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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff

]
]

vs.

] Case No. 97-5128


]

DAN MEADOR

Defendant

_______________________________________
Memorandum of Law
In Support of Motion to Convert Direct Appeal
Now comes Dan Leslie, Meador, commonly known as Dan Meador, and hereby
incorporates all statements of fact concerning the character of the party and his abode and
relationship to Federal jurisdiction, and his denial of being DAN LESLIE MEADOR,
DAN MEADOR, or any other jurisdictic, non-moral being.
Petitioner's memorandum of law expounds on only four issues raised in petitioner's
motion to convert direct appeal to an extraordinary writ amounting to a common law
remedy on a four-square challenge and collateral attack on the indictment, judgment and
sentence in UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. DAN LESLIE MEADOR, etc., case
96-CR-113-C, tried in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, H. Dale Cook presiding. Due to extremely limited time, lack of access to laws

of the United States (Statutes at Large), and other fundamental resources, limited access
to a typewriter, limited hours of law library operation, etc., memorandum segments to
other matters raised in petitioner's motion have not been completed. As expeditiously as
possible, petitioner will complete segments which demonstrate that (1) the United States
Code, particularly Titles 18 and 26, are merely evidence of law, they are not law, and the
Government, whether of the United States or the de facto United States of America, has
in fact prosecuted this matter and the Moore-Gunwall case (96-CR-082-C) under color of
law; (2) the United States District Court, operating under Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure for United States District Courts, imposed Civil Law-Maritime Law process
under modified Admiralty procedure, thereby depriving petitioner of due process of law,
being common law procedure and forums, as contemplated by the "arising under" clause
at Article III 2.1 and the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution; and (3) the
alleged indictment against petitioner is defective, and of no consequence, because (a)
petitioner was deprived of the right to participate in the grand jury selection and seating
process, interview witnesses against him; (b) the U.S. Attorney conducted grand jury
proceedings, which is contrary to common law forum contemplated by the Bill of Rights;
and (c ) an indictment was not returned in open courts, all required by petitioner's due
process rights secured in common law forums contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioner alleges that the four memorandum segments incorporated in this instrument are
adequate: (1) The Article IV United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma has statutory and regulatory capacity to prosecute only misdemeanor and petty
offenses, with consent of the accused, on military installations and on land under
Department of the Interior jurisdiction, and (b) the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Federal Rules of Evidence, etc., do not apply to proceedings in Article III district courts
of the United States, which have original criminal jurisdiction under 18 USC 3231; (2)
all entities involved in prosecution of the instant matter must disclose five essential
elements of authority to establish standing and territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction;
(3) the "United States of America" is a government foreign to the United States, and has
no standing either by Constitutional delegation of authority or Titles 18, 19, 21, 26 and
other titles of the United States Code, save Title 48; and (4) contrary to Article I 9.3 of

the Constitution, the Article IV United States District Court, being a legislative rather
than judicial court, has effected a bill of attainder against petitioner.
Counsel for the "United States of America", the Internal Revenue Service, and various
individuals the four-square challenge and collateral attack issues against will no doubt
allege, "The pleading is unintelligible," or "Allegations are just so much more tax
protester rhetoric," etc. However, that is not the case: Among other things, petitioner
happens to be an award-winning writer, and research has matured enough that precious
few constructive arguments remain. The Cooperative Federalism scheme, formerly
known as Corporatism, has been laid bare; the "United States of America" is now known
to be a government foreign to the United States; the Internal Revenue Service is in fact
successor to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico; no taxing statute in the Internal
Revenue Code reaches the Union of several States and people indigenous to or otherwise
situated in the several States unless they happen to be U.S. Government employees; the
Internal Revenue Code and the Statutes at Large vest authority in the Treasury
Department, via the General Accounting Office, for administration and collection of
delinquent taxes in the Continental United States; the so-called income tax levied in
Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is simply the "normal tax" levied against officers
and employees of the United States, etc. (Internal Revenue Act of Nov. 23, 1921 and the
Public Salary Tax Act of 1939); and United States municipal authority, including police
powers, judicial and corrections authority within the Union of several States party to the
Constitution is limited to Federal enclaves, defined at 18 USC 7(3). The "United States
of America, SS, President of the United States", has standing only in Federal courts
located in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
The fact that judicial officers (magistrates) in United States District Courts preside under
the gold-fringed Union Jack (executive martial law/admiralty banner), rather than the
official flag of the United States, prescribed at 4 USC 1, is proof positive of underlying
authority and purpose when the executive admiralty-martial law authority is extended
beyond borders of the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV 3.2
legislative jurisdiction, and the authority moves under threat or actual force of arms, it

cannot be construed other than as acts of plunder and war, with the sovereign people of
the several States being the object of plunder, suppression, sedition and treason.
Petitioner alleges that it is not his responsibility to disprove standing for the "United
States of America", the Internal Revenue Service, the United States District Court, the
United States Attorney, the Department of Justice, et al. Petitioner has been arrested and
imprisoned. Petitioner alleges that those responsible have conspired to the common end
of false imprisonment. As the accused, those responsible are prima facie guilty of false
imprisonment unless or until they (1) prove standing, (2) prove subject-matter
jurisdiction, and (3) prove territorial jurisdiction.
The four memorandum components that follow do not rely on abstract or constructive
arguments. They are based squarely on the Constitution of the United States, Statutes at
Large, statutes published in the United States Code (evidence of law only), regulations,
executive orders, executive officer delegations of authority, and other governmentgenerated authorities, including judicial decisions that articulate constitutional principles.
Therefore, requisite response from counsel for the plaintiff ("United States of America")
must be with concrete rather than abstract proofs.
For example, the last sentence of 40 USC 255 stipulates that until the United States has
formally accepted jurisdiction over land acquired by the United States, with jurisdiction
ceded by the legislature of the State where the land is acquired, United States jurisdiction
is presumed not to exist. Where the instant matter is concerned, counsel for the "United
States of America" may prove United States jurisdiction in the county of Kay, or the
community of Ponca City, state of Oklahoma, by entering proof that the United States
formally accepted jurisdiction to the county or community in compliance with
requirements of 40 USC 255 and Article I 8.17 of the Constitution.
Petitioner has demonstrated that 26 USC 7701(a)(12)(A) & 7805(a) vest Internal
Revenue Code authority in the Treasury Department, a/k/a Treasury of the United States,

not the Department of the Treasury of the United States, the Department of the Treasury,
Puerto Rico, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or the Internal Revenue Service, and
that the Statutes at Large, as well as 5 USC 5512, vests authority in the General
Accounting Office, as general agent for the Treasury of the United States, for collection
of delinquent employee taxes.
In response, counsel for the "United States of America" and the Internal Revenue Service
must produce requisite authorities into record Statutory authority, executive orders,
delegations of authority, general application regulations.
Most importantly, petitioner alleges that the "normal tax" prescribed in Subtitle A of the
Internal Revenue Code is not a true income tax contemplated by the Sixteenth
Amendment (it is a privilege tax). The "normal tax" was first imposed on officers and
employees of the United States by Act of July 1862 the Sixteenth was not implemented
until 1913. Therefore, counsel for the United States of America must disclose what
Article I delegated authority the normal tax issues under. If the tax does not fall within
Congress' Article I enumerated powers, or is merely an exercising authority to regulate
government, extension of the authority to the Union of several States and the population
at large is patently fraud and must be condemned as usurpation of power.
An old colloquialism says that close counts only in horse shoes and hand grenades. The
principle applies in this forum: Proofs must be concrete. As in all things, truth has
substance. Proofs of law, executive orders, executive officer delegations of authority, and
general application regulations, along with disclosure of constitutionally delegated
authority, constitute the substantial force of law. Without the requisite proofs, those
responsible for prosecution of the instant matter are condemned for false imprisonment
and stand in jeopardy for other alleged offenses.
The four memorandum elements follow:

1. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution. (1) Lack authority to prosecute felony crimes. (2) have no jurisdiction
authority beyond that prescribed at 18 USC 7(3), and (3) are incompetent at law as
contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article III 2.1 and the Fifth Article of
Amendment to the Constitution.
The United States District Court is a territorial court of the United States, created at 28
USC 132:

132. Creation and composition of district courts [sic]


(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record
known as the United States District Court for that district.

Per Historical and Statutory Notes, 132 merely continues existing law courts already
in existence, with officers of the respective courts, would continue to function from 28
USC 1 (Federal Code of Civil Procedure), and 48 USC 641 (Territories and Insular
Possessions). The "United States District Court" is distinct from the "district court of the
United States", the former being a legislative-territorial court of the United States, the
latter an Article III judicial court of the United States. These courts were variously
established, with the original district courts of the United States, or their respective
predecessors, by original judiciary acts of 1789 and 1791, then by Enabling Acts for the
various States admitted to the Union of several States party to the Constitution
subsequent to the founding States. The United States District Courts were established in
territories belonging to the United States prior to any given territory being admitted to the
Union as a member State. This arrangement continues to the present in American Samoa,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and other territories of the United States which are not in the

Union of several States party to the Constitution, save the District of Columbia, which is
a legitimate Federal district, and Puerto Rico, a commonwealth Federal State.
By definition, at 28 USC 451, the "district court of the United States" is clearly
distinguished from the "United States District Court":

The terms "district court" and "district court of the United States" mean the courts
constituted by chapter 5 of this title.

The broader definition at 28 USC 451, which includes territorial courts created by "Act
of Congress", is as follows:

The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the United States,
courts of appeal, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court
of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are
entitled to hold office during good behavior.

In the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (Title 18, United States Code), original
jurisdiction over offenses against the United States is vested in Article III district courts
of the United States at 18 USC 3231, which also preserves jurisdiction of laws and
courts of the several States (Const., Art. III 2.3):

3231. District courts


The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of
the several States under the laws thereof.

Territorial courts ("United States District Courts") which have felony criminal
jurisdiction for prosecution of crimes listed in Titles 18, 21, 26 and other titles of the
United States Code are specifically enumerated at 18 USC 23, and Rule 54(a), Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the United States District Courts:

23. Court of the United States defined


As used in this title [title 18, United States Code], except where otherwise expressly
provided the term "court of the United States" includes the District Court of Guam, the
District Court of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands.

The section above was added by P.L. 103-322, 1994. Designations in Rule 54(a), below,
are dated by removal of the Canal Zone from United States jurisdiction:

Rule 54. Application and Exception


(a) Courts. These rules apply to all criminal proceedings in the United States District
Courts; in the District of Guam; in the District Court of the Northern Mariana Islands,
except as otherwise provided in articles IV and V of the covenant provided by the Act of
March 24, 1976 (90 Stat. 263); in the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and (except as
otherwise provided in the Canal Zone) in the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone; in the United States Court of Appeals; and in the Supreme Court of

the United States; except that the prosecution of offenses in the District Court of the
Virgin Islands shall be by indictment or information as otherwise provided by law.

Authority of the various courts of the United States is determined by capacity: Under
Article III of the Constitution, the judicial branch of United States Government operates
independent of legislative and executive branches; under Article IV 3.2, which vests
Congress with plenary power over territory belonging to the United States, executive and
judicial branches operate under congressionally delegated authority as the Constitution
does not vest authority in or over territory belonging to the United States in the executive
or judicial branches of government. Thus, the following statutes govern what executive or
judicial functions may be exercised when delegated authority under Congress' Article IV
3.2 legislative jurisdiction is conferred on the other branches.

4 USC 71:
71. Permanent seat of Government
All that part of the territory of the United States included within the present limits of the
District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United States.
4 USC 72:
72. Public offices; at seat of Government
All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of
Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

Per 4 USC 72, statutory authority is mandatory where executive or judicial entities
operate in capacities which are under Congress' authority in the geographical United
States, the mandate articulated in the following:

Congress, having the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal
and state, over the territories of the United States, so long as they remain in the territorial
condition, may itself directly legislate for any territory, or may extend the laws of the
United States over it, in any particular that Congress may think fit. U.S. v. McMillan,
Utah 1897, 17 S.Ct. 395, 165 U.S. 504, 41 L.Ed. 805.
The power of Congress over the territories of the United States is general and plenary,
arising from and incidental to the right to acquire the territory itself, and from the power
given by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States. Church of Jesus Christ v. U.S.,
Utah 1890, 10 S.Ct. 792, 136 U.S. 1, 34 L.Ed. 481.
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States not included in any state must
necessarily be governed by or under the authority of Congress. The territories are but
political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United States. Their relation to the
general government is much the same as that which counties bear to the respective states,
and Congress may legislate for them, as a state does for its municipal organizations. The
organic law of a territory takes the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the
local government. It is obligatory on and binds the territorial authorities; but Congress is
supreme, and for the purposes of this department of its governmental authority has all the
powers of the people of the United States except such as have been expressly or by
implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitution. Per Waite, Ch. J., In
Brunswick First Nat. Bank v. Yankton County, Dak. 1880, 101 U.S. 129, 25 L.Ed. 1046.

