a restfulterminus
ad quern
and thatnature
does nothingin vain, and not on his theoryof the virtus
derelicta.
For his
of
this
to
the
we
must
look
to
a
different
conheavens,
theory
application
text:the questionof whetherthereis any supernatural
in
the
sacrapower
ments.55
As part of his discussionof thisquestion,Marchia concludesthat "the
or form
heavens,moved by an angel, receive fromit some force{virtus)
whichis neutral,"i.e. producesneithernaturalnor violentmotion,"acciin the heavfromlocomotion,and whichinheresformally
dental,different
ens."56This forceis his virtus
derelicta
:
If the intelligence
stoppedmovingthe heavens,theywould stillkeep
or
fora timevia thisforce'sfollowing
and continuing
moving revolving
of theircircularmotion,as is clear froma potter'swheel,whichkeeps
revolvingfora timeafterits primemoverhas stoppedmovingit. For
thereseemsto be the same ratiohere as thereis thereand vice versa,
namely,a forceleftbehind{virtus
derelicta)
by the primemoverin the
mobileboth here and there.57

inNicole
in: Priori(ed.),AttidelPrimo
Vis Derelicta
Oresme,
(cit.n. 45 above),
Convegno
ForMarchia's
ofthevirtus
derelicta
119-20.
, seethearticles
theory
bySchabelandZanin
in thepresent
volume.
535 11.3015-18.
54S 11.308-12.
M lhe context
Schneider
a clearexplanation
in Die
mayseemunconnected;
provides
inAccessus
adLombardm:
TheSecular
226,as doesSteven
Kosmologie
(cit.n. 2 above),
Livesey
andtheSacred
inMedieval
Commentaries
ontheSentences
de Thologie
et
, in: Recherches
Mdivales
72.1(2005),165-67.
Philosophie
56S IV.1.21,11.4-6.The section
in Schneider,
andlinenumbers
refer
totheextract
DieKosmologie
newedition
ofS IV.1
(cit.n. 2 above),50-52,butseealsoChrisSchabel's
in thepresent
volume
(thesourceofthetextin n. 57 below).
57S IV.1.2 3, 11.20-25:"intelligentia
cessante
movere
caelum,
quodadhuccaelum
moveretur
ad tempus
siverevolveretur
huiusmodi
circularem
virtutem,
perhuiusmodi
sicutpatetde rotafiguli
ad tempus,
motum
etcontinuantem,
exequentem
quaerevolvitur
movere.
Eademenimratiovide
cessante
movente
turessehiequaeestibiete conprimo
in mobili
videlicet
virtus
derelicta
a primo
motore
hicetibi."
verso,

11:22:44 AM

FRANGIS
ON THE HEAVENS
OF MARCHIA

39

In thispassage, the virtus

elida is said to be the ratio
der
, so that the sense
of 'ratio' here must be that of a reason for or cause of something
namely,the continuationof the mobile's motion afterthe mover has
stopped.
Now, in order for this admittedlysuggestivepassage to supportthe
methodologicalclaim, Marchia's celestial application of his terrestrial
derelicta
mustbe somehowlicensedby the universality
theoryof the virtus
of the physicsof motion. But in practice he licensesthe applicationby
between the sublunarand
tryingto show that the standarddistinctions
realms
do
not
a
for
supralunar
present problem thisapplication.To paraa little,his argumentsare:
phrase the DoctorSuccinctus
(1) The motiveforceof an angelicmoveris more noble and perfect
than thatof any inferior
moversmanage to
mover,and yet inferior
in
their
mobiles
a
force
which
continues
the
motion.Therefore
impress
all the more does an angelicmovermanage to do this.58
(2) There is no obviousreasonwhythe heavensshouldnot be receptiveof a virtus
derelicta
derelicta
has no contrary.
For
, because the virtus
a virtus
or form(such as light)whichhas no contraryis neutral,and
therefore
would not introduceinto the heavensany alteration.59
derelicta
because the lat(3) The heavensmustbe receptiveof a virtus
ter,being a principleof locomotion,is no less perfectthan locomotionitself(ofwhichtheheavensare obviouslyreceptive),
and so cannot
be dismissed
fromtheheavensunlessanyotherreasonis given,besides
forits beingrepugnantto the heavens.60
imperfection,
to and moreproportionate
to their
(4) The heavensare less resistant
moverthanany inferior
mobileis to its mover;so theyare moreapt
to receivetheirmover'sinfluence.61
These argumentsare specificto the heavens and to theirangelic movers,
and make no appeal to a generalclaim about the universalapplicability
of physicallaws as revealedby the fundamentalhomogeneityof celestial
and terrestrial
matter.Marchia clearlyagreeswithhis contemporaries
that
the heavens cannot naturallyadmit of imperfections
or of qualitiesthat
586*IV.1.22,11.9-13.
59S IV.1.22,11.14-18.Presumably
thisis becausedarkness
is justtheprivation
of
light.
60S IV.1.24,11.28-32.NotethatSchabelhas'nisidetur'whereSchneider
hadthe
lessmodest
'nequedatur'.
61S IV.1.25,11.34-36.

11:22:44 AM

40

MARKTHAKKAR

have contraries.His strategy

is not to appeal to the methodologicalclaim,
but instead to argue that celestialbodies can be held to accept a virtus
derelicta
withoutdoingviolenceto the usual special physicsof the heavens.
5. Conclusion
For Francis of Marchia, the heavens and the earth are similaronly in
an attenuatedsense: theyhave the same primematterand thusthe same
bare potentiality,
but theirnaturalpotencies(and presumablytheirsecond matter)are very different.
Accordingly,while his cosmologyallows
thatphysicalprinciplesmay apply to both the heavens and the earth,it
does not guaranteethat theywill. The peculiar dispositionssuperadded
to celestial mattermean that Marchia still needs Aristoteliancelestial
physicsto determinewhat is naturallypossible in the supralunarrealm,
thatis, how the heavens behave withoutdivineintervention.
To be sure,
he is preparedto apply terrestrial
principlesto the heavens,providedthat
Aristoteliancelestial physics presents no barrier. But once this vital
qualificationis made explicit,Marchia's cosmologyno longer seems to
be the radical break with traditionthat we have been led to believe.62
Oxford,England
Balliol College(University
of Oxford)

62I amverygrateful
toRichard
ChrisSchabel,
CeciliaTrifogli,
Cross,RussFriedman,
andRachelFarliefortheir
comments
on earlier
ofthisarticle.
drafts
helpful

11:22:44 AM

FrancisofMarchiai Virtus derelicta

and theContext
of Its Development*
CHRIS SCHABEL

Abstract
This articleoffersthe firstcriticaleditionof the mostimportant
versionof
Francisof Marchia'sfamousquestion1 of his commentary
on Book IV of
the Sentences
derelicta
, in whichthe Franciscantheologianputs forthhis virtus
to
Marchia's
theoryof projectilemotion.The introduction
attempts place
in itspropercontext.The theorymightseemto us an obviousimprovetheory
menton Aristotle,
but ratherthan an immediateand completebreakwith
tradition
thatall scholastics
derelicta
was more
quicklyadopted,Marchia'svirtus
a stagein a gradualprocessthathad begun manydecades beforeand did
not finduniversalacceptanceamonghis firstsuccessors.Moreover,Marchia
himselfdid not take the theoryto what mightseem the obviousconclusion
thatJean Buridanwould draw,because Marchia employedthe virtus
derelicta
to explainmorephenomenathanjust projectilemotion.
said thatthroughday and nighttheEarthrotatesaroundthe
Pythagoras
of
the
circleof the equator. . . Others,refuting
thisopinion,say
poles
thatif the Earthrotated,the thingsin the air and the birdsand clouds
wouldbe leftbehindbythemotionoftheEarth.ButPythagoras
maintains
that not only does the Earth rotate,but so do the air and whatever
or thatof
thingsare in it. So, whetherthePythagoreans'
opinionis truer,
theotherswho positthattheEarthis immobile,no argument
can detect.
Nicole Oresme, perhaps the most famous scientistof the Middle Ages,
expressedthese sentimentsin the mid-14th century,in part based on
argumentsbuildingon those of Francis of Marchia.1 Today any child
* I wouldliketothank
William
William
O. Duba,Stephen
D. Dumont,
J. Courtenay,
Russell
L. Friedman,
andMarkThakkar
fortheir
comments
andassistance.
1 Fora passageusing
closeto Marchia's,
see NicoleOresme,
Le Livre
du
terminology
cieletdumonde
III, c. 7, eds.A.D. MenutandA.J.Denomy,
Madison,
Wisconsin,
1968,
612.82-4:
"Maisde quelcunque
telmouvement
ce qui le faitestunequalitou
violent,
vertu
motive
ou corpsainsimeuparle premier
motif."
See also
qui estcauseeet imprimee
F. Zanin,La rielaborazione
delconcetto
divisderelicta
inNicole
Oresme
, in:D. Priori
(ed.),Atti
delI Convegno
suFrancesco
Internazionale
delTronto2002,117-59.
d'Appignano,
Appignano
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2006
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
44,1

11:22:56 AM

CHRISSCHABEL

42

would probablysay that Pythagoraswas "obviously"correct,yet it took

almosttwo centuriesbeforeCopernicuspublisheda defenseof the Earth's
rotationin his De revolutionibus
, and anothercenturybeforethe idea gained
wide acceptance among naturalphilosophers.Part of the reason forthe
was hesitantand thought
"delay,"as we mightcall it,is thatOresmehimself
thattherewas no way to decide the questionof the Earth'sdiurnalmotion.
In thispaper I would like to returnto Francisof Marchia's notionof
virtus
dere
lieta.Two of the threeissues I wish to discussparallel the delay
withthe acceptanceof Oresme'sidea and his own hesitation:
first,
although
did
and
Oresme
Buridan
and
develop Marchia's
adopt
eventually
John
insight,Marchia's immediatesuccessorswho dealt withhis opinionwere
not overlysupportive.Second, Marchia has been criticizedfornot taking
derelicta
to its "obvious" conclusion,makingit a
his theoryof the virtus
The thirdissue has to do with origias
did
Buridan.
permanentforce,
I
nality:the words quoted to begin this paper were in fact notthose of
Nicole Oresme; David of Dinant penned themover a centuryand a half
beforeOresme wrote,as Elena Casadei has discovered.2Likewise,it has
recentlybeen claimed that Marchia did not inventthe basic idea of virtusderelicta
, but variousauthorshad supportedthe notionformanydecades
before Marchia gave his principiailecture on the fourthbook of the
Sentences
around the beginningof 1320. In short,the virtusderelicta
, as
"obvious" a theoryas it mightseem todayto a teenager,was not obvious.
Originality
Let me again quote at some lengthfroma medievaltext,thisone pitting
derelicta
the virtus
theoryagainstthe Aristoteliantradition:
I positthreeconclusions.First, thata proEighth,withoutarguments,
medium.
is notmovedbythecontaining
jectileseparatedfromthethrower
2 E. Casadei,Lafilosofia
dei
edanalisi
dottrinale
crtica
diDaviddiDinant:
dellanatura
edizione
from
testi
Oxford,
, Universit
quoting
deglistudidi Roma"La Sapienza"1998,65.15-23,
circumferri
terram
"Dicitenim<Pythagoras>
Bodleian
per
Library,
Digby67,ff.96v-97r:
circa
circapoloscircuii
diemetnoctem
diei,solemverocircumferri
perannum
aequatoris
et circaaliospolos.Quorum
opinionem
peralia tempora
poloszodiaci,et alia similiter
ea quaesuntinaereetavesetnubes
si terra
sicinquiunt:
circumfertur,
quidamrefellentes
nonsolumterram
DicitautemPythagoras
a motuterrae.
accidit
circumferri,
praeteriri
sitPythagoreorum
verior
ineo.Utrum
sunt
etquaecumque
immo
edametaerem
opinio
igitur
ratio."
nullapotest
terram
esseimmobilem,
an aliorum,
deprehendere
quiponunt

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA
OF MARCHIA'S

43

Second, thatit is not movedby a virtus

impressa
impressedon the conderelicta
leftin it by
tainingmedium.Third, thatit is movedby a virtus
the thrower.
I provethe first conclusion thus:if the projectilewere moved by
the partsof the containingmedium,it would eitherbe moved by the
partsthatare in frontof the projectile,or thosebehind,or thoseon
the sides.Not by thosein front,because no mobileis movedby someit; but the part of the mediumthatis in frontresistsit,
thingresisting
as appears to our senses. . .; therefore
the projectileis not moved by
thepartin frontof it. Again,no mobileis movedby something
moved
in
but
the
front
of
the
is
moved
part
projectile
againstit, as
againstit;
an
with
arrow
shot
the
etc.
wind; therefore,
appears
against
Nor is it movedby the partsbehindthe projectile,because it is not
movedby themexceptby a push;but thisis impossible,
as I showthus:
. . . assumingthatthereis a verylightclothbehinda stone,such that
thestonecannotbe movedby theair [behind]unlesstheclothis pushed,
throughan impulsionthe yieldingof the cloth [to the air] will be easier than the motionof the stone;yet thereis no yieldingthere,but
ratherthe clothcontinually
fromthe stoneand fallstoward
getsfarther
thepartsof the air behindit; therefore
it has been shownthatit is not
propelledby thoseparts.This is also clear withan arrowwhosefeathers bend towardthe back of the arrowas if pushedby the air thatis
at restor movingagainstthe arrow.For theydo not lean towardthe
if the arrowwere
frontof the arrow,whichwould happen necessarily
the
of
the
air
that
are
toward
the
back
of the arrow.
propelledby
parts
Nor is it moved by the partsto the sides,because no principleof
movingactivelyor passivelycan be assignedto them,just as it cannot
be assignedto the partsof waterarounda ship or carryinga fish.So
it has been proventhata projectileis not moved by the partsof the
containingmedium.
The second conclusion is thatit is not movedby any virtus
impressa
on themedium,becauseit seemsveryfantasticum
forthestring
impressed
of a bow to impressa virtus
on the upper partsof the air. This does
not happenin any way,unlessone saysthatthe arrowitselfcarriesthe
virtus
fromthe stringto the upperpartsof the air, and thatwhenit is
in thesepartsit appliesto themthe virtus
throughwhichtheymove the
thevirtus
receivedfromthearrow.But thisseems
arrow,[thatis] through
absurd.
Thereforethe third conclusion is left,namelythat the thrower
, throughwhichit is movedcontinuously,
impartsto the subjectits virtus
while that virtus
were inseparablefromthe
lasts,because if that virtus
the
would
move
ifit foundan infinite
forever,
projectile, projectile
space

11:22:56 AM

44

CHRISSCHABEL
receives
And so in thiswaya projectile
and resistance.
without
repugnance
whilethe
fromthe throwera virtus,
throughwhichit movescontinually
is separatedfromthe thrower,
whenthe virtus
virtus
lasts.And therefore,
...
the projectileis stillsaid to be movedby the thrower

dereThis is a nice explanationfor and proof of the need for the virtus
litta.Yet theseare not Marchia's words,but thoseof his fellowFranciscan
Gerard Odonis. The problem is that we do not know who wrote first,
Odonis or Marchia. The quotationabove comes frombook II, distinction
3
14, question 8 of Odonis' Parisian Sentences
commentaryfrom 1327-28,
date fromaround
whilethevariousextantversionsof Marchia's treatment
the beginningof 1320 to about 1323. But it turnsout that Odonis had
at Toulouse in the late 1310s, and althoughthe reportatio
read the Sentences
that once circulatedfromthose lecturesdoes not survive,many philosophical questionsfromthe years between his two series of theological
lecturesare extant in a Madrid manuscript,Biblioteca nacional 4229,
includinga questionDe motuthat Paul Bakkerhas published,which contains a versionof the passage just quoted. Althoughthe firstversionof
De motuprobablydates fromthe early 1320s, afterMarchia's lectures,it
could be based on Odonis' earlierToulouse lectures.4As in the case of
David of Dinant's opinion of the problem of the Earth's rotation,there
is no argumentthancan determinewhetherMarchia expandedon Odonis,
or Odonis summarizedMarchia. We do not even know what Anneliese
Maier would have thought,because she did not have access to any pertinentmanuscriptof Odonis' works,which explains her silence on the
matter.I do not want to take away fromMarchia his mostfamousidea,
however,so it should be stressedthat his treatmentis much longerand
twelvein comparison
survivesin threetimesas manymanuscript
witnesses,
3 FortheLatintext,
in
ofthisintroduction
to an Italianabbreviation
seean appendix
del
su Francesco
D. Priori(ed.),AttidelIII Convegno
Internazionale
, Appignano
d'Appignano
Tronto2006,forthcoming.
4 ForDe motu
De motu
Autour
dela question
Otetlemouvement.
Guiral
Bakker,
, seeP.J.J.M.
4299, in: EarlyScienceandMedicine,
Madrid
dansle manuscrit
conserve
nacional,
, Biblioteca
texton 316-17.FortheToulouseand
8.4 (2003),298-319,
esp.307-8andtheparallel
Odonis
TheSentences
andMadrid
Parislectures
,
4229,seeC. Schabel,
ofGerardus
Commentary
Without
the
46 (2004),115-61,
de philosophie
mdivale,
OFM,in:Bulletin
esp.119-24.
to his
ofthearticle
ofthefinalversion
benefit
justcited,in L.M. de Rijk'sintroduction
vol.II: De intentionibus
OdonisO.F.M.,Opera
edition
ofGiraldus
, Leiden-Boston
Philosophica,
section
ofOdonis'Sentences
dateforanother
fora 1316-22
2005,8-10,theeditor
argues
textin Madrid
forthecorresponding
commentary
(partofbookI) andposits1328-34
PeterAuriol's
toOdonis'ignoring
4229.FortheSentences
date,de Rijkpoints
commentary

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA'S
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA

45

to Odonis' four. Moreover, as we shall see, althoughJohn the Canon

attributedthe theoryto Gerard Odonis,John himselfremarkedthat the
argumentswere notOdonis' own, perhaps a referenceto his debt to
Marchia.
Regardlessof the answer to the question of the relationshipbetween
Marchia and Odonis, however,thereis littledoubt thatMarchia was not
the inventorof the basic virtus
derelicta
theory.While Maier did not find
any Christianprecursorwho clearlysupportedMarchia's view, she did
point to passages in Bonaventure,Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, and
extensive
treatment
offirst
andsecond
available
also
intentions,
by1317,andsinceAuriol
1316-19
forOdonis'swork.Against
the
Odonis,de Rijkprefers
ignores
this,however,
threemssofbookI thatdatethecommentary
an
explicitly
assignit to 1326(probably
error
for1327)or 1327,andin other
contexts
OdonisdoesdealwithAuriol
him
(citing
6 times
inbookI). De Rijkalsopoints
toa passageinboththeSentences
and
commentary
De intentionibus
toPopeJohn,
andLegateRobert,
with
Peter,
referring
KingPhilip,
Bishop
' Count
theSentences
CountGastonagainst
De intentionibus
commentary
Louis,and
having
withthree
Sentences
mssmentioning
Proctor
Arnald
andPrefect
butDe intentionibus
Gerard,
andoneSentences
ms(Madrid,
Biblioteca
Nacional65,whichde Rijk,p. 3, erroneously
to theBiblioteca
de la Universidad
on thebasisofa 19th-century
critassigns
catalogue,
n. 11, myprevious
andcorrect
statement
thatitis nowintheBiblioteca
icizing,
Nacional)
instead
Proctor
GeraldandPrefect
Arnald.
FortheSentences
de Rijk
having
commentary,
claims
that
andPhilip
V (1316-3
andperJohnXXII (1316-34)
January
1322)aremeant,
or hissuccessor
PeterAuriol(1321-22),
hapsBishopPeterofAix-en-Provence
(1318-21)
whereas
heposits
thatDe intentionibus
is a laterrevision
nowreferring
to PhilipVI (1328he doesnotputforth
a newcandidate
forBishopPeter.
50),although
this,since
Against
theextant
msscontain
Gerard's
Parisian
lectures
of 1327/8,
to Philip
theywouldrefer
VI. Moreover,
Aix-en-Provence
wasactually
an archbishopric,
whilePierre
(Peter)
Roger
- wasbishopofArrasand
whomGerardwouldcertainly
haveknown
in
Paris
residing
from
late1328tolate1329.Yetitis notcertain
thateveryone
in thispassageis Odonis'
anddocuments
oftheUniversity
of
contemporary:
looking
JohnXXII'sletters
through
I havenotbeenabletoidentify
theprefect
ortheproctor,
butRobert
couldsimply
Paris,
be thefamous
ofCouron
whowasresponsible
forthenotorious
LegateRobert
University
statutes
of 1215.Interestingly,
thecountsof Foixfrom1301-91
werenamed
however,
Gaston
onecouldguessthattheoriginal
(I-III),andsinceFoixis nearToulouse,
passage
wasin thelostToulouse
andsimply
On the
reportatio
copiedintothelaterParisversion.
other
hasCountLouis,whocouldbe LouisI ofFlanders
andNevers
hand,De intentionibus
moreimportant
intheParisregion;
thiswouldpointtoa dateafter
(1322-46),
1328,given
thereference
toKingPhilip
intheextant
I Sentences
Odoniscitesother
(i.e.VI). However,
works
in Madrid4229,so de Rijk,pp. 9-10,maintains
contained
thatthesewereearlier
versions
ofthetexts
andthattheversion
ofDe intentionibus
andtheseother
tracts
inMadrid
4229wererevised
after
1328.In sum,ifwemust
takemostofthenamesas contemporaries,
thatFranciscans
werenotsupposed
toteachartsuntil
after
their
noting
studies,
theological
wecouldclaimthefollowing
Sentences
inthelate1310s,
lectures
now
sequence:
(1)Toulouse
ofthephilosophical
works
contained
inMadrid
intheearly
lost;(2)versions
4229,written
is nowlost;(3) ParisSentences
in 1327/8,
lectures
1320s,ofwhichat leastDe intentionibus
theextant
written
version
from1328/9citing
theseversions
andincorporating
material
from
theToulouse
inMadrid4229revised
in 1328-34.
lectures;
(4)at leastDe intentionibus

11:22:56 AM

46

CHRISSCHABEL

especiallyPeterJohn Olivi that revealed theirawarenessof the theory,

and Aquinas' own opinion appears to have waveredbetweenrejectingit
and consideringit a possibility.5
In 2004 Rega Wood publishedan edition
of what she claims is Richard Rufus of Cornwall's Physicscommentary,
which she dates to Paris before 1238. If she is correct,it would perhaps
make it the firstWesternPhysics
commentaryand would change our view
of the earlyreceptionof Aristotelian
sciencein the West. In the sole manuscript,in Erfurt,the textis anonymous,and one of Wood's main argumentsforattributing
the commentary
to RichardRufusconcernsMarchia.
on
book
of
the
, Wood's authordeals withproCommenting
eight
Physics
jectile motion.Rejectingthe mediumas the mover,he concludes:"Then
it is necessaryfor somethingto be impressedin the projectileby the
thrower.And it seems to me thatthisis true:thatsome qualityand form
or something
is impressedby the thrower. . ."6 Since in Marchia'squestion
on the virtus
derelicta
there is a marginalreferenceto "Richard," Wood
argues that Marchia is citingRichard Rufus of Cornwalland is building
on the verypassage just quoted, which would also entailthat the Erfurt
commentaryis by Richard Rufus.7
Edith Sylla and Silvia Donati have rightlyrejectedthisconnectionand
questionedthe attributionof the text to Richard Rufus,which must be
strongerif we are to rewritethe historyof the receptionof Aristotle's
in the West.8Moreover,thereis not much more to the exposition
Physics
of the theorythan the line I quoted above, and the authoreven retains
5 A. Maier,
DieImpetustheorie
inead.%wei
, Vienna-Leipzig
1940,revised
reprint
Grundprobleme
derscholastischen
, 3rded.,Rome1968,134-53.
Naturphilosophie
6 Richard
Rufus
ofCornwall,
InPhysicam
Aristotelis
VIII.3.1,ed.R. Wood,Oxford
2004,
240.610-14:
"Et si itaest,tuncin ipsoproiecto
a proiciente.
Et
oportet
aliquidimprimi
mihiquodhocestverum,
videtur
etforma
sivealiquidei imprimatur
quodaliquaqualitas
a proiciente
..."
7 R. Wood,Introduction
to Richard
In Physicam
Rufus,
(cit.n. 6 above),11-12.
8 See E. Sylla'sreview
in:NotreDamePhilosophical
Reviews
2004.08.09
and
(on-line),
S. Donati's
review
TheAnonymous
onthePhysics
inErfurt,
Cod.Amplon.
article,
Commentary
Q.
312 andRichard
de Thologie
et Philosophie
, in:Recherches
Rufus
ofCornwall
mdivales,
72.2(2005),232-362,
Donatipoints
outthat,although
there
esp.269-83.In particular,
aretwelve
a version
ofMarchia's
text,onlyone(C) hasa marmanuscripts
containing
toRichard,
anditprobably
wasnotwritten
himself.
Moreover,
ginalreference
byMarchia
thereference
is to "Bonaventura,
Rie',"andit appearsat theveryendofa. 2, where
whoever
wrotethereference
wasprobably
notthinking
ofthevirtus
derelicta
in projectile
motion
at all,butrather
celestial
I believe(andDonatinowagrees)
motion.
thescribe
wasreferring
to a. 3, on thesacraments
sincethereis a largenotein the
themselves,
lower
inC, f.177vb,
ofthesamecolumn
atlength
from
Thomas
margin
quoting
Aquinas'
Summa
withthe
III, q. 62,a. 4, resp.andad 1 and4, anda. 3, ad 1, dealing
theobgiae

11:22:56 AM

DEREUCTA
HIA'S VIRTUS
FRANGIS
OF MARC

47

in the medium,too.9Nevertheless,
some impressio
leavingaside the question
of authorship,everyoneagrees thatthe authorof the Erfurtcommentary
rejectsthe Aristotelianaccount and holds some kernelof Marchia's virtus
and that the textdates fromthe 13thcentury,although
derelicta
theory,10
not
as
early as the 1230s.
perhaps
fora couple ofyears,sparked
Wood's claim,whichhad been circulating
further.
Donati to investigate
Althoughpreviousscholars,such as Duhem,
Michalski,Maier, and Clagett,had foundsome antecedentsin late-antique
and Arab thinkers,
John Philoponosand Avicenna,forexample,11among
Christiansno trueprecursorto Marchia had been found.Based on mid13th centuryOxford writings,which Donati and Cecilia Trifoglihave
Donati
Donati discoveredseveralprecursors.13
studiedratherexhaustively,12
found that a commentaryin a Paris manuscript(BnF lat. 16149), an
anonymoustextprobablystemmingfroma revisionof Adam of Bocfeld's
mid-13th centurycommentaryon the Physics
, containsalmost the same
from
theresponinthesacraments;
onf.175ra,
thescribe
hadquoted
virtus
earlier,
spiritualis
ofMiddleton
in Summa
Richard
siones
III, q. 60,aa. 1-3and6. Mostprobably
theologiae
and
Maierunderstood,
DieImpetustheorie
is meant,
as Anneliese
(cit.n. 5 above),189-91,
derelicta.
Thusthereis almost
wasnotan advocate
ofvirtus
Richard
ofMiddleton
surely
andMarchia
reference
andRichard
Rufus
ofCornwall,
noconnection
between
themarginal
theErfurt
to Richard
Rufus.
cannot
be usedto attribute
commentary
9 Richard
"Debemus
InPhysicam
240.628-33:
VIII.3.1,ed.Wood(cit.n.6 above),
Rufus,
cumfortis
inmedio
et in proiecto,
utmihividetur,
est,
quodhaecimpressio
ergodicere,
etconseenimnaturalem
motum
etdatei motum
duofacit:
proiecti
oppositum,
Impedit
facere
tantum
unumistorum,
ettuncsi fuerit
debilitatur
continue
utpossit
grave
quenter
in fineautemdebilitatur
et
tantum
utneutrum
facere,
sursum,
possit
quiescit;
proiectum
sicmotus
oppositus."
10Although
notto thedegreethatWooddoesin herIntroduction
(cit.n. 6
perhaps
above),6-12.
11See various
surLonard
de Vinci
II, Paris1909,andIII,
placesin P. Duhem,Etudes
in K. Michalski,
La philosophie
au XIVesicle.
Paris1913,andtheearlier
studies
reprinted
inM. Clagett,
aresummarized
SixEtudes
1969.Theirthoughts
, K. Flasch(ed.),Frankfurt
inthe
Middle
in:Isis,39.1/2(1948),29-44,at 40-42;id.,
Some
General
ofPhysics
Ages,
Aspects
Wisconsin
TheScience
intheMiddle
1959,508-15;andMaier,
Madison,
Ages,
ofMechanics
A.B.Franco,
DieImpetustheorie
(cit.n. 5 above),esp. 119-33.See alsorecendy
Avempace,
oftheHistory
ofIdeas,64.4(2003),521-46,
andImpetus
in:Journal
Motion,
Projectile
Theory,
Whilethedirect
ofmostlate-antique
andArabfigures
andtheliterature
citedthere.
impact
inthisparticular
on 14th-century
Christians
is unlikely
FabioZanin,inhispaper
context,
in the
whowasquitewellknown
below(pp.87-91),alsodiscusses
theroleofAverroes,
Marchiaciteshimoften,
Averroes
doesnot
Westbythelater13thcentury.
although
ofvirtus
derelicta.
defend
thetheory
12See forexample
C. Trifogli,
in theThirteenth
(ca.1250-1270).
Oxford
Physics
Century
studies
PlaceandTime,
Leiden-Boston-Kln
Motion,
2000,andthepre-2000
byeadem
Infinity,
andDonaticitedin thebibliography
there.
13See Donati,TheAnonymous
(cit.n. 8 above),278-81and360-62.
Commentary

11:22:56 AM

48

CHRISSCHABEL

passage verbatimas in the Erfurtcommentary.Wood and Donati point

to anothertext,an anonymousDe animacommentaryfromperhaps the
moventis
that is in
late 1240s, which also makes briefmentionof a virtus
the moved projectileafterthe throweris no longer in contact.Donati
et corruptione
also indicatesa commentaryon De generatone
, probablyby
William of Cliffordand datingto the 1250s, in which the thrower'svirtuscontinuesto be withthe projectileeven afterthe moveris not touchlasts,
ing it, and "the motion of the projectilelasts as long as this virtus
and no longer." Donati sees yet anotherparallel in Geoffreyof Aspall's
commentaryon De celoet mundofromthe 1250s. This author speaks of
an impressionof a virtusmotivain the projectile,althoughalso in the
and with a great impetus
medium: "If I stood behind you and forcefully
with
senses
the violence in your
would
your
perceive
pushed you, you
in
be
some
derelicta
and
that
there
would
passio
you, so you would
body
the
virtus
not be able to hold yourselfback," until
graduallydiminished.
These theoriesare quite undeveloped,nowherenear as sophisticated
as Marchia's presentation.But we must rememberthat they date over
and much research
halfa centurybeforeMarchia's Sentences
commentary,
remainsto be done on the physicsof the intervening
years.We may yet
findthat Francis of Marchia and Gerard Odonis were heirs to a more
advanced traditionthan we think.
Reception
makes another
At firstsightthisslightreductionin Marchia's originality
issue even more puzzling: why didn't everyoneadopt the "obviously"
were
superiortheory?In the 1320s and early 1330s severalmajor thinkers
aware of the virtusderelecta
theory,which is understandablegiven that
Marchia had held the Franciscanchair of theologyat Paris, at thattime
arguablythe top positionin theologyin theworld.A couple of his chronological successorswere perhapslukewarmsupporters;Maier mentionsthe
FranciscanNicholas Bonet and John the Canon. In his commentaryon
the Physics
,Johnthe Canon presentsAristotle's
rejectionof motion,includin
a
vacuum,
concluding that "Gerard Odonis
ing projectilemotion,
A
little
to
these
later,Johnremarks,"To the aforearguments."14
responds
14JohntheCanon,In Physicam
IV, q. 4, ed. Venice1520,f.43ra:"Adistasrationes
between
Gerardus
Odonis."The connection
Johnand Odoniswasnotedby
respondei
intheMiddle
General
Some
(cit.n. 11 above),41,andMaier,
ofPhysics
Ages
Aspects
Clagett,

11:22:56 AM

DEREUCTA
VIRTUS
FRANGIS
OF MARGHIA'S

49

said doctor[GerardOdonis] responds,although

ofAristotle
said arguments
the argumentsnow adduced are not his." To Aristode'sclaim that"somethingthrownin a vacuum would not have the means of being moved
that it has in a plenum,"via Odonis- and perhaps Marchia, since the
argumentsare not Odonis' John respondsas follows:
of thethrower
I say thata thingthrownis movedmaterially
by thevirtus
it
is
carried.This
which
the
medium
the
of
and not by
through
parts
Whence
one cannot
the
air.
an
arrow
shot
with
is apparent
through
understandor claim thatit is moved because of the push of partsof
the air. For it is apparentto our sensesthatthe air does not produce
thatmotion,but ratherit presentsan impediment.15
in theelectronic
theCanon
In hisentry
DieImpetustheorie
John
(cit.n. 5 above),199-200.
theconF. Brown
, NewYork2004,Stephen
surveys
ofNational
Biography
Oxford
Dictionary
andidentity
ofJohntheCanon:someput
evidence
forthecontroversial
dating
tradictory
in various
somelabelled
others
himin theearly14thcentury,
partsofthe15thcentury;
forexample,
callshim
tothe1520edition,
Franciscan
himan English
Oxford
(theexplicit
references
and
himotherwise.
Brown
viainternal
a Minorite),
others
explains
describing
coma Florence
oftheeditio
thecolophon
ms)ofhisPhysics
(Padua1475,from
princeps
masthat
hisonlysurviving
work,
JuanMarbes,
JohnwasinfacttheCatalonian
mentary,
so he
oneearlymshasBarcelona),
canonofTortosa(actually,
terofartsat Toulouse,
that(1) hismss
himto the15thcentury
Brown
alsoassigns
wasnotFranciscan.
claiming
in
on theEucharist"
condemned
toWyclif's
areall 15thcentury,
(2) "herefers
teaching
scotistica'
and
suchas 'conclusio
1413,and (3) "he employs
15th-century
expressions,
however.
Allofthesearguments
canbe countered,
famosa
apudscotizantes'."
'propositio
Commentaries
Latin
Aristotle
26 (1970),183-4,which
, in: Traditio,
(1) C.H. Lohr,Medieval
B. Capitolare
Brown
listsMadridBN 2014,Vat.lat.3013,Viterbo
26,Washington
cites,
Florence
while
BNCConv.Soppr.
C.8.722as 14thcentury;
CUALibrary
169,andFlorence
CUA 169is dated1394;Maier,%wei
C.8.722is actually
15thcentury,
(cit.
Grundprobleme
14thcentury;
Viterbo
thatVat.lat.3013is early
26 hasa noteof
n. 5 above),
69,claims
thatdate;andMadrid2014,whiledatedtheimpossible
salefrom1373,so it preexists
sinceit is nextto a 14th-century
i.e. 1303,is probably
Mllo.ccc.3,
early14thcentury
weshould
read
inMadrid2015,so perhaps
commentary
Wylton's
Physics
copyofThomas
andthoughts
onViterbo
forinformation
S.D. Dumont
30 rather
than3,for1330(I thank
in bookI, q. 4, andno comreference
to Wyclif
andMadrid).
(2) Thereis no explicit
ofthemss
wewouldnotexpect
reference
(which
anyway
giventhedating
pelling
implicit
in the
active
are
authors
as
Terms
such
scotizantes
by
(3)
already
employed
justgiven).
intheintroduction
tothisvolume
1310sand1320s.Asdiscussed
Johnthe
(pp.8-9),what
1329butprobably
before
toa datesoonafter
Canoncitesanddoesnotcitepoints
Buridan,
OdoniswhenthelaterPhysics
ofprojectile
motion
sincein thecontext
JohncitesGerard
- survives
- muchmorefamous
inabout30 manuscripts
and
ofJohnBuridan
commentary
in
a
more
on
at
much
expected
place.
goes
greater
length
15JohntheCanon,InPhysicam
rationes
IV,q. 4, ed.Venice1520,f.43ra:"Adpredictas
nonsintsue... Etquando
licetrationes
nuncadducte
Aristotelis
dictus
doctor,
respondet
invacuononhaberet
a quomoveretur
sicutinpieno,dicoquod
dicitur
quodresproiecta
medii
virtute
etnona partibus
movetur
<materialiter>
resproiecta
[naturaliter]
proiicientis
de sagitta
intelligi
Quodapparet
proiecta
peraerem.Undenonpotest
perquodfertur.

11:22:56 AM

50

CHRISSCHABEL

It is not absolutelyclear thatJohn agrees withOdonis and Marchia, but

derelicta
is not used.
it seems so, althoughthe termvirtus
natuNicholas Bonet also bringsup the new theoryin his Philosophia
ralis, again in the contextof motionin a vacuum. Much of the general
discussionseems to reflectMarchia's influence,althoughhis overallconclusion is not as specificas we would like:
Some people assertthattherecan be violentmotionin a vacuumwithout the movingprincipleor throwerbeingin contactwiththe mobile
And thereasonforthisstatement
is this:because
eitherreallyor virtually.
but quasi tranin violentmotiona certain
formanotlastingpermanently
sientis impressedon the mobile,and as long as thatformalaststhere
can be motionin the vacuum,but whenit fails,the motionceases.16
It appears fromthis statementthat Bonet is less sure about projectile
motionin the void than about the impressedformain projectilemotion,
whichis again the varietythatlasts onlyfora time.In a second passage
he statesas much:
Concerningviolentmotion[in thevacuum]as wellone mustalwayssay
- but I underthatit wouldbe weakerat the end thanat thebeginning
if it is possible.And the reason
standthisforthe motionof projectiles,
orformaimpressa
on the mobile
is this:sincethatvirtus
forthisstatement
moves
failsand weakens,and consequently
by the movercontinually
[them]moreslowly,so violentmotionproducedin a vacuumhas to be
slowerin the end thanin the beginning,
just as in a plenum.Yet vioin
a
vacuum
at the beginningand middle
would
be
faster
lentmotion
than in a plenum,because a mobile [in a plenum]has to dividethe
partsof the air thatresisteach other. . .17

enimapparet
aeris.Sensibiliter
veldiciquodmoveatur
quod
propter
impulsum
partium
DieImpetustheorie
sedmagis
aernonfacit
ilium
Maier,
motum,
presentat
ipseimpedimentum";
on thebasisofmsBAV,Vat.lat.
to "materialiter"
(cit.n. 5 above),200,n. 58,corrects
3013.
16Nicholas
autem
naturalis
V, c. 1,ed.Venice1505,f.63rb:"Fertur
Bonet,
Philosophia
violentus
essein vacuoabsquehocquodmovens
ab aliquibus
prinpotest
quodmotus
velvirtualiter.
Et ratiohuiusdictiest
mobili
velrealiter
siveproiiciens
coniungatur
cipium
sedquasi
nondiupermanens,
mobili
ista:quiain motuviolento
imprimitur
aliquaforma
in vacuo.Illaautemdeficiente,
essemotus
illaforma
et quamdiu
durt,
transiens,
potest
cesstmotus."
17Nicholas
naturalis
V, c. 1,ed.Venice1505,f.63va:"De motuetiam
Bonet,
Philosophia
autem
infinequaminprincipio.
violento
estdicendum
Intelligo
quodessetdebilior
semper
illaseu
virtus
Ratiohuiusdictiestista:quoniam
si sitpossibilis.
de motuproiectorum,

11:22:56 AM

DEREUCTA
FRANCIS
VIRTUS
OF MARCHIA'S

51

treatmentof
Like John the Canon, Bonet continueswith his interesting
what motionin a vacuum would be like, but makes no furtherremark
that he appears to supportin all
about the nature of the virtus
impressa
motion.
projectile
at Paris was
Marchia's Franciscansuccessoras bachelorof the Sentences
Francis of Meyronnes.As AnnelieseMaier remarked,Meyronnesand a
Franciscanfollower,Himbertof Garda, both reacted to Marchia's virtus
derelitta
, but theyrejectedit explicitly.
Meyronnesdevoteda separatequestion of his Sentences
to
commentary projectilemotion: "Are projectiles
moved by any internal
forma?""Here some people maintainthattheyare
moved by someformaimpressa
, by which, as long as it moves, the prois
the
throweris annihilated,motion is continfor
when
jectile moved,
ued."18This briefdescriptionof Marchia's theorydoes not reflecta close
reading of Marchia's question,certainlynot of the long versionof the
text,whichmay have been writtenafterMeyronnes'lectures.Meyronnes'
do not seem to hit the mark.19For
fourargumentsagainstit, therefore,
because
we
see
that
motiongetsstrongerwithdistance,
example: "Third,
because when it is veryclose to the thrower,the mobile is moved more
weakly."Perhaps he is mixingfallingbodies withprojectilemotion,as in
the firstobjection.None of the objectionspertainto Marchia's developed
theory.Meyronnesconcludesas follows:
ThereforeI say that the mobileis moved by the medium.Thus one
shouldknow that thereare fourthingsthat relatein order:first,the
motionof the thrower;second, the throwerdividesthe mediumvio-

forma
a movente
mobili
continue
deficit
etdebilitatur,
etperconsequens
tardius
impressa
in vacuohabetessetardior
in finequamin princimovet.
Motusitaqueviolentus
factus
invacuoinprincipio
tarnen
essetmotus
violentus
etmedio
pio,sicutetinpleno.Velocior
habetdividere
aerisquaese invicem
resistunt."
quaminpleno,quiamobile
partes
18Francis
ofMeyronnes,
InII Sententiarum,
d. 14,q. 7,ed.Venice1505,f.17va:"Utrum
moveantur
ab aliquaforma
intrinseca
. . . Hic dicunt
proiecta
aliquiquodmoventur
per
illudmovetur,
annihilato
enim
aliquamformam
impressam
quaequamdiu[17vb]movet
motus."
Maieractually
reads"proiciente,"
which
, continuatur
<proiciente>
[prohibente]
mustbe correct,
butshedoesnotsayfrom
whatedition
or manuscript
itcomes.
19Francis
ofMeyronnes,
In II Sententiarum,
d. 14,q. 7, ed. Venice1505,f. 17vb:"Sed
contraquadrupliciter:
estquodforma
eiusdem
rationis
inclinet
primo,
quia impossibile
mobile
ad contrarias
eademautemforma
rationis
et eiusdem
partes;
imprimitur
quando
movetur
sursum
etdeorsum,
ibienimestactivum
etpassivum
eiusdem
rationis
. . . Tertio,
indistantia,
invalescit
quiavidemus
quodmotus
quiaquandoestmultum
propeproiiciens,
mobile
debilius
movetur."

11:22:56 AM

52

CHRISSCHABEL
lently;[third,]the mediumcloses behindso therewon'tbe a vacuum;
fromthisclosurethe mobileis propelled.20
[fourth,]

Soon afterwards,
Himbertof Garda dealtwiththeissuein his own Sentences
in
similar
fashion.For example, "Second, in that case procommentary
would
be
moved
more at the beginningbecause such a disposijectiles
tion is impressedin the projectile;but theyare not moved more at the
etc."21It seems
beginning,as is clear with a javelin or arrow; therefore,
that neitherMeyronnesnor Himbertwas a close observerof projectiles
or a carefulreader of Francis of Marchia.
I have inspectedsome of the obvious places in the pertinentwritings
of a few other authors of the 1320s who mightbe expected to have
reactedto Marchia and Odonis' virtus
derelict
a, but so farI have not found
otherdiscussions.
AnnelieseMaier mentioned
just one otherfigure:William
of Ockham. In a section of Ockham's Sentences
commentaryvariously
attributedto books II and III, and publishedas part of book III in the
criticaledition,thereis a sectionon projectilemotion.22
In the case of a
stoneflyingthroughthe air, Ockham agrees thatthe moverof the stone
cannot be the thrower,who is no longerin contact,and he accepts the
criticismagainst Aristotlethat it cannot be the air either,since the air
can actuallymove againstthe stone. But he also rejectsthe idea that a
power is in the projectile:
20Francis
ofMeyronnes,
InII Sententiarum,
d. 14,q. 7, ed.Venice1505,f. 17vb:"Ideo
dicoquodmovetur
a medio.
Ubitarnen
sciendum
estquodquattuor
sehabent
perordinem:
motus
secundo
istepellens
dividit
medium
a partepostmedium
violenter;
primo
pellentis;
clauditur
ne sitvacuum;
ex iliaclausione
mobile."
pellitur
21Himbert
of Garda,In II Sententiarum
, d. 14, a. 2, BAV Vat. lat. 1091,f. 106r:
ad secundum
dicitCommentator
causatin proiecto
"Quantum
quodproiciens
dispositionem
Probatio:
velmovetur
a [forma]
vel
perquammovetur.
quiaproiectum
proiciente
a forma
inproiecto.
causata
Nona proiciente,
immediate
quiaproiciens
posset
postproiectionem
et tuncproiectum
in virtute
moveretur
movetur
a tali
non-entis;
corrumpi
igitur
forma
veldispositione
a proiciente
inproiecto
causata.
Sedcontra
. . . Secundo,
quiatunc
in principio,
estimpressa
inproiecto;
sed
proiecta
magismoverentur
quiatalisdispositio
nonmagismoverentur
inprincipio,
sicutpatetde iaculovelsagitta;
etc.Dicitigitur
igitur
Franciscus
deMayronis
..." SinceHimbert
Marchia's
toAverroes,
assigns
opinion
perhaps
hereas elsewhere
he useda different
version
ofMeyronnes'
commentary.
Alternatively,
hemayhavereadMarchia
sinceMarchia
seemstoclaimAverroes
as an ally(see
directly,
Zanin's
ina. 1 (f.105v)Himbert
hadgiven
four
paperbelow,
pp.87-88).
Interestingly,
arguofa certain
ments
"Ge"arguing
thatheavy
andlight
areproperly
moved
things
bysomewhiletheopinion
couldbe ascribed
toGerard,
thearguments
do notmatch
external;
thing
thosein Gerard
Odonis'II Sent.,
d. 14,q. 7, orin thecorresponding
section
ofDe motu.
22Guillelmi
deOckham
inlibram
tertium
Sententiarum
Quaestiones
), q. 4, eds.F.E.
(Reportado
St Bonaventure,
NewYork,1982,142-44;
cf.q. 2 (p. 66).
KellyandG.J.Etzkorn,

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARGHIA'S
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA

53

Nor can it be a virtus

in the stone,forI ask whatcauses thisvirtus.
Not
thethrower,
fora naturalagentbroughtto itsobject{passo)in thesame
way alwayscauses its effectin the same way; but the thrower,with
absoluteand relativein it, can be broughtto a
respectto everything
stonewithoutmovingit in just the same way as whenit does moveitformyhand can be movedand broughtto some bodyslowly,in which
case [myhand] willnot move it locally,or it can be movedswiftly
and
withimpetus
and thenbroughtto [thebody] in the same way as before,
in whichcase it will cause motion,unlikethe previouscase; therefore
thisvirtus
thatyou positcannotbe caused by anything
absoluteor relativein the thrower
. . . Indeed it wouldbe amazingifmyhand caused
some virtus
in a stoneby touchingthe stonethroughlocal motion.23
Maier consideredit possible that Ockham was reactingto Marchia. If
would be perplexing,
so, Ockham'srefutation
givenMarchia's and Odonis'
clear presentationsof the virtusderelicta
theory,for it would seem that
Ockham had not paid close attention.Since in at least one other context in book IV Marchia appears to be reactingto Ockham, however,
Ockham was probablyreactingto a more basic versionof the theory,
whichhad been circulatingalreadyforseveraldecades, as we have seen.
In any case, the virtus
derelicta
idea appears to have stimulatedOckham
to put forthhis famous,radical, new theorythat "local motionis nothing but the moveable thing'scoexistingwithvarious parts of space."24

23William
ofOckham,
III Sent.,
(cit.n. 22 above),142.17q. 4, eds.KellyandEtzkorn
in lapide,quiaquaero:a quo causatur
143.7:"Necvirtus
iliavirtus?
Nona proiciente,
causaieffectum.
Sed
quiaagensnaturale
aequaliter
approximatum
passoaequaliter
semper
ad omneabsolutum
et respectivum
in eo, potest
proiciens,
quantum
aequaliter
approximarilapidiet nonmovere
sicutquandomovet.
Potest
enimmanusmeatardemoveri
et
alicuicorpori,
ettunenonmovebit
localiter.
Etpotest
velociter
etcum
approximari
ipsum
et tuncapproximatur
et tunc
moveri,
mpetu
E) eodemmodosicutprius,
(approximari
causabit
motum
etpriusnon.Igitur
istavirtus
nonpotest
causari
ab aliquo
quamtuponis,
absoluto
velrespectivo
in proiciente
... (p. 144.2-4)
Mirabile
enimessetsi manusmea
inlapideperhocquodmotulocalitangit
causaret
virtutem
Thetransaliquam
lapidem."
lationofthissametextbyWalsh,in A. HymanandJ.J.Walsh(eds.),Philosophy
inthe
Middle
TheChristian,
andJewish
Traditions
Islamic,
, 2nded.,Indianapolis
1973,689,is
Ages.
from
an olderedition
ofOckham.
24Which
iswhytheabovepassage
isincluded
inHyman
andWalsh's
reader
inmedieval
William
III Sent
ofOckham,
., q. 4, eds.KellyandEtzkorn
philosophy.
(cit.n. 22 above),
143.18-19:
"... motus
localis
. . . nonestaliudnisiquodmobile
coexsistat
diversis
partibusspatii."

11:22:56 AM

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CHRISSCHABEL

Hesitation
The key passage in Ockham is only one page long. Even the important
sectionsin Odonis and Marchia are ratherbrief,althoughMarchia's is
probablythe longesttreatmentof the problemin his day, which suggests
that he may have provoked the extensivediscussionsin Buridan and
Oresme. We must never forgetthat before 1330 medieval thinkerssimply did not pay thatmuch attentionto the problemof projectilemotion.
Given the littletimeand thoughtthattheydevotedto the issue,we should
not be surprisedat the slow pace of change in medieval naturalphilosophy withrespectto questionsthatbecame crucialin the 16thand 17th
centuries.
Still,one mightask, why did Marchia hesitate?By makingthe virtus
derelicta
permanentin the case of the absence of externalresistance,as
Buridan was to do in the case of celestialmotion,Marchia would have
been morefirmly
on thepath to Galilean theoriesand would have received
more creditforbeing his famouscompatriot'sforerunner.
The explanation probablylies in the context.Marchia's task was more difficult
than
Galileo's. Marchia treatedthe issue in a Sentences
commentary,
duringhis
theologicallectures.He was tryingto determinewhetherany supernatural virtus
inheredin the sacraments.It was only by analogythathe discussedprojectilemotion.Marchia was shootingfora single,unifiedtheory
that would explain both naturaland supernaturalphenomena- and not
onlyprojectilemotionin nature,but also othernaturalphenomena.This
in articletwo of his question,
is why,when treatingnaturalinstruments
Marchia gives as examples not only a hand, which throwsa projectile,
but also a tongue.
This explainsMarchia's "hesitation"when dealingwithcelestialmotion.
Marchia assemblesall the ingredients
fora deistictheoryof the universe,
the
realm
of
terrestial
combining
projectilemotionwiththe celestialrealm
of the heavenlybodies, in which God gives thingsan initialshove and
then everything
workscontinuouslyforever.In the heavens,too, thereis
a virtus
derelicta
leftby the intelligences,
and "with the intelligenceceasto
move
the
the
heaven
would
stillmove or revolvefora time
heaven,
ing
"
11.
this
virtus
through
[see appendix, 400-1]. But, we ask, why "for a
time"? Why not forever?We are then annoyed to be faced with what
: "If any such virtus
seems to us an odd objection
were caused in the heavens, it would be incorruptible"[423-4], namelybecause thereexistsnothThe modern reader is
ing in the heavens that would corruptthe virtus.

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FRANGIS
OF MARGHIA'S
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA

55

withMarchia: whyis thisan objection?

Shouldn't
puzzled,perhapsfrustrated
this be a proofof the permanenceof the virtusderelicta
withoutexternal
If it were,wouldn'twe almosthave a theoryof inertia?Marchia
resistance?
solves the objectionas follows[445-9]:
This argumentshouldnot troublethe faithful,
because we are assured
thatin theheavenof theblessedtherewillnotonlybe spiritualor mental praise,but also vocal. Nor will the saintsbe mutethere,not speaking to each othereven vocally.Now it is evidentthatthissound [vox]
caused in heavenwill not be perpetual;ratherit will be corrupted.
Since nothingelse can be found in heaven to corruptthis vox
, it must
be corruptedby itselfby nature.One assumes that Marchia means that
in heaven, in order for saintsto speak, theirvoices cannot continueto
sound, or echo, forever,otherwiseconversationand vocal praise would
be impossible.25
Thus the virtus
derelicta
leftby the tonguesof the saints
lasts
for
a
in
and
like
fashion
the virtus
derelicta
leftby the hand
time,
only
in projectilemotion,or the virtus
derelicta
leftin the heavens by the intelligences,also merelylasts fora time. Marchia gives another,more commonlyused example:the remnantsof somethingbrightremainleftbehind
in the eye withthe removalof the object; theyneitherdisappear immebut onlyfora time. "It
diatelywiththe object,nor remainpermanently,
is thusin thepropositum
withthe virtus
caused or impressedin the heaven
other
virtus
caused by every
by the intelligencemovingit, and also withevery
other
motor
local
motion"
through
[466-9].
To be fairto Marchia, in the sentencethat concludes his discussion,
he admitsthat"it could also perhapsbe maintainedthatthisvirtus
caused
in the heavens would be incorruptible"[475-6]. So he does not actually
deny the deist interpretation
completely.Nevertheless,his main effortis
to show that this virtus
would not be permanent,but would only last a
time,and the reason appears to be that consistencyrequiresit. In typical, one mightsay beautiful,medieval fashion,Marchia triesto explain
projectilemotion,speaking,seeing,celestialmotion,and the conversation

25Thatthesaints
isassumed,
forinstance,
inHenry
ofGhent's
speakinheaven
Quodlibet
deGandavo
VII, ed. G.A. Wilson,
Leuven1991,44-47:"Utrum
VII, q. 7, Henrici
Quodlibet
lausvocalis
beatorum
eritingloria."
answers
thatthequestion
is notwhether
Henry
they
ofheavenly
talk,since"thesaintsin Heavenspeakto eachotherand singthehymns
butrather
how,giventhatthereis no air.
praise"(p. 45.23-24),

11:22:56 AM

56

CHRISSCHABEL

of the saintsin heaven with one, simple,unifiedtheoryof virtus

derelicta.
Buridan
did
not
extend
Marchia's
he
restricted
it.
Jean
theory;
TheEdition
As we have seen, Francisof Marchia's discussionof his virtus
derelicta
theory of projectilemotion occurs in the firstquestion in his commentary
on book IV of the Sentences
in the contextof the power of the sacraments.
Twelve manuscriptscontain the firstquestion of book IV, but seven of
them carrywhat looks like a heavilyabbreviatedversion,and Vat. lat.
943 containsa different
but parallel redaction.The appendix presentsa
criticaleditionof the long version,extantin fourwitnesses.26
Unlike in the seven codices with the brieftext and the singlewitness
of the otherredaction,the incipitin threeof the fourwitnessescontainof book
ing the long versionassignsthis firstquestion to the Principium
IV: Circaprincipium
. . . (line 1 in the edition;
quartilibri,quaeroprimoutrum
the fourthmanuscriptbeginsdirectlywiththe utrum).
However,Nazareno
Mariani recendypublishedanothertext purportingto be the Principium
for book IV, preservedin two Madrid manuscripts,Biblioteca nacional
504 (M) and 517 (D). They bear the incipit: Circaprincipium
quartilibri
utrum
.
.
.27
Some
in
at
an
is
order.
[pm.M), quaero
attempt
explanation
in
The Principium
the
Madrid
is
as
follows:
Utrum
question
manuscripts
sacramentalis
instrumentaliter
ad gratiae
creationem.
Then
aliquavirtus
possitcooperari
threearticlesare proposedsecundum
triaquaecontinentur
in ipsa,scilicet
subiecet medium
. . .: (1) Quidsit virtus
sacramentum,praedicatum,
copulansutrumque
talisquaeponitur
in subiecto
sit
creatio
in
; (2) Quid
gratiaequaeponitur praedicato'
instrumentaliter
in compositione
But
(3) Quid sit cooperari
quodponitur
utriusque.
then on the basis of these a fourthis added, which is the main question
26ForMarchia's
andthemanuscripts
ofthisquestion,
seeR.L. Friedman
commentary
andC. Schabel,
Francis
ontheSentences:
ListandState
Question
ofMarchia's
Commentary
of
Research
63 (2001),31-106,esp.40-47,58-59,and 98-99.Cf.
, in: MediaevalStudies,
N. Mariani,
e ipotesi
sulCommento
alleSentenze
diFrancesco
della
MarcaOMin
Certezze
., in:
Archivm
Franciscanum
95 (2002),
TheredacHistoricum,
93-183,
esp.93-94and109-15.
in an appendix
tionin Vat.lat.943 willbe published
to an Italianabbreviation
ofthis
in Priori(ed.),AttidelIII Convegno
su Francesco
introduction
Internazionale
(cit.
d'Appianano
n. 3 above),
andI haveedited
inseven
theversion
found
witnesses
fora study
ofMarchia's
bookIV forthcoming
in:Picenum
Seraphicum.
27See Francis
ofMarchia,
Commentario
inIV libros
Sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi.
Quaestiones
etPrologus
Grottaferrata
onp. 223.6;cf.
, ed. N. Mariani,
2003,223-62,
praeambulae
incipit
Friedman
Francis
andSchabel,
onthe
Sentences
61.
ofMarchia's
(cit.n. 26 above),
Commentary

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
DEREUCTA
OF MARCHIA'S
VIRTUS

57

itself.28
Both Madrid manuscriptsare incomplete,containingonly three
of the fourproposed articles,and D breaks offeven beforethe end of
articlethree.The firstthree articlesfollowthe plan, althoughafterthe
first20 lines of articleone, in the followingca. 830 lines thereare only
two furtherreferencesto sacraments,in lines 6 and 12 at the startof
in naturalphilosophy,logicallyarticlefour
articlethree.Afterthisexcursus
oughtto have returnedto answerthe questionitselfabout the sacraments.29
Since the two Madrid witnessesof the Principium
in IV contain only
threeof the fourarticlespromised,perhaps the twelvemanuscriptswith
versionsof the firstquestionof book IV actuallypreservediffering
redactionsof the Principium'
s "missing"fourtharticle.There are several argumentsin favor of this hypothesis.First,as we have seen, three of the
fourmanuscriptsof the long versionexplicitlycall it a Principium.
Second,
the question itself,utrum
in sacramento
sit aliqua virtus
insistens
supernaturalis
siveeisformaliter
inhaerens
, does not depart much fromthe proposed title
of article4 in the Madrid manuscripts.Third, the questiondeals extenthemeas called for,and afterdepartingfrom
sivelywiththe instrumentum
the sacramentaltheme in its own articles one and two, the question
returnsto sacramentsand grace in its thirdand finalarticle,thusanswering both thisquestionand the principiaiquestionas foundin the Madrid
witnesses.Fourth,in Madrid 517 (D), immediatelyfollowingthe premature end of the Principium?
s article3 on f. 37vb, the shortversionof the
firstquestionof book IV beginson f. 38ra, as ifto createa unifiedwhole.
One could add that, since the question of projectile motion is more
dealt within book II than book IV, its presencehere is perhaps
fittingly
due to its inclusionin a special principiailectureratherthan in a normal lectureon book IV. Seven of the othereightmanuscriptsapparently
then abbreviatedthe textand simplydropped the Principium
attribution.
A more thoroughanalysisof book IV and a criticaledition of the
abbreviatedversionwill have to await another time. The sigla used in
the editionof the long versionare as follows:30
28See Quaestiones
andFriedman
, ed.Mariani
223-24.19-25,
praeambulae
(cit.n. 27 above),
andSchabel,
Francis
ontheSentences
ofMarchiai
Commentary
(cit.n. 26 above),61,forthe
text.
In thequestion
title
and11.9, 12,and25Mariani
readscreatorem
rather
thanFriedman
andSchabel's
creationem
creationem
is required
forsense.
, although
29Forthereferences
to thesacraments,
see Quaestiones
, ed. Mariani(cit.
praeambulae
n. 27 above),257,11.6 and 12.Marianihimself
hintsthatthefollowing
in D,
question
oneoftheshorter
criticus
for1. 129.
versions,
261,apparatus
maybe related:
p.
30Forthemanuscripts,
seeFriedman
andSchabel,
Francis
onthe
ofMarchia's
Commentary
Sentences
(cit.n. 26 above),41-47.

