Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Top of Mind
October 31, 2013
Issue 18
A Guide to Guidance
From the editor: With the recent adoption of explicit forward guidance as a stimulative
policy tool by the major European central banks, virtually every major central bank is
now using the tool in some form. The potential benefits and dangers of such policies
have therefore become Top of Mind. We ask Professor Michael Woodford widely
regarded as one of the leading monetary economists whether the greater use of
guidance is a good thing. His answer: YES, but the form of the guidance matters. We
then lay out our take on why some central banks remain hesitant to fully embrace the
policy (concerns about inflation as well as tying their hands in an uncertain world), if
softer guidance can still be effective (somewhat, according to the Scandi experience),
why disconnects (Sep 18 taper NOT!) still happen (things change, making it hard to
sometimes follow through), whats better: asset purchases or forward guidance
(increasingly the latter), and what the market seems to prefer (deeds over words).
Inside
Source: wordle.com
Forward (mis)guidance?
Huw Pill, GS European Economics
10
Efficacy of QE versus FG
Jari Stehn, GS US Economics
12
13
Huw Pill
Michael Woodford
Robin Brooks
Editor:
ECS Executive Committee:
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification,
see the end of the text. Other important disclosures follow the Reg AC certification, or go to
www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
Japan
60
1.0
58
0.5
56
0.0
54
Sep
-0.5
52
-1.0
Energy contribution
50
Non-energy contribution
National core CPI
2011
2010
48
Jan
May
Sep
Jan
2012
May
Sep
Jan
2013
May
Sep
Jan
-1.5
May
11/1
Sep
11/7
12/1
12/7
13/9
13/7
13/1
Source: MIC.
Spain exiting recession, leaving GDP 7.4% below its 2008 peak.
Spain GDP, %
10
2.0
80
1.5
BRA
70
MEX
1.0
4
0.5
60
3Q
0.0
-2
-0.5
-4
50
40
-1.0
-6
30
qoq (rhs)
-8
-10
97
98
99
00
01
yoy (lhs)
02
03
04
-1.5
05
06
07
Source: INE.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
08
09
10
11
12
13
-2.0
20
Jan-12
Apr-12
Jul-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Apr-13
Jul-13
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
A Guide to Guidance
As we approach the five-year anniversary of the US Federal
Reserve Board lowering US policy rates to their effective zerobound in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis, central banks
across the developed market economies faced with generally
improving but still-anemic growth continue to look to
unconventional policy tools to further stimulate their economies.
talk about future policy intentions), and why the market and the
Fed have seemed so disconnected at various points this year
despite substantial attempts by the Fed to communicate more
clearly (there were mistakes in communication, but that does not
mean the situation would have been better if the Fed had instead
kept its mouth shut, especially in such unprecedented times.)
In recent months, both the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
Bank of England (BOE) also began experimenting with explicit
forward guidance as a stimulative policy tool, marking a not entirely
new but important shift in approach given these central banks
substantial reluctance to adopt such policies in the past. With
various forms of forward guidance now being implemented by
virtually every major central bank, the potential benefits and
dangers of such policies have become Top of Mind.