Thus, the Article IV United States District Court, operating subject to and as an extension
of Congress' plenary power in the geographical United States, is a legislative rather than
judicial court judicial officers of the United States District Court function in a
ministerial or magistrate capacity rather than as true judges of independent courts. They
are bound in all respects by congressional edict, thus rules and forums prescribed by
English-American common law as contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article
III 2.1, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment to the
Constitution, are abandoned for Federal Rules of Evidence and Procedure which merge
Civil Law and Maritime Law under Admiralty rules.
Conclusions advanced supra are supported by Advisory Committee Notes for 1972
Proposed Rules, published following Rule 1101, Federal Rules of Evidence, in the note to
subdivision (a), reproduced here in relative part:

Note to Subdivision (a). The various enabling acts contain differences in phraseology in
their descriptions of the courts over which the Supreme Court's power to make rules of
practice and procedure extends. The act concerning civil actions, as amended in 1966,
refers to "the district courts *** of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty
and maritime cases. *** "28 U.S.C. 2072, Pub. L. 89-773, 1, 80 Stat. 1323 The
provisions as to criminal rules up to and including verdicts applies to "criminal cases and
proceedings to punish for criminal contempt of court in the United States district courts,
in the district courts for the districts of the Canal Zone and Virgin Islands, in the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico, and in proceedings before United States magistrates." 18 U.S.C.
3771.
These various provisions do not in terms describe the same courts. In congressional usage
the phrase "district courts of the United States," without further qualification,
traditionally has included the district courts established by Congress in the states under
Article III of the Constitution, which are "constitutional" courts, and has not included the
territorial courts created under Article IV, Section 3, clause 2, which are "legislative"

courts. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 21 L.Ed. 966 (1873). However, any doubt as
to the inclusion of the District Court for the District of Columbia in the phrase is laid to
rest by the provisions of the Judicial Code constituting the judicial districts, 28 U.S.C.
81 et seq., creating district courts therein, id. 132, and specifically providing that the
term "district court of the United States" means the court so constituted. Id. 451. The
District of Columbia is included. Id. 88. Moreover, when these provisions were
enacted, reference to the District of Columbia was deleted from the original civil rules
enabling act. 28 U.S.C. 2072. Likewise, Puerto Rico is made a district, with a district
court, and included in the term. Id. 119. The question is simply one of the extent of the
authority conferred by Congress. With respect to civil rules it seems clearly to include the
district courts in the state, the District Court for the District of Columbia, and the District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico.
[discussion of bankruptcy courts omitted]
[discussion of admiralty jurisdiction omitted]
The criminal rules enabling act specified United States district courts, district courts for
the district of the Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands, the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and proceedings before United States commissioners.
Aside from the addition of commissioners, now magistrates, this scheme differs from the
bankruptcy pattern in that it makes no mention of the District Court of Guam but by
specific mention removes the Canal Zone from the doubtful list.

The further difference in including the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico seems not to be significant for present purposes, since the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is an appellate court. The Rules of Criminal Procedure
have not been made applicable to it, as being unneeded and inappropriate, Rule 54(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the same approach is indicated with respect
to rules of evidence.

If one were to stop at this point and frame a rule governing the applicability of the
proposed rules of evidence in terms of the authority conferred by the three enabling acts,
an irregular pattern would emerge as follows:

Civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases district courts in the states,
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
Bankruptcy same as civil actions, plus Guam and Virgin Islands.
Criminal cases same as civil actions, plus Canal Zone and Virgin Islands (but not
Guam).

This irregular pattern need not, however, be accepted. Originally the Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Civil Procedure took the position that, although the phrase "district courts
of the United States" did not include territorial courts, provisions in the organic laws of
Puerto Rico and Hawaii would make the rules applicable to the district courts thereof,
though this would not be so as to Alaska, the Virgin Islands, or the Canal Zone, whose
organic acts contained no corresponding provisions. At the suggestion of the Court,
however, the Advisory Committee struck from its notes a statement to the above effect. 2
Moore's Federal Practice & 1.07 (2nd ed. 1967); 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure 121 (Wright ed. 1960). Congress thereafter should apply to the district
courts of Hawaii, 53 Stat. 841 (1939), Puerto Rico, 54 Stat. 22 (1940), Alaska, 63 Stat.
445 (1949), Guam, 64 Stat. 384-390 (1950), and the Virgin Islands, 69 Stat. 497, 507
(1954). The original enabling act for rules of criminal procedure specifically mentioned
the district courts of the Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands. The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico was blanketed in by creating its court a "district court of the United States"
as previously described. Although Guam is not mentioned in either the enabling act or in
the expanded definition of "district of the United States," the Supreme Court in 1956

amended Rule 54(a) to state that the Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable in Guam.
The Court took this step following the enactment of legislation by Congress in 1950 that
rules theretofore or thereafter promulgated by the Court in civil cases, admiralty, criminal
cases and bankruptcy should apply to the District Court of Guam, 48 U.S.C. 1424(b),
and two Ninth Circuit decisions upholding the applicability of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure to Guam. Pugh v. United States, 212 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1954); Hatchett v.
Guam, 212 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1954); Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 38 U. of Det. L.J. 173, 187 (1960).

From this history, the reasonable conclusion is that Congressional enactment of a


provision that rules and future amendments shall apply in the courts of a territory or
possession is the equivalent to mention in an enabling act and that a rule on scope and
applicability may properly be drafted accordingly. Therefore the pattern set by Rule 54 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is here followed.

The substitution of magistrates in lieu of commissioners is made in pursuance of the


Federal Magistrates Act, P.L. 90-578, approved October 17 1968, 82 Stat. 1107.

The scheme is somewhat more on point in the Advisory Committee Notes on adoption for
1944, in discussion of what was then Rule 54(a)(1):

Note to Subdivision (a)(1). 1. The Act of June 28, 1940 (54 Stat. 688; 18 U.S.C. former
687 [now 3771]), authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of criminal
procedure for the district courts of the United States in respect to proceedings prior to and
including verdict or finding of guilty or not guilty or plea of guilty, is expressly
applicable to the district courts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, Virgin
Islands, the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the United States Court for

China. This is likewise true of the Act of February 24, 1933 (47 Stat. 904; 18 U.S.C.
former 688 [now 3772], authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules in respect to
proceedings after verdict or finding or after plea of guilty. In this respect these two
statutes differ from the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1064; 28 U.S.C. former 723b,
723c [now 2072], authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules in respect to
proceedings after verdict or finding or after plea of guilty. The last-mentioned Act
comprises only district courts of the United States and the courts of the District of
Columbia. The phrase "district courts of the United States" was held not to include
district courts in the territories and insular possessions, Mookini v. United States, 303
U.S. 201, 58 S.Ct. 543, 82 L.Ed. 748, conformed to 95 F.2d 960.

Fortunately, the seeming confusion is reasonably easy to straighten out; Just as there are
two distinct court systems the Article III judicial district courts of the United States and
the Article IV legislative-territorial courts, the United States District Courts there are
two distinct systems of law. The Article III district courts of the United States operate
within rules and forums of English-American common law contemplated by the "arising
under" clause at Article III 2.1, where the Article IV United States District Court
operates under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, etc.,
which accommodate Civil Law, imposing Admiralty rules, and presumptions, which join
Civil Law and Maritime Law into an indistinguishable system. Civil Law process is both
foreign and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and where criminal
matters are concerned, is contrary to the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
In order to straighten out the distinction, there was a correction of the Supreme Court
order pertaining to criminal rules of procedure from December 26, 1944 to December 27,
1948. The first portion of the 1944 order is set out below:
ORDER OF DECEMBER 26, 1944

It is ordered that Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States
governing proceedings in criminal cases prior to and including verdict, finding of guilty
or not guilty by the court, or plea of guilty, be prescribed pursuant to the Act of June 29,
1940, c. 445, 54 Stat. 688, 18 U.S.C.A. 687
Following a 1948 judicial conference at which some of the Alice In Wonderland wording
was straightened out, the Supreme Court issued the following corrective order:

ORDER OF DECEMBER 27, 1948

The following order was adopted by the Supreme Court on December 27, 1948.
1. That the title of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure be, and is hereby is, amended
to read as follows:
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts.
The formal title, and proper application of the [Federal] Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts has remained essentially the same since. Section 1 of the
most recent order affirms application, as follows:

ORDER OF APRIL 23, 1996

1. That the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Court be,
and they hereby are, amended

Rule 1 for the United States District Courts, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is as
follows:
Rule 1. Scope

These rules govern the procedure in all criminal proceedings in the courts of the United
States, as provided in Rule 54(a); and, whenever specifically provided in the rules, to
preliminary, supplementary, and special proceedings before United States magistrate
judges and at proceedings before state and local judicial officers.

Rule 54(a), supra, in relevant part, affirms the assertion that the rules apply only to
proceedings in Article IV United States District Courts: "(a) Courts. These rules apply to
all criminal proceedings in the United States District Court"
Here is where the rubber meets the road: 18 USC 3231, in compliance with 4 USC
72, vests authority in Article III district courts of the United States:

The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

Rule 54(c ) defines, or applies, the term "State", in a stand-alone position, as follows:

"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

The Rule 54(c ) application for the term "Act of Congress" narrows down the matter of
where any given legislation is applicable:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the
District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.

The various Acts of Congress promulgated under Article IV 3.2 authority are applicable
in and limited to Congress' legislative jurisdiction over territory belonging to the United
States. This authority does not reach the Union of several States party to the Constitution
and the American people at large. Further, Civil Law, which can be likened to admiralty
or executive rule over conquered peoples, cannot extend inland to the Union of several
States party to the Constitution. Therefore, Article III district courts of the United States,
located in the Union of several States, are obliged to operate within rules and forums
prescribed by the English-American common law at the time the Constitution (1789) and
the Bill of Rights (1791) were implemented. The sovereign American people carry the
constitutionally secured right to substantive due process of law, as contemplated by the
"arising under" clause at Article III 2.1, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Amendments, throughout what might be described as the "American Empire" anywhere
they might be subject to Federal authority. The constitutionally secured rights of the
sovereign people, along with unalienable and inherent rights not enumerated (Ninth
Amendment), are antecedent to constitutionally enumerated powers delegated to the
United States (Tenth Amendment).
The riddle is resolved in the following fashion: Article III district courts of the United
States are vested with original jurisdiction regarding felony crimes against the United
States (18 USC 3231, 1st paragraph), within jurisdiction of the geographical United
States, as defined at 21 USC 7. The Article III district court of the United States, as
defined at 28 USC 451, must operate within rules and forums prescribed by the

English-American common law, as contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article


III 2.1, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments.
Article IV United States District Courts empowered by statute at 18 USC 23 (Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands), and Rule 54(a), F.R.Crim.P. for the
United States District Courts, (Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands,
and formerly, the Canal Zone), may prosecute felony offenses prescribed in Title 18 and
other titles of the United States Code. These Article IV courts, and United States District
Courts located in the Union of several States party to the Constitution, operate under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, both written
specifically for United States District Courts.
The obvious question is why Congress established Article IV territorial courts within the
Union of several States. There is a legitimate answer beyond the obvious deception:
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States accommodate the
Federal Magistrate System. The responsibility of this system is limited to misdemeanor
and petty offenses committed on Federal territory within the Union of several States
where the United States has secured exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction in compliance
with provisions of Article I 8.17 of the Constitution, and/or 40 USC 255: (1) the
United States must secure title to land; (2) the State legislature must cede jurisdiction (see
title 80, Oklahoma Statutes, 1, 2 & 3, and corresponding cession laws for other Union
states); and (3) the United States must formally accept jurisdiction.
The Constitutional grant for Congress to secure jurisdiction is at Article I 8.17, and is
limited to the seat of government (District of Columbia), forts, magazines, arsenals,
dockyards, and other needful buildings. However, two categories of land were retained by
the United States in States admitted to the Union after about 1870: Lands set aside by
treaty as Native American Indian reservations, and unappropriated public lands, most of
which are designated as national parks and forests (see Constitution of Oklahoma, Article
I 3).