11:22:56 AM

58
C
P
W
Z

CHRISSCHABEL
Vatican City,BibliotecaApostolicaVaticana, Chigi, lat. B VII 113
Prague, MetropolitniKapituly531 (C 99)
Palat. lat. 4826
Vienna, sterreichische
Nationalbibliothek,
Paris, Bibliothquenationalede France, lat. 15852

Maier published substantialsegmentsof the firsttwo of this question's

threearticlesin 1940, using ms C but providingsome variantreadings
fromthe redactioncontainedin Vat. lat. 943 (= E). Clagettmade a partial
in 1959,and GraziellaVescovini
of Maier's transcription
Englishtranslation
in 1969. Then in 1991 NotkerSchneider
reprintedMaier's transcription
the
section
of Maier's text that deals with heavenly
reprinted four-page
i.e.
most
of
article
motion,
two,but he also recheckedms C and showed
thatMaier had made severalerrorshere,includinga nine-wordomission
perhomoioteleuton
(11.394-95 below). Naturally,he repeatedsome of Maier's
errors,notablyin lines 76-79 of his text.In 1998, again followingms C,
Nazareno Mariani printeda different
sectionof the textMaier had tran- fromarticleone- as
scribed
of
his introductionto the editionof
part
Marchia's Physics
commentary.
Finally,in 2002, Mariani printedthe entire
ms
from
with
the correspondingquestion in ms D,
C,
question
along
which he labeled an abbreviation.Since Mariani did not take Maier's
text into consideration,he thereforemade different
errorsfromMaier,
both in interpreting
abbreviationsand in punctuation.31
To sum up, there are at presenttwo printingsof Maier's somewhat
flawed32
fromms C of a substantialportionof the question,
transcription
corrected
partially
againstC itselfin a small sectionby Schneider;a few
quotationsfromms E in Maier's notes; Mariani's complete but problematictranscription
of C; and Mariani's transcription
of ms D. It should
also be notedthatthe completerelianceon C forthe main versionentails
that any errorsin C have been repeatedin the transcriptions.
Given the
31A. Maier,
DieImpetustheorie
TheScience
(cit.n.5 above),166-80;
(ed.andtrans.),
Clagett
Mechanics
intheMiddle
La teoria
dell'imof
Ages(cit.n. 11 above),526-30;G.F.Vescovini,
- Friedman
andSchabel,
Francis
onthe
Sentences
, Turin1969,1-21
peto
ofMarchia's
Commentary
haveerroneously
claimed
thatthisis an Italiantransla(cit.n. 26 above),38,andothers
DieKosmologie
desFranciscus
deMarchia:
, undUntersuchungen
Texte,
tion;N. Schneider,
Quellen
des14.Jahrhunderts
York-Kobenhavn-Kln
zurNaturphilosophie
, Leiden-New
1991,50-52;
Francisci
deMarchia
sivedeEsculo
etcompilato
libros
Aristotelis
, OFM,Sententia
,
super
Physicorum
eipotesi
ed.N.Mariani,
Grottaferrata
131-59.
Certezze
1998,66-77;Mariani,
(cit.n.26above),
32Examples
ofothererrors:
sheomits19 words
at 11.276-7below;
perhomoioteleuton
inherline415,instead
ofthecorrect
shereads"impetus,"
which
worse,
"virtus,"
perhaps
in Marchia's
is notfound
text!
anywhere

11:22:56 AM

DEREUCTA
VIRTUS
FRANGIS
OF MARGHIA'S

59

importanceof the question,then, there seems littleneed to justifythe

followingcriticaledition.
Of the manuscripts,C and Z are fromthe firsthalf of the 14th century,C datingto 1327; P and W date closer to the end of the century.
C, which earliereditorshave used exclusively,is very good, containing
perhaps only two dozen minorunsharederrorsand one unsharedomisof 7 words (1. 94). It does share about threedozen
sion perhomoioteleuton
minorvariantswithZ, however,of whichabout halfare errors.Although
it is a ratherlate manuscript,P is also verygood. P's scribe was adept
at improvingthe text'saccuracy and clarity(e.g. 11. 15 and 60), and P
containsonly about 30 minor variants,almost all unshared,around a
of 4 words
dozen being errors.There is one omissionper homoioteleuton
(1.540). W and Z are much worse. Besides the 10 or so minorvariantsit
W has about 100 minor
shareswithone or more of the othermanuscripts,
variantsof itsown in additionto over 50 minorunsharederrors,although
only 4 major omissionsamountingto 41 words total(11.9-11, 124-5,3978, and 481). It also shows signs of minor abbreviationon a half dozen
occasions. Z containsabout 130 minor unsharedvariants,half of those
beingerrors.It also had 6 largeomissionsfor44 words,and it sharesclose
to 40 minorvariantswithotherwitnesses,most notablyC as mentioned.
Since the only obvious familyresemblanceis between C and Z, and
Z is ratherpoor, I have generallygone with the majorityof the independentmanuscriptsC, P, and W, W usuallydecidingbetween C and
P where these two best witnessesdisagree.Where P and W offerinterestingreadings,however,theyhave been treatedwith caution, because
thereis evidence of scribaltampering.Orthographyis classicizedin the
edition,and the apparatus criticusis ratherexhaustive,especiallyfor C
and P. In addition,I note in parenthesesvariantsof consequence from
the previouseditionsas follows:
Ml ed. Maier 1940; reprintVescovini 1969
M2 ed. Mariani 1998
M3 ed. Mariani 2002
S ed. Schneider 1991
Abbreviationsin the apparatus are standard;* = lectioincerta.
of Cyprus
University

11:22:56 AM

60

CHRISSCHABEL

Francisci de Marchia
Principium In quartum librum Sententiarum, redactio B

10

15

20

Circa principium
sit aliqua
quartilibri,quaero primoutrumin sacramentis
virtussupernaturalis
insistenssive eis formaliter
inhaerens.
Videturquod sic,quia omniscausa concurrens
ad aliquemsupernaturalem
effectum
concurritper virtutemaliquam supernaturalem
in ipsa formaliter
sed
sacramenta
concurrunt
causaliter
ad
iustificationem
animae
existentem;
ea suscipientis;
in
sit
eis
virtus
eis
ergo oportetquod
aliqua
supernaturalis
formaliter
insistens.
vel esset aliqua
Contra,quia talis virtus,si ponereturin eis formaliter,
formasensibilisvel spiritualis.
Non spiritualis,
talis
non
quia
potestrecipi
in aliquo subiectosensibili,
subiective
cuiusmodisuntomniasacramenta.Nec
sensibilis,quia talis non potestcooperali ad effectum
aliquem spiritulem,
propterquod tamentantumponiturhic aliqua virtus.Ergo etc.
Ad evidentiamhuius quaestionis,est primosciendumquod virtussupernaturalisest duplex,videlicetsubsistens,
quae Deus est, de qua diciturAd
Hebraeos quod Deus est "portansomnia Verbo virtutissuae"; et insistens
sive formaliter
inhaerens,puta caritas,de qua loquiturApostolus,primaAd
Corinthios,
capitulo13: "Si habueroomnemfidem,"etc., "caritatemautem
non habuero,nihilmihiprodest."Nunc autemhic non quaeriturde virtute
sed tantumde insistente.
Constatenim quod in sacramentis
est
subsistente,
virtussubsistens,
quae Deus est,modo quodam specialiassistendocuilibetad
infusionem
gratiaeomni digne ipsumrecipienti.Et sic loquiturPaulus,Ad
Corinthios3, dicens:"Ego piantavi,Apollorigavit,
Deus autemincrementum
Est ergo solumdubium,et de hoc
dedit,"supple:'per gratiaeinfusionem'.
14-15Ad Hebraeos1.3. 16-18I Ad Corinthios
13.2-3.21-23I Ad Corinthios
1 circa. . . primoom.W 6 ea suscipientis]
Z 8 (virtus
causa*iustificantis*
om.Ml)
9 (spiritualis
noninv.MI) 9-11recipl.. . potest
om.perhomoio.
W 10 sacramenta]
scientiaC (sacramenta
inv.Z 12 hicaliqua]istaWZ (hecaliqua
M3) 11 effectum
aliquem
1 add.P 17capitulo
om.W || autemom.C (W) 17-18caritatem
...
M3) 15hebraeos]
om.utabbrev.
W 18 habuero]
habeamZ || prodest
om.P(W)|| autemhicinv.
prodest
W 19(tantum
om.M3) || de om.W 20 deusestinv.P || speciali]
Z || cuilispirituali
add.mg.P 21 ipsum]
ea W; sacramentum
add.s.l.P || paulus]apostobet]sacramento
lusW;prima
add.mg.P 22 corinthios]
timotheum
CWZ || dicens]
dicebat
CZ || apollo]
autemadd.W 23 supple]
scilicet
W || gratiae
infusionem
inv.W || (solum]
solvendum
Ml) Il et de hoc]de hocquodW

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HIA'S VIRTUS
FRANGIS
OF MARC
DEREUCTA

61

subsistentem
sitin sacramentis
quaeritquaestio,utrumpraetervirtutem
aliqua
causata ab ipsa virtutesubsistente,
25 virtusinsistenssive inhaerensformaliter
ad aliquem
quae Deus est.Et ratiohuiusdubiiestquoniamcausa concurrens
effectum
causandumvideturquod concurratper aliquam
supernaturalem
virtutemei insistentem
sive formaliter
et per
inhaerentem,
supernaturalem
aliam
a
virtute
Deus
sacramenta
autem
est;
consequens
primasubsistente,
quae
ut
30 concurrunt, videtur,aliquo modo causaliterad effectum
supernaturalem,
vel saltemad aliquampraecedentem
putaad gratiaeinfusionem
dispositionem;
etc.
quare
Secundo,iuxtahoc est sciendumquod triplexest genusinstrumentorum.
Est enimquoddam instrumentum
sicutdolabra [P 164vb],secunartificiale,
II De anima.Aliudest connaturale,
sicutmanus,quae est,
35 dum Philosophum,
secundumPhilosophum,III De anima
, organumorganorum.Aliud superiuxtaverbumChristi,Marci ultimo:"Qui credinaturale,ut sacramentum,
deritet baptizatusfuerit,salvuserit."Ex quo sequiturquod sacramentum
beatitudinisconsequendae.
baptismisit quasi instrumentum
primarium
Tunc ergo,his praemissis,
sic est procedendumin quaestioneista: primo
40
enimvidebitur
utrumin instrumento
artificiali
sitsivereeipiatur
aliqua virtus
a principalisive artificiali
instrumento
inhaerenssive formaliter
agenteipsi
inexistens.
Secundo,videbituridem de instrumento
naturali,utrumvidelicet
in manu vel in lingua,et sic de [C 175rb]aliis naturalibus
sit
instrumentis,
influxaa potentiaprincipaliter
taliainstrumenta
45 aliquavirtus
naturaliamovente,
alia a formaipsorumcuiuslibet
propria[W 193va] et a motu.Tertio,ex hoc
videbiturprincipalepropositum,
videlicetutrumin sacramentis,
quae sunt
instrumenta
sive
sit
virtuseis
spiritualia supernaturalia, aliqua supernaturalis
inhaerensformaliter.
34-35Aristoteles,
Deanima
5. 35-36Aristoteles,
Deanima
II,c. 1:412b12-1
III,c. 8:432al-2.
37-38Marcus16.16.
W 24-25insacramentis
24 sacramentis]
sacramento
insacraaliquavirtus]
aliquavirtus
P 25 subsistente]
mentis
insistente
W 29 aliam]alia P || subsistente]
subsistentem
W
30 aliquomodoom.W || effectum]
add.W || supernaturalem]
PW
aliquem
spiritulem
35 (aliud]aliquodMl) 36 (aliud]aliquodMl) 38 salvus
eritom.utabbrev.
W 39 quasi]
sicutadd.CZ || primarium]
Z || consequendae]
W* (conferende
primm
consequendo
inv.Z || quaestione
istainv.WZ 41 utrum]
si W || in om.
M3) 40 estprocedendum
Z (om.M3) II instrumento]
Z || artificiali]
instrui*
accidentali
C (artificiali
Ml) 42 a
iter.
C 11 siveformaliter
inv.W 44 (lingua]
con.adlignoM3) 11 aliisnaturalprincipali
ibusinv.Z 45 influxa]
Z || potentia]
infusa
W || principaliter]
P 46
primo
principali
a om.C 47 principale
om.Z || videlicet
utrum
scilicet
W || (sunt]
istaadd.M3)
utrum]
48 instrumenta]
W 11 supernaturalis
sacramenta
virtus
inv.W 49 formaliter
om.
W

11:22:56 AM

62

CHRISSCHABEL

<Articulus primus>
dico quod eademdifficultas
estde instrumento
artificiali
50 Quantumad primum,
et de motu violentolapidisversussursum.Sicut enim motuscuiuscumque
gravisversussursumest violentus,ita eadem rationemotusdolabrae seu
Et ideo eadem
martelliquo elevaturseu qualitercumquemoveturab artifice.
artificiali
motoab artifice
difficultas
estvidereutrumin instrumento
recipiatur
et utrumin lapidemotosursum,sivequocumque
55 aliqua virtusab ipso artifice,
alio gravi,recipiaturaliqua virtuscontinuansmotumhuiusmodiab ipso
movente.Unde si in lapide violentermoto non recipituraliqua virtusab
et si in istoreciartificiali,
ipsumalia a motu,nec in instrumento
impellente
in
et
ilio.
pitur,
< Septemconclusiones>
60 Quantumergo ad hoc pono septemconclusiones.Primaconclusioest quod
non esta manumovenvidelicetgravisad sursum,
huiusmodi
motusviolentus,
tis.Istamproboprimo,quia manucessantemoveregrave,adhucipsumgrave
continut
motumsuum.Secundo,quia estoetiamquod manusessetdestructa
ad deorsum,adhucnihilomivel quod moveretaliquidmotuopposito,videlicet
65 nus gravecontinutmotumab ipsa inchoatum.
a forma
Secundaconclusioestquod iste [Z 167rb]motusnon esteffective
naturaliipsiusgravisquod movetur.Ista probatur,quoniamomnismotusqui
est a principiointrinsecosive a formanaturalimobilisest naturalis;sed
sed violentus;
ergoetc. Praeterea,quia
[P 165ra]istemotusnon estnaturalis,
ad
70 formanaturaliscuiuslibetmixtiest determinata unummotumsecundum
ad omnemdifferentiam
positionis,
speciem;sed istemotusest indeterminatus
et
a
et
a
motu
circulari
et
dextris
enim
moveri
ante
sinistris,
retro,
potest
moturecto;ergo etc.
a formanatuTertiaconclusioestquod huiusmodimotusnon esteffective
75 rali ipsiusmedii,puta aquae vel aeris,in quo huiusmodicorpusmovetur.
Ista probatureadem rationequa secunda,quoniamformamediinaturalisest
videlicet
52 (seu]siveMl) 53 (seu]siveMl) || et om.Z 54 (videre]
Ml) || in om.Z
Z
om.perhomoio.
. . . virtus
inv.W 55-56artifice
om.Ml) 55 aliquavirtus
Il (artificiali
add.
octoCZ, Pacmg. 61 ad om.W 62 istam]
58 in1om.Z; s.l.W 60 septem]
primam
om.
Z || ipsum]
CZ [om.
movetur
C II primo
om.CZ || movere]
M2) || grave2
quantum
Z || (alimovetur
determinata
W 63 etiam]enim*Z || (destructa]
M2) 64 moveret]
quid]aliudMl) 65 ipsa]ipsoZ 66 secunda]secundoP || quod]quia CZ 69-70
estadd.mg.Z 71 (iste]illeM3) 11 (indetermiom.perhomoio.
sed. . . naturalis
Z; natura
W 75 aquae]aqua
determinatus
Ml) 72 motuom.P 73 ergoetc.om.utabbrev.
natus]
Z || (huiusmodi
om.M1-2;conveniens
Z II aerisiter.
M3) 76 (quoniam]
quiaM2-3)

11:22:56 AM

HIA'S VIRTUS
FRANGIS
DEREUCTA
OF MARC

80

85

90

95

63

determinata
ad unum motumsecundumspeciem;sed iste motusest indeut
terminatus, dictumest; ergo etc.
Quarta conclusioest quod nec est ab ordinepartiummediise moventium
successive.Dicerentenim fortealiqui quod huiusmodimotussic causatur
quoniammovenslapidemvel quodcumquealiud graveprimomovetpartem
aeris sibi propinquam,et illa primomota secundomovetaliam, et sic per
ordinem.Et hincest quod, cessantemanu,non cesstmotus,quoniam,licet
ipsa cessante,cessetprimapars aerissibipropinqua,non tamenomnesaliae.
Et ideo aliae aerispartesmotaedeferunt
ipsumgrave.Et ita dicuntistiquod,
licetiste motusnon sit a manu nec a formagravis,nec etiamdeterminate
ab aliqua partemedii,est tamena totomedio indeterminate
sumpto.
Contrahoc arguiiPhilosophusin fineVili Physicorum
, et primosic: illud
quod non movetnisi quia movetur,cessantemotionepassiva qua movetur,
cesstmotioactivaqua movet;sed primapars aeris propinquamanuilapidem impellenti
non movetactivealiam nisi quia mota [C 175va] a manu,
nec secunda pars tertiamnisi quia mota a prima,et sic de omnibusaliis;
ergo si [W 193vb]primanon recipita manu virtutem
aliquam,et secunda
a primavel a manu, cessantepassiva motionequa movetura manu, cessabitomnismotioeius activa;ergo etc.
Quinta conclusioest quod non est a se ipso. Ista patet,quoniam nihil
a se ipso; ergo etc.
potestesse effective
Sexta conclusio,quod nec potestesse a formacaeli. Ista patet,quoniam
formacaeli est determinata
ad unum motum.

88-95Aristoteles,
cum
Averrois
Commentariis
Vili,c. 10:266b27-267a20
Physica
(Aristotelis
Opera
IV, ed.Venice1562,f.429vaH-bL).
77 (secundum]
siveM2) 79 est1om.P || (nec]nonMI) || ordine
partium]
aliquaparte
Z 80 dicerent]
add.mg.
Z 11aliqui]aliquis
diceret
Z 81 aliudom.W 82(illa]
Z; partium
illa<m>M2) 11 mota]motuC (motaMI) 83 cesst]
W 84 sibiom.W || (omnes
cesset
illaepartes
aerisZ
aliae]estin aereM2!) 85 ideo]omnesadd.W || aliaeaerispartes]
86 etiamdeterminate]
Z (indeterminate
indeterminata
. . . parte]
M2) 86-87determinate
ab aliquapartedeterminata
P 89 quia]quodW || passiva]
Z 90 propinqua]
positiva
Z || manui]
manuCZ 91 nisiom.Z || manu]motuCZ 92 tertiam]
secunpropinque
damW 93 virtutem
. . . manu2
om.perhomoio.
aliquamino.P 11 et]necP 94 cessante
C II motione]
Z (om.C) 96 (est1om.MI) || ipso]ergoetc.add.P 98 sexta]
movente
aliaZ II conclusio]
estadd.W

11:22:56 AM

64

CHRISSCHABEL

100

estquod
Septimaet ultimaconclusioaffirmativa,
quae sequiturex praedictis,
huiusmodimotusest immediateab aliqua virtuteper modumactus primi
derelictaab ipsoprimomovente,
puta [P 165rb]a manu.Et haec estsententia
in fineVili Physicorum
et
etiam
Commentatoris
, commento27.
Philosophi
Ista conclusiosequiturex praecedentibus.
enim
dare
Oportet
aliquid quod
105 sit causa istiusmotussicutet cuiuscumquealteriuseffectus;
sed non potest
dari aliquid aliud,ut visumest; ergo etc.

< Opinio Philosophi

>
Sed tuncest dubium:ubi sit huiusmodivirtussubiective,
utrumvidelicetsit
in corporegravimoto,vel in ipso medio,et quid in se sit formaliter?
Ad hoc videturdicerePhilosophusin fineVili Physicorum
quod huiusmodi
110 virtusrecipitursubiectiveet formaliter
in medio,puta in aere vel in aqua,
non autemin corporemoto.ImaginaturenimPhilosophusquod, quia aer et
aqua suntvelociorismotusquam lapis vel huiusmodicorporagraviaquae
moventurin eis, ideo primapars aeris propinquamanuiimpellenti
aliquod
gravevelociusmoveturquam illudgravesit natummoverideorsum,et ideo
115 iste motusaeris velociorimpediimotumgravisdeorsum.Et hinc est quod
tamdiugraveimpulsumascenditsursumquousque pervenitad partemaliquam aeris quae non moveturvelociusquam illud grave moveaturdeorsum- immomotusgravisdeorsumest velociorilio motu,et ideo non potest
ille motusilliuspartismediivinceremotumgravis,propterquod statimtunc
120 incipitdescendereipsumgrave.Et ita dicitibi Philosophusquod huiusmodi
in aere.
subiective
virtuscausata a manu,continuansistummotum,recipitur

In
f.429vaI-bL);
100-103
Aristoteles,
Vili,c. 10:267a8-12
Averroes,
(ed.Venice,
Physica
Aliaversioin Vat.lat.943 habetcommento
VIII, comm.27 (ff.364rbF-365vaI).
Physicam
Cf.comm.82 (ed.Venice,
ff.430raA-431vaI).
109-137
77,sednoninveni.
Aristoteles,
In Physicam
etAverroes,
VIII,comm.82 (ed.Venice,
VIII,c. 10:266b27-267a22,
Physica
1vaG).Cf.Physica
ff.429vaH-43
IV, c. 8: 215al3-bll.
100septima]
octavaC; aliaZ || conclusio]
estW || (sequitur]
secuuntur
M3) 101alimotore
mocionem
M2) 102(movente]
Ml) || (haec]hocMl)
qua] aliaW H (modum]
W 107
cuiuslibet
Il estom.W 103etiamom.WZ || (27]20 M2-3) 105cuiuscumque]
W || videlicet]
virtus
subiective
huiusmodi
virtus
ubisitom
. Z II huiusmodi
subiective]
W 108gravimoto]sicutin totoW 109opiniophilosophi
add.mg.C 110et
scilicet
P 11 in3om.W; ap exp.W 111enim]autem
inmedio]inmedioetformaliter
formaliter
W 11 lapisvelom.W
Z 11 quia om.CZ 11 aer]in aereW 112velocioris]
velociores
113manui]manuZ 115gravis
om.Z 116 (pervenit]
Ml; pervenerit
M2-3)
provenit
om.O 121motum]
modum
W {om.Z)
118potest
exp.C; impedii
mg.C 119vincere
istum
. . . nataeom.Z
121-122

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA
OF MARGHIA'S

125

130

135

140

145

65

Unde imaginatur
Partesenimaerissuntnataecondensanet rarefieri.
Philosophus
sicut
et etiam Commentator
quando lapis proiciturin aqua fiuntet
quod,
in aqua quidamcircuii,sic consimiliter
lapisproiectusin aerefacit
generantur
in aere quosdam invisibiles
circuios,quorumprimus,quia moveturcelerius
se
descenderei
deorsum,ideo defertlapidemad secundum
quam lapis per
ad
et
secundus
tertium,
circulum,
usque
impediendoeius motumproprium
versusdeorsum.Et sic huiusmodicircuiicausati in aere deferuntlapidem
ad aliquemcuiusmotusnon sitvelociormotu[Z 167va]
quousqueperveniatur
cessantcircuii,et grave incipitdescendere,ipsis
et
tunc
deorsum,
gravis
cessantibus.
Et quia isticircuiisuntconsequenterse habentes,non continui
[P 165va],ideo concluditPhilosophusquod huiusmodimotusviolentusnon
estcontinuus,
sed consequenter
se habens,nec quod sic moveturmovetur
per
se, sed per accidens,sicutnautaad motumnavisipsumdeferentis.
[C 175vb]
Tunc ergodicitquod, quia aer et etiamaqua estrarefactibilis
et condensabilis,
in una parteet rarefit
ideo,ut condensatur
[W 194ra]
perhuiusmodi
impulsum
in alia, recipithuiusmodivirtutem
per quam motuspostea continuatur.
IstudprobatPhilosophus
videlicet
virtusrecipiatur
tripliciter,
quod huiusmodi
in medio. Primo sic: contrariorum
contrariaesunt causae; sed ad sensum
apparetquod, quando aliquod non multumgraveproicitursuperius,fiante
ventoecontrario,revertitur
interdumad proicientem,
quod non est nisi ex
motucontrario
aerisipsumdeorsumimpellentis;
eadem
rationeet motus
ergo
eius sursumest ex motuaeris contrario,sive per virtutem
receptamin aere
ipsumversussursumimpellentem;
ergo etc.
Secundosic: omnismotusqui esta principiointrinseco
estnaturalis,
natura
II Physicorum'
enimest principium
motuset quietis,secundumPhilosophum,
sed motuslapidissursumnon estnaturalis,
sed violentus,
sed si esseta virtute
in
a
aliqua recepta lapide, esset naturalis,quia esset principiointrinseco
mobilis;ergo etc.
145-146
Aristoteles,
II, c. 1: 192b20-23.
Physica
autemZ 124-125
facit
inaereom.perhomoio.
W 125(primus]
123fiunt]
M2;
principio
con.adprincipium
Z || (eiusom.Ml; scilicet
secundum
M2) 127secundus]
M2-3) 129
scilicet
circulum
add.mg.P || motu]motus
Z
Ml) || aliquem]
(perveniatur]
proveniatur
Z 135dicit]dicoW || quiaom.W || etiamaqua]esseaquaeC
134motum]
modm
iuresicM2) 138videlicet
om.W || (virtus
vir(etiam
aquaMl) 136(rarefit]
recipiatur]
tutesrecipiantur
contrario
Ml) 140apparet]
M2-3)|| interpatetZ 141(econtrario]
dumZ 142eademratione]
W 143(sive]s. Ml) 146estprincipium
recte
dum]movetur
motus
estW || secundum
om.utabbrev.
W 148recepta]
motus]
principium
philosophum
Z
W; recipitur
receptiva

11:22:56 AM

66

CHRISSCHABEL

150

III Ethicorum
est cuiusprinPraeterea,secundumPhilosophum,
, violentum
non
conferens
est
movens
cipium extra,
passo aliquam vim; ergo
gravesursumnullamvimconfer
passo,videlicet
lapidimoto;ergonec aliquamvirtutem
influitsive causai in ipso, sed in medio; quare etc.
omnemobilerecipiens
virtutem
Praetereatertio,
aliquama moventeassuescit
155 ad illamsivead actumeius,sicutpatetde manuscribentis;
sed lapisproiectus
assuescit
ad
motum
sursum,quantumcumquepluriesproiciatur;
numquam
ergo nullamvirtutem
recipita movente.

160

165

170

175

>
< ContraPhilosophum
sitinlapide
Sed contrahoc arguo,et ostendoquod huiusmodi
virtus
principalius
vel in quocumquealio gravimoto quam in medio. Et arguoprimosic: aut
huiusmodivirtusest formahabens contrarium
aut non est habens contrarium.Non estformahabenscontrarium,
sicutlevitaset gravitas,
quod probo
estprincipium
motuum
Primo,quia nullaformahabenscontrarium
dupliciter.
sive oppositorum,
sed unius tantum hoc patet de gravitate
contrariorum
et levitate[P 165vb]; sed ista virtusest indifferenter
principiummotuum
est
enim
motus
secundum
omnem
differentiam
oppositorum,
principium
etc.
Praeterea
nulla
virtus
habens
contrarium
est
secundo,quia
positionis;
ergo
motusrectiet circularis;
sed per huiusmodivirtutem
corpusquod
principium
motu rectoet circulari,sicutpatet
moveturviolentermoveturindifferenter
virtusnon esthabenscontrarium.
de rotafiguli;ergosequiturquod huiusmodi
motivanonhabenscontrarium
natarecipiin aereestnatarecipi
Sed omnisvirtus
in ipso lapidemoto,sivein quocumquealio gravimixto,et multoetiammagis
magisnata
quam in aere. Probatiohuius:quia formanon habenscontrarium
in
subiecto
habente
conest recipiin subiectonon habentecontrarium
quam
accidentales
etiam
substantiales
elementares
sed
tam
formae
trarium;
quam
suntmagiscontrariae
quam formaemixti,magisenimformamixtiestelongata
150-151Aristoteles,
Ethica
Mcomachea
III, c. 1: 1110b15-16(AL 26.1-3,fase.4, trans.
ed. R.A.Gauthier,
Leiden-Brussels
Aristoteles,
Grosseteste,
1973,p. 411.26-7).155-156
Ethica
Ncomachea
II, c. 1: 1103a20-23
cit.,p.396.8-10).
(ed.Gauthier
W 151passoaliquam
om.utabbrev.
150secundum
vim]vimpassoaliquid
philosophum
W II (ergocon.adsetM2) 155ad2om.Z 156ad] illamsivead add.W 157(movente]
add.mg.C || principalius]
motoreMl) 158 contraphilosophum
priusWZ (prius
W* (motivm
M1-2-3) 160est2om.W {om.Ml) 162motuum]
motivm
M2-3) 163
motivm*
W 165 (omnem
omnes
differentiam]
(unius]virtus
M2-3) 164 motuum]
P 172huiusom.Z 174etiam
differentias
Ml) 171ipsoom.W || quocumque]
quolibet
Z 175sunt]sedW
om.W; formae

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA'S
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA

180

185

190

195

200

67

a contrarietate
quam formaelementarisunde formamixticomparataad
formaselementorum
habetrationemformaequasi mediaeet neutraerespectu
illarum,sicutcompositum
[C 176ra]respectucomponentium.
Ergorelinquitur
quod magislapis vel quodcumquealiud corpusmixtumest subiectumproportionatum
praedictaevirtutis
quam aer vel quodcumquealiud elementm.
illud
est
effectus
sive motusmoventis
Praeterea,
quod prius
susceptivum
est
formaecausatae per illum,quod enim est receptivum
prius susceptivum
motus,et formaequae est [W 194rb]terminus
motus;sed lapis priusquam
aer estsusceptivus
motuslocalisperquemcausaturhuiusmodi
virtusa movente;
et
istius
virtutis
derelictae
motum
Probatio
minorisi
ergo
per
ipsum.
quia manus
nonmovetaeremnisimovendolapidem,ergolapispriusrecipitmotummanus
huiusmodiderelictam
quam aer, et per consequensvirtutem
permotum,cum
sit capax eius, ut ostensumest. Quod autemvirtushuiusmodicauseturper
motumsiveipso mediantepatet,quoniammanusquiescens,sicutnec movet
aliquid,ita nec causai aliquidin aliquo,puta in lapidenec in [Z 167vb]aere.
subiectumistiusvirtutis
Praeterea,illudestmagisproportionatum
quod est
subiectummotusqui est ab illa virtute,quod enim
magisproportionatum
effectui
magisestproportionatum
causae; sed lapis
magisest proportionatum
estsubiectum
istimotuiqui estab huiusmodi[P 166ra]
magisproportionatum
virtutederelicta;ergo etc. Probatiominorisiillud est magisproportionatum
subiectum
motusquod quidemperfectius
natumestmoveria virtute
motiva;sed
vel
aliud
mixtum
debiti
est
facilius
et
lapis
quodcumque
ponderis
perfectius
mobilea virtutemotivaquam aer vel aliud leve,sicutquam palea, perfectius
enim movensmovetet proicitlapidemdebitiponderiset longiuset etiam
faciliusquam paleamvel quodcumquealiud minusleve; ergosi palea propter
sui levitatem
non est mobileproportionatum
virtuti
motivae,nec aer ipse,ex
est
subiectumproportionatum
istiusvirtutis
quo sequiturquod lapis magis
continuantsmotumhuiusmodiquam sit aer; quare etc.
virtuti
motivae
Praeterea,confirmatur,
quia illudestmagisproportionatum
176elementaris]
elementalis
Z || (mixti]
mixtaM2) 176-177
ad formas
elecomparata
ad formas
elementorum
W 177(formas]
formam
mentorum]
comparata
Ml) 180aliud
subiectum
aliudW 181prius]
CZ 182estsusceptivum]
elementm]
primo
suscepticum
esse*Z II (perillum]principii
motore
M2) 183(quaeexp.utcon.M2) 184(movente]
mediiMl) 188 virtushuiusmodi
inv.C; istiushuiusmodi
Z
MI) 185 (minoris]
189(quoniam]
cumMl) 190nec2]velW (om.MI) 193magisest1inv.P 193-194
. . . proportionatum
om.
om.Z 195 proportiona(causae
perhomoio.
M2) 194 estsubiectum
Z 196(perfectius]
W 197
tum]proportionaler
perficiens
M2-3)|| a] ab huiusmodi
aliudinv.CW 199etiam]
tuncW 202magis]
nonW || subiectum]
quodcumque
magis
add.W 203continuantis]
Z (continentis
consequentis
M2-3)11 quareom.W 204illud]
quodZ

11:22:56 AM

68

CHRISSCHABEL

205 quod movendominuslaedituripsa virtusmotiva;sed minuslaediturvirtus

motivamanus in movendosive pellendolapidemdebitiponderisquam in
movendopaleam vel aliquid aliud nimisleve; ergoetc.
Praeterea,illudquod defertaliquodcorpusad aliquemlocumantecedenter
iliumlocum;sed aer non potestantecedenter
ingredialiquemlocum
ingreditur
violenter
sive
et
210 ad quem movetur ingreditur
motum;ergocorcorpuspulsum
existentem.
aliquamin eo formaliter
per aeremsivevirtutem
pus non movetur
in quercuet ingreditur
Probado minoris:quia iaculumprofunditur
quo non
aer
enim
non
aer
priusingreditur quam partes
ingrediantecedenter,
potest
per iaculumdividanturimmo ordinenaturaedivisiopartiummuri,et per
215 consequensingressus
iaculi,per quem fithuiusmodidivisio,praeceditingressum aeris. Si enim ingressusaeris ingressumiaculi antecedere
t, cum omne
aer
a
suo
possetingrediet
sequereturquod
posteriori,
priuspossitseparali
1
7
sine
huiusmodi
se
[C 6rb] iaculo,quod est falsum.
penetrareper partes
Tunc ergo potestbreviterarguisic in forma:deferensaliquod corpusad
220 locum aliquem priusest in loco ilio ipsumdeferensquam delatum,ordine
saltemnaturae;sed aer non prius ingreditur
quercusquam
profunditatem
iaculum,immoposterius;ergo etc.
Ex hoc ultra:illudidemmovetlapidemvel quodcumquealiud corpussursum quod dividitpartes[W 194va] mediiper quod movet,dividendoenim
225 [P 166rb] mediummovetet movendo dividit;sed lapis vel aliud corpus
non aer; ergoetc.Minorpatet,
motumdividitpartesmediiper quod movetur,
quoniamaer non dividitpartesquercus,sed iaculum,ergoeadem rationequa
dividitistud,dividitet quodcumquealiud mediumper quod transit.
< Opinio propria>
saltemnecessariohuiusmodivirSed quicquid sit de subiectoistiusvirtutis,
230 tus motuminchoatumcontinuansest ponendavel in mediovel, quod magis
credo,in corporemoto.
Unde est sciendumquod est duplexvirtusmovensaliquod gravesursum:
Z (minus
Z 207nimis]
minus
206in1om.^N11pellendo]
M2-3) 209aliquem]
impellendo
sinevirtute
aliumZ 210(et]setM2) 211(sivevirtutem
aliquaM2-3)|| exisaliquam]
itamovemedii
W (existente
inexistentem
Ml) || ingreditur]
M2-3) 212(minoris]
tentem]
W || quo]quodZ 213-214
turCZ; inmovetur
partes
periaculum
periaculum]
partes
W 218penetrare]
P 215quem]quodP 217suoom.W || sequeretur]
impensequetur
eiusZ 219 breviter
C (ipsepenetrare
etrare
arguiino.W 220
M2-3)|| huiusmodi]
P 225vel]
movetur
om.P 222immo]ergoZ 224movet]
Z || ipsum
prius]
primm
aliquidadd.W 227 partes]partemP || quercus]ergoetc.add.Z 232 estduplex
ino.W

11:22:56 AM

HIA'S VIRTUS
FRANGIS
OF MARC
DEREUCTA

235

240

245

250

255

260

69

et ista
quaedam motuminchoanssivegravead motumaliquemdeterminans,
virtusest virtusmanus;alia virtusest motumexequensinchoatumet ipsum
et ista est causata sive derelictaper motuma prima,nisi enim
continuans,
estdarecausammotussequentis,
ponaturaliqua alia virtusa prima,impossibile
ut superiusestdeductum.Et istavirtus,
in quocumquesubiectoponatur,continutet exequitur
motumsecundumproportionem
et modumquo determinata
esta prima.Et istaestvirtusneutra,non habenscontrarium,
cum exequatur
motumsecundumomnemdifferentiam
positionis.
Et si quaeraturqualis sithuiusmodivirtus,potestdici quod nec est forma
nec simpliciter
fluens,sed quasi media,quia per aliquod
simpliciter
permanens,
Sicut
caliditas
ab
tempuspermanens.
ignegenitain aqua non habetesse permanenssimpliciter
sicutin igne, nec simpliciter
edam fluensut calefactio
sed
habet
esse
ad
determinatum
ipsa,
permanens
tempus,sic in proposito,
huiusmodi
virtuspermanetad tempusaliquodsecundumproportionem
virtutis
a qua derelictaest.
Meliustarnenvideturquod huiusmodivirtussitin [Z 168ra]corporemoto
et Commentator,
tumquia
quam in medio,quicquidde hoc dixerit
Philosophus
"frustra
fitperpluraquod potestfieriperpauciora";nuncautemnullaapparet
necessitasponerealiquid aliud a corporemoto sive virtutein eo receptaet
a principalimoventeesse causam effectivam
motus;ergo nec medium.
Tum secundo quia, hoc ponendo, melius et faciliussalvanturomnia
de isto motu quam ponendo virtutem
apparentiaet concessa communiter
huiusmodiesse in medio- hoc patet,quoniamponendovirtutem
istamesse
in lapide moto salvaturquod ipse lapis moveturaliquo modo per
formaliter
se, non per accidensad [P 166va]motumaerissicutnauta ad motumnavis;
non consequenter
se habens;
secundo,salvaturquod istemotusestcontinuus,
movetur
a
manu
tertio,
quod lapisprius
proicientis
ipsumquam aer,cumnecaer
ab eo moveaturnisi quia lapis movetur;quarto,quod huiusmodivirtusest
250Aristoteles,
Lesauctoritates
Louvain1974,p. 141,
I, c. 4 (J.Hamesse,
Aristotel,
Physica
#26);cf.188a17-18.
om.perhomoio.
Z 237estdeductum
234estvirtus
inv.Z 238(et1om.M2-3)|| (secunW 243tempus]
dum]inM2) 241(quaeratur]
quaerasM2-3) 242simpliciter1]
simplex
Z 11 ab ignegenita
tumu*
inaqua]inaquaab ignegenita
W 11 habet]habens
CZ (habet
etiaminv.P; simpliciter
W (simpliciter
esseadd.W
M2) 244 simpliciter
M2) || fluens]
Z 249quicquid]
245ipsaom.P || tempus]
tumu*
fitadd.W || tum]verum
Z 250fit]
sitW H quod]quaeZ 251 eo] ea W 11 recepta]
Z 11et]eo Z 252(movente]
recipitur
motore
Z
tenendo
Ml) 253 (ponendo]
positoM2) 254 motu]motoW || ponendo]
Z 258 (se habens]sequensM2) 259 quod]quia Z || prius]
255 in medio]metrm
CWZ (priusMl) 260quodhuiusmodi]
primo
quiahaecZ

11:22:56 AM

70

CHRISSCHABEL

virtusneutra,non habenscontrarium;
quinto,quod lapis [C 176va]vel quodut
aliud
cumque
corpusproiectum, iaculum,dividitmediumper quod transit.
Sed nullumhorumquinqu salvariconvenienter
potestponendohuiusmodi
virtutem
essein medio,putain aere vel in aqua, si fiatmotusin aqua, utpatet
265 discurrendo
per accidensad
per omnia tuncenimlapis tantummoveretur
motumaerissicutnautasivenavisad motummaris;secundoetiam,istemotus
se habens,quod non
ut patet[W 194vb],sed consequenter
non eritcontinuus,
videturesse rationabile;
tertio,sequiturquod proicienslapidemprimomoveat
etnonaeremquam lapidem,cumlapismoveaturab aere per istamvirtutem,
270 nisiab aere primomotoa manu,cum istavirtusper quam movetcausetura
manu in ipso mediantemotusiveper motum;quartoetiam,non ita apparet
cumsitnata
possitesseneutra,nonhabenscontrarium,
quomodotuncistavirtus
tunc
non
in
subiecto
habente
contrarium;
potestsalvari
quinto,
recipipraecise
dividat
mediumper
aliud
vel
corpusproiectum,
quod iaculum, quodcumque
275 quod transit.Ergo etc.
estsuperius,
Praeterea,
corpusmixtummagisestsubiecquia, ut declaratum
istiusvirtutis
tumproportionatum
quam aliquod elementm,
ergo etc.
<Ad rationesPhilosophi>
Hoc tenendo,potestrespondenad rationesPhilosophi.Ad primam,quando
revertitur
ad proicientem"
diciturquod "interdum
etc.,concorpusproiectum
in
virtutem
motus
aeris
280 cedo, quando
Quando
proicientis.
oppositumsuperai
sed moveturultra,et hoc per virtutem
autem non superat,non revertitur,
te principalisive primamovente,quoniamsicut
derelictamin lapide a virt
derelictae
motuslapidispraecellitsiveexceditmotumaeris,ita et actiovirtutis
in aere
actionem
virtutis
causatae
excedit
in lapide a manu impellente
ipsum
in
huiusmodi
etiam
enim
virtutem
a
movente
Non
285
medio,
nego
recipi
ipsum.

11.138-144.
278Hic supra,
conveZ 263(quinqu]
262perquodtransit]
M2-3)|| salvari
quietem
quodpertransit
huiusmodi
virtutem
add.W 265tantum
nienter
inv.W 264esseom.Z || ut]ponendo
movetur
om.W II (moveretur]
Ml) 266etiam]tuncW; enimZ 267(erit]estMl) ||
rationale
Ml) 269
M2-3)|| (sequitur]
sequeretur
(non2]nuncM3) 268 (rationabile]
Z (posset
Z 271etiam]enimZ 272possit]
motum
Ml) 274quod]
posset
moveatur]
. . . etc.om.
esseZ 276-277
Ml) 278
perhomoio
(praeterea
quosZ 276utom.Z II est2]
concedendo
add.mg.C || hoc]sedP; ergoadd.W || (tenendo]
ad philosophum
responsio
W || quoniam
om.
W 279etc.om.W 282prima]
aristotelis
primo
Ml) II philosophi]
etiamadd.W
accessionem
Z 283(sive]et Ml) 284(actionem]
Ml) 285huiusmodi]

11:22:56 AM

DEREUCTA
FRANGIS
VIRTUS
OF MARCHIA'S

290

295

300

305

3 10

71

immonec motussuperaimotumnisiquia una virtussuperaialiam,et itaagit

fortius
quam alia.
Ex quo sequiturquod, quando lapis vel aliquod gravemovetur[P 166vb]
in medio,siveetiamleve,quod concurrunt
ibi duo motus,videlicet
motusipsius
in
est
immediate
a
virtute
derelicta
et
etiam
motus
aeris,
lapidis,qui
lapide,
- ad motum
- licetnon immediate
tam
enim
aer
motus
etiam
facit
qui
lapidis,
quam etiamvirtuslapidiscausata in ipso ab impellentedeferunt
lapidem.
Exemplum:navisin marimoveturduplicimotu.Moveturenim,trahitur,
seu pelliturad pulsummaris;vehituretiamseu moveturmotutrahentis.
Quod
ad motumalicuiuspraecisenonpotest
moveri
patet,quoniamilludquod movetur
celeriussive velociusilio; sed constatquod interdumnavis multocelerius
movetur
ad motumearum.
quam ipsaeundaemaris;ergonon tantummovetur
Consimiliter
dico in proposito,quod videlicetlapis defertur
et moveturper
non
tantum
aerem
sive
eius
sed
etiam
aerem,
motum,
per
per motumsive
in
tis derelictae lapide a primomovente.
impulsumvirt
Per hoc patetad rationem.
Concedoenimquod, sicutquandolapisproicitur
ibi duplexdeferenslapidemsive motor,puta aer motuset
sursum,concurrit
in lapi[C 176vb]dea movente,
ita consimiliter
in motucontrario
virtusderelicta
deorsumversusproicientem
concurrit
quo lapisrevertitur
duplexmotor,puta
aer impellenset virtutemillam lapidis vincenset principiumintrinsecum
mobilis[Z 168rb],puta gravitas[W 195ra]ipsa. Ex hoc autemnon sequitur,
ut infertur,
quod motuslapidissursumsittantumab aere,nec per consequens
quod huiusmodivirtusmotumistumcontinuanssit in aere praecise.
Ad secundam,quando diciturquod "omnismotusest naturalis"etc.,dico
naturalemlapidis,et sicest
quod motusistepotestcomparalivel ad virtutem
cum
sit
contra
eius
inclinationem
eius
violentus,
naturalem;vel ad virtutem
accidentalem
et extrinsecam
a
derelictam primavirtute,
et istomodo estaliquo
modo connaturalis,
et ita est simpliciter
motusviolentus,
quia contrainclinationemformae
etsecundum
secundum
inclinationem
naturalis,
naturalis,
quid
quia
309Hic supra,
11.145-149.
C (surius
surus*
287 fortius]
Ml; fortius
M2-3) 288-289(movetur...
leve]siveetiam
inmedioMI) 292etiam]esseCZ {exp.
levemovetur
utcon.M2);ipsaadd.W 294pelZ || etiam]enimZ 295 (quoniam]cumMl) 297 ipsaeom.Z
litur]impellitur
298-299peraerem]peralterum
motore
CZ; om.W 300 a] in Z || (movente]
MI)
301enimom.CZ 302ibiom.W || (duplex]
<virtus>
add.M2) 304revertitur]
vertitur
W 305(illam]
iliaMl) || lapidis]
W 306mobilis]
CZ (medioM2-3)
mobili*
lapidem*
307 infertur]
Z || lapidis]lapis*Z || tantum]
inferunt
W || (consequens]
tarnen
contrarium
eiusadd.Z 11 virtute]
v'iiiZ
M2) 311 eius2om.W 312extrinsecam]

11:22:56 AM

72

CHRISSCHABEL

a magnete.Iste ergo motus

315 formaeaccidentalis.Exemplum:ferrumtrahitur
formam
vel
ad
sive
virtutem
ferri
et sic est vionaturalem,
potestcomparali
vel ad formamimpressam
lentus,quia contraeius naturaleminclinationem;
in ferroab ilio lapide,et sic est aliquo modo naturalis.Et hoc est quod dicit
Commentator
, commento35.
superVili Physicorum
"violentum
Ad tertiam,
dicitur
320
[P 167ra]est"etc.,dico quod mobile
quando
sivepassumpotestconsideralisiveaccipi dupliciter,
quia vel secundumsuam
essentialem
sivenaturalem
et intrinsecam,
et quod secundamistamest
formam
ei extrinsecam
naturaleestsimpliciter
naturale;vel secundumaliquamformam
et quod secundumtalemest naturaleest tantumsecundum
et accidentalem,
vimpasso potestintelligi
325 quid naturale.Tunc dico quod agens non conferre
dupliciter,
quia vel quod non confrtsibi vim primam,videlicetnaturalem
vel quod nec istamnec aliquam aliam. Et utroqueistorum
et intrinsecam,
modorumdictumPhilosophi,videlicet"violentumest" etc.,est verum,sane
intelligendo.Movens enim seu agens non conferipsi mobili passo vim,
vim seu
nec etiamconfert
330 perfectionem
aliquam naturalemseu intrinsecam,
sed
et
accidentalem
et
extrinsecam
sibi
convenientem,
aliquam
perfectionem
et repugnan
tem. Et ideo non dicituraliquid sibi conferre,
disconvenientem
tionemconvenientem
auferre.Dando enim quod sibi dissed magis disposi
aufertquod conveniens
estet contraeiusnaturaleminclinationem,
conveniens
non
Et hoc modo intendit
335 est,et ideo diciturnihilsibiconferre.
Philosophus,
nihil
nihil
sed
conveniens.
ei
tribuat
absolute,
quod
quod
violenter
calefitab igneet ignisipsamcalefaciens
Exemplum:aqua violenter
non quod non tribuatei aliquid,sed quia nectribuit
diciturnihilsibiconferre,
naturalemet intrinsecam,
nec etiam accidentalem
vim sive perfectionem

if.373vbL-375raB,
InPhysicam
35(ed.Venice,
316-319
VIII,comm.
Averroes,
esp.374vaH).
11.150-153.
320Hie supra,
Z 317 (quia]quasiM2-3)|| eiusom.W || natu316ferri
naturalem]
supernaturalem
mobile
siveom.W 321considerali]
ralemom.C 319viii]4 W 320-321
W;
comparali
om.C {add.utcon.M1-2-3)|| estom.Z 323vel]
om.Z II suamom.W 322secundum
Z 324(etaccidentalem
intrinsecam
quodadd.W || ei] et CZ {om.Ml) || extrinsecam]
Z || (intelconfert
om.W 325naturale]
tantum
add.W || conferre]
om.Ml) II tantum
W 329(seu]
scilicet
om.W 328videlicet]
Ml) 326quodom.Z || primam
ligi]intendi
add.W 330(seu1]sive
seuadd.W {add.utcorr.
siveMl) Il mobili]
Ml) || vim]scilicet
diceretur
M3) ||
Ml) II (seu2]siveMl) 331et2]esseG; etiamP; om.Z 332(dicitur]
sibiadd.GZ || enim]ei Z 334 et]eo Z 335
aliquidsibiinv.W 333 dispositionem]
dicereinv.P 338(dicitur]
nihilsibiinv.W 336quod2]quiaP 337ipsamcalefaciens
CZ || (et]ei M2-3)
turM3) II nihilsibiinv.W 339vim]naturam

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARGHIA'S
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA

73

- immoconvenientem
dando
340 aliquamconvenientem
removet,
putafrigiditatem,
sibi disconvenientem,
caliditatem.
Et
sicut
calefactio
puta
qua aqua calida
calefitestnaturalis
et violenta,naturalis
siquidemestaliquo modocomparando
ipsamad formamquam aqua recipitab igne,puta ad caliditatem[G 177ra],
violentaautemestsimpliciter
ad formam
naturalem
per comparationem
aquae,
est in propositode motugravissursum.Est enim,ut dictum
345 sic consimiliter
ad formamnaturalem
est,istemotusviolentussimpliciter
per comparationem
gravis,sed naturalissecundumquid, comparandoipsum ad illam virtutem
accidentalemderelictamin gravia primavirtutemotiva.
Ad ultimam,quando dicitur,"omne mobile" etc., dico quod verumest
350 [W 195rb]de ilioquod recipit
a movente
vimaliquametnonhabetin se formam
naturalemipsumad opposituminclinantem,
sicutde manu scribentis
patet.
Habens autemin se formaminclinantem
ad aliquemmotumnumquampotest
assuefieri
ad motumoppositum,
quantumcumque
recipiata moventealiquam
virtutem
determinatam
ad illummotum,sicutpatetde [P 167rb]ferroquod,
355 quantumcumque
et moveatura magneteper virtutem
alipluriesattrahatur
in
a
ex
hoc
assuefieri
ad
istum
quam ipso magneteimpressam,
numquam
potest
motum.Et hoc propterformamnaturalemquam habet ipsum ad motum
contrarium
inclinantem.
Et idempatetde aqua quae nonpotestad caliditatem
licetab ignefuerit
et hoc proptereandemrationem.
assuefieri,
pluriescalefacta,
est in propositode lapide motosursum.Quia enimgravehabet
360 Consimiliter
formamnaturalem,
inclinantem
puta gravitatem,
ipsumad motumdeorsum,
ideo quantumcumque
ad motumcontrarium,
recipiata manu virtutem
puta
ad illummotum.
sursum,numquampotestper illam assuefieri
Hoc de primo.
<Articulus secundus>
365 Quantumad secundum,quod est de instrumento
naturali,utrumvidelicet
instrumentum
a
naturale,sicutmanusvel lingua,recipiantaliquamvirtutem
349Hic supra,
11.154-157.
340aliquam]
movet
C 341sicut]
sicCZ 342calefit]
aliquomodoW;om.Z || removet]
calefactibilis
W (calefacit
eritM3) || modo]naturalis
add.C
CZ; calefacit
Ml) || (est1]
343 recipit]
et add.C 346 naturalem]
Z
naturalis
C, Wpc(!) 344 simpliciter]
recepit
350formam]
add.W 351-352
CZ (corr
. adpatethabens
aliquam
patethabens]
philosophus
Ml; perhibens
M2-3) 352aliquem]
aliquodZ 353ad motum
oppositum]
aliquidmotus
Z II quantumcumque]
C (quantumcumque
M2Ml; quacumque
oppositus
quamcumque
motore
3) II (movente]
Ml) 354 quod]qui CPZ (quodMl) 356 a om.Z || istum]
suumZ 358etom.PW 363illam]
illaZ 11assuefieri]
W 365articulus
calefieri
secundus
add.mg.
articlus
add.mg.
WZ 11ad. . . instrumento]
insacramento
estdesecundo
W
P;secundus

11:22:56 AM

74

CHRISSCHABEL

potentiamoventeipsa,dico quod sic. Et hoc patetex primo,quoniamsi illud

ad motumillum,recipita moventevirtutem
mobile,quod motumnon assuefit
ad illum
multo
motum
continuantem, magisilludquod ex motuassuefit
aliquam
ut manusvel
370 motum,cuiusmodiestquodlibetnaturalehominisinstrumentum,
vel
a
movente
ea.
Nisi
enim
virtutem
dispositionem
aliquam
linguarecipiunt
seu
habituari
actum
assuefieri
ad
nullum
formam
[Z 168va]
aliquamreciperent,
possent;ergo etc.
ad aliquemmotumassuefit
Confirmatur,
quoniamomneilludquod assuefit
375 per aliquid derelictumin ipso ex ilio motu,quia praeciseper motumnon
sed huiusmodiinstrumenta,
puta manus,lingua,et oculus,
possuntassuefieri;
et proprios;ergo etc.
assuescuntad actus determinatos
Praeterea,habitusestformaquaedam derelictain habitoalia a dispositione
instrumentis
sed in istisorganisseu naturalibus
primaad habitmdisponente;
in qua ex
sive generaturhabitus,ut patet de manu scriptoris
380 derelinquitur
in
sive
eis
actu
scribendi
motu
sive
habitus;ergo
generatur
generatur
frequenti
formaaliqua alia a formispropriisipsorum,quae quidem est
derelinquitur
inclinansad actus secundosper modumactusprimi.
< Excursusde motucaeli>
Ex istisduabus conclusionibus
quae positaesunt [C 177rb] de instrumento
et naturali,videturposse concludiquod caelummotumab angelo
385 artificiali
aliam
sive formamab ipso neutramaccidentalem,
recipiataliquam virtutem
inhaerentem.
Hoc potestprobari,primoex
a motu locali, caelo formaliter
sic: quantoaliqua potentiamotivaestnobilior
[P 167va]moventis,
perfectione
in subiectonato eam
virtutem
tantomagisnata est imprimere
et perfectior,
motiva
virtute
390 recipere;sed virtusmotivailliusmotoris[W 195va]estperfectior
seu
moventia
inferiora
tamen
et
inferioris
motoris,
imprimunt caucuiuscumque
et exequentem;
santin hisquae moventvirtutem
aliquammotumcontinuantem

motore
estadd.Z || (movente]
367potentia]
primoW || ipsa]ipsamZ 368motum1]
instrucuiusM3) || hominis
continentem
M3) 370(cuiusmodi]
Ml) 369(continuantem]
mentum
inv.W 371 (recipiunt]
Ml) || ea] eamCZ (eumMl) 372reciperent]
recipit
add.W 375(aliquid]
autadd.CZ; aliter
W || seu]velP 374motum]
aliquem
receperit
W 379disponente]
veladd.W 378habitoalia]habituato
disponenM3) 376manus]
CZ
contrahendi
temW (disponentem
M3) || seu] organisadd.W 381 scribendi]
Z 384duabus]
duobus
alicuius
duos+ ? add.C (duosperadd.M3) || actus2]
383actus1]
Z (concedi
concedi
add.W 385 concludi]
M3) ||
C, Wac (!); om.Z || de] sacramento
Z
forma
animoMl) 386formam]
C, Wpe(!)(formam
M1-3S) 387hoc]conclusi
(angelo]
M3)
continentem
inv.P 391(seu]siveMI) 392(continuantem]
389-390
eamrecipere

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
VIRTUS
DEREUCTA
OF MARCHIA'S

395

400

405

410

415

75

in celo, dumhuiusmodivirtutem
ergomultomagisilludmovensimprimet
modo ipsumcaelum sit capax sive receptivum
eius. Sed non videtur ratio
quare non sit receptivum
ipsius,cum virtusista non habeat contrarium
virtusenimsive formanon ponensin caelo alterationem,
cuiusmodiest ista
sicutlumen,nonrpugnt
caelo
forma,cumsitneutra,non habenscontrarium,
huiusmodi
autem
virtus
est
non
habens
contrarium
nec
magisquam lumen;
in
caelo
alterationem
ponens
aliquam magisquam lumen;quare etc.
Ex quo sequiturulteriusquod, intelligentia
cessantemoverecaelum,quod
adhuccaelummoveretur
siverevolveretur
ad tempusper huiusmodivirtutem,
huiusmodicircularemmotumexequentemet continuantem,
sicutpatet de
rotafiguli,
ad tempus,cessanteprimomoventemovere.Eadem
quae revolvitur
enimratiovideturesse hie quae estibi et e converso,videlicetvirtusderelicta
a primomotorein mobilihic et ibi.
Praetereasecundo,arguitur
ex parteipsiusmobilis,primosic:si caelumnon
essetreceptivum
talisvirtutis,
hoc non videreturesse nisi propterimperfectionemipsius, sed ista imperfectionon obstat,quoniam virtusquae est
ilio; sed ista virtusest principium
principiumalicuiusnon est imperfectior
motuslocalis cuius caelum est receptivum;
nisi detur
ergo et illiusvirtutis,
aliud
ab
caelo reciperehuiusmodi
aliquid
imperfectione
propterquod repugnet
virtutem.
moventi
Confirmatur,
quia quantoaliquodmobilemagisestproportionatum
et minusresistitsibi, tantomagis natumest recipereet recipitinfluentiam
suo motoriet magisest sibi proportionatum
eius; sed caelum minusresistit
suo motori;ergo etc.
quam aliquod mobilehic inferius
Sed contrahoc arguitur,
primosic: movenssive agens hic inferius,
puta
movenslapidem,nonimprimit
huiusmodi
in lapidemoto,sed inmedio
virtutem
facit
per quod movet,quod [P 167vb]quidem,secundumCommentatorem,

In Physicam
418-420
ff.430vaI-431rbE).
Averroes,
Vili,comm.82 (ed.Venice,
393imprimet
huiusmodi
virtutem
iter.
C 394 sit]fitCZ (sitM1-3S) 394-395(eius. . .
om.perhomoio.
om.per
receptivum
MI) 396 (ista]iliaMl) 397-398sicut.. . contrarium
W 399quare]ergoW 400sequitur]
homoio.
etiamadd.W || movere]
Z 402
movetur
huiusmodi
om.CW 11circularem]
Z 403(movente]
circulationem
motore
MIS) 11movere]
Z 404ratiovidetur
movetur
essehiequaeest]videtur
esseratiohicetW 405a] si W
movente
W || (inmobili]
inmobili
Il motore]
M3) 406 arguitur]
arguoW || si] sitW
et add.W || (nisidetur]
{om.M3) 407 (virtutis]
Ml!) 410 receptivum]
impetus
neque
datur
Cpc(a prima
W
estinv.
MI, S/?c!)411 ab imperfectione
M3) 413magis
perfectione
414 natumest inv.CZ 416 aliquod]aliquidC || motori]motoC (motori
MIS)
417 (sive]s. MI) 419 facit]
fuitCZ (fitMl, S/?r!)

11:22:56 AM

76

CHRISSCHABEL

420 condensandoet rarefaciendoipsum; sed caelum non est rarefactibile

nec
cum
sit
et
nec
istius
virt
tis
condensabile,
incorruptibile impassibile;ergo
receptivum.
Praetereasecundo,si aliqua talis virtuscausareturin caelo, ipsa esset
Probatio:quia si corrumperetur,
vel corrumperetur
a contrario,
incorruptibilis.
425 vel per corruptionem[C 177va] sui subiecti,vel ad cessationemagentis
moventis.
Non primum,quia non habetcontrarium.
Nec secundum,quia eius
subiectumest incorruptibile.
Nec tertium,
videlicetad cessationem
moventis,
talis
virtus
manere
ad
cessante
virtute
et
quoniam
ponitur
tempus,
ipsamovente,
ita eadem rationesemperpoteritmanere,ipsa cessante.Sed non videturquod
430 intelligentia
talem,videlicet
possitaliquamvirtutem
incorruptibilem,
producere.
Ergo etc.
Ad primum,quando diciturquod "movensinferiusaliquod grave non
et conimprimitin medio virtutemhuiusmodinisi medianterarefactione
dico
densatione," quod hoc estper accidens,non per se. Est enimhoc,primo,
ad recipiendum
435 ex hoc quia mediumnon estin propinquadispositione
huiusmodi virtutem,
nec ipsumetiamcorpusmotum,et ideo oportetalterationem
et condensationem
illam praecedere.Secundo,
quae fitper rarefactionem
tam
[W 195vb] movens [Z 168vb] quam etiam mobile sive motum
quia
huiusmodiest corpus,et ideo oportetibi esse alterationem,
quoniamcorpus
440 non movetcorpusnisiexpeliendo,et per consequensmediumin aliqua parte
condensandoet in alia rarefaciendo.
Hic autemin isto motuprimimobilis
esttotumoppositum,
quoniamcaelumestin ultimaet propinquadispositione
ad istam virtutem,
et ideo non oportetalterationemaliquam praecedere.
Movens etiamnon est corpus,sed spiritus.Quare etc.
Ad secundum,quod est difficilius,
dico quod ista rationon debetmovere
445
constat
in
caelo beatorumnon tantumerit laus
fidelem,quoniam
quod
sivementalis,
sed etiamvocalis.Nec enimsanctieruntibi muti,non
spiritualis
11.417-422.445 Hic supra,
432 Hic supra,
11.423-431.
om.MIS) || caelum]
lumenZ 421 impassibile]
420 (ipsum
Z 424 quiaom.
impatibile
Z II corrumperetur1]
Z || velcompeteretur
om.perhomoio.
Z 425 vel2]
corrumpetur*
videlicet
W || cessationem]
suiadd.Z 426 secundum]
Z 427 cessationem]
subiectum
seuadd.W || (moventis]
cumMl) || virtute
agentis
S) 428 (quoniam]
agentis
ipsainv.
W 429ratione]
movere
Z 434hoc2om.W 435quia]quodC
proadd.P || manere]
436 ipsumetiaminv.W || oportet]
quod*add.Z 438 etiam]ipsumadd.W || (sive]s.
om.Z 441 alia]aliquaC || hic]nuncZ 442 (ultima]
Ml) 439 estcorpus
multiplici
Z || (quoniam]
fideliter
MIS) 444etiam]etWZ 446fidelem]
quiaS) || quodom.W
II erit]estW 447 enim]etiamZ

11:22:56 AM

FRANGIS
HIA'S VIRTUS
DEREUCTA
OF MARC

450

455

460

465

470

475

11

loquentesad invicemetiamvocaliter.Nunc autem constatquod huiusmodi

vox in celo causatanon eritperpetua,immocorrumpetur.
Quaero quomodo
vel per quid? Non per corruptionem
subiecti,quia caelum in quo recipitur
est incorruptibile.
Nec per actionemcontrarii,quia non habet contrarium,
alias caelumalteraretur
recipiendoipsam.Tunc ergodico ad rationemquod
ilia virtuscorrumpitur
sive destruitur.
Et quando quaeris per quid, dico quod non per corruptionem
subiecti,
nec per actionemcontrarii,
quia non habet,sed per cessationemagentis[P
moventis.Ubi tamenest advertendum
168ra]seu virtutis
quod corrumpiad
cessationemvirtutismoventisest dupliciter.Uno enim modo aliquid corad cessationem
virtutis
moventissic quod, cessanteipsa, simulillud
rumpitur
et destruitur,
sicutmotus.Simul enim,in eodem instantiquo
corrumpitur
virtusmoventiscesst,corrumpitur
sive cesstet desinitipse. Alio modo alidicitur
sive
desinere
esse cessantealiquo, non quod ilio cesquid
corrumpi
santesive corruptosimulillud aliud corrumpatur,
sed quia non potest,ilio
suae entitatis,
sicutilli radii
cessante,diu manere,propterimperfectionem
sive reliquiaederelictaein oculo ex excellentivisibilicorrumpuntur,
amoto
ilio visibili,non simul,sed ad modicumtempus,quia non possuntdiu perSic est in
manere,ilio remoto,propter[C 177vb] eorum imperfectionem.
in caelo ab intelligentia
moventecausataseu impressa,
propositode istavirtute
et etiamde quacumquealia a quocumquealio motoreper motumlocalem
causata.
Unde dico quod triplexest genusformarum.
Est enim aliqua formasimsicutmotus,et talissimultransit
et desinit,
cessantemovente.
successiva,
pliciter
Alia est simpliciter
ut
albedo.
Tertia
est
permanens,
quasi media, quia nec
successiva
ut
nec
motus,
simpliciter
simpliciter
permanens,quia non potest
cessante
causa
nisi
ad
modicumtempustantum,cuiusmodi
eius,
permanere,
est ista virtusmotivaa primavirtutecausata.