Central
bank policy
intentions
shrouded
in secrecy
BOJ, Jan-98
Monetary
policy
meeting
begins on a
monthly
scheduled
basis (adhoc before)
Fed, May-99
Releases a
statement
about the
FOMC
decision
even after
no change in
federal funds
rate target;
Begins
BOJ, Apr-98 announcing
Introduction policy tilt
indicating
of Bank of
most likely
Japan law
that clearly future
sets out the interest rate
action
dual
mandate of between
sustainable then and the
next FOMC
growth
under price meeting
stability
Fed, Feb-94
Begins
explicitly
announcing
changes in
federal funds
rate target
1993
1994
BOE, Feb-93
Publishes first
Inflation
Report
1995
1996
1997
1998
BOE May-97
BOE granted full
independence
and MPC
established
Fed, Jan-00
Commits to
publishing a
statement
after every
FOMC
meeting;
Replaces
tilt with
statement
describing
balance of
risks to
economic
outlook
intended to
cover an
interval
extending
beyond the
next FOMC
meeting
Fed, Mar-02
Begins
releasing
votes of
individual
Committee
members
and
preferred
policy choice
of any
dissenters
1999
2000
2001
2002
BOJ, Oct-00
Begins
publishing
report on
growth and
BOJ Mar-01
inflation
Initiates
outlook
outcome-based
ECB, Jan-99
guidance for its
Begins conducting
rate policy
monetary policy,
which includes
some aspect of
forward guidance
in its "intention to
maintain a 3%
MRO rate for the
foreseeable future"
RBZ, Jun-97
Begins
announcing its
forecast of
future shortterm interest
rates
BOE, Jun-98
Bank of England
Act formalizes
BOE, Oct-98
independence
BOE MPC
expedites release
of Minutes from
5 weeks to 2
weeks (13 days)
Fed, Feb-05
Expedites
the release
of FOMC
minutes to
make them
available
before the
subsequent
FOMC
meeting
Fed, Aug-03
Begins to
issue direct
qualitative
statements
about its
future policy
inclinations
in various
verbal
formulations
2003
2004
Fed, Nov-07
Increases the
frequency and
expands the
content and
horizon of its
publiclyreleased
inflation and
economic
activity
forecasts
BOJ, Mar-06
Introduces the
"understanding of
medium-to-long-term
price stability" in
numerical form (0-2%);
Introduces the "two
perspectives
approach" that
considers the dual
mandate as well as an
assessment of risk
2005
2006
2007
Riksbank,
Feb-07
Begins to
Norges Bank,
regularly
Nov-05
release
Begins to regularly forecasts of
release forecasts the future
of the future path path of their
of their policy rate, policy rate
2-3 years ahead
BOJ, Oct-03
Makes the
conditions for an
exit from QE more
transparent,
providing three
conditions that
must be satisfied
before ending QE
Central
Bank of
Iceland,
Mar-07
Begins to
regularly
release
forecasts of
the future
path of their
policy rate
BOJ, Jul-08
Announces: (1)
The release of
statement
explaining their
latest
assessment of
the economic
and price
situation after
every meeting
(not just those
when interest
rates are
changed) (2)
The October
semi-annual
economic and
price outlook
will release
forecasts for a
longer time
horizon
ECB, Jul-13
Introduces
forward
guidance not new in
its history
but a
significant
Fed, Aug-11 step away
Shifts to
from the
calendarmantra "we
based
never preguidance
commit" that
from vague Trichet
qualitative
established
guidance
Fed, Apr-11
Chairman
holds first
press
conference
following a
FOMC
decision
Fed, Dec-12
Replaces
calendar-based
guidance with
outcome-based
guidance
("thresholds)
2008
2009
2011
2012
2010
2013
BOC, Apr-09
Initiates calendar- BOJ, Feb-12
(3) Risk
Sets
inflation
based guidance,
balance charts
conditional on the "goal"
will be
inflation outlook
published more
BOE, Mar-13
frequently (4)
Remit adjusted
Release of
to further
minutes will
formalize
always be
inflation/growth
before the
flexibility; BOE
subsequent
invited to
meeting (5)
consider forward
Monthly
guidance
economic
assessments
in Japanese
will be
BOE, Aug-13
released the
Introduces
day after the
outcome-based
Board meets
forward guidance
(English
(first time it has
version two
used forward
days after)
guidance of any
kind)
Red = Fed
Purple = ECB
Blue = BOJ
Green = BOE
Top of Mind
Issue 18
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Top of Mind
Issue 18
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Top of Mind
Issue 18
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2.90
September 18
FOMC Statement
2.85
2.80
2.75
2.65
9/16/2013 9:05
9/16/2013 10:50
9/16/2013 12:35
9/16/2013 14:20
9/16/2013 16:05
9/16/2013 20:50
9/16/2013 22:35
9/17/2013 0:20
9/17/2013 2:05
9/17/2013 3:50
9/17/2013 5:35
9/17/2013 7:20
9/17/2013 9:05
9/17/2013 10:50
9/17/2013 12:35
9/17/2013 14:20
9/17/2013 16:05
9/17/2013 20:45
9/17/2013 22:30
9/18/2013 0:15
9/18/2013 2:00
9/18/2013 3:45
9/18/2013 5:30
9/18/2013 7:15
9/18/2013 9:00
9/18/2013 10:45
9/18/2013 12:30
9/18/2013 14:15
9/18/2013 16:00
9/18/2013 20:45
9/18/2013 22:30
9/19/2013 0:15
9/19/2013 2:00
9/19/2013 3:45
9/19/2013 5:30
9/19/2013 7:15
9/19/2013 9:00
9/19/2013 10:45
9/19/2013 12:30
9/19/2013 14:15
9/19/2013 16:00
9/19/2013 20:45
9/19/2013 22:30
9/20/2013 0:15
9/20/2013 2:00
9/20/2013 3:45
9/20/2013 5:30
9/20/2013 7:15
9/20/2013 9:00
9/20/2013 10:45
9/20/2013 12:30
9/20/2013 14:15
9/20/2013 16:00
2.70
Source: Bloomberg.