Rule 54(b)(4) leads the way to determining subject matter jurisdiction of United States
District Courts located in the Union of several States:

(4) Proceedings Before United States Magistrate Judges. Proceedings involving


misdemeanor and other petty offenses are governed by Rule 58.

The United States magistrate judge, created and duties prescribed at 28 USC 631-639,
is almost as illusive as the United States District Court: Originally he was a national park
commissioner, required to live in or near the national park where he would serve as
commissioner. He has gone through several title changes, including United States
commissioner and United States magistrate, until finally settling into black robes under
the current handle United States magistrate judge. The term "judge" is a misnomer.
However, the United States Magistrate System, accommodated by United States District
Courts within the Union of several States, is governed by 18 USC 3401
misdemeanors and application of probation laws. Subject matter jurisdiction comes
primarily from other titles of the United States Code.
The Federal Magistrate System has been implemented under regulations promulgated by
the Defense Logistics Agency, relating to military installations (32 CFR, Part 1290.1 et
seq.), and the Bureau of Land Management, relating to national parks, forests, etc. (43
CFR, Part 9260.0-1, et seq.). Department of Justice regulations governing proceedings
are at 28 CFR, Part 52.01, et seq.
Limitations on the United States magistrate judge are found at Rule 5, F.R.Crm.P. for
USDC, subsections (b) and (c ), as applicable:

(b) Misdemeanors and Other Petty Offenses. If the charge against the defendant is a
misdemeanor or other petty offenses triable by a United States magistrate judge under 18
U.S.C. 3401, the magistrate judge shall proceed in accordance with Rule 58.
(c ) Offenses not Triable by the United States Magistrate Judge. If the charge against the
defendant is not triable by the United States magistrate judge, the defendant shall not be
called upon to plead

Arguably, no offense by any of the sovereign American people is triable by a United


States magistrate judge as he has no authority in law not law which may be imposed on
the sovereign American people. To demonstrate, it is useful to consider the scope of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Supreme Court of
the United States order. December 29, 1948), as articulated in Rules 1 and 2:

Rule 1. Scope and Purpose of Rules.


These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions
stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.
Rule 2. One Form of Action.
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action".

Law and equity, law being English-American common law, simply do not mix or merge.
They are two distinct systems. And that is more certainly the case for admiralty, the law
of the sea. In Article III 2.1 of the Constitution, law and equity are two distinct classes

of case covered by the "arising under" clause, and admiralty and maritime cases, as well
as jurisdiction, are distinct and separate law and equity are applicable within the Union
of several States; admiralty and maritime jurisdiction follows the ebb and flow of the sea
under United States jurisdiction.
The notion that all may be joined under a single set of rules, to be designated "civil
action", is absurd. What the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for United States District
Courts imposes is a modern derivation of Roman Civil Law, with Civil Law being the
fraternal twin to maritime law the admiralty, whether prince or captain, is sovereign and
supreme. This stands in contradiction to common law, which is predicated on historically
proven natural law ("the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" [Declaration of
Independence]), where man is not only created in the image of his Creator, but is
endowed with "certain unalienable rights", and only then is government "instituted
among men" with specifically delegated authority. Civil Law is both foreign and
repugnant to the Constitution and other components of the organic law of the United
States.
The nature of the Federal State a territory of the United States was articulated in Ex
parte Morgan, D.C.Ark. 1883, 20 F. 298:

A territory under the Constitution and laws of the United States is an in-choate state a
portion of the country not included within the limits of any state, and not yet admitted as
a state into the Union, but organized under the laws of Congress, with a separate
legislature, under a territorial governor and other officers appointed by the President and
Senate of the United States.

Congress stands supreme in territories of the United States; Congress may exercise only
constitutionally delegated authority where the Union of several States party to the
Constitution and the sovereign American people are concerned. This is tacitly articulated

in the historical note following repealed 48 USC 1490, which sheds light on the
approximate state of affairs in about 1951:
HISTORICAL NOTE

The source of most sections in this chapter [Provisions of a General Nature relating to
United States territories and possessions] is the Revised Statutes enacted in 1873 and
other early statutes. The Revised Statutes can no longer apply to contiguous territory,
Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands each has its own organic act,
providing a complete system of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. The
Canal Zone has its code of laws. The independence of the Philippine Islands was
recognized by 1946 Proc. No. 2653, July 4, 1946, set out in note under 1394 of Title 22,
Foreign Relations and Intercourse. The other possessions, such as Samoa, are covered by
special provisions set out elsewhere in this title [title 48].

Each of the territories named above had United States territorial courts, known after 1948
as United States District Courts, and most were named at one time or another in Rule
54(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for United States District Courts, as having
general jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against the United States. Since the historical
note was written, Puerto Rico adopted a constitution and became a commonwealth,
although remaining under Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction (1953), and
Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union of several States party to the Constitution
(1959). Congress has since conferred status as "citizen of the United States" on citizens of
Guam and American Samoa citizens of Puerto Rico are citizens of the geographical
United States, as are citizens of the District of Columbia.
Although the Alice in Wonderland language identifying the Article IV United States
District Court wasn't finalized until 1948, United States territorial courts have been
around since the United States began aggressive expansion. The character of the courts,

and source of authority, was addressed by Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance
Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828):

These [territorial] courts then, are not Constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are
incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general
rights of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of the clause which
enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is
conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body
possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be
exercised in the States in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the 3d
article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of the
State government.

A more contemporary, and definitive, statement which specifically addresses the "United
States District Court" was made in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921):

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article
III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under
Article IV, Section 3 of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction
to that of true United States courts in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting
to a tribunal not subject to local influence does not change its character as a mere
territorial court.

Finally, "The United States District Court has only such jurisdiction as Congress
confers." Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin, 191 F.Supp. 245 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).
The nature of the United States District Court is characterized by the United States
magistrate judge. The United States magistrate judge holds an administrative office he
has only a ministerial capacity, he does not have a true judicial capacity. He is appointed
by Article III judges, but they are carrying out delegated administrative responsibilities
relating to an administrative, quasi-judicial system known as the Federal Magistrate
System, accommodated by the legislative-territorial United States District Court. As other
administrative agencies, the Federal Magistrate System must (1) operate within the
confines of special law (4 USC 72), and (2) there must be implementing regulations
which prescribe application of the law (44 USC 1505(a) and 5 USC 552).
Special law which implements the Federal Magistrate System for the United States
District Court located in the Union of several States is 18 USC 3401, along with
various other provisions in titles 16, 18, etc., and the regulations are those promulgated
by the Defense Logistics Agency and Bureau of Land Management, cited supra. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other United
States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the Constitution,
have no authority beyond that prescribed by 18 USC 3401 and attending regulations.
The acid test is found at 28 USC 2072, which extends authority for the Supreme Court
of the United States to promulgate rules for the United States District Courts. In
subsection (b), there are two defaults so far as application of the rules and limits of
territorial authority:

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.

The sovereign American people are assured of substantive due process of law, being
English-American common law process and forums, as contemplated by the "arising
under" clause at Article III 2.1 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and Federal Rules of Evidence, implement Civil Law, as does appeal rules predicated on
rules for the United States District Court, the Civil Law being a form of law both foreign
and repugnant to the Constitution. Therefore, rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of
the United States under authority of 28 USC 2072 cannot extend to and adversely affect
the sovereign American people and the Union of several States party to the Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment due process clause serves as an absolute ban so far as the
sovereign American people are concerned:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

The second fatal element is this: So far as the Union of several States and the sovereign
American people are concerned, Congress may not delegate legislative authority to the
other branches of government. The separation of powers contemplated by the
Constitution presumes that legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government
will operate independently, with each carrying out power delegated to it without
assuming powers or delegating powers to the others.
In a dissenting position taking exception to the Supreme Court order of February 28,
1966, Justice Black cited a position he and Justice Douglas previously took:

In a statement accompanying a previous transmittal to the civil rules, MR. JUSTICE


DOUGLAS AND I said:
"MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS are opposed to the submission
of these rules to the Congress under a statute which permits them to 'take effect' and to
repeal 'all laws in conflict with such rules' without requiring any affirmative
consideration, action, or approval of the rules by Congress or by the President. We
believe that while some of the Rules of Civil Procedure are simply housekeeping details,
many determine matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in lawsuits that in
practical effect they are the equivalent of now legislation which, in our judgment, the
Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and approved by the
President. The Constitution, as we read it, provides that all laws shall be enacted by the
House, the Senate, and the President, not by the mere failure of Congress to reject
proposals of an outside agency. ***" (Footnotes omitted.) 374 U.S. 865-866.

So far as Congress' delegated power is concerned, Federal rules of procedure and


evidence go much further than simply making new law they accommodate Civil Law,
which is not authorized or recognized by the Constitution, and even if Civil Law was
authorized, merging of law, equity and admiralty into a single system with universal
application, contrary to clear divisions set out in Article III 2.1 of the Constitution,
would amount to Congress authorizing the judicial branch of government to unilaterally
amend the Constitution. The Constitution does not provide the judicial branch of the
Federal government a role in amending the Constitution. Nor do Congress or the
President have authority to delegate their respective roles in national government to other
branches each branch must function in its own capacity, as powers of the various
offices are specifically delegated by the Constitution.
Therefore, all rules promulgated under authority of 28 USC 2072 must be applicable
only to the geographical United States under Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative

jurisdiction, or they must be defaulted due to the judicial branch of government lacking
constitutionally-vested legislative authority, and no authority to unilaterally amend the
Constitution.
Conclusion
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution, do not have statutory or regulatory authority to prosecute felony crimes
even when said crimes are committed on Federal enclaves located in the Union of several
States, as defined at 18 USC 7(3).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution, are legislative-territorial courts that have no authority whatever beyond
United States jurisdiction within the Union of several States save on Federal enclaves,
defined at 18 USC 7(3) and secured in accordance with provisions of Article I 8.17 of
the Constitution and 40 USC 255.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution, impose a merged system of Civil Law and Maritime Law, under
modernized Admiralty rules, and are therefore incompetent at law as contemplated by the
"arising under' clause at Article III 2.1 and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles
of Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, they may not deprive the sovereign
American people of life, liberty, or property.
2. Petitioner alleges that agencies of the United States, including the office of the United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and the Department of Justice of
the United States, and the Internal Revenue Service, the latter an agency of the
Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, operating in the Continental United States as an

independent contractor to provide systems development and record-keeping services for


the Treasury of the United States, and the Article IV legislative-territorial United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, lack five essential elements of
authority to prosecute the instant matter in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution of the United States, the Oklahoma republic included.
The five essential elements are as follows:
(1) The agency, department, or court must operate within the framework of powers
delegated to the United States, principally via powers delegated to Congress via Article I
8 of the Constitution (governed by the Tenth Article of Amendment, Constitution of the
United States);
(2) All departments of United States Government, including the United States District
Court, may operate only within the current borders of the Seat of Government, being the
District of Columbia, (4 USC 71), and may not operate beyond the Seat of Government
unless they are authorized to operate elsewhere by special law (4 USC 72), and then
must operate within confines prescribed by said law;
(3) When Congress by statute vests the President of the United States with authority, the
President may delegate the authority by Executive Order, providing the Executive Order
is published in the Federal Register, giving the general population notice of authority
delegation (3 USC 301);
(4) When the President delegates authority to an administrative agency head or an
executive officer such as the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, etc., or
Congress by statute vests authority in an executive officer, the officer may re-delegate
authority to others within affected agencies in compliance with requirements of the
Federal Register Act by publishing such delegation in the Federal Register (44 USC
1505(a));