448(nunc]nisiM3) 449vox]estadd.C 450recipitur]

CW 451(actionem]
recipietur
accessionem
contraria
Z 452(alteraretur]
abitaretur
MIS) || contrarium]
M3) || ipsam]
rationes
accessionem
Ml, Sp) || quod]quiaW 455 (actionem]
ipsasCZ II (rationem]
add.M3) || sed]se C (sedM1-3S) 456(seu]siveMl) ||
<contrarium>
MIS) II (habet]
ubi MIS) 457 (moventis]
motoris
(moventis
unde]motoris
MIS) || enimom.C
458illud]idemCZ {om.
om.Z 460(moventis]
motoris
MIS) 459in]etiamC || instanti
deficit
CZ || ipse]esseZ 460-461aliquidom.W 461 aliquo]ilioP
MIS) Il desinit]
463 entitatis]
entisW 465 ilio]primoZ 466 sic]sicutW 468 (etiam]
quidemM3)
471simultransit]
Z || desinit]
esseadd.W 472 est1om.Z
W; transit
simpliciter

11:22:56 AM

78

CHRISSCHABEL

Posset etiam fortedici quod huiusmodivirtuscausata in caelo esset

incorruptibilis.
Hoc de secundo.

480

485

490

495

500

<Articulus tertius>
dico quod in sacramentis
non est aliqua
ad
tertium
articulum,
Quantum
sive eis inhaerensformaliter,
sed tantumest in eis virtussubvirtusinsistens
cuiuslibetsacramenti.
sistens,quae Deus est,qui immediateagitad effectum
Etprimo
Istudproboin generalide quolibetsacramento
quattuorrationibus.
a
Deo
causata
in
est
huiusmodi
virtus
sic:
si
sacramentis
[W 196ra]
aliqua
arguo
et extensaextensioneet divisionesubiecti,
sive influxa,aut ipsa est divisibilis
aut estinextensaet indivisibilis
; sed nullumhorumpotestponi; ergoetc. Probariominoris,et primoquod non possitponi indivisibilis:quoniamhaec est
et accidentalem,
differentia
interformam
substantialem
quia formasubstantialis
licetsecundumquid
estnobiliorsuo subiectoet ab eo simpliciter
independens,
estsuo subiectoignobilior
sitdependens,e contrarioautemformaaccidentalis
et
licet
forma
substantialis
inextensaet
et ab eo simpliciter
ita,
dependens,
in
divisibili
et
sicut
anima
rationalis
subiecto
indivisibilis
extenso,
possitrecipi
et indivisibilem
in corpore,tarnenformamaccidentaleminextensam
recipiin
et
subiectoextensoet divisibiliimpossibileest, quoniam formaindivisibilis
et extensa,formaautemaccidentalis
non potest
inextensaestnobiliordivisibili
estdivisibile
essenobiliorsuo subiecto;sed quodlibetsacramentum
[P 168rb]et
Secundo
non
divisibilis:
etc.
extensum;ergo
possitponi
quoniam
proboquod
subiectiest
sivedivisibilis
estet extensaextensione
omnisformaquae dividitur
nonestmaior
maiorin maioriet minorin minorisubiecto;sed virtussacramenti
in maiorinec minorin minorisubiecto,nec enimvirtusbaptismiestmaiorin
maioriaqua vel minorin minori;ergo etc.
Secundosic: aut huiusmodivirtus,si ponitur,est corporeaaut incorporea.
nonpotestrecipiin aliquosubiecto
Non incorporea,
quia accidensincorporeum
sacramentum
cuiusmodi
est
quantumad suum matecorporeo,
quodlibet
in
unius
sicut
et
verba
riale,
aqua
baptismo.Praeterea,quia accidensproprium
add.mg.W 11
add.mg.P; tertius
articulus
tertius
478hoc]etiamadd.Z 479 articulus
Z
irai.
W 481 deusestqui iter.
C 480 inhaerens
formaliter
rie'add.mg.2
bonaventura
W 489 sitom.W 11 accidentalis]
om.W 486 possit]
11 qui. . . sacramenti
quia
potest
Z || indivisibilem]
inextensa
om.W 492inextensam]
add.W 490licetom.Z 491recipi
Z 11quoniam]
W 493quoniam]
indivisibili
potest
quiaZ 496probo]ponoZ 11possit]
quia Z 497 estet inv.W 499 enim]etiamW 500 minorom.W 501 sic aut]sic
P || aut2]velW 504verba]
sicZ || ponitur]
W; arguitur
C; sicautem
ponatur
arguitur
om.Z
verboC || proprium

11:22:56 AM

VIRTUS
DEREUCTA
FRANCIS
OF MARGHIA'S

79

505 subiectinon potestesse in alio subiectoilli subiectoopposito;sed accidens

est propriumsubiectoincorporeosicutet accidenscorporeum
incorporeum
corporeo;ergoetc. Nec potestdici quod sitvirtuscorporea,quoniamhuiusnisi ad hoc quod sit ratiocausandi
modi virtusnon poniturin sacramentis
in
anima
sacramentum,
aliquid spirituale
suscipientis
quod non potestcom510 peterealicuicorporali;ergoetc. [C 178ra]Confirmatur:
quia huiusmodivirnon
tus,si ponaturcorporeain baptismovel in quocumquealio sacramento,
- immominus
est magisproportionata
ipsi animae et effectui
qui causatur
in ipsa quam sintverba et aqua quantumad sacramentum
baptismi,ergo
- immominus
non magis
potesteffectum
aliquem causarein anima quam
515 ipsa verba et aqua. Gonsequentiapatet.Sed antecedensprobatur,quoniam
nulla substantiacorporeanec aliquod quodcumquecorporeummovetanimam rationalemnisimediantesensitiva,
medianteautemista,potestmovere
sed
huiusmodi
virtus
ipsam;
supernaturalis
corporeain elementoaquae existensnon est nata moveresensitivm,
nec enim sensualiquo est apprehensi520 bilis,quod tarnenfacitipsa formaelementi,et etiamverba ipsa; ergo etc.
Tertio sic: aut ista virtusest permanensaut est fluens.Non permanens,
in subiectonon
quoniam accidenspermanensnon potestrecipiformaliter
sed
permanente, successivo,cuiusmodisuntomniaverba sacramentalia
quae
suntprincipaliain quolibetsacramento.Nec fluens,quia virtussacramenti
veritatem[W 196rb]sacramenti;
Veritasautemsacramentinon
525 praesupponit
est nisi in ultimoinstantiprolationisorationissacramentalis,
puta in ultimo
instanti
ultimaesyllabaevel litteraeistiusorationis:"Hoc estcorpus
prolationis
istiustotiusorationis
et non ante,et istius:"Ego te baptizo"
meum,"estVeritas
ista
virtussittantumin ultimovocbulo
etc.;ergore[P 168va]linquitur
quod
530 sive in ultimasyllabavel litteratotiusorationis,et non in praecedentibus,
cum non sintpro ilio instanti.Et ita sequiturquod nomenSpiritusSancii,
sive
quod poniturultimoin baptismo,est receptivumalicuiusperfectionis
virtu
nomenPatris,nec etiamFilii.Hoc autem
tis,cuius non est receptivum
estfalsum,quoniamsicutad quamcumquevirtutem
siveeffectum
causandum

505alio]aliquoW || subiecto2
om.W || (opposito]
obiecto
M3) 506(et]estM3) 508
nonom.C 509 aliquid]aliquodW 510 corporali]
W || quia]quodZ 512
corpori
Z 513-514ergononinv.P 514 causare]
creatur
creareZ 517 sensitiva
om.
causatur]
lac.W 518 ipsam]ipsaW 523 successivo]
successive
C || omnia]istaadd.W 525
unitatem
unitasM3) 526 instanti
om.W [om.Z) 526-527
(veritatem]
M3) || (veritas]
orationis
. . . prolationis
Z 528 (veritas]
om.perhomoio.
unitasM3) 11 istius2
om.Z 529
Z 531sint]sitZ 532ponitur]
veritas
inadd.CZ || ponitur
ultimo
inv.W 533
virtus]
W
cuius]quiaZ || etiam]nomen

11:22:56 AM

80

CHRISSCHABEL

una persona,concurrit
et alia. Ita etiamnon est alicuius
535 ad extraconcurrit
virtutis
nomen
unius
supernaturalis
receptivum
personaecuiusnon sitnomen
alteriusreceptivum.
Ergo etc.
Quartoet ultimoarguosic: aut huiusmodivirtusessetuna aut plures.Non
una, quia talisnon possetesse in pluribussubiectis,cuiusmodisuntaqua et
540 verba,et ipsa etiamverbainterse. Nec plures,quia tunctalesplures,ex quo
eis
ponunturad causandumaliquidin anima,per consequenscorrespondent
in anima,quod non ponitur.Ergo etc.
etiamdiversieffectus
Dico ergo quod nulla alia virtusest in sacramentis
nisi virtussubsistens,
Deus
est.
Nec
aliter
sacramenta
dicuntur
causa
esse
quae
gratiaequam obsersintcausa gloriaeconsequendae.Sicutenimobservatio
545 vantiaepraeceptorum
diciturcausa gloriaenon effective,
sed tantumex hoc quia Deus
praeceptorum
statuitcuilibetobservanti
dare
praecepta
gloriam "Si vis,"inquit,"ad vitam
sacramentadicunturcausa gratiae
ingredi,servamandata" ita consimiliter
non effective,
quia ista est solus Deus, sed pro quanto ipse Deus ordinavit
550 et statuitcuilibetdignesuscipienti
ipsa conferre
gratiam[C 178rb] effective.
Sic ad quaestionem.
<Ad rationemprincipalem>
ad aliquem
Ad rationemin principio,
quando diciturquod "causa concurrens
ad
ilium
effectum"
concedo
de
causa
effectum.
etc.,
quae agit
supernaturalem
Sic autemnon concurrunt
sacramentaad gratiamsivead iustificationem
ani555 mae. Non enimconcurrunt
causaliter,ut tu accipisin minori,ut statimdictumest. Quare etc.

19.17. 552Hic supra,

11.3-7.
547-548Matthaeus
Z || non]nuncW 539(subiecetalia]etaliaconcurrit
535ad extraom.Z || concurrit
P 542ponitur]
CZ
M3) 540etipsaetiamverbaom.perhomoio.
tis]sacramentis
potest
P (mg.);
observantia
W 545 sint]sitP (mg.)545-546
544-545observantiae]
observatio
om.
W 546quia]quodW 548serva]suaC (serva
sint. . . praeceptorum
M3)
perhomoio.
effectum
inv.W 554 concurrunt]
concurrent
549quanto]tantoZ 553 supernaturalem
C 555statim
om.W 556 quareetc.om.utabbrev.

11:22:56 AM

FrancisofMarchia, Virtus derelicta, and Modifications

of theBasic Principles
ofAristotelian
Physics
FABIO ZANIN*

Abstract
This articletakesas its pointof departurethe convictionthatlate medieval
science should be studiedin its own right,and not merelyto determine
whetherit presageddevelopments
in earlymodernscience.Case in point:
Francisof Marchia's theoryof virtus
derelicta
, the theorythatthe motionof
a projectilethroughthe air is due to a forceleftbehind by the original
motiveforce. Certainly,Marchia's view is not a forerunnerof inertia.
breaks with two important
Nevertheless,it is argued that virtusderelicta
Aristotelian
of
motion:
that
principles
"everything has a beginningmustnecalso
have
an
end"
and
"form
is alwaysindivisible."
dereThus, virtus
essarily
lictais neitheran Aristotelian
solutionto the problemof projectilemotion
nor a development
on theroad to earlymodernscience;it belongsto a new
of motion.
(butsubsequently
undeveloped)understanding
It is worthre-examininghow Francis of Marchia analyzes the causes of
the motionofjbroiecta,
not only because his analysishas originalfeatures,
but also because these featuresconflictwith several principlesof the
Aristoteliantheoryof motion.In particular,the concept of virtus
derelicta
plays the main role in Marchia's break with tradition.It mightappear
that Anneliese Maier wrote all that could be writtenabout projectile
motionin the laterMiddle Ages,withspecial referenceto Marchia's opinion. Most importandy,she removedonce and for all any cause formisvirtus
derelicta
as identicalto "inertialforce":
interpreting
* In whatfollows
I willrefer
to ChrisSchabel's
critical
edition
ofMarchia's
Sent.
IV,
in thisvolume(pp. 41-80),rather
thanAnneliese
Maier'sfamous
text,
q. 1, published
sincetheformer
isbasedontheresults
oflaterMarchia
studies
thatMaiercouldnothave
I willsimply
known.
in squarebrackets
as IV.1 followed
quotetheedition
bylinenumbersafter
a colon,e.g.[IV.1:3-17].Thanks
toRussFriedman
andChrisSchabel
forreadon an earlier
draft
ofthisarticle.
ingandcommenting

Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,
2006
Alsoavailable
online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
44,1

11:23:32 AM

82

FABIOZANIN
The cruciaicontrastbetweenthe principleof inertiaand the theoryof
lies in both the above-mentioned
elements:in the idea thaton
impetus
its own account a motionremainsunchangedin the absence of any
externalor internalforces,and thatas a consequencethereare (violent)
does not showthe tendencyto
motionsin responseto whichthe mobile
come back to a stateof rest.This idea signalsthe abandonmentonce
ab aliquomoveand forall of the Aristotelian
principleomnequodmovetur
mechantheabandonment
ofthefoundation
ofscholastic
tur,and thereby
ics, whichthe impetus
theorystillretainedand on whichit was based.
This contrastis in any case so strongthatthe new idea could not be
developedon the basis of the old theory,but onlyin oppositionto it.1

derelicta
is used in order to solve problemsassociThe device of virtus
distinction
betweennaturaland violentmotion.
ated withthe Aristotelian
derelicta
fitentirelyinto
As far as Maier was concerned,Marchia's virtus
minor
modifications
an Aristotelian
requiringonly
conceptualframework,
derelicta
of Aristode'sbasic theory.2In Maier's view, then,whenevervirtus
the
medieval
within
the
Aristotelian
a
role
framework,
played specific
one.
was entirelydependenton the Aristotelian
mode of scientific
thinking
on
the
is
it
Maier's
considered
views
that
we
have
matter,
So, given
really

1 A. Maier,%weiGrundprobleme
Das Problem
derintensiven
derscholastischen
Naturphilosophie.
zwiRome1951,306:"Derentscheidende
Grsse.
DieImpetustheorie
, 2. Auflage,
Gegensatz
Momenten:
ersten
undderImpetustheorie
schendemTrgheitsprinzip
liegtindenbeiden
Krfte
sichvonselbst
ohneuereoderinnere
in demGedanken,
dasseineBewegung
das mobile
unddasses folglich
erhlt,
Bewegungen
gibt,denengegenber
(gewaltsame)
DieserGedanke
bedeutet
in denRuhezustand
zurckzukehren.
nicht
dasBestreben
zeigt,
ab aliquo
movetur
omne
desaristotelischen
dieendgltige
, und
quodmovetur
Prinzips
Aufgabe
diedie Impetustheorie
derscholastischen
derGrundlagen
damitdieAufgabe
Mechanik,
istallerdings
so
hat.Unddieser
undaufdenensieaufgebaut
nochfestgehalten
Gegensatz
ihnentwickeln
nurgegen
sichnicht
ausdemalten,
sondern
dassderneueGedanke
stark,
seein particular
konnte."
On Marchia
ibid.,161-200.
2 Maier,%weiGrundprobleme
dass
vielmehr,
(cit.n. 1 above),195: "Marchiaerklrt
das
dierichtige
Aristoteles
habe,indemerdieBewegung
Lsunggefunden
grundstzlich
derprimre
die einAbleger
Kraftzurckfuhrt,
aufeinesekundre
bewegende
proiectum
zu korrigieren:
derTrgerdersekundre
istnurin einemPunkt
Kraft
ist.DieseLsung
Thereis a largebibliography
sondern
derbewegte
Kraft
dasMedium,
istnicht
Krper."
the
thereadermight
consult
of motion,
butamongotherworks
on Aristotle's
theory
York1971;
Berlin-New
H. Happ,Hyle.Studien
zumaristotelischen
Materie-Begriff',
following:
Unafisicasenzamatematica:
G.A. Lucchetta,
Democrito,
Arstotele,
, Trento1978;
Filopono
a
inPhysics
Aristotle
onContinuity
D. Bostock,
VI, in: L. Judson
Physics:
(ed.),Aristotle's
Causation
inthePhysics,
D. Charles,
Collection
1991,179-212;
, Oxford
Teleological
ofEssays
and
Method
in Cosmology
Aristotle
andMathematics:
in: ibid.,101-28;
Aporethic
J.J.Cleary,
1995.
York-Kln
, Leiden-New
Metaphysics

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derelicta
necessaryto reconsideryet again what Marchia means by virtus
as well as the role it plays in his analysisof the causes of violentmotion?
From the 1950s to the 1990s, Marshall Clagett and Edward Grant
publishedtheir contributionsto the studyof late medieval science. At
manyjuncturesin his studiesof medieval science, Clagett adopted the
whetheraspects
generalperspectiveof PierreDuhem, examiningexplicitly
of medievalscience were genuineforerunners
of the Galilean-Newtonian
ScientificRevolution.With particularreferenceto the problem of virtus
derelicta
, Edward Grant was not entirelyin agreementwith the view of
derelicta
had the same meaningas 'inerDuhem, who thoughtthat virtus
tial force',at least implicitly;
Grant argued thatthe concept
nevertheless,
of impetus
derelicta
, but preferredby John
(a termsynonymouswith virtus
has
some
characteristics
of
the
Buridan)
principleof inertia.3In my opinion we need to re-examinethe issue, because lyingbehind the research
of practicallyall those who studylate medievalscience is a highlyproblematic presupposition.This presuppositionis encapsulated in the followingquestion:does latemedievalscienceanticipatetheGalilean-Newtonian
ScientificRevolution,or does it stilldepend on Aristotle?
I thinkthat it is importantforus not even to attemptto answerthis
falsequestion,because it lookslike an either/
or dichotomy:either
medieval
scienceanticipatedGalileo orit stilldepended on Aristotle.But the apparent dichotomyis only the resultof the diffusionof Duhem's pioneering
works arguingfor the essentialcontinuitybetween medieval and early
modernscience,on the one hand, and of Kuhn's epistemologicalnotions
describingthe structureof scientificrevolutions,on the other.4Duhem
and Kuhn seem to leave us with a choice between continuityand disand no middleground.The questionwe mustask,beforeeven
continuity,
beginningour studyof late medieval science, is as follows:is it really
3 ForClagett,
see e.g.his"Introduction"
to Nicole
Oresme
andtheMedieval
of
Geometiy
A Treatise
andMotions.
ontheUniformity
andDifformity
Known
as Tractatus
Qualities
ofIntensities
deconfigurationibus
etmotuum,
ed.andtrans.
M. Clagett,
Madison-Milwaukeequalitatum
London1968,105-06.Clagett
dealsdirecdy
withMarchiaand virtus
in hisThe
derelicta
Science
intheMiddle
Madison1959,519-20,
where
on p. 520Clagett
folofMechanics
Ages,
lowsMaierinarguing
thatMarchia's
virtus
derelicta
is"a simple
emendation
oftheAristotelian
theprincipal
ForGrant's
theory,
transferring
impressed
powerto theprojectile."
opinion,
see e.g. TheFoundations
Science
intheMiddle
and
Institutional,
ofModern
Ages.TharReligious,
Intellectual
Contexts
, Cambridge
1996,95-97.
4 I refer
inparticular
to P. Duhem,
Lesystme
dumonde.
Histoire
desdoctrines
cosmologiques
dePlaton
Copernic
vol.VII, 4, andvol.VIII,542,andtoT.S. Kuhn,The
, Paris1954-59,
Structure
Revolutions
, Chicago1962.
ofScientific

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FABIOZANIN

possible to answer the question "Does late medieval science anticipate

modernscience"? In my opinion it is not possibleto marshalconclusive
evidence or rationalargumentsforeitherthe affirmative
or the negative
responseto this question.We can point out certaindeviationsfromthe
or fromthe other,but thatis not the same as answerone way of thinking
the
ing
global question of whethermedieval science anticipatedmodern
derelicta
an anticipationof
to be either
science. Given that assumingvirtus
ofAristotelian
modernscienceora continuation
physicsis a falsedichotomy,
it seems more usefulto pay attentionto the exact meaningof the conderelicta
and the role Marchia gives to it in his explanationof
cept virtus
If we take the above questionas our pointof departhe motionofproiecta.
ture,this will colour the way we understandall the argumentsused by
the Franciscantheologian.
Marchia analyzesviolentmotionin the contextof his discussionof the
consecrationof the Eucharist [IV. 1:1-2]. Maier did not make much of
thisfact,as if it were a negligiblepoint.As mentionedabove, her efforts
derelicta
anticwere directedtowardsansweringthe questionwhethervirtus
and
she
that
it did
of
showed
the
modern
clearly
concept 'inertia5,
ipated
not. On the otherhand, Maier did carefullystressthatlate medievalsciso to speak, in
ence was really a heterogeneous"world of thinking,"5
of meanings.Despite
derelicta
had a multiplicity
whichthe conceptof virtus
that,however,she did not noticethat thereis a manifestbreak fromthe
Aristotelianframeworkin the way that this concept is used to explain
the causes of severaldiversekindsof violentmotion.6
I will argue below that virtusderelicta
representsa way of conceiving
motion that is neitherAristoteliannor Galilean: it can be seen as the
startingpoint of a new concept of motion.To be sure, Marchia's ideas
when takenup by Nicole Oresme,forexamwere inchoate;nevertheless,
about the nature and causes of every
soon
led
to
conclusions
ple, they
fromboth Aristotle'sconclukind of motionthat appear to be different
of
modern
sions and those
physicists.Specifically,the concept of virtus
to onlysome kinds
derelicta
, in preciselythe way Marchia takesit, restricts
of motionthe applicabilityof the Aristotelian
physicalprincipleaccording
5 See Maier,Zjjuei
(cit.n. 1 above),114.
Grundprobleme
6 I shouldstress
from
theAristotelian
didnotea departure
thatMaieractually
point
andnotviolent,
and
causesa motion
thatis in somewaynatural
ofview:virtus
derelicta
to thispoint,
whichis crulittle
attention
is correct.
ButMaierdevoted
thisobservation
motion
thatis both
cialinmyopinion,
becauseitis therootofa newwayofconceiving
See Maier,%wei
andnon-Galilean.
nonAristotelian
(cit.n. 1 above),185-86.
Grundprobleme

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to which "everything
that has a beginningmustnecessarilyalso have an
end."7 In effect,virtus
derelicta
makes it possible to analyze a broad spectrumof non-violentmotionsthat neverthelessare not natural motions,
having no natural tendenciesor aims; since natural,terrestrial
motions,
on the Aristoteliansystem,always cease when the mobiles come to rest
in theirproper places, in this respectvirtus
derelicta
allows for the possibilityof some motionstakingplace withoutnecessarilycomingto an end.
In addition, it will be argued that virtusderelicta
opens the door to a
of
certain
of
inasmuch
as it breakswiththe
quantification
types motion,
Aristotelianprinciplethat formis always indivisible.The very fact that
virtus
derelicta
is a formthat in principledepletesitselfmakes it possible
to measureit, and the motionit causes, in a quantitativeway thatis not
open to the traditionalAristotelianview of form.
Let us begin,then,- as we must- by outliningthe exact contextin which
the concept of virtusderelicta
was born. Francis of Marchia explains its
in
his
on
meaning
commentary the Sentences
(book IV, question 1), as he
triesto understandwhat kind of alterationtakesplace duringthe consecrationof the Eucharist:how can the formsof Christ'sbody and blood
inherein the matterof bread and wine [IV. 1:8-12]? Marchia considers
the problem of consecrationto be just one of a group of changes that
include (1) motionsthat are not completelynatural,such as projectile
motion,in which the projectilecontinuesto move afterthe motiveforce
ceases to act on the mobile,and (2) artificialchangescaused by an external forcethat leads shapelessmatterto a non-connaturalend (one that
is completelycontraryto its essence,for example a shape that it would
nevertake on by itself)[IV. 1:50-9]. Put simply:we are dealinghere with
changes or motionsthat are not absolutelynatural,since some type of
outside force is required to make them occur (in contrastto natural
change),and yetare not absolutelyviolenteither,sincetheydo not oppose
the natural tendenciesof the object receivingthe action of the motive
force[IV. 1:320-7]. On the basis of thesepreliminary
dereexamples,virtus
lictaclearlyseems to be used as a conceptualtool that makes it possible
to explainwhy "hybrid-motions"
that are neithercompletelynaturalnor
violent
completely
happen.
7 Thiswastherealpointofdeparture
from
Aristotelian
which
as faras I can
physics,
tellMaierdidnotnotice.
FortheAristotelian
seeDe celoI, 12,282a25;for
principle,
seehisLe Livre
ducieletdumonde
Oresme,
I, c. 29,eds.A.D. MenutandA.J.Denomy,
Madison1968,200-02.

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FABIOZANIN

derelicta
is a forma
thatthe motive
Accordingto Marchia,virtus
peraccidens
forcegives to the mobile body allowingit to continueforsome time in
its movement,withoutanotherpush being necessaryto keep it moving.
derelicta
is adapted to the dispositionsof what undergoes
Moreover,virtus
its action, or to be exact, followingwhat Marchia himselfoftensays, it
acts proportionatelyto the movable potentialitiesof the moved body.
Thus, this is not a formof the sort that leads to the perfectionof the
matterto which it is united by reachingthe veryessence of the matter
itself[IV. 1:232-40, 329-36, 345-8]. In consequence virtus
derelicta
is more
mixta'in fact,bodies of this type are unceaseasily received by corpora
directions.Therefore
inglysubjectedto several forcesacting in different
virtus
derelicta
acts againstthe naturaltendenciesof thiskind of body. In
otherwords,wheneverthiskindof motiveforce{virtus
derelicta
alone) acts,
no essentialchange is caused, as Marchia explains:
What is moreperfectly
suitedto be movedby a motivevirtus
is a more
of
but
a
stone
or
other
mixed
motion;
proportionate
subject
any
body
of sufficient
movable by a
weightis more easily and more perfectly
motivevirtus
than air or some otherlightthing,such as chaff,forthe
movermoreperfectly
movesand throwsfarther
and moreeasilya stone
of sufficient
else lighterthanthis;
weightthanhe does chaffor anything
if because of its lightness
chaffis not a proportionate
mobile
therefore,
fora motivevirtus
, thenneitheris air itself,and it followsfromthisthat
a stone is a more proportionatesubject of the virtus
continuingthis
motionthan air is [IV. 1:195-203].
whatis remarkable
RegardingMarchia'sanalysisof themotionofproiecta,
is that frequendythe Franciscantheologianmaintainsthat virtus
derelicta
is a formlackingany naturalinclinationor tendency;thereis no ideoderelogical imperativeconnectedto it. The movementimpartedby virtus
- thisis motionthat does not
lictais indifferent
with respectto direction
conformto the patternof naturalmotion.At the beginningof any given
motionvirtus
derelicta
can workwith or againstthe particularnaturaldisof
the
mobile
position
body withrespectto thismotion.If it worksagainst
the mobile body's naturaldisposition,the resultis that virtus
derelicta
dissipates more quicklythan when it is workingwith the natural disposition. Thus, for Marchia virtusderelicta
has no regard for any 'end' of
whether
'end'
is
in
taken
a
movement,
temporal,spatial,or essentialsense
1:
[IV. 237-40, 258-62, 384-7]. Now, this particularfeatureis common
to the motionof proiecta
and to purelyviolentmotion.Nevertheless,the

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PHYSICS

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motion caused by virtusderelicta

is not preciselyan example of violent
motion. In fact,Marchia never forgetsto stress,when it seems useful,
that the motioncaused by virtus
derelicta
is connaturalis
, because it can be
it
is
not
in
with
the
(although
necessarily) agreement
dispositionsof the
mobile body [IV. 1:309-15].
A furtherconsequence of thisview is that it underminesthe universal
idea thatany motionwithoutan end or a natvalidityof the Aristotelian
ural inclinationis forcedor violentmotion. This will have crucial conafterMarchia will think
sequencesforthe way severalmedievalphysicists
of motionin general,basing theirideas on Marchia's own theoryof virtusderelicta.
The conclusionaccordingto which the motiongiven by this
kind of forcenot only has no end, but also no temporalstoppingpoint,
will be the most importantone that natural philosopherslike Buridan
will deduce fromthe particularfeaturesof virtus
derelicta.
The Franciscantheologianappears to have regardedthe theoryas his
own originalinvention.In any eventhe looked upon it as divergingfrom
the main auctoritates
in the fieldof physics.8Nevertheless,it seems clear
thatMarchia drew some inspirationfromAverroes,who in factis quoted
threetimesin Marchia's IV Sentences
, question 1 [IV. 1:249, 318-19, 417.9
To
be
the
Muslim
sure,
20]
philosopherdoes not use the concept of
virtusderelicta
and
he may not even have realized the change in the
,
Aristotelian
framework
thathe was introducing.Yet Averroesestablished
the theoreticalconditionsthat made it possibleto talk about a new kind
of motion,beginningwithcelestialmotionand applyingitslaws to someand only some- terrestrial
motions.Averroessinglesout a special kind
of motionwithparticularfeaturesthatmake it different
frommerelynatural motions(motus
naturaliter
and
violent
motions(motus
simpliciter) merely
extranaturavi
and
similar
to
the
motion
of
that
Marchia
),
proiecta
analyzes.
This is the motionof heavenlybodies, which,accordingto Averroes,has
no natural tendency:whateverthe formkeeping the heavenlybody in
8 In facthemaintains
histheory
de hocdixerit
etCommentator"
"quicquid
Philosophus
[IV.1:249].
9 ForAverroes'
ofthecontradictions
between
natanalysis
implied
bythedistinction
uralandviolent
seeAristotelis
dephysico
auditu
libri
cum
Averrois
Cordubensis
variis
motion,
octo,
ineosdem
a summis
huius
aetatis
a mendis
commentariis,
quaeomnia
Philosophis,
quamplurimis
expurcum
Averrois
commentariis
, VIII, comm.27-35,in:Aristotelis
gatecernuntur
, apudlunetas,
opera
Venice1562-1574,
vol.IV, ff.364ra-375rb
as Averroes,
In Physicam
,
(quotedhenceforth
followed
ofthecomment
andthefolio).
bythenumber

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FABIOZANIN

motionmay be, thatformdoes not lead to any conditionof perfection.10

As we saw above, Marchia's virtus
derelicta
acts in the same way. Indeed,
, because
accordingto Averroes,the motionof heavenlybodies is connaturali
it happenslikeany naturalmotiondoes. There is onlyone crucialdifference
between the motion of heavenlybodies and that of proiecta
: the former
can receiveendlesslythe actionof a virtus
extrnseca
the angelic
(specifically,
thatdriveseach heavenlybody),but the matterofproiecta
canintelligence
not.11 Beyondthat,however,theyare bothneithermotus
naturaliter
,
simpliter
nor motusextranaturante
but motus
naturam
, to use Averroes'words.
praeter
The potentiallyinfiniteaction of the virtus
of heavenlybodies is limited only by the essence of this kind of body, which is essentiallysim- that
- fromthe
is absoluta
is, disengaged
ple.12Since thisvirtus
body, the
formthis virtus
constitutesdoes not depend on the matteron which it
acts. Thus its action would be endlessand of infiniteforce;it is restricted
Averroesmakes a short
onlyper accidens
by the limitsof matteritself.13
referenceto heavenlymotionin his long commentary
on the Physics
, book
where
the
under
discussion
is
the
cause
of
the
motion
of
VIII,
subject
animatedbodies. Here he maintainsthatit is possibleto place alongside
the natural formof a movable body qua body anothernatural form
anima that is not necessarilycontraryto the formerand that,therefore,
togetherwiththe formercan anywaycause a completelynaturalmotion.14
Here again, then,we see Averroesarguingthata forceor formcan exist
that sometimescauses natural motion,sometimesviolent,and hence is
fromthe causes of either.
strictly
speakingdifferent
Marchia's theoryhas its startingpoint in the analysis of heavenly
motions,which Averroesacknowledgedto be special. Marchia definesa
betweenvirtus
derelicta
and virtus
coelestis
: the latteris perunique difference
10Averroes,
In Physicam,
27,f.365vb.
11IV.1:368-77;
Averroes
Sermo
desubstantia
orbis
's opera
Cordubensis,
, cap.3, in:Aristoteli
cum
Averrois
, IX, f. 10va-b.
12Averroes,
Sermo
desubstantia
, 3, f. lOvb.
13Averroes,
Sermo
desubstantia
, 3, f.9ra.
14Averroes,
In Physicam
"Potest
ab
, 27,f. 365rb-va:
quisdicerequodmotuscorporis
estmotus
extranaturam,
cummoveat
anima,verbigratiaad superius,
ipsumecontrario
suomotunaturali.
innatum
estmoveri
ad inferius,
sedtarnen,
Corpusenimanimalis
quia
animaanimalis
estforma
suicorporis
necesse
estutmotus
eiusa suaanima
naturaliter,
fitnaturaliter.
inventum
in eo, itaquodin
Sed,si fuerit
aliquidmotum
perprincipium
suocorpore
nonsitprincipium
contrarium
motuianimae,
tuncilludmotum
eritmotum
naturaliter
scilicet
et percorpus,
utdeclaratum
eritde corpore
simpliciter,
peranimam
coelesti."

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somewherebetweena
feetin se, while the formeris naturallyimperfect,
which
leads
the dispositionsof a
for
form
(colour,
example),
permanent
body to a conditionof perfectionor fullactualization,and a successive
form(motionor time, for example) allowingfor a continualsuccession
of parts instantafterinstant:
So I say thatthereare threetypesof form:one is simplysuccessive,
such as motion,and thissortof formdisappearsand goes away at the
suchas whitesame timethemoverstops.Anotheris simplypermanent,
ness. The thirdis roughlyin the middle,because it is neithersimply
successive,like motion,nor simplypermanent,since, when its cause
caused
ceases,it can onlyremainfora shorttime- and themotivevirtus
is
of
sort
the
first
virtus
this
[IV. 1:470-5].
by
Marchia does not take the step that Buridan will in his commentaryon
: if virtus
derelicta
De celo
, as Buridan calls it) acted on a body
(or impetus
thatdid not resistits action,and in so doing it favouredthe dispositions
of the body, the resultwould be motionwithoutend. One could imagine thishappeningin the heavens,since thereis no contraryresistance
and indeed God restedon the seventhday aftersettingthe spheresin
motion.15Francis of Marchia, on the other hand, only admits that the
motionofproiecta
alwaysdepletesitself,ceasing aftera time,as our expederelicta
is a formthat
rience tellsus. He draws the conclusionthat virtus
has a limitedamount of "power" or "force" in it, and this force can
situations
spread out eitherwhollyor partiallyaccordingto the different
in which it takes effect[IV. 1:423-31, 445-53].
of Marchia's
We should turnour attentionto a second characteristic
which
illustrates
the
crucial
made
to
the
Aristotelian
theory,
change being
framework.
Form is an indivisibleprinciplein Aristode'swell-knownopinOf course, one could measure the
it is not quantifiable.16
ion; therefore,
15See IoannesBuridanus,
In Metaphysicen
Aristotelis
, lib.XII, q. 9,J. Badius
quaestiones
unaimaParis1518(reprint
Frankfurt
Ascensius,
1964),f. 123ra:"Adhucessetponibilis
nscioan fatua:
vosscitis
a proiginario,
quodmulti
ponunt
postexitum
quodproiectum
fortior
iciente
movetur
ab mpetu
datoa proiiciente
et movetur
durtimpetus
quamdiu
et in infinitum
duraret
nisidiminueretur
et corrumperetur
a
quamresistentia;
impetus
velab inclinante
ad contrarium
nulresistente
contrario
motum.
Et in motibus
celestibus
lumestresistens
contrarium.
mundi
Deusquamlibet
movit
Ideo,cumincreatione
spheram
a movendo
etperimpetum
illisspheris
semvoluit,
quavelocitate
ipsecessavit
impressum
illimotus.
Undedictum
die requievit
estquodDeus septima
ab
perposteaduraverunt
omnioperequodpatraverat."
16See Physics,
194b15.
II, 2, 193b23-

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FABIOZANIN

effectsof thisindivisibleprinciple,e.g. in motion,but thiswould onlytell

us about the degree to which a body's resistiveforcehinderedthe action
of the motiveforces.For example,velocityin local motionis affectedby
the resistiveforcethe medium"uses" to preventthe action of any motive
force.17On this analysisof motion,if the degree of resistiveforcewere
zero, thiswould resultin instantaneous
motion,as Marchia himselfnotes.18
Althoughhe may not have known it, Marchia was workingwithina
particularpre-Galilean conceptual tradition,somewhat un-Aristotelian,
whichthe Byzantinecommentator
JohnPhiloponus(d. ca. 570) had helped
develop centuriesbeforein discussingat lengththe possibilityof motion
in a void in a long note at the end of his commentaryon book IV of
.19 Philoponus stressesthat, according to the principles of
the Physics
Aristotelianphysics,any change that occurs is due to the contributions
both of the dispositionsof the body subjectedto the motiveforceand of
the motiveforceitself,which has a specificdegree.20If the resistiveforce
were zero, the motiveforcewould act accordingto its proper maximal
degree and would not undergo any reduction.The Byzantinecommentatoradds that it reallyseems nonsensicalto thinkthat a materialbody
could move in an instantover any distance.In fact,the spatial distance
betweentwo pointsis itselfa sort of resistance.21
Averroesmaintainedthe same conclusionin his treatiseDe substantia
orbis
: the matterof heavenlybodies is subiectum
tantum
, i.e. a heavenly
17In anycase,although
on theAristotelian
forcecan in principle
resistive
be
theory
- ifitever
wasa rareoccurrence
in thelaterMiddleAges
suchmeasurement
measured,
occurred.
18See Francis
ofMarchia,
libros
Aristotelis,
VIII,c. 9, no.3, quotedand
Super
Physicorum
in C. Schabel,
discussed
OntheThreshold
Mass?Francesco
onResistance
ofInertial
d'Appignano
andInfinite
delI Convegno
suFrancesco
Internazionale
, in:D. Priori
(ed.),Atti
Velocity
d'Appignano,
delTronto2002,182-83andnn.20-21.
Appignano
19Iohannes
InAristotelis
libros
commentaria:
corollaquinqu
posteriores
Philoponus,
physicarum
rium
deinani
inAristotelem
et auctoritate
, in: Commentaria
, vol.XVII, editaConsilio
graeca
Academiae
Litterarum
et impensis
Berlin1888,
regiaeBorussicae,
typis
GeorgiReimeri,
as: Philoponus,
Corollarium
deinani).
Thereis a largebodyof
675-95(quoted
henceforth
ofmotion;
literature
on Philoponus'
see e.g.M. Wolff,
Geschichte
derImpetustheorie.
theory
derklassischen
Mechanik
zumUrsprung
, Frankfurt-am-Main
1978,67-160pasUntersuchungen
Unafisica
matematica
TheTheory
senza
sim;Lucchetta,
(cit.n. 3 above);R. Sorabji,
ofImpetus
orImpressed
Matter
inAntiquity
Force:
Motion.
Theories
andTheir
, Space,
, in:R. Sorabji,
Philoponus
C. Wildberg,
, London1988,227-48;
, in:E.N.Zalta(ed.),TheStanford
Sequel
John
Philoponus
URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/
(Fall2003Edition),
Encyclopedia
ofPhilosophy
as wellas theliterature
referred
to in thoseplaces.
entries
/philoponus/;
20Philoponus,
deinani
Corollarium
, 677-78.
21Philoponus,
in
Corollxmum
deinani
to Philoponus,
motion
, 681-84.According
happens
timein all casesbecauseitsessence
is temporal;
seeon thisspecific
pointibid.,695.

11:23:32 AM

PHYSICS
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MARCHIA
& THE BASICPRINCIPLES

91

body's formdoes not bringits matterfrompotencyto act, and as a result

the essentiallimitsof its quantityare the unique resistiveforcethat limitself.In any case, even iftherewere infinite
its the actionof the vismotrix
there
would
still
be
finite
motion in the heaven, which is caused
force,
will
the
of
Marchia advances simangelic intelligences.22
by
self-limiting
ilar objectionsto the Aristotelianideas about instantaneousmotion and
derelicta
is an entitythat lies beyond the
appears to conclude that virtus
basic principlesof the Stagirite'stheoryof motion.In fact- and here is
- since the action
a major break with the traditionalAristoteliantheory
of virtus
is limitedand observable,it becomes theoretically
derelicta
possible to quantifythe motionofproiecta
and virtus
derelicta
itself.In thisway,
the Aristotelian
principleaccordingto whichthe formis indivisibleis rendered null and void. Moreover,as Marchia tellsus [IV. 1: 449-53], given
this new theoreticalframeworkwe should not deny the hypothesisof
motionin a void,23that is, the motion of a body so disposed that virtus
derelicta
can act on it withfullforce.
22Averroes,
De substantia
"Manifestum
estenimquod,si incorpore
orbis,
3, f.9vb-10ra:
ex materia
intempore,
etforma
essetvirtus
infinita
inipsoessevircomposito
sequeretur
in ipsaactione
tutem
infinitam
autpassione,
et estimpossibile
intulit
ex
quodAristoteles
in tempore.
coelestia
Et estmanifestum
possevirtutum,
quibusmoventur
corpora
quod
nonsequitur
etiamex hoc,quodcorpus
in se infinitam
in temfinitam
recipit
passionem
ex materia
et forma,
sicutsequeretur
cumactioet passioeius
pore,ut sitcompositum
in tempore.
fuerit
finita
Primum
enimcontingit
ei, secundum
quodestcorpustantum;
secundum
autemsecundum
noncompositum.
in hac
Modusdeceptionis
quodestcorpus
etquodfecit
Aristotelem
contradicere
istorum
duosibi,estaequivocatio
quaestione,
putari
rumnominum,
finitum
et infinitum,
cumnondistinguitur
distinquoniam,
'sic'Fortasse:
et infinitas
in tempore
finitas
a finitate
etinfintate
guuntur?]
contingentes
contingentibus
inactione
etpassione,
istaambiguitas,
etex hacfinitate
in qua conveniunt
corcontingit
et materialia,
declaravit
Aristoteles
universaliter
omneessefinitum,
poracoelestia
corpus
nonex finitate,
secundum
ex materia
etforma,
et
quaeaccidit
corpori,
quodcomponitur
dubitationes
contra
Aristotelem.
Etpotest
perhaecabscinduntur
aliquisdicerequod,cum
omnecorpusagitperaliquodet patitur
estutomnecorpus
fitcomperaliud,necesse
ex materia
etforma.
Et ad hocdicamus
esseverum.
Sedcorporum
est
positum
quoddam
itaquodforma
nonconstituitur
itaquodmateria
estsubieccompositum,
permateriam,
tumtantum,
et nonmateria,
cuiusessesitinpotentia,
utcorpus
coelestae etquoddamestcompositum
ex materia,
et forma,
quae estin potentia,
quae constituitur
per
utcorpora
etcorruptibilia.
. . . Apparet
etiamexhoccorpus
coeleste
materiam,
generabilia
nonhaberesubiectum
nisitantum
motum
autemgenerabilia
et
localem,
propter
corpora
habentmateriam
et corruptionem,
daturautemeis
corruptibilia
propter
generationem
forma
seddifferenter,
inaltero
vero
actionem,
infinita,
propter
quiainalteroesttempore
finita:
illaesuntimmateriales,
istaeveroformae
materiales.
Secundum
hocigipropterea
turdebetintelligi
istaquaestio,
diuantelogicam
quamignoravi
perscrutationem."
23Maierstresses
thistheoretical
too:%wei
(cit.n. 1 above),
consequence,
Grundprobleme
196-97.

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FABIOZANIN

The innovationof Marchia's concept of virtus

derelitta
lies not so much
in puttingthe new motiveforcein theproiectum
ratherthanin the medium
throughwhich it moves [IV. 1: 158-80], as in grantingit a crucial role in
the analysisof a particularset of natural motions(or motionsthat are
non-violentstridosensu)as a formwith no natural tendencyor disposition,which causes the motion.Maier paid so much attentionto the fact
that virtusderelicta
was in the projectileas opposed to in the medium
because she realizedthatthe solutionto thiskindof problemcould make
it possible to conceive of motion in a void.24In so doing Maier overlooked the idea of virtus
derelicta
as a special kind of form.This is a pity,
because it is thislatteraspect of virtus
derelicta
thatreallyshowsa decisive
departurefromthe Aristotelianpoint of view concerningnatureand its
laws. AlthoughMaier made frequentmentionof Marchia's theory,she
did not notice that it containsimplicitlythe theoreticalpossibilityof a
of motiveforceas a form.25
quantification
Marchia's theoryof virtus
derelicta
shouldbe consideredthe firststep on
- in
the road to a new physics
ratherits
fact,it is no longerAristotelian;
featuresare unique. I will supportmy point of view withMarchia's own
words.When he triesto give persuasivereasonsin orderto explainwhat
virtus
derelicta
reallyis, he comparesits motiveaction withthat by which
attract
iron and with that by which light illuminatesbodies
magnets
1:3
1518, 352-7, 394-9]. The firstcomparisonis simplypart of a long
[IV.
traditionof studieson the motion of proiecta
and it is easy to findit in
: magcommentarieson the Aristotelianlibrinaturales
fourteenth-century
netsattractiron by inducingan alterationin the iron thatpreparesit for
, to which the
receivingwithoutresistancethe action of the vis attractiva,
26
iron conformsitself[IV. 1:355-7].
The second comparison,however,cannot be found so easily before
Marchia's commentaryon Sentences
, at least to my knowledge.Afterwards
it seems to be used widely by artistae
who became magisti
during the
24Maier,weiGrundprobleme
(cit.n. 1 above),225.
25In fact,
aboutthequantification
Maierdoesnotsayanything
ofform.
26See e.g.IoannesBuridanus,
degeneratane
etcorruptione
I, q. 18,msBerlin,
Quaestiones
lat.fol.387,f. 141va: "De magnete
dicendum
sed
Staatsbibliothek,
quodagitin ferrum
ut dicitCommentator
ita quodaliquam
Physicorum,
priusin aeremmedium,
septimo
in aeremet multiplicatur
ettuncferrum
qualitatem
imprimit
usquead ferrum,
perillam
estinnatum
moveri
ad magnetem
sibiimpressam
qualitatem
propter
aliquamconvenieninhislongcommentary
tiam."
Averroes
alsomadethiskindofcomparison
onthePhysics
,
as Marchia
knows:
In Pkysicam,
35,f.374va.

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MARCHIA
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PHYSICS

93

derelicta
acts in
periodJohn Buridan taughtat Paris (ca. 1325-60): virtus
the same way as light(lux)when it illuminatesbodies, and thereforeit
noncorruptibiles
into act: "For a virtus
or formlike
puts theirdispositions
light,which does not posit any alterationin the heavens and thisform
[i.e. the virtusderelicta
] is of this sort, since it is neutral and withouta
- is not
contrary
repugnantto the heavens any more than lightis; but
thisis a virtus
that has no contraryand positsno more alterationin the
heavens than lightdoes" [IV, 1:396-9]. Finally,light(lux)becomes lumen
as it is reflectedby a non-transparent
body. In fact,lumenis the visible
that
is
the
of
the
light
reflection
lightemanatingfroma per se luminous
body.Justas lightdoes not lead a complexbody to the perfectionrelated
to any of its qualities,but ratherit bringssome dispositionsinto act, so
virtus
derelicta
bringsdifferent
dispositionsinto act.27
Marchia wants to place the action of virtusderelicta
in the group of
causes of motion that have no natural disposition;in this respect,it is
just like light,which does not director aim the changes that it causes
towardsa goal thatis contraryto anothergoal (a spatialend, forexample),
as generallyhappenswhen a materialbody movesupwardsor downwards.
Causes of thiskind are what power "connatural"motions,which do not
have theirends in conditionsof perfectionproper to the movingbodies
(in contrastto permanentformslike qualities);consequently,thesecauses
do not provokeany corruption(or at least it happens merelyperaccidens
),
because theybringinto act formsthat are not contraryto otherforms.
This reallyis a departurefromthe originalAristotelian
theoryof motion,
because in Marchia's opinion movementswithoutend are in some way
natural.This crucial difference
is not renderedexplicitby Marchia, and
of course neitherare its consequences,but we can tryto do that,starting fromthe Franciscan'sarguments.
27Among
thatcouldbe given,
seee.g.C. Kren,TheQuaestiones
quitea fewexamples
Oresme
The University
ofWisconsin,
, 2 vols.(Ph.D.Dissertation,
superde celoofNicole
Madison1965),vol.1,book1,q. 22,401:"Secunda
conclusio
estde accidente
quodnon
a contrario
necperse sicudcaliditas,
ut albedo,sed
corrumpitur
nequeex consequenti
absentiam
sicudlumen
velspecies
inmedio.
Estigitur
conclusio
conservantis,
propter
quod
talede natura
suaestcorruptibile
et tarnen
estquodaliquidtalenunquodlibet
possible
sicudpriusarguebatur
de lumine,
etcausaestquiataleaccidens
non
quamcorrumpatur,
habetcontrarium
ideononindigent
a resistendo
sed
positivm,
contrario,
aliquavirtute
estde se potest
si maneatconservans
et corrumpitur
si recedens."
quantum
perpetuali
NotethatMaierfound
thecomparison
between
theessence
oflight
andthatofvirtus
derelicta
in Marsilius
ofInghen's
on thePhysics
thesecondhalf
(orimpetus)
commentary
(from
ofthefourteenth
%wei
century):
Grundprobleme
(cit.n. 1 above),285.

11:23:32 AM

94

FABIOZANIN

naturalis
derelicta
, such as virtus
, causes a motion that is not
Any virtus
destinedto come to an end- thisin contrastto violentmotions
necessarily
because it is not in oppositionto the naturaldispositionsof the moved
body in any way. Such a motion could in principlelast forever,but in
derelicta
has temporallimrealityit lastsfora limitedtimebecause a virtus
its of action. This is what Marchia maintainsin two different
passages
of his Sentences
IV, q. 1, the second of which bringsout the difference
betweenvirtus
derelicta
and virtus
coelestis
:
And if someoneasks what typeof virtus
thisis, one can say thatit is
neitheran absolutelypermanentform,nor an absolutely
vanishingone,
but quasi in between,because it remainsfora time.Justas heat generatedby firein waterdoes not have permanentexistenceabsolutelyas
it does in fire,nor absolutely
vanishingexistenceliketheheatingprocess
but ratherexistencethatremainsfora fixedtime,thusin thematitself,
terat hand thistypeof virtus
remainsfora timein accordancewiththe
proportionof the virtus
by whichit is leftbehind [IV, 1:241-7].
But one mustrealizethatbeingcorrupted
withthecessationofthemovin
virtus
is
two-fold:
one
is corrupted
withthecessation
ing
waysomething
ofthemovingvirtus
suchthat,whenthevirtus
that
stops,
thingis corrupted
and destroyed,
likemotion,forat theinstantthatthevirtus
of themover
is
the
motion
or
or
ceases
at
the
same
time.In anostops,
corrupted stops
therwaysomething
is said to be corrupted
or to cease to be whensomethingelse ceases not because when that somethingelse ceases or is
it itselfis corrupted
at thesame time,butbecauseitcannotlast
corrupted
when
the
other
has
on accountof the imperfection
of its
ceased,
long
being.Justas the raysor remainsleftin theeye fromsomething
excepwhen the visiblethingis
tionallybrightare not corruptedimmediately
removed,but aftera shorttime,because theycannotlast long withthe
becauseoftheirimperfection,
itis thuswiththisvirtus
caused
thingremoved,
in theheavenby themovingintelligence,
or impressed
and also withany
othervirtus
caused by any othermovervia local motion[IV, 1:456-69].
eliminatethe condiHowever, on the same basis we could theoretically
tion thatrestricts
the possibilityof an everlastingmotion,if we only consider the dispositionsof that which is undergoingthe non-corruptive
motiveaction.These actionsare put into effectby a naturalmotiveforce,
such as sunlight,but the action itselfdoes not lead the body undergoing
the action to a stateof perfection,
forthereis no limitto the degreesof
illumination.In effect,these dispositionswould be luminousforever,if
outsidecircumstancesallowed it.

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& THE BASICPRINCIPLES
OF ARISTOTELIAN
PHYSICS

95

Buridan will take the crucial step in this directionand in this sense
will go beyondMarchia's theoryof virtus
derelicta
,28Maintainingthatsuch
a virtus
connaturalis
has a limitedforcewith referenceto time and degree
of intensity,
and therefore
thatit can onlycause a simple,limited
stressing
is
an
unfounded
a
change, merely
prioridecision. Conceiving a motion
withoutnaturaldispositionor aim means ipsofactoconsideringit as potenwithinan Aristotelian
I thinkthat
tiallyeverlasting
conceptualframework.
the famouspassage fromBuridan'scommentaryon De celo
in
, whichthe
motion
of
the
heavens
is
as
the
a particular
effect
of
perpetual
imagined
virtus
derelicta
, should be read fromthispoint of view: virtus
derelicta-impetus
is the correctnaturalcause of that perpetuity,bearing in mind its featuresand the essence of the matterof heavenlybodies.
Marchia's theoryof virtus
derelicta
is one of the most importantcontributionsto the renewalof Westernscientificthinking,
because it exceeds
the limitationsof the Aristoteliantheoryof motion.Neverthelessit stops
at the thresholdof a self-conscious
break by maintainingthata perpetual
motionis naturallyimpossible(although,we can add, logicallypossible,
betweennatfollowingDuns Scotus' well knownviews on the distinction
ural and logicalpossibility).
In itsessence,virtus
derelicta
has a limitedduration and consequentlyit can cause only a limitedmovement.Popper
would have stressedthat this is clearlyan ad hocprinciple,which does
not depend on any otherformalprincipleof the theoryof virtus
derelicta
.29
In fact,it is onlyused in orderto retainthe Aristotelian
principleaccordthat has a beginningmust also have an end."
ing to which "everything
Buridan gets rid of it, but he is stillable to keep his theoryof motion
coherent:in fact, he startsto travel on a new path, along which the
meaningof 'motion' itselfchanges.30
Padova
Universit
degliStudidi Padova

28See above,note15.
29See:K.R. Popper,
Realism
andthe
AimofScience
, London-Melbourne-Sidney-Auckland1983,partI, chap.1, 15,133-35.
Johannesburg
30On Buridan's
ofmotion
Science
see,e.g.,Clagett,
theory
ofMechanics
(cit.n. 3 above);
Science
Giovanni
Grant,TheFoundations
ofModem
(cit.n. 3 above),95-98;A. Ghisalberti,
Buridano.
Dallametafisica
allafisica
dumouvement
danslaphilo, Milan1975;J. Biard,Le statut
naturelle
buridanniene
duXIVe
, in: S. CarotiandP. Souffrin
sophie
(eds.),La nouvelle
physique
sicle
, Florence
1997,141-59.

11:23:32 AM

Utrum inhaerentia sit de essenta accidentis. FrancisofMarchiaand

theDebateon theNatureofAccidents
FABRIZIOAMERINI

Abstract
Thispaperattempts
to providea generalreconstruction
ofFrancisofMarchia's
doctrineof accidentalbeing.The paper is dividedintotwo parts.(1) In the
the debate on the natureof accidents
firstpart,I begin by reconstructing
held beforeMarchia,showingthatsuch a debateis characterised
by a progressiveshiftconcerningthe way to understandaccidents.While the first
modes
of
Aristotelian
ofbeing
regardaccidentsespeciallyas inhering
interpreters
in the secondhalf
substances,the majorityof theologiansand philosophers
For them,the
of the thirteenth
centuryregardaccidentsas absolute
beings.
problemis no longerto explainif and, if so, how accidentscan be distinct
can makesomeone thing.
buthow accidentsand substances
fromsubstances,
focus
is
on
their
explainingwhattheontologicalstaMetaphysically, primary
oftheEucharistie
is. Although
it is especially
theconsideration
tusofinherence
and theocase thatinducesthischange,I pointout thatmanyphilosophers
for
in
texts
the
find
Aristotle's
logians
philosophicalsupport takingthisstep.
I
more
In
second
focus
the
closelyon Marchia'sdoctrine,arguing
(2)
part,
revisedversionof Scotus's.UnlikeAquinas
thatMarchia'spositionis a slightly
of accidentsby
and Bonaventure,
Marchia explainsAristotle's
metaphysics
of
the
and
not
vice
versa.
of
the
Eucharist
So, in orderto
way
metaphysics
of
this
miraculous
Marchia
maintains
the
case,
consistency
explain philosophical
thatone does not need to modifythe notionof inherenceby distinguishing
actual frompotentialinherenceand includingthe latterin the accident's
and,
essence;ratherit is necessaryto takethe case of the Eucharistseriously
on thisbasis,to removeinherencetotallyfroman accident'sessence.In conclusion,theEucharistshowsthataccidentsare absolutebeingsto whichactual
inherencepertainscontingently,
potentialinherencenecessarily.But like
thatremainunresolved.
Scotus's,Marchia'sdoctrinefacessome difficulties
Remarks
Introductory
as basicallybipartite.
Traditionally,
people thinkof Aristotle'smetaphysics
we
worldfroman Aristotelian
If we look at the extra-mental
perspective,

Vivarium
44,1

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2006
- www.brill.nl/viv
online
Alsoavailable

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MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

97

findsubstanceson the one hand and accidentsor qualificationsof substanceson the other.What ontologicalstatusAristodegrantsto accidents,
though,is not immediatelyclear. In fact,we could regard accidentsas
independentbeings,or perhaps modes of being, that are reallydifferent
if not separable fromsubstances;or, alternatively,
we could regardthem
as substances'modes of being,whichare onlyconceptually
different
or separable fromsubstances.The problemarisesbecause Aristodepursuesboth
theseviewsto a certaindegree.In orderto obtaina generalunderstanding
of the nature of Aristotelianmetaphysics,then, a studyfocused on the
natureof accidentalbeing is required.
In thispaper,I intendto presentMarchia'spositionon accidentalbeing.
I will argue thatMarchia maintainsthe same positionin his philosophical
and theologicalwritings,
and thatin many respectsthispositionis similar
to Scotus's. In order to argue for my point, I will startby introducing,
in a systematicway, some influentialthirteenthand fourteenth-century
treatments
of thetopic.Then, I willturnto Marchia'sdoctrine.Specifically,
I intendto approach thistopic froma philosophicalpoint of view,while
examiningthe traditionof the Commentarieson Aristotle'sMetaphysics.
Althoughit is especially(albeit not exclusively)the case of the Eucharist
thatcompelsmedievalphilosophersand theologiansto rethinkthe nature
of accidents,nonethelessI intendto point out that different
theological
or philosophicalexplanationsof accidentalbeing are groundedupon differentbut quite legitimate
readingsof Aristode'sMetaphysics.
Thus, thelabel
'Aristotelianconceptionof accidents',which is oftenused to characterise
the conceptionof accidentsendorsedby medievalphilosophers,
as opposed
to theologians,
some
requires
nuancing.At theend of theday,no theological
or philosophicalexplanationof accidental being reallybringsAristotle's
intocrisis;nonethelesseveryexplanationexcludesa particular
metaphysics
versionof it.
1. A Philosophical
AreNothing
Other
Explanation
ofAccidental
Being:Accidents
thanModesofBeinga Substance
Exhibits
In his worksAristodeprovidesat least two different
accountsof what an
accidentis. On the one hand, Aristotletellsus that an accidentis not a
being in an absoluteway. For an accidentis what it is while also being
else, i.e. a substanceof which it is predicated.1On the other
something
1 Cf.e.g.Anal.Post.,
22
I, 4, 73b5ff.;

passim.

11:22:15 AM

98

FABRIZIO
AMERINI

hand, Aristotledoes suggestthat an accidentis nonethelessa being of a

certainkind. For an accidentis something
of a substance,since it is predicated of it, and a substancecan lose the accidentwhile stillremaining
a substance.2
of acciProbablythe cleareststatementof this twofoldunderstanding
dentscan be foundin the Metaphysics
in
Book
ch.
4. This
, especially
VII,
Chapter is devoted to the question of what thingshave essence and
In the firsthalfof the Chapter,Aristotlearguesthatonly subdefinition.
stances can have essence, since only a substanceis what is properlya
"thissomething"(todeti),and essence expressespreciselywhat is properly
a "this something".When a thingis predicatedof anotherthing,as in
the case of accidents,we do not have a "thissomething".Hence, essence
and a definition
belongsonlyto thosethingswhose formulais a definition,
occursif the thingdefinedis a primarybeing. Here, Aristotledefinesthe
propertyof being a "thissomething"in termsof being primary,and this
latterpropertyin termsof predicativesimplicity.
As a result,only a substance is a primarybeing because only a substanceis a being the nature
of which does not consistin predicatingsomethingof somethingelse or
simplyin predicatingitselfof somethingelse. For example, a man is a
primarybeing because, first,he is not predicatedof anythingmore primary and, second, his very nature does not involve predicatingsomefromit. By contrast,
thingof somethingelse that is categoriallydifferent
no accidenthas an essence,since no accidentis a primarybeing. In fact,
an accident is what it is because of somethingelse (i.e. a substance)of
which it is predicated.3
In the second half of the Chapter,by contrast,Aristotlemodifiesthis
pictureslightly,by arguingthat each categorialitem can have essence
and definition,
albeit not in the same way. Substanceshave essence and
definitionin an absolute way, while accidentshave them in a qualified
and secondaryway.4 In some respect,accidentsare also a "this something"and a primarybeing. For as Aristodetaughtin the Categories
and numerically
one.5Therefore,
theyare beingsthatare perse, indivisible,
are
at
least
with
to
their
own category.6
they
primarybeings,
respect
2 Cf.e.g.Top.,I, 5, 102b4ff.;
Met.,V, 30, 1025a30-33.
3 Cf.Met.,VII, 4, 1029b
13-1030a17.
4 Cf.Met.,VII, 4, 1030al7-bl3.
5 Cf.e.g.Cat.,2, lb6-9;4, lb25-27,
2a4-7;5, 3bl8-19.SeealsoMet.,',1,1017a22-27.
6 Cf.Met.,VII, 9, 1034b7-10.