Kris.Dawsey@gs.com
212-902-3393
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
4.5
4.0
3.5
8.5
Baseline*
Optimal Control
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
Unemployment Rate
%
8.0
Baseline*
Optimal Control
7.5
7.0
2.5
2.0
Baseline*
Optimal Control
1.5
6.5
6.0
1.0
5.5
0.5
5.0
0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
4.5
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
1.0
0.5
0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
Forward (mis)guidance?
Huw Pill, Chief GS European Economist,
discusses the concerns about forward
guidance that seem to be generally greater on
the European side of the pond
The Federal Reserve was an early and enthusiastic adopter of
explicit forward guidance for monetary policy. By contrast, the
leading central banks in Europe initially showed greater reluctance.
Indeed, for some time, the mantra of ECB President Mario Draghi
(and, before that, his predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet) had been
we never pre-commit on the future path of policy interest rates.
More recently, attitudes have evolved. Over the summer, both the
ECB and the BOE officially adopted their own forms of forward
guidance. But, crucially, European policymakers have been at pains
to point out that their guidance should be interpreted as a vehicle
for better explaining their existing policy framework, rather than as
a shift in the strategic framework itself.
In particular, European central banks have avoided giving the
impression that they would be prepared to hold policy rates
lower for longer than would normally be expected, in an
attempt to ease financial conditions by flattening the yield curve to
a greater than usual extent. Such an approach has been advocated
by some as a way of obtaining additional monetary easing when
(short-term) policy rates reach their zero lower bound.
The objections
The main objection to the pursuit of such a policy is that it
would not be time consistent. In other words, once
macroeconomic conditions began to normalize for example, as
slack is eroded by stronger growth and inflation threatens to rise
the central bank would have an incentive to raise rates regardless
of its previous guidance in order to achieve its stabilization
objectives.
Two consequences could arise from the adoption of such a time
inconsistent approach. On the one hand, it may undermine the
effectiveness of the forward guidance program itself. Because
market participants understand that central banks will want to
renege on its promises in the future, they will not believe the
guidance offered at the outset. This lack of credibility implies that
market expectations will not be influenced by the announcement of
guidance, and therefore the desired flattening of the yield curve
and associated financial easing will not happen.
On the other hand, should the monetary authorities actually deliver
policy interest rates that were lower for longer than normally
required to stabilize the inflation outlook at target, it is natural to
expect that the inflation rate will rise, possibly to undesired
levels. Of course, this may simply represent a short-term
overshoot of the inflation objective. But should longer-term inflation
expectations be destabilized in the course of the overshoot, the
deviation from target is likely to prove more persistent and more
costly to correct.
Central banks in Europe may be particularly concerned about these
issues. For example, given the specific institutional context in the
Euro area, the monetary policy decision making process may find it
more difficult to follow through on guidance offered in the past.