(5) And the executive officer or agency head in whom administrative authority for any
given title or chapter of the United States Code is vested must publish general regulations
in the United States Code is vested must publish general regulations in the Federal
Register for all statutes that have general application, per mandate of the Administrative
Procedures Act (5 USC 552) and the Federal Register Act (44 USC 1501 et seq.,
specific publishing requirements at 1505(a)).
Petitioner alleges that where matters at hand are concerned, the decision in United States
vs. Constantine, 296 U.S. (Dec. 1935), has significance as this decision was responsible
for amalgamation of fraud presently perpetrated in large part by the Internal Revenue
Service, and has a bearing on matters at hand.
The Constantine case came shortly after ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in
1933, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, the Eighteenth responsible for national
prohibition. Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment gave State officials and officials of
the United States concurrent jurisdiction with respect to laws affecting production and
distribution of intoxicating liquors (distilled spirits in general). When the Twenty-First
Amendment repealed the Eighteenth, each State was empowered to make its own laws
relating to production and distribution of intoxicating liquors, and the Federal
Government lost the constitutionally delegated authority for concurrent jurisdiction
relating to State liquor laws, taxes, etc.
As a result of the Constantine decision, administration of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act (enacted in 1935, seemingly intended to replace 1926 Federal
legislation) was moved off shore under authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Puerto Rico, via Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940the historical note located on page
794 of the United States Government Manual, 1995/96 edition, lists the Internal Revenue
Service as successor of the Federal Alcohol Administration, but the name of the IRS
predecessor in existence in 1940 was the Bureau of Internal Revenue, not the Internal
Revenue Service. It is significant that Congress never created a "Bureau of Internal

Revenue". The name changed from BIR to IRS was done via T.D.O. No. 150-29, in 1953.
The linking U.S. Government Manual note follows:

Alcohol Control Administration, Federal


Established by EO 6474 of Dec. 4, 1933. Abolished Sept. 24, 1935, on induction into
office of Administrator, Federal Alcohol Administration, as provided in act of Aug. 29,
1935 (49 Stat. 977). Abolished by Reorg. Plan No. III of 1940, effective June 30, 1940,
and functions consolidated with activities of Internal Revenue Service.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, (Puerto Rico Trust No. 62 (Internal
Revenue)), and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Philippines (Philippines Trust No. 2
(internal revenue)), had administered the China Trade Act, which governed trade in
opium, cocaine, and citric wines, from approximately 1904 until the Act was repealed in
1938, replace by other treaty agreements. The Philippines became an independent
commonwealth in 1946, leaving BIR, Puerto Rico, which continued to administer United
States maritime treaties pertaining to narcotics and cocaine, and beginning in 1940,
administration of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which remains in effect (see
listing, 27 CFR, Part 1).
Constantine pointed out that once the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed, the United
States lost the constitutional delegation of authority necessary to enforce State liquor
laws. Consequently, Federal agents responsible for enforcing liquor laws could not
enforce them in the Union of several States where Federal law did not extend to the
several States.
A more contemporary decision which addresses the matter of constitutionally delegated
authority was given in New York vs. United States, 550 __, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 120 S.Ct.
__ (1992). Headnote 6 states as follows:

In a case involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the
inquires as to whether an act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to
Congress in Article I of the Federal Constitution, or sovereignty reserved by the
Constitution's Tenth Amendment, are mirror images of each other: if a power is delegated
to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any
reservation of that power to the state, whereas if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution
has not conferred on Congress; the Tenth Amendment directs the courts to determine
whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
(headnote 25) States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States, and state
government are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the federal
government; the Federal Constitution instead leaves to the several states a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty, reserved explicitly to the states by the Constitution's Tenth
Amendment.

In New York vs. United States, the court went on to say that if the Constitution does not
delegate an authority to the United States, the several States may not accommodate
Federal exercise of a power which is not granted, but must first secure a constitutional
amendment. The decision also addressed the obvious, calling on judicial wisdom of the
past: The question where constitutional government is concerned is not what powers
government should have, but what powers are specifically delegated. Those who exceed
constitutionally delegated authority invariably do so for self-serving ends, the decision
concludes.
This notion is fundamental to matters at hand as the central question is not what powers
the Constitution delegates, which might support what Congress has done, but more on the

order of what Congress had done and the relationship of congressional and agency acts
relative to the Constitution.
Where the instant matter is concerned, legitimacy of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of
Justice, and the United States Attorney, relies on performance of legitimate functions
within the constitutional framework, but there are two different constitutional frameworks
to consider: Congress' Article I delegated authority as it applies to the Union of several
States party to the Constitution, and Congress' plenary power over territory belonging to
the United States. Under provisions of Article IV 3.2 of the Constitution, Congress may
make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory belonging to the United States.
Any given Act of Congress, or act of any agency or government official, may be
legitimate in the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV 3.2
legislative jurisdiction, but not in the Union of several States party to the Constitution,
where Congress may exercise only delegated powers, most of which are enumerated at
Article I 8 of the Constitution.
The character of the Internal Revenue Service, supra, is material to the instant matter, as
this matter (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. DAN LESLIE MEADOR, etc., 96-CR113-C), the two Moore-Gunwall cases prosecuted in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma (95-CR-129-C & 96-CR-082-C0, and the alleged
Federal grand jury investigation of "common law" courts held in Oklahoma (November
1995), were all the result of complaints allegedly made by or under supervision of Tracy
Foster, an inspector with the IRS Internal Security Division (see Foster testimony,
Meador trial transcript). Therefore, the common corpus of allegations of offense by
petitioner are predicated on the presumption that the November 1995 grand jury
investigation was legitimate and authorized by law, that prosecution of the 1996 MooreGunwall case was in fact a lawful proceeding, and that the Internal Revenue Service and
the "United States of America" have standing to prosecute causes in the Union of several
States party to the Constitution.

Theoretically, Congress might levy, collect and enforce income tax laws (Sixteenth
Amendment, 1913), but in reality, the so-called "income tax" prescribed in Subtitle A of
the Internal Revenue Code (Vol. 68A, Statutes at Large, as amended in 1986 and since) is
the "normal tax", first levied in 1862 against wages of officers and employees of the
United States, then renewed sometime prior to 1921 the "normal tax" is today levied
only against wages of officers and employees of the United States, United States political
subdivisions, and officers of corporations where the Untied States has a proprietary
interest (see definition at 26 USC 3401(c )). The corporate income tax which was
effected at approximately the time the Sixteenth Amendment was promulgated was
repealed by the Internal Revenue Act of Nov. 23, 1921.
Aside from simply not being a tax levied under Sixteenth Amendment authority, making
whatever authority the United States might have via the Sixteenth Amendment irrelevant,
the special taxes prescribed in Subtitles A & C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended in 1986 and since, do not rely on a specific constitutional grant of authority as
they are predicated on Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction in the selfinterested United States, and certain privileges and benefits derived from government
employment.
One of the non-constitutional "privileges" derived from employment for United States
Government is the privilege of discharging rather than paying debt, with the medium
being "public money" predicated on obligations of the United States (see 31 CFR, Part
202, et seq., relating to Federal Tax and Loan Depositaries). It is a scheme that operates
completely outside the Constitution there is no Article I constitutional authority for
Congress to substitute this mathematically impossible and therefore fraudulent credit and
monetary system, and no constitutional grant of authority for the Union of several States
party to the Constitution to participate (see particularly, Article I 8.5, 8.6 & 10.1,
Constitution of the United States).
Where the instant matter is concerned, authority must originally be seated with the
Internal Revenue Service since Ms. Foster, in her capacity as an officer, agent or

employee of IRS, is initiator of all related matters. However, it is useful to consider all
authorities for key agencies of the United States involved, including the office of the
United States Attorney, the Department of Justice, and the United States District Court,
elsewhere demonstrated to be an Article IV legislative-territorial-statutory court of the
United States.
So far as constitutional authority concerning Congress' responsibility to prescribe and/or
prosecute crimes, it is extremely limited except under Article IV 3.2 authority relating
to territories belonging to the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States had
the following to say on the matter in the first decade after United States government
convened under the Constitution:

In relation to crimes and punishments, the objects of the delegated power of the United
States are enumerated and fixed. Congress may provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States and may define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations. Art. I s. 8 But there is no reference to a common law authority: Every power
is [a] matter of definite and positive grant; and the very powers that are granted cannot
take effect until they are exercised through the medium of law. United States vs. Worrall,
2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 384, 391 (1798)

The Fourteenth Amendment and several amendments promulgated since 1870 expand
United States authority relative to voting and civil rights violations against "citizens of
the United States", and might conceivably extend authority relating to a true income tax
levied under authority of the Sixteenth Amendment, but the United States does not have
general civil and criminal jurisdiction throughout the Union of several States party to the
Constitution. Without a special constitutional grant of authority, per U.S. vs. Constantine
and New York vs. United States, supra, courts of the United States, whether Article III
judicial courts (district courts of the United States), or Article IV legislative-territorial

courts (United States District Courts), lack subject matter jurisdiction within the Union of
several States save on Federal enclaves, defined as United States special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction, per 18 USC 7(3).
In many instances, prosecutors for the "United States of America" (a government foreign
to the United States) predicate prosecution of offenses on the commerce clause (Art. I
8.3), but there is an inherent fallacy in this notion as no specific authority for prescribing
punishment is enumerated in the Constitution (Tenth Amendment block; U.S. vs. Warrall,
supra), and Title 18 of the United States Code addresses only offenses committed in the
geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction,
and United States admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The term "interstate commerce" is
defined at 18 USC 10, reproduced in relative part:

10. Interstate commerce and foreign commerce defined.


The term "interstate commerce", as used in this title, includes commerce between one
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and another State, Territory,
Possession, or the District of Columbia.

Application of the term "State" at Rule 54(c ), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for
United States District Courts (territorial courts of the United States), clarifies
geographical limitations of the above definition:

"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

The Union of several States party to the Constitution is excluded only territory subject
to Congress' Article IV 3.2 plenary (municipal) power is included. Thus, United States

subject matter and territorial jurisdiction are concurrent Title 18 of the United States
Code, as well as Titles 19, 21, 26 and 48, along with most other titles of the United States
Code, are limited to United States territorial and maritime jurisdiction, as 18 USC 7
clearly indicates. These titles do not apply to the Union of several States unless a given
statute or Act specifically references the several States party to the Constitution.
Unless a specific constitutionally delegated power is entered into record to authenticate
Federal criminal prosecution, Congress' Article IV legislative jurisdiction extends only to
territory belonging to the United States, so Federal territorial and subject matter
jurisdiction are concurrent. The fact is verified in numerous court decisions, the following
among them:

Without proof of the requisite ownership or possession [of land] by the United States, the
crime has not been made out. U.S. vs. Benson, 495 F.2d 475, at 481 (1974).
All courts of justice are duty-bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extend of
jurisdiction, although these acts are not formally put into evidence, nor in accord with
pleadings. Jones vs. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 11 S.Ct. 80 (1890)
Federal criminal jurisdiction is never presumed; it must always be proven; and it can
never be waived. U.S. vs. Rogers, 23 Fed. 658 (United States District Court, W.D. Ark.,
1885)
Unlike most state courts of general jurisdiction, in which jurisdiction is generally
presumed unless contrary is demonstrated, in federal district courts absence of
jurisdiction is generally presumed unless party invoking federal jurisdiction clearly
demonstrates that it exists. State of La. Vs. Sprint Communications Co., 892 F.Supp. 145.

In principle, the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States [Congress' Article
IV 3.2 legislative jurisdictional], is not addressed to subject matter, but to specific
geographical locations, per U.S. vs. Bevons, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818). It is
axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove territorial jurisdiction over a crime, in
order to sustain a conviction therefor, U.S. vs. Benson, 495 F2d. 475, at 481 (1974).

When a federal court is without jurisdiction over the offense a judgment of conviction by
the court and/or by the jury is void ad initio, on its face. Bauman vs. U.S., 156 F.2d 534
(5th Cir. 1946).

The connection between territorial and subject matter jurisdiction is made by the
following:

The subject-matter of a criminal offense is the crime itself. Subject-matter in its broadest
sense means the cause; the object; the thing in dispute. Stilwell vs. Menkham, 10 P.2d 15,
16 (Kan. 1932)

Jurisdiction of the subject matter is derived from the law. It can neither be waived nor
conferred by consent of the accused. Objection to the court over the subject matter may
be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is never
waived. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired by
consent of the accused or by waiver of objections. 21 Am.Jur.2d, "Criminal Law", 339,
p.589.
The appearance of conflict above is resolved by the following:

The law creates courts and defines their powers. Consent cannot authorized a judge to do
what the law has not given him the power to do. Singleton vs. Commonwealth, 208 S.W.
2d 325, 327, 306 Ky. 454 (1948).