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OF ACCIDENTS
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99

Nonetheless,accidentsmust always be defined"by addition",i.e. with

referenceto substances.For accidentsdo not existapart fromsubstances
in the extra-mental
world. So accidentsare beings in a secondaryway,
since theyneed a substancein orderforthem to actuallyexist.But that
does not preventthemfromhavingall the same a certainkind of being.
Hence, accidentshave essence and definitionto a certaindegree.
Aristotleconcludeshis argumentby sayingthat such explanationsare
equivalentto each other.7It does not matterif we say that accidentsare
not beings in an absolute way or that they are beings but not in an
absoluteway. In spite of thislast claim of Aristotle's,however,the doctrineAristodeproposes in the Metaphysics
seems to be open ineluctably
to two equallywell-groundedinterpretations.
On the one hand, someone
could hold that it says that accidentsand substancesare distinct,if not
separable, beings. For accidents are distinguishablefrom substancesat
least in definition,
and if theycan be definedto a certaindegreeon their
own, theymust to a certaindegree have some being of theirown. On
the otherhand, someone could equallywell insistthataccidentsare nothing other than modes of being that a substanceexhibits.For accidents
cannot be separatedfromsubstancesin existence.So theydo not have
any separate and absolute being; indeed, they do not have a separate
and absolute definition.Let me call these interpretations
the Expansive
and the Reductive Interpretation,
main
The
respectively.
philosophical
seems to be concernedwithis explaining
problemthe firstinterpretation
what unityor relationshipholds between such distinctitems,while the
secondinterpretation
has to explainhow such itemsare distinguishable
from
each other. As we shall see, when Marchia composed his works,the
debate on accidentalbeing had shiftedsignificantly
fromthe firstto the
second problem.
If we look more closely at the Metaphysics
doctrine,we see that the
most natural reading of the traditionalAristoteliandictum 'an accident
7 Cf.Met,VII,4, 1030b3-7.
Formoredetails
onthisargument,
seeM. Frede- G.Patzig
Aristoteles
und
2 vols.,Munich1988,
(eds.),
Z"-Text,bersetzung Kommentar,
"Metaphysik
Aristotle's
. TheCategories
andMetaphysics
esp.vol.2,adloc.;M.V.Wedin,
ofSubstance
Theory
Moregenerally,
on Aristode's
ofaccidental
, Oxford
2000,197T.
Zeta
theory
being,see
M. Durrant,
Essence
andAccident
A. Code,Aristotle
onEssence
, in:Mind,84 (1975),595-600;
- R. Warner
andAccident
Grounds
Intentions
, in R. Grandy
,
(eds.),Philosophical
ofRationality:
Ousia.AnEssayonAristotle's
, Ends,Oxford1986,411-39;M.J.Loux,Primary
Categories
Z andH, Ithaca-London
in
1991,104-8;N.O. Dahl,TwoKinds
Metaphysics
ofEssence
A PaleManis NottheSameas His Essence
Aristotle:
, in: The Philosophical
Review,106.2
forfurther
(1997),233-65(andseethere
literature).

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AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

estensquia entis)8
is
is a being because it is somethingof a being' {accidens
a subjectivereading. An accident is not a being on its own, but it is
i.e. a substance'smode of
somethingthat a substancehas or exemplifies,
being that the substancecan cease to have withoutceasing to be what
it is. Thus, on the subjectivereading,the most importantfact about an
accidentis thatit has a subject
, i.e. the substance.As some medievalinterif
had
meantto say thatan accidentis a being
Aristotle
preterspointout,
on its own, he would have said that an accidentis somethingof a being
estentisquia ens)and not vice versa.9So, for
because it is a being (<accidens
and
it is essentiallywhat it is because of a
an
accident
exists
Aristotle,
substance{peraliud).Accordingly,the idea that foran accident'to exist'
and to be' means 'to inhere in a substance' could be regardedas the
authenticAristotelianview about accidents' essence. In fact,if an accident could existwithouta substance,it would be a substance.Hence, it
could be definedwithoutreferenceto a substance.But only substances
can existand, hence,be definedseparately,since onlysubstancesare primarybeings in an absolute way.
AreSomething
OtherThan
Accidents
2. An Alternative
Philosophical
Explanation:
ModesofBang
Substances'
So far,we have seen that thereare at least two explanatoryaccountsof
accidental being. This twofoldunderstandingof accidentsderivesto a
Aristotle
large extentfromthe factthat,unlikehis medievalinterpreters,
betweenaccidents'essenceand existence.
does not make a clear distinction
is drawnbetweenthe existential
So no distinction
'substance-inseparability'
"substancethat accidentsnaturallyhave and the essentialor definitional
to
accidents.
be
that
Indeed, according to
might
granted
separability"
the doctrineof definitionthat Aristotleelaboratesin the Metaphysics
, the
definitionstatingthe thing'skind of being expressesthe conditionsthe
thingdefinedmust satisfyin order for it not just to be a thingof that
kind but also to existas a thingof that kind. This is most clear because
Aristotleconnects the definitionto the species of things.A species is
and at the level of the species
regardedas the true object of definition,10
8 Cf.Met.
, VII, 1, 1028al8-20.
9 Cf.e.g.Geoffrey
incontrarimi.
inMetaphysicam,
ofAspall,
,
VII,q. 4,argumentum
Quaestiones
Gonville
andCaiusCollege,
msCambridge,
509,f.97ra.
10Cf.e.g.Met.
11,1036a28-29.
, VII, 10,1035b33-36al;

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101

there seems to be no room for a distinctionbetween essence and existence.This is a consequenceof Aristotle'sso-calledessentialism,
according
a set of essential
to which existing,fora thing,amountsto exemplifying
properties.Neverthelessif we look at Aristotelianmetaphysicswith such
a distinctionin mind, the relationshipbetween the definitionand the
being of the thingdefinedbecomes unclear. For in such a case, it can
be asked whetherthe definitionof a thinghas to express
only the species
of being a thingexhibitsor if it furtherhas to explainwhat conditionsa
particularthingmust satisfyin order forit to actuallyexist.As a result,
it can be asked whetherthe subject (or the referenceto the subject),
which is includedin the definitionof an accident,has to be includedin
the accident'sessence as well.
At firstsight,the classificationwe introducedabove appears rather
rigid,insofaras it seems to be unable to capture all cases or to cover
themadequately.In fact,ifsomeoneendorsesthe ReductiveInterpretation
he is compelled to say that accidentsdo not have essence and
strictly,
at all. Nor can he even say thataccidentsinherein a substance.
definition
For he upholds that accidentsare not beings,and as a consequence he
mustuphold thattheyare not inhering
beings.So whoeveradopts a strong
reading of the Reductive Interpretationis compelled to conclude that
accidentsare nothingother than modes of being a substanceexhibits.
Apart froma fewmasters,however,philosophersand theologiansduring
centurieswere unwillingto adhere to this
the thirteenth
and fourteenth
conclusion.
deflationary
On the other hand, the Expansive Interpretation
is open to various
The
fact
that
accidents
are
defined
with
reference
to substances
readings.
accidents.
Even
about
the
status
of
allowingfor
says nothing
ontological
accidents'definitional
dependenceupon substances,someonemightemphasise the accidents'substance-dependent
being as well as theirsubstanceIn
essence.
other
he
words,
mightregard accidents (1) as
independent
after
that
can
be
identified
only
theyinherein a substance,hence
things
fromthisthat accidentsare nothingotherthan modes of being
inferring
of substances,or (2) as thingsthat can be identifiedeven before they
fromthisthat accidentsare someinherein a substance,hence inferring
These two readingsagree
other
than
modes
of
of
substances.
thing
being
that accidentshave a certainkind of being of theirown, but they disagree on whetherthis kind of being is reducibleto a substance'smode
of being. Richard Rufus of Cornwall and Albertthe Great, forinstance,

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

emphasise(l),11but some otherphilosophersare more inclinedto follow

(2). Roughlyspeaking,theselatterthinkthat accidentscannot existapart
fromsubstances,but this does not implythat accidentsare only modes
of being that substancesexhibit.The problem of the ontologicalstatus
of inherence,then,arises froman alternativereadingof the Aristotelian
estensquia entis.
dictumaccidens
A usefulpresentationof the questionsinvolvedin this topic can be
on theMetaphysics
found in Geoffreyof Aspall's Questions
, composed in
Oxfordduringthe 1260s. From Aspall's workwe can inferthat in both
the Paris and OxfordArtsFacultiesbasicallytwo typesof questionwere
from
debated: first,whetheraccidents have essences that are different
substances,and second, whetheran accident's essence may be reduced
to a certainsubstance'smode of being.The latterquestioncan be regarded
For someonecould answerthefirst
as quiteindependentfromtheformer.12
in
while
the
positive
answeringthe second one in eitherthe posquestion
itiveor the negative.But if he answersboth questionsin the positive,he
needs to clarifythe relationshipbetween an accident and its inherence,
i.e. the way thatthe accidentrelatesto the particularsubstanceof which
it is a mode of being. Thus, once philosophersbegin to take the positive
answer to the firstquestionfor granted,the debate focusesin a special
way on the degreeof being to be grantedto accidents.In thiscase, some
commentatorssoon add a thirdquestion,namely whetheran accident
inheresin a substancebecause of itselfor because of somethingelse, such
in two otherways,namely
as inherence.13
This questionis also formulated
11See e.g. RichardRufusof Cornwall,
Dissertatio
inMetaphysicam,
VII, msVatican,
Vat.lat.4538,f.45ra:"Adhocdicendum
Biblioteca
Vaticana,
quodaccidens,
Apostolica
omninatura
nichil
estaliudnisiesseipsius
substantie.
substantie,
(. . .) Natura
circumscripta
In the
naturam
sedestessetantum
accidentis
nonestdivisacontra
substantie,
ipsius".
im
Mnster
theGreat,
samevein,seeAlbert
, VII, tr.1,ch. 1,ed. B. Geyer,
Metaphyska
Westfalia
1964,vol.II, 316,11.66-69,and 317,11.19-24;ch. 4, 320,11.16-28,esp.
1.5; ch. 12,336,1.9-338,1.26. See
25-28;ch.7, 327,11.92-98;ch. 10,333,1.88-334,
libros
Prime
Aristotelis
ailsoRogerBacon,Questiones
, VII, q. 2, ed. R. Steele,
Philosophie
supra
Oxford
1930,197,11.2-13.
12Cf.Geoffrey
utrum
ofAspall,Qu.met.,
., f. 96ra: Pomoqueritur
VII, q. 1, mscit
diversam
ab essentia
substantie.
accidens
habeatessentiam
(. . .)"; q. 4, mscit.,f.97ra-b:
hoc
utrum
accidens
sitsolumesseentiset essesubstantie
"Iuxtahocqueritur
vel,preter
idemquod
sitaliquodaliudet essein se. Nec esthocquerere
quodestessesubstantie,
eiusessentia
sitessesubhocestquerere
utrum
seddatoquodhabeatessentiam,
prius,
stantie".
13See e.g.Radulphus
inMetaphysicam
, VII,q. 2, respondeo
, msFlorence,
Brito,
Quaestiones
Conv.Soppr.
E. 1. 252,f.292rb-va;
Nazionale
Biblioteca
Zimmermanni,
Centrale,
Anonymous

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and second,whether
whetheran accidentcan existwithouta subject,14
first,
inherenceis part of an accident'sessence.
PuttingtogetherGeoffrey'stwo questionsmentionedabove, we could
The firstgroup
singleout threepartiesamong Aristotelianinterpreters.
is composedof thosewho say thataccidentsare not beingson theirown,
since theydo not have an essence of theirown.15Many argumentscould
be invokedforthisposition.For instance,everyaccidenthas to be defined
withreferenceto a substance.But the definition
has to mirrorthe essence
of the thingdefined.Hence the substance,or at least the referenceto
substance,has to be part of an accident'sessence. Moreover,the being
of a thingderivesfromits essence. But an accident'sessence consistsin
its inherenceand inherenceis not a thingbut a mode or a respect.So
the accident'sbeing (esse)is posteriorto its inhering(inesse)and depends
if an accident had its own essence, it would have
on it. Furthermore,
two different
beings,i.e. one insofaras it is a substance'smode of being
and anotherinsofaras it is somethingon its own, and hence it would
have opposite properties.16
As is clear, these thinkersendorse a version
of what we called the Reductive Interpretation.
But by arguingin this
could
run
into
some
trouble
way they
explainingAristotle'smetaphysics.
For example, if we say that accidentsinhere,we must allow that they
are somethingto which the propertyof inheringhas to pertain.For otherwise accidents could not be said to be inheringin a substance.But
thesephilosophersseem to contradictthemselves,because at one and the
same time theyclaim that accidentsare not beings on theirown, since
theydo not have theirown essences,and nonethelessit seems clear that
inherenceexpressestheirwhole essence.
The second group is composed of those who, like Albertthe Great,
accept that accidents are beings on their own.17If accidentswere not
inMetaphysicam
incontrarium,
msCambridge,
Peterhouse
, VII, q. 1, argumentum
Quaestiones
152,f.33ra.
14On this,
seeS. Donati,"Utrum
accidens
existere
sinesubiecto".
Aristotelische
possit
Metaphysik
undchristliche
ineinigen
desausgehenden
13.Jahrhunderts
,
Theolog
ungedruckten
Physikkommentaren
- K. Emery
- A. Speer(eds.),
in:J.A.Aertsen
von1277.Philosophie
NachderVerurteilung
und
an derUniversitt
vonParisimletzten
Viertel
des13.Jahrhunderts.
Studien
undTexte
,
Theologie
Berlin-New
York2001,577-617.
15Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,
dicere
Qu.met
., VII, q. 1,ms.cit.,f.96rb:"Quidamsolebant
nonhabetessentiam.
quodaccidens
(. . .)".
16Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,Qu.met
., VII, q. 4, ms.cit.,f.97ra-b.
17Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,
f.96rb:"Propter
hocdicitur
Qu.met.,
VII,q. 1,ms.cit.,
aliter,
scilicet
nominai
unomodosubiectum
et estsubaccidente,
alio
quodnomenaccidentis

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

would be wiped out.18

beings on theirown, the categorialclassification
Nonetheless,these thinkersemphasise that accidents are nothingother
thansubstances'modes of being,i.e. accidentalqualifications
of substances.
Accordingly,theytryto save the categorialclassification
by considering
it as a logical ratherthan a metaphysicalclassification
of things.On this
one kind of basic things,i.e. substances,
approach,the categoriesidentify
and nine modes of being of such things,insofaras each mode can be
isolatedconceptuallyon its own. But only substanceshave a distinctcorworld. These thinkersendorse a weak version
relatein the extra-mental
of whatwe called the ExpansiveInterpretation
(i.e. version(1)). According
this
run
to Geoffrey,
could
into some problemsinterhowever,
position
In the Categories
and
hence
semantics.
, indeed,
Aristotle's,
pretingAverroes's,
Aristotlestatesthat an accidentalterm it does not matterwhetherconThis entailsthat an
crete or abstract
signifiesexclusivelya property.19
accidentaltermnever signifiesthe bearer of the propertyexcept "conseFor the bearer of the propertyis not includedin
quently"(ex consequent).
the semanticspectrumof an accidentalterm.
The thirdgroup, finally,is composed of those who emphasise that
accidentsare beings on theirown, since they have an essence of their
own.20They argue as follows:An accident can be definedto a certain
degree on its own, so it must have to a certaindegree an essence of its
of the firstgroup,thinkers
own. On the one hand, unlikethe interpreters
in this thirdgroup hold that inherencecannot expressthe whole being
of an accident.For ifinherencedoes expressthe accident'sbeing,an accident would be a relative.On the otherhand, theyargue thatif an accidentwere not a being on its own, it could not be called a being inhering
in a substance.Thus, even allowingthat accidentshave a definition"by
addition",thisdoes not entailthattheyare reducibleto substances'modes
of being. For the substanceis seen as an essence added to that of the
accident.Nor can an accidenthave the same being as a substance.For
modonominat
essesubiecti
sicdispositi.
Primo
modononsignificant
subiectum
quoddam
et accidens
diversam
secundo
autemmodofacit(prosic)".Forreferences
to
essentiam,
Albert's
seen. 11 above.
texts,
18Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,Qu.met
., VII, q. 4, mscit.,f.97rb.
19Cf.Cat.,5, 3b19.
20Cf.Geoffrey
ideodicere
ofAspall,Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, mscit.,f. 96rb:"Possumus
.
habetetquidditatem,
etdiffer
eo modoquo
(. .) quodaccidens
quodammodoessentiam
habetab essentia
et absolute
estin aliquoperse
substantie,
quia essentia
principaliter
nonestessentia
in dependente
utin accidente,
utin substantia;
autem,
absoluta,
stante,
sedminus
proprie".

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105

otherwisethe substance'spropertiescould be predicatedof the accident

as well. These thinkers,then, maintaina strongformof the Expansive
(i.e. version(2)). Nonetheless,among philosophersarguing
Interpretation
versions.Some of themdistinguish
forthispositionwe can finddifferent
betweenabsoluteaccidents,whichare both somethingof a substanceand
somethingon their own, and relativeaccidents,which are only somethingof a substance.Others,by contrast,thinkof all accidentsas beings
on theirown.21
Apart fromthe questionwhetherall accidentsare or are not beings
on theirown, philosopherslike Geoffreythinkthat accidentsare somethingof a substancewhile also being somethingon theirown. However,
theythinkthat no accident,as separatedfroma substance,is naturally
Accordsomethingon its own, but onlyas dependentupon a substance.22
assume
that
does
not
inherence
the
whole
essence
of
ingly,they
express
accidents.Quite the opposite,as some philosopherspoint out, inherence
is not an essentialbut a per se secundo
modopropertyof accidents,especiallyifwe consideraccidentswithAvicenna'sdoctrineof essencein mind.
Avicenna'sviewson essence,
Accordingto the standardway of interpreting
- it does not matterwhethersubstantialor accidenessence
indeed, any
tal- can be consideredin threeways, althoughit can existin only two.
When an essence is consideredon its own, it does not have its own kind
of being. An essence such as humanity,for instance,on its own is neitherparticularnor universal,neitherone nor many. On its own, humanity is only what it is, namely humanity.Such an essence howevercan
existin two ways. It existsas particularwhen it is realisedin the extramental world; it existsas universalwhen it is abstractedby the mind.
Applyingthis doctrine to accidents, one could say that accidents on
theirown are nothingotherthan accidents.They do not have theirown
kind of being. When accidents are consideredon their own, they are
neitherinheringnor non-inhering,
neitherbeing in a substancenor not
in
a
a
substance.23
As
being
consequence,accidents'being or essence (esse)
21Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,Qu.met.,
VII, q. 4, mscit.,f.97rb.
22Cf.Qu.met.,
f.97rb-va:
"omneaccidens
estaliquidinse preterhoc
VII,q. 4, mscit.,
sed aliquodmagiset aliquodminus.
Se<d> accidens
essealiquodestessesubstantie,
autquodsitaliquidin se ita quodabsolutum
aut
quidin se potest
intelligi
dupliciter:
ab alio,et hocultimo
modoestaccidens
quodsitaliquidin se itaquodsitdependens
hocquodestessesubstantie".
aliquidin se preter
23Cf.e.g.PeterofAuvergne,
inMetaphysicam,
PeterVII,q. 2,msCambridge,
Quaestiones
house152,f. 189vb:"Adpropositum
secundum
Avicennam.
arguitur
(. . .) Intelligendum

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

can be seen as logicallypriorto accidents'inhering(inesse),

which can in
turn be seen as logicallyprior to accidents' being actuallyin a subject
From this perspective,accidentsand substancesshare the
(essein effectu).
same existentialbeing,but have different
essentialbeings.24
Endorsingthis
view is necessaryif one does not want to grant two different
kinds of
to
i.e.
the
accident's
own
and
its
accidents,
being
being
being a substance's mode. Hence, according to these philosophers,the traditional
Aristoteliandictumaccidens
estens quia entishas to be read in an objectiveway, insofaras, on thisreading,the accidenthas being of some kind
objectivelyon its own; and indeed these philosophersaim to establish
that an accidentis a being on its own precisely
because it is somethingof
a being.25
As Geoffrey'squestionsreveal,the problemmost frequently
discussed
in the ArtsFacultyafterthe 1260s did not concernthe existentialseparabilityof accidents,but ratherthe degree of being that can be granted
to substances'accidentalmodes of being. Specifically,
Geoffrey's
questions
- all
show that it is possible to invoke purely philosophicalarguments
ex propria
estquodaccidentia
raoneipsorum
nechabent
essenecnon-esse";
q. 12,f.
ad subiectum
195ra-b:
fundatur
tamennonest
accidentis,
"Dependentia
supernaturam
de ratione
eiusessentiali,
sedaliquidconsequens
ipsum,
quodinestsibiperse secundo
mododicendi
perse".
24Cf.Geoffrey
ofAspall,Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, mscit.,f.96rb:"Duplexestesse,scilicet
et esseexistentie.
Esseessentie
esseessentie
etesseessentie
sub(existentie
ms)accidentis
nonsuntidem,sicutnecestessentia
eorumeadem.Esseautemactualis
stantie
existentie
eorum
estidem.(. . .) Ad aliud,cumdicitur
'accidentis
esseestinesse',
si perhoc'inesse'
falsum
cuminherentia
solum
simul
illud
inherentia,
est;sedoportet
intelligitur
cointelligere
ethocestessentia
accidentis".
quodinheret,
25Thisideais quitepopular
in boththeOxford
andParisArts
amongphilosophers
Faculties
the1260sand 1270s.See,forinstance,
Zimmermanni,
Qu.
during
Anonymous
f.33ra-b;
DomusPetri,
inMetaphyskam
VII, q. 1, mscit.,
met.,
, VII,
Quaestiones
Anonymous
Peterhouse
Richard
ofClive,Quaestiones
inMetaphyskam
152,f.314vb;
,
q. 12,msCambridge,
Cathedral
f.138rb-va:
VII,q. 1,msWorcester,
M3,f.138ra;
Chapter
Library,
q. 2,mscit.,
nonestaliudab inesse.
"Soletdiciquodesseaccidentis
(. . .) Capiofalsitatem,
quia'inesse'
duodicit,scilicet
esseet in ilioesse,quiaquodinheret
aliud<est> ab eo cuiinheret,
inherentia
nonessetmedium
interduo";SimonofFaversham,
Quaestiones
alioquin
super
libro
Padova1957,73,11.3-10;PeterofAuvergne,
Praedkamentorum,
q. 2, ed.P. Mazzarella,
f. 195rb:
"Soletautemhicqueriutrum
inesseaccidentis
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 12,mscit.,
prius
sitquamsuumessevelnon.Et solutio
ad hocex diffinitione
de
apparet
priusassignata
enimde esseessentiali
dicoquodilludesseaccidentis
esse.Loquendo
accidentis,
priusest
natura
estin se,nichil
estinalio,utAvicenna
(. . .) Quodenimnichil
quamsuuminesse.
autemde essein effectu,
esse
sue.Loquendo
cum[esse]accidens
vult,primo
Metaphyske
in effectu
nonhabeatnisiperessesuisubiecti,
et essea suosubiecto
nonhabetnisiin
hocmodoesseeiusnonestpriusquamsuuminesse".
subiecto
inheret,
quantum

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107

groundedin Aristoteliantexts in orderboth to affirmand to deny that

accidentsare beingson theirown otherthan substances'modes of being.
Philosophershoweverdo not go on to discusswhetheraccidentscan naturallyexistapart fromsubstances.For fromthe point of view of the natural world, adopted by philosophers,accidents are always realised as
substances'modes of being. Accordingly,with respectto the interpretathe debate appears to focusexclusivelyon
tion of Aristotle'smetaphysics,
the degree of ontologicalautonomy,but not independence,Aristotlehad
grantedto accidents.Nonetheless,the philosophicaldebate on accidental
being also permitsmedievalphilosophersto extendthe inquiryto a considerationof the logical possibilityfor accidentsto exist naturallyapart
from substances.From this perspective,this debate opens the way to
incorporatingthe case of the Eucharistinto an Aristotelianframework.
it generatessome puzzles concerninginherBut fromanotherperspective,
ence thatare leftunsolvedby philosophers.For one, the majorityof mastersin the ArtsFacultytend to say that accidentsare somethingon their
own otherthan substances'modes of beingwhilemaintainingat the same
time that accidents'essence is logicallyprior both to accidents'inhering
in a substanceand to accidents'being actuallyin thatsubstance.So someto findin
one could inferfromthis that it is not logicallycontradictory
are not
or
even
accidents
that
accidents
nature non-inhering
inhering
actuallyinheringin a substance.For another,the philosopherssay that
inherenceis in some measure inseparable from an accident's essence,
of it. Indeed, accidentscontinue
since it is a properpassion (passiopropria)
someonecould
to be regardedas substances'modes of being.Accordingly,
questionhow it is possibleforinherenceto be logicallyinseparablefrom
an accident'sessence,if the formerfollowslogicallyfromthe latter,without this entailingthat inherenceis part of an accident's essence. These
puzzles are one of the reasons why some theologianswill look for a
refinement
of the notion of accident.
ThomasAquinas'
s Solution:
3. Theological
of theProblem.
Expansions
and
Accidental
between
Accidental
Essence
Being
Distinguishing
As we have seen, Aristotle'swell-knowndoctrineof the analogyof being,
ways viz. priaccordingto which 'being' is said of thingsin different
marilyof substancesand secondarilyof accidents , summarisedabove
estens quia entis,does not say anythingabout the
by the dictumaccidens

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

kind of being accidentshave. For the dictumcan be read in at least two

ways,i.e. subjectivelyand objectively,so that it can be invokedby supof the Aristotelian
metaphysicsof acciportersof oppositeinterpretations
dents.Moreover,if we read it in an objectiveway, the ontologicalstatus
of inherencebecomes undecided,since inherenceno longerexpressesthe
whole essence of accidents.
It is the case of the Eucharistthatespeciallyfavoursan objectivereading of the Aristoteliandictum.Accordingto the naturalcourse of events,
it seems impossiblefor an accident to exist and not to inherein a substance.For we can findin the worldcreatedsubstanceswithoutaccidents
(for instance,separate substances)but no accidentswithoutsubstances.
But the case of the Eucharistcompelsus to say thataccidentscan in fact
existwithoutinheringin a substance.Thus, whoeverwants to maintain
that accidents essentiallyare nothingother than substances'modes of
being is compelledto rethinkthe nature of accidents.
In the 1250s,Thomas Aquinas formulatedwhat can be consideredthe
versionof such a rethinking.26
mostinfluential
Generallyspeaking,Aquinas
elaboratesa two-steptheologicalstrategy.We can finda firstaccount of
on theSentences
and a finalaccount in his later
it in Aquinas's Commentary
or the fourthbook of
of
the
Summa
the
third
like
works,
Theologiae
part
Gentiles
.
the SummaContra
The firststep in Aquinas's theologicalstrategyconsistsin demonstrating that it is logicallypossiblefor an accidentto existand not to inhere
actuallyin a substantialsubject. Since thereis at least one case, i.e. the
Eucharist,in which accidentsactuallyexist withoutinheringactuallyin
a substance,such a separate existenceis logicallypossible. This logical
possibilityis clearly a supernaturalpossibility,depending upon God's
omnipotence.God can cause accidentsthat are not caused by the substancesthatnaturallycause them,since God can cause directlyany effect
is regarded
thatis usuallycaused by secondarycauses. God's intervention
case. In the case at hand, God makesaccias an absolutelyextraordinary
concerns
dentsquasi-substantial
beings.27Specifically,thistransformation
the
the
which
after
Consecration,
becomes,
subject of all
only quantity,

26On Aquinas's
and on hispredecessors,
see P.J.J.M.
treatment
Bakker,
theological
etle miracle.
Lesdoctrines
La Raison
1999,vol. 1,
% Nijmegen
(c. 1250-c.1400
eucharistiques
294-316.
27Cf.e.g.Aquinas,
Summa
Illa, q. 75,a. 5, ad 4.
Theologiae,

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MARCHIA

109

the remainingaccidents.Thus, all the accidentsexceptquantitystillhave

a subjectin which theyinhere,even thoughit is not a substantialsubcan two "Aristotelian"
prinject. Only withregardto quantity,therefore,
ciplesbe rejected,viz. (1) thatan accidentcannotbe the subjectof another
accidentand (2) thatan accidentcannot existwithouta subjectin which
it inheres.28
The second step in Aquinas's theologicalstrategyconsistsin proving
that the Eucharistdoes not fundamentally
change our ordinaryunderstandingof accidents.For afterthe Consecrationaccidentsare not substancesbut stillaccidents.29
This is the most importantbut also the most
in
problematicstep Aquinas's strategy.What kind of being do accidents
have after
the Consecration?This questiondependsupon how one answers
another question: What kind of being do accidents have beforethe
Consecration?As to this point, Aquinas's argumentis not particularly
on theSentences
, Aquinas
complicated.Let me considerit. In his Commentary
assumes that accidentsbring two relationsto a subject. First,accidents
inherein a substanceand second, theydepend upon God. Althoughan
accident naturallydepends upon a substanceand remotelyupon God,
Aquinas thinksthat 'to be in a substance'and 'to depend upon God' are
not definitional
featuresof an accident.As a result,an accidentis what
it is independently
of the factthat it depends upon a substanceor upon
God.30When answeringa traditional'philosophical'objection- viz. an
accidentcan never existwithouta subject,even if miraculously,
because
an accidentis definedas what is in a subject- Aquinas points out that
'to be in a subject' cannot expressan accident'sessence because 'to be'
(esse)is not a genus, so it cannot be part of a definition,and only a
definition
can reveal the essence of a thing.Nonetheless,'to be in a subis
ject' somethingthatcan pertainto an accident'sessence. For instance,
if we definequality as a dispositionof a substance,this definitionsays
what quality essentiallyis. This definition,however,does not say that
qualityis inheringin a substanceor dependingupon God. Nor does it
28Cf.Aquinas,
Sum.theol.
a. 2, ad 2.
, Ilia, q. 77,a. 1, respondeo;
29Gf.Aquinas,
Sum.theol
manente
., Ilia, q. 77,a. 1,ad 4: "(.. .) accidentia
huiusmodi,
substantia
sedsubstantia
eorum
panisetvini,nonhabebant
ipsaesse,necaliaaccidentia:
habebat
huiusmodi
esseperea. (. . .) Sedpostconsecrationem
ipsaaccidentia
quaeremahabent
esse.Undesuntcomposita
ex esseet quodest";a. 2 c: "Etquia,subtracto
nent,
remanent
accidentia
secundum
essequodpriushabebant,
estquod
subiecto,
consequens
omniaaccidentia
remanent
fundata
dimensivam".
superquantitatem
30Cf.e.g.Aquinas,
libros
Sententiarum,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,qa. 1.
Scriptum
super
quatuor

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AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

say thatqualitycan inherein a substance.So if qualityis separatedfrom

a substance,quality does not cease to be a dispositionof a substance.
to be actuallyor potentiallyin a substanceis somethingthat
Accordingly,
pertainsto a quality,but it is not part of a quality'sessence. As a matter of fact,Aquinas never says that the accident'sessence includeseven
a potential
inherencein a substance.In his theologicalwritings,
Aquinas
maintainsthat it is the accident's mode of being- as distinctfromits
inherence.An accidentis what
essence- thatincludesan actualor potential
it is independentlyof its actual or potentialinherence.For an accident
is none other than a qualificationof a substance.Thus, only the reference to substanceis part of an accident'sessence. If we do not allow for
be accidents.
this conclusion,separate accidentscould not actually
If thisreadingof Aquinas's theologicalstrategyis correct,we can state
identical
fromthe at-first-glance
thatAquinas's solutionis quite different
one of Bonaventure,who explainsthe Eucharistiecase by distinguishing
In fact,Aquinas's distinction
between actual and potentialinherence.31
to an essence
betweenwhat is partof an essence and what merelypertains
but is not part of it seemsto be introducedin orderto removeany inherence froman accident'sessence ratherthan to include an inherenceof
some sort (i.e. the potentialinherence)in its essence. As a consequence,
'to inhere'mightbe understoodin Aquinas's textsin two different
ways.
On the one hand, if cto inhere' is understoodsimplyas 'to be in' neitherthe actual nor the potentialinherenceis part of an accidents'essence
but of its mode of being or existence.For the same reason,the property
'to depend upon God' cannot be part of an accidents'essence. On the
otherhand, if 'to inhere'is understoodas 'to be of' thisactual tendency
item
to inhereis part of an accident'sessence. For everynon-substantial
Eucharist
this
the
a
substance.
From
is essentiallysomethingof
viewpoint,
does not modifythe accident'sessence or nullifythe accident'sactual tendency for being somethingof a substance.Thus, it should not be said
that, for Aquinas, accidents sometimesare actuallyinhering(i.e. when
theyare joined witha subject)and sometimesare not inheringat ill(i.e.
- even
when theyare disjoinedfroma subject)
thoughtheycan be actually inheringat some time or another.Quite the opposite,it should be
said that the Eucharistsimplysuspendsthe accident'sactual being in a
31Cf.Bonaventure,
Sententiarum
libros
Commentarla
inquatuor
, IV, d. 12,p. 1, a. 1,q. 1,
in OperaOmnia,vol.IV, Ad ClarasAquas1889,271a.

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ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
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111

as faras the accidentalessenceis concerned,accidents,

subject.Nonetheless,
becauseofthressence
, maintainthe propertyof being somethingof a subwhich
the actual or potentialinherencein a substanceis
stance,upon
grounded.32
Afterthe Consecrationaccidentsdo not lose the kind of being they
had in some way beforethe Consecration.For accidentsstillremainaccidents and, qua accidents,they still have an accidental kind of being.33
Before the Consecration accidents did not have any being on their
own; nonetheless
theyhad being.Beforethe Consecration,indeed,theaccident's being is the same as the substance's accidental being. But this
accidentalbeing is not the same as the substance'sbeing. Therefore,the
accident'sbeing is not the same as the substance'sbeing,even thougha
substanceand an accident share the same existentialbeing.34Afterthe
Consecration,an accident continuesto exist as a substance'saccidental
being. But now such a being is a subsistentbeing and not merelythe
accidentalbeing of a substance.35
This interpretation
of Aquinas's doctrineis not the only one possible.
In fact,it is unclear fromAquinas's textshow we are to read the claim
that afterthe Consecrationaccidentshave being. On the one hand, this
claim could be read as saying(1) that separate accidentshave the same
thatsuch
beingtheyhad beforethe Consecration,withthe sole difference
is
After
that
it is the
now
self-subsistent
all, Aquinas says
being.
being
all
of
the
accidents
the
of
conversion
that
identity
throughout
process
marksout transubstantiation
fromcreation.But accidentscan remainthe
same only if theirbeing remainsthe same.36But on the other hand, it
could also be read as saying(2) thatseparateaccidentshave a newbeing,
32Gf.e.g.Aquinas,
Sum.theol.
non
, Ilia, q. 77,a. 1, ad 2: "In hocautemsacramento
daturaccidentibus
sintsinesubiecto,
sedex divinavirtute
sustenquodexvisuaeessentiae
tante.
Et ideonondesinunt
esseaccidentia."
mine).
(emphasis
33See n. 32 above.
34Fora slighdy
different
seeJ.F.Wippel,
TheMetaphysical
Thought
ofThomas
explanation,
toUncreated
From
Finite
D.G. 2000,265.On thistopic,
see
, Washington
Aquinas.
Being
Being
alsoP.L.Reynolds,
PerseAccidents,
Accidental
andtheTheology
inThomas
Being
oftheEucharist
e studisullatradizione
filosofica
13 (2002),193-230;
, in: Documenti
medievale,
Aquinas
M. McCordAdams,
Aristotle
andtheSacrament
A Crisis
inMedieval
in:
Aristotelianism,
ofAltar:
- M. Tweedale
R. Bosley
Aristotle
andHisMedieval
, Calgary
1991,195-249;
(eds.),
Interpreters
andR. Imbach,
deFreiberg
a-t-il
Thomas
surle "De
Pourquoi
Thierry
critique
d'Aquin?
Remarques
accidentibus
furPhilosophie
undTheologie,
Zeitschrift
45 (1998),116-29.
"9in:Freiburger
35Cf.Aquinas,
Sum.heol.
, Illa, q. 75,a. 5, ad 4.
36Cf.Aquinas,
Sum.theol.,
Illa, q. 75,a. 8, respondeo.

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FABRIZIO
AMERESTI

because beforethe Consecrationthey did not have theirown being at

all. According to either reading, separate accidents are still accidents,
which do not actuallyinhere.But in the firstcase, accidentscan stillbe
consideredas inheringitems,since theymaintaina tendencyto inhere,
even thoughGod makes it impossiblefor them to realize thistendency.
So they continueto be actuallyaccidentsas to both theiressence and
theirbeing. In the second case, on the other hand, accidentsare not
actuallyinheringitems.For theydo not maintainan actual tendencyto
inhere. So they are accidental items as to theiressence but substantial
itemsas to theirbeing.
Althoughthe second reading will be the one most followedand the
one most criticisedby later theologians,the firstreadingseems to be the
correctone. For it fitswith anotherfeatureof Aquinas's thought.When
explaining the case of the Eucharist, Aquinas maintains two other
"Aristotelian"principles,namely,first,that no accident can pass from
one subject to anothersubject and, second, that everyaccident is individuated by its subject.37Now, Aquinas defendsthe miraculouscase of
separateaccidentsby citingthe firstof theseprinciplesagainstthosewho
looked for another subject of inherence,once the substance of bread
changesintothe body of Christ.Aquinas defendsthisprincipleby appealForing to the factthatseparateaccidentsare stillaccidentsoftheHost.38
and here Aquinas appeals to the second principle it is the Host that
individuatessuch accidents.We can maintainthis claim, however,only
ifwe allow thatthe accidentswe see afterthe Consecrationare stillaccidentsof the Host, and not, say, genericaccidentsor even accidentswith
only the appearances of the Host. But we can grantthis if and only if
such accidentsare regardedas stillhavingan actual tendencyto perform
theirfunctionof qualifyingthe Host. In such a case, God limitsHimself
to barringthe actual achievementof thisactual tendency.From thisperspective,the Eucharistdoes not affectthe accident'sessence,but onlythe
fulland completeachievementof the accident'sactual existence.
Aquinas's philosophicaltreatmentdoes not essentiallychange thispicture. In his philosophicalwritings,fromthe De enteet essentia
up to the
essence
of an
maintains
that
the
on
the
,
Aquinas
Commentary Metaphysics
a
a
of
subthan
is
other
accident,say quality, nothing
being qualification
esse
relies
the
same
time
that
at
the
while
stance,
quality's
maintaining
37Cf.e.g.Aquinas,
Sum.theol.
, Illa, q. 77,a. 1, respondeo.
38Cf.e.g.Aquinas,
Sum.theol.,
Illa, q. 75,a. 5, respondeo.

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ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE

113

upon its actual or potentialinherencein a substance.In his philosophical writings,

Aquinas does not discussthe case of separateaccidents,even
to do so. Nor does he discuss the logical
when he has the opportunity
possibilityforan accidentto existwithoutactuallyinheringin a subject.
This omissionis not particularlysurprising,however. For, as we have
seen, Aquinas thinksthatthe Eucharistis an exceptionalcase thataffects
accidents'existence,but does not alter the essence and hence the natural kind of being accidentshave. So it is logicallyimpossibleto imagine accidentsnaturallynon-inheringin a substance,since accidentsare
incompletebeingsand, hence, incompleteessences.From thisperspective
it is not withoutsignificance
thatthe same doctrinesummarisedabove is
on theMetaphysics
, which is conrepeated by Aquinas in his Commentary
on
with
the
third
of
his
Summa
Theologiae.
Commenting
part
temporary
the accident'sbeing
book VII, forinstance,Aquinas clearlydistinguishes
fromthe accident'sessence. An accident depends naturallyupon a subject forboth its being and its essence. But the subjectis externalto the
accident'sessence. So neitherthe substancenor the propertyof being in
a subject is part of an accident's essence. The referenceto a subject,
though,is includedin an accident'sessence. This means thatan accident
is not reducibleto a substancequalifiedso-and-sonor to an independent
on a substance,but ratherto a substance'sbeing
qualificationsupervening
Even
when
existingseparately,accidentsdo not lack the actual
qualified.39
of
substances'
accidentalmodes of being.
property being
4. FromAquinasto Scotus
The distinctionsintroducedby Aquinas in order to integratetransubstantiationinto an Aristotelianframeworkhad a certaindegree of success among theologians of the next generation.In particular,several
theologiansattemptto draw a connectionbetweenAquinas's distinction
betweenwhat is part of an accident'sessence and what merelypertains
's distinctionbetweenpotential
to it, on the one hand, and Bonaventure
The mostinfluential
and actual inherence,on the other.40
example of this
39Cf.Aquinas,
inMetaphysicam
, V, lec.9, ed. M.-R.Cathala- R.M. Spiazzi,
Expositio
n.
Turin-Rome
n.
lec.
1, 1257;lec.4, n. 1352.
1964, 894;VII,
40See e.g.Hervaeus
IV Librum
Sententiarum
, d. 12,q. 1, a. 2, ed.
Natalis,
Scriptum
super
Paris1647,f. 355aC-bD;Quodlibeta
, IV, q. 9, ed. Venice1513(rpt.Ridgewood
1966),
IV Librum
Sententiarum
f. 109va-b;
DurandofSt.-Pourain,
, d. 12,q. 1, ed.
Scriptum
super
Venice1571,f.322rb.

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

ofAristotle's
attemptcomesfromGiles ofRome.41This line ofinterpretation
with
of
success
will
meet
of
accidents
varyingdegrees
throughmetaphysics
At the beginout the traditionof the commentarieson the Metaphysics.
ningof the fourteenthcentury,for instance,the Franciscan theologian
Alexanderof Alexandriawill adopt it withouthesitation,whereas at the
century,the AugustininHermitPaul of Venice
beginningof the fifteenth
Alexanderby way of Francis of
will rejectit vigorouslywhile criticising
Marchia's arguments.42
Among philosophers,however,apart fromrare exceptions,the most
common trend was to reject Aquinas's solution.Althoughthe position
statingthat an accident cannot existwithouta subject was criticisedat
lengthby Giles of Rome in 1270 and solemnlycondemnedin Paris by
Etienne Tempier in 1277,43many philosopherscontinuedto endorse it.
Amongthem,we can name Sigerof Brabant,Boethiusof Dacia, Ferrandus
of Spain, and Radulphus Brito at Paris,44and William of Bonkys at
Oxford.45
Specifically,the philosopherscriticiseboth steps of Aquinas's strategy.
Their argumentis that it is logicallyimpossiblefor an accidentto exist
and not to inhereactuallyin a substance,because only actual inherence
41See GilesofRome,InIV Sententiarum.
Monacensis
, q. 9 (d. 12),ed.C. Luna,
Reportatio
Christi
decorpore
Florence
, prop.41,ed.Rome1554(rpt.
2003,464-65.See alsoTheoremata
am Main1966),f.28va-b;Questiones
Frankfurt
, VII, q. 2, ed. Venice1501
methaphisicales
of
amMain1966),fol.27va.In thesamevein,seeAugustinus
Triumphus
(rpt.Frankfurt
Universittsbibliothek
inMetaphysicam
192,
, VII, q. 10,msInnsbruck,
Ancona,
Quaestiones
f. 115ra-b.
42On thisdebate,see F. Amerini,
sullanatura
accidenti
Alessandro
d'Alessandria
, in:
degli
andid.,Francesco
filosofica
16(2005),179-235;
Documenti
e studi
sullatradizione
medievale,
accidenti
eucaristici
. Il casodegli
come
diPaoloVeneto
, in:Picenum
seraphicum,
fonte
d'Appianano
forthcoming.
43Cf.GilesofRome,De erroribus
conI, n. 10,andXII,n. 8. Thearticles
philosophorum,
list(cf.Enqute
surles219artito R. Hissette's
in Parisarenn.196-99according
demned
Parisle 7 mars
1277, Louvain-Paris
clescondamns
1977,287).
44Cf.e.g.SigerofBrabant,
inMetaphysicam
,
, VII, q. 1, Cambridge
Quaestiones
reportatio
Louvain1983,328-29;Parisreportatio
ed. A. Maurer,
, ed. Maurer,
452,and qq. 5-6,
librum
ofDacia,Quaestiones
III, qq. 1,4, and6, ed. N.J.
454-55;Boethius
Topicorum,
super
ofSpain,
Green-Pedersen
1976,167,174,and 177;Ferrandus
-J. Pinborg,
Copenhagen
Merton
281,f. 83va-b;Radulphus
, VII, msOxford,
College,
super
Metaphysicam
Expositio
concreti.
Texts
Termini
accidentales
inPorphyrium,
Brito,Quaestiones
q. 34,in S. Ebbesen,
du Moyende l'Institut
theLate13thCentury
, in:Cahiers
gegrecetlatin,53 (1986),
from
VII, q. 2, mscit.,f.292rb-va;
Radulphus
37-150,
q. 3, in S. Ebbesen,
esp.85-6;Qu.met.,
- K. Emery
- A. Speer(eds.),op.cit.(n. 14
inJ. A. Aertsen
Brito
onthe"Metaphysics",
above),450-92,
esp.484, 3.1-2.
45Cf.William
Gonville
inMetaphysicam
ofBonkys,
, VII,q. 1, msCambridge,
Quaestiones
andCaiusCollege,
344,f.55vb.

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115

can be realized, so that, for an accident, cto exist' means precisely'to

inhereactually'.So, even ifwe mustbelieve by faiththatthereexistseparateaccidents,inheringonlypotentially,
philosophically
speakingaccidents
cannot be otherthan actuallyinheringitems.This is because- criticising
- if we allow for accidents
the firststep in Aquinas's strategy
,
actually
we
must
that
accidents
are
from
conclude
no
substances,
separated
longer
accidentsbut substances.Moreover- and criticisingthe second step- if
we allow that inherenceis not part of an accident's essence, we must
conclude that inherenceis itselfan accident. In this case, however,we
cannot avoid an infiniteregressof the relationsof inherence.As a consequence, God cannot cause accidentswithouthaving them caused by
the substancesthatnaturallycause them,fortwo reasons:first,secondary
causes exerta special causationthat cannot be bypassedby the primary
cause, and second, God cannot cause anythingdirectlywithoutmaking
use of somethingelse. In short,God can replace secondarycauses in
termsof efficient
but not materialcausation.
5. Scotus'sNew Perspectives
As has been said, the philosopherstend to criticiseAquinas, while the
theologianstend to followhim. But not all theologiansaccept Aquinas's
doctrine.Scotus, forinstance,is one of those who rejectAquinas's solution. Like Aquinas, Scotus looks at the Eucharist as an extra-ordinary
case thatcompelsus to rethink
accidents.But the resultof such a rethinking
is quite different
fromAquinas's.As forwhetherinherenceis or is notpart
of an accident's essence,we have seen that Aquinas answersthis question in a qualifiedlypositivemanner;Scotus, on the otherhand, answers
the questionin the negative.Accordingto Aquinas, an accidentis a thing
whose metaphysicalnature consistsin being somethingof a substance.
Accordingto Scotus, instead,being somethingof a substanceis added
accidentallyto an accident,whose metaphysicalnatureconsistsin being
a thingon its own. For thisreason, Scotus thinksthatAquinas is wrong
in sayingthat accidentspass froma being theylack beforeConsecration
to a new being afterConsecration.For neithercreationnor accidental
change is involvedin the Eucharist.Nor can the new being be substantial. For otherwiseaccidentswould be absolutelyindependentbeings.46
46See Scotus,
Ordinatio,
TV,d. 12,q. 1,ed. L. Wadding,
Lyons1639(rpt.Hildesheim
vol.VIII,703-04,
nn.3-4.Fora similar
seeFrancis
ofMeyronnes,
criticism,
1969),
Scriptum

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AMERESTI

he is quite
AlthoughScotus arrivesat his finaldoctrineby degrees,47
in
his
career
that
substances
and
accidents
are
explicitthroughout
saying
absoluteand perse beingson theirown.48Nonetheless,substancesare cat, while acciegoriallypriorto accidents,so thatsubstancesare perseprimo
Both substancesand accidentsreceivethe property
dentsare perse secundo.
of being per se directlyfromGod, upon whom both beings depend for
their existence.Both substancesand accidents receive the propertyof
direcdyfromGod, as well. When God crebeing per se primoet secundo
ates an accident,a propertynecessarilyflowsout fromit. Such a propertyis preciselya tendencyor aptitudeto inherein a substance,and an
this tendencyor aptitude,which can be actuaccident has primitively
alised at some timeor another.Two pointsare entailedby thisview. On
the one hand, the fact that such a propertyfollowsupon an accident's
essence entails that it is a contingentpropertyof an accident. On the
other hand, though,the fact that such a propertynecessarily
flows out
is
a
se
modo
If
entailsthat it
per secundo
property. thispropertyis external
to an accident'sessence,an accidentcan have or not have such a property.So the factthat an accidenthas such a propertyis a naturallybut
not logicallynecessaryconstraintconcerningan accident'sessence- as the
case of the Eucharistreveals.
Scotus providesa firsttreatmentof the topic of accidentalbeing in the
on theMetaphysics
, VII, q. 1 ("whetherinherenceis part of an
Questions
Scotus will returnto this topic on sevaccident's essence"). Afterwards,
eral occasions throughouthis career, but he will provide an extensive
treatmentof it only in the later Ordination
IV, d. 12. Here Scotus reproin
find
the
the
same
conclusions
we
Questions
, albeit in different
poses
clothes.We can summariseScotus's metaphysicsof accidentsas follows.
Afterfirstdistinguishing
the generalconceptof accident
fromthe objects
that can be denominatively
called accidents(forinstance,a whiteness),49
IV Sententiarum
PeterAuriol,
, d. 12,q. 5, ed. Venice1520,ff.195vb-196ra;
super
Scriptum
IV Sententiarum
, d. 12,q. 5, ed. Rome1605,p. 113a.
super
47Foran insightful
reconstruction
ofScotus's
doctrine
anditsevolution,
see G. Pini,
andInherence.
Scotus
andtheParisDebate
ontheMetaphysics
Substance
, Accident
, in
oftheEucharist
- J.-L.Solre- G. Sondag(eds.),DunsScot Paris.1302-2002
- E. Karger
O. Boulnois
,
Turnhout
2004,273-311.
48See e.g. Scotus,Quaestiones
etal.,St.
inMetaphysicam
, V, qq. 5-6,ed. R. Andrews
N.Y. 1997,vol.III, 466-71;
VII,qq. 2-4,vol.IV, 109-29;
Parisiensia,
Bonaventure,
Reportata
IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed. L. Wadding,
1969),vol.XI.2,676-79;
Lyons1639(rpt.Hildesheim
Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,703-26.
49Cf.Scotus,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.dt.,711,n. 5.
VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,92,n. 8; Ord.,
Qu.met.,

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117

in the Questions
and second,actualfromaptitudinalor potentialinherence,50
on theMetaphysics
Scotus draws an originaldistinction,i.e. that between
what is part of the essence of somethingand what is essentiallyidentical
to somethingbut is not part of its essence.51Scotus does not repeat this
distinctionin the Ordinatio
, where he introducesinstead the distinction
betweenwhat is part of the essence of somethingand what followsnecseem to amountto the
essarilyfromthe essence. But the two distinctions
same thing. In fact,what is essentiallyidentical to somethingwithout
being part of its essence is coextensivewith that thing.So it necessarily
followsfromsuch a thing.Thus, forexample,animal is part of the essence
of man and hence essentially
identicalto man; in contrast,risibleis essenman
identical
to
because
it followsnecessarilyfromman, but it is
tially
therenot part of the essence of man. On the basis of such distinctions,
Scotus
draws
three
conclusions.
fore,
The firstconclusionis thatno inherenceis partof an accident'sessence.52
For the foundationof a relationis different
fromthe relation,and inherence is grounded upon neitherthe substance (for otherwisesubstance
should be said to inhere)nor the compositeof accident and inherence
(for otherwiseinherencewould be grounded upon itself),but precisely
upon the accident.But inherenceis a relation.Hence inherenceis different
fromthe inheringaccidentand posteriorto it. Moreover,inherenceconcerns all the categoriesand nothingessentialis common to them.53
The second conclusionis that the aptitudinalinherenceor essential
dependence an accident bringsto a substanceis essentiallyidenticalto
For the passionsof being are essentiallyidenticalto being,
the accident.54
and 'to be primarily(or per se or even in sf and cto be secondarily(or
inherere
or even essein alio)' are passions of being. So cto be secondarily'
is essentially
identicalto the accident,so thataccidentsare secondaryand
less perfectbeings than substances.Moreover,this dependence abstracts
fromthe actual existenceof an essence and foundsitselfupon possible
50Gf.Scotus,Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,92, n. 9; Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711,
n. 5.
51Cf.Scotus,
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,93,n. 11.
52Cf.Scotus,Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,93-94,n. 12; Ord.,
TV,d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,
711,n. 5.
53Cf.Scotus,
VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,94, nn. 13-14;Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,
Qu.met.,
717,n. 9.
54Cf.Scotus,
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,94,n. 15; Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711,
n. 5.

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FABRIZIO

essences.But thesefoundationsare immutable,since necessarilyGod creates by imitatingthese exemplarymodels. Therefore,the order between
substancesand accidentsis also immutable.55
Finally,the thirdconclusionis that actual inherenceis not essentially
identicalto the accident.56For eitherextremeof this order can change
while the otherextremeremainsthe same, because God's will is contingent with regard to any existencewhatsoever.Thus, for an accident,it
is absolutelycontingent
thatit inheresactuallyin a substance.Only actual
If the subjectwere part of an accidependenceupon God is necessary.57
dent's essence, any accidental compositewould be a substantialbeing.
to the subjectwerepartof an accident'sessence,
Moreover,ifthe reference
an accident could not be made withoutsuch a reference.But it is not
logicallyimpossibleto finda counter-example.So the subjectis only an
externalcause. Unlike in his Questions
on theMetaphysics
, in the Ordinatio
Scotus narrowsdown this conclusionto absolute accidents.An absolute
accident, qua absolute, does not require somethingupon which it is
grounded.But a relativeaccident,qua relative,requiresboth a foundation and a terminus.
Apart fromthe emphasisScotus puts on the factthat essentialdependence does not belong to an accident'sessence,we see thatScotus'sposition is not particularlyfar fromAquinas's. As we have seen, Aquinas
thinksthat the subject,as such, does not fillany formalrole withregard
to the essence of a givenaccident.To see the similarity
betweenAquinas
and Scotus on thispoint,it can be noted that the parallel Scotus draws
in his Questions
on theMetaphysics
betweenthe relationships
accidentsbring
to substancesand those creaturesbringto God, in order to explain that
neitherrelationshipis part of an accident's essence, is the same as the
one Aquinas draws in his Commentary
on theMetaphysics
, book VII, ch. 5.
a
creature
does
on
a
creature
is not what it is
God,
Although
depend
insofaras it depends on God. Likewise,an accidentis not what it is insofaras it inheresin a substance.As Scotus pointsout both in an addition
on theMetaphysics
to the text and at the end of the Questions
, book VII,
upon a substancebecausethesubstance
q. 1, an accidentdependsessentially
55Cf.Scotus,
VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,94-95,nn.16-17;Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.dt.,
Qu.met.,
717,nn.9-10.
36Cf.Scotus,
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,96,n. 18.
57Cf.Scotus,
VII, q. 1,ed.cit.,96,n. 20; Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,721,
Qu.met.,
n. 18.

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119

existsprimarilywhile the accident exists secondarily.But an accident's

formalbeing does not consistin this dependence upon a substance.So,
fromthe fact that an accident is a being because it is somethingof a
being, it is wrong to inferthat 'to be somethingof a being' expresses
preciselythe being an accidentformallyhas. Nor, fromthe factthat an
accidentis a being because it is somethingof such a being,is it rightto
inferthat an accident is not a being if it is not somethingof such a
To conclude:some thing
being.Here we have a case offallaciaconsequents.
a can be caused by some other thingb while being formallywhat it is
of b. Likewise,a can be more perfectthan b with regard
independently
P
a
to property while both are P.58
As is clear, Scotus considersaccidents as absolute and autonomous
beings.Accordingly,
explainingthe ontologica!statusof inherenceis parfor
him. As to this,we can distinguishthree stages in
ticularlypressing
In
his
on theMetaphysics
Scotus's thought.
, Scotus confineshimQuestions
selfto labellinginherenceas a respect,but he does not go any deeper
into the nature of inherence.Scotus focusesagain on this issue in the
later theologicalworks,especiallyin the Ordinatio
, III, d. 1, q. 1, in the
in
Parisiensia
the Reportata
, II, d. 1, q. 7, where he
, q. 19, and
Quodlibet
betweenan accident'sessentialdependence upon substance
distinguishes
and its actual or causal dependence. Finally,in the Ordinatio
, IV, d. 12,
to
the
Fourth
Book
his
definitive
Scotus
reaches
position.According
q. 1,
if
act
of
subextrinsecus
adveniensthe
of the Ordinatio
, inherenceis a respectus
stances' being qualifiedby accidentsis describedas an act of accidents'
inheringin the substances.For, just because a particularsubject and a
particularaccident are put into the world,the accident does not inhere
necessarilyin the subject. But, ratherstrangely,Scotus concludes from
this that inherence,qua relative,necessarilyrequiresa subject.59On the
other hand, however,if the act of inheringis described as an act of
58Cf.Scotus,
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 1, ed.cit.,97-98,nn.27-28.
59Scotus's
Whilewe can define
a certain
seemsto runas follows.
quality,
argument
a certain
such
without
toa subject,
wecannot
define
suchas whiteness,
relative,
referring
In fact,
andthetermoftherelation.
as fatherhood,
without
to botha subject
referring
to (inthiscase)
thata man,whois a father,
fatherhood
is defined
as therelation
brings
cannot
be defined
without
another
inherence,
man,whois a son.Therefore,
quarelative,
fortworeasons.
On theonehand,
to a subject.
Thisargument
sounds
referring
strange,
andhenceto define
it
fatherhood
as an absolute
itseemsto be possible
alsoto consider
In hisCommentary
without
toa subject.
ontheCategories
, forinstance,
JohnBuridan
referring
andOckham's
viewsonrelatives
withregard
tothispoint
criticises
bothScotus's
precisely
inPraedicamenta,
Munich1983,92-99,esp.95-96).On
(Quaestiones
q. 13,ed.J. Schneider,

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then inherencecan be classifiedas an action (of the accident)

qualifying,
or as a passion (of the subject).In thiscase, inherencerequiresan agent
in order to act on a patient.60
On the basis of Scotus's argument,therefore,we can conclude that God can create an accident that does not
inhereactuallyin a subject,nor will inhereunlessGod wantsit to inhere.
For actual inherencein a subjectis an absolutelycontingentrelationthat
is added "later" to the accident. From the opposite side, we can conclude that it is God's will that puts togetheractuallyan accidentand a
subject.There is no othercause that linksan accidentand a subjectto
each other.
In any case, Scotus grantsthat the essentialdependenceupon a substanceis essentiallyidenticalto an accident'sessence,insofaras it follows
necessarilyfromit. How mustwe read this claim? Accordingto Scotus,
once an accident comes into existence,the accident receivesnecessarily
the propertyof inheringpotentiallyin a subject. But puttingthingsthis
way, Scotus facestwo traditionalproblemsthathe himselfrecognises.On
the one hand, ifinherenceis removedfroman accident'sessence,it must
be an accident.But in thiscase inherencerequiresanotherinherencein
order to inherein that accident. On the otherhand, if a is not part of
the essence of , then a can be logicallyseparatedfromb. But if a cannot be logicallyseparatedfrom, then a mustbe part of the essence of
b. This is exactlythe case withpotentialor aptitudinalinherence.Scotus
rejectsthe idea thataccidentsare independentbeingslike substances.For
the possibilityof inheringcannot be removed,sinecontradictione
, froman
accident's essence. This entails that it is not possible to have accidents
that are unable to inherein a substance.Nonetheless,Scotus denies that
being able to inherein a substanceis part of an accident'sessence.
As to the firstproblem,in order to block the infiniteregress,Scotus
invokesthe rule that a relationis the same as its foundationif the foundationcannotexist,sinecontradictione
, withoutthatrelation.This holdsprein
of inherence.The same inherenceby
the
case
of
the
inherence
cisely
in
a
which a colour inheres
surface,for instance,inheresin the colour
as well. For otherwisethe colour could not be said formallyto inherein
a surfacebecause of the inherence.On the otherhand, the inherenceby
which the inherenceof the colour in a surfacealso inheresin the colour
to define
evenwhiteness,
without
theotherhand,it seemsto be impossible
quaquality,
is always
thequality
Forwhiteness,
toa subject.
ofa certain
quaquality,
subject.
referring
60Cf.Scotus,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, ed.cit.,711,nn.6-7.
Ord.,

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121

is absolutelythe same as the inherenceby which the colour inheresin

the surface.For it is logicallycontradictory
to statethatthe inherenceof
a colour in a surfaceexistsand that the colour does not inhere in the
surface.61
As to the second problem,Scotus repliesthat actual inherenceis not
a perse but a peraccidens
propertyof an accident,because it involvesthe
actual union an absolutebringsto anotherabsolute. Now, such a union
is a respectas
extrnsecas
adveniens
, because it does not flow out necessarily
fromeitherextreme.Indeed, God can create and preserve,sinecontradictione
, an absolutewithoutanotherabsolute. Thus, the actual relationan
absolute brings to another absolute is perfectlycontingent.Insofar as
potentialinherenceis concerned,though,Scotus is carefulto say thatthe
potentialinherenceis not a real and positivepropertythatis superadded
to the accident,since it cannot be separatedfromthe accident in existence. Thus, an accident and its potentialinherencedo not give rise to
any real composition.Hence inherenceis not another accident that is
fromthe former.Saying that an accidentis potentiallyor
reallydifferent
inheringamounts simplyto sayingthat an accident has a
aptitudinally
to inherein a subject,i.e. that it is not logicallyimposnon-repugnancy
sible forthe accidentto be actuallyin a subject.62
Summing up, Scotus upholds that an absolute a can be essentially
ordered to anotherabsolute b insofaras a thirdthingc causes a to be
less perfectthan b, withoutthis entailing,first,that the degree of lesser
perfectionexpressesa part of the essence of a and, second, that a comparisonof perfectionbetweena and b when concerning,basically,their
being requiresa directcomparisonof a to b. If God were to separate
froman accident its potencyto inhere,God would make that accident
an independentbeing. But Scotus, as has been said, rejectsthis conclusion.63On the otherhand, Scotus argues that actual or potentialinherence in a subjectis not essentialto the account of what kind of created
being an accidentis. An accidentis not a certainkind of created being
because it can inhere,but it can inhere because it is a certainkind of
createdbeing. Nonetheless,it is difficult
to understandhow the potency
to inhere can be removedfroman accident's essence and not be logically separablefromthe accidentitself.In otherwords,it is unclear how
61Cf.Scotus,
nn.14-17.
Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.
, 718,nn.11-12;719-20,
62Cf.Scotus,
nn.21-22;725,n. 24.
Ord.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,ed.cit.,719,n. 13;723-24,
63See above,n. 46.

