Justice Between Age Groups and Generations. by Peter Laslett; James S.

Fishkin
Review by: Gregory S. Kavka
Ethics, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Oct., 1993), pp. 184-186
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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184

Ethics

October1993

Laslett, Peter, and Fishkin,James S., eds. JusticebetweenAge Groupsand

Generations.
New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1992. Pp. xii + 243. $30.00 (cloth).

This book is the sixth volume in the well-knownPhilosophy, Politics,and

Society series. Like its predecessors,it contains generallyhigh-qualityessays
writtenby distinguishedphilosophers,economists,lawyers,politicalscientists
and historians;but unlike them,it is focused on a single general topic:justice
between groups of people living over differenttime intervals.Despite the
common topic, the essays are remarkablydiverse in subject matter.Looking
at issues involvingpast generations,Peter Laslettdiscusseswhetherthe notion
of a contractor trustbetween generationsmakes sense, George Sher explores
reasons whyclaimsforcompensationforinjusticesweaken as new generations
emerge, and David Braybrookeargues that the idea of a past social contract
cannot be used (as some libertarianwritershave supposed) to legitimizeunrestrictedprivate propertyrights.Focusing on the future,Richard Epstein
contendsthat social action to promoteeconomic savingsforlater generations
will be futile,while Derek Parfitand Tyler Cowen argue for a zero rate of
intergenerationaldiscount, and Cowen shows how this discount rate follows
fromconsequentialism,given certainplausible assumptions.JonathanGlover
discusses moral issues arisingfrompossible futuregeneticscreeningpractices
fordisability,and Larry Temkin shows how concern for equalityadds to the
familiarconsequentialist puzzles about justice between generations.James
Fishkinand David Thomson look at relationsamong presentlyexistinggenerations. The formerargues that the libertyto produce, and conferbenefitson,
children creates special problems regardingjustice for liberal theory,while
the latterclaims thatthe modernwelfarestateis a device of insurance for the
middle classes, not for redistribution,and that its expansion has worked to
the great advantage of the currentmature generation and the detrimentof
succeeding generations.
In their introduction (p. 20), the editors mention Sikora and Barry's
toFutureGeneration
anthology(R. I. Sikora,and Brian Barry,eds., Obligations
[Philadelphia: Temple UniversityPress, 1978]) as "the onlypreviouscollection
of essays devoted to the[ir] subject." One main differencebetween the two
books is instructiveas regards the progressof the subject in the decade and
a half since Sikora and Barry's volume appeared. While the earlier volume
was devotedalmostexclusivelyto distributionand population problemslooked
at withina narrowlyconsequentialistframework,the new essays use and discuss social contracttheory,liberal theory,and egalitarianismas well as consequentialismand range over topicsas diverseas geneticscreeningand compensation for past wrongs.So the subject has expanded in both breadthof topics
covered and varietyof methodologies employed. Unfortunately,there has
been littlechange in another respect. It is stillmuch easier to generate problems than solutionsin thisarea, so mostof the essays are devoted to pointing
out how moral and political theorizingis made more difficultwhen generational issues are taken into account or to criticizingconventionalviews that
failto properlyappreciate the implicationsof generationalpassage. (Cowen's
essay "Consequentialism Implies a Zero Generational Discount Rate" is a
welcome exception in his regard.)