Under Congress Article I delegated authority, the United States potentially has
jurisdiction from sea to shining sea (Article III 2.3 limitation of United States judicial
authority excepting), with the Union of several States party to the Constitution included.
However, when Congress exercises Article IV 3.2 legislative authority, subject matter
and territorial jurisdiction extend only so far as territorial borders of territories belonging
to the United States. Within the framework of Congress' Article IV 3.2 capacity, the
United States, as a self-interested entity, is foreign to each of the several States party to
the Constitution in the same sense and to at least the same extent one of the several States
is to the others.
As a consequence, Congress' authority, and therefore United States territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction, rests on the capacity Congress was acting in when promulgating
legislation: If Congress was acting under Article IV 3.2 municipal authority, territorial
and subject matter jurisdiction are limited to the geographical United States (territory
belonging to the United States), and is foreign to the Union of several States party to the
Constitution.
The sovereignty of the several States, including those admitted on equal footing after the
original thirteen established national government under the Constitution of the United
States, was specifically articulated in Pollard vs. Hagen, 44 U.S. 213, 221, 233, as
follows:

the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right to soil in
Alabama or any of the new states which were formed The United States has no
Constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent

domain, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted Alabama is therefore


entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all territory within her limits, subject to
the common law.

Implications relating to Federal jurisdiction limits, and the possibility of compromising


Federal jurisdiction on enclaves within the several States, were framed in Senate hearings
reported in the "Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction
Over Federal Areas Within the States", Part II, "A Text of the Law of Legislative
Jurisdiction", June 1957, page 199, in the section titled, "Relation of States to Federal
Enclaves":

One of the Navy officers testifying at the Senate hearing raised a question as to the effect
on the Federal criminal jurisdiction over Federal areas of a grant to the States of
concurrent jurisdiction for tax matters. The Attorney General of the United States raised
the same question in commenting on the bill by letter to the Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee:
From the standpoint of the enforcement of the criminal law, the legislation may result in
an embarrassment which is probably unintended. Criminal jurisdiction of the Federal
courts is restricted to Federal reservations over which the Federal Government has
exclusive jurisdiction, as well as to forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other
needful buildings (U.S.C., title 18, par. 3d [now 18 USC 7 (3)]. A question would arise
as to whether, by permitting the levy of sales and personal-property taxes on Federal
reservations, the Federal Government has ceded back to the States its exclusive
jurisdiction over Federal reservations and has retained only concurrent jurisdiction over
such areas. The result may be the loss of Federal criminal jurisdiction over numerous
reservations, would be deplorable.

Due to concerns of the Attorney General and others, in which limits of Federal
jurisdiction within the several States was clearly being that prescribed at what is now 18
USC 7 (3) was articulated, a special provision reserving Federal jurisdiction was added
to legislation granting authority of States to levy taxes in Federal areas located within
their respective borders.
The several States, by virtue of the Treaty of Peace, were recognized as sovereign
political bodies within their respective geographical bounds. By way of the Constitution
of the United States, the People of the [u]nited States of America delegated certain
enumerated powers to the United States, by way of legislative authority vested in
Congress, exclusive of executive and judicial branches of government. Among those
powers was authority for Congress to acquire land for the United States for specific
purposes and by prescribed means (Article I 8.17, Constitution of the United States),
and to make all needful rules and regulations necessary for administration of lands so
acquired (Article IV 3.2, Constitution of the United States). Authority relating to the
territories of the United States subject to Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction
differs from Article I enumerated powers applicable to the Union of several States party
to the Constitution and people situated in the several States.
Therefore, the Constitution of the United States, being the law of the land, is a paramount
issue for any and all criminal prosecution by Federal authorities: It is the sole source of
authority for the United States, and when challenged, those responsible for prosecuting
alleged offenses against the United States must disclose and demonstrate the root of
constitutional authority to establish territorial and/or subject-matter jurisdiction. In the
absence of constitutionally enumerated powers, Federal officials have no authority in the
Union of several States.
Petitioner alleges that no such authority is in evidence where the instant matter is
concerned, so the root and foundation of fundamental law necessary for Federal
government to prosecute the instant matter is absent.

As demonstrated in another section, the United States Code is not law, it is merely
evidence of law, so no law is in evidence to support prosecution of the instant matter (18
USC 1503 & 1504 are merely evidence of law, the Statutes at Large are missing, with
the Statutes at Large being the law necessary to support prosecution), but the United
States Code is sufficient for demonstrating statutory, delegation, and regulatory authority
necessary for any given Government agency, or contract agencies such as Internal
Revenue Service, to secure legal standing to sustain causes against people situated in the
Union of several States party to the Constitution of the United States.
The character and line of authority of the Internal Revenue Service, which operates under
direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury, Puerto
Rico, and application of Internal Revenue Code criminal statutes, demonstrates how the
four essential elements relating to statutory authority, Presidential and executive officer
delegations of authority, and regulations prescribing application of statutes, are essential
to all criminal prosecution by Federal authorities.
The instant matter arises from Government initiatives on behalf of the "United States of
America" and the Internal Revenue Service, for criminal prosecution of Kenney F. Moore
and Colleen Moore, who live in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, and Wayne Richard Gunwall,
who lives in Ponca City, Oklahoma, for alleged interference with administration of
internal revenue laws (26 USC 7212(a)). The Moores and Mr. Gunwall were indicted in
1995 (95-CR-129-C) but after petitioner composed a letter framing criminal complaints
against H. Dale Cook, Neal B. Kirkpatrick, Sam Joyner, Tracy Foster, and others, and
sent the complaint in care of the court clerk for the United States District Court, Northern
District of Oklahoma, for delivery to the foreman of the grand jury then thought to be
convened for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Mr. Kirkpatrick entered a motion for the
indictment against the Moores and Mr. Gunwall to be dismissed. H. Dale Cook, serving
as magistrate of the Article IV United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, dismissed the case. The Moores and Mr. Gunwall were subsequently indicted
on basically the same charges, with 26 USC 7212(a) once again the core charge, in
1996 (96-CR-082-C). Petitioner assisted the Moores with construction of a pleading

styled as a refusal for cause which was filed in response to the 1996 summons mailed to
the Moores when charges were reinstated (should have been treated as a motion to
dismiss, per Rule 54(c ), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Court).
As is the case where the instant matter is concerned, the prosecuting attorney in the office
of the United States Attorney, serving as agent for the "United States of America" and the
"Internal Revenue Service", failed to verify constitutional authority to establish territorial
or subject matter jurisdiction for the two Moore-Gunwall indictments.
As demonstrated elsewhere, the "United States of America" is a government foreign to
the "United States" and the Union of several States party to the Constitution. The "United
States of America" is not authorized as a governmental entity by the Constitution of the
United States, or titles 18, 19, 21, 26 or 28 of the United States Code. Because the
"United States of America" nature and territorial authority have been treated extensively
in a separate section, that matter will not be treated here. However, it is useful to
demonstrate that standing must be proven in record:

Standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather
must affirmatively appear in record; it is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of
jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to
invoke judicial resolution of the dispute; the parties must allege facts essential to show
jurisdiction, and if they fail to make the necessary allegations, they have not standing.
FW/PBX, Inc. vs. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603.

As demonstrated supra and in other sections, the Internal Revenue Service is an agency
of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, under direction of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the office in the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, where the
original office of Commissioner of Internal Revenue, created by Act of July 1862 and

effectively abolished with adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1873, was in the Treasury
of the United States, a/k/a Treasury Department.
The fact that the Internal Revenue Service is not an agency of the Department of the
Treasury of the United States is verified by consulting the list of Department of the
Treasury agencies in Title 31 of the United States Code. Also of particular significance
where the instant matter is concerned, the Department of the Treasury of the United
States is an executive department, the Treasury of the United States is a Congressional
department, with the General Accounting Office, under direction of the Comptroller
General, being distinct, separate, and responsible for collection of obligations to the
United States, including taxes owed under provisions of Subtitles A & C of the Internal
Revenue Code (Vol. 68A of the Statutes at Large), as amended in 1986 and since.
The Internal Revenue Service, successor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico,
(T.D.O. No. 150-29, 1953), operates out of or in conjunction with Puerto Rico Trust No.
62 (Internal Revenue), which is still administered by the Secretary of the Treasury (31
USC 1321). The Internal Revenue Service has delegated authority to collect certain
customs taxes in United States off-shore territories of the United States, and United States
maritime jurisdiction.
The so-called "income tax" prescribed in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is not
generally included in authority delegated to the Internal Revenue Service. The "income
tax" is simply the "normal tax" preserved in the Internal Revenue Act of November 23,
1921, and the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 (see Statutes at Large). The "normal tax", as
the name of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 suggests, applies only to Government
employees and officers of corporations construed to be instrumentalities of the United
States - corporate entities the United States retains a proprietary interest in. Definitions at
26 USC 3401(c ) & (d), which apply to withholding Subtitle A & C taxes at the source,
confirm this allegation. And as various regulations specify, withholding agents, not
employees in general, are the persons liable for these taxes (see 26 CFR, Part 1.1441,
etc.).

With Internal Revenue Service identity disclosed, tracking authority via (1) special
statute granting departments of government authority beyond the District of Columbia,
(2) the need for Presidential Executive Orders to delegate authority vested in the
President, (3) the need for executive officer delegations of authority, and (4) the need for
regulations which prescribe application of statute authority, will demonstrate that the
Internal Revenue Service lacks standing in the Continental United States, and that
prosecution of the Moore-Gunwall cases, predicated on 26 USC 7212(a), was patently
fraud and amounted to usurpation of power and operation under color of law.
Authority for administration of the Internal Revenue Code, reproduced here from Title
26, is at 7701(a)(12)(A) & 7805(a):

26 USC 7701(a) (Definitions)


(12) Delegate

(A) In general. The term "or his delegate" (i) when used with reference to the Secretary
of the Treasury, means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more
redelegations of authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in the context;
and (ii) when used with reference to any other official of the United States, shall be so
construed.

26 USC 7805(a), as follows:


(a) Authorization.

Except when such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than an
officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations
as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.

The Internal Revenue Service, which is not an agency of the Treasury of the Untied
States, a/k/a Treasury Department, or the Department of the Treasury, United States, may
collect Subtitle A & C taxes only as designated at 7701(a)(12)(B):

(B) Performance of certain functions in Guam and American Samoa. The term
"delegate," in relation to performance of functions in Guam or American Samoa with
respect to the taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2 and 21, also includes any officer or
employee of any other department or agency of the United States, or of any possession
thereof, duly authorized by the Secretary (directly, or indirectly by one or more
redelegations of authority) to perform such functions.

Statutory authority at sections 7701(a)(12)(A) and 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
meet criteria of 4 USC 72: Employees of the Treasury Department, a/k/a Treasury of
the United States, have statutory authority to collect and enforce provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code within the Continental United States so far as jurisdiction of the
Internal Revenue Code extends. The Department of the Treasury doesn't have this
authority, and the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, through the Internal
Revenue Service, doesn't have it.
Collection authority for Subtitle A & C taxes is conveyed via the Fair Debt Collection
Act, located in Title 5 of the United States Code, not Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue
Code. At 5 USC 5512, it is found that the General Accounting Office, as general agent
for the Treasury of the United States, and the Attorney General, in his capacity as

Solicitor of the Treasury, are responsible for collecting delinquent taxes owed to the
United States:

5512. Withholding pay; individuals in arrears


(a) the pay of an individual in arrears to the United States shall be withheld until he has
accounted for and paid into the Treasury of the United States all sums for which he is
liable.
(b) When pay is withheld under subsection (a) of this section, the General Accounting
Office, on request of the individual, his agent, or his attorney, shall report immediately to
the Attorney General the balance due; and the Attorney General, within 60 days, shall
order suit to be commenced against the individual.