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AMERINI

else we can say thatan accidentis less perfectthan a substance,in order

to explain that it can inhere in a substance,withoutinvokingprecisely
the accident'scapacityto inherein that substance.
Treatment:
The Questions
6. Marchiai Philosophical
on theMetaphysics
When Marchia wrotehis Commentary
ontheMetaphysics
, whichcan be dated
64
on theSentences
to about the same period as his Commentary
(13 19-23), the
debate on accidentsand inherencewas well articulated,as we have seen.
In particular,one point of the debate seems to have been set in stone
by thistime.Philosophersno longerneeded to questionwhetheran accidenton itsown does or does not have beingand essence.For in Marchia's
view the theologicalcase of the Eucharistand many philosophicalarguments clearlyprove that accidentsdo indeed have being of theirown.
PeterAuriol,readingthe Sentences
at Paris two yearsbeforeMarchia, still
discussedthispoint,but the view that accidentshave no degree of being
Auriol labels an "old opinion".65As a result,in Marchia's day the main
philosophicalproblem at issue concernedthe kind of relationshipholding betweenan accidentand its subject.Specifically,the discussioncentred on the question whethersome sort of inherencemust be included
in an accident'sessence.Marchia dealt withthe topic of accidentalbeing
on several occasions,but especiallyin his Metaphysics
book
commentary,
VII. At the beginningof the commentaryon thisbook, Marchia immediatelyjoins in thisdebate by asking"whetherinherenceis or is not part
of an accident'sessence".
Generallyspeaking,Marchia identifiestwo partiesamong Aristotelian
On the one hand, there are those who say that some sort
interpreters.
of inherenceis part of an accident's essence. For being in a subject is
an essentialfeatureof an accidentjust as much as being on its own is
- C. Schabel,
64On Marchia's
lifeandworks,
see R.L. Friedman
Francis
ofMarchia's
Mediaeval
63
andC. Schabel,
on
the
Sentences
in:
Francis
,
Studies,
(2001),31-106,
Commentary
, in E.N. Zalta(ed.),TheStanford
, URL: http:
ofPhilosophy
ofMarchia
Encyclopedia
//plato.
On thelikely
dateofcomposition
stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/francis-marchia.
ofMarchia's
onthe
ontherelation
between
thiswork
, andespecially
Commentary
Metaphysics
vonMarchia:
Die
andMarchia's
ontheSentences
Franziskus
, seeS. Folger-Fonfara,
Commentary
undeiner
Besonderen
e studisulla
erste
einer
, in:Documenti
Unterscheidung
Allgemeinen
Metaphysik
tradizione
filosofica
16 (2005),461-513,
medievale,
esp.495-501.
65See PeterAuriol,
In IV Sent.,
d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 109a(cf.alsop. 1,
of thistextat URL: http://spot.colorado.
11.22T.,ofR. Pasnau'sEnglish
translation
12.pdf).
edu/~pasnau/research/aureol4-

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123

an essentialfeatureof a substance.Like Aquinas, these thinkerssay that

the generalconcept 'to be' spreadsinto the categorialscheme by way of
modes of being and not by way of differentiae
, since 'being' is not a genus.
But unlikeAquinas, theyalso say thatthe mode of being 'to be in a sub'rational'
ject' mustbe part of an accident'sessence,just as the differentia
has to be part of the essence of the species 'man'.66
Marchia rejectsthis common opinion. A mode of being has a relational status;hence it requiresa positiveand absolute foundation.If an
accidentis distinguished
froma substancebecause of that mode, then it
must be distinguished
beforehandbecause of that positiveand absolute
foundation.As a consequence,everymode of being presupposesa certain being. So if an accident is distinguishedfroma substancebecause
of a mode, it has to be distinguished
beforehandbecause of that being.
to
from
the
factthat an accidenthas a mode
Thus, according Marchia,
is
of being it incorrectto inferthe factthatit has being. Quite the opposite.The deductionmustbe: An accidenthas being,hence it has a mode
of being.For otherwise,ifaccidentsand substancesare distinguished
from
each other accordingto a mode of being, it followsthat accidentsand
substancesshare the same being.67
The second opinionis not completelydistinctfromthe former.It is a
common opinion among theologians.This opinion distinguishes
between
twowaysof inhering,i.e. actuallyand aptitudinally.
it
Accordingly, applies
the followingrule: If a cannot be separated fromb, sinecontradictione
, b
must be part of the essence of a. But an accident cannot be separated
fromaptitudinal,
i.e. potential,inherence,sinecontradictione.
Hence the aptitude to inherein a substancemust be part of an accident'sessence.68
Marchia rejectsthis second opinion,as well. The reason is the same.
Aptitudinalinherencehas a relationalstatus,so it can belong to an accidentonlybecause of a positiveand absolutefoundation.Hence an accident
is distinguishedfroma substancebecause of that positiveand absolute
foundation.
no aptitudinal
itemcan grantactualbeingto someFurthermore,
thing.Nor can a thingbe an absolute because of a relationalitem.69
Marchia does not dwell here on this latter remark,confininghimself
to recallinga traditionalargument.Nonetheless,Marchia picks out a
66Cf.below,appendix,
11.12-36.
67Cf.below,appendix,
11.43-59.
68Cf.below,appendix,
11.36-42.
69Cf.below,appendix,
11.60-82.

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AMERESTI

problematicfeatureof the commontheologicalopinion,whichScotus had

alreadypointedout. Clearly,aptitudinalinherenceexpressesnothingbut
thatit can fulfil
an accident'saptitudeto inhereactually,i.e. a possibility
at some time or another.For what is actuallyan accidentcan onlyhave
to inhereas if this
actual inherence.An accidentcannot have an aptitude
that
an
accident
were
a
actuallyhas. An actuaptitude
positiveproperty
to
inhere
has
the
accident
again in the future,
aptitude
ally non-inhering
and hence the aptitudeto be an accidentagain, but actuallyit is not an
accident at all. It is simplysomethingfor which it is not logicallycontradictoryto inhere actuallyat some time or another.70In brief,if we
say that 'to be aptitudinally' is part of the essence of a, then it is
sufficient
to say thatsomethinghas the aptitudeto be b in orderforthat
b is not actually, but it will be
to
be
a. But what is aptitudinally
thing
will
an
be realised.For 'to be aptib
when
such
aptitude
actually only
a
V
is
the
condition
0, but not
whereby thingis aptitudinally
tudinally
the conditionwherebya thingis actuallya. Therefore,aptitudinalinherence does not statean accident'spositiveand real property.It statesonly
a negativeproperty,which has to be explained in a conditionalway: If
a is an accident,then nothingpreventsa frominheringin a subject at
some time or another.That is to say that an accidentis a naturemade
for it to inherein a
in such a way that it is not logicallycontradictory
time
or
another.
at
some
subject
Once Marchia has rejectedthese positions,he provideshis own solution. His answersounds 'scotistic'.Like Scotus,Marchia defendsa strong
Formally
readingof what we above called the Expansive Interpretation.
is
what
it
is
because
of
itself.
It is a
whatsoever
accident
speaking,any
kind
and
it
has
its
own
of
its
own
on
(ensperse)
being (esseperse)
being
although,materiallyspeaking,an accident can exist only because of a
Consequently,
any accidentwhatsoever
subjectin whichit actuallyinheres.71
can be identifiedformally,and hence be numericallycounted,because
of itself
although,materiallyspeaking,an accidentcan be individuated
70Fora similar
De accidentibus,
ch. 22, ed.
of Freiburg,
see e.g. Thierry
argument,
M.R.Pagnoni-Sturlese,
1983,84,nn.4-6.
Hamburg
71Cf.Marchia,
VII, q. 3, msP, f.49vb-50ra;
Qu.met.,
q. 6, msP, f.52ra: (. . .) llud
autemestensforsineeo; accidens
intelligi
peraliudnonpotest
quodestensformaliter
nonestensnisicausaliter"
maliter
se ipsoetnonpersubiectum,
(for
quiapersubiectum
Formoredetails
on thisaspect
oftheEdition).
thesiglaofthemss,seebelow,Criteria
exanalogia
adsubstantiam
accidentia
ofMarchia's
see Qu.met.,
IV, q. 4 (Utrum
precise
though,
sintentia
velexse),msP, f.22ra-vb.

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125

only because of the subject in which it inheres.Throughouthis comMarchia oftenrepeatsthataccidentsand substancesare different
mentary,
se
, i.e. because of their own essences and natures,while subper primo
stances and accidentscan be distinguishedonly secondarilybecause of
inherence.With regard to this,Marchia's main argumentis that every
beingis logicallypriorto any mode of being. But 'to inhere',eitheractually or aptitudinally,
expressesa mode of being. Therefore,an accident
is distinguished
froma substanceprimarilybecause of itself.
In the Questions
on Metaphysics
, VII, q. 1, Marchia is rather explicit
about the fact that inherence has to be removed from an accident's
essence.For Marchia thinksof aptitudinalinherenceas a properpassion
that flows out necessarilyfrom an accident, while actual inherenceis
regarded as simply accidental to the accident's essence. Nonetheless,
Marchia does not inquire furtherinto the relationshipbetweenan accident and its inherence.Like Scotus,he does not explain what naturean
accidentmusthave in orderforaptitudinalinherenceto flowout necessarilyfromit. Nor does he explain what ontologicalstatusactual inherence preciselyhas.72Because of Marchia's conciseness,one could remark
that once inherenceis removedfroman accident'sessence,the ontological statusof inherenceis no longerclear. For inherencecould be regarded
as no longer necessaryto explain an accidental composite.In fact,an
accidentalcompositecould be describedas made up exclusivelyof two
someone would see betweena coloured
items,so that the sole difference
surfaceand a colour plus a surface,forinstance,is that in one case the
colour is joined togetherwith the surface,while in the other case it is
notjoined to it. No intermediateitem is requiredhere. It is sufficient
to
invokeGod's will or the course of eventsimplementedby God in order
to explain such an accidentalcomposition.
From anotherperspective,
Marchia's solutionfacessome technicalproblems concerningAristotle'sdoctrine of the categories. For one thing,
Marchia thinksthatinherenceis reallydifferent
froman accident'sessence.
For inherence is an accidental propertyfollowingupon an accident's
essence. According to Marchia, indeed, differentaccidents must have
different
subsubjects,since the same accident cannot qualifydifferent
But
the
of
and
that
of
jects.
subject quantity
quantity'sinherence,for
thereforequantity and its inherence must be
instance, are different,
72Cf.below,
11.83-114.
appendix,

11:22:15 AM

126

FABRIZIO
AMERINI

different.
Hence theymustbe different
accidents.There can be no doubt
For the subjectof quantityis substance,
that theirsubjectsare different.
while the subject of quantity'sinherenceis quantityitself.In fact,every
subject receivesthe denominationfromthe accident that is predicated
denominativelyof it. But while a substancecan be called 'quantified5,
substancecannot be called 'inhering'.Only quantitycan be called 'inherof quantityand
ing'. Thereforeinherenceis predicatedabsolutely{absolute)
But
if
relative
of
substance.73
inherence
is an accident
)
only secondarily(
that is different,
say, fromquantity,then it mustbe explainedto which
in factbelongs.Now, it seems thatinherencebelongs
inherence
category
to each accidentalcategory,since any accidentcan inherein a substance.
But no singlethingcan belongto more than one category.Nor can inherence be a transcategorial
property,since,first,substancedoes not possess
it and, second, no accident can exist withoutbelongingto at least one
category.
For anotherthing,as has been mentionedabove, if we removeinherence froman accident'sessence,we give rise to an infiniteregress.For
if inherenceis an accident,it requiresanotherinherencein order forit
to inhere in that accident. Moreover, if inherence is a third item in
betweenthe subject and the accident,how can we explain the factthat
the accident but not the subjectinheres?On the otherhand, if we folinherenceas a passion or as an
low Scotus's suggestionof understanding
we
face
the
crucial
of
action,
problem explainingthe unityor even the
between
two co-existingitems,i.e. the substanceand
relationshipholding
to say
the accident.That is to say, it could not be logicallycontradictory
thata colour inheresactuallyin a surface,forinstance,and thatthe surface is not actuallycoloured. For a colour is not a thingable to qualify
essentiallya surface,since it simplyco-existswiththe surface.As a consequence,givena surfacethatis coloured,we could have some difficulties
explainingthe reason why we say that we have a coloured surfaceand
not a surfacewith a colour.

73Cf.below,appendix,
11.99-110.See alsoQu.met.,
habere,
V, q. 23 (Utrum
quosubiecMarchia
for
sitinpredicamento
habitus
tum
habet
accidens,
), ms.P, f.43rb.Generally,
argues
andnotmerely
ofan accident
ofanother
thepossibility
accident,
being
beingthesubject
in a substance.
Marchia
folaccident
can inhere
thatbecauseofwhich{idquo
) another
canbe theimmediate
butnottheremote
thatan accident
lowsScotusin saying
subject
accidens
sitpersesubiectum
On thispoint,
see Qu.met.,
ofanother
accident.
IV, q. 8 (Utrum
alterius
msP, f.27ra-va.
accidentis),

11:22:15 AM

MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

127

an Accident
and Its Subject
6.1. TheRelationship
between
when commentingon
Marchia provides a solutionto these difficulties
V.
Marchia
treats
the
book
,
unityholdingbetween
Metaphysics
Specifically,
a subject and an accident when commentingon book V, ch. 6, where
he discussesthe questions"whetheran accident is some one thingwith
its subject" and "whethersomethingone resultsfroma subject and an
accident".74Furthermore,Marchia investigatesthe categorial status of
inherencewhen commentingon book V, ch. 23, where he discussesthe
question"whetherthe having,by whicha subjecthas an accident,belongs
to the categoryof habit".75Let me startwiththe firstof these questions.
Afterdistinguishing
between unity by union and unityby identity,
Marchia observesthat a subjectand an accidentare one only according
to the firstsense of 'unity'.This means that when we say, for instance,
that a surfaceis coloured,we do not state that the surfaceis the same
as the colour,but thatthe surfaceand the colour make some one thing.
In particular,the surfaceand the colour are not one peraliudbut perse,
because they are one immediately.For an accident cannot be reduced
to a substantialsubject,nor do a subject and an accidentmake a third,
distinctentity,since such an entitycannot be a substance
metaphysically
or an accident.76Thus, the unityholdingbetween a colour and a surface has to be perse. For ifthe surfaceand the colour are one on account
of somethingelse, i.e. inherence,we would have an infiniteregress.77
Therefore,sayingthat a proper passion P inheresper se in a subject
amountsto sayingthat and P are perse and immediatelyone by union.
74Cf.Marchia,
unum
cum
subiecto
accidens
Qu.met.,
V, q. 4 (Utrum
faciat
) andq. 5 (Utrum
exsubiecto
etaccidente
resultet
aliquid
unum).
75Cf.Marchia,
habet
accidens
, sitinpredicahabere,
V, q. 23 (Utrum
Qu.met.,
quosubiectum
mento
Thisis question
8 ofBookVI according
toA. Zimmermann's
list(Verzeichnis
habitus).
Kommentare
undPhysik
desAristoteles.
Ausdereit
vonetwa
zurMetaphysik
1250-1350,
Ungedruckter
of
Leiden-Kln
liststhelast11questions
ofbookV as thefirst
1971,143).Zimmermann
bookVI.
76Cf.Marchia,
nonestidemsubiecto,
V, q. 4, msP, f.32vb:"(.. .) accidens
Qu.met.,
necex eis rsultat
Probo:quia illudtertium
nonessetformaliter
subaliquodtertium.
stantia
necformaliter
cumcompositum
nonsitformaliter
accidens,
aliquodcomponentium.(. . .) Perhocpatetad primum,
dicendum
quiapassioperse inestsubiecto,
quod
estipsampassionem
facere
unumunitate
inessesubiecto
cumsubiecto
perse passionem
unionis".
77Cf.Marchia,
faciunt
V, q. 4, msP, f. 32vb:"(.. .) quecumque
unum,et
Qu.met.,
nonperaliud,faciunt
unumperse,quiaunumperse <est> idemquodnonperaliud;
sedaccidens
etsubiectum
uniuntur
immediate
etperse,etnonperaliud,quiatuncesset
in infinitum;
unionis".
processus
ergofaciunt
perse unumunitate

11:22:15 AM

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

As can be noted,Marchia does not focushere on the special issue of

the relationshipbetweeninherenceand its subject,since he confineshimone of Aristotle's
text.Specifically,
selfto commentingon the Aristotelian
goals in book V, ch. 6, is to exclude the existenceof an underlyingsubfromthe substance,in orderto explainthe accident's
ject thatis different
in
a
substance.
Thus, it is unclear whetherMarchia looks at the
being
insofaras it is externalto the accident'sessencean
aliud
inherenceas
an accidentwitha substance.Nonetheless,
playinga rolein keepingtogether
we could reapply Marchia's same argumentto the case of inherence,
since Marchia upholds, first,that the aptitudinalinherenceis a per se
propertyof an accidentand, second, that an accidentcan be the subject
of anotheraccident.
The question we have been consideringup to now shows that for
Marchia it is not so problematicto allow that an accident and a substance are one perse in an immediateway. This impliesthatthereis not
a thirdthingthatlinkstogetheran accidentwitha substancewhilebeing
fromthe substanceor the accident.Nor
at the same timereallydifferent
does the union of a surfaceand a colour,forinstance,give rise to somefroma surfacewith a colour. For a colour is
thingessentiallydifferent
essentiallynot the qualificationof a surface,but a thingco-existingwith
betweena coloured
the surface.Thus, thereis not an essentialdifference
surfaceand a surfaceplus a colour. But in the lightof a doctrinesuch
as this,which describesaccidentalcompositesas mereologicalcombinationsof two reallydifferent
items,what is the role played by inherence?
In orderto clarifythispoint,let me turnto anotherplace in Marchia's
commentary,i.e. to question 6 of book VII, where Marchia
Metaphysics
asks "whetheran accident can be cognised withoutcognisingthe subject". Traditionally,the problemof the cognitionof accidentsraises two
questions: (i) whetheran accident can be cognised withoutcognising,
throughthe same act of cognition,the subject,and if thisis not the case,
(ii) whether,withina linguisticexpression,adding the accidentto the subject amounts to making a repetition.For our argumentwe can leave
aside the second questionand focus on the firstone.
The common opinion holds that it is not possible to cognise an acciIn both
dentwithoutcognisingthe subject,eitherconcretelyor abstractly.
in
the
accident:
in
of
the
definition
is
included
cases, indeed, the subject
, if we defineconcrete
, if we defineabstractaccidents,or in recto
obliquo
accidents.The basic reason forsayingthisis that an accidentis a being
existingonly by analogy to substance,and, since the modes of cognising

11:22:15 AM

MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

129

a thingfollowthe modes of being of that thing,an accident cannot be

cognisedwithoutcognising,throughthe same act of cognition,the substance as well. On the other hand, we could argue that the intellectis
a more perfectfacultythan sensation,and since sensationcan cognisean
accident independentlyof and beforecognisingthe substance,then the
intellectcan cognisean accidentwithoutcognisingthe substance.In fact,
the only reason we could invoketo rejectthisconclusionis that an accident cannot exist independentlyof a substance,thereforeit cannot be
of thatsubstance.But thisis not trueuniversally.
cognisedindependently
of a species,and nonethelesswe
For a genus cannot existindependently
can cognise the genus withoutcognisingthe species. Hence the 'modistic' dictumthat the modes of cognitionfollowthe modes of being is not
true in an unqualifiedway.
An accident
Marchia's own answerrelieson an importantdistinction.
can be understoodin two ways: either according to its essence, from
whichwe derive
) the natureof accident,or accordingto thatwhich
(accipere
is in somethingelse, and to thiswe attribute
) the natureof acci(imponere
dent.78In the firstway, accordingto Marchia, we can say that an accident can be cognisedwithoutcognisingthe substanceat the same time.
For an accidentis prior to its inherence,insofaras it is the foundation
the accidentis cogof thatinherence.Cognised in such a way, therefore,
nised withoutthe substance,because an accident refersto a substance
only because of inherence.79
Particularlyimportantfor our argumentis what Marchia says in the
lines that follow.Accordingto Marchia, accidents can be arranged in
two generalclasses.In the firstclass we findaccidentsthatinhereimmediatelyin a subject,whilein the second class we findaccidentsthatinhere
78Cf.Marchia,
essedicendum
aliter,
Qu.met.,
VII, q. 6, msP, f.5Ivb:"Ideovidetur
a qua
vel quantum
ad rationem
essendi,
possumus
loquidupliciter,
quodde accidente
natura
velquantum
ad illudquodestin alio,cuiimponitur
natura
accidentis,
accipitur
accidentis".
79Cf.Marchia,
de accidente
VII, q. 6, msP, f.5Ivb:"Si loquimur
Qu.met.,
quantum
intellectu
ad rationem
in alio,sicdicendum
essendi
quodaccidens
simplici
aliquopotest
sineposterinoncointellecto
subiecto.
Quodsicpatet,quiapriuspotest
intelligi
intelligi
ineo; ergo
sicutfundamentum
estpriusfundato
estpriussuainherentia,
ori;sedaccidens
Sed intelligendo
accidens
sineinherentia,
accidens
sineinherentia.
intelligintelligi
potest
ad subiectum
nisimediante
inherennonhabetordinem
itursinesubiecto,
quiaaccidens
sinesubiecto.
subiectum
sineaccidente;
tia.Ergoaccidens
Item,
potest
intelligi
potest
intelligi
sueinherentie;
sinesuainherensedaccidens
estsubiectum
ergoaccidens
potest
intelligi
sinesubiecto".
tia;si sic,potest
intelligi

11:22:15 AM

130

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

in a subject only mediately.Now, in the firstclass we find inherence,

understood.
while in the second class we findeveryaccidenttraditionally
in
inherence
inheres
an
accident
and
that
immediately because of
Saying
itselfis necessaryin order to avoid any infiniteregress.Thus, at the end
of Marchia's analysiswe meet with the followingontologicalpicture:
(1) An accident is posteriorto a substanceand inherenceis posterior
to an accident;
i.e. because of itself;
(2) Inherenceinheresin an accidentimmediately,
in
An
inheres
a
i.e.
accident
substance
mediately, because of inher(3)
ence.80
Marchia articulatesthispicturea bit more by distributing
accidentsinto
threefurther
fromtheirinherence,
groups:(A) accidentsthatare different
i.e. absoluteaccidents,(B) accidentsthatare the same as theirinherence,
Marchia
i.e. respectiveaccidents,and (C) the inherenceitself.Accordingly,
that
accidents
to
can
be
to
a
certain
belonging (A)
cognised
upholds
while accidentsbelongingto (B) or to
degree separatelyfromsubstance,81
It
cannot
be
(C)
cognisedseparately. is importantto note, however,that
in spiteof thislatterthreefoldclassification,
Marchia tendsto differentiate
in
insofar
as
he
fact
his positionfromScotus's
mergesthe firsttwo groups.
For, accordingto Marchia, respectiveaccidentsas well as absolute accidentsinherein a substancebecause of inherence.So in contrastto Scotus,
80Gf.Marchia,
estscienQu.met.,
VII, q. 6, msP, f. 5Ivb: "Ad cuiusintellectum
sicut
dumquodduplex
estaccidens.
subiectum,
Quoddam
quodse ipsoimmediate
respicit
nonmediante
estipsainherentia,
subiectum,
que se ipsaimmediate
respicit
aliquotertio,
in infinitum.
subiecQuoddamveroestaccidens
quodrespicit
quiatuncessetprocessus
tumnonimmediate,
<se> ipso,sedmediante
sicutestipsum
accialiquotertio
posteriori,
densinherens
subiectum
nisimediante
inherentia
sua. Aliterenim
quod nonrespicit
inherentia
subiectum
et aliteripsumaccidens
inherens
inherens,
quia accidens
respicit
inherentia
etinherentia
immediate
subiectum
subiectum
mediante
(seipsam
respicit
respicit
dicendum
subiectum
se ipsononpotest
ms).Adpro-positum
quodaccidens
quodrespicit
et nonintelligendo
inherens
et cui inheret.
nisicointellecto
Accidens
subiecto,
intelligi
subiectum
mediate
sinesubiecto,
autemquodrespicit
potest
intelligi
quiapotest
intelligi
sinemedioposteriori
subiectum.
Etideoaccidens
inherens
sine
quorespicit
potest
intelligi
In particular,
sineipsovelsubiecto".
the
licetinherentia
subiecto,
ipsanonpossit
intelligi
a subject
concerns
twokinds
ofaccidents:
ofbeingcognised
without
(i)absolute
possibility
or denominative
and (ii)abstract
accidents.
It doesnotconcern
accidents
(iii)concrete
accidents.
81Cf.Marchia,
VII, q. 6, msP, f. 5Ivb: "Dicendum
Qu.met.,
quodomneaccidens
sinesubstansicutestaccidens
absolutum,
potest
intelligi
quodestaliuda suainherentia,
et neutro
autemnon".
tiadupliciter,
et in abstracto
modo;in concreto

11:22:15 AM

OF ACCIDENTS
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
MARCHIA

131

fromwhom he inheritsthistypeof theory,Marchia extends(3) to all the

accidents.82
We are now in a positionto defineMarchia's views on the relationship holdingbetweenan accident and its subject. Saying that inherence
inheresimmediatelyin an accident,and hence that an accident and a
substanceare perse one, amountsto sayingthat inherencedoes not add
fromthe inheringaccident,even though inhera thingreallydifferent
ence is not reallythe same as the inheringaccident. Actual inherence
does not change the natureof an accident.It simplysays that the accident is actuallyrelated to a substance.So an accident can lose such a
propertywithoutceasing to be what it is. An actuallyinheringaccident
from
and an actuallynon-inheringaccident,hence, are really different
each other.Thus, a qualifiedsubstance,such as a whiteman, is not simply the same as the sum of a substanceand a qualification.For when
referboth
speakingof the sum of man and whiteness,we can rightfully
to the case of a whitenessthatactuallyinheresin a man and to the case
of a whitenessthat actuallydoes not inherein him. But the firstcase is
fromthe second because in the firstcase whitenessis actureallydifferent
man.
From thiswe can also inferthatan accidentis really
related
to
ally
different
fromitsinherence.But sinceinherencecannotbe separatedfrom
an inheringaccident,we can inferfurtherthat inherenceis not a thing
fromthe inheringaccident.
reallydifferent
Marchia's doctrine,and especiallythe place of inherencein it, has
some clear problems.Marchia says that an accidentis to inherenceas a
foundationis to a relation.This parallel howeveris quite misleading.As
a matterof fact,we can have in nature foundationswithoutrelations,
but the oppositedoes not hold. Nonetheless,God can miraculouslyseparate a relationfromits foundation,insofaras God can detach the relation's inherencein the foundationfromthe relationitself.For inherence
is somethingadditional to a relation.Accordingto Marchia's parallel,
though,we should say that God can also separate inherencefroman
82Gf.Marchia,
autemquodestsuainher., VII, q. 6, msP, f.52ra:"Accidens
Qu.met
necin concreto
necetiamneutro
necin abstracto
sinesubiecto,
entianonpotest
intelligi
nonpotest
sine
se ipsainheret,
Et ideosi relatio
modo,sicutnecipsainherentia.
intelligi
noninheret
se ipsa,sedmediSi verorelatio
necin concreto
necin abstracto.
subiecto,
- , tuncrelatio
- quodcredoesseverius
sinesubiecto,
etin
anteinherentia
potest
intelligi
estpriorsua
etneutro
abstracto
absoluta,
modo,sicutaliaaccidentia
quiaex quo relatio
absoscilicet
sineea,quiaeademestratiode utroque
accidente,
inherentia,
intelligi
potest
accidens
estpriussuainherentia".
ex quo utrumque
lutoetrespectivo,

11:22:15 AM

132

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

accident,since the formeris posteriorto the latter.But it does not seem

possibleforGod to be able to make inherenceexistwithoutan accident.
In fact,when God separatesan accident froma subject,God does not
separatethreeitems,but onlytwo,i.e. the subjectand the accident.The
Inherenceis a
two cases, therefore,must be regardedas asymmetrical.
in
because
it
inheres
kind
of
relation,
immediately the accident,
special
so that it cannot be separated fromthe accident. While a colour, for
instance,inheresin a surfaceby way of inherence,inherenceinheresin
the colour by way of itself.So while a colour can be separatedfroma
surfaceby detachingthe colour's inherencein the surfacefromthe surface, the colour's inherencein the surfacecannot be separatedfromthe
colour itself,because thereis not an inherenceof the colour's inherence
in the surfacethat can be detached fromthe colour. Moreover,while a
surfaceand a colour are per se one insofaras no underlyingsubject is
involved,the colour's inherenceand the colour are one only insofaras
a surfaceis presupposed.All this entails that, once an accident is put
into existence,it would seem to be logicallyimpossiblefor the accident
to lack inherence.But this raises a problem.For if inherencecannot be
separatedfroman accident'sessence,nothingpreventsan accidentfrom
inheringin a substanceimmediately.In fact,if the colour's inherencein
a surfaceinheresimmediatelyin a colour,thenthe colour is immediately
inheringin the surfacebecause of thatinherence;hence the colourimmediatelyinheresin the surface.But if inherenceis inseparablefromthe
to avoid the conclusionthat, once it is put into
accident,it is difficult
existence,an accident is a thingessentially
inhering.And this,of course,
thrust
of
Marchia's
the
whole
position.
goes against
StatusofInherence
6.2. The Ontological
In order to furtherclarifyMarchia's theory,let me considerthe second
of the two questionsmentionedabove: book V, q. 23, on "whetherthe
having,by which a subject has an accident,belongs to the categoryof
habit" (see above at n. 75). To my knowledge,Marchia is the sole comwho connectsin some way the statusof inhermentatoron theMetaphysics
In book V, q. 23, Marchia attacksthe
of
habit.
ence to the category
opinion claimingthat inherencedoes not belongper se to any category,
but belongs,by reduction,only to the categoryof the inheringaccident,
since inherenceis part of an accident'sessence. This is why inherenceis
an accident'smode of being and no mode belongsperse to any category,

11:22:15 AM

ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE

OF ACCIDENTS
MARCHIA

133

. Marchia
even though a mode can belong to a categoryper reductionem
is
in
the
same
that
inherence
with
those
who
categoryas
deny
agrees
an accifrom
inherence
is
different
the inheringaccident.For, first,
really
dent, since the accident can lack inherence.Hence, theycannot belong
to the same category.Second, inherencehas a relationalstatusand no
relationcan be part of an absolute'sessence. But accidentsare absolute
beings.Third,inherenceis formallythe same in each category,so it must
be in a determinatecategory.Finally,if a mode of being is part of a
thing'sessence,then it mustbe concluded that an accident is part of a
substance'sessence as well.83
Accordingto Marchia, inherencebringstwo respectsto a subject. It
involves,first,a respectof perfectingand, second, a respectof dependence. If we considerinherenceunder both the respects,i.e. perfecting
and dependence,we must conclude that inherenceis not in the same
categoryas the accident,because such respectsbelong to the categoryof
In fact,what informsand what is informedas well as what
relation.84
makes dependentand what is dependentare relatedperse. In particular,
adveniens
each respectis extrinsecus
, because an accident is neitheressenof a substance.
a
substance
nor essentially
perfective
tiallydependentupon
of perHowever, if we considerinherencewith regard to the activity
fectionan accidentperforms,we must conclude that inherencebelongs,
by reduction,to the same categoryas the inheringaccident.The inherence of a colour, for instance,is the same as the act of inheringon
account of which a surfacehas that colour, so that an accident'sinhering in a subject is the same act as the subject's having that accident.
and both acts
These acts are reallyidentical,but conceptuallydifferent,
accident.
One
as
the
to
the
same
thing,in fact,
inhering
category
belong
has only one immediatemode of being. But ctoinherein a subject' and
tobe possessedby a subject'are modes of beingof an accident.Therefore,
83See Qu.met.,
V, q. 23,msP, f.43rb.
84Cf.Marchia,
accidentis
ad subiecV, q. 23,msB, f.87ra:"(.. .) inherentia
Qu.met.,
et formalem
siveperfecinformativum
duo.Includit
enimprimorespectum
tumincludit
subiectum
in quantum
accidens
informat
et perficit
tivum
ad perfectibilem,
subiectum;
accidentis
includit
ab accidente.
auteminformatur
et perficitur
(. . .) Secundoinherentia
inquantum
inessendo
etfigitur
ad subiectum,
innititur
ipsisubiecto
respectum
dependentie
accidentis
hocdicendum
quantum
(. . .) Et secundum
quodinherentia
superessesubiecti.
In my
relationis".
sedestinpredicamento
estingenere
ad neutrum
accidentis,
respectum
di Spagnamanuscript
I haveusedtheBologna,
from
thisquestion
Collegio
transcriptions
available
to me are
Mazarine
becausethecopiesoftheParis,Bibliothque
manuscript
in thisquestion.
unreadable

11:22:15 AM

134

AMERESTI
FABRIZIO

theymustbe reallythe same mode.85Nonetheless,it is not logicallycontradictoryto thinkthatjust one of these modes holds. Let me consider
an example.Whitenessbelongsto the categoryof qualityand whiteness's
inherencein a surfacebelongs to the categoryof relation. But when
whitenesswhitensthe surface,the act of whiteningfulfilled
by whiteness
to
the
of
action
and
the
act
of
whitened
received
belongs
category
being
the
surface
to
the
of
When
whiteness
is
by
belongs
category passion.
relatedto a surface,it whitensthat surfacenecessarily.Accordingly,the
resultof the act of whiteningbelongs to the categoryof habit,because,
once this act is fulfilled,
a surfacehas the whiteness.Nonetheless,each
habit can be classifiedaccording to the item perfectingthe subject.
Therefore,a qualitygives rise to a qualitativehabit, so that the inherence of a qualitybelongs,by reduction,to the categoryof quality.This
means that the perfectiveaction fulfilledby an accident is absolutely
extrinsicto the subject. In fact,whitenessperfectsa surfaceonly secundumquid.The fact that such an action is an extrinsichabit of the subject means thatalthoughwhitenessnaturallywhitensa surface,it is possible
to think
of whitenessas actuallyinheringin a surfaceand of the surface
as not actuallyhavingwhiteness.For whitenessdoes not affector alter,
in essence, the nature of the surface.Althoughthe whiteness'sinhering
in a surfaceand the surface'shavingwhitenessare in factthe same act,
'to inherein a surface'is conceptuallydifferent
from'to be possessedby
a surface',insofaras 'to inhere' logicallyprecedes 'to be possessed'. For
the act of inheringis groundedin the accidentwhile the act of having
is groundedin the subject.Thus, as the Eucharistiecase compels us to
admit,it is logicallypossible to say that at the same time the whiteness
of a surfaceis actually broughtabout and the surfaceis not actually
white.For it is logicallypossible to separate the act of accidents'inhering in a subjectfromthe act of the subject'shavingaccidents,since the
formerlogicallyprecedesthe latter.In particular,the case of the Eucharist
says somethingmore radical. For in such a case, while the separateaccidentscontinueto play the role of accidentsof the Host, i.e. continueto
85Cf.Marchia,
ad secundum
membrum
V, q. 23,msB, f.87ra-b:
Qu.met.,
"Quantum
a subiecto,
sitin genere
utrum
habetur
dicitur
habitus)
(seil,
ipsumhabere,
quo accidens
accidentis
estidemcumipsoinherere
habetur
a subiecto,
quo accidens
quodinherentia
accidentis
secundum
ita quodipsuminherere
estidemquodhaberide subiecto
rem,
estin genere
differens
solumsecundum
et utrumque
accidentis
inherentis
rationem,
per
ethaberi,
reinonestperse etimmediate
etinherere
nisiunus
reductionem,
quiaeiusdem
modusessendi".

11:22:15 AM

OF ACCIDENTS
MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE

135

be inheringin the Host, the Host no longerpossessesthe qualifications

determinedby thoseaccidents,since the Host in whichthe separateaccidents inhere no longer exists.This means that even in separationaccidents do not lack their actual tendencyto inhere in a given subject,
unaccomplished
althoughGod's will makes such a tendencytemporarily
fromthe side of the subject.In conclusion,Marchia seems to thinkthat
the logical possibilityof separatingthe act of accidents'inheringin substancesfromthe act of substances'havingaccidentsis the clue to giving
a philosophically
well-groundedexplanationof the miraculouscase of the
of whatwe called the Expansive
Eucharist.For it permitsthe reconciliation
Aristotle's
of
of
metaphysics accidents accordingto which
Interpretation
accidentsare independentbeingsto a certaindegree- witha theological
of the actual world
case thatrevealswhat the deep metaphysicalstructure
of the Eucharistallows us to square the
is. As a result,thisinterpretation
philosophicalprinciplethat a thingis actuallyan accidentif and only if
it is an actuallyinheringbeing withthe theologicalprinciplethata thing
is an accidentif and only if it has been thoughtby God as an absolute
thingforwhich it is not logicallyimpossibleto inherein a substance.
on theSentences
7. Marchiai Theological
Treatment:
The Commentary
So far,we have seen what Marchia's positionon accidentalbeing is in
his most importantphilosophicalwork. Now let me turn to Marchia's
theologicalworks.The firstthingwe mustsay is thathis theologicaltreatdifferent
fromthephilosophicalone. In his Commentary
mentis not essentially
on theSentences
, which can be dated to around 1319-23, Marchia's focus
is again on what kind of thinginherenceis and hence on what kind of
unityholds betweenan accident and its subject.In particular,the main
and the ending-point
of
problemforhim is to establishthe starting-point
the act of divineseparation.Withregardto this,Marchia beginsby rejecting two opinions.
The firstopinionis thatof PeterAuriol.This opinionholds thatinherence expressesthe unityof a subjectand an accident.But unitydoes not
stateanythingpositive,but rathersomethingprivative.For two thingsare
one if theyare not dividedfromeach other.Hence unitystatesthe privation of division,because we definesome one thingas somethingthat
is undivided.This idea is groundedin Auriol'sconvictionthatan accident
is a truereality(estverares),which is not the same as a substance(nonest
ipsa substantia
), even thoughit does not existapart froma substance(non

11:22:15 AM

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AMERINI
FABRIZIO

est ressinesubstantia
).86This entails that inherenceexpressesnot only a
an
accident's
of
essence, but ratherthe whole essence of the accipart
dent. So inherenceis not regardedby Auriol as a thirdthingin between
As a consequence,when God separates
the substanceand the accident.87
an accidentfroma substance,the accidentalcompositepasses froma priof
vative statusto a positiveone, i.e. froma privationto an affirmation
division.88So accidentsremain incompleteand interminatethingseven
when theyare separatedfroma substance.For otherwiseaccidentswould
Auriol argues for his point thanksto a distinctionthat
be substances.89
will be criticisedat lengthby Hervaeus Natalis.90Auriolholds thatif two
, they cannot be separated from
thingsare connectedper se primomodo
if
modo
each other.But two thingsare connectedperse secundo
, theycan
. Now, to be in a subject
be separatedfromeach other sinecontradictions
is a properpassion of an accident,so an accidentcan existwithoutbeing
in a subject.
Marchia rejectsthis opinion because he thinksthat it is incorrectto
defineunityin a privativeway. Quite the opposite:It is the divisionthat
mustbe definedas a privationof unity.For if unityis a privativehabit,
then,once unityis recovered,substancesand accidentswill have a positivehabit. But divisioncannot be regardedas a positivehabit.91

86Cf.Marchia,
inquatuor
libros
Seritentiarum
, IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, msParis,
Scriptum
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 109a
BnF,lat. 15852,f. 182rb-va;
Auriol,
translation
(Pasnau's
[seen. 65 above],1,11.22-27).
87Gf.Auriol,
multi
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, Rome1605,p. 110b:"Ethicfaciunt
inherentia
sitde essentia
utrum
accidentis.
difficultatem,
(. . .) Si esseformaliter
magnam
sedestprecise
estaccidere
estde essentia
accidentis
accidentis,
(. . .) nonergoinherentia
et inherentia
estipsamet
essentia
accidentis"
(Pasnau'stranslation
[see
ipsainherentia,
In particular,
Auriol
seealsoa. 2,p. 112a-b.
n. 65 above],5-6,11.180-82,
grants
196-201);
like'master'
isbotha relative
andsomea purely
relative
status.
Whilea relative
accidents
an accident
like'colour'is onlya relative
i.e. a manwhois a master,
absolute,
thing
(cf.Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 2, ed.cit.,p. 112a).
88Cf.Auriol,
translation
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,Rome1605,p. 110b(Pasnau's
[see
11.157ff.).
n. 65 above],4ff.,
89Cf.Auriol,
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 2, a. 1,Rome1605,p. 113a.
90Cf.Hervaeus,
IV, q. 9, ed. Venice1513,ff.106va-108rb.
Quodlibeta,
91Cf.Marchia,
huiusopinf. 182va:"Fundamentum
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1,mscit.,
inprimo.
nonsitnisiprivatio,
falsum
videlicet
est,utpatuit
ionis,
Magisenim
quodunitas
et multitudo,
unitasconvenit
cumpositivis
magis
quamcumprivativis
percontrarium,
inquatuor
libros
seeLandulphus
cumprivativis".
Fora similar
remark,
Caracciolo,
Scriptum
La Raison
etle miracle
Sententiarum,
IV, d. 12,q. 2 (seethetextquotedin Bakker,
[cit.
n. 26 above],401,n. 268).

11:22:15 AM

ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE

MARCHIA
OF ACCIDENTS

137

The second opinion is the oppositeof the first.Accordingto it, when

God separatesan accidentfroma substance,he removesa positiveentity.
Such an entityis a thirdthingexistingbetween the substanceand the
accident.As is clear, this opinion draws a strongparallel between substantialand accidental composites.For it holds that the superveningof
an accidental formon a substantialsubject gives rise to a thirdindependententity,i.e. the accidentalcomposite.Like a substantialcomposite, an accidental compositesuch as a white man is not the sum of a
man and a whiteness.It is a new entity,which is formallydifferent
from
both the man and the whiteness.But unlike a substantialcomposite,a
white man is one and a being only in a qualifiedway (.secundum
quid).
Accordingto this opinion,when the whitenessof the Host is separated
fromthe Host, the divine separationbreaks not only the unitybetween
the Host and the whiteness,since the Host is no longerpresent,but also
the entityof the whiteHost. In otherwords,afterthe Consecration,we
no longerhave a whiteHost, but only the whitenessof the Host.92
Marchia rejectsthis opinion as well, by way of an argumenthe also
on theMetaphysics
,
employs,in a slightlymodifiedform,in his Questions
et accidente
resultet
book V, q. 5 ( Utrumex subiecto
aliquidunum).An accidentalcompositeis eithera self-subsistent
subjector is inheringin a subin thiscase, an accidentwill
In
is
a
But
the
first
it
substance.
case,
ject.
be part of a substance,since it was part of the accidentalcomposite.In
the second case, by contrast,the accidentalcompositeis an accident.But
in thiscase, a substancewill be part of an accident.The opponentcould
reply,however,that the accidentalcompositeis not somethingintermediate insofaras it is a thingconnectingthe accident to the substance.
For the compositeis neithera substancenor an accident. In any case,
such a compositecan be said to be somethingintermediateinsofaras it
fromeach of them.93
is somethingmade up by them and different
92Cf.Marchia,
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1, mscit
., f. 182va.
93Cf.Marchia,
V, q. 5, msP,
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, mscit.,f. 182vb;Qu.met.,
f.33ra:"Quantum
ad secundum,
dicoquodex subiecto
etaccidente
nonrsultat
aliquod
aliudab utroque
eorum.
Primosic:si ex
tertium
Quoddeclaratur
tripliciter.
compositum
subiecto
et accidente
rsultat
autilludcompositum
aliquodtertium,
querode iliotertio:
tertium
estperse subsistens
autestalteriinherens,
cuminter
istanonsitdaremedium.
etitaaccidens
eritparssubstantie,
Si estperse subsistens,
quia
ergoestperse substantia,
Si autem
accidens
estparsilliuscompositi;
illudcompositum
sitalteri
quodestimpossibile.
sitaccidens,
etitasubstantia
estparsaccidentis,
inherens,
ergoilludcompositum
quiasubnec
stantia
estparsilliuscompositi;
quodestimpossibile.
Ergonecestperse subsistens

11:22:15 AM

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FABRIZIO
AMERINI

Marchia also rejectssuch a reply,by way of an argumenthe employs

on theMetaphysics
, book V, q. 5. An accidentalcomagain in his Questions
is
an
because
it superveneson both a substance
posite formally accident,
and an accident,whichbothhave completebeingon theirown. Therefore,
we can ask ourselveswhetherthe accidental compositeis in something
else as in its subject or not. In the firstcase, itsjoining with its subject
gives rise to a thirdentity.But in thiscase, an infiniteregresscannot be
avoided. In the second case, on the otherhand, the accidentalcomposite
is not some one thing.Nor can we say that it is not in somethingelse
as in its subject.For if thatwere the case, the accidentalcompositeis a
substance.Hence, the conclusionis that a substanceand an accidentdo
not give rise to a thirdthingthat is different
fromboth the substance
and the accident.94
Marchia's solutionis a version of Scotus's. When God separates an
accidentfroma substance,what he removesis a respect.Unlike Scotus,
however,Marchia thinksof such a respectas intrinsicand extrinsicat
the same time,althoughwith regardto different
things.With regardto
adveniens
God, indeed, it is extrinsecus
, while with regard to the natural
world it is intrinsecus
adveniens.
This means that once a substanceand an
accidentare put into existence,inherenceflowsout necessarilyfromthem.
For it is logicallyimpossibleto findan accidentwithouta substancein
the actual natural world, even though this is not logicallyimpossible
absolutelyspeaking.But if we look at inherencefroma more general
perspective,it is only a contingentrespect,because God could detach
alteri
etperconsequens
estnichil,
autestensperse aut
inherens,
quiaomnecompositum
estensin alio".
94Cf.Marchia,
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1, a. 1, mscit.,f. 182vb;Qu.met.,
V, q. 5, msP,
f.33ra:"Secundo
sic:quidquid
advenit
reiconstitute
in actucompleto
ms)est
(composito
accidens.
Sed si ex subiecto
et accidente
resultet
illudteraliquodtertium
compositum,
tiumcompositum
adveniret
subiecto
et accidenti
constituto
in actucompleto
suigeneris.
essetin se formaliter
et omneaccidens
subiecaccidens,
Ergoilludcompositum
requirit
tertium
haberet
subiectum
cuiinhereret.
Etqueram
tum;ergoilludcompositum
proprium
tuncde istocomposito
et suosubiecto
autex eisrsultat
comproprio:
aliquodtertium
autnon.<Si non,>eademratione
necexipsoprimo
subiecto
etaccidente
positum
primo
Si sic,queramde ilioquartocomposito
rsultat
in
et eritprocessus
aliquodtertium.
in compositis
infinitum.
in infinitum
resultantibus
ex subiecto
et
Ergoveleritprocessus
veloportet
starein primo,
et accidente
nonresultet
accidente,
quodex subiecto
aliquod
tertium
Thefinal
intheQuestions
Marchia
invokes
onthe
compositum".
argument
Metaphysics
andperfection.
concerns
The wholeis moreperfect
thananyofitsparts.So
generation
an accidental
is formally
moreperfect
thanthesubstance
andtheaccident.
But
composite
ifso,an accidental
hasbeengenerated
moreperfectly
thanthesubstance
or
composite
theaccident,
becausegeneration
is specified
byitsterms.

11:22:15 AM

MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

139

inherencefromthe accident,if He should wish to do that. Therefore,

with regardto God inherenceis an accidentalpropertyof an accident,
while withregardto a naturalsubstanceit is a properpassion.95As can
be noted,thisconclusiontendsto confirmMarchia's philosophicalresult.
For accordingto Marchia's theologicaltreatment,
we mustconclude that
it is logicallyimpossibleto findin the actual naturalworld accidentsthat
are actuallynon-inheringin a subject,so even separate accidentscontinue to be relatedto the Host to a certaindegree.
8. Final Remarks
As we have seen, Marchia takes part in the long debate on the nature
of accidents.This debate is characterisedby a progressiveshiftin the
way accidents are understood.While the firstAristotelianinterpreters
modesof beingof substances,when
regardaccidentsprincipallyas inhering
discussingthe questionas to whetheraccidentsare or are not beings on
theirown, the majorityof theologiansand philosophersin the second
halfof the thirteenth
For them,
beings.
centuryregardaccidentsas absolute
the problem is no longer to explain whetherand, if so, how accidents
can be distinctfromsubstances,but how accidentsand substancescan
make some one thing.Metaphysically,
theirmain focusis on explaining
what the ontologicalstatusof inherenceis. Althoughabove all it is considerationof the case of the Eucharistthat induces this change in view,
we have seen that many philosophersand theologiansfindin Aristotle's
textsphilosophicalsupportfor takingthis step.
In thisdebate, Marchia basicallytakesthe side of Scotus. Nonetheless,
Marchia's doctrinereveals an interesting
attemptto refineScotus's doctrineand to readjustit to a new doctrinalcontext.In particular,Marchia
radicalises Scotus's position. In fact, according to Marchia, not only
absolutebut also non-absoluteaccidentscan be separatedfromsubstances
by divineomnipotence.As we have seen,unlikeAquinas and Bonaventure,
Scotus explainsAristotle'smetaphysicsof accidentsby way of the metaphysicsof the Eucharistand not vice versa. For, accordingto Scotus,the
Eucharistis a case that reveals
what the real metaphysicalorder of the
in
actual world is ratherthan a case that violates
thisorder.Accordingly,
order to explain this case in a philosophicallydefensibleway, one does
95Cf.Marchia,
Sent.,
IV, d. 12,q. 1,a. 1, mscit.,f. 183ra-b.

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140

FABRIZIO
AMERINI

not need to followAquinas in modifying

the notionof inherenceby disactual
from
tinguishing
potentialinherence,and includingthis latterin
the accident's essence; ratherit sufficesto take this case seriouslyand,
to removeanyinherencefroman accident'sessence.In conconsequently,
clusion,the Eucharistrevealsthat accidentsare absolutebeingsto which
actual inherencepertainscontingently
while potentialinherencepertains
to them necessarily.Indeed, the case of the Eucharistshows clearlythat
God did not thinkto create accidentsessentiallyas qualificationsof substances,but as absolute beings,even thoughabsolute beings less perfect
thansubstances.But likeScotus's,Marchia's doctrinefacessome difficulties
that remain unresolved.
For one thing,Marchia does not clarifyat lengthin what the metaphysical imperfectionaccidents have consists.While Aquinas tried to
explainwhy accidentsare less perfectbeingsthan substances answering
that they are in some way inheringitems- Marchia seems to consider
the factthat accidentsare less perfectbeings than substancesas a primitiveand inexplicablefactconcerningaccidents.An accident,qua created
being,is made in such a way that it is not logicallyimpossibleforit to
inherein a subject and to perfectit, if God should wish that. But it is
not possible to inquire furtherinto how an accident has to be made in
order forit to fulfilthislogical possibility.
For anotherthing,Marchia thinksof aptitudinalinherenceas a necessaryconditionfor a thingto be an accident.But he denies that such
an aptitudeis a positiveand real property.Nonetheless,Marchia allows
that such an aptitudeis a proper passion of an accident,which cannot
be separatedfromthe accident'sessence. But again he denies that such
an aptitude,qua inseparableproperty,is part of an accident's essence.
the aptitudinalinherenceappears
Accordingto Marchia's claims,therefore,
to bear an uncertainontologicalstatus.For it is poised problematically
betweenbeing an essentialand a contingent(i.e. non-essential),
albeitnatIn
one
an
lack
accident
Cannot
urallynecessary,property.
way, indeed,
such a propertywithoutceasing to be what it is, since accidentsthatare
unable to inhereare not accidentsbut substances.In anotherway, however,an accidentcan lose such a propertywithoutceasing to be what it
is, since an accident is not what it is because it can inhere,but it can
inherebecause it is what it is.
From anotherperspective,we have seen that,unlikeScotus, Marchia
extendsthe logical possibilityof being separatedto all the accidents.A
froma qualityor a quantity.
relation,qua an accident,is not different

11:22:15 AM

MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

141

Relation does not inherein a substancebecause of itself,but because of

inherence,whichis added to it. But the case of relationseemsto be quite
peculiar. For we can thinkof a qualityor a quantityas separatedfrom
a substance,but it is difficult
to thinkof fatherhoodas separatedfroma
man. In fact,unlikequantityand quality,the categoryof relationseems
to have a weak ontologicalstatus,so that it requiresnecessarilya nonThis appearsto be a problematicpointforMarchia's
relationalfoundation.
doctrine.
Finally,Marchia thinksthat inherence is posteriorto an accident's
essence and that inherence,qua an accident,inheresimmediatelyin the
accident.As has been seen, by such a step Marchia intendsto block the
infiniteregressof inherences.For an accident inheresin a substanceby
way of inherence,but inherenceinheresin the accident in an immediate way. Accordingly,God can separate an accident fromits subject of
inherenceby detachingthe accident'sinherencein the subjectfromthe
subjectitself.And God can do that because inherenceis a relationthat
is posteriorto the accident. Rather strangely,however,Marchia denies
that inherenceitselfcan be detached fromthe accident. For inherence
cannot existon its own withoutan accidentor a subject,since inherence
is definedas the accident'spropertyof being in a subject.This seems to
implythat when God separatesan accident froma substance,the relation of inherencebecomes unrealisedfromthe side of the subject,but it
remainsintactfromthe side of the accident. In fact,althoughan accident is formallyidentifiedin-and-ofitself,separate accidentscontinueto
be seen as the accidentsof a certainsubject,i.e. of the Host. But thisis
possibleifand onlyifseparateaccidentscontinueto be regardedas inhering in the Host. If this is true,however,then it seems clear that God
can separate the accident's inheringonly from the substance,but not
fromthe accident.Accordingto Marchia's doctrine,therefore,
we should
conclude that beforebeing individuatedmateriallyby a subject,actual
inherenceis an absolutelycontingentpropertyaccidentshave, while aptitudinalinherenceis a necessarybut not essentialproperty.For although
it is possible for accidentsnever to inhere in a subject,if God should
wish that,nonethelessnothingpreventsaccidentsfrominheringin a subject at some time or another.But once accidentsare individuatedmateriallyby a subject,actual inherencetoo has to be seen at least as a proper
passion of an accident.For a qualitythat is actuallyseparatedfromthe
Host, forinstance,can stillbe the qualityof thatHost and not, say, a
genericquality or a qualitywith only the appearances of the Host if

11:22:15 AM

142

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

and only if it maintainsactuallyan aptitudeto inheretowardsthatHost.

to avoid the furtherconclusion
But in this case, it seems to be difficult
that inherenceis part of an accident'sessence to a certaindegree,once
accidentsare individuatedmateriallyby a subject.
come about basicallybecause Marchia
As we have seen,thesedifficulties
thinksof a thing'sessence as expressingonly the kind of being a thing
formallyexhibits.Accordingto Marchia, not all the materialconditions
involvedin theprocessof a thing'scomingintoexistencemustbe included
in the essenceof thatthing.This idea, however,encountersa basic objection Marchia does not recognise.In general,it is possible to thinkof a
qualitywithoutthinkingof a substance,because it can be grantedthat
an accident is not formallywhat it is because of a substance.Afterall,
an accidentis an accidentand not a substance.Nonetheless,it is difficult
to thinkof an accidentof a givensubstancewithoutthinkingof thatsubstance as well. Althoughit is possible to identify
formallyan accidentas
to a substance,
to its genericor specifickind of being withoutreferring
it seems to be impossibleto explain the kind of being an individualaccito all the conditionsinvolvedin its individudent has withoutreferring
ation. In fact, an accident separated from a subject is not seen as a
genericaccident or even as a particularspecies of accident,but it continuesto be seen as the accidentof the individualsubjectfromwhich it
has been separated. From this perspective,the referenceto the subject
seems to be necessaryin order to identifyformallya given accident as
the accidentof a given subject.
In conclusion,while some theologianslike Bonaventure,Aquinas and
Giles of Rome seemed to be interestedin dealingwiththe topic of accidental being fromthe point of view of accidentsas theyare realisedin
the actual world,hence lookingforthe conditionsaccidentsmust satisfy
in order for them to actuallyexist,Scotus and Marchia widen thisperspectiveby consideringaccidentsalso with respectto divine activity.In
clearlysoughtto solve some
doing so, Scotus's and Marchia's treatments
difficultiesassociated with the traditionaltheological doctrine of the
of accidentalbeing,
Eucharist,by providinga more generalinterpretation
which is able to explain the identityof accidentsthroughoutthe process
fromcreand hence to differentiate
transubstantiation
of transubstantiation
ation and generation.But at the end of the day, by removingany inherence fromthe accident'sessence,theyseem to nullifyany basic difference
betweensubstancesand accidents
somethingAquinas and Bonaventure

11:22:15 AM

ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE

OF ACCIDENTS
MARCHIA

143

betweenactual and potenweretryingto preservethroughtheirdistinction

tial inherence.
Criteria
oftheEdition
on
In the followingappendix I provide an editionof Marchia's Questions
1
.
As
is
the
text
of
Marchia's
theMetaphysics
book
known,
Questions
,
VII, q.
is contained in two manuscripts.I follow the usual way of indicating
them:
B = Bologna, Bibliotecadel Collegio di Spagna, 104, f. 94ra-vb;
P = Paris, BibliothqueMazarine, lat. 3490, ff.48va-49ra.96
The followingeditionconfirmsthat P is the betterof the two manuscripts.Althougheven P cannot be regardedas a fullyreliable witness,
of the text,it must be said
because of its occasional oversimplifications
B
shows
a
contrast
that
systematictendencyto banalize the text.As
by
a matterof fact,B has a total of 60 major errorsand inferiorreadings,
whileP contains33 errorsand faultyvariants.In two relevantcases, however,B gives a more extendedtextthan P and in such cases it is P that
drops the text(see 11.17, 35-36). The two manuscriptsshare furthermore
a common misreading(1. 96) and, probably,two omissions(11.86, 103).
In the apparatus
, only the variantsin cases where three words or more
are involved have been recorded. Trivial or insignificant
substitutions,
35 varierrors
are
not
recorded.
and
material
Thus,
simple inversions,
ants have been suppressed.
, I make use of the following
Finally,as to the text and the apparatus
signsand abbreviations:
add.
inv.
om.
<xxx>
[xxx]

addidit/additum
invertit/inversum
omisit/
omissum
addenda esse censeo
delenda esse censeo

Parma
ofParma
University
96Forthesesiglaand fora first
evaluation
of themanuscripts,
see R.L. Friedman,
vonMarchia
Franziskus
, in Folger-Fonfara,
(cit.n. 64 above),502.
Appendix

11:22:15 AM

144

AMERINI
FABRIZIO
Appendix
Franciscus
de Marchia
in
Questiones Metaphysicam,VII, q. 1

queriturutruminhe/f 48va P; f. 94rb B/ Circa principiumseptimi97

rentia98sit de essentiaaccidentis."
distinguit
aliquid ab aliquo
Quod sic videtur,quia illud quod primo100
accidens primo a substantiaper esse
est de rationeeius; sed distinguitur
5 in alio, quia non est dare aliquid aliud per quod primodistinguatur;
ergo
inherentiaest de essentiaaccidentis.
Contra: passio non est de essentiasubiecti;sed inherentiaest quedam
passio accidentis;ergo non est de essentiaeius.
ab
Respondeo. Hie sunttriavidenda. Primo,utruminherentiadiffrt
in aliquo generedeterminato.
10 ipso accidente.Secundo, utrumsit101
Tertio,
in quo genere est.
Quantum ad primum,dicunt aliqui102quod aliter descenditgenus in
species,aliter/f.48vbP/ ens in decernpredicamenta,quia genus descenens autem descenditin decernpredicadit in species103
per differentias,
sed105
15 menta104
non per differentias
per modos essendi.Sicutergodifferentie
97principium
P
librum
septimi]
septimum
98inherentia
add.B
] accidentis
99accidentis
add.B
] inherentis
100
illudB
primoante
101sitom.P
102
inMetaphysicam
Cf.e.g.Anonymous
, VII,q. 1,msCambridge,
Zimmermanni,
Quaestiones
hie.Ensenimquoddividitur
hocpatetperPhilosophum
Peterhouse
152,f.33ra:"Item,
cuiuslibet
acciinessentia
indecern
includitur
(. . .) ergoinessentia
cuiusque,
predicamenta
substantie
et
unamessendi
communem
dentis.
(. . .) 'Ens'nonsignificai
aliquamrationem
in substantiam
etaccinondistinguitur
accidenti.
Ensenimperaliquasrationes
speciales
scilicet
rationem
essendi
duasrationes
sedsignificai
diversas,
dens;tuncenimessetgenus;
ad aliuddietm.
et rationem
essendi
absolutam
(. . .) Item,illudquo primoaliquiddisa substantia
ab alio estin essentia
eius;sed accidens
per
primodistinguitur
tinguitur
estaccidens
essendi
ad aliuddictam
rationem
perhabitudinem
(. . .); ergoaccidens
primo
subiecfidem
secundum
ad aliud.(. . .) Si nosponamus
possitessepreter
quodaccidens
inessentia
ethocsecunnonincluditur
accidentis
dicemus
accidentis;
tum,
quodinherentia
Cf.etiamAnonymous
sednonsecundum
dumfidem
estconcedendum,
philosophiam."
Peterhouse
inMetaphysicam
DomusPetri,Quaestiones
152,
, VII, q. 11,ms Cambridge,
inMetaphysicam,
de Alexandria,
f.314va-b;
Alexander
, VII, q. 3, ed.Venice1572,
Expositio
sullanatura
accidenti
diAlessandria
Alessandro
f. 185rb-vb
, in:Documenti
degli
(cf.F. Amerini,
16 (2005),179-235,
filosofica
e studisullatradizione
medievale,
224-27).
praesertim
103
in species
om.P
104
P
] genera
predicamenta
105sedJquiaensnonhabetdifferentias
in ea B
cumnonsitgenusseddiscendit