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Book Reviews

185

The essays range so broadly that few specificissues are treatedby more
than one author. There are, however, two multiplydiscussed issues worth
mentioningin this briefreview. One concerns the practicalfeasibilityof any
social policy aimed at increasingsavings for futuregenerations.In an article
thatis destinedto become a classic (and should be required reading forgraduate studentsin economics as well as philosophy),Parfitand Cowen contend
that the standard practice of economists and social planners of discounting
futureutilitiesof society's(present and future) members is as littlejustified
as would be a "spatial"discountratethatdiscountedpeoples' utilitiesaccording
to theirspatial distance fromthe decision maker.They demonstratethatmost
of the familiarargumentsfortime discounting(e.g., uncertainty,democracy
are arguments for distinctprinciples that often significantlydiverge from
time discounting in their implications. In the course of their discussion
(pp. 157-58), Parfitand Cowen respond to Epstein's essay. Epstein argues
that any governmentpolicy for increasing savings for futuregenerationsis
bound to fail,because the more support people expect their descendantsto
receive frompublic funds,the less of their privatefundstheywill pass on to
theirheirs(and the moretheywillconsume in theirown lifetimes).In response,
Parfitand Cowen correctlynote thatany reductionin privatebequests would
not fullyoffsetthe increased public savings,because parents care about thei
not simplytheirchildrenbeing supported. (To prove
theirchildren,
supporting
the point, I invite Epstein to call my parents-who live in the same cityas
he does-and convince them to spend theirsavingson theirown retirement
ratherthan leaving a legacy to theirchildrenwho are now perfectlycapable
of providingfor themselves.I am confidenthe would be no more successfu
in this endeavor than I have been.)
The second point thatseveralauthorstouch on, thoughfromquite differ
ent angles, concerns relationsofjustice among currentsuccessivegenerations
Fishkin discusses the problems raised by successive population cohorts of
differentsizes (e.g., baby boomers and their children) and notes the added
burden a smaller later cohort will have supporting a larger earlier cohort
whichis in retirement(pp. 72-73). But he failsto point out thatthe negative
effectsof this burden will vary greatlydepending on how many childrenthe
smallercohortproduces: moreretiredpersonscan be supportedwithtolerable
sacrificeif fewerresource-absorbingchildrenare present.Even having fewer
children will provide little relief, however, if the per capita resources the
elderlyrequire are increasing.Thomson claims that theyare increasing(pp.
224-25), as part of a general patternin which the recentlyretired(or about
to retire) generation has been doubly favored by welfare-statepolicies that
favored the young while they were young, and favor the old now that they
are old. Add to this Epstein's observation that a large portion of current
budget deficitsare used to providepresentconsumption,and hence constitut
transfersto presentgenerationsfromfutureones, and a bleak pictureemerges
regardingprovidingforfuturegenerationsin the immediatefuture.Current
young people, in the years ahead, will be asked to sacrificeboth (i) to help
numerous retired persons who benefitedat their expense in the past from
governmentprogramsfor the young that are no longer available and from
enormous deficitspending and (ii) to help leave resources for futuregenerations. If, under the circumstances,they claim they are being asked to make

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186

Ethics

October1993

"excessivesacrifices"(one of the reasons forwithholdingresourcesfromfuture

generations that Parfitand Cowen imply may have moral legitimacy[pp.
148-49]), they may be right.This bodes ill for both political stabilityin the
coming centuryand the welfareof futuregenerations.It is one of the merits
of this fine state-of-the-art
collection of essays that it bringssuch perplexing
and disturbingproblems to our attention,even if it provides littleguidance
about how to solve them.
GREGORY S. KAvKA

University
ofCalifornia,Irvine

Huefner, Robert P., and Battin,MargaretP., eds. ChangingtoNationalHealth

Care.
Salt Lake City: Universityof Utah Press, 1992. Pp. vii+ 371. $24.95 (paper).

According to Battin and Huefner, the intentionbehind this interdisciplinar

collectionof commissionedpapers is not to focuson whetherwe should change
to a national health care systembut to consider what ethical issues would
arise if we did (p. ix). In actuality,however,the contributionsboth over- and
undershootthis intention.Several contributionsdo not address ethical issues
raised by having a national health care systemat all, explaining instead why
we do not yet have one (Baumann, Feldstein,and Brown) or comparing the
performanceof our current systemto several national health care system
(Waitzman;J. Francis does argue in his paper on cross-nationalcomparisons
that the kindsof moraljustificationsdifferentcountriesuse fortheirsystems
have an effecton their structures).These contributions-which are quite
good-seem more relevantto the debate about whetherwe should establish
national health insurance. So does the contributionby Buchi and Landesman,
which argues for a fundamentalrightto health care. Those papers that are
focused on the ethical issues the editorsintendedto have discussed nevertheless leave importantgaps. Specifically,more attentionshould have been focused on a crucial issue facing all national systems,namely, how to restrict
the benefitsavailable, specifically,how to rationbeneficialhealthcare services.
Nevertheless, this is a useful set of papers of high quality on a topic of
great importance.
It is commonlyargued, as Wiklernotes in his "overview"essay on ethical
issues, that national health insurance is incompatiblewithAmerican political
culture.Wiklerassertsthatthis "exceptionalism"thesis(everyonebut Americans and South Africanshave national healthinsurance) is definitively
refuted
by the wide acceptance of the U.S. Medicare system.Baumann, a historian,
provides other reasons for rejectingthe thesis: the historyof "close encounters" with national health insurance often points to coincidental forces or
events,not American attitudesor politicalprocesses,as the reason thatreform
effortsfailed. Feldstein,an economist,argues thateven now thereis no unity
behind a particular national health insurance proposal because employers,
providers,patients,and the governmentall have quite differentgoals. Nevertheless, the exceptionalism thesis is not dead. In his contribution,Brown

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