The historical note following 5 USC 5512 discloses capacities:

In subsection (b), reference to the "General Accounting Office" is substituted for


"accounting officers of the Treasury" on authority of the Act of June 10, 1921, ch. 18,
title II, 42 Stat. 23. The words "on request of" are substituted for "if required to do so by"
as more accurately reflecting the intent. Reference to the "Attorney General" is
substituted for "Solicitor of the Treasury" and "Solicitor" on authority of section 16 of the
Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 212, 47 Stat. 1517; section 5 of E.O. 6166, June 10, 1933; and
Section 1 of 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 2, 64 Stat. 1261.

The role of the General Accounting Office, and authority concerning obligations of and to
the United States, was established by Act of Congress on June 10, 1921, at 42 Stat. 23, as
follows:

Title III. General Accounting Office


Sec. 301. There is created an establishment of the Government to be known as the
General Accounting Office, which shall be independent of the executive departments and
under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States. The
offices of Comptroller of the Treasury and Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury are
abolished, to take effect July 1, 1921. All other officers and employees of the Comptroller
of the Treasury shall become officers and employees in the General Accounting Office at
their grades and salaries on July 1, 1921, and all books, records, documents, papers,
furniture, office equipment and other property of the office of the Comptroller of the
Treasury shall become the property of the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller
General is authorized to adopt a seal for the General Accounting Office.

The significant section so far as the instant matter is concerned is 305, 42 Stat. 24, as
this amendment specifies that all claims of or against the United States are under
authority of the General Accounting Office:

Sec. 305. Section 236 of the Revised Statutes is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 236. All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the United States or
against it, and all accounts whatever in which the Government of the United States is
concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office."

The term "all" used in Sec. 305, amending Sec. 236 of the Revised Statutes, is inclusive
all authority relating to obligations of or to the United States must be settled and adjusted
in the General Accounting Office. Per 301, the General Accounting Office, as agent for
the Treasury of the United States, is an office independent of the executive branch of
government. The Department of the Treasury of the United States is an executive
department of United States Government; the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of
the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico. The Internal Revenue Code, at sections
7701(a)(12)(A) and 7805(a), vests authority in the Treasury Department, not the
Department of the Treasury of the United States, the Department of the Treasury, Puerto
Rico, or the Internal Revenue Service. By way of specific delegation of authority, the
Internal Revenue Service, as an agency of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico,
may administer chapter 1, 2 & 21 taxes in Guam and American Samoa (26 USC
7701(a)(12)(B)), as follows:

(B) Performance of certain functions in Guam and American Samoa. The term
"delegate," in relation to performance of functions in Guam or American Samoa with
respect to the taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2 and 21, also includes any officer or
employee of any other department or agency of the United States, or of any possession
thereof, duly authorized by the Secretary (directly, or indirectly by one or more
redelegations of authority) to perform such functions.

The Internal Revenue Code clearly splits lines of authority: The Treasury of the United
States, via the GAO, is responsible for collection of Subtitle A & C taxes, where
applicable, in the Continental United States; IRS, as an agency of the Department of the
Treasury, Puerto Rico, presumably has delegated authority to collect Subtitle A & C taxes
in Guam and American Samoa.
Verification that "internal revenue laws" are customs laws so far as establishing internal
revenue districts under authority of the President, at 26 USC 7621, is verified by

following the authorities for establishing internal revenue districts. This is done by
referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, (beginning on page 721 of the
1996 Index volume to the Code of Federal Regulations; the Table and other finding aids
are authorized at 55 USC 1510 and 1 CFR, Part 8.5). It is found that 26 USC 721 is
not listed. Therefore, per 44 USC 1505(a) of the Federal Register Act, there is no
authority for establishing revenue districts in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution, and the authority has no general affect on people indigenous to the several
States.
However, the President did delegate authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to
establish internal revenue districts via Executive Order No. 10289 (1951, as amended,
published following 3 USC 301). Authority conveyed in E.O. 10289 in addition to
authority to establish revenue districts, deals with authority to administer certain customs
laws and the Anti-Smuggling Act.
The Secretary of the Treasury subsequently removed certain United States off-shore
territories from customs district and region offices located in Florida, Georgia and New
York, and moved administration of customs laws (internal revenue laws) under authority
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, an office in the Department of the Treasury,
Puerto Rico.
By referencing Internal Revenue Code administrative regulations at 26 CFR, Part
301.7621-a (these regulations for the most part don't have general application), it is found
that E.O. No. 10289, relating to customs laws and the Anti-Smuggling Act, is the only
authority delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury to establish internal revenue districts.
Because application is only in United States maritime and off-shore territorial
jurisdiction, the Executive Order does not have to be published as a document of general
application that affects the Union of several States and people indigenous to the several
States. Therefore, it is not listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules as having
general application.

E.O. NO. 10289, in relative part, follows:

DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY


1. The secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform the
following-described functions of the President without the approval, ratification, or other
action of the President:
(a) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the act of August 1, 1914, c. 223,
38 Stat. 609, 623, as amended [section 2 of Title 19], (1) to rearrange, by consolidation or
otherwise, the several customs-collection districts, (2) to discontinue ports of entry by
abolishing the same and establishing others in their stead, and (3) to change from time to
time the location of the headquarters in any customs-collection district as the needs of the
service may require.
(b) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Anti-Smuggling Act of
August 5, 1935, c. 438, 49 Stat. 517 [section 1701 of Title 19], (1) to find and declare that
at any place within any area on the high seas adjacent to but outside customs waters any
vessel or vessels hover or are being kept off the coast of the United States and that, by
virtue of the presence of any such vessel or vessels at such place or within such area, the
unlawful introduction or removal into or from the United States of any merchandise or
person is being, or may be, occasioned, promoted, or threatened, (2) to find and declare
that certain waters on the high seas are in such proximity to such vessel or vessels that
such unlawful introduction or removal of merchandise or persons may be carried on by or
to or from such vessel or vessels, and (3) to find and declare that, within any customsenforcement area, the circumstances no longer exist which gave rise to the declaration of
such area as a customs-enforcement area.
(c ) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Act of August 26, 1985,
Public Law 98-89, 97 Stat. 510 (46 U.S.C. 3101) [section 3101 of Title 46, Shipping] to

suspend the provisions of law requiring the inspection of foreign-built vessels admitted to
American registry.
(d) The authority vested in the President by section 5 of the act of May 28, 1908, c. 212,
35 Stat. 425, as amended (46 U.S.C. Appendix 104)[section 104 of Title 46], to determine
(as a prerequisite to the extension of reciprocal privileges by the Commissioner of
Customs) that yachts used and employed exclusively as pleasure vessels and belonging to
any resident of the United States are allowed to arrive at and depart from any foreign port
and to cruise in the waters of such port without entering or clearing at the custom-house
thereof and without the payment of any charges for entering or clearing, dues, duty per
ton, tonnage taxes, or charges for cruising licenses.
(e) The authority vested in the President by section 2 of the act of March 24, 108, c. 96,
35 Stat. 46 (46 U.S.C. Appendix 134) [section 134 of Title 46], to name the hospital ships
to which section 1 of the said act shall apply and to indicate the time when the
exemptions thereby provided shall begin and end.
(f) The authority vested in the President by section 4228 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (46 U.S.C. Appendix 141) [section 141 of Title 46], (1) to declare that upon
satisfactory proof being given by the government of any foreign nation that no
discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the ports of such
nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the
produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States, or
upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United
States or from any foreign country the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and
impost within the United States are suspended and discontinued, so far as respects the
vessels of such foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported
into the United States from such foreign nation, or from any other foreign country, and
(2) to suspend in part the operation of section 4219 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
(46 U.S.C. Appendix 121) [section 121 of Title 46], and section IV, J, subsection 1 of the
act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat. 195, as amended (46 U.S.C. Appendix 146)

[section 146 of Title 46], so that foreign vessels from a country imposing partial
discriminating tonnage duties upon American vessels, or partial discriminating import
duties upon American merchandise, may enjoy in our ports the identical privileges which
the same class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in such country:
Provided, that prior to the issuance of an order of the Secretary of the Treasury
suspending and discontinuing (wholly or in part) discriminating tonnage duties, imposts,
and import duties within the United States, the Department of State shall obtain and
furnish to the Secretary of the Treasury any proof required by the said section 4228, as
amended, as the basis for that order.
(g) The authority vested in the President by section 3650 of the Internal Revenue Code
[now covered by section 7621 of Title 26], to establish convenient collection districts (for
the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting the taxes provided by the internal
revenue law), and from time to time to alter such districts.
(h) The authority which is now vested in the President by section 2564(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code [section 2564(b) of Title 26 (I.R.C. 1939)], and which on and after
January 1, 1955, will be vested in the President by section 4735(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 [section 4735(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [section
4735(b) of Title 26 (I.R.C. 1954)], to issue, in accordance with provisions of the said
section 2564(b) or 4735(b), as the case may be, orders providing for the registration and
the imposition of a special tax upon all persons in the Canal Zone who produce, import,
compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away narcotic drugs.
(i) The authority vested in the President by section 53218 of the Revised Statutes, as
amended (19 U.S.C. 540) [section 540 of Title 19, Customs duties], to employ suitable
vessels other than Coast Guard cutters in the execution of laws providing for the
collection of duties on imports and tonnage.
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform without
the approval, ratification, or other action of the President the following functions which

have heretofore, under the respective provisions of law cited, required the approval of the
President in connection with their performance by the Secretary of the Treasury:
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 6 of the act of July 8,
1937, c. 444, 50 Stat. 480 [section 728 of Title 40], to make rules and regulations
necessary for the execution of the functions vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the
said act, as amended.
(b), (c ) & (d) revoked

(e) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 1 of Title II of the act
of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 220 [section 191 of Title 50], to make rules and
regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in
the territorial waters of the United States.

Although 26 USC 7621 is not listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and rules as
having general application, E.O. No. 10289 is listed, with application exclusively under
Title 19 of the United States Code, with the authority the Secretary exercised being under
Section 1(a) of E.O. No. 10289 for arrangement of customs collection districts (38 Stat.
609, 623). Authority under 26 USC 7621 is not reflected in the Title 19 regulations.
As alleged supra, the Secretary of the Treasury did remove the Panama Canal Zone,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands from customs district and region offices located in
Florida, Georgia and New York, and moved territories to administration of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico. This was
done via T.D.O. No. 150-42 of 1956:

Office of the Secretary

[Treasury Dept. Order 150-42]


Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands
Administration of Internal Revenue Laws
By virtue of authority vested in me as Secretary of the Treasury it is hereby ordered:

(1) The Panama Canal Zone is removed from the Internal Revenue District, Jacksonville,
and from the Atlanta Region; and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of the United States
are removed from the Internal Revenue District, Lower Manhattan, and from the New
York City Region.

(2) The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide
for the administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the Panama Canal
Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
(3) This order shall not be deemed to affect the procedures for administrative appeal
existing immediately prior to August 1, 1956.
(4) This order shall be effective as of August 1, 1956.
Dated July 27, 1956
David W. Kendal

Acting Secretary of the Treasury


[F.R. Doc. 56-6280; Filed August 3, 1956; 8:50 a.m.]