11:22:15 AM

OF ACCIDENTS
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
MARCHIA

20

25

30

35

145

per quas genus descendit in species sunt de essentia specierum, ita

sunt de
modi essendi per quos descenditens in decernpredicamenta106
essentia
inherentia
est
de
et
ita
essentia decern107
predicamentorum,108
accidentis.Quod probatur,quia aut ens109descenditin decernpredicaturn
aut per modos essendi.Non per differentias,
menta per differentias
est
habet
differentias
ens
esset
tunc110
genus,
genus, quia quicquid
quia
autem sunt extra
tum quia extra rationementis nichil est, differentie
rationemhabentisdifferentias.
Ergo ens descenditper modos essendi.
Item, sicut se habet esse per se ad substantiam,ita se habet esse111in
alio ad accidens; sed esse per se est de ratione substantie;ergo esse in
accidentis.
alio est de ratione112
accidentis,tunc esset posItem, si esse in alio non esset de ratione113
teriusipso accidentein ilio generepriorinaturequo accidens est, et non
est [non] dependere a subiecto,nec esset in subiecto,sed esset ens per
se et postmoduminestsubiecto.Igiturnon educiturde potentiasubiecti,
quia nichileduciturde potentiasubiectinisi ens in subiecto.Si ergo accidens esset prius natura ipsa inherentiain ipso priori nature,non esset
non de subiecto;
ens in subiecto,et est generatum.Igituressetgeneratum114
hie
Confirmatur
et
cetera.
est
per Philosophum115
impossibile;igitur
quod
in septimo,quod accidentia dicunturentia eo quod taliterentis. Item,
accidentisesse est inesse.117
Porphyrius:116
Alii118dicunt quod duplex est inherentia:actualis et aptitudinalis.119
Inherentiaactualis non est de essentiaaccidentis,inherentiaautem apti- ut dicunt- est de essentia accidentis.
tudinalis
Quod patet, quia illud
106
om.P
perquos. . . predicamenta
107
om.P
decern
108
itamodiessendi
suntprimo
distincta
differentie
specierum
] etsicut
predicamentorum
add.B
decern
suntprimo
distincti
(exdistincta
postcorrectionem)
predicamentorum
109ensom.P
110tuncom.P
111
esseom.P
112ratione
P
] essentia
113ratione
] reB
114
B
] generatur(?)
generatum
115Cf.Aristoteles,
VII, 1, 1028al8(ALXXV 3.2,132,1. 11).
Metaphysics
116Cf.Porphyrius,
, cap.De accidenti
(ALI 6-7,20,11.13-15).
Isagoge
117
Itemsi. . . inesseom.P
118Cf.e.g.Thomasde Aquino,
libros
Sententiarum
, IV, d. 12,q. 1,
super
quatuor
Scriptum
inquatuor
libros
Commentarla
a. 1, qa. 1; Summa
, Illa, q. 77,a. 1; Bonaventura,
Theologiae
deCorpore
Theoremata
Sententiarum
Christi,
Romanus,
, IV, d. 12,p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; Aegidius
prop.41.
119aptitudinalis
P
] potentialis

11:22:15 AM

146

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

non potestabsolviab aliquo, est de essentiaeius;

40 quod sine contradictione
non potestabsolvi ab inherentiaaptised accidens sine contradictione120
inherentia
tudinali;ergo
aptitudinalisest de essentiaeius.121
Contra primumarguitur:quia ille modus essendi non est magis proprius huic fundamentoquam illi nisi in ratione alicuius positiviproprii
45 magis huic fundamentoquam illi.122Si igiturmodus essendi in alio est
et non substantie,hoc non est nisi If 94va BI in
propriusaccidenti123
rationealicuius positivi124
magis propriiaccidentiquam substantie.Ergo
interse per illud positivmpriaccidens et substantiaprimo distinguntur
mum et non per modos essendi.
sicutse habet modus essendiin communiad esse in communi,
50
Item,125
ita se habet modus essendipropriusad esse proprium;sed modus essendi
in communipresupponitesse in communi;ergo modus essendiproprius
presupponitesse proprium.Ergo prima distinctioaccidentisad substantiam non est per modos essendi,sed per esse proprium.
55
Item,126
precise per modos essendi et non per essenque distinguntur
distinsed accidens et substantia128
tiam, habent eandem essentiam;127
accidens
et
substantia
modos
essendi
per te; ergo
gunturpreciseprimoper
habent eandem129essentiam; quod est impossibile.Ergo illud ex quo
per modos essendi.
primo130
sequiturquod distinguntur
Contrasecundum:quia nullaaptitudoestmagispropriahuicfundamento
60
quam illi nisi in131rationealicuiuspositivisubstratipropriihuic et non132
illi; sed aptitudoessendi in subiectoest propria accidentiet non133subaccidentiplusquam substantie
stantie;ergo illa aptitudonon est propria134
120sinecontradictione
B
postabsolvi
121eius] accidentis
B
122nisi... illiom.B
123accidenti
P
] accidentis
124
add.B
] prioris
positivi
125item] sicutse habetmodusessendi
velsicadd.B
ad esseproprium
proprius
126item] illaadd.B
127essentiam
disdiversas
essentias,
igitur
quodhabeant
] quia tenendo(?)
oppositum
add.B
etnonpermodosessendi
tantum,
positi
quodestoppositum
tinguntur
peressentiam
128et substantia
B
1 ad substantiam
129eandem
om.P
130distinguntur
P
] distinguantur
primo
131m om.B
132etnon] fundamento
quamP
133et non] priusquamB
134non. . . propria
B
] nonestP, nonpropria

11:22:15 AM

MARCHIA
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
OF ACCIDENTS

147

nisi in135rationealicuiussubstratipropni accidenti.Et ideo136substratum

65 propriumest prima ratio distinguendoErgo accidens distinguitur
primo
a substantia137
per illud substratumpropriumet non per inherentiam

70

75

80

85

aptitudinalem.
Item, nichil est138tale in actu per solam aptitudinem,quia aptitudo
non dat nisi esse aptitudinale;139
sed quantitasest quoddam ens in actu
distinctaa substantia;ergo quantitasnon est actu distincta140
per solam
sed
aptitudinem, per aliquid prius.141
Item, absolutum non est formaliterabsolutum per respectum; sed
quantitas est quoddam ens absolutum; aptitudo autem quecumque est
quidam142respectus,quia nichil est aptum natum ad seipsum, sed ad
aliud, quia143omnis aptitudo,ut aptitudo,non est ad se, sed ad aliud;
a substantiasola aptitudine.
ergo quantitasnon144distinguitur
in
actus
et
sunt
eodem genere,sicut homo in actu et
Item,
potentia
homo in potentiasunt in eodem genere; sed inherentiaactualis et inherentiaaptitudinalis
se habentsicutens in actu et ens in potentia;igitursunt
in eodem genere. Sed inherentiaactualis non est de essentiaaccidentis,
quia potestseparali ab eo, sicut patet in SacramentoAltaris;nec igitur
.145
inherentiaaptitudinalis
Ideo dico aliterquod decernpredicamentanon distinguntur
primoper
modos essendi,sed per rationespropriaspriores;per modos autem essendi
secundarioet146consequenter.Sicut147
distinguntur
species148
distinguntur
consequenterper propriaspassiones,Nec <accidentia> distinguntur
primo
actualemnec aptitudinalem,
sed solumsecundario.
per propriaminherentiam
135
in] subB
136Et ideo] illudP
137ergo. . . substantia
accidens
et substantia
inter
se B
] igitur
distinguntur
primo
138estom.B
139esseaptitudinale
1 aptitudinalem
B
140actudistincta
P
distinctum
] accidens
141Cf.Franciscus
de Marchia,
esttalein actu
Qu.met.,
IV, q. 4, msP, f.22rb:"nichil
sivepotentiam;
sed accidens
estensin actuet non
persolamaptitudinem
separatum
habensad subiectum
nisianalogiam
siveaptitudinalem
etnonactualem."
potentialem
142quidam] unus(?)
B
143quia] exsedpostcorrectionem
B
144nonom.B
145Item. . . aptitudinalis
om.P
145et om.B
147Sicut] ergoP
148species
] nonadd.P

11:22:15 AM

148

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

Quod sic149patet, quia150accidens habet aliam naturama151substantia,

ideo habet alium modum essendi et non e converso.Non enim152
quia
90 habet alium modum essendi,153
ideo habet aliam naturam,sed quia habet
aliam naturam,ideo habet alium modum essendi. Et ita prima /f 49ra
PI distinctionon est per modos essendi154
proprios,sed per essentias
95

100

105

110

proprias.
Similiter,quia accidens habet aliam naturama substantia,ideo habet
talem aptitudinemad substantiam,155
et non e converso:non quia habet
talem156
ideo habet aliam157
naturam.Ideo primaratio158
disaptitudinem,
non
est160
inherentia
sed
in
natura
tinguendi159
aptitudinalis,
propria, qua
fundatur/f 94vbB/ talis161
aptitudo.
Istudprobo, quia quorumeumqueaccidentiumsubiectaimmediatasunt
diversa,et ipsa sunt diversa,quia idem accidens non perficitimmediate
diversa subiecta; sed subiectum immediatumquantitatiset subiectum
immediatum162
inherentiequantitatissunt diversa;ergo quantitaset eius
inherentiasuntdiversa.Probatiominoris:subiectum<immediatum>quantitatisest substantia,subiectumautem immediatuminherentiequantitatis
non est substantia,sed quantitas.Probatio: quia unumquodque subiectum recipit denominationemaccidentis; substantiaautem non inheret
inherentiaquantitatis,sed ipsa quantitas,163
quia ipsam denominai;ergo
substantianon est subiectumimmediatumillius inherentie,sed quantisubstantiaautem et quantitassuntdiversa;ergo subiectumimmetatis;164
diatum quantitatiset inherentieest diversum.
Confirmatur,
quia passio secundumtotamrationemsuam est extraradonem totam165
subiecti;sed inherentiaest passio accidentis;ergo inherentia
149sicom.P
150quia] estadd.B
151a ] quamB
152enim] quiahabetaliummodum
etnone converso
essendi
nonenimadd.B
153essendi
om.B
154essendi
om.P
155talem
... ad substantiam
B
] aliam... a substantia
156talem] aliamBP
157aliam] talemB
158ratio] co B
159distinguendi
B
] distinguitur(P)
160estom.B
161talis1 illaB
162
immediatum
om.P
163sed. . . quantitas
om.P
164sedquantitatis
om.B
lb5suam. . . totam
om.B

11:22:15 AM

OF ACCIDENTS
ANDTHE DEBATEON THE NATURE
MARCHIA

115

120

125

130

149

est extra
rationemsuam, et actualemet aptitudinalem,
secundumtotam166
rationemaccidentis.
univocum
non est169
dicendumquod si ens168
Ad rationemin oppositum167
tuncnon descendit[ergo]ad decernpredicamenta
ad decernpredicamenta,
nec per modos essendi,sed descenditse ipso; et ita
nec170per differentias
non sequiturquod descenditper modos essendi.Si autemponaturens uniin decerngenera172
vocum,tuncest dicendumquod ens descendit171
primo
modorumessendi,etnon
decerngenerumet173
fundamentales
per differentias
per modos essendi.Nec tamensequiturquod ens sitgenus,quia genusdicit
deterens autemnon dicitunam nturm174
unam nturmdeterminatam,
nturm.
in
ad
omnem
in
dicit
nturm
communi
sed
minatam,
potentia
dicendumquod
Et cum diciturquod nichilest extrarationem175
entis,176
rationem
illud est177
contraeos sicutcontrame, quia si nichilest extra178
et ita
extra
rationem
non
sunt
decern
modi
essendi179
tunc
entis,
entis,
se ipso. Si autem
ens non descenditper modos essendi,sed descendit180
ens non181descendit182se ipso, ita potest dici quod descendit183per
differentias184
prioressicutper modos essendi.185
dicithoc
Tunc ad dictumPhilosophi186
respondeoquod Philosophus187
in
dicit190
determinando
in tertio188
sed
oppositum,
quarto189
arguendo,
166totam
B
] omnem
167
11.12-23.
in oppositum
om.P | | Cf.supra,
168si ens1 sciens
B
169est] sitB
170tunc. . . necJprimo
B
171descendit
add.B
] permodosessendi
172
B
] predicamenta
genera
173
et om.B
generum
174naturam
om.B
175rationem
B
] naturam
176Cf.supra,
11.12-23.
177est] itaadd.B
178extra] contra
P
179essendi
om.P
180nondescendit
B
... estdescendere
. . . seddescendit
] descendere
181nonom.B
182descendit
] a add.B
183descendit
B
] descendat
184
B
differentias
] essentias
185essendi
om.B
186Cf.supra,
11.12-23.
187Philosophus
] perhocB
188Cf.Aristoteles,
, III, 3, 998b22-27
(ALXXV 3.2,56,11.239-244).
Metaphysica
189Cf.Aristoteles,
, IV, 1, 1003a20-22
(ALXXV 3.2,67,11.1-2).
Metaphysica,
190determinando
dicitino.P

11:22:15 AM

150

135

140

145

150

AMERINI
FABRIZIO

cum dicit quod est quedam scientiaque speculaturens in quantum ens

sunt193
et que huic191
insuntpassionesproprie.Et sicutnumeri192
passiones
in
ens194
sunt
in
ita
entis
passiones
quantum
proprie quantum numerus,
proprie.
in quarto et sexto libro196
dicit quod sicut sanitatiset convaItem,195
lescentieest aliqua causa, ita entisin quantumens suntprincipiaet cause.
pasErgo, secundumPhilosophum,ens habet passioneset principia;sed197
siones sunt extra rationem198
subiecti,ergo aliquid est quod est extra
rationem199
entis.
Ad secundum200
dicendumconsequenterquod esse per se non est de
rationesubstantie,sed est quidam modus essendi201
propriusconcomitans
substantiam.202
dicendumquod aliquid est tale per aliud dupliciter:
Ad Philosophum203
<ens> se ipso et
vel causaliter.Accidens est formaliter204
vel formaliter
ens per subiectum.
autem aliquo modo est206
non subiecto;causaliter205
accidentisestinessenon primo,
Ad Porphyrium207
dicendumquod esse208
sed concomitanter.209
De secundo et tertiomembrodictumest in quinto libro,210
capitulode
'habere'.211

191que huic] qua hocB

192numeri
B
] numerus
193suntom.B
194ensom.B
195Item] illudB
196sextolibroom.P | | Cf.Aristoteles,
VI, 1,1025b3-7
, IV,2, 1003a33-bl9;
Metaphysica
(ALXXV 3.2,67-68,11.15-37;125,11.1-8).
197sed] secundum
B
198extrarationem
B
] ensrationis
199quod. . . rationem
] reB
200Cf.supra,
11.24-26.
201essendi
om.P
202concomitans
B
a substantia
substantiam
] communicans
203Cf.supra,
11.24-26.
204formaliter
1 causaliter
B
205causaliter
P
. . . realiter
. . . causaliter
] realiter
206estante
aliquoB
207Cf.supra,
11.24-26.
208esse] causaB
209concomitanter
] coiB
210libro] supraadd.B
211Cf.Franciscus
inMetaphysicam,
de Marchia,
V, q. 23,msP, f.43ra-va.
Quaestiones

11:22:15 AM

How Is Strength
of the Will Possible?
Francis
Marchia
and theAct of the Will*
Concerning
of
ANDREAA. ROBIGLIO

Timemakesoldformulas
lookstrange
Theproperties
andsymbols
change
But round
thefreedom
ofthewill
centre
still
Ourdisagreements
W.H. Auden
Abstract
contexts
withthenature
FrancisofMarchiadealtat lengthin severaldifferent
theposof thewilland willing.Here I examinejust one of thosediscussions:
final
a
related
to
for
the
will
to
reason's
sibility
go against
judgment, topic
weaknessof will and the sourceof sin. Marchia is clearlyof a voluntaristic
ofreason.
bent,holdingthatthewillcan indeedact againstthedetermination
forhis position,I exploresome of
AfterexaminingMarchia'sargumentation
latermedievalunderstanding
thebackground
to Marchia'sviewin a distinctively
withthe
of the human mind as a systemof internalacts and dispositions,
of
to
the
same
that
several
them
possibility
belong
facultysimultaneously.
a new,more
This increasingly
of themindmirrors
complexconceptualisation
of
the
"Self".
complexconceptualization
Presentingan account of Francis of Marchia's conceptionof the will is
a difficult
task for at least three reasons. First,the secondaryliterature
has tendedto focuson otheraspectsof his thought,such as his cosmology
(e.g. A. Maier, N. Schneider,F. Zanin), epistemologyand metaphysics
(e.g. S. Folger-Fonfara,C. Schabel, T. Suarez-Nani, A. Zimmermann),
the debate on Christianpoverty(e.g. R. Lambertini),and other more
specificallytheologicalissues (e.g. W. Duba, F. Ehrle, R.L. Friedman,
* I amdeeply
toTizianaSuarez-Nani,
Girard
Russell
and
Friedman,
Etzkorn,
grateful
I owemyacquaintance
To thefirst
withFrancis's
andmuchmore.
ChrisSchabel.
works
In writing
oftheentire
IIB. Cal Ledsham
thispaperI useEtzkorn's
Reportatio
transcription
in Marchia's
revised
a first
draft
ofmypaper.Allconjectures
text(signalled
by<...>)
aremine.

BrillNV,Leiden,2006
Koninklijke
- www.brill.nl/viv
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
44,1

11:24:00 AM

152

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

C. Schabel). Second, the relevantwritingsof Marchia remain for the

mostpart unedited.1A thirdand more generallinguistico-conceptual
rearenders
treatment
of
Marchia
on
the
will
more
son, however,
complex
still.The philosophicalvocabularyused to describethe will and willing
and fourteenth
centuries.The censorship
changedrapidlyin the thirteenth
ofbothacademicand ecclesiastical
theinterplay
authorities,
amongdifferent
of
the
new
patterns thought(juridical,theological,"scientific"),
conception
- all had an
of "certainty"and its influenceupon the notion of doctrine
impact on the conceptualisationof the will.2
Despitethesechanges,Auden'swordsremainvalid: "Round thefreedom
of the will/ourdisagreements
centrestill",thoughthisis not obviousfrom
a distance."Time makes old formulaslook strange":thatis to say, manners of formulation,
symbolsand projectschange over time,and indeed
rather
changed
quicklyin the time period in which Marchia worked.3
For this reason, the historicaldevelopmentof the concept of the will is
difficult
to trace,requiringas it does a subtlearchaeologyof ideas.
Given this state of affairs,this paper will limititselfto presentinga
narrowaspect of Marchia's conceptionof the will. Specifically,
the paper
will focus on one question fromthe second book of his Sentences
comthe
"Whether
the
will
could
act
either
mentary,namely,
question
prior
to, or against rationaljudgment". This question explicitlyinvolvesthe
problemof the weaknessof the will, an often-discussed
topic in contemporaryphilosophy.4
1 Thisexplains
thepresence
in myarticle
oflongquotations
from
Marchia's
works.
ForthethemeI am goingto deedwith,see particularly
C. Schabel,
Il determinismo
di
Francesco
diMarchia
19 (2000),15-67,
texton
(II),in:Picenum
seraphicum,
esp.Marchia's
diFrancesco
diMarchia
sullapredestinazione
20
63T.;
id.,La dottrina
, in:Picenum
seraphicum,
3diFrancesco
e ipotesi
sul'Commento
alleSentenze
Certezze
(2001),9-45,esp.9-16;N. Mariani,
dellaMarca
Franciscanum
95 (2002),93-183,
at 106-08.
Historicum,
, in:Archivm
2 Thelanguage
usedinthediscussion
onthefreedom
ofthewill,forinstance,
changed
around
thetimeoftheParisCondemnations
of1270and1277.Scholastic
terprofoundly
thatmeantonething
before
theseevents
often
a different
carries
senseafter.
minology
Cf.e.g.A.A.Robiglio,
volere.
Tommaso
i tomisti
e la volont,
Milan2002,
L'impossibile
d'Aquino,
34 n. 67 and96 n. 92.Although
itdoesnotfocus
onterminology,
seeM.W.F.
specifically
Condemnation
Makea Difference
toDiscussions
Moral
1277.DidtheParisian
Stone,
After
Psychology
- K. Emery,
in:J.A.Aertsen
ofHuman
Agency?,
Jr.- A. Speer(eds.),NachderVerurteilung
von1277,Berlin-New
York2001(Miscellanea
Mediaevalia,
28),795-826.
JThe shift
in learned
ofmeanings
at theverybeginning
ofthe14thcenvocabulary
in a general
alios
:
scholars
turyhasbeenwelltreated
{inter
wayin theworkofeminent
M.-D.Chenu,R.-A.Gauthier,
T. Gregory,
P. Michaud-Quantin,
butwe
J.E.Murdoch),
needfurther
anddetailed
research
on thematter.
comprehensive
4 The widespread
ofthistopicdates,at least,from
discussion
Donald
contemporary

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

153

Consideredrightly,
the understanding
of thisquestionwill
nevertheless,
an
of
contours
of
Marchia's
entire
overview
the
permit
projectand system.
I will presentan explicationof the textof his question,while drawingin
other aspects of Marchia's original account when relevant.I will not
directly
analyzethepositionsheld by Marchia's main sources(Duns Scotus,
Peter Auriol,but also Aquinas as read throughthe lens of Godfreyof
Fontainesand earlyfourteenth-century
authors).5
1. The Text:A "Treatise"
on theHumanWill
Francisof Marchia deals extensively
withthe topic of the human will in
his commentaryon the second book of the Sentences.
Francis read the
Sentences
at Paris probablyin 1319-20. For the second book, we possess
twoversions,
whichare bothperhapsreportationes
(studentnotesof Marchia's
if
raw
even
are
not
but appear to have been
lectures),
reportationes
they
revisedby Marchia to some extent.6The firstversionof book II, called
A (hereafter"The A version"),is preservedin as many as 16
Reportatio
B (hereafter"The B version")seems to
while the Reportatio
manuscripts,7
existonlyin a singlemanuscript,Vat. Lat. 943 (hereafterE).8 The questionson the will's freedomare, in the case of the A version,those from
Davidson's
influential
article
Howis Weakness
1970,
oftheWillPossible?
(originally
published
nowavailable
in:D. Davidson,
onActions
andEvents
1980,21-42).On the
, Oxford
Essays
medieval
ofthedebate,
R. Saarinen,
Weakness
from
oftheWillinMedieval
Thought
aspects
toBuridan
fundamental.
See alsoRobiglio
York-Kln
, Leiden-New
1994,remains
Augustine
in thispaper,cf.also
Forbibliography
on thetheme
discussed
(cit.n. 2 above),123-52.
Dupch
del'ange
la libert
Lessources
del'anthropologie
J. Schmutz,
d'indiffrence.
anglologiques
moderne
, in:Les tudes
2002,169-98.
philosophiques,
5 Theseaspects
m an article
in preparation
for:Freiburger
willhopefully
be surveyed
furTheologie
undPhilosophie.
Zeitschrift
6 Fora moredetailed
cf.C. Schabel,
Francis
account
ofFrancis'
academic
career,
of
Marchia
2001Edition
, in: TheStanford
), EdwardN. Zalta
ofPhilosophy
(Winter
Encyclopedia
November
(lastconsulted:
(ed.),URL - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-marchia
2005).
7 The standard
on themanuscripts
thevarious
versions
ofMarchia's
study
containing
- C. Schabel,
Sent,
is thatprovided
Francis
ofMarchia's
commentary
byR.L. Friedman
onthe'Sentences':
ListandState
63 (2001),
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Question
ofResearch
Commentary
31-106.
- Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),42 and54.Antonino
8 Gf.Friedman
Poppiseemsto
A
that
the
version
is theoriginal
Parisian
lecture
theB version
lectures
(1319-20),
suggest
heldin Avignon
on the
butthereis no evidence
thatMarchiaheldlectures
(1323-24),
' delCommento
Sentences
atAvignon
etprologus
alleSentenze
(cf.A. Poppi,'Quaestiones
praeambulae
di Francesco
dellaMarca
Franciscanum
97 (2004),469-80).On
, in:Archivm
Historicum,
I tendto consider
thebasisofmylimited
theB version
to be a revision/
comparison,

11:24:00 AM

154

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

q. 42 to the end, and, in the case of the B version,those fromq. 55 to

the end (E 38rb ff.).
The argumentsfoundin the two versionscorrespondto one another
onlyloosely,and the textcontainedin the A versionusuallydevelopsthe
issues at greaterlength,but with less attentionto the structureof the
question(e.g. openingargumentsare not always repliedto at the end of
the question).For textfromthe A versionof Marchia's II Sentences
, I will
Vat.
Barberini
lat.
791
late
use the
(hereafter
fifteenth-century
manuscript
sed nondeterior
, correctedoccasionallyby the earlyfourteenthB), recentior
centurymanuscriptVat. Chigi B VII 113 (hereafterC).9
Here is the synopticlist of questions:10
:
TheA version

TheB version
:

sitcausa
q. 42: utrumintellectus
actusintelligendi,
vel voluntasactus
volendi,vel tantumobiectum
(B 74va-76rb);
sit totalis
q. 43: utrumintellectus
causa actusintelligendi
et voluntas
actusvolendiet sensusactus
sentiendi(B 76rb-79ra);
q. 44: utrumvoluntasmoveat
vel
per se potentiasinferiores
tantumper accidens(B 79ra-80rb);
q. 45: utrumvoluntasmovendo
et alias potentias
intellectum
inferiores
imprimatsive causet
in eis (B 80rb-81rb);
reale
aliquid

q. 55: utrumobiectumsitper se
et
causa effectiva
actusintelligendi
volendi(E 38rb-39va);
q. 56: utrumvoluntaset intellectus
sinttotalescausae suorumactuum
(E 39va-40vb);
q. 57: utrumvoluntasmoveatse
per alias potentiasinferiores
(E 40vb-41rb);
q. 61: utrumvoluntasaliquid
vel in
imprimtin intellectum
movet
quam
aliquam potentiam
(E 41rb-vb);

in thenextparagraph
in the
mentioned
abbreviation
oftheA version
(forthereasons
in theA version).
it
Underanycircumstances,
maintext:lackofstructural
coherence
other
thanParis,on thebasis
cameintobeingsomewhere
seemslikely
thattheB version
sunt
"Adsextum
secundo
mododiciquodvisioetauditio
ofthefollowing
remark:
posset
meoParisius"
ab unodoctore
essentialiter
sicutaudiviteneri
(E 8vb).
tempore
respectus,
- Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),41, andthe
9 Ms B datesfrom1472;cf.Friedman
- Schabel2001,41.
Ms C datesfrom1327;cf.Friedman
literature
referred
to there.
- Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above).It should
10Cf.thefullquestion
be
listsin Friedman
inMarchia's
Sent,
deadwiththetopicofthewill's
notedthatother
commentary
questions
from
bookI, d. 1,on fruition
freedom
anditsrelation
to theintellect,
(cf.
e.g.questions
- Schabel2001,63-64),
from
bookII (qq. 20-21,24
andangelogical
Friedman
questions
cf.ibid.,88-89,94),butI willnotdiscuss
and24-25oftheB version;
oftheA version,
in nn.44 and49 below).
theremarks
thesequestions
here(see,however,

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL
OF MARCHIA
q. 46: utrumaliae potentiaea
volntatemoventesipsam
eo modo quo movent
voluntatem,
earn,causentsive imprimant
aliquidin ipsa (B 81rb);
q. 47: utrumvoluntaspossitse
movereante determinationem
sive iudiciumrationisvel contra
ipsumvel praeteripsum
(B 81rb-84ra);
q. 48: utrumprimacausa
concurratimmediatein omni
actionecuiuscumquecausae
secundaesive naturalissive etiam
liberae,coagendosecumet
determinando
ipsam ad agendum
(B 84ra-88vb);
q. 49: ultimoquaero utrum
Deus sitper se causa peccati
effectiva
(B 88vb-89vb).

155

q. 62: utrumpotentiaealiae
moveantvoluntatem
aliquid
in earn (E 4 Ivb);
imprimendo
q. 63: utrumvoluntaspossitse
moverecontradictamenrationiset
contraeius determinationem
(E 42ra-42vb);
q. 64: utrumvoluntasin omni
actu suo determinetur
a prima
causa (E 42vb-44ra);

q. 65: utrumDeus sit causa

effectiva
peccati(E 44ra-45ra).

The firstfivequestionsin both versionsdeal with the will's relationship

to the otherfaculties,in particularto the intellect,and to the objects of
volition.Particularlyremarkablewithrespectto the relationshipbetween
will and intellectare questions43 (of versionA) and 56 (of B). The last
two questions(48-49 of versionA, 64-65 of B), on the otherhand, concern
the relationshipbetweenthe human and the divinewill,a topic destined
to have a long lifein earlymodernphilosophyand theologyin, forexample, the post-tridentine
disputeoftenreferredto as de auxiliisor in such
authorsas Luis de Molina, Leibniz, Malebranche,and Pascal.11This set
of questions,then,formsa veritabletreatiseon the will, an identifiable
11On thedeauxiliis
andtheeponymous
commission
established
controversy
theological
at theend of the 16thcentury
until1606)to investigate
thisissue,cf.
(andlasting
a lasactasdelTridentino
deauxiliis
F. Cereceda,
Recurso
enla lucha
, in:Estudios
Eclesisticos,
14 (1935),257-69;R.O. PrezM.,La controversia
sobre
la definicin
dela libertad
enla teologia
moderna
dela definicin
molinista
delibertad),
Rome1963.On thebackground,
(Aproposito
cf.R.E. McNally,
Freedom
andSuspicion
at Trent:
Bonuccio
andSoto,
in:Theological
Studies,
onlaterdevelopments
onMalebranche),
cf.P. Riley,
TheGeneral
29 (1968),752-62;
(mainly
TheTransformation
into
theCivic
Willbefore
Rousseau.
, Princeton
1986;andX.-M.
oftheDivine
Le Bachelet,
Prdestination
etgrce
Controverses
dans
la Compagnie
deJsus
autemps
efficace.
d'Aquaviva
Histoire
etdocuments
indits
ofMarchia
, t. I, Leuven1931.Fora brief
(1610-1613).
placing
onthese
seeS.K. Knebel,Wille,
undWahrscheinlichkeit.
DasSystem
dermoralischen
issues,
Wlfel
in derJesuitenscholastik:
1550-1700
, Hamburg
2000,160-61n. 155.In this
Notwendigkeit

11:24:00 AM

156

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

sub-sectionof book II of Marchia's Sentences

commentary.In thispaper,
we will limitourselvesto a detailed discussion( 2-7 below) of question
63 of the B versionon whetherthe will can act againstthe decree and
determinationof reason, along with a brieferdiscussionof the correspondingquestion47 of the A version( 8). We conclude ( 9) withsuggestionsforthe best way to understandthe backgroundto what appears
to be most innovativein Marchia's discussion.
s BestJudgment
2. ActingagainstOne3
The motivationbehind the topic of question63 of the B versionis easily
identified.On the one hand there is an analogy between the will and
motionin general:the willis to the intellectas the mobileis to its "proper
motor"; that is to say, the will can move itselfneitherprior to nor in
oppositionto the intellect'sjudgment.12On the other hand, the claim
according to which the facultyof the will is completelyfree (simpliciter
In thisqueslibera
) excludesany dependenceof the will on the intellect.13
tion, Francis proceeds by firstpresentingan establishedopinion, then
in itsfavour,and finally
his own perspective
excludingthearguments
offering
itis worthwhile
that14th-century
thinkers
likeDunsScotusandGregory
context,
noting
ofRimini
wereimportant
sources
forbothMolinaandLeibniz.
12Version
B: "Proprium
mobile
nonpotest
se movere
contra
conatum
motoris;
proprii
A: "Proprium
sedintellectus
siveratioestmotor
voluntatis"
(E 42ra).Version
proprius
antenecpostneccontra
mobile
nonpotest
moveri
motum
suimotoris;
sedvoluntas
/B
8lva/comparatur
ad intellectum
sicutmobilead suummoventem
proprium;
ergonon
moveri
motum
intellectus"
ante,necpost,neccontra
(B 81rb-va).
potest
13Version
B: "Potentia
liberanonnecessitatur
a principio
inferiori
simpliciter
simpliciter
et intellectus
estpotentia
liberasimpliciter,
estinferior
se; sedvoluntas
ea, quianonest
A: "Contra.
liber"(E 42ra).Version
liberanonnecessitatur
ab
Quia potentia
simpliciter
inferiori
estpotentia
liberaetintellectus
estinferior
se; sedvoluntas
aliquoprincipio
ipsa
A {loc.cit.),
cumnonsitliber"(B 8Iva).In version
thetraditionell
is basedon
argument
theindependence
ofwhatis morenoblewithrespect
towhatis lessnoblebyusingtwo
of themind,as stipulated
1) thewillis a freefaculty
by the 1277Paris
postulates:
Condemnation
andbyother
Franciscan
authors
ofthelate13thcentury,
and2) thenobilofitsobjects
thanbythemodality
ofthe
is determined
lessbythenature
ityofa faculty
from
a nobler
to thefaculty,
so thatfreeactsderive
As backobject's
presence
faculty.
to Marchia's
itcanbe notedthatthe"nobility"
ofthewillwasheavtreatment,
ground
Thomae
de la Marein his Correctorium
fiatris
(inprimam
ilystressed
byWilliam
partem
estsimpliciter
altiorquamvolun<Summae>,art.XXXIV):"Quodintellectus
potentia
to Aquinas's
Summa
hadbeen
, I, q. 82, a. 3 wherethenobility
tas",referring
Theologiae
"excomparatione
obiectorum
ad invicem".
See P. Glorieux
established
(ed.),Lespremires
Kain 1927,16Iff.On theseissues
thomistes:
I. Le Correctorium
(Quare'
corruptorii
polemiques
inthe
LateThirteenth
moregenerally,
seeB. Kent,Virtues
oftheWill.TheTransformation
ofEthics
1995.
, Washington
Century

11:24:00 AM

ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

157

on the problem.Yet versionsA and B differin the way thattheyexhibit

this general structure.I will firstpresentan account of the B version
question (revised I think by Marchia before 1325, presumablywhile
no longerin Paris),14
because it focusesmore on human action and seems
to reveal more on the specifictopic of thispaper.
Marchia claimsthathis replyis in agreementwiththe authorityof the
. . . aucsaints(namelyAugustine)15
and with dialecticalreasoning{propter
rationes
toritates
sanctorum
etpropter
). He statesthat,once the intelprobabiliores
lect makes a practicaljudgment,the will could will to act in accordance
withthatjudgmentor will to do just the opposite.16
At the foundationof Marchia's view is the positionthat what distinguishesa "freecapacity"fromany non-freecapacityis choice.Insofaras
some externalcause does not preventit from acting, a natural, nonIn other
uni-directional.
rationalfacultyacts necessarily;it is structurally
in
a
that
the
alternatives
must
be
such
its
words, goal
way
only
unique,
open to it are to succeed in its acting or not to act at all; acting in a
different
way is not an option.17In fact,the only way the intellectcan
fail to act in the one way that it can act is in the case when the relevant externalconditionsforits attainingits object are lacking.
In contrast,a rationalfaculty(prohairesim
included)18can attain varithat the will is fullyready to
ous, even opposinggoals; notwithstanding
i.e. that all conditions(both perception
in ultimadisposinone),
act (exsistens
and intellection)are setded and taken into account, it is stillable to act
and able not to act. The alternativeof doing somethingelse is always
open. What determinesthe specificgoal a rationalfacultychooses,given
the possibilityof many goals? Moreover,what permitsthe will even to
refuseto choose?19There is only one determining
principle,as Augustine
14See n. 69 below.
15MarchiaquotesAugustine's
, XII, 6 (cf.E 42va).Cf. on thispassage
CityofGod
TheDivided
'Civitas'
P.L.MacKinnon,
, in:D.F.Donnelly
ofGod':TheDivided
Self/
Augustine's
'City
1995,319-52.
, NewYork-Bern
ofCritical
Essays
(ed.),TheCity
ofGod.A Collection
16"Dicoquod,factadeterminatione
volrationis
perintellectum
practicum,
quacunque
untaspotest
velieet nonvelieoppositum"
(E 42va).
17Thisis thewell-known
fac"rational"
and"natural"
Aristotelian
distinction
between
Ethics
andMetaphysics
ulties(cf.inter
aliabookIII oftheNicomachean
IX, 2 (1046b
1-24)).
ofitsproper
Thealternative
ofdoingsomething
else(viz.theimmediate
goadas
opposite
in thecaseofnatural
faculties.
either
orunderstood)
is always
excluded
perceived
18On "rational
Ethics
choice"(prohairesis
Nicomachean
, III, 2 (1112a16).
), cf.e.g.Aristotle,
19The refusal
a leveldistinct
and
to willis a sortof"choice",
butit occupies
from,
different
whichobtains
between
indeedhigher
than,thelevelofthepriorchoice,
goals
in otherwords,
to willis
therefusal
either
bythesensesor bytheintellect;
presented

11:24:00 AM

158

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

wrote,whichis simplythe freefacultyitself(i.e., the will).Now, according

to Marchia, the finalconditionrequiredby the will in order to be fully
ready to act is the rationaljudgment: "The will is only in its finaldispositionto willingwhen the final rationaljudgment is made." At that
point the will can elect eitherto act in accordance with the intellect's
.20
finaljudgmentor not: ergopro tuncpotestnonagere
, quodestpropositum
Marchia's argumentforthispositionis a typeof processof elimination.
If one inquiresabout the difference
betweena freeand a non-freefaculty
thereare only two live possibilities.If the powers are fullyready to act
(i.e. in theirfinaldisposition),thenthe freepower is able not to act while
the non-freepower is not able not to act. If, on the otherhand, the powers are not fullyready to act (i.e. not in theirfinal disposition),then,
once again the freepower is able not to act while the non-freepower is
not able to act. But the second option can be eliminated,since, outside
of its final disposition,a non-freeagent, in point of fact,does not act,
and is therefore"able" not to act as well,because of the logical principle
ab essead possedaturillatio
; in thisway, if the second optionwere correct,
betweenfreeand non-freeagents.So, this
therewould be no difference
betweenthe two powers
leaves us withthe firstoption:thatthe difference
is that,withall conditionsin place forthemto act, the freepower is still
It seemsfairly
able not to act, whilethe non-freepower acts necessarily.21
obvious that at the very foundationof this argumentlies the implicit
liberum
is the ability
ofprincipium
assumptionthatthe definingcharacteristic
In fact,thisis built
non-liberum.
to do otherwise,in contrastto a principium
Whilediscussing
theissue,
Marchia
does
andnotacting.
thechoicebetween
merely
acting
distinction
between
thefreedom
iswith
notinvoke
thescholastic
(which
quoad
specificationem
andthefreedom
exercitium
dealswithacts).Thisdistinction
toobjects)
(which
quoad
regard
element
ofAquinas's
hadbeenan essential
in,e.g,De malo
, q. 6.
argumentation
20"Praeterea,
unius
irrationales
necessario
quandopossunt,
quiaomnes
potentiae
agunt
et nonpossunt
Potentiae
rationales
suntfactivae.
contrariorum,
non,quia suntfactivae
etprorumquoddeterminet
haecduo:appetitum
simul.
Ideooportet
essealte
utrumque
a nonliberum
hairesim;
distinguitur
Quaeroergoquomodoprincipium
ergomediate.
inultima
inqua natum
existens
libero?
Autperhocquodprincipium
liberum,
dispositione
itwas
non-liberum
nonpotest
nonagere[when
nonagere,
etprincipium
estagere,
potest
liberum
<etiam>non
inits"lastdisposition"].
Autquiacitraultimam
dispositionem
potest
nonpotest
sednon-liberum
modo,quiasicutprotuncliberum
agere.Nonsecundo
agere,
nonagere,immode factononagit.Ergodistinnonagere,itanon-liberum
potest
potest
ad volendum
nisifacta
modo.Sedvoluntas
nonestin ultima
dispositione
guuntur
primo
rationis.
ultimadeterminatione
Ergoprotuncpotestnonagere,quodestpropositum"
(E 42va).
21forthetext,
seen. 20 above.

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL
OF MARCHIA

159

into both optionsthat Marchia gives.22While thispositionspeaks clearly

in favourof the independenceof the will, not a particularlyAristotelian
elementsin Marchia'sreasoningare clearlyPeripatetic,
position,nevertheless
22In addition,
Scotus's
ofthewillas "causaconcurrens"
(earlier)
(andnotsimtheory
bebackground
toMarchia's
seeS.D. Dumont,
view;onScotus's
might
theory,
ply"totalis")
DidScotus
HisMindontheWill?,
in:Aertsen-Emery-Speer
2001(cit.n. 2 above),
Change
formula
Marchiainterprets
theAugustinin
719-94,
esp.748-49and 773-84.Moreover,
"malaevoluntatis
nihilinvenitur"
causaefficiens
si quaeratur,
, XII, 6)
(cf.TheCity
ofGod
diciquodhocfitex obiecto,
necquodunustemptet
etaliusnon
as follows:
"Nonpotest
refers
toAugustine's
"unusperseveret
animocasto,
aliusveromoveatur
[Marchia
example:
in utrique"
ad illicite
concurrant
faciendum"],
(E
quia supponitur
quodomniapariter
moreor lesscorresponding
to q. 56 oftheB version,
42va).In q. 43 oftheA version,
Marchia
to whichthewillis butthe"causapartialis"
of
discusses
theopinion
according
- he writes
- mdiat
volition:
"Istaopinio
inter
duasopiniones
extremas,
(B 76rb)
quarum
unaponitobiectum
essetotalem
causameffectivam
et aliapotentiam";
sucha moderate
couldbe thatofScotus,
evenifitrefers
toa doctrine
torecent
which,
opinion
according
didnotbelongto theParisian
oftheSubtleDoctor.Francis
scholarship,
teaching
rejects
he does
thearguments
andstates
thatthewillis thetotalcauseofvolition.
Nevertheless,
notdealdirectly
on thebasisofa structural
withtheactofthewill,butargues
analogy
andthewill.He shows,
in other
howboththesenses
and
words,
intellect,
amongsenses,
theintellect
arethe"totalcauses"ofrespectively
theactofsensation
andtheactofthe
Sucha strategy
volintellect.
isjustified
since"actusintellectus
nobissuntnotiores
actibus
in theotherversion,
untatis"
at E 40ra);so ifonewereto
(B 77ra;butnotexplicidy
oftheactoftheintellect,
demonstrate
thattheintellect
is thecausatotalis
he wouldipso
thatthewillis thecausatotalis
ofvolition.
As is oftenthecasewith
factodemonstrate
from
thewillto theintellect,
andthedevelopment
touches
theargument
shifts
Marchia,
of "totalcause",see the
On thedifferent
ofthenotion
upongnoseology.
interpretation
DidScotus
hisposition
ontherelationship
and
remarks
modify
ofintellect
judicious
byM. Ingham,
in: Recherches
de theologie
et philosophie
69 (2002),88-116.Letme
will?,
mdivales,
Marchia
between
pointoutat leastonenoteworthy
aspectofthisdiscussion.
distinguishes
iudithe"actus<intelligendi>
formaliter
(asthe"actusiudicandi,
cognitivi"
quointellectus
catde obiecto",
whichrefer
andseemsto entailtheassentofthe
to a precise
meaning
virtualiter
et causaliter
do notentailany
(which
will)andthe"actustantum
cognitivi"
assent
towards
thetruth
inobiecto).
Herecomestheinteresting
Notonlysimple
point.
cogand argumentation
can be notional
i.e.
butalsoreflective
nition,
judgment
knowledge,
- I
thatdoesnotdemand
exercise
anyrealassent(as in a sortofdialectical
knowledge
- saysMarchia-< homo
> discurrit
wouldadd)."Saepeetiam
nectamen
tersyllogizando
minodiscursus
ex quo patetquodactusformaliter
suntaliiab actibus
assentii,
cognitivi
et etiamab actibus
et dividendi
intellectus
discurrendi.
Actusautemhuiuscomponendi
sunttres:estenimquidamactusintellectus
modivirtualiter
cognitivi
simplicis
apprehensioet dividendi
siveaffirmandi
et negandi;
et tertius
estactus
nis;aliusactuscomponendi
discurrendi
velsyllogizandi"
cf.alsoE 40ra).Theargument
which
fol(B 77ra;myitalics;
lowsis,to Francis's
eyes,successful,
yetit concerns
onlythesecondkindofactsofthe
B we read:"Probo
intellect:
the"actusistinoncognitivi
formaliter"
(B 77ra).In version
enimprimo
esttotalis
causaactuum
nonformaliter
quodintellectus
(E 40ra)
cognitorum"
andweshould
a secundo
sucha secondpart,how, a second
expect
partoftheargument;
andthequestion
closeswithout
touched
on the"actusformaliter
ever,is missing
having
See alsobelow,
cognitivi".
pp. 171-72.

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160

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

irrationales
e.g. the vocabularyused and the distinctionbetweenpotentiae
contrariorum.
uniusfactiuaeand potentiae
rationales
factivae
3. StillNegotiating
withtheMedievalAristotle
Indeed, Marchia's approach in his questionson book II of the Sentences
is stronglymarkedby the presenceof Aristotle.The heavyrelianceupon
Aristotleis apparent even when our author deals with an issue or item
This is evidentin the first
that is not properlyspeakingAristotelian.23
where
Marchia
unam
This opinion is
of
opinionem.
presents
part
q. 63,
"Aristotelian"(at least as thisexistedin the medievalschools),and is one
which Aquinas could have held. Francis gives a summaryof it:
To act againstour bestjudgmenthappens accordingto a sortof practical syllogism,which presupposestwo premises,one universaland one
) in orderto reach the conparticular,both necessary(ambaesuntnecessariae
clusion,which in this practicalcase is equivalentto saying:in order to
will. It is possible for the premisesto be entertainedby the intellectin
one of two ways: eitheractually(that is to say, in the formof present
or merelyimplicitly(that is to say in the formof habits
understanding)
and "memory").24
Accordingto advocates of thisview, the will is able to
go againstthe rationaljudgmentonlywhen one or both of the premises
are presentto the will as merelyhabitual knowledge,but not as actual
knowledge.In contrast,when the premisesare both existingbeforethe
intellect"in act" (i.e. theyare knownactually),thenthe will mustadhere
conditionforthewillbeing
to their(actual)rationalconclusion.A sufficient
able to do otherwiseis forthe particularminorpremiseto be habitual.25
23Indeedtheproblem
oftheopposition
between
theintellect
andthewill,as such,is
tothemedieval
ofAristotle's
notanAristotelian
issue.Nevertheless,
according
understanding
andreason
takento be an
Ethics
between
sensation
wasoften
Mcomachean
, theopposition
thewillandtheintellect,
as themedieval
discussion
on Mcomachean
between
opposition
On thisaspect,
seeRobiglio
Ethics
BookVII attests.
(cit.n. 2 above),esp.24-27,123-46.
24On these
ofethical
seeKent(cit.n. 13 above)andalsoO. Boulnois,
discourse,
aspects
- P.-F.Moreau- L. Renault
dela volont?,
in:B. Besnier
: Existe-t-il
despassions
DunsScot
et
mdivales.
Thories
et
despassions
Les
(1), Paris2003,
(eds.), passions
antiques
Critiques
281-95.
25In presenting
which
oftheincontinent"
the"syllogism
(thatis to say,theargument
themodaldistinction
ofthewill),Marchia
stresses
between
absolute
theweakness
explains
andconditioned
subcondicione),
assum(necessarium
{necessarium
simpliciter)
necessity
necessity
kindofnecessity
thiskindofviewonlythefirst
(stronger)
sharing
ingthatforscholars
oftheincontinent"
wouldexclude
freedom
(cf.E 42ra).The abovementioned
"syllogism

11:24:00 AM

ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

161

This said, Marchia collectsseveral argumentssupportingthis type of

intellectualistic
accountofhumanaction;some of themGodfreyof Fontaines
could have held as well.
a) The will cannot act on what is unknown.But the oppositeof reaSo the will cannot will the opposon's finaljudgmentis unknown.26
site of reason's finaljudgment.
goal of the will is the good, since the will can
b) The transcendental
In
ratione
boni
.
otherwords,to will in the shadow of evil,
act
sub
only
the natureof the facultyitself.Implicitly
subratione
would
contradict
mali,
goal, the arguassumingthatthe intellecthas truthas itstranscendental
ment continuesin this way: since the true and the good are cornmutablewithone another,what is opposed to rationaljudgmentwould
not be good (because not true),and hence the will cannot will it.27

oneparticular
is given
oneuniversal
is framed
as follows:
bythe
byreason,
given
premise
conclusio
the(parsenses;
now,sinceinsyllogistic
sequitur
semper
partem",
logic"peiorem
of
overreason.On suchan explication
conclusion
willsee thesensesprevailing
ticular)
Marchia's
La saggezza
diAristotele,
cf.C. Natali,
theincontinent
action,
Naples1989,202-14.
ad primum
estunaopinioquodsicutinsyllogismo
textisas follows:
speculativo
"Quantum
non
etminor
etex unaillarum
scilicet
maioruniversalis
sunttrespraemissae,
particularis,
estmaior
simul[...], itaetiamin syllogismo
sedex ambabus
conclusio,
practico
sequitur
velinactu
velinhabitu
etutraque
universalis
etminor
tantum,
haberi,
potest
particularis,
dicunt
istiquod,
etalterain actu.Tuncad propositum
velunainhabitu
secundo
elicito,
in oppositum
in habitu,
voluntas
existentibus
ambabus
potest
apudintellectum
praemissis
inactuapudintelmaiori
universali
existente
illarum
conclusionis
Similiter,
praemissarum.
in oppositum.
Sed
in habitu,
adhucpotest
voluntas
tantum
lectum
et minori
particulari
in actuapudintellectum,
tuncestimpossibile
existente
quodvoluntas
possitin
utraque
rationonsequideterminationem
eiusquodconclusum
est,necprotunc
potest
oppositum
Dicunt
tamen
ulterius
conclusum
estetiudicatum.
vultquodsicultimate
nis,sednecessario
Tuncdicunt
velsimpliciter
velsubcondicione.
dicitur
quod
dupliciter:
quod'necessarium'
necessario
determinationem
nonsequitur
voluntas
rationis,
quiatalisnecessitas
simpliciter
subcondicione
nontollit
necessario
excludit
sed sequitur
, quia talisnecessitas
libertatem,
ex suppositione,
scilicet
factadeterminatione
vultnecessario
et ideovoluntas
libertatem,
intellectum
avertere
ab ilioiudicioet ipsumconveretiam
voluntas
tamen
rationis,
protunc
potest
voluntas
velie"(E 42ra;italics
teread iudicandum
oppositum
oppositum,
quofacto
potest
see alsonn.30,
viewofthesyllogism
oftheincontinent,
mine).Formoreon Marchia's
53 below.
26"Proistaopinione
inaliquid
necacceptat
nonfertur
sic:voluntas
incognitum,
arguitur
sicutpatetX De Trinitate
2; sedilludcuiusoppositum
capitulo
aliquidut incognitum,
estincognitum,
velacceptum
subratione
iudicatum
esta ratione
quareetc."(E
incogniti;
42ra).
27"Voluntas
voluntas
estboni.Et
nonpotest
veliesubratione
mali,III Ethicorum:
ad malum.
Sed illudcuiusoppositum
iudidicitquodnullus
aspirans
Dyonisius
operatur
maliutsic;patetde se.Ergovoluntas
habetrationem
catum
esta ratione
essevolendum

11:24:00 AM

162

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

c) On the medieval view, accordingto both the principleof noncontradictionand the Aristotelianprincipleof the singularity
of a facit
is
for
the
intellect
to
at
the
same
time
have,
ulty'sact,28
impossible
and upon the same issue, two judgmentscontradictingone another.
On the otherhand, wheneverthe will acts, at that verysame instant
it "converts"the intellectto the object of the act; that is to say, the
actionof the will entailsan intellectual
judgmentabout its object.Now,
if the actual judgment and the actual act of the will were opposed,
there would be ipsofacto two opposite judgments,both actual (one
And this
opposed to, and the other entailedby the actual volition).29
is not acceptable,accordingto the two principlesmentionedabove.
. But if
d) The repetitionof the same kind of act generatesa habitus
the will has the possibilityof going against the judgment of reason,
thenit has the possibility
of doing thistwiceor manytimes.Eventually
there will be the birth of a habitus
, either virtuousor vicious, but
in any case discordantwith reason. There could be, in otherwords,
intellectualpractical wisdom (prudentia
:) withoutcorrespondingmoral
virtuein the will (insofaras the latteracts against reason); or even
nonpotest
illudvelie"(E, 42ra).ForAristotle,
seeNicomachean
Ethics
, III, 4 (1113a15-16):
"Thegoodis theobjectofwilling".
28Theideaaccording
towhich
suntinsingularibus"
Ethics
,
"operationes
(e.g.Nicomachean
acts
III, 1-2,1110b7 and 111lb23)doesnotallowforthesamesubject
having
multiple
inthesamefaculty,
at thesametime,
underthesamerespect;
otherwise
theaction
would
no longer
somerareexceptions,
be "singular".
thisprinciple
wascommonly
Apartfrom
in themedieval
Cf.Robiglio
In q. 56 oftheB
shared
schools.
(cit.n. 2 above),111-13.
version
'eadempotentia
circaidem
(cf.n. 22 above),Marchia
explains:
"Quandodicitur
obiectum
nonpotest
habere
inquoet<obiecactus',dicoquodsi sitidemsubiectum
plures
tum>circa
Francis
introduces
a further
, concedo".
quod.
Despitethisconcession,
interpretation
whichwouldmakethisdistinction
Letus
("inquo" vs."circaquod")superfluous.
dici Marchia
seewhy:"Velpotest
eiusdem
ordiarguesquodactusomnesintelligendi
circaquodcumque
sunteiusdem
et componuntur
nis,putasingulares
obiectum,
rationis,
affirmativa
<iudicia>eiusdem
rationis
inter
se etnegativa
similiter
inter
se eiusdem
rationis"(E 40vb,italics
to thislastpieceofargumentation,
Francis
seems
mine).According
toimagine
a structural
tothejudgment
insubiecto
doubleness
(a sortof"compositio
quo"
Thispointremains
that,at leastto someextent,
doubleness).
unfortunately
presupposes
Cf.n. 29 below.
undeveloped.
29"Item,impossibile
estquodintellectus
habeatsimuliudiciaopposita
de eodem;sed
in eodeminstanti
in quo voluntas
vultaliquid,convertit
<intellectum>
ad iudicandum
iudicatunum,voluntas
vultoppositum,
illud;ergosi in eodeminstanti
quo intellectus
intellectus
habebit
iudicia
etconvertetur
ad unum
sequitur
quodineodeminstanti
opposita
etad suumoppositum.
Probatio
scilicet
minoris,
vult,
quodineodeminstanti
quovoluntas
illud:quia si in alioinstanti
convertit
intellectum
ad iudicandum
tuncconconverterei,
nonvolendo,
alioinstanti
vult
verterei
nisiproquointellectus
iudica(E 42ra,
quiapronullo
italics
mine).

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

163

"moral virtue"togetherwith falsehood.This kind of a split between

the virtuesof the will and those of reason should not be possible,since
in the constitution
of habitsthe human being operatesas a whole (both
as a rationaland a willingbeing).Moreover,thisis unacceptableaccording to Aristotle,
especiallyifone takesseriouslybook 7 of theKicomachean
Ethics
, accordingto which to act against one's own actual knowledge
scientiam
in actu
) seems verydifficult.30
(.
Francis proceeds with the strategicdismantlingof such argumentsby
estarticulus,
immo
quoting the Paris Condemnationof 1277: ad oppositum
duoarticuli
Parisius.31
The specificarticleshe quotes are art. 129 (quodvolin actu, nonpotestagerecontraearn)
untas,manente
passioneet scientia
particulari
existente
in tali dispositione,
in qua nataestmoveri,
and art. 131 (Quodvolntate
est
non
et manente
sic disposito
, impossibile quodvoluntatem
quodnatumestmovere
velie)}2It is clear thatthe FranciscanMarchia, teachingat the end of the
30"Si voluntas
eadem
simulvelieoppositum
eiusquodiudicatum
esta ratione,
potest
II Ethicorum,
sedexacribus
ratione
bisvelfrequenter;
habitus,
potest
frequentatis
generatur
Tuncponamus
iudiciorationis.
rationis
siterroneum;
quodiudicium
sequitur
oppositus
inappetitu
inratione.
moralis
Similiter
quodvirtus
generetur
absquehocquodsitprudentia
inintellectu
morali
si ratiositrecta,
sinevirtute
prudentia
peroppositum:
poterit
generari
in appetitu,
V Ethicorum
in fineubidicit:'Manifestum
ex
Aristotelem
quodestcontra
dictis
nonestpossibile
bonum
esseprinciptm
sineprudentia
necprudentia
sine
quoniam
virtute
morali'
Ethics
. ErgoimposNicomachean
, bookVI, ch.17,1144b3
1-32]
[cf.Aristotle,
iudicium
rationis.
Et haecestintentio
Aristotelis
sibileestvoluntatem
aliquidveliecontra
III Ethicorum
3: 'Ignort
et a quibus
ergoomnismalusquae oportet
operari
capitulo
malifiun[cf.1110,b28-30].
talepeccatum,
iniusti
etuniversaliter
Et,propter
fugiendum.
tertio
talissibifinis
videItem,in eodemcapitulo
[cf.Ill 4b1] : 'Qualisestunusquisque
tur'.Ergo,si voluntas
estmala,finis
malusvidetur
sibibonus,
etnonnisi
perintellectum;
estbona,intellectus
beneiudicatur,
etsi mala,male.Ergovolergo,etc.Ergosi voluntas
a ratione.
untasnullomodovultoppositum
iudicati
ultimate
Item,VII Ethicorum
capitulo 'de continente
et incontinente',
a proposito
istamquaestionem,
Philosophus
disputt
etsolvit
scientiam
estdupliciter:
velinhabitu
velinactu./42rb/
distinguendo
quodhabere
inhabitu
Etdicitquodfacere
contra
scientiam
nullum
estinconveniens,
veroconoperari
in actudurum
trascientiam
videtur.
sineparticulari
sub
Item,habitamaioreuniversali
nonestinconveniens;
autemhabitain actu,et
ipsaacceptaoppositum
operari
utraque
from
admirabile"
Notethatthepassages
Aristode
(E 42ra-b).
oppositum
operari
quoted
herebyMarchia
weremosdy
cf.J. Hamesse
florilegio,
(ed.)LesAuctoritates
commonplaces;
' Unflorilge
mdival:
tude
etdition
Aristotelis
, Louvain-Paris
1974,232-49.
historique
critique
31"Ad oppositum
estarticulus,
immoduo articuli
Parisius.
Primus
estquodhabita
in actuetminore
in actu,voluntas
nonpossit
in oppositum:
maiore
universali
particulari
in ultima
error.
Secundus
estquodvolntate
existente
velie
ipsanonpossit
dispositione,
contra
iudicium
rationis:
error"
(E 42rb).
32See D. Pich(ed.),La condamnation
In oneof
de1277, Paris1999,118-19.
parisienne
themsspreserving
thetextofthe1277Condemnation,
msFlorence,
Biblioteca
namely
Nazionale
Conv.Soppr.S.M. Novella,
from
the14thcentury),
E.5.532(dating
Centrale,

11:24:00 AM

164

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

second decade of the fourteenth

centuryin Paris, regardsTempier's articulias an authorityto which deferenceis required.33
Francisalso criticisesthe aboveWhile certainlyappealingto authority,
The mediumby
mentionedopinion on the basis of reason {perrationerri).
facultiesis merelythe act of the
whichthe will moves the other(inferior)
will, that is to say, the volition.If this mediumwere itselfmodallynecessary,the contingencyof the human actions consequentupon it could
only be illusory:
si, finitaultimadeterImpossibileest quod moveataliquid contingenter
- ut tu dicisminationerationisde aliquo obiectovolibili,necessario
voluntasvultillud (E 42rb).
Such a modal necessityat the root of human volitionforcesus to accept
one or the otherpart of the followingdisjunction:eitherthe originaljudgment is right,and in that case the will will always be good [factaimpeccabilis
), or the judgment is wrong, and in this case there will be no
etimpoenitibilis
.34
of repentance,and humanswillbe factaobstinata
possibility
Thomam".
art.129is quotedhere
noteat art.129:"contra
there
is a marginal
Similarly,
thetitle
"unus
which
seemstobe thatofAquinas;
"unaopinio",
indeed,
byFrancis
against
Marchia's
to refer
toAquinas.
usedbyMarchia
doctor"
is sometimes
Take,forinstance,
animae
"Sedad hocrespondet
unus
doctor
tenens
20 (oftheA version):
potentias
question
Summa
ittoAquinas's
esseaccidentia"
, I, q. 77,art.1,ad
theologiae
(B 43va)andcompare
animaenonsiteiusessentia,
5: "Ethocmodo,cumpotentia
oportet
quodsitaccidens".
on thispointas well;cf.Glorieux
had focused
William
de la Mare'sCorrectorium
(cit.
etcondamnations
au
Insolente
libert.
Controverses
Cf.alsoF.-X.Putallaz,
n. 13 above),412ff.
de la Mare's
butnotethatWilliam
XIIIesicle,
1995,93-105and 110-12;
Fribourg-Paris
in
cf.Guillelmus
de la Mare,Scriptum
thatoftheCorrectorium;
didnotmatch
ownthought
de
See F. Caldera,
Munich1995,487ff.).
II Sent.,
d. 38,qq. 1-4(ed.H. Krami,
Guglielmo
testuali
e originalit
e Pietro
di Tarantasia:
Tommaso
la MaretraBonaventura,
dipendenze
d'Aquino
98 (2005),465-508.
Franciscanum
alleSentenze
delfCommento
Historicum,
' in:Archivm
33One should
ofcanonization
thatin 1319Aquinas's
alsoremember
beganin
process
was contested
Court.Thiscanonization
by some
by theAngevin
Naples,sponsored
acts
thefirst
trial's
andPopeJohnXXII,twoyearslater,didnotconsider
Franciscans,
The secondprocesswas heldin 1321at
a further
butdemanded
sufficient,
inquiry.
ofVercelli,
oftheDominican
theaccount
Fossanova
See,forinstance,
Raynerus
Abbey.
in 1901(andlaterpublished
first
discovered
byFeliceTocco):"Scioquod
byG. Boffitto
dixerunt
sibi[toPopeJohnXXII]antecanonizationem:
<fratres
minores>
caveatis,
quidam
unum
vobisquodcanonizastis
dominepapa,quidfacitis,
improperabitur
quia semper
conwasnota sufficient
haereticum"
(the"heretical"
pointmustbe theviewthatpoverty
See F. Tocco,Studi
forreceiving
dition
ancescani,
Naples1909,ch. 12(quotation
charity).
belown. 69.
at 327).See further,
- voluntas
- uttudicis
34"Si (. . .) necessario
intellectum
tenet
vultillud,ergonecessario
ab ilio,sicutnec
estquodavertat
intellectum
in ilio.Et si necessario
tenet,
impossibile
sit
sitmalum,
ab eo. Et si illudiudicium
se ipsamavertere
sequitur
quodvoluntas
potest

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

165

In thispart of his argument,Marchia uses an implicitparallelbetween

volitionand motion,betweenactusvolendi
and actusmovendi?5
The volition
is viewed as a sortof driverconnectingthe mind withthe motionof the
The judgmentneeds a "medium"or "middle
effects.
body and its further
term"in order to pass on to action, and such a medium is the act of
the will. If such an act followsnecessarilyfromthe intellect'sjudgment,
therewould not be any contingency
betweenthe startingpoint (thejudgment)and the endingpoint (the motion of inferiorfacultiesvia the first
motion of the will). Thus, the necessityattached to the intellect'sjudgment will colour the will's willingand all of the effectsof that willing.
Aristotelians
Nevertheless,
(like Godfreyof Fontaines)would have had a
promptanswer to this initial criticism.The modalityof the motion of
will,theywould say, is not that of absolute necessity,but ratherthat of
a conditionednecessity(necessitas
suppositions
), conditionedon the will actin
first
will
the
the
could
ing
place (i.e.
simplynot will). It appears that
Marchia would denythatthisdistinction
is relevantto the matterat hand:
no matterwhat the modalityof the "driver"is, that modalityis going to
affectboth the will and the intellect,so that the final (external)effects
will be necessary,if the will's willingthe rationaljudgmentis necessary.
In otherwords,if thereis a volition,thentherewill be a necessaryvolition,conditionedby the intellect'snecessaryjudgment.36
At least one possibleobjectionwould appear to speak againstMarchia's
of omnipotentGod could break the chain of
position:the intervention
necessity,and "produce" somethingopposed to the decree of rational
factapenitus
obstinata
etimpoenitibilis;
etsi sitbonum,
factaestimpeccabilis,
quiaab ilio
volito
nonpotest
se necintellectum
avertere.
Hoc estfalsum,
ergoetc."(E 42rb).In fact,
"ex certamalitia"
entailed
the"impoenAquinashaddeniedthata volition
necessarily
itibilitas
De ventate,
(e.g.ThomasAquinas,
peccati"
q. 24,a. 11,ad 4).
35 Quianihilmovet
veltenet
aliudin aliquovoluntas,
nisimediante
actuvolendi
(E 42rb;
italics
mine).
36ForMarchia's
ofnecessitas
subcondicione
, seeaboven. 25.Marchia's
explicit
mentioning
lineofreasoning
is summed
text:"Etperactumvolendi
necessarium
up in thefollowing
estquodmoveat
si finita
ultima
determinatione
rationis
impossibile
aliquidcontingenter
de aliquoobiecto
volibili
uttudicis,voluntas
vultillud"(E 42rb).The same
necessario,
is laterusedbyMarchia,
withcharity:
"Sic caritas
estinfima
virtus,
argument
dealing
immo
nonestvirtus
nisiperaccidens;
eo quodvoluntas
nonestliberaimmediate
quantum
<ad actum>volendi
sedquantum
ad actummovendi,
et ilioposito,
quidquid
deinceps
estnecessarium,
immonecetiamquantum
ad iliumestvoluntas
libera.Primo
sequitur
estquodaliquis
actussitlibermediate
nisi[neccod.]mediante
actuimmequiaimpossibile
diatelibero;
sedvoluntas
nonhabetactumimmediate
liberum;
quareetc.IstasuntcontraScripturam"
seefurther
below,
(E 42rb).On "charity"
p. 167.