Moreover, in many European countries with a recent history of
more elevated inflation, the perceived threat of destabilizing longerterm inflation expectations could be greater than in the United
States, where the Federal Reserve has built up a strong reputation
over many years.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Huw.Pill@gs.com
+44(20)7774-8736
Fed FOMC
Publishes a short press release containing the FOMC decision, a concise (and typically stylized) explanation of its
Generally pursues an individualistic communication strategy through inter-meeting speeches and commentary by
ECB GC
Publishes a short press release containing the GC decision, explanation of its underlying reasoning, and (at times)
individual members, which at times reveals highly diverse opinions across FOMC members
forward guidance
Governor holds a press conference with Q&A immediately following policy decisions; Press conference is generally less
detailed than the Minutes of the BOE or the Fed; does not provide any information on voting
Does not release Minutes
Does not release votes (decisions generally made in a consensual way)
Publishes projections of inflation and economic growth - up to two years ahead - four times per year (March, June,
September, December)
M ario Draghi, P resident
Euro pean Central B ank
So urce: Euro pean Central B ank
Publishes a Monthly Bulletin one week after each monetary policy meeting that contains an assessment of economic
developments and information on the analytic framework used in its decision-making process
Provides an annual report and testifies before Parliament
Generally displays a relatively high degree of consistency among the inter-meeting statements of individual committee
members
BOJ MPC
Publishes a statement after every meeting announcing the MPC decision and explaining its latest assessment of the
longer horizon
Includes interim review of the growth and inflation outlook in the January (revision of Oct report) and July (revision of Apr
Haruhiko Kuro da, Go verno r
B ank o f Japan
So urce: B ank o f Japan
BOE MPC
Publishes the MPC decision after each meeting, but normally provides an explanation only when interest rates are
and the BOE's assessments for inflation over the following two years, accompanied by an hour-long press conference
Publishes a Quarterly Bulletin, which comments on market developments and monetary policy operations
M ark Carney, Go verno r
B ank o f England
So urce: B ank o f England
accountable
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
August 9, 2011
calendar guidance
January 25, 2012
calendar guidance
0.0
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
1.6
1.4
1.2
Better-than-consensus
NFP report (Jun. 5)
Forward
guidance
introduced
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Source: Bloomberg.
Robin.Brooks@gs.com
(212) 902-8763
10
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
Rates
Francesco
Garzarelli
& Team
Credit
Charlie
Himmelberg
& Team
Equity
David Kostin
(US)
Kathy Matsui
(Japan)
Tim Moe
(Asia ex-Japan)
Peter Oppenheimer
(Europe)
Helen Zhu
(China)
& Teams
Commodity
Jeff Currie
& Team
Unconventional monetary policies need to be considered as extensions of traditional monetary policy. In that
sense, we would expect a dovish surprise to lead to currency depreciation and vice versa.
The problem with non-traditional policies is that they are not as easily comparable across countries as traditional
policy rates, generating substantial uncertainty. Market participants have long looked at longer maturity interest
rates to compare cross-country differences in non-conventional policies. But these relationships also change.
Calendar guidance introduces less volatility into bond yields than threshold guidance, for example.
Often it appears that gauging the distance from the stated policy target gives the best indication of central bank
stance. Currencies are likely to weaken when their central banks undershoot their individual target by a
larger margin than others.
Although forward guidance has evolved significantly since its introduction by the Fed around 2008, behind it
always laid an attempt to keep expectations of short term rates anchored around zero for a sufficient period of
time into the future.
During its first implementation in the form of calendar guidance, rate expectations became increasingly
anchored to their lower bound, to the point that long-term rates were unresponsive to macro developments and
term premium was eroded across the curve given the low volatility.
The implementation of threshold guidance has proven to be more challenging, in particular as it is seen by the
market as intrinsically intertwined with QE. Proof of this was the sharp rates sell-off during the summer driven
by the expectation of an earlier policy rate hike based on the assumption that the FOMC was going to taper in
September and the rally once the decision was delayed.
More recently, economic data have been mixed and markets have pushed out expectations for the first hike,
with implied volatility moving down to levels last seen around Bernankes testimony before Congress in May.
We believe that markets will not unwind the term premium now built into the yield curve and that 10-yr
government yields will smoothly drift higher towards our year-end forecasts of 2.75% for US Treasuries
and 2% for German Bunds. We forecast a further sell-off in 2014, as stronger expected growth pushes the
economy towards the Feds thresholds, influencing expectations of rate hikes.
We think that forward guidance is a more effective stimulus to credit risk appetite and credit creation
than QE.
But tapering is not tightening if it is accompanied by improvements in forward guidance.
Based on our conversations with investors, we think that the market is giving this point too little weight, paying
too much attention to rates risk and QE tapering, and not enough attention to the likelihood of more dovish
tailwinds from forward guidance.
We are therefore more bullish than the market on headline risks from the Fed over the next few quarters.
More generally, we think credit remains fairly valued. Credit quality remains strong, and the above arguments
plus the prospect of better growth means that the outlook for risk-taking remains favorable.