Finally, the key statute which provides the corpus for the Moore-Gunwall cases, and the
instant matter, must have general application regulations published in the Federal
Register before it will support prosecution of the Moores and Mr. Gunwall for interfering
with administration of internal revenue laws, or provide a foundation for prosecution of
the instant matter obstruction of justice, etc. (18 USC 1503 & 1504) may be
predicated only on interference with lawful proceedings.
By referencing the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, general application
regulations for 26 USC 7212 are found to be 27 CFR, Parts 170, 270, 275, 285, 290,
295 and 296, all of which are under administration of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms. There are no general application regulations published in the Federal
Register for the Internal Revenue Service or the Treasury Department to prosecute under
Subtitle A & C authority in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Therefore, the
presumption that the Moores and Mr. Gunwall interfered with lawful Subtitle A & C
taxing authority, that IRS had standing as the complaining party, or that the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma was proceeding against the Moores
and Mr. Gunwall in lawful forum is defaulted on all five counts listed supra.
There is no evidence of a constitutional grant of authority for the Internal Revenue
Service, or the General Accounting Office, to levy and collect a tax specifically
authorized by the Constitution; there is no evidence of a statute which grants the Internal
Revenue Service or the Department of the Treasury authority to operated beyond the
District of Columbia; there is no Executive Order which extends general jurisdiction
within the Union of several States party to the Constitution; there are no executive officer
delegations of authority which extend Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Internal
Revenue Service authority to the Union of several State party to the Constitution; and

there are no general application regulations pertaining to Subtitle A & C taxing authority
which extend to the Union of several States for prosecution of criminal offenses listed in
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 7212(a) in particular.
Therefore, the "United States of America" case against the Moores and Mr. Gunwall is
defaulted as fraud and usurpation of power, with the ultra virus of defaulting the instant
matter.
It will be noted that there are no regulations for Title 18 of the United States Code, the
Federal Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, nothing in Title 18, including 1503 &
1504, is applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution.
These allegations may also be verified by way of the Department of Justice, which is an
executive agency at the Seat of Government (28 USC 501), and the office of the United
States Attorney, formerly known as a district attorney (28 USC 541).
The United States Attorney has authority by regulation (delegation) for 28 USC 547,
prescribing duties, only under 28 CFR, Part 77 (see Parallel Table of Authorities and
Rules, p. 768). The regulation authorizes the United States Attorney to communicate with
represented persons (jurisdic persons), nothing more. It does not extend special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction in the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the
United States beyond that prescribed at 18 USC 7(3) Federal enclaves located in the
several States.
More condemning where the Moore-Gunwall case and the instant matter are concerned,
U.S. Attorney authority relative to Federal taxes pertains to internal revenue laws, a/k/a
customs laws, not normal and Social Security taxes (see 28 USC 547(4)). This is
verified by the specific grant of authority at 5 USC 5512 GAO must certify causes to
the Attorney General in his capacity as Solicitor of the Treasury, and the Attorney
General must initiate litigation. The specific grant is exclusive of authority of the U.S.
Attorney at 28 USC 547(4).

This is significant as the Tax Division of the Department of Justice (28 CFR, Part 0.70) is
prohibited from prosecuting 26 USC 7212(a) & (b), so that authority falls to the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (28 USC 0.55). The Criminal Division
administers prosecution only of customs laws, Subtitle E taxes, and a few Subtitle D
taxes such as gambling. The U.S. Attorney, via 28 USC 547, may prosecute the same
causes relating to internal revenue laws as prescribed for the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice (28 CFR, Part 0.55).
The Department of Justice is an executive department located at the seat of United States
Government, supra, with authority of the Department vested in the Attorney General (28
USC 509). Under Congress' Article I 8.15 authority, the Attorney General may
investigate officials in all branches of Federal government (28 USC 526 & 535), and
other officers and employees of the United States. However, the Attorney General, as
head of the various other departments and agencies, must delegate authority in
compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 USC 1505(a)), per 28 USC 510, and
those to whom authority is delegated may not exceed limits of special law which permits
the Department of Justice to operate beyond the borders of the District of Columbia (4
USC 72). The authority of the Department of Justice to investigate criminal matters,
other than investigation of Federal government officials, is limited to U.S. Attorney
jurisdiction within the geographical United States subject to Congress' Article IV 3.2
legislative jurisdiction, per the absence of general application regulations (delegations of
authority) for 27 USC 547.
The governing "special law" required by 4 72 for the Department of Justice and the
U.S. Attorney to prosecute criminal matters is 18 USC 7, with subsection 7(3)
determining geographical limitations within the Union of several States party to the
Constitution. This is the territorial limit for the United States, not the "United States of
America", to exercise jurisdiction of the United State. 18 USC 7(3) prescribes the
following Federal jurisdiction within the Union of several States:

(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired
by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be,
for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

Territory specified in 18 USC 7(3) includes lands Congress is authorized to purchase


under authority of Article I 8.17 of the Constitution, and two categories of land reserved
for the United States in States admitted to the Union after the Civil War lands set aside
by treaty as Native American Indian reservations and trust lands, and unappropriated
public lands, most of which have been designated as national parks and forests (see
Constitution for the State of Oklahoma, Art. I 3; Oklahoma cession laws, Title 80,
Oklahoma Statutes, 1, 2 & 3).
Per 40 USC 255, in order for the United States to secure jurisdiction over land in the
Union of several States, (1) the United States must acquire title to land, (2) the legislature
of the State where it is acquired must cede jurisdiction, and (3) the United States must
formally accept jurisdiction. Per the last sentence of 40 USC 255, until the United
States has formally accepted jurisdiction, lack of United States jurisdiction is presumed.
It is one of the ironies, and possibly Achilles heel of Cooperative Federalism, that
Congress, frequently if not exclusively setting as Congress of the "United States of
America", operates as a legislative body of government foreign to the United States. This
capacity is even one step removed from Congress' authority as the Congress of the United
States with plenary power over territory belonging to the United States authorized at
Article IV 3.2 of the Constitution.
That consideration aside, the 4 USC 72 mandate for United States Attorney exercise of
duties (28 USC 547) relating to offenses against the United States (28 USC 547(1)),
is dependent on 18 USC 7 for jurisdictional definition, with 7(3) applicable with the

Union of several States. The Department of Justice is subject to the same territorial
limitations.
Both the United States Attorney and the Department of Justice have general jurisdiction
in United States territories and insular possessions, and in United States maritime
jurisdiction. However, jurisdiction for these offices within the Union of several States,
per 18 USC 7(3), follows delegation orders and reorganization plans applicable to the
Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior, with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Bureau of Land Management being the two prevalent agencies in the
Department of the Interior.
Where Executive Orders, executive officer delegations, and regulations are not published
in the Federal Register in compliance with requirements of 44 USC 1505(a),
application of statutes may be only to Government officials, United States territories and
insular possessions, the United States maritime jurisdiction (see Federal Register Act
generally, 44 USC 1501 et seq.). This is precisely the geographical bounds prescribed
at 18 USC 7, with verification of geographical application being that there are no
regulations published in the Federal Register for Title 18 of the United States Code.
Authority of the Article IV legislative-territorial United States District Court is treated in
a separate section so only a summary statement needs to be included here: Title 18 of the
United States Code, at 3231, vests criminal prosecution authority, saving the laws and
authority of courts of the several States, in the Article III "district court of the United
States", exclusively of the Article IV United States District Court. Only those United
States District Courts specifically authorized by statute at 18 USC 23, and by Rule
54(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for United States District Courts, have
authority to prosecute felony offenses United States District Courts for Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands.
United States District Courts located in the Union of several States are limited to
prosecution of petty and misdemeanor offenses under authority of 18 USC 3401, in the

framework of regulations promulgated by the Defense Logistics Agency (32 CFR, Part
1290.1 et seq.), and the Bureau of Land Management (43 CFR, Part 9260.0-1 et seq).
Finally, it is useful to demonstrate territorial jurisdiction for the "Federal law enforcement
community". This is easiest done by reference to regulations, the first defining a law
enforcement emergency, at 28 CFR, Part 65.70:

28 CFR, Part 65.70: definitions


(a) Law enforcement emergency. The term law enforcement emergency is defined by the
Act as an uncommon situation which requires law enforcement, which is or threatens to
become serious or epidemic proportions, and with respect to which state and local
resources are inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens, or to enforce the
criminal law. The Act specifically excludes the following situations when defining "law
enforcement emergency":
(1) The perceived need for planning or other activities related to crowd control for
general public safety projects; and,
(2) A situation requiring the enforcement of laws associated with scheduled public events,
including political convention and sports events.
(b) Federal law enforcement assistance. The term Federal law enforcement assistance is
defined by the Act to mean funds, equipment, training, intelligence information, and
personnel.
(c ) Federal law enforcement community. The term Federal law enforcement community
is defined by the Act as the heads of the following departments or agencies:
(1) Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(2) Drug Enforcement Administration;


(3) Criminal Division of the Department of Justice;
(4) Internal Revenue Service;
(5) Customs Service;
(6) Immigration and Naturalization Service'
(7) U.S. Marshals Service;
(8) National Park Service;
(9) U.S. Postal Service;
(10) Secret Service;
(11) U.S. Coast Guard
(12) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms;
and,
(13) Other Federal agencies with specific statutory authority to investigate violations of
Federal criminal law.
(d) State. The term state is defined by the Act as any state of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,

American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.

The list of Federal territories and United Nations trust territories and United Nations trust
territories at 28 CFR 65.70(d) is a reasonably complete listing of territories subject to
Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction. These are the "Federal" states that are
members of the political alliance or coalition known as the "United States of America",
and it is here only, exclusive of the Union of several States party to the Constitution, that
the Federal law enforcement community has standing and jurisdiction.
Under Article I 8 and Article IV of the Constitution, Congress is vested with authority
to call out the militia if necessary to enforce laws of the Union, in the event of civil
uprising, or in the event of invasion. Either the legislature or chief executive of a State
must extend a request for assistance in the event of rebellion or civil uprising. In other
words, there is no constitutional grant of authority for United States civil enforcement
agencies to exercise municipal and police powers in the Union of several States party to
the Constitution. Consequently, the Tenth Amendment ban against exercise of Federal
authority which is not specifically delegated constitutes an absolute barrier to the civilian
law enforcement agencies exercising powers in the Union of several States.
The Federal law enforcement community is also a mixed bag of enforcement agencies
that has no criminal enforcement authority whatever in the Union of several States: At
least two of the agencies, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Internal
Revenue Service, both successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, are agencies of the
Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was not
created by Congress, but the provisional government of Puerto Rico, in approximately
1904, the provisional government being under supervision of the United States military
until approximately 1940, as documented elsewhere.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is an administratively created agency in the


Department of Justice (see historical note for 28 USC 531), which has statutory
authority to investigate Title 18 crimes only by United States government officers and
employees (28 USC 535). The FBI was not created under Congress' legislative
authority and has no other legitimate charter which extends agency police powers to the
Union of several States party to the Constitution.
These agencies do not operate under Congress' delegated authority, and they are not
creatures of the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, they do not have municipal
and police powers within the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the
United States. Whatever legitimate authority they have must therefore be limited to
territories of the United States, as defined by the term "state" at 28 CFR, Part 65.70(d).
Approximately the same list of agency personnel is authorized to apply for warrants, at
28 CFR, Part 60.3. The key, however, is designation of local law enforcement agencies at
28 CFR, Part 60.3(b):

(b) Local Law Enforcement Agencies:


(1) District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department;
(2) Law Enforcement Forces and Customs Agencies of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the
Canal Zone.

Law enforcement agencies of the several States and political subdivisions of the several
States are not included. Therefore, Federal law enforcement agencies have no jurisdiction
in the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the United States.
Conclusion

Petitioner alleges that in order for principals party to prosecution of the instant matter to
sustain the conviction, they must (1) prove standing, (2) prove territorial jurisdiction, and
(3) prove subject-matter jurisdiction. In order to do this, each entity, including the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, the office of the United
States Attorney, the Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, and the "United
States of America" must establish authority under five criteria: (1) They must produce
authority under Congress' Article I 8 delegated powers relative to the Union of several
States party to the Constitution of the United States; (2) they must provide statutory
authority which meets criteria of 4 USC 72 for operation outside the territorial borders
of the District of Columbia, with criteria extending to the Union of several States party to
the Constitution; (3) where applicable, they must provide a properly executed Executive
Order promulgated by the President which conveys appropriate authority within the
Union of several States party to the Constitution; (4) there must be properly executed
delegations of authority which convey appropriate authority within the Union of several
States party to the Constitution of the United States which comply with requirements for
publication in the Federal Register prescribed by 44 USC 1505(a); and (5) statutory
application to the Union of several States party to the Constitution must be prescribed by
regulation published in the Federal Register in accordance with provisions of the Federal
Register Act, at 44 USC 1505(a).
Allegations of offense where the instant matter is concerned are predicated on a Federal
grand jury convened in November 1995 to allegedly investigate "common law" courts in
Oklahoma, and prosecution of the Moore-Gunwall case (96-CR-082-C) having been a
lawful proceeding predicated on alleged interference with administration of internal
revenue laws of the United States (26 USC 7212(a)). The Moore-Gunwall case is of
particular import as the Government indictment which alleged that the Moores and Mr.
Gunwall committed an infraction against the "United States of America" failed to
disclose either a taxing statute or a statute which determines that Dr. Moore, a retired
private-practice chiropractor, was liable for any given tax prescribed in the Internal
Revenue Code. Therefore, the allegation of interference with administration of internal

revenue laws of the United States is predicated solely on a penalty statute that is absent
the antecedent requirements of a taxing statute and a liability statute, so prosecution of
the Moores and Mr. Gunwall was fraud on its face.
The above demonstrates that United States territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction
within the Union of several States party to the Constitution is limited to jurisdiction
prescribed at 18 USC 7(3) supra. The Government has failed to produce constitutional
authority, statutory authority, Executive Orders, delegations of authority, and general
application regulations prescribing application of statutes at issue to establish standing for
the "United States of America", and the Internal Revenue Service, or to establish
territorial or subject-matter jurisdiction of the United States. In the absence of these
indispensable authorities, the conviction in the instant matter must be discharged, and
petitioner's liberty restored.
3. Petitioner alleges that the "United States of America" has no standing to prosecute
crimes in the Union of several States party to the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, all proceedings against people of and otherwise situated in the Union of
several States party to the Constitution which are initiated in the name and by authority of
the "United States of America" are null and void for fraud, and most particularly,
usurpation of power. In the event of criminal prosecution, the action effects false arrest,
and frequently, false imprisonment.
Although the People of the "United States of America" established the "Constitution of
the United States" (Preamble/Title) as the governing authority which enumerates and
delegates powers to national government, the "United States of America", individually or
collectively, was given no power by that instrument. Each of the several States party to
the Constitution retained sovereignty which was not delegated to the national government
known as the United States (Tenth Article of Amendment), and each of the several States
was bound to the Constitution as the law of the land (Art. VI, cl. 2).