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

Dei adds no conjudgment.But to Marchia such an hypothesisexpotentia

to
human
action.
While
Marchia
intrinsic
accepts the realityof
tingency
in history,he considersits use in solvingthese probdivineintervention
lems of human freedomto be nothingmore than a trick.Ex se, i.e. "in
God's intervention
does not create any room for
itselfand intrinsically",
authenticcontingencyin human action qua human. A parallel argument
can be made about the effectsof chance on human freedom.Having
excluded, then, that either God's interventionor chance events could
human agency,Marchia
introduceany real contingencyinto specifically
can claim thatunder all conditionsifthe will followsnecessarilythe intellect's finaljudgment,then all our actions would be necessary:sic totus
estnecessarius?1
in ordine
ad voluntatem
processus
Moreover, according to Marchia, Aristotlehimselfwas also opposed
accountof human action,since he affirmed
thatfrom
to the intellectualist
to
end
human
are
masters
of
their
own
acts:
beings
beginning
Et hoc est contraPhilosophumIII Ethicorum
, qui dicitibi quod sumus
domininostrarum
operationuma principiousque ad finem.Si autem,
voluntasnecessariovellet,iam nullumdominium
factadeterminatione,
haberetsuperactumsuum.38
For all thesereasons,then,Marchia maintainsthathuman beingsshould
have in theirpower not only the executiveact of the will, but a fortiori
theimperativeact {actusimperatwus
), so thatrationaljudgmentcannotdetermine it.39
4. In theShadowof theScriptures
Having dealt with that issue, Francis discussesanothermoral argument.
The firstfreeact is the one responsiblefor the moral qualityof human
37"... eodemgenere
inilio,etsicestimposnecessitatis
tenet
intellectum
quoilludvult,
vela casuavertatur.
se ab ilionecetiamintellectum,
nisia superiori
sibilequodavertat
agente
in ordine
ad voluntatem
estnecessarius."
Sed exsehocestimpossibile
, et sictotus
processus
Adam'sFall("casus")andtheconsemine).Marchiadoesnotmention
(E, 42rb;italics
necessitas
ofMan'sfirst
sinuponthewill(cf.theAugustinin
fixturi
peccati
); seealso
quences
n. 49 below.
38E 42rb.The reference
is to Mcomachean
Ethics
, III (esp.Ill 4b30-3
1); cf.alsothe
on PeriHermeneias
medieval
commentaries
, II, c. 14.
39"Actus
inpotestate
nonestmagis
voluntatis
exsecutivus
quamactusimperatives,
quia
between
illenonestin potestate
voluntatis
nisimediante
ipso"(E 42rb).The distinction
isthatbetween
overall
command
andexecution.
and"actus
executivus"
"actus
imperativus"

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167

consistit
vel vitii.Here
action: in ilio actusecundum
speciem
primaratiovirtutis
Marchia thinksabout the volitionin questionas being a firstact of love,
i.e. the acceptance or rejectionof God.40This is an Augustininmove
that,afterPeterJohn Olivi,41and on the verge of the disputeover the
polemical conpovertyof Christand the Apostles,could have distinctly
notations.42
Now, to make thisvolitiondependentupon the rationaljudgment would effectivelymake charity dependent upon the rational
considerationof God. In thisway, charitywould become a cognitiveand
- a
not an affectivevirtue
positionat odds with general (not exclusively
the
matter.
The consequence of thiswould be that
views
on
Franciscan)
of
would
be
the
lowest
virtues,a mere collateraleffectof human
charity
knowledgeof God:
Dei et proximi,sed in actu
Virtusnon consistit
primoin actu dilectionis
ad considerandum
Deum et proximum,
et sic carimovendiintellectum
tas est infimavirtus,immo non est virtusnisi per accidens.(. . .) Ista
suntcontraScripturam.
(E 42rb; cf. nn. 36, 40 above)
of Holy Scripture,specifically
But thiswould be at odds withthe authority
estcaritas(I Tim.
Saint Paul, because- as Marchia mentions
-finis
praecepti
a
is
out
of
the
end
of
the
commandment
1, 5):
charity,
pure heart and
the
it
of a good conscience.Since charityis the goal of
commandments,
mustbe the highestvirtue,based on the willed acceptance of God.
A further
argumentalong theselinespresentedby Marchia worksfrom
the notionof the "desirable"or volibile
, accordingto the
(even voluntabile
If
Latin translationsof Aristotle). the intellectdeterminesnot only what
is intelligible(iintelligibile
), but also what is desirable,the will cannot hope
40"Inilioactusecundum
consistit
velvitii,
liber;
primaratiovirtutis
quiprimo
speciem
ad actumvolendi,
nonestliberaimmediate
sedfactadeterminatione
voluntas
quantum
virtus
nonconsistit
ad actummovendi;
sedsolumquantum
ergoetc.Et perconsequens
ad consideranin actudilectionis
Dei etproximi,
sedin actumovendi
intellectum
primo
immononestvirtus
nisiperaccietsiccaritas
estinfima
dumDeumetproximum,
virtus,
dens"(E 42rb).
41See on thisissue,M.-Th.d'Alverny,
Petrus
Ioannis
Unadversaire
deSaintThomas:
Olivi,
Commemorative
Studies
in:St.Thomas
1274-1974:
1974,voi.2, 179-217.
, Toronto
Aquinas
42It couldbe seenas a strategy
touseAquinas
thatis to say,pitting
Aquinas,
against
oftheearvalueofcharity
theintellectualistic
theclaimofthesupreme
against
approach
continentia
liest"Thomists".
See Glorieux
(cit.n. 13 above),298-302:
"Quodpaupertas,
of
On Marchia's
ad perfectionem
instrumentaliter".
et oboedientia
conception
pertinent
in thisvolume,
andtheliterature
referred
to there,
see R. Lambertini's
article
poverty,
ownworks.
Lambertini's
especially

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

to change the priorintellectualfocus.The volitioncannothave real alternativesat its disposal when it has no desirableobjects apart fromthose
previouslydeterminedby the intellect,since, as Marchia says, the intellect, by the veryact that it determinesthat an object is intelligibleand
desirable,"can determinethat the will should hold the intellectto considering"that particularintelligibleand desirable object.43Hence, we
would only ever desirewhat the intellectjudged to be desirable.
Reflectionon man's firstmorallycharged act then pulls Marchia not
towardsthe topic >fthe firstangelic sin, and fromthereto
surprisingly
the fall of man.44
5. The Sin ofAdamas Paradigm
for theSin of bothAngelsand HumanBeings
The point of departurein any discussionof the moral statusof Adam
and his descendentsis the realityof sin. This assumed,Marchia implicitly
introducesa common scholasticprinciple:the rejectionof any infinite
regress.If sin exists,theremusthave been a firstsin. Man's firstsin could
onlyhave been due to passion,ignorance,lack of attention,or even pure
malice (ex meramalitiavoluntatis).
Using a standardstrategyof arguingby
exclusionof the putativealternatives,Marchia shows that only the last
one, "malice", could really constitutethe root of originalsin; in other
words,he shows that,in all cases, the true cause of sin can only be the
will freelywilling.Thus, Francis argues that both passion and ignorance
- i.e.
are eitherstructural
somethinginherentand hence invincible or
then therewould not have been any
theyare not. If theyare structural,
sin as such, because the possibilityof actingdifferently
would have been
and
hence
one
would
not
have
been
excluded,
morallyculpable (withit
understoodthat moral culpabilityand sin can only apply when thereis
a possibilityof avoiding the proscribedbehavior). If passion and igno43"Sicutratiodeterminat
et volibile,
deterestintelligibile
itapotest
quodobiectum
in consideratione
immoeodemiudiminare
debettenere
intellectum
illius,
quodvoluntas
iudicatur
secundum"
cio,nonalio,quo iudicatur
(E 42rb).
primum
44The background
forthispointis surveyed
in: G. Cervellon,
dejustice
chez
L'affection
- E. Karger
- J.-L.Solre
DunsScot.
etluxure
danslepch
del'ange
, in:O. Boulnois
Justice
Marchia
asks:"Quo
G. Sondag(eds.),
DunsScot
Paris,
1302-2002
, Turnholt
2004,425-68.
homovelangelus?"
tohuman
Now,thejumpfrom
angels
beings
peccato
peccavit
primus
in hisq. 20
found
to Adam)is permitted
ofMarchia's,
byanother
position
(specifically
inhomine
sinteiusdem
rationis"
"Utrum
intellectus
etvoluntas
etangelo
(oftheA version):
(B 40va-45va).

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FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

169

ranee are not structural,

however,then theycould be overcomeby the
and
onus
shiftsonto provingthemto actuallyhave been
the
will,
probandi
the sourceof sin. Withrespectto attention(and lack thereof)as the cause
of thisfirstsin, Marchia arguesin a parallel fashion.Eitherpayingattention was "obligatory"or it was not. If it was not obligatory,then sin is
clearlynot the resultof lack of attention.If attentionwas obligatory,on
the other hand, then the lack of attentionhas to be attributedto the
5
will: nonconsideravit
quia voluit?In all cases, then,the will, and in particular the malice of the will, emergesas the only possible source of the
firstsin.46
et tuncde illa
Ergo primumpeccatumfuittantumex malitiavoluntatis,
non habereiliumactummalum,aut non
quaero: aut pro tunctenebatur
tenebatur.
Si secundo[primocod.]modo,non peccavit.Si primo[secundo
codi]modo,ergonecessariomediantealiquo dictaminerationis,
quia voluntasnon teneturaliquid non velie nisi praevioaliquo iudiciorationis.
Et tunc vel fuitiudiciumactale rationis,aut fuitiudiciumhabitale
tantum.Si fuitiudiciumrationisactale,habeturpropositum,
quia tunc
actale
rationis.
Si
autem
fuit
iudicium
habitale
fuitcontraiudicium
rationissine actuali,tune fuitinconsideratioactualis <talis habitus>.
Procedaturergo sicutprius:aut potuit<homo> vitareaut non, et tandem oportetdevenirequod facitcontrarationempracticamin actu.47
Central to Marchia's argumenthere- and he makes this explicitin the
A versionof his Sentences
commentary is the notionof obligationas connected to the will: somethingis required insofaras the will is under a

45"Nec<peccavit>
considerare
etnonconex <in>consideratione,
quiaauttenebatur
Si nontenebatur,
nonpeccavit.
Si tenebatur
et nonconsiautnontenebatur.
sideravit,
ergo
malavoluntas
deravit
considerare
quaenoluit
quandodebuit"
quiavoluit,
ergopraecessit
(E 42va,italics
mine).
4b Autpeccavit
autex nconsideratione,
autex
autex ignorantia,
pnmoex passione,
autnon.Si
Nonprimo
vincere
meramalitia
voluntatis.
modo,quiaautpotuit
passionem,
malavoluntas
vincere
et
etnonvoluit,
passionem,
ergopraecessit
quaenonvoluit
potuit
nonfuitex passione.
Nec peccavit
ex ignorantia
eandem
sicprimum
propter
peccatum
Necex
autinvincibilis,
ettuncdeducatur
sicutprius.
rationem,
quiaautillafuitvincibilis
<in>consideratione
[. . cf.n. 45 above]"(E 42va).
47E 42va.Thepassageconcludes
as follows:
automnis
actusvoluntatis
"Item,
sequitur
autaliquidpraecedit.
Si primomodo,et omnistalisestnecessarius,
rationem
practicam,
Si secundo
tunc
estnecessarius.
modo,et illesitcontingens,
ergoomnisactusvoluntatis
inilioconsistit
etpotest
sine
virtus
etvitium.
esseinvolntate
Ergovirtus
praecedit
prima
inmedioconsistens
rectaratione
Hoc estfalsum,
esthabitus
electivus
quiavirtus
practica.
determinabit".
proutsapiens

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

certain"law" which de iureobligesit.48Thus, his argumentcan be reconstructedas follows:eitherthe will when willingthe firstsin was under
an obligationnot to will somethingevil or it was not under that obligation. If it was not under the obligation,then therewas no sin. But if it
was under an obligation,that obligationcould only arise on account of
a prior dictateof reason about the proper course of action. Now, if the
judgmentof reason were actual, then Marchia has his overallpoint: the
will is able to act againstthejudgmentof reason. If, on the otherhand,
thejudgmentof reasonwere merelyhabitual,thenthe firstsin musthave
come about on account of lack of attentionto the judgmentof reason,
and then Marchia can simplyappeal to his earlier argumentson that
topic, showingthat the lack of attentionmust have been willed. The
demonstration
is successful.
Moreover,Marchia could argue furtherby generalizingto the entire
human race: if in at least one case (i.e. the sin of Adam) the will could
act against the dictamen
rationis
, then it is in general able to act against
the (best)judgmentof the intellect.If thiswas true forAdam, it is true
foreveryone.The latterassumptionis implicit,but requiredforMarchia's
argumentto be sufficient.49
48See e.g.q. 47 (oftheA version):
hominis>
"Ergosequitur
quod<primum
peccatum
fuitex malitia.
malo,inquofuit
Quaerotuncde istoactuvoluntatis
primo
peccatum
primm:/b/autvoluntas
vitare
huiusmodi
actummalum
autnon.Si non,ergonon
potuit
Si potuit,
auttenebatur
iliumactum
vitare
etoppositum
autnon.Si non,
habere,
peccavit.
nonpeccavit,
actumadquem
vitandum
nonobligatur
quianullus
peccateliciendo
(necobmittendoillumquemhaberenontenetur).
Si autemtenebatur
tuncarguo:nullus
tenevitare,
turvitare
nisipropter
rationem
dictantem
illudessevitandum"
italics
aliquid
aliquam
(B 82va-b;
Thenotion
ofobligation,
as thelastquotation
introduces
an intrinsic
ratioshows,
mine).
naldimension
to theoperation
ofthewill.Butwhatkindofrationality
is it?Aboutour
ofthisfundamental
itseemsassumed
and
"law",Marchia
knowledge
saysnothing:
directly
from
theBible.Moreover,
theemergence
ofa juridical
"positively"
vocabulary,
employed
ofthewill,is alsonoteworthy
whendealing
withfreedom
sinceitwasa mark
byMarchia
oftheage.In question
thenotion
ofimputatio
"Illudest
42 (oftheA version),
appears:
ofiurisdictio
is evoked
perse causaactuscuiimputatur
ipseactus"(B 74va).Alsothenotion
in q. 44 (A version):
"<Voluntas>
movet
perse ad actum(. . .), cumenimsitpotentia
inregno
animaenonhabens
se"(B 79vb).Cf.William
ofOckham,
,
suprema
superiorem
Dialogus
estlegibus,
nectenetur
de
2, bookI, c. 15: "Et rexin regnosuosolutus
part3, tract.
iudicare
necessitate
secundum
formulas
"rexinregno
suoprinceps
leges".On thejuridical
nonrecognoscens",
La metamorfosi
dellasovranest","rexsuperiorem
etc.,seeM. Manzin,
itallalucedeldibattito
medievale
su intelletto
e volont
e metamorfosi
, in: M. Basciu(ed.),Crisi
dellasovranit
: Atti
delXIXCongresso
dellaSociet
Italiana
diFilosofia
Giuridica
e Politica
nazionale
29-30Sept.
(Trento,
1994),Milan1996,303-06.
49Interestingly,
in Marchia's
no argumentative
useis made(as faras I can
questions
tellanddespite
ofAugustine)
ofAdam'scognitive
theauthoritative
presence
superiority

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OF MARCHIA

171

someDifficulties
6. 'Divideut imperesSolving
The last part of q. 63 containsMarchia's replies to the opening arguments(a, b, c, and d above). In replyto the firstargument(z),the link
betweenvolitionand knowledgepostulatedin the argumentis not denied,
but the notionof "knowledge"is made more nuanced by drawinga distinctionwith respectto it. Marchia makes use of a common scholastic
distinction
betweentwo acts of the intellectproducingtwo formsof knowlan
edge:
apprehensiveact, givingraw or simple intellectualcognition,
ratioand a judicative act, yieldingcomplex knowledgeand the dictamen
nis.50Marchia employsthisdistinction
by claimingthatin the absence of
all cognition,therecan be no volition;but volition,on the other hand,
determinate
does notrequirereflective
pro actu
judicative knowledge{cognitio
and
sufficient
Thus, apprehensiveknowledgeis both necessary
iudicandi).
for the functioningof the will; judicative knowledgeis neither.This is
the case in such a way that the will can be said to depend on the intellect and reason (i.e. intellect's"apprehensive"act), withoutdependingon
any (particular)rationaljudgment.51This solution indeed seems more
semanticthan real; the point of objectiona had been the independence
of thewillin relationto fulland authenticknowledge;such "actual knowledge" cannot be mere apprehensionof reality,ratherat some level or
ofhuman
whosenatura
is
theFallincomparison
tothediminished
before
capacity
beings
La conoscenza
di
B. Faesde Mottoni,
lapsa(cf.forsomeofthe'sameissuesin Bonaventure,
3d. 23,a. 2, 3 diBonaventura
DiodiAdamo
innocente
nelleinII Sententiarum
, in:Archivm
q.
ofthisaspect
91
evaluation
Franciscanum
Historicum,(1998),3-32).Notethata definitive
in
willalsoneedto takeintoaccount
hisChristological
ofMarchia's
questions
thought
thescopeofthepresent
fallsoutside
bookIII oftheSentences:
; suchan examination
paper.
50Aswesawabove(n.22),Marchia
within
reflective
makesa further
distinction
judgofthefundamental
distinction
between
andthismustbe seenas a development
ment,
autemhuiusmodi
virandreflective
A, msB 77ra:"Actus
simple
judgments,
e.g.version
alius
tualiter
sunttres:estenimquidamactusintellectus
simplicis
apprehensionis;
cognitivi
et negandi;
et tertius
estactusdiscurrendi
et dividendi
siveaffirmandi
actuscomponendi
velsyllogizandi".
51"Adprimam
in oppositum
dicoquodactusintellectus
estduplex,
scilicet
rationem
etistiactusdifferunt
actusapprehendendi
etactusiudicandi,
(. . .).Etsicdicoquodcognitio
veldeterminate
tantum
actu,velutestcommunis
proaltero
utrique
potest
accipidupliciter:
actuiapprehendendi
et iudicandi,
tuncconcedo
actui.Si <estcommunis>
quodvoluntas
in incognitum;
tamenin opposinonpotest
sedutcognitio
estcommunis
utrique,
potest
tumcognitione
dummodo
sitcognitum
Item,datoquod
iudicativa,
cognitione
apprehensiva.
nonposset
velieoppositum,
adhuctamen
actum
suumetnonvelieiudiposset
suspendere
catum"(E 42va-b;italics
mine).At n. 22 above,we sawthat,forMarchia,
any"actus
whichentails,
to some
formaliter"
has theformofthe"cognitio
iudicativa",
cognitivus
theassent
ofthewill.
extent,

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ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

anotherit mustmake a judgmentabout reality.Marchia seems aware of

the difficulty.52
, book 6, c. 2),
Basing himselfon Aristotle(cf.Nic. Ethics
he objectsto his own positionthatthe will's impulseto pursue or to flee
or negativejudgments,respectively.
is based on the mind's affirmative
Thus, judgmentis a necessaryprerequisiteforwilling.In responseto this
objection,Marchia attemptsto develop and enrichhis arguments.
between
Accordingto Marchia,in additionto the traditionaldistinction
a
there
is
also
further
disand
"judicative"knowledge,
"apprehensive"
tinctionbetweentwo different
judgments,both
typesof rationalreflective
of which are involvedin the dialecticof human action. This is a point
to which we should pay great attention,because Marchia will insiston
it in both versionsof his Sentences
commentary(see on this also below,
8), developingthe internaldistinctionand articulationof human mental acts, both volitionaland cognitive:
Et ideo dico quod iudiciumestduplex,quia quoddamestiudiciumsuperans et quoddam est iudiciumsuccumbensvel superatum.Tunc dico
quod <si> sit tantumunum iudicatum,quod voluntasnon potestin
oppositum;tamen non sequiturpropterhoc quod voluntasvelitillud
necessario,quia potestsuspendereactumsuum et resilireab actu.53
AlthoughMarchia's discussionon this point is not as elaborate as one
could wish, neverthelessthis much seems clear: there are two typesof
one of which"pre
vails", apparentlyby receivjudgment,both reflective,
chosen by the will. Such
additional
through
being
strengthprecisely
ing
a multiplicity
of judgmentsbroadens the scope of volition:the choice is
not merelybetweenacting and not acting,ratherchoice is expanded to
include being able to act againsta judgmentalreadydetermined,thanks
to anotherprevailingjudgment.
52"Sed hocvidetur
actumiudicandi,
nonsufficere,
praesupponit
quia actuselectivus
hocestin appetitu
et fuga,VI
affirmatio
et negatio,
persecutio
quiaquodestin mente
comofMarchia's
Ethicorum"
passagein theA version
(E 42vb).Cf.,fortheparallel
belowat n. 77 in themaintext.
mentary,
53E 42vb.Atthispoint,
beendrawn,
Marchia
wasableto
withthedistinction
having
"Sedhomovirtuosus
habetduoiudioftheincontinent:
thewell-known
interpret
syllogism
esseeligendum
secundum
secundum
bonum
rationem,
cia,unum'simpliciter'
quodiudicat
bonum
delectabile
secundum
etaliud'secundum
quid,quia
quodiudicat
quid'secundum
secundum
estprosequendum.
Et iudicium
scilicet
secundum
sensum
[thatis to saythat
voluntas
ex sualiberiate
in homine
nihilominus
tamen
secundum
virtuoso,
quid'succumbet
iudicatum
sive'secundum
sive'simpliciter'
iudicium,
quid'"
<agere>in utrumque
potest
(E 42 vb).Cf.n. 25 above.

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173

These are new medieval developmentswhich we would not be able

to find in ancient philosophy,since according to Aristotle(and to the
acts cannot belong to the same realm
Greeksin general)two "different"
I
will
returnto the growinglater medieval
the
mind.54
Below
of
( 9),
trend,and Marchia's place in it, to representthe mind and individual
facultieswithinthe mind as articulatedsystemsof acts and dispositions,
so thatvariousaspectsof selfinteractwithone anothercreatingsuch tensions as weaknessof the will.
The second argument(), as already noted,was based upon the concept of the ratioboni.Here Marchia offersan answerwithintheAristotelian
framework
and endorsesthe strategyused just above. The ratiobonicould
be of different
sorts,involvingsome ratiomalisecundum
quid, so that there
is some room forchoice leftto the individualamong thingsthatare more
or less good relativeto each other.That is to say, thereis not only an
absolute good or evil, but also a slidingscale on which good and evil
are to an extentconditionedby the situation.This argumentwas already
and became a commonplacein thirteenth
cenput forwardby Aristotle55
I
in
it
the
More
scholastic
so
will
leave
to
side.
debate,
interesting,
tury
in
is
a
which
Francis
casts
doubt
the
statement
very
my opinion,
upon
54The distinction
wasan
twokindsofreflective
as faras I know,
between
judgment,
Oneofthefirst
authors
tothink
ofsucha distinction
innovation
of12th-century
theology.
whiledeeding
withtheactsofthewillseemstohavebeenSimonofTournai
(d.ca. 1210);
inbothPeterofPoitiers
andStephen
cf.Robiglio
wefind
significant
development
Langton;
in
hintofthiskindofdistinction
(cit.n. 2 above),154-55.I do notsee anysignificant
AurioPs
ontheSentences
Peter
Commentary
(e.g.bookII, dist.25,q. un.,a. 2; ed.P. Capullius,
Theexigencies
foran internal
articulation
Rome1605,265bff.),
oneofMarchia's
sources.
in
of"theSelf",ofcourse,
datesfrom
thetimeofAugustine
andhasitsmainstimulus
ofreflective
acts
thePauline
thesolution
nevertheless,
bymeansofa multiplicity
Epistles;
before
theelaboration
andassimilation
ofother
ofthemindwouldnothavebeenpossible
- to
studied
notions
of"purepossibility",
bySimoKnuuttila).
Aquinas
(e.g.theconcept
- proposed
in his
Marchiaknows
sucha twofold
structure
ofvolitions
quotean author
onthispoint,
anddespite
demalo
Quaestiones
(ca. 1268),q. 16,a. 3,andelsewhere;
disputatele
ofearly14th-century
Thomasstoodon thesame
thecontrary
"Thomists",
interpretation
Thisunusual
is notnew.It wasproposed
by
byScotus.
interpretation
pathlaterwalked
Dominican
Alfonso
de
oftheEarlyModern
someSchoolmen
period,
e.g.theSalamancan
Luna(d. 1596);on Luna,see Robiglio
(cit.n. 2 above),115-19.On thisissue,see also
inAncient
andMedieval
S. Knuuttila,
Emotions
, Oxford
2004,265n. 33.
Philosophy
55"Licetoppositum
malialiquo
illiusquodiudicatum
estrespectu
eiushabeatrationem
modo
ab ilio,quiatarnen
iudicatum
estbonumsecundum
, quiadistrahit
quid,ideopotest
Ethics
voluntas
illudeligere"
, III, c. 4, 1113a
(E 42vb;italics
mine).Cf.e.g.Mcomachean
andit maybe opposite,
23: "Yetdifferent,
things
people".Cf.
appeargoodto different
dellevirt
morali
inAristotele
M. D'Avenia,
delbene
Le dimensioni
,
cognitive
L'aporia
apparente.
Milan1998.

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174

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

presuppositionsof the argument.It is in fact not certain,accordingto

Marchia, that the will cannot will somethingevil: concedatur
aliquomodo,
licetdubium
,56Marchia suggeststhat "perhaps"one could will to do somethingevil not onlythroughconsideringit to be a partialgood {subincomalterius
mali).
pletaratione
boni)but to a certainextent"directly"{subratione
Dimension
7. The Temporal
of theWill and the(Virtually)
MultipleSelf
The thirdinitialargument{c)- centeringon the law of non-contradiction
of the intellectualact- is solved by makingreference
and the singularity
to the temporalextensionof all human
(thoughhastilyand half-implicitly)
action. Contradictoryacts only become a problemwhen we are talking
about these acts takingplace at one and the same time.Francishintsat
natureof the human action. No action lasts only
the trans-instantaneous
an instant;it always has a duration or a "term" and, throughtime,
different
judgmentsbecome available.57I will tryto clarifymy interpretationby way of an example.

56"Adsecundum,
in malum,
cumdicitur
nonpotest
concedatur
aliquo
quodvoluntas
ofthispointinScotus,
seeG.Alliney,
'Velie
modo,licetdubium"
(E 42vb).Fora discussion
/ Ethics
e la banalit
delmale
& Politics,
malum
expuralibertate3:
DunsScoto
, in:Etica& Politica
at:http://www.units.it/dipfilo/etica_e_politica/2002_2/indexalline
2, 2002,on-line
toaffirm
thatthewillcanwilltheevilqua
William
Ockham
wasprobably
thefirst
author
in an argument)
either
ofa doubtorofan element
evil.Butthissuggestion
(intheform
ofAquinas's
onEvil.Duringthe
havealready
beenclearto thereaders
Questions
might
in discussing
Sentences
PeterLombard's
13thcentury,
(bookII, dist.7, c. 3), medieval
to
triedto makecompatible
thesinoftheangelandthestatements
authors
according
in-and-of
which:1) evilhasno existence
itself;
2) "nonpossunt
itaqueboniangelivelie
malum".
Cf.Knuuttila
(cit.n. 44 above).
(cit.n. 54 above),209n. 99,andalsoCervellon
57 Ad tertium,
ineodem
instanti
estsi
quodvoluntas
quo vult,etc.,dicoquodverum
Sedsiinveniat,
nonpotest
<convertere
intelintellectum
subopposito
iudicio.
noninveniat
convertit
intellectum
ad illud
lectum>propter
sed intempore
sequenti
incompossibilitatem,
ofthe
to mytentative
thetwojudgments
interpretation,
quodvult"(E 42vb).According
"in eodeminstanti"
and "in tempore
distinction
between
Marchia's
(despite
opposition
in a "simultaneous"
evenifeachofthemhad a
are bothengaged
struggle,
sequenti")
thestrong
formulation
to whichthewill
different
duration.
Moreover,
according
despite
thatthewillcan
toitspurpose,
Marchia's
texthereseemstosuggest
converts
theintellect
toward
thepurposes
ofthewill,buttheproduction
knowledge
onlyturnalready-produced
andsalvo
meliori
iudithepowerofthewill.In other
ofknowledge
remains
words,
beyond
' means

ofthejudg"whatis understood",
thatis to saythe"content"
cio,hereintellectum
rather
thantheintellect
as a partner
ofthewill.
subopposito
ment("intellectum
iudicio"),
ininstanti
fiatsubito
A closereading
"Utrum
actusvoluntatis
oftheunidentified
question
in order
willbe required
whichmight
be Marchia's,
velfiatin tempore"
(E 49ra-50vb),
- Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),42.
Cf.Friedman
to study
thispointfurther.

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FRANGIS
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175

One could thinkof two distinctvolitions:to will to eat a piece of cake

and to will to diet. There is no intrinsiccontradictionbetweenthesetwo
ifthere
Nevertheless,
volitions,since their"objects"circaquodare different.
a
to
someone's
actual
is to be any consistency
activities, problemarises:
the diet is not compatiblewitheatingthe cake now.One way of explaining thissituationis by means of the followingparadigm:thereis a general
volition(to diet) and this conflictswith a particularvolitionthat is in
some way an exceptionto the carryingout of the first(to eat a piece of
cake rightnow as an exceptionto the ongoingdieting).This is the standard
paradigm: general volition vs. particularvolition; such a paradigm is
,
employedby Marchia as well when he says that homohabetduo iudicia
unumsimpliciter
... et aliudsecundum
quid(cf. n. 53 above). Is this the best
way to explainthe situation,however?It does not seem to be (and Francis
may have agreed,at least in the passage we are dealingwithnow). Since
all the volitionsinvolved are "singular", i.e. particular,what is here
describedas a "generalvolition"should in factbe understoodas nothing
other than "the particularvolitionfor somethinggeneral", so that the
betweenobjects
conflictat issue here is yetagain reducedto the difference
volitions
are in
fact
that
these
two
vs.
But
the
("general"
"particular").
conflictat all would then lead one to the conclusionthat there is only
one particularobject whichis both being willed and not willed.This was
consideredstrictly
impossibleby the likes of Godfreyof Fontaines.
ifthe appeal to a distinction
between
to
How, then, explainthisconflict,
use
of
a
distinction
between
voliOne
answer
is:
the
is
barred?
by
objects
tions.Such a distinctioncan be allowed, however,only if one maintains
thattherecan be more than one volitionor act of the will at once. And
this in turn requiresa certaindivisionof the self into several "virtual"
selves.58If one were to postulatesuch a divisionof the self,then one
could maintainthat each volitionhas an intrinsicdurationto it (and this
durationis a characteristicof each virtualself in relationto the same
volitionsmightwell coexistwith
outsideworld),althoughthe contradictory
one anotherin the same objectivetime.A "dietengagement",forinstance,
have different
and a "cake-eating
temporaldurationsabsolutely
engagement"
correspondingto two virtualselves.
speaking(long-termvs. short-term)
exists.And
virtual:only one selfever actually
is therefore
The multiplicity
58SomeofJohnElster's
aresurprisingly
similar.
Cf.J.Elster
(ed.),TheMultiple
arguments
Studies
inRationality
andSocial
1986,aswellas morerecent
, Cambridge
Change
publications.
Self.

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176

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

when one of the two simultaneously"open" selves runs its course, the
two selves collapse into the prevailingone.
An explanationavailingitselfof thisparadigmpermits,in my opinion,
a fundamentaltypeof freedomwithrespectto variousobjectsthatcannot
be offeredby the standardparadigm and, more importantstillfor our
presentpurposes,it can explain an aspect of Marchia's own ideas: his
kinds of reflective
distinctionbetweentwo different
judgment,which,as
and
succumbens
.
we saw above, he calls respectively
superans
Such a relationof volitionto time is developed explicitlyneitherby
Marchia nor by any othermedievalthinker,but seems extremely
promishas
to
some
notions
such
since
it
the
descriptive
capacity charge
ing,59
with
an
intrinsic
moral
value.
as "advance", "delay", "temporising",
etc.,
of habits,eithervirtuousor vicious,
Along the same lines,the constitution
would operateby changingthe temporal"quality"of action.For a virtuous
would be quite easy and, as a
person,forinstance,the diet-engagement
his
not
to
eat
cake
would
be correspondingly
decision
quick,
consequence,
so that the split between a double-termself (long-termvs. short-term)
and disappear.
would tend to resolveitselfswiftly
us
These lastconsiderations
bring to thefinalpartof Marchia'squestion.
The initialargumenttakingitspointof departurefromthe discordbetween
of eithervirtuousor
volitionand cognitionin relationto the constitution
vicioushabits(d) is contestedby Marchia both on the basis of a textfrom
(viz.
Augustineand of the principleof the moral qualityof intentionality
some action contributes
that one's intention,good or evil, in performing
to the moral statusof thataction).Marchia stressesthe conditionforpro, i.e. "practice".The repetitionof random "atomic" voliducing a habitus
each
tions,
going against the correspondingrationaljudgment,seems to
him a mere abstraction.In fact,accordingto Marchia,thewillin isolation
esthabitus
of virtues:virtus
fromthe intellectcannotbe constitutive
conformis
<rectae>.60
rationi
Moreover,a volitionof somethingthat opposes rational
59On thisneglected
in X. Zubiri,
Sobre
el sentimiento
see theseminal
reflections
point,
la
, Madrid1992,esp.95 and 137-39.Cf. Robiglio
(cit.n. 2 above),80-82,
y volicin
214-15.
60"Adaliud,quodtuncessetvirtus
moralis
sineprudentia,
dicosecundum
Augustinum
dicerefalsum
et dicitverum,
in Enchiridion
qui credit
quamqui
quodmagismentitur
dicoquodsi voluntas
facitcontra
dicereverum.
Ad propositum
dicitfalsum
et credit
virtus
sedvitium,
est
rationem
erroneam,
quiavirtus
quodestmala,etnonadgenerabitur
Enchiridion
rationi
<rectae>"(E 42vb).Cf.Augustine,
habitus
conformis
, ch. 6, 18,ed.
iudicandus
estquidicitfalsum
E. Evans,Turnholt
1969,58: "Nemosanementiens
quod
in ipsoestnonfallit
ipsesedfallitur".
quoniam
quantum
putatverum,

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

177

judgmentmay be possibleinsofaras the will uses or provokesotherjudgmentsthatare alternatives

to the firstone.61This pointwas noted above,
in Marchia's responseto c (cf. n. 57 above). Anarchicacts, in thissense,
would certainlydestroy
the habit that would come into the world by a
sort of "double-bind"action,62but they could under no circumstances
a positivepractice,i.e. generatea new habit: corrumpitur
constitute
quodgeneratum
estet sic nullushabitus
.63
generatur
Francis also rejectsthe argumentthat was used to supportthe "habit
Ethics
, Book 7.
objection"(d) and was taken fromAristotle'sNicomachean
If Marchia is to be believed,the rationalisticaccount of human action
given by Aristotlewas not the Philosopher'sfinal,consideredview but
In book 7 of hisNicomachean
Ethics
, according
onlya provisionalhypothesis.
to Marchia,Aristotleloquitur
nonasserendo,
sedtantum
ratiocinando
.64
probabiliter
As theseexamplesshow,in our ongoingefforts
to understandMarchia's
use of his sources,it will be absolutelyessentialto considercarefullythe
Ethics
, Augustine'swritingsand,
interplaybetweenAristotle'sNicomachean
in the background,Saint Paul's Epistles.
Medieval discussionson the weakness of the will had a more complex traditionand sourcesthan is commonlysurveyedin the modern literature.On the one hand, therewas
thewell-knowntextof Aristotle(book 7 ofNicomachean
Ethicstogetherwith
some passages fromhis treatiseOn theSoul);65on the other hand, there
61"Ulterius
dicoquodlicetinprimo
instanti
velitoppositum
iudicii
tamen
comrationis,
muniter
avertit
intellectum
a primoiudicioet convertit
illudquod
ipsumad iudicandum
ettuncpersecundum
actum
illudquodgeneratum
eratexprimo
contrario
vult,
cointelligitur
iudicio
etsicnonestgeneratus
etposteavelitoppositum
simili
modo<et>
habitus;
ipsius,
estet sicnullus
habitus
corrumpitur
quodgeneratum
generatur"
(E 42vb:italics
mine).
62I alludehereto thetheory
advanced
Bateson
andothers
initially
byGregory
(and
laterexpanded
on byCarlosSluzkiandEliseoVern),
whichdealswithactsofspeech
- J.Beavin
- A.Tarnopolskya paradoxical
nature.
Cf.C.E.Sluzki
having
(self-contradicting)
E Vern,Transactional
research
onthedouble
in: Archives
of General
bind,
disqualification
16(1967),494-504.
ofthiskind,
as
however,
Psychiatry,
caution,
Usinganalogies
requires
notedbyJ.Elster,
andSociety.
Contradictions
andPossible
Worlds
York, Chirchester-New
Logic
Brisban-Toronto
1978(advocem
Bateson).
63Seen. 61 above.Also:"Eteodemmodode prudentia
sinevirtute
morali,
quianullus
habitus
illetamen
nonestprudentia,
habitus,
generabitur.
[. . .] Item,estoquodgeneratur
>
estde hisquae generantur
ad finem,
tamen< volntate
quiaprudentia
praesupposita
rectaex terminatione
finis"
(E 42vb).
64"Adilludde VII Ethicorum
diciprimo
nonasserendo,
sedtanpotest
quodloquitur
tumprobabiliter
ratiocinando"
(E 42vb).
65I refer
toAristotle's
De anima
, III, 10(433a10-14).Saarinen
(cit.n. 4 above)concenon thisbranch
trates
ofthetradition.
Cf.alsomorerecent
works
ofSaarinen,
e.g.Walter
on'akrasia3:
Second
37 (1999),60-71.
, in:Vivarium,
Burle);
Thoughts

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178

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

were biblical texts(e.g. I Cor. 7, 5), glosses on those texts,and several

ecclesiasticalauthoritiesup until the time of Peter Lombard (IV Sent.,
d. 31, c. 7). Aquinas, forinstance,was aware of such a twofoldtradition
when he wrote (In IV Sent
., d. 27, q. 3, a. 1, arg. 2): continentia
dupliciter
sumitur
a diversis.
Future studiesof Marchia's ideas on will, action, and
moralswill also have to take into account this richnessand diversity.66
8. TheA Version
ofMarchia'sII Sentences
The generalstructureof the questionwe have been examiningdoes not
The considerable
varybetweenthe two versionsof Marchia's II Sentences.
use of authoritative
and Augustinecharacterizes
passagesfrombothAristotle
the A versionjust as much as it does the B version.Some key definitions
are clearlyPeripatetic:the definitionof 'virtue',for instance,as habitus
electivus
in medioconsistens
There is a certainshift
proutsapiensdeterminabit.
in emphasis,however,for in the A version a number of cosmological
aspectsof the issue of the will's relationshipto the intellectare developed
at some length,while otherfeaturesof the B versiondo not appear at
all in the A version.Thus, the heart of question 47 of the A version
voluntas
antedeterminationern
siveiudicium
rationis
velcontra
(Utrum
possitse movere
is in fact new, dealing with the relationbetween the firstcause
ipsurri)
(God) and secondary causes (includinghuman beings). Moreover, the
of different
ordersof causes) tends
vocabularyemployed(e.g. concurrentia
to recall more the vocabularyof Duns Scotus, at least as he expresses
himselfin his Lectura
, book II, question 25.67
66In thisconnection,
I wouldliketo mention
an interesting
and relevant
article
by
Kretzmann:
theLawofMyMind:
onRomans
Norman
7, in: T.V.
Warring
Against
Aquinas
andtheChristian
Faith
ForfurMorris
, NotreDame,Indiana1988,172-95.
(ed.),Philosophy
Thomas
onHuman
andcriticism,
seeR.Pasnau,
therdiscussion
Nature
, CambridgeAquinas
NewYork-Oakleigh
2002,443 n. 17,andespecially
(cit.n. 2 above),147-52.
Robiglio
in mind,
insomerecent
Withthisliterature
anddespite
theclaims
tothecontrary
scholI wouldsaythatAugustine's
a distinction
, book8, doesnotpresent
Confessions
arship,
kinds
ofvolition.
within
theframework
between
twodifferent
indeed,
Augustine,
operates
der
oftheChristian
ideaofincontinence.
P. vanBeek,Das Willensdrama
Cf.,forinstance,
- D. Hattrup
- C. Mayer
von
8, in:N. Fischer
zurLektre
,Confessionesc
Befreiung.
Anmerkungen
inAugustins
DerSprung
inlebendige
Leben
undGnade
, Paderborn}Confessionese.
(eds.),Freiheit
withL.F.
Mnchen-Wien-Zrich
2003,97*-113*,whichI wouldreadin conjunction
Le Confessioni
Pizzolato:
, vol.3, Milan1994,231-41.
Sant'Agostino,
67Cf.Dumont
alsothepointofcontact
between
this
(cit.n. 22 above),whoexplains
intellectualism
ofAquinas".
See alsoIngham
ofScotusandthe"balanced
earlyapproach
(cit.n. 22 above),88-90.

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FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

179

AlthoughMarchia is criticalof some views of Aquinas (the unusdoctor

of the text),neverthelesshis discussionof several points taken fromthe
The Paris Condemnationof 1277 goes
is respectful.68
SummaTheologiae
unmentioned.69
The questiondeals now withthe problemof "causation".70
This is firstconsideredin general(de omnicausasecundain communi
),71then
it is consideredfora long while fromthe point of view of naturalagency
),72and finallyit is consideredfromthe point
(de agentenaturaliin speciali
P Only the last section
of view of human voluntaryaction (de causalibera)
to question63 of theB versiondiscussed
withsome differences,
corresponds,
in the last sectiondo not so much involvechanges
above. The differences
in the argumentsthemselves,but ratherchanges in stress,emphasis,and
accent.

68The textdeserves
a detailed
whichI willpresent
elsewhere
(cf.n. 5 above).
study
seemsto
at thebeginning
We couldnotethatthelistofarguments
byFrancis
presented
Marchia
tendsto read
viae"(cf.B 8Ivbff.).In addition,
follow
theThomistic
"quinqu
Averroes.
to thefifth
ideastakenfrom
as having
Referring
explicitly
developed
Aquinas
in
naturali
"Secundo
de agente
Francis
says(inart.1 ofthequestion):
way,forinstance,
MSS have"auctor"]
sic:Omne
unusdoctor
"unus";other
primo
[C omits
arguit
speciali
finem
ab ipsocognitum
finem
determinatum
agitvelpropter
aliquem
agensquodintendit
MSS have"ilio"]ipsum
finem
ab ipsoincognitum
sedab alio[other
velpropter
cognoscente
motaad certum
terminm
sibia sagitsicut
sibipraefixum
etpraestitutum,
patetde sagitta
finem
finem
siveintendit
determisedomneagensnaturale
tantepraefixum;
agitpropter
in ipsumet
naturaliter
terminm
motum
deorsum
et tendit
natum
(graveenimintendit
insuaactione
naturalis
causasecunda
levesursum);
agitdeterminata
ergoetc.Ergoomnis
finem
huiusmodi
determinatum
causaesecundae
a primacausa;causaenimpraestituens
"Haec
nonpotest
essenisiipsaprimacausa;ergoetc.".Marchiaconcludes
significantly:
commento
ratiofundatur
a Commentatore
12 Metaphysicae,
19,ubidicitquodnatura
a causisuniversalibus"
agitformaliter
(B 8Ivb;cf.C 160rb).
69We should
ofThomasAquinas
notforget
thecanonization
(July1323)anditsconartiBourret
revoked
inFebruary
1325,theParisian
Tempier's
Bishop
Stephen
sequences;
salvomeliori
on Aquinas'
s doctrine.
Thissaid,I do notthink,
clesas faras theytouched
in theA version
canbe usedas
articuli
arenotfound
iudicio
, thatthefactthatTempier's
A
In otherwords,
as faras I see,version
an argument
to fixthedateofthatversion.
tothe1277
havepreceded
version
butlesscoherent
as well)might
B, thereference
(richer
hisrevision,
before
beenaddedbyMarchia
condemnation
February
during
perhaps
having
intheA version
errores
arementioned
elsewhere
1325.TheParisian
(e.g.B 29va).Gf.also
n. 33 above.
70Interestingly,
on bookII oftheSentences
theA version
of Marchia's
commentary
oftheconcept
examination
withan extended
(unfortunately,
abruptly
interrupted)
begins
- Schabel2001(cit.n. 7 above),
See on thisquestion,
Friedman
ofcausality
(B lra-5va).
85-86.
71Cf.B 81va-b.
72Cf.B 81vb-82rb.
73Cf.B 82rb-84ra.

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180

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

Here I will quote a long passage fromthe last sectionof the question,
which pulls togethermuch of what we have seen above:
Ad primam<rationem>,quando diciturquod voluntasnon potestvelie
(quantumspectatad propositum)
ignotumetc.,dico quod actusintellectus
et actum appreest duplex. Habet enim intellectusactum iudicandi74
est
et
aliud
aliud
enim
est
hendendi,
quod apprehensum
apprehendere
iudicare.Unde multa intellectusapprehenditquae non iudicat,sicut
cum comparetea ad invicem,
extremaambo contradictionis
apprehendit
Per hoc enim probat
facere
nisi
non
apprehenderet.75
quod
posset
sensuumextecommunis
sensibilia
sensus
apprehendit
Philosophus76
quod
extremaconnec
tamen
intellectus
iudicat
riorum,quod comparaiea,
etc.
tradictionis;
quare
Tunc ergoad rationemconcedoquod voluntasnon potestvelieignotum,
ut ignotumest privatioactus iudicandiet actus apprehendendi
simul;
potesttamenvelieignotum,ut ignotumprivatpraeciseipsumiudicium,
Et tunc dico quod, quando voluntasvult
non autem apprehensionem.
nonvultignotum,
estperintellectum,
eius
determinatum
oppositum quod
sed vultignotum,
seu inapprehensum
hoc estincognitum
intellectum,
per
bene apprehendit
illudcuiusoppositum
Intellectus
hoc estnon iudicatum.
licetnon habeat actumiudiciicirca ipsum.
dicttet determinai,
in volntate
Sed hoc non videtursufficere,
praesupquoniamactuselectionis
non
tantum
actum
iudicandi
in
intellectu
actum
,
apprehendendi;
quia,
ponit
et negatio,
secundumPhilosophum,<quod> est in intellectuaffirmatio
et ideo, licetet actusvoluntatis
hoc est in appetitufugaet persecutio;77
tamenactuselectionon praesupponatnisisimplicemactumintellectus,
actumcomplexum
siveactum
vel fugaepraesupponit
nissivepersecutionis
Et ideo dico aliterquod duplexestiudicium
iudicandiipsiusintellectus.
etaliudnonpraevalens
etpraevalens
intellectus:
, et ad utrumque
superans
quoddam
istorumpotestsequi voluntas(....)
Ad tertium,
quando dicitur"in eodem instantiin quo voluntasvultaliintellectum"
etc.,dico quod verumest nisiinveniateum78
quid convertit
sub actuiudicandi79
opposito;quando auteminvenitsub oppositoiudicio,
eum in eodem instantiin quo vult,propter
tunenon convertit
incompossiEt
tamen
sed
convertit
eum in tempore
bilitatem
actuum
,
seguenti
imperceptibili.
74iudicandi]
inB.
videndi
75HereMarchiapostulates
butnotjudged;
can be apprehended,
thatcontradictions
existandwork.
he accepts
thisbecausearguments
perabsurdum
perhaps
76Cf.Aristotle,
OntheSoul
, III, ch. 1-2.
77Cf.Aristotle,
Ethics
Mcomachean
, VI, ch.2 (1139a21-22).AL XXVI-3,254.
78eum]earnB.
79iudicandi]
B.
indicandi

11:24:00 AM

ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

181

nisiquando habetactumvolendi,conquando dicisquod non convertit

sedpotest
nontantum
in instanti,
habere
actum
volendi
cedo quod voluntas
potest
; et sic continuandoactum volendiper tempus
per tempus
ipsumcontinuare
sed in temporesequenti,avertere80
aliquodpotestnon in primoinstanti,
et a primo/83va/iudicio;et ita non
a primaconsideratione
intellectum
habeat in eodem instantiiudicia oppositaut
sequiturquod intellectus
dicebas.81
Here we see Marchia maintainnot only the distinctionbetween appre- that
hensive and judicative knowledge,but also- most interestingly
This
vs. non-praevalens.
betweentwo kindsof reflective
judgment,superans
and it
seems necessaryto Marchia to overcomecontradiction,
distinction
further
entailsthe temporalnatureof the volition(propter
incompossibilitatem
Indeed, Francis speaks of a "continuation"(continuatio
per tempus)
actuurri).
of the act of the will. Withoutsuch a diachronicconceptionof the act
of the will, the just-mentioneddistinctionwould reduce itselfto a bare
betweentwo different
judgmentsof theverysame
chronologicaldistinction
kind or, in otherwords,between two different
"imperceptible"steps of
does not exclude this
Marchia's
text
the same reflective
judgment (and
at
This
less
is, least,my interpretation
original,reading).
possible,though
etpraevalens
et
: quoddam
intellectus
of the sentence:duplexestiudicium
superans
to two kindsofjudgment.I am nevertheless
aliudnonpraevalens
, as referring
consciousthatMarchia's effortto thinkof the act of the will in termsof
an "historicalaction" havingits own durationremainsambiguous.82
3
'
9. Distinctions
of theSelf
Without presentingany conclusive statementsabout Marchia's own
aspect of those areas of his
approach,I would like to stressa noteworthy
thoughtexaminedhere. The textswe have consideredconfirma tendency
to the earlyfourteenth
in Westernthoughtof the twelfth
centuryto repas an articulatedand "disembodied"
resentthe human mind increasingly
Crucialto thistendency
systemofinternalacts and sub-divideddispositions.
of the acts belongingto any one faculty,withthe
was the multiplication
resultingpossibilityof a "struggle"among these acts, each against the
other.
80avertere]
evertere
B.
81B 83ra-va
italics
mine.
(cf.C 161ra-b);
82Marchia,
doesfirmly
statethatthewillcanactin an instant.
forinstance,

11:24:00 AM

182

ANDREA
A. ROBIGLIO

An examplemay makemylaststatement
clearer:thediscussion,
throughout the thirteenthcentury,touching on the strugglebetween Christ's
human wills,forexample Christ'swillingnessand unwillingness
to die. In
this particularscholasticdebate, we see the emergenceof the notion of
velltas.
This "velleity"can be a volitionthe objectofwhichis unattainable,
so that it is also called voluntas
.83In the particularexample
impossibilium
underdiscussionhere,thisallowsan explanationforthe oppositionbetween
Christ'swill to die (in orderto accomplishthe plan of Redemption)and
his "velleity"to refusedeath,withoutattributing
any "weakness"toJesus's
will.Maintainingthathuman beingshave the abilityto "chose" something
thatcannotbe attainednot onlyrequiresrejectingAristotelian
orthodoxy,
but requiresa new articulationof the Self as well.
In the textsabove, Francis of Marchia does not use the expression
velleitas
, nor does he deal with unattainablegoals; yet his modalisedand
discreteapproach to the will in relationto the other faculties(viz. the
the backgroundpresenceof thisnew aspect of
intellect)indicatesstrongly
medieval thought,an aspect that was being developed already by both
Aquinas and Scotus.84
Such a notion of the will and its acts yieldsa concept of weaknessof
the will radicallydifferent
fromthatfoundin Aristotle's
Ethics
Nicomachean
,
book 7. Aristotle's
abasia is made possibleby a certainmind-bodyarrangement,whereinthe facultyof reason cannotcope withthe disorderemerging fromthe senses and sensitiveappetite,that is to say, the lower part
of the soul. This happens in particularwhen the emotionsovercomethe
governanceof reason in such a way thata man acts againsthis own best
rationaljudgment.For Aristotle,it would be impossiblefor thereto be
with each other,
multipleacts of the highestpart of the soul conflicting
because each level of the soul can have onlyone act. Conflictsare mapped
levels of the soul.85The medieval
only Vertically'between the different
discussionof incontinence(incontinentia
:) representsmore or less the same
sort of problem: a type of mind-bodyverticalintegrationproblem.But
83I cannotdevelop
thepointhere,butI survey
it extensively
in Robiglio
(cit.n. 2
Forfurther
seeA.A.Robiglio,
It Hasa Thomistic
above),ch. 1 andpassim.
developments,
Locke
ontheConcept
RingtoIt:John
ofVelleity
(inpreparation).
84Gf.Cervellon
(citn. 44 above),446-47.
85On thesingularity
ofcognitive
andappetitive
of
acts,seeaboven. 28. Theamount
literature
thistopicis impressive.
Letmemention
at leastthefollowing
studies:
studying
Natali(cit.n. 25 above);M. Woods,
Aristotle
on'Akrasia
sull'etica
' in:A. Alberti
(ed.),Studi
diAristotele
inthe'Republic':
DoesPlatochange
, Naples1990,227-61;G.R. Carone,Akrasia3

11:24:00 AM

FRANGIS
ANDTHE ACT OF THE WILL
OF MARCHIA

183

is not the only obstacleto "the strength

formedievalthinkersincontinentia
of the will": thereis anothermedieval discussioninvolvingthe weakness
of the will that did not occur in antiquity,and this discussionis tighdy
linkedwiththe medievalcoinage of the term'Velleity'.In thiscase, there
can arise a conflictin the soul betweendifferent
acts of the same faculty
or level of the soul. This is because the conflicthere is not a mind-body
problem,but instead could be characterised,at least at firstblush (and
somewhatanachronistically),
as a mindselfproblem.
The pictureI am drawingof a mind-selftensionmay also help us to
appreciate better the argumentativestrategiesadopted by Francis of
Marchia. Francis,by means of the distinctionbetweentwo different
acts
of reflective
both
of
which
are
at
the
of
the
will,
judgment,
disposal
to explaintheinterplay
of multiple(and even opposing)"rational"
attempted
volitions,away fromany influenceof passion,which,thoughnot rejected,
is relegatedto anotherprecinctentirely.86
At the same time,in Marchia's
we
can
see
how
a
"voluntaristic"
account of human action,
approach,
when it does not confineitselfto illusoryrhetoricalclaims but attempts
to offerconvincingarguments,
the "rationality"
proceedswithoutdismissing
of acts. Francislooked forthe possibility
of independentvolitionsby revising the structureof both the intellectand the will. The intellect,in the
way that it is specificallyused, and apart fromnarrow applicationsto
particular"regions" of reality,appears to be dependentupon the will,
such that the formeris a kind of will-that-argues.
Accordingto Francis
of Marchia, the formulaforthe strengthof the will mightbe as follows:
dividatur
ut imperei.
Freiburgim Breisgau
Universitt
Albert-LudwigsSeminar
Philosophisches
hisMind?,
in Ancient
In contemporary
in:Oxford
Studies
20 (2001),107-48.
Philosophy,
ofthewill,on theonehand,andtheso-called
debatetheweakness
mind-body
problem,
ontheother,
aretwodistinct
In contrast,
theMiddleAges,
philosophical
problems.
during
wereinextricable,
as theywerealsoinAntiquity;
cf.G.R.Carone,
MindandBody
in
they
LatePlato
furGeschichte
derPhilosophie,
87 (2005),227-69.
, in:Archiv
86Marchiadoesnotexcludetheroleplayedby emotions
in theeconomy
ofmoral
he endeavors
nevertheless
todrawa picture
ofthestructure
ofthemindablealso
action;
,
toactindependently
ofpassions.
Seen. 47 above:"Primum
apartfrom
passions,
peccatum
In thesamesense,
non
thecaseofChrist's
willis helpful
as a philosophical
fuitexpassione".
model:
for
thetension
between
volitions
cannot
viatheprevabe explained
Jesus,
opposing
lenceofloweremotional
forces.

11:24:00 AM

FrancisofMarchiaand Williamof Ockham:

Fragments
froma Dialogue*
ROBERTO LAMBERTINI

Abstract
It is well knownthat Francisof Marchia and Williamof Ockhamjoined
MichaelofCesena'srebellion
againstthepope,together
escapingfromAvignon
and signingdocumentssupporting
Cesena's defenceof Franciscanpoverty.
The relationship
betweenthe worksof the two thinkers,
on the otherhand,
is the subjectof ongoinginvestigation.
AfterdiscussingFrancis'rejectionin
his Commentary
on theSentencesof Ockham'stheoryofquantity,
thispaper
showshow Francis'Improbatio
became a sourceforOckham'sOpusNonaginta
Dierum.
criticaleditionofthelatterwork,
Buildingon Offler's
ground-breaking
it is argued that Ockham made extensiveuse of Francis'Improbatio
, even
the arguments
of
thoughon severalpointshe feltit necessaryto reformulate
his confrre
or even to substantially
modifyhis positions.The two Franciscan
differed
commitments
and
theologians
deeplybothin theirbasicphilosophical
in theirmethodological
attitude.These differences
emergedeven when they
were- so to speak- fighting
on the same front.
Some decades ago, in her ground-breakingstudy of the receptionof
William of Ockham's thought,Anneliese Maier devoted an interesting
sectionto Francisof Marchia. She pointedout that Francis,in his treatment of the Eucharist,was probablythe firstauthor to take Ockham's
innovativeinterpretation
of quantityinto consideration;Francisdiscusses
at lengthand eventuallyrejectsOckham's theoryof quantity,whichplays
an importantrole in the latter'sinterpretation
of the Eucharist.1In 1963
* Thisarticle
wasmadepossible
ofmanypeople,
bythekindness,
helpandpatience
in particular
ChrisSchabelandRussFriedman.
I alsowishto thank
CarloDolciniand
fortheir
I havealready
Andrea
Tabarroni
constant
someofthe
encouragement.
presented
contents
ofthepresent
contribution
in Italianin Nonnumquam
dwersorum
impugnantium
personas
Francesco
d'Ascoli
come
delpensiero
di Ockham
Politico
, in:Pensiero
assumpsi:
fonte
politico
1 (2003),97-140,
butin a rather
different
context.
Medievale,
1 A. Maier,
dersptscholastischen
, Rome1955,199-209;
Hintergrnde
Metaphysische
Philosophie
cf.also eadem,Zu einigen
Problemen
derOckhamforschung,
Mittelalter
, in: eadem,Ausgehendes
,
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2006
- www.brill.nl/viv
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
44,1

11:22:41 AM

ANDWILLIAM
FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
OF OCKHAM

185

Hilary S. Offlerwas able to enrichthe apparatus of his criticaledition

of Ockham's OpusNonaginta
Dierumwith referencesto Francis' Improbatio
the
then stilluneditedand almost
to
bull
Quia virreprobus),2
(a reply
papal
unknown.In this way Maier and Offlerrevealed traces of a dialogue
betweentwo Franciscantheologianswho also shared an importantpolitical decision,the adhesion to Michael of Cesena's rebellionagainstPope
John XXII. The presentpaper presentssome furtherevidence concernfocusing
ing this "dialogue," althoughthe pictureremainsfragmentary,
in particularon its second phase, thatis on the relationshipbetweenthe
Dierum.The stressof this articlewill be
and the OpusNonaginta
Improbatio
on
doctrinal
but also on parallelpassages that
not
similarities,
only
placed
show how Ockham used the work of his fellowrefugee.
De corpore
Christi
Since Maier's and Offler'spivotalstudies,manycontributions
have enriched
our pictureof the discussionbetweenFrancisand Ockham.JrgenMiethke
and Gedeon Gi showed thatMaier's importantdiscoverysolved onlyin
part the difficult
problems of chronologyconnected to Ockham's and
Francis' commentarieson the Sentences
.3 In particular,theydiscardedthe
thatin Maier's opinionwould have explained
complexclusterof hypotheses
the supposed cross-references
between the two commentaries.The only
that
now
seems
beyond doubt is that Francis,in writinghis comthing
was aware of Ockham's work,and not vice-versa.More recently,
mentary,
Paul Bakkerwas able to situatethe dissensionbetweenthe two Minorite

in:Archivm
Franciscanum
Historicum
vol.1, Rome1964,188-91,
originally
published
46 (1953),161-94.
2 Cf.Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Dierum
deOckham
Politica
, in Guillelmi
,
Opus
Nonaginta
Opera
xviii:". . . another
Manchester
II, eds.J.G.SikesandH.S. Offler,
1963,"Introduction,"
a full-scale
in
Michaelist
Francis
ofAscoli,
attack
on Quiavirwhich
theologian,
composed
ofthetextmaywellhaveprovided
Ockham
withtheimmediate
itssystematic
criticism
in abundance."
In thefolforOND, as it clearly
didwithideasandauthorities
pattern
I willrefer
to thisedition
as Opus
Dierum.
Nonaginta
lowing,
simply
3J. Miethke,
Ockhams
, Berlin1969,23-29;G. Gi,Praefatio
, in:
WegzurSozialphilosophie
Guillelmi
de Ockham
in librum
Sententiarum
eds.R. Wood,
Quaestiones
quartum
(Reportatio),
NY 1984,16*G. Gi,andR. Green,
St.Bonaventure,
Gnade
undEucharistie
17*;E. Iserloh,
inder
desWilhelm
vonOckham.
Ihre
der
,
Theologie
Bedeutung
irdieUrsachen
Reformation
philosophischen
Wiesbaden
andthe
London
Studium:
Ockham,
Chatton,
1956,24-26.See alsoW.J.Courtenay,
Observations
onRecent
inOckham's
Ockhams
, in:DieGegenwart
, eds.W.Vossenkuhl
Changes
Biography
andR. Schnberger,
Weinheim
1990,327-37.