Quantitative easing (QE) has supported global equity markets in recent years, and everything else equal the
potential tapering of asset purchases is likely to be a headwind across stock markets. However, DM equities
should still be able to perform in an environment where policy is tightened as a response to a better DM growth
outlook, at least when measured over slightly longer horizons.
Equity investors are concerned that forward guidance will be an imperfect substitute for QE, though
ultimately the fundamental linkage of these policies to the equity market is through interest rates, which may be
anchored by forward guidance. Our US Economists believe forward guidance is a more effective tool for driving
growth and keeping rates low.
In the US we have found Fed commentary to be as impactful to equity returns as changes in policy rates. Our
outlook for continued easy monetary policy via low rates and forward guidance supports pro-cyclical areas of the
market such as growth, weak balance sheets and low return on capital. Communication that implies tightening
could have the opposite effect over shorter time horizons.
Looking across the global equity landscape, EMs have generally responded more negatively to a potential
tightening of US policy, especially those with significant current account deficits. On the other hand, the
normalization of unconventional policy in the United States is likely contingent upon an economic growth
recovery, which in turn would bode positively for global equity markets.
The impact of central bank easing on commodity markets has likely been limited; it is the pace of economic
activity and not forward expectations of such activity that drive physical commodity markets.
The exception is gold, as gold and US real interest typically move with a strong inverse correlation. Thus, Fed
easing has been broadly supportive of gold prices.
But the pass through of future easing on rates and ultimately gold prices is likely shifting; as threshold forward
guidance is inherently data dependent, the correlation between gold and economic activity will likely return to its
pre-QE higher level. Under our economic forecast for above trend growth in 2014, we forecast further declines in
gold prices next year.
Over the long term, the expansion of the Fed balance sheet through QE could spur inflationary pressures,
lending support to gold prices. But the substitution of QE for forward guidance may limit this potential upside.
11
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
Efficacy of QE versus FG
Jari Stehn of our US economics team
addresses the shifting preference towards
forward guidance (FG) from asset purchases
(QE), but the difficulty is in the disentangling
The Fed has used both asset purchases (QE) and forward
guidance extensively since reaching the zero bound for the federal
funds rate in late 2008. Initially, the FOMC viewed QE as a highly
effective tool in easing financial conditions and supporting the
economy. In 2011, for example, Chairman Bernanke argued that a
wide range of market indicators supports the view that the Federal
Reserve's securities purchases have been effective at easing
financial conditions. Over the last couple of years, however, it
appears that the committees view on the relative reliability of its
two unconventional tools has shifted. In 2012, for example,
Bernanke stressed in his Jackson Hole speech that both the
benefits and costs of nontraditional monetary policies are
uncertain. This September, Bernanke stated that forward
guidance is actually the stronger, more reliable tool.
Bernanke speak
We agree
Our own research is consistent with the view that forward
guidance is a more powerful and reliable tool than asset purchases.
Specifically, our results suggest that a given change in longterm Treasury yields is about twice as effective in easing
broader financial conditions when it comes through forward
guidance as when it comes through asset purchases.
Moreover, we found that the accuracy of these estimates is
notably higher for the effects of forward guidance than QE.
60
Forward Guidance
QE
50
40
30
20
10
Bernanke, February 3, 2011:
"A wide range of market indicators supports the view that the Federal
Reserve's securities purchases have been effective at easing financial
conditions"
Bernanke, August 31, 2012:
"...both the benefits and costs
of nontraditional monetary
policies are uncertain"
2012
2013
From QE to FG
We see two main reasons why the committees thinking might
have evolved toward favoring forward guidance. First, it appears
natural for the efficacy and costs of the two policies to change
over time. Bernanke said explicitly in 2012 that the costs and
benefits of unconventional policies will also vary over time,
depending on factors such as the state of the economy and
financial markets and the extent of prior Federal Reserve asset
purchases. A larger balance sheet, for example, would be
expected to make the effects of additional QE more uncertain.
Likewise, the effectiveness of using additional forward guidance
would be expected to depend on how far market pricing is from
the committees view on the path of the funds rate.
Second, a number of academic studiesincluding work
conducted at the Fedsuggest that the efficacy of QE has
fallen relative to forward guidance. Most notably, Michael
Woodfords presentation at last years Jackson Hole conference
argued forcefully that forward guidance is a more powerful tool
than asset purchases. In addition, more recent studies of the
magnitude of QEs impact have produced estimates considerably
different from earlier studies, likely increasing Fed officials
uncertainty.
Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Days Since Policy Action
2011
Jari.Stehn@gs.com
212-357-6224
12
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
%
7
5
Actual policy rate
4
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
LasseHolboell.Nielsen@gs.com
+44(20)7774-5205
13
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
100
80
60
Tightening
40
20
0
Easing
-20
-40
-60
-80
0
FOMC
Statement
Minutes
Chairman
Speech /
Testimony
FRBNY
President
Speech
Vice Chair
Speech
Governor
Speech
Other
President
Speech
-100
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
100
BOE issued
outcomebased
guidance
90
ECB issued
"extended
period"
guidance
80
70
Fed issued
outcomebased
guidance
60
Fed issued
"mid-2015"
guidance
50
40
30
20
Fed issued
"2014"
guidance
Fed issued
"extended
period"
guidance
Fed issued
"for some
time"
guidance
Fed issued
"mid-2013"
guidance
10
Year
Country
1990
1991
Canada
1992
1993
1995
Spain
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Peru, Philippines
2013
Japan
Source: Federal Reserve Transparency and Financial Market Forecasts of ShortTerm Interest Rates, Swanson, February 9, 2004; Inflation Targeting: A New
Framework for Monetary Policy? Bernanke, Mishkin, January 1997.
Questioning credibility
1,800
2.5
Growth
strategy
-0.70
1,700
-0.50
1,600
-0.30
BOJ
introduces 2%
inflation target
1.5
September FOMC
1,500
-0.10
0.10
1.0
1,400
Final
decision
on VAT
hike
Apr 4th
unprecedented
easing
Three-party
agreement on
raising the
consumption tax
2.0
Abe elected
LDP leader
Noda Cabinet
resolution on
legislation for
raising the
consumption tax
0.30
0.5
1,300
0.50
0.70
1,200
0.0
0.90
1,100
Aug-12
Oct-12
Dec-12
Gold price
Feb-13
Apr-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
US 10 year TIPS yield (right axis, inverted)
Oct-13
-0.5
Jan-12
Apr-12
Jul-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Apr-13
Jul-13
Oct-13
Source: Bloomberg.
14
-0.4
0.6
7.6
2.6
1.9
EURO AREA
GERMANY
CHINA
BRAZIL
JAPAN
1.9
2.4
7.6
0.5
0.0
1.6
2.8
1.8
2.3
7.7
2.0
0.9
2.8
3.6
1.7
2.4
7.4
1.7
0.9
2.6
3.5
2014
GS
Cons
FX
1.32
6.12
2.32
6600
1.27
6.07
2.43
107
6200
12-mth
GS
Cons
107
$/JPY
2.40
$/BRL
6.15
$/CNY
1.40
EUR/$
1.27
EUR/$
1.40
1.27
EUR/$
1.40
12-mth
GS
Cons
Copper ($/mt)
101
3-mth
GS
Cons
98
$/JPY
2.25
$/BRL
6.16
$/CNY
1.38
EUR/$
1.32
EUR/$
1.38
1.32
EUR/$
1.38
3-mth
GS
Cons
HSCEI
1300
3-mth
GS
Cons
HSCEI
TOPIX
1400
1110
12-mth
GS
Cons
BOVESPA
11000
3250
DAX
3200
Eurostoxx 50
1845
SP500
1850
Gold ($/toz)
TOPIX
1250
BOVESPA
3010
DAX
2950
Eurostoxx 50
1715
SP500
1750
12-mth
GS
Cons
Equity
3-mth
GS
Cons
4.25
1.00
2.00
2.75
1.25
2.50
3.25
4.25
12-mth
GS
Cons
Corn ($/bu)
0.10
10.25
6.25
0.50
0.13
3-mth
GS
Cons
0.10
10.00
6.00
0.50
0.13
10-yr
2013
2014
Rates (% eop)
Policy
2013
2014
Note: Recent revisions marked in red; GDP consensus is Consensus Economics, all other consensus is Reuters, commodity 12-mo consensus is Reuters for 2014 average.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
105
105
110
108
12-mth
GS
Cons
3-mth
GS
Cons
1.6
US
Commodities
2.8
Global
2013
GS
Cons
Revision Notes
Revision Notes
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
15
Top of Mind
Issue 18
El
16
Top of Mind
Issue 18
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