11:22:41 AM

186

ROBERTO
LAMBERTINI

theologians in the wider context of competing interpretationsof the

Eucharist.Specifically,
Bakkershowed thatFrancisof Marchia supported
a slightlymodifiedversionof Scotus' theoryconcerningthe inherenceof
accidents.4In thiscontext,althoughfar frombeing a faithful
followerof
of quantity,which is
Scotus,5Francis rejected Ockham's interpretation
hardly compatible with the basic assumptionsof Scotus' metaphysics.
Current investigationsof the various survivingversions of Francis of
Marchia's commentaryon Book IV of the Sentences
may shed more light
on the precisemomentthat Francislearned of the new positionheld by
his Englishconfrre
at Oxford.6Perhaps in the futurewe will be able to
establishwhetherFrancis came across Ockham's opinion while delivering his Parisian lecturesof 1319-20, or whetherthis happened later on,
while he was revisinghis lectures into a Scriptum
? In the latter case,
Francis' criticismwould be even closer chronologicallyto the year in
- which was also relatedto
which Ockham was summonedto Avignon,
his theoriesconcerningthe Eucharist.8

4 P.JJ.M.
La raison
etk miracle.
Lesdoctrines
Bakker,
(c.1250-c.
eucharistiques
1400).Contribution
l'tude
desrapports
entre
etthologie
389, vol.1,Nijmegen
1999,especially
122-32,
philosophie
in thisvolume.
Amerini's
article
andtheIntroduction
408;cf.alsoFabrizio
5 Cf.R.L. Friedman,
Francis
andJohn
DunsScotus
onthePsychological
Model
ofMarchia
of
theTrinity,
in:Picenum
18 (1999),11-56.
seraphicum,
6 Gf.R.L. Friedman
and G. Schabel,Francis
ontheSentences:
ofMarchia's
Commentary
ListandState
63 (2001),31-106.The problems
, in:Mediaeval
Studies,
Question
ofResearch
from
thecomplex
tradition
ofFrancis'
havenotyetbeensolved;
stemming
commentary
theinteresting
contribution
edipotesi
sulCommento
alleSentenze
di
Certezze
byN. Mariani,
Francesco
MarcaOMin.,
in:Archivm
della
Franciscanum
95 (2002),93-183,
is
Historicum,
farfrom
I ofFrancesco
cf.C. Schabel,
TheRedactions
compelling;
ofBook
d'Appignano's
Commentary
ontheSentences,
in: D. Prioriand M. Balena(eds.),AttidelII Convegno
su
Intemazionale
Francesco
del Tronto2004,97-122;R.L. Friedman,
and
, Appignano
d'Appignano
Principia
inFrancesco
Sentences
TheQuestion
utrum
enssimcQuaeritur
Prologue
d'Appignano's
Commentary:
essesubiectum
alicuius
123-49.
scientiae'
ibidem,
pliciter
simplex
possit
7 Forexample,
Maierwaspersuaded
thatFrancis
refers
to Ockham's
Tractatus
decorthiswouldmeanthatFrancis
musthave
; giventhechronology
poreChristi
accepted
today,
written
thisquaestio
after
thisdateis,infact,
theconclusion
ofC. Grassi,
1323-4;
Introduction
in Guillelmi
deOckham
Tractatus
etTractatus
deQmntitate
deCorpore
Christi
Theo
, X),
(Opera
logica
St. Bonaventure,
NY 1986,23*-28*.
The problem
is thatFrancis'
to
passagereferring
Ockham
a freerendering.
is nota literal
butrather
quotation,
8 ForOckham's
inAvignon,
trial
cf.J.Koch,Neue
Aktenstcke
Wilhelm
Ockham
zudem
Gegen
inAvignon
de Thologie
ancienne
et mdivale,
7 (1935),
Prozess
, in: Recherches
gefhrten
and8 (1936),79-93.nowin:id.Kleine
See
353-80,
, vol.2, Rome1973,275-365;
Schriften
TheAcademic
andIntellectual
Worlds
alsoW.J.Gourtenay,
, in:P.V.Spade(ed.),The
ofOckham
toOckham
etalibi1999,17-30.
, Cambridge
Cambridge
Companion

11:22:41 AM

ANDWILLIAM
OF OCKHAM
FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

187

toMunich
FromAvignon
At any rate, it seems highlyplausible that Ockham and Francis were
both in Avignonby 1324, the formerbecause of the investigationinto
his doctrines,the lattermost probablyon account of the task of teach.9 Nevertheless,we have no
ing theologyat the local Franciscan Studium
evidenceof contactsbetweenthe two theologiansuntilthe dramaticchange
in theirlivesthatresultedfromMichael of Cesena's rebellionagainstJohn
XXII. As is well known,the Englishfriar,who was on trialin Avignon,
and the Italian masterof theology,who most probablyowed at least his
titleto Michael of Cesena,10fled fromAvignontogetherand temporarily found safe haven in the Ghibellinecity of Pisa. From this time on
theirnames appear togetherin severalcollectivedocumentssignedin support of Michael's denunciationofJohn XXII as a heretic.In the firstof
these documents,which Knysh considers
althoughwith no compelling
- a backdated
the
rebel friarsto justifytheir
made
by
forgery
arguments
The
and
Ockham
Francis
action expostfacto
,
appear only as witnesses.11
of
both
the
from
Pisa, however,carry
theologians
signatures
Appellations
as supportersof Michael's appeal.12Ockham and Francis also appear as
9 See footnote
inAvignon.
For
Francis'
11fora pieceofevidence
concerning
position
in Avignon,
cf.
of hisactivity
dateforthebeginning
1324as a commonly
accepted
Italiani
della
Marca
P. Vian,Francesco
, vol.49,Rome1997,esp.
, in:Dizionario
degli
Biografico
theissuedeserves
794.Nevertheless,
deeperinvestigation.
10According
A History
Education
ofB. Roest,
to theinvestigations
(c. 1210ofFranciscan
thechoice
Michael's
thatduring
2000,102,weknow
generalate
1517),Leiden-Boston-Kln
to themagisterium
callthe"degree
forwhatspecialists
ofthecandidate
,
course,"
leading
rested
withtheminister
general.
11EditedinNicolaus
Chronica.
Documentation
onPope
Minorita:
XXII,Michael
ofCesena
John
A Source
Book
inEnglish.
with
Summaries
andthePoverty
, eds.G. Gi andD. Flood,
ofChrist
coram
at 189:"Acta,gestaetfactafuerunt
NY 1996,182-89,
St.Bonaventure,
praedicta
Francisco
de Esculo,in sacratheoOrdinis
fratribus
ethonestis
Minorum,
viris,
religiosis
Guillelmo
Minorum
deAvenione,
Fratrum
etlectore
tuncinconventu
Ocham,
logiadoctore
as Chronica.
I willrefer
to thisedition
..." Henceforth
in sacrapaginamagistro
simply
Period
Ockham'
s Avignon
G. Knysh,
Studies,
, in:Franciscan
concerning
rectifications
Biographical
oder
ineine
Ockhams
46 (1986),82-85,and,against
Engfiihrung
Perspektiven
Knysh,
J.Miethke,
dneneuere
Publikation
EinePolemik
zuOckhams
, in:Mittellateinisches
Biographie
falsche
Richtung?
gegen
Ockham
to G. Knysh,
Miethke's
article
is a reaction
29 (1994),77-78.Actually,
Jahrbuch,
to find;Prof.Knyshhimself
1994,a bookwhichis difficult
, Winnipeg
very
Perspectives
I do notsharemany
senta copyofthebookto me,andI amgrateful,
although
kindly
seines
undWortfhrer
von
Cf.E.L. Wittneben,
ofhisviews.
Franziskanerjurist
Bergamo.
Bonagratia
mitPapstJohannes
Ordens
imStreit
XXII,Leiden-Boston
2003,pp. 282-83.
12Cf.Appellatio
et
Chronica
informa
maiori
, 423: "Cui appellationi
, NicolausMinorita,
virifrater
Franciscus
incontinenti
adhaeserunt
eteamapprobaverunt
religiosi
provocationi
in sacra
de Anglia,
in sacrapagina,
etGuillelmus
de Ockham
de Esculo,
doctor
magister

11:22:41 AM

188

ROBERTO
LAMBERTINI

co-authorsof the Allegationes

virorum
,13These textsof varying
religiosorum
which
most
were
the
result
of a team effortled by
length,
probably
da
do
not
allow
us
to
establish,let alone evaluate,
Bonagratia Bergamo,
the contributionsof the individualco-authors.They merelyinformus
that Francis and Ockham agreed on the basic tenetsof Michael's position,which theythemselveswere endeavoringto corroboratewith their
arguments.
The situationchanges after16 November 1329, the date of publication of the papal bull Quia virreprobus
, which claimed to refuteMichael's
in
a
definitive
Now
the group,which in the meantime
arguments
way.14
was settlingin Munich, not only reactswith a collectiveworkknownas
,15but also producessome worksthathave onlyone author.
Appellatio
magna
There are severalclues suggesting
thatFrancisof Marchia,in his Improbatio
,
vir
have
been
the
first
to
write
even
before
the
Quia
,
reprobus
may
against
Munich Appeal was made public on 26 March 1330. In particular,the
existingparallelpassages in the two treatises,and even more in the rough
draftof the Appellatio
magnapreservedin Vat. lat. 4009, stronglysuggest
that it was Bonagratia who reworkedsome passages fromFrancis into
the Appellatio
, and not the reverse.Indeed, takinginto consideramagna
tion the interpretation
of a dialogue between Pontius Pilate and Jesus
concerningthe natureof the latter'skingship,it is possible to see a sort
is in theAppellatio
informa
minori
455.It is worth
, ibidem,
pagina. . thesamewording
thattheChronica
in sacrapagina";manyscholars
callsOckham"magister
noting
(e.g.
Ockhams
TheAcademic
Miethke,
Weg
(cit.n. 3 above),29-34,butalsoCourtenay,
(cit.n. 8
believe
thecontrary
The author
oftheChronica
above),25,seemsto agreewithMiethke)
couldhavebeeninaccurate
in hiseffort
to stress
theacademic
ofthefriars
who
prestige
rebelled
woulddeserve
a deeperinvestigation
however,
JohnXXII; theproblem,
against
which
wouldnotbe appropriate
in thiscontribution.
It mustbe addedthatthesesubscriptions
arenotavailable
intheentire
tramanuscript
thecriteria
Gi andFloodin thisedition,
dition.
followed
seeJ. Miethke,
by
Concerning
(Chronik
' von
Dererste
Druck
dersogennanten
desNicolaus
Minorita
vollstndige
( 1330/1338).
*
3
Prsentation
eines
Farbbuches
des
14.
in:
Deutsches
54
zur
Archiv,
Bemerkungen
Jahrhunderts^
(1998),623-42.
13Cf.Allegationes
virorum
Chronica
, in Nicolaus
Minorita,
, 524: "Allegationes
religiosorum
de Thalheim,
fratrum
Henrici
Francisci
de Apponiano
virorum,
religiosorum
[theedition
has 'Appomano'],
dictide Esculo,Guillelmi
in sacrapaginamagde Ockham
wrongly
istrorum
..."
14Quiavirreprobus
Chronica
, in Nicolaus
Minorita,
, 553-613;thispapalbullhas been
editedseveral
notonlyin Bullarium
Franciscanum
V byC. Eubel,butalsotogether
times,
withOckham's
Dierum
andFrancis'
Fordiffering
none
reasons,
OpusNonaginta
Improbatio.
oftheseeditions
canbe considered
"criticad."
15Edition
in Nicolaus
Chronica
Henceforth
Minorita,
, 624-866.
"Appellatio
magna."

11:22:41 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDWILLIAM
OF OCKHAM

189

of evolution from Francis' Improbatio

, which describes the episode in
termsof a university
to
the
Munich Appeal, which adopts the
,
disputatio
of
a
instead.
The rough draftseems to represetting
legal interrogation
sent a middle stage in this evolution,since in many passages it changes
Francis' disputatio
into the processualone.16
terminology
If thisis true,then Francismusthave workedat a veryquick pace to
have at least part of his work incorporatedin the Munich Appeal.17At
to Francis'
any rate,inJanuaryof 1331 Michael of Cesena refersexplicitly
as an alreadyavailablerefutation
ofJohnXXII's Quiavirreprobus
,
Improbatio
- but
the
tradition
transmits
an
unfinished
although
manuscript
actually
- work.18
almostcomplete
It is beyond any doubt,however,that Ockham
wrotehis OpusNonaginta
DierumafterFrancisand afterthe Munich Appeal.
As Offlershowed many years ago, the Venerabilis
uses both treaInceptor
tisesas sourcesforhis own refutation
of the papal bull Quia virreprobus.19
The relationshipis thereforepracticallyreversedwith respectto the
: thereFrancis,
previousone betweentheircommentarieson the Sentences
informedof the innovativetheoryof his Englishconfrre
, rejectsit as untenable. In Munich, it is Ockham who is acquainted with the work of his
fellowrefugeeand uses it for his own treatise.In the lattercase, howon different
ever,theyare not fighting
sides,but supportthe same position: the defenceof the Franciscantheoryof povertyagainstJohn XXII.

16I arguedin favorof thisthesis,

forward
evidence
in support,
in Francesco
putting
d'Ascoli
e la polemica
contro
Giovanni
XXII:a proposito
deirapporto
tral"Improbatio'
e
francescana
monacensis
O. Gori,G. Pesiri,
A. PiazzaandR. Rinaldi
' in:A. Degrandi,
l"Appellatio
magna
Studi
inonore
di Girolamo
Arnaldi
dallaScuola
di
nazionale
(eds.),Introd.
byO. Capitani,
offerti
studi
medioevalL
Rome2001,277-308.
17Cf.Lambertini,
Francesco
dAscoli
e lapolemica
(cit.n. 16 above),300-5.
(Quiavir
18Francisci
de EsculoOFM Improbatio
contra
libellum
domini
Iohannis
quiincipit
of
' ed. N. MarianiOFM, Grottaferrata
reprobus
(Rome)1993;thisis thefirst
product
Mariani's
to makeFrancis'
works
available
to a widerpublic;see
praiseworthy
attempt
alsoFrancisci
de Marchia
sivede EsculoQuodlibet
cumquaestionibus
selectis
excommentario
in
librum
Sententiarum
Grottaferrata
etcompilatio
, ed. N. Mariani,
(Rome)1997;Sententia
super
libros
ed. N. Mariani,
Grottaferrata
inIV
Aristotelis,
Physicorum
(Rome)1998;Commentarius
libros
Sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi.
etprologus,
ed.N. Mariani,
Grottaferrata
Quaestiones
preambulae
Mariani's
see thereview
article
Notes
editions,
(Rome)2003.Concerning
byC. Schabel,
ona Recent
Edition
s In Primm
Librum
Sententiarum
, in:Picenum
ofParts
ofFrancis
ofMarchia'
19 (2000),277-82,
andAtti
delII Convegno
suFrancesco
Internazionale
seraphicum,
Appignano
97-147.Mostrecently
Mariani
twosermons
attrib(cit.n. 6 above),especially
published
utedto Francis:
DueSermoni
attribuiti
a Francesco
dellaMarca
Franciscanum
, in: Archivm
98 (2005),571-95.
Historicum,
19Offler,
Introduction
de OckhamOpus
Dierum
, in:Guillelmi
, xvii-xviii.
Nonaginta

11:22:41 AM

190

LAMBERTINI
ROBERTO

As I will show, Ockham drawsinspirationfromFrancis'Improbatio

, but
in
to
of
a
As
is
well
known
students
his
rationes
new
Ockham,
way.
shapes
his OpusNonaginta
Dierumattemptsto give a sort of impartialaccount of
the discussion,presentingthe opposingargumentsofJohn XXII and his
as if Ockham himselfwere not involvedin the debate.John
impugnatores
Kilcullen speaks of "recitativeworks,"recallingthat, at the same time,
Offlerhad alreadyunderOckham is himselfone of these "attackers."20
arises
from
the
linedthe ambiguity
that
Inceptor.21
approachof the Venerabilis
is concerned,Ockham does not confinehimAs faras Francis'Improbatio
selfto describingFrancis'rationes
, but oftenreshapesthem,in an attempt
as it seems to improvethem. Ockham is well aware of the fact that,
while concurringin condemningJohn XXII's position,the impugnatores
sometimesdisagreeon the reason whyJohn is wrong. Consequentlyhe
claims to have exposed on occasion the positionsof different
,
impugnatores
who tryto refutethe pope in divergingways.22Given this kind of disDierumappears even more layclaimer,the structureof OpusNonaginta
ered, as Ockham not only presentsthe discussionas if he were not one
of the impugnatores
, but also reportsthe disagreementsamong them.This
he
notwithstanding, formulatesanew many arguments,and in so doing
he also revealshis own position.23
This second "fragment"
of the "dialogue"betweenFrancisand Ockham
is thereforeeven more complex than the first,since is not a clear-cut
oppositionof two competingaccounts of a fundamentalaspect of the
thatare supposed
of arguments
Eucharistiemiracle,but rathera refinement
focuson some
to servethe same purpose.In the followingI will therefore
some
of
Francis'
which
cases in whichOckham further
positions,
develops
will go on to play an importantrole in Ockham's politicalthought.
Dominium
and dominia
In his Ockhams
, Miethkerightlystressedthe semWegzur Sozialphilosophie
Dierumin which
inal importanceof the passages fromthe OpusNonaginta
of
the
criticizes
Ockham
originsof ownership
Pope John's interpretation
20T. Kilcullen,
toOckham
in: TheCambridge
ThePolitical
Writings,
Companion
(cit.n. 8
above),302-25.
21Offler,
Introduction
(cit.n. 19 above),xv.
22Opus
Dierum
, c. 124,857.
Nonaginta
23Cf.myNonnumquam
note
diversorum
assumpsi
(cit.in theasterisk
personas
impugnantium
above).

11:22:41 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDWILLIAM
OF OCKHAM

191

, in fact,outlinedhis own
among human beings.24The Venerabilis
Inceptor
of
the
of
and
theory
origins society
power startingfromhis critiqueof
views.
tenets
of
Ockham's
John's
Many
position,which not by chance
he presentsas the positionof the impugnatores
(thatis, those who accuse
The disJohn XXII of heresy),in fact derive fromFrancis' Improbatio.
cussionconcerningthe natureof the originalrelationshipof mankindto
thingsoffersa tellingexample. The firsttextsproduced by the group
aroundMichael describedthisrelationship
in termsof absence of dominium.
In implementing
Bonaventure'sdistinction
betweenususfactiand dominium
,
in
between
the
which
human
state,
theydistinguished
beings
prelapsiarian
was intromerelyused things,and the postlapsarianone, where dominium
duced as a consequenceof sin.25
JohnXXII reactedto thisaccount:referring to the passages in Genesis where God says: "Dominamini piscibus
maris,"John thereforeconcluded that dominium
already existed before
the Fall. The only difference
that was broughtabout by Original Sininto different
accordingto John was the divisionof a common dominium
dominial Francis of Marchia had to take this objection into account.
is the first"Michaelist" text that speaks of two
Indeed, the Improbatio
dominia.21
While denouncingthe papal positionas heretical,Francisimpliceven in the prelapsarian
idy admitsthat it is rightto speak of dominium
state. He observes,however,that there are two kinds of dominia
, which
differradicallyfromeach other.28The firstkind of dominium
markedthe
24Miethke,
Ockham's
Weg(cit.n. 3 above),467-77.
25See e.g.Appellatio
informa
maiori
in 1328,editedin NicolausMinorita,
, published
Chronica
essetpeccatum
noneratappropriatio
rerum
, 239-40:"Et quodsicutantequam
sedfuisset
habitus
ususrerum
usuconsumptibilium
et nonconintroducta,
temporalium
tibilium
sicfuitin apostolis
et apostolicis
forcomviris";
sump
absquealiquaproprietate,
see.B. Tpfer,
und
indermittelalterlichen
undStaatstheorie
Urzustand
,
mentary
Sndenfall
Geselbchqfis- Apostolisches
Paradiesischer
1999,esp. 431-68;J. Miethke,
^justand
Stuttgart
Zeitalter
undGesellschaftstheorie
im14.Jahrhundert,
Armut.
Franziskanische
Selbstverstndnis,
^eitkritik
Religises
in: F.J.Feiten,
N. Jaspert,
andS. Haarlnder
imMittelalter.
(eds.),VitaReligiosa
Festschrift
Elmzum70. Geburtstag,
TheState
, Berlin1999,505-32;cf.alsoG.L. Potest,
furKaspar
of
Innocence
andPrivate
inthePolemic
onEvangelical
attheBeginning
Property
Poverty
oftheFourteenth
Paradise.
TheGarden
, in:F.R. PsakiandC. Hindley
Century
(eds.),TheEarthly
ofEden
from
toModernity
, Binghamton,
NY, 2002,149-63.
Antiquity
26Cf.Tpfer,
undSndenfall
Urzustand
(cit.n. 25 above),433-36.
27Cf.myLapovert
storica
della
dell'identit
minoritica
daBonaventura
Evoluzione
pensata:
definizione
ad Ockham
, Modena2000,205-18.
28Improbatio
dominium
introductum
siueproprium
, 153:"Consimiliter
'periniquitatem,'
siuecommune,
estalterius
a dominio
communi
naturali
omnium
si
generis
quodfuisset
homononpeccasset,
et distat
ab eo plusquamacetuma uino,quia se habetad illud
sicutcorruptibile
ad incorruptibile,
et diuisibile
ad indiuisibile."

11:22:41 AM

192

LAMBERTINI
ROBERTO

prelapsarianstatein which human beings not only shared thingsin use,

but were so deeplytied to one anotherby brotherly
love that even their
in
could
be
and
the
shared,
everyonerejoiced
feelings
happinessof the
others.Francissummarizeshis positionverywell in the followingpassage:
. . . quilibet
de comodoalterius
sicutde suo,et solacium
uniusredundasgaudebat
setin singulos:
et itagaudium
reifuisset
cuiuslibet
commune
omnibus
perparticimutueconsolationis,
iuxtaillud:"Eccequambonumet quamiocundum
pationem
in unum."(. . .) Et ita,si homononpeccasset,
abitare
fratres
omniacomfuissent
muniatripliciter,
utendi
etquoadcomscilicet,
quoaddominium,
quoadpotestatem
munesolacium
rerum.
Et postpeccatum,
factaestdivisio:
peroppositum,
tripliciter
iurisutendi
etquoadapprodominii,
quoadappropriationem
quoadappropriationem
solati
etgaudii,
maleaifectati
nolunt
alteri
communicare.29
priationem
quodhomines
In his OpusNonaginta
DierumOckham begins his descriptionof the position of the impugnatores
withthe distinction
betweentwo kindsof dominium.
As Miethke remarkedin 1969, Ockham prefersthe expression"alterius
rationis"to the "alteriusgeneris"that Francis uses.30This could also be
a distantecho of the divergentphilosophicalattitudesof the two theologians;31more relevantdifferences
emerge,however,in what follows.First
of all, Ockham focuseshis attentionnot on the bonds among human
beings, as Francis does, but on the relationshipbetween mankindand
nature.Accordingto Ockham,in theprelapsarianstateanimalsand plants
obeyed human beings spontaneously,and in this sense the human comthat ceased to exist afterthe
munitythen exerted a kind of dominium
Fall.32On thisbasis, Ockham can describethe transitionfrominnocence
29Improbatio
, 155.
30Miethke,
Ockhams
Dierum
, c. 28,492-93:
(cit.n. 3 above),470;cf.Opus
Weg
Nonaginta
"Seddicunt
istiimpugnatores
Nonenimappelquodhie,sicutin aliis,cavillose
procedit.
lansnegatin omnisensuprimos
in statuinnocentiae
dominium
parentes
temporalium
sed negatipsoshabuisse
. . . Dominium
habuisse;
dominium,
quodvocatur
'proprietas'
in statuinnocentiae,
esttotaliter
alterius
rationis
autem,
quodhabueunt
primi
parentes
ab istodominio."
ForMarchia's
alterius
the
, seen. 28 above.Surprisingly
generis
enough,
recent
G. Geltner,
EdenRegained:
William
andtheFranciscan
Return
toTerrestrial
ofOckham
Paradise
59 (2001),63-89,is silent
aboutthissourceforOckham
, in:Franciscan
Studies,
andinaccurate
in manyrespects.
31Ockham's
for"ratio"instead
of"genus"
couldperhaps
be linked
to the
preference
different
andsemantical
andOckham's
Francis'
theoontological
presuppositions
underlying
closerscrutiny.
logies;thewholeissue,however,
requires
32Opus
Dierum
dicunt
, c. 14,432:"Adcuiusevidentiam
Nonaginta
[seil,
impugnatores
] esse
sciendum
omnium
datumprimis
fuitpotestas
quoddominium
temporalium
parentibus
rationabiliter
etgubernandi
resistentia
itaquod
violenta,
regendi
temporalia
absqueeorum
homini
violentiam
velnocumentum
inferre
nonpoterant."
Cf.A. Brett,
and
Right
Liberty,
inLater
Individual
Scholastic
etalibi1996,66-68,whoanaNature.
, Cambridge
Rights
Thought
deserve
further
examination.
however,
lyzesthispoint;herconclusions,

11:22:41 AM

FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA
ANDWILLIAM
OF OCKHAM

193

to thefallenstatein a morenuancedway thanFrancisdid in theImprobatio.

Not just two, but three distinctstages should be considered:beforethe
Fall mankindalreadyenjoyedan almostunlimiteddominium
over creation.
in order to obviate the difficulties
of the new
Immediatelyafterwards,
state, God gave human beings the power to distributethingsand to
appropriatethem.Remarkingthatone could call thispower "dominium"
as well, even thoughit would be an improperuse of the term,Ockham
seems not only to criticizeJohn XXII, but also implicitlyto correct
Francis. Ockham's thirdstage, which correspondsto the presentsituationin the fallenstate,can be describedin termsof a pluralityof dominiaP
To sum up, Ockham is well aware of Francis'responsetoJohn'sobjection regardingthe originaldominium
; while sharingthe basic tenetof his
of theprelapsarianstateis radicallydifferent
position i.e. thatthe dominium
fromthe one thatcharacterizesthe fallenstate- he modifiesit in several
ways.In particular,Ockham's stresson the factthatbeforethe Fall nature
was at the unconditionaldisposal of mankindavoids the risksof what
i.e. the view that the prelapsarianstate can
Tierneycalls "primitivism":
be completelyrestoredafterthe Fall.34This view could be inferredfrom
the writingsof previous "Michaelist" authors,35and had already been
33Opus
Dierum
scilicet
antepeccatum,
, c. 14,439:"Etitafuittriplex
Nonaginta
tempus:
inquotempore
habuerunt
Secundum
dominium,
qualenumquam
aliquihabuerunt
postea.
fuitpostpeccatum
et antererum
etin iliotempore
habuerunt
divisionem;
tempus
potestatem
etappropriandi
dividendi
sibires,etsi talispotestas
vocetur
condominium,
potest
cediquodhabuerunt
dominium
commune
rerum.
Tertium
fuitpostdivisionem
tempus
ettuncinceperunt
dominia
rerum,
propria,
qualianuncsuntmundanorum."
34B. Tierney,
TheIdeaofNatural
Studies
onNatural
, Natural
Law,andChurch
Rights.
Rights
critical
remarks
on Tierney's
interLaw,1150-1625
, Atlanta
1997,162.Forinteresting
seeWittneben,
vonBergamo
dispretation,
Bonagratia
(cit.n. 11 above),298-9.Fora recent
ofOckham's
cussion
see C.J.Fernandez,
Ockham's
, in: Pensiero
theory,
Theory
ofProperty
Politico
2 (2004),147-59.
Medievale,
35Thisiswhatonereads,
inNicolaus
forexample,
in:Appellatio
informa
maiori,
Minorita,
etsanctus
Clemens
unacumeisetomnibus
239:". . . apostoli
Chronica,
eorumque
discipuli,
volentibus
vitam
etservaverunt
ad hocstatum
imitari,
apostolicam
assumpserunt
quantum
scilicet
introductum
essetquodaliquis
qui fuitantepeccatum,
antequam
periniquitatem
hocmeumproprium
diceret
ethoctuum.
fuitstatus
innocentiae
sivelegisnatQui status
urae. . L. liger,
Fr.Bonagratia
deBergamo
eteiusTractatus
deChristi
etApostolorum
paupertate
Franciscanum
"Hoc
22 (1929),
, in:Archivm
Historicum,
487-511;
292-335,
esp.496-97:
etiamprobatur
Namfilius
ex ratione.
Dei ad hocnaturam
humanam
utgenus
assumpsit,
humanum
a statuinnocentie
Setnonperfecte
et
exciderat,
quodperpeccatum
repararet.
convenienter
nisiassumpsisset
naturam
Unde
innocentem,
reparasset
ergotalemassumpsit.
Iohannem
ecceAgnus
Dei:Si agnus,
Setsiassumpsit
natuAugustinus
super
ergoinnocens.
raminnocentem,
earnsecundum
omnem
anime,quamhabuisset
assumpsit
perfectionem
Setinstatuinnocentie
fuissent
homines
sinedominiis
distinctis,
aliquisinstatuinnocentie.

11:22:41 AM

194

ROBERTO
LAMBERTINI

rejected by critics of the Franciscan position, such as Durand of St

Pourain.36Ockham, in fact,neveradmitsthatwe can returnto the state
thatobtainedbeforethe Fall. Even the Apostoliccommunity,
whichrepresentsthe highestlevel of perfectionattainablein this life,had to live
in a world where the originalharmonywas irrevocablylost.
Per iniquitatem
Among the cnonesof the Decretum
regardingthe nature and origin of
the
known
as
Dilectissimis
attrib, takenfroma forgery
ownership, passage
uted to Pope ClementI, is surelyone of the mostinfluential.
In thispassage one reads that "per iniquitatemalius dixit hoc esse suum et alius
istud. . ."37There had alreadybeen a livelydiscussionamong the canonistsconcerningthe exact meaningof the expression"per iniquitatem"in
thiscontext,and thisdiscussionemergedagain in theconfrontation
between
the pope and the Michaelists.John attackedthe interpretation
Bonagratia
had given to this passage in the Appellatio
minor
, statingthat it is wrong
to say, as Bonagratia did on behalf of his MinisterGeneral, that "per
iniquitatem"in thiscontextmeans that the divisionof propertydepends
on human positivelaw. Instead,John maintainedthat "per iniquitatem"
refersto the Original Sin, "peccatumprimorumparentum."38
Francisof
sicut
Vili di.,c. 1 etc.Igitur
siChristus
tenuit
statum
nonhabuit
dominium
innocentie,
patet
inspeciali
distinctum
velincommuni
alicuius
usumfacti
rei,setsolumsimplicem
eorum";
a litdelater,
habuit
inquantum
Christus
homoetapostoli
p. 506:"Iliumstatum
postquam
statum
deiurenature
habere,
perfectionis
assumpserunt,
quemfuit
possibile
quemhomines
etdivino
etnonquemhabuerunt
cumChristus
innocens
habuissent,
propter
iniquitatem,
etperfectissimus
et docuerit
suosvitaminnocentissimam
et perfecassumpserit
apostolos
fuitnecexcogitari
tissimam,
qua perfectior
numquam
posset."
36Cf.Tpfer,
undSndenfall
Durandus'
textis edited
425-29.
Urzustand,
(cit.n. 25 above),
inJ.Miethke,
Das Votum
De paupertate
Christi
etApostolorumdky
Durandus
von
Sancto
Porciano
imtheoretischen
Armutsstreit.
Einedominikanische
Position
inderDiskussion
umdieFranziskanische
Armut
in: S. Jenks,
andM.L. Laudage(eds.),Vera
LexHistoriae.
(1322/3),
J. Sarnowsky,
Studien
65. Geburtstag,
Klnzu mittelalterlichen
Kurze
zu seinem
Quellen.
Festschrift
fiirDietrich
Wien-Weimar
in se et
1993,149-96,
verisimile,
esp.173:"Nonestigitur
quodChristus
in apostolis
reduxerit
mundum
ad statum
fuitpossibile,
immoelegit
innocentie,
quantum
afflictiones
et miserias
innoprose et apostolis
paupertatem,
corporales,
que suntstatui
centie
omnino
contraria."
37An excursus
aboutthistextis in Tpfer,
undSiindenfall
Urzustand
(cit.n. 25 above),
abouttheorigin
ofproperty,
see
esp. 174-5.Forthediscussions
amongthecanonists
R. Weigand,
DieNaturrechtslehre
derLegaten
undDekresten
vonIrnerius
bisAccursius
undvon
Gratian
bisIohannes
Teutonicus
, Mnchen
1967,esp.307-36.
38Quiavirreprobus
Chronica
, inNicolaus
Minorita,
, 593-94:"Exhocdicitipsequoddivisiotemporalium
estfactaperiushumanum,
et contra
quoddicitur
iniquum,
aequitatem

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195

Marchia, who himselfdoes not entirelyavoid the use of expressionssuch

as "dominiumintroductum
per iniquitatem"or "introductum
per peccaanswersthatthe Sin mustbe consideredthe origin,not the immetum,"39
diate cause, of the institution
of the postlapsariandominium
.40According
to Francis,John XXII, who claims on the contrarythat Original Sin is
the immediatecause of dominium
, contradictshimselfin various ways.41
Here again Ockham refersto the opinion of the impugnatores
; one pasDierumwe
sage is an almostliteralecho of Francis.In the OpusNonaginta
read that,accordingto the impugnatores
, "hie per propriaverba convinciSuccinctus
had written
"se ipsumconuincit."
tur,"whiletheDoctor
Nevertheless,
the main objectionOckham directsat John is not the same as Francis5,
because Ockham sees the contradictionin the fact that, on one hand,
John denies the human origin of propertydivisionand, on the other,
insistson its being immediatelycaused by Original Sin.42In contrast,
Francis had remarkedthat the pope had spoken of Adam as the first
ownerof property,
beforeEve was created.43Ockham does not limithimselfto this,but expands on the subject,recallingthe two interpretations
of "per iniquitatem"available in the Glossaordinaria
to Gratian'sDecretum
and already quoted in the Pisan Appellatio
informamaiori.The Glossain
factlistedthe possible interpretation
of iniquitas
as a customcontraryto
naturalequity,or as sollicitudo.
Ockham remarksthat the pope does not
/
iurisnaturalis.
Dicimus
nonintelligitur
iusgenquodhocestfalsum,
quiaperiniquitatem
sedintelligitur
fuit."
This
tium,
peccatum
primorum
parentum
perquodnatura
corrupta
inwhich
is oneofthefewpassages
totheAppellatio
informa
and
maiori,
JohnXXII refers
known
as "appellatio
in forma
cf.Appellatio
not,as usual,to theshorter
version,
minori";
informa
maiori
Chronica
, inNicolaus
Minorita,
, p. 239.Mariani,
Improbatio,
p. 372,footnote
to theAppellatio
informa
minori
he remarks
thattherefer34,refers
, although
imprecisely
encewas"adsensum."
39Improbatio
, pp. 153-54.
40Improbatio
uenenum
suumin eo quoddicit,quod'istadiuisio
, p. 156:"3,efundit
rerum
factaestperpeccatum
mediate
et origiprimorum
parentum':
quod,si intelligat
uerum
uelsuperbie,
immediate
intronaliter,
est,quiapeccatum
cupiditatis
quoistadiuisio
ductaest,descendit
ex radicepeccatioriginalis,
sicutceteraalia peccata;si
originaliter
autemintelligat
immediate
et directe,
sicutintelligere
uidetur,
proutin sequentibus
magis
falsum
esteterroneum,
rerum
in
fuisset
factaimmediate
apparebit,
quiatunctalisdiuisio
paradiso:
quodnoninuenitur."
41Improbatio
, p. 373.
42Opus
Dierum
, c. 92,p. 669.
Nonaginta
43Improbatio
nonfuitaliquod
, p. 373: ". . . ergoantepeccatum
primorum
parentum
dominium
nonhabuitaliquod
et,perconsequens,
Adam,antequam
proprium
peccaret,
dominium
cuiusoppositum
temporalium
proprium:
ipsedicithie.Et ita se ipsumconuincit."

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LAMBERTINI
ROBERTO

in his interpretation,
but suggestsa meaning,
followthe Glossaordinaria
of iniquitas
with Original Sin, that can be true only in
the identification
a particularsense, that is that thepeccatum
was the occasioof the
parentum
introductionof propertydivision.The real cause was indeed the human
will.44
Followinga different
strategy,Ockham comes to the same resultas
Francisin thiscase: withoutsin therewould have been no propertydivicannotmean thatsin immediately
sion,but the canon Dikctissimis
brought
propertydivisioninto existence.The substantialagreementof the two
Franciscantheologianson this seeminglyabstruseexegeticalproblem is
important,because it is connected to a much deeper problem,that of
the role of the human will and initiativein establishingdifferent
dominia.
As we shall see below, this is a core questionof the dispute.
Humanuni
et divinum
, pp. 376-377
Improbatio

Dierum
, 88, p. 656
OpusNonaginta

Set quod immediateprima diuisio Secundaconclusio,quam probant,est

sitintroducta,quod primumdominiumtemporadominiorum
propriorum
ante diluuiumet post diluuium,iure lium propriumpost lapsumfuitiure
humanaaut
humanoet non iurediuinonisimedi- humanoseu ordinatione
humanaintroductum.
Hanc
ate,quo modoomniaiurasunta Deo, volntate
patet,quoniam prima diuisiodomi- probantsic: Prima divisiodominioante rum, quae legiturin scriptura,fuit
niorum,que legiturin scriptura,
diluuium fuit divisio inter Abel et interAbel et Gain. Sic enim legitur
Abelpastorovium
Caym: ante quam diuisionem,non Genesisiv: Fuitautem
Factumestautempost
legituraliqua alia divisiodominiorum et Cain agricola.
diesutofferret
Gain de fructibus
prior.Illa autem diuisionon legitur muitos
Deo. Abel quoqueobtulit
fuisse facta immediate auctoritate terraemuera
diuina,set magisuoluntatehumana, de primogenitis
gregissui, et de adipibus
Dominus
ad Abel,etad
; et respexit
quia quod Caymessetagricolaet Abel eorum
iiii
muera
dus.
Ad
Cain
etad muera
ovium
sicut
Genesis
autem,
,
pastor
legitur
Ex
non
verbiscolhoc
non
diuino
iussu
set
hiis
capite,
magis illius, respexit.
humanoinstinctu
factumest,eo quod ligiturquo istiduo habueruntrerum
dominia.Sed non
Caym, terrenuset terrenadiligens, divisarumdistincta
44OpusNonaginta
Dierum
modopotest
sicutisteexponit,
, c. 92,p. 669:"tertio
exponi,
et tuncperiniquitatem
ut 'iniquitas'
ibipropeccatoprimorum
non
accipiatur
parentum;
sed accipitur
cf.Miethke,
Ockhams
causaliter,
occasionaliter";
Weg(cit.
accipitur
proprie
n. 3 above),485-87.

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197

terrenorum
cure incepitincumbere. legitur
quod istadivisiofuitfactapraehoc
.
fuerit
diuino;
ergovolntatehumana
(. .) quod Caym
agricola,
cepto
set fuitprimadivisiointroducta.
non auctoritate
diuinaimmediate,
sua propriavolntateet cupiditateest
factum(. . .) Et sic divisioreruminter
ex altero
Caymet Abelperiniquitatem
latere,scilicetex parte Caym, introducta est. . .
Offlerhas alreadyremarkedon Ockham'sdependenceon Francis'Improbatio
on this point:45even thoughhe does not copy Francis' exact words in
to his model. Provingthat human
his own text,Ockham is veryfaithful
law, and not divinelaw, is responsibleforestablishingpropertydivision,
- on
Francis of Marchia refersto the case of Cain and Abel, suggesting
- thatthe division
the basis of the Glossaordinaria
goes back to Cain's corrupted will. As one can easily see from the above example, Ockham
reportsFrancis' argumentby "polishing"it, that is droppingthe reference to Cain's evil will, which probably seemed to him superfluousin
to show that the
the economy of his reasoning.It is indeed sufficient
mere fact of the divisionbetween the two brothersdoes not dependaccording to the Holy Scripture on God's will. It must thereforego
back to human initiative.Moreover, Francis suggeststhat "per iniquitatem" can apply to Cain's wicked intention,while Ockham avoids this
claim completely,since it could conflictdangerouslywiththe above-menof Dilectissimis.
tioned Franciscaninterpretations
At any rate,here Ockham followsFrancison the path of a well established Franciscantradition,one that had alreadybeen defendedbyJohn
Duns Scotus.46For his part, Francis supportedthis doctrinein his comaround
, read in Paris in all probability
mentaryon Book IV of the Sentences
this
not by
had
1320.47In Quia vir reprobus
doctrine,
John
challenged

45See alsoMiethke,
Ockham
Weg(cit.n. 3 above),484.
46I havesummarized
thediscussion
aboutScotus'textin La povert
(cit.n. 27
pensata
3 Political
andEconomic
seeJohn
DunsScotus
above),113-22,141-61.Foran introduction,
the
NY 2001,1-21(unfortunately,
A.B.Wolter,
St.Bonaventure,
, ed.andtrans.
Philosophy
inthenextedition).
errors
thatshould
be removed
Latintextcontains
several
typographical
47On thistext,
toFrancis
andEcclesiology
seemyNatural
Law,Religious
of
according
Poverty
dans
etImagination
in:J. Meirinhos
andM.G.Pacheco(eds.),Intellect
Marchia
, forthcoming
dePhilosophie
Mdivale
dela SIEPM
duXI Congrs
International
la philosophie
mdivale.
Actes
,

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ROBERTO
LAMBERTINI

arguing,as many criticsof the FriarsMinor had done, that the rightof
ownershipis foundedon naturallaw, and not on human positivelaw,48
but by claimingthat it restssolely on divine law.49This claim allowed
him to deny the validityof the whole Franciscanaccount of the origins
of ownershipand to groundownershipin the relationship
existingbetween
God and human beings even before the Fall. For Franciscans,on the
contrary,it was vitalto declare the human originsof ownership,because,
as has been noted several times,this was a necessarypremiseof their
theoryof the absolute povertyof Christ and, therefore,of theirinterpretationof Franciscanpoverty.50
In Ockham's laterpoliticalwritings,
such as his Breviloquium
, the human
of
would
become
an
essential
of
a
origins ownership
part
politicaltheory that denies the divine originof ownershipin order to counterthe
over thingsand politicalcommunipapal claim to a universaldominium
as
such
as
Giles of Rome had argued at the
ties, Augustinintheologians
In
of
the
this
case, Ockham clearlytakesinspiration
beginning
century.51
fromFrancis' Improbatio
, re-elaboratesit in the contextof the directcontroversywithJohn XXII, and then developsit further,
makingit a cornerstoneof his politicalthought.52

du27 au 31 aot2002, Turnhout

delIV libro
delCommento
Porto,
2006;butalsoA proposito
alleSentenze
di Francesco
la quaestio
su
Internazionale
37, in:AttidelII Convegno
d'Appignano:
Francesco
d'Appignano
(cit.n. 6 above),9-26.
48Cf.V. Mkinen,
Criticism
Franciscan
andtheBirth
Godfrey
ofFontaines'
Concerning
Poverty
19(2000),69-85;cf.alsoV. Mkinen,
, in:Picenum
ofIndividual
Rights
seraphicum,
Property
intheLateMedieval
Discussion
onFranciscan
, Leuven2001,esp.105-90.
Rights
Poverty
49Cf.Quiavirreprobus
Chronica
, in Nicolaus
Minorita,
, esp.590-94.
50On thisissue,seeA. Tabarroni,
Francescanesimo
e riflessione
sinoad Ockham
, in:
politica
Eticaepolitica:
leteorie
deifiatimendicanti
nelDuee Trecento.
Atti
delXXVIConvegno
intemazionale.
15-17ottobre
1998, Spoleto1999,203-30;cf.Mkinen,
Assisi,
Property
Rights
(cit.n. 48
seealsomyPoverty
andPower:
Franciscans
inLater
Mediaeval
Political
,
above),162-90;
Thought
in:J.KrayeandR. Saarinen
Moral
ontheThreshold
, Dordrecht
(eds.),
Philosophy
ofModernity
2004,141-63.
51Cf.Miethke,
Ockhams
Aiconfini
delpotere.
Il dibatWeg
(cit.n. 3 above),495-96;idem,
titosullapotestas
a Guglielmo
d'Ockham
Padua
, trans.C. Storti,
papaleda Tommaso
d'Aquino
Depotestate
Dieppstliche
imWiderstreit
der
Theorie
2005,originally
papae.
Amtskompetenz
politischen
vonThomas
von
bisWilhelm
vonOckham
2000.
, Tbingen
Aquin
52A.S.McGrade,
Introduction
ofOckham,
A Letter
tothe
Friars
Minor
andOther
, in:William
eds.A.S.McGrade
andJ. Kilcullen,
etalibi1995,xiv-xix;
Kilcullen,
Writings,
Cambridge
ThePoliticai
A History
Writings
(cit.n. 20 above),308-09;
J. Coleman,
ofPolitical
Thought.
From
theMiddle
Oxford
2000,169-98.
AgestotheRenaissance,

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HeathenKings
The temporalimplicationsof Christ'skingshipwas long a debated issue
in medievalpoliticalthought.53
They play a role in the discussionbetween
of Cesena onlyafterQuia virreprobus
around
Michael
and
the
,
group
John
because in this decretalthe claim that,fromhis conception,Christthe
man was temporallord of everythingis used to reject the thesis that
Christwas absolutelypoor in his earthlylife. Afterthe publicationof
, thisthesisoccupiesan importantplace in the listof errors
Quia virreprobus
the Michaelistsattributeto the pope.54Their endeavorsto show that,on
the contrary,Christ the man renounced every sort of temporalpower
over thingsand over human beings focusednot only on scripturalpassages statingthat Christwas poor, but also on the relationshiphe seems
to have had with the politicalauthoritiesin the Palestineof his day. In
theirview, if Christ can be said to have recognizedthe legitimacyof
Roman rule and its governors,he cannot reallyhave been king in any
To
temporalsense of the term,because thiswould implya contradiction.
this end they had to challenge another pillar, so to speak, of curialist
doctrine,i.e. that no power can be legitimateoutside the Church. This
themewould acquire a special relevancein Ockham's later works,such
From the followingsynopsisit is highlyprobable that
as the BreviloquiumP
:
Ockham took one of the keyargumentsforthisthesisfromthe Improbatio
, p. 408
Improbatio

Dierum
, 93, pp. 683-84
OpusNonaginta

... in eodem regno temporalinon In eodemregnosaecularinon possunt

possuntnec debentesse simulreges esse pluresregesveri,non habentes
a pari et inconnexi,quia Nemopotest regnumpro indiviso,quorumneuter
scilicet
duobus
dominis
inconnexis, cognoscit regnum ab altero. Sed
sentire,
Christi
Romanorum
secundumMatheum vi. capite: set imperator
tempore
Cesar, imperatorRomanorum,fuit fuitverusrexIudaeae, quamvisfuisset
et constatquod
in tempo- rexaliorumregnorum;
licetinfidelis,
uerusdominus,
ralibus,aliterenimChristusuerbo et Christuset imperatornon tenebant
53Aboutthisissuecf.J. Leclercq,
auMoyen
duChrist
dela royaut
L'ide
, Paris1959;
Age
cf.alsomyLa povert
(cit.n. 27 above),249-68.
pensata
54Cf.C. Dolcini,
Gloriosus
Il diploma
Marsilio
e Ockham.
Deus,la memoria
politica
imperiale
epolitologia
in
dipoteri
Minor
, il Defensor
, Bologna1981, nowin idem,Crisi
Quoniam
Scriptum
d'Ockham
Fieschi
a Guglielmo
Da Sinibaldo
crisi.
, Bologna1988,343-98.
55William
etalibi
Oxford
1.III (Opera
Ockham,
IV), ed.H.S. Offler,
politica,
Breviloquium,
ThePolitical
On thisissue,seeA.S.McGrade,
ofWilliam
ofOckham.
Thought
1999,161-93.
etalibi1974,esp.96-103.
Personal
andInstitutional
, Cambridge
Principles

11:22:41 AM

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ROBERTO
LAMBERTINI

non con- regnum Iudaeae pro indiviso,nec

exemplosibi dari tributum
suluisset.
Christus
autema Cesarereg- Christuscognoscebat
regnumIudaeae
num temporalenon recognouit,
licet ab imperatore
nec imperator
a Christo.
sibitributum,
nonin recognitione
regni ErgoChristusnon fuitverusrexsaecsed pro uitationescandali et futuri ularisIudaeae.
misterii,dederit,nec Hic videnturtriaprobanda.Primm
significatione
Cesar recognouitregnumtemporale est quod Caesar seu imperatorfuit
a Christoin quantumhomo,setpotius rex Iudaeae. Hoc ex Evangelioelicieius ministriexigebanttributuma turevidenter,
Christodicente:Reddite
Christo,ut patetMatheixvii.capite. quae suntCaesas, Caesari
; ex quibus
verbiscolligitur
quod ilia,quae Caesar
vendicavitin Iudaea, vere erantsua.
Sed Caesar tanquamrex Iudaeae et
dominus vendicavittributum;ergo
vere tributumerat ipsius tamquam
regiset domini;ergovereipsefuitrex.
Secundumhic probandumest,quod
Caesar non recognoscebat
regnuma
Christonec recognosceretenebatur.
Nam ante nativitatem
ChristiCaesar
fuitrex verus; sed per nativitatem
ChristiregnumCaesaris non fuitin
nec immutatum
nec
aliquodiminutum
in aliquam subiectionemredactum;
ergo, sicut ante nativitatemChristi
nontenebatur
ab aliquohornin
recognoscereregnumquodcunque,ita post
nativitatem
Christinon tenebaturab
hornin
homorecognoscere
inquantum
et
ita
non
tenebaturrecogregnum;
noscereregnuma Christoinquantum
erat homo.
Tertiumquod videturprobandumest,
non recognoscebat
quod Christus
regnum a Caesare. Sed hoc probatione
non indiget:cum numquamregnum
aliquod vindicaverit,sed rex fieri
recusavit
...
Again in this context,Ockham re-elaboratesFrancis' ratio
, givinga probatiofor some presuppositions
that were implicitin the argumentof his
; on the otherhand, he drops the referenceto the tributepaid by
confiere

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that
Christ. Indeed, this episode fromMatthew evoked interpretations
denied Christ's submissionto the emperor,because Jesus says, in the
Vulgate, . . ergo liberisuntfilii.Ut autem non scandalizemuseos vade
of this conad mare.. . ."56 Obviously this suggestedan interpretation
troversialepisode which could riskweakeningits value as prooffor the
thesisFrancissupported.It is true,in fact,that Francisuses thispassage
fromthe Vulgate to show that Christwas not obliged to pay a tribute
to the emperoras a subordinatedkingwould have had to. On the other
hand, the same episode could be interpretedin the sense that Christ
obeyed the Roman emperornot because the latterwas a legitimatesovereign,but simplyto "avoid scandal". In thisperspective,the papal claim
could be well founded:Christwas trulya temporalsovereign,but chose,
"in order to avoid scandal," to act as if he were not. There are traces
of such a use of thisepisode in the politicaldebate.57In the face of this
Inceptor
probablypreferredto avoid the quotacomplexity,the Venerabilis
to the evidence that Christnever laid claim to a
tion, simplyreferring

56Mt. 17,26,Bibliasacraiuxta
versionem
, eds.R. Weberet alii,Stuttgart
1994,
vulgtm
in theAppellatiti
in theparallel
1553.Thisis evenclearer
, in
magna
passagecontained
a Iudaeisrequisitus
utrum
Chronica
fuisset
Nicolaus
Minorita,
, pp. 637-8:"CumChristus
Caesari
etquae
Reddite
Caesari
tenerentur
de iuredaretributum
Caesari,
quaesunt
respondit,
manifeste
sunt
DeiDeo, (. . .) Ex quibusverbis
Christi
apparet
quodCaesareratverusrex
sicutregi,tributum
dariiussit.Quod
in temporalibus,
et dominus
quia sibiChristus,
tribfecisset
nisiipsum
habuisset,
quiaprestare
proregeverointemporalibus
nequaquam
c. 2. Et perconsequens
Christus
nonerat
subiectionis
utaestprobatio
X, De censibus,
in temporalibus,
rexetdominus
cumduoin solidm
immediati,
quorum
regesetdomini
in eodemregnoessenequeant,
duobus
dominis
servire
neuter
subsit
, ut
alteri,
potest
quianemo
'Romacondita
duosfratres
habetur
Matthaei
, dicitur:
6, 24. Et 7 causaq. 1,c. In apibus
autemquodChristus
nonrecognovit
nonpotuit.'
Constat
habere
aliquodregregessimul
mincensum
a Caesare,
Petrosolvere
numnecdominium
temporale
quialicetmandaverit
in recognitione
alicuius
hocfecit
istris
Caesaris
regninec
prose etproipso,nontarnen
ut patet
ab ipsoCaesare,sedproevitatione
dominii
scandali,
temporalis
quodteneret
dicitur
Nec Caesarrecognovit
Matthaei
28,q. 1 c. Iamnunc.
17,26 et expresse
aliquod
a Christo
secundum
nec dominium
temporale
quodhomo,sedpotiusministri
regnum
a Christo,
ut patetin dictocapitulo
Matthaei
Caesarisexigebant
tributum
17,23." In
I am
thatOckham
tookhisinspiration
from
theAppellatio;
itis notimpossible
principle,
inclined
tobelieve
thatFrancis
washismodel.
57See forexample
etpapali
, c. 8, ed. F. Bleienstein,
Johnof Paris,De potestate
regia
evoked
as usedbysupporters
ofeccle1969,101,wherethispassageis at first
Stuttgart
from
"Sidicatur
nontenebatur
sedsolvit
vitare
siastical
quodsolvere
exemption
laypower:
de didrachmate
census
. . thepassage
wasalready
usedfor
volens
scandalum
utdicitur
in Gratian's
different
Decretwrv.
cf.C. XXIII,q. 8, c. 22,andc. XXVIII,q. 1,
purposes
cols.961 and 1082.
c. 8, ed. E. Friedberg,
Leipzig1879,respectively

11:22:41 AM

202

LAMBERTINI
ROBERTO

kingdomin his life and even refusedto accept the positionwhen it was
offered.
Ockham derivedyet anotherproofthatChristwas
From the Improbatio
never kingin a temporalsense: the factthat the Gospels never describe
his dutiesas a temporalking. Given this situation,to
Christas fulfilling
claim that he was neverthelessking would amount to accusing him of
, a commonlydiscussedissue in
being somethingsimilarto a rexinutilis
and the Opus
political theory.58From a comparison of the Improbatio
Dierumit becomes clear that,here again, Ockham insertedin
Nonaginta
his Opusan argumenthe found in the Improbatio
,59formulating
it, howin
a
rather
different
ever,
way:
, pp. 411-12
Improbatio

Dierum
, 93, p. 683
OpusNonaginta

Quod edam rationeevidentipatet,

quoniamuellehaberenomenalicuius
officiiet non facereea que spectant
ad illud officiumest uelle habere
nomen officiisine re: quod non est
opus sapientis. Velie enim uocari
regemet nolle facereilia que spectantad opuset officium
regis,estuelle
habere nomen regis sine re et, per
consequens,est usurparesibi nomen
regis: set constatquod Christusin
hac vitamortalinon exercuitilla que
ad officium
regis
spectantet pertinent
temporalis.

et
Qui regnumsuscipitgubernandum
se
nullo
modo
introde regimine
ipsius
mittit,
quamvispossit,est de malitia
seu de nequitiavel negligentiameritoarguendus;quia talisvulthabere
et quae regis
nomenregis,et officium
suntminimeexercere,quod malitiae
vel negligentiae
est penitusascribendum. Sed Christusde saeculariregiminecuiuscunqueregnise nullatenus
intromisit;
ergovel non suscepitregnec fuitrex per
num gubernandum,
militiavel negvel
fuit
de
consequens:
ligentiaarguendus.

58Cf.C. Dolcini,
da Cesena
diMichele
Il pensiero
, 1328-1338
, Faenza1977,now
politico
incrisi
e politologia
in idem,Crisi
dipoteri
esp.196-98.
(cit.n. 54 above),147-221,
59The parallel
Chronica
Minorita,
,
(inNicolaus
magna
passagefoundin theAppellatio
in Improbatio
:
Dierum
as is theone contained
p. 646)is notas closeto OpusNonaginta
malebellaprosubiectis,
cumad regimen
"Praeterea,
pugnare
regispertineat
temporalis
et successionibus
militibus
factores
dare,de haereditatibus
temporalibus
stipendia
punire,
inquanestquodChristus,
facere
etsimilia
etordinare,
(. . .) de quibuscertum
disponere
nonrexit
inhacvitasicse nullatenus
tumhomoviator,
intromisit,
sequitur
quodChristus
in
sedspiritualiter,
sibicommissum
quarenonfuitrexetdominus
temporaliter
populum
et remissus";
cf.alsoibid.,p. 666.
in regendo
fuisset
negligens
alioquin
temporalibus,

11:22:41 AM

OF OCKHAM
ANDWILLIAM
FRANGIS
OF MARCHIA

203

Conclusion
At a pointin timethatwe have not yetascertained,Francisand Ockham
again parted theirways. At the end of a trial duringwhich Francis at
firsttried in vain to defend his views, the Franciscan fromAppignano
repentedin 1343.60Ockham remained in Munich, faithfulto his positions untildeath. Their legacies in the historyof medieval thoughtalso
had differing
destinies:Ockham's philosophicalstyleexertedan enormous
influence,even thoughmany of his specificsolutionsto philosophicaland
theologicalproblemswere rejected.61Francis of Marchia's philosophical
theologyplayed an importantrole in debates for many years,but in a
much less sensationalmanner,so thathis actual importanceis stillunder
In the specificfield of politicalitheory,the success that
investigation.62
in an almost
Ockham's writingsenjoyedhelped to cast Francis'Improbatio
and
it
is
Offler
which
it
was
freed
from
shade,
finallyreceiving
by
perennial
the attentionit deservesonly since the publicationof Mariani's edition.
At the presentstate of knowledge,we can reconstructthe basic outline of the complex relationshipbetween the two Franciscan authors.
Their firstencounter took place in the early 1320s when Francis of
Marchia squarelyrejectedthe doctrinesconcerningthe categoriesand the
active in England. The commitmentof
Eucharistdefendedby a confrre
Michael
of Cesena changed the situationradboth friarsto the cause of
ically. They contributedtogetherto some collectiveworks,but it was
Francis,this time,who would be used by Ockham. The attitudeof the
On the one
was multi-faceted.
towardsthe Improbatio
Venerabilis
Inceptor
violent
chose
a
different
he
hand,
avoiding
polemicsand
strategy,
clearly
60Cf.E.L. Wittneben
sul
allestrette.
Unteologo
andR. Lambertini,
Osservazioni
francescano
18(1999),
d'Ascoli
manoscritto
delprocesso
a Francesco
testimone
97-122,
, in:Picenum
seraphicum,
di
manoscritta
dellaconfessio
dellatradizione
allestrette.
II. A proposito
and Unteologo
francescano
19 (2000),135-49.
Francesco
in:Picenum
d'Ascoli^
seraphicum,
61Forinteresting
TheReception
intothismulti-faceted
issue,seeW.J.Courtenay,
insights
et
at theUniversity
, in:Z. KaluzaandP. Vignaux
(eds.),Preuve
ofParis
ofOckham's
Thought
in
raisons
l'Universit
deParis
, Paris1984,43-84;idem,TheReception
ofOckham's
Thought
Oxford
Ockham
toWycltf,
14thCentury
, in:A. HudsonandM. Wilks(eds.),From
England
and
inthe
andCertitude
1987,89-107;K.H. Tachau,Vision
Optics,
Epistemologa
AgeofOckham:
1250-1345
theFoundations
, Leiden1988.
ofSemantics,
62Scholars
in
influence
of Francis'
ofmedieval
thought
possessa deepinvestigation
andtheProblem
Peter
Auriol
atParis,
1316-1345.
C. Schabel,Theology
Foreknowledge
ofDivine
andFuture
324-36;butone shouldnotforget
2000,esp. 189-220,
, Aldershot
Contingents
ofthetheologian
from
contribution
to there-discovery
Russell
Friedman's
Appignano.

11:22:41 AM

204

LAMBERTINI
ROBERTO

manyof Francis'texts
personalattacks;on the other,althoughmodifying
some keyelements
he undeniablytookfromthe Improbatio
and arguments,
Dierum
that were to become centralnot only to his OpusNonaginta
, but
also to his politicalthoughtin general,as emergesin his later works.If
Ockham was among the adversariesimplicitlyreferredto in Francis'
is a source, in its
, the latter'sImprobatio
Commentaryon the Sentences
of
Ockham's
politicaltheory.
proper meaning,
Macerata
Universit
deglistudidi Macerata

11:22:41 AM

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/';-=09

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