The following cites from the Constitution of the United States verify that authority was
vested in a national government to be known as the United States:

Article I 1.
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Article I 8.
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.
[Art. I 8.17] To exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases whatever, of such District
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dockYards, and other needful Buildings.

What may appear to be an equivocation relating to the President, as chief executive of the
United States, isn't. He is elected by an at-large vote which begins with the qualified
voters of the several States, then is finally confirmed by the Electoral College, comprised
of representatives of the several States. He is therefore President of the United States of
America, being the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and he is seated as
President of the United States, being the national government vested with power by the
Constitution.

Article II 1.1
Section 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. He shall hold his office during the Term of four years, and, together with the
Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected
[Art. II 1.8] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following
Oath or Affirmation: -- "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Likewise, the judicial power of the United States is authorized in Article III of the
Constitution there is no reference to or authority vested in the "United States of
America".

Article III 1
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish

The Constitution itself requires fidelity to the Constitution and laws of the United States,
not the United States of America:

Art. VI, cls. 2 & 3:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution

The Tenth Article of Amendment, which frames the Separation of Powers Doctrine so far
as separation between State and Federal authority are concerned, stands as a bar to
Congress or the Executive conferring authority to another entity other than the United
States:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are preserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Even in territory belonging to the United States, Congress is vested with responsibility
relating to the "United States", not the "United States of America";

Article IV 3.2:

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States

This trust is preserved in the United States Code in general, with the exception being Title
48 of the United States Code, relating to territories and insular possessions of the United
States. So far as Titles 18, 19, 21, 26 and 28 are concerned, the "United States" is the
principal of interest as plaintiff, defendant, or prosecuting party. Statutes from Titles 18
and 28 verify this allegation:

28 USC 1345 & 1346:


1345. United States as plaintiff
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States
1346. United States as defendant
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States
Court of Federal Claims, of:

(1)Any civil action against the United States, for the recovery of any internal-revenue
tax

(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in
amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress.

(b)(1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together
with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District

Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages

Title 18, the United States Code of Criminal Procedure, lists only offenses against the
United States, not the "United States of America";

18 USC 3231:
3231. District Courts
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of
the several States under the laws thereof. [see 18 USC 7(3) for special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States within the Union of several States party to the
Constitution]

If naming the "United States of America" as a principal of interest was merely a clerical
error, it might be considered harmless. However, both the United States Code and the
Code of Federal Regulations convey an amount of authority to the "United States of
America", as distinguished from the "United States", so there is conclusively a difference
between the two so far as statutory authority, regulations, and jurisdiction in which the
"United States of America" has standing as a principal of interest. Of particular note, the
"United States of America" is principal of interest where crimes against laws of the
United States are committed in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, as stipulated at 48
USC 874 & 1406f:

874. Judicial process; officials to be citizens of the United States; oaths.


All judicial process shall run in the name of the "United States of America, ss, the
President of the United States", and all penal or criminal prosecution in the local courts
shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of "The People of Porto Rico [Puerto
Rico]", and all officials shall be citizens of the United States, and, before entering upon
the duties of their respective offices, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States and the laws of Porto Rico [Puerto Rico].
1406f. Judicial process; title of criminal prosecution
All judicial process shall run in the name of the "United States of America, scilicet, the
President of the United States", and all penal and criminal prosecutions in the local courts
shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of "The People of the Virgin Islands
of the United States".

Both Puerto Rico, formerly Porto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, were among the island
nations won from Spain in the Spanish-American War. Other island nations and territories
conceded at conclusion of the Spanish-American War included Guam, what is now
known as American Samoa, and the Philippines. The Philippines Islands became an
independent commonwealth in 1946.
From the time of Spanish acquiescence, the United States ruled these island acquisitions
as captured territories under military rule. Thus, the executive authority extended over the
courts "United States of America, ss [scilicet], President of the United States", in the
chief executive's capacity as commander in chief of the United States military. Military
rule is equivalent to admiralty rule, or in another light, rule under martial law.
The President's authority as Commander in Chief of the military is at Article II 2:

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States

Again, constitutionally delegated authority rests in the President's capacity as chief


executive officer of the United States, not the United States of America, and even when
the United States is the principal, the Constitution extends authority for the presence and
exercise of military authority in the Union of several States only under three conditions,
two specified at Article IV 4 of the Constitution:

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.

Exercise of presidential admiralty-martial law authority within the Union of several


States party to the Constitution is authorized only (1) in the event of invasion (war), or
(2) in the event of civil uprising. The third possibility is when laws of the Union,
promulgated under Congress' delegated power, are being blatantly ignored or refuted.
However, it is the antecedent responsibility of Congress to authorize whatever United
States initiative of this sort there is, as specified at Article I 8.15:

[The Congress shall have Power] To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel Invasions

Clearly, military-martial law authority can spread inland to the Union of several States
only in the event of actual invasion, and must be focused on invading forces, and only in
the event of rebellion which is physically confrontational and of magnitude enough that
legislatures or chief executives of the several States formally request that Congress
provide Federal assistance. It is, in fact, the right of the people to demand and peacefully
work for government correction or change. So far as United States Government is
concerned, the corpus of the constitutionally secured rights is in the First Article of
Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the


free exercise thereof: or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

State constitutions all have corresponding provisions, with most reaching even further to
explicitly or implicitly include principles set out in the Declaration of Independence. The
people are ultimately and finally sovereign, with governments in the American system of
constitutional republics authorized only to perform those powers specifically enumerated
in applicable constitutions. Constitutionally secured rights articulated in the First Article
of Amendment accommodate a wide range of remedies, and when understood in the
context of English-American lineage common law, a wide range of political and legal
instruments that can be deployed for curative remedies.
Unfortunately, territories belonging to the United States or otherwise subject to Congress'
Article IV 3.2 power, supra, do not enjoy the same benefits and protections afforded the
Union of several States party to the Constitution and the sovereign American people
indigenous to the Union of several States. This was the case for the Hawaiian Islands,
taken by force, despite having treaties with the United States, in 1893, Puerto Rico, the

Philippines Islands, Guam, etc., taken in the Spanish-American War (1898), other
territories of the United States until admitted to the Union, and more recently, Pacific
trust territories put under United States custodial care by way of the United Nations. Until
the 1930's, the United States noncontiguous possessions were for the most part governed
by provisional governments established under United States military authority, in stages
being transferred to the Department of the Interior, but ultimately under a memorandum
of agreement between the military and the Secretary of State. Thus, the "executive"
authority under the President's capacity as Commander in Chief and government of
territory belonging to the United States.
The Constitution does not extend authority pertaining to territory belonging to the United
States to executive or judicial branches of government. Therefore, both executive and
judicial branches operate as agents of and subservient to Congress in all matters relating
to territories of the United States. Analogously, this arrangement effects a vertical stack
where all three branches of Federal Government operate in a single line of authority
what has been described as a legislative democracy rather than three independent
branches as contemplated by the Constitution.
A sense of this was articulated in U.S. vs. McMillan, Utah 1897, 17 S.Ct. 395, 165 U.S.
504, 41 L.Ed. 805:

Congress, having the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal
and state, over the territories of the United States, so long as they remain in the territorial
condition, may itself directly legislate for any territory, or may extend the laws of the
United States over it, in any particular that Congress may think fit.

In Murphy v. Ramsey, Utah 1885, 5 S.Ct. 747, 114 U.S. 15, 29 L.Ed. 47, the decision
rationalized congressional edict predicated on authority of the sovereign people:

The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the national territories, have
supreme power over them and their inhabitants. In the exercise of this sovereign
dominion they are represented by the government of the United States, to whom all the
powers of government over that subject have been delegated, subject only to such
restrictions as are expressed in the constitution or are necessarily implied in its terms.

All authority respecting territory belonging to the United States is vested in Congress,
and as the single authority in United States Government, Congress has plenary, or what
might better be described as permissive authority respecting territory belonging to the
United States all authority which is not expressly or implicitly prohibited by the
Constitution. For all practical purposes, this is the antipodes of Congress' authority
respecting the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Congress may do pretty
well as Congress pleases in the geographical United States (territory belonging to the
United States); Congress has restricted, specifically enumerated powers so far as the
Union of several States and the sovereign people are concerned.
On the surface, it might appear that the "United States of America" is merely a fabrication
representative of the [u]nited States of America, with the President exercising admiraltymartial law authority in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands on behalf of the Union of
several States party to the Constitution, but in reality, the "United States of America" is a
coalition or political compact of Federal territories, also known as States, and the United
Nations trust territories, known as the "United States of America".
The "United States of America" appears as a principal of interest in Attorney General
delegations of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-1:

0.64-1 Central or Competent Authority under treaties and executive agreements on


mutual assistance in criminal matters.

The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division shall have the
authority and perform the functions of the "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority"
(or like designation) under treaties and executive agreements between the United States
of America and other countries on mutual assistance in criminal matters which designate
the Attorney General or the Department of Justice as such authority. The Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, is authorized to redelegate this authority to the
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Division, and to the Director and Deputy
Directors of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division.

Again, the Constitution and Titles 18, 19, 21, 26, 28 and other titles of the United States
Code vest authority in the United States, not the United States of America, yet the United
States of America, under the President's admiralty-martial law authority over conquered
peoples, appears in Title 48 of the United States Code, supra, and again in Attorney
General delegations of authority. The authority is connected to applicable law which
authorizes the treaty, Public Law 95-144 (18 USC 4100 et seq.) at 28 CFR, Part 0.642:

0.64-2 Delegation respecting transfer of offenders to or from foreign countries.


The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division is authorized to
exercise all of the power and authority vested in the Attorney General under section 4102
of title 18, U.S. Code, which has not been delegated to the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons under 28 CFR 0.96b, including specifically the authority to find the transfer of
offenders to or from a foreign country under a treaty as referred to in Public Law 95-44
[should be P.L. 95-144] appropriated or inappropriate

Authority delegated to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b finally
resolves the dilemma as the subpart authorizes the Director as agent for the United States
of America, and agent for the United States, thus distinguishing the two as unique and
separate government or quasi-government entities:

0.96b Exchange of prisoners.


The Director of the Bureau of Prisons and officers of the Bureau of Prisons designated by
him are authorized to receive custody of offenders and to transfer offenders to and from
the United States of America under a treaty as referred to in Public Law 95-144; to make
arrangements with the States and to receive offenders from the States for transfer to a
foreign country; to act as an agent of the United States to receive the delivery from a
foreign government of any person being transferred to the United States under such a
treaty; to render to foreign countries and to receive from them certifications and reports
required under a treaty; and to receive custody and carry out the sentence of
imprisonment of such a transferred offender as required by that statute and any such
treaty.

The subpart is made clearer by eliminating excess wording from 0.96b then inserting
the original delegation of authority from 0.96:

0.96b, in relative part, [editing added]:


The Director of the Bureau of Prisons [is] authorized to receive custody of offenders
[from] and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America under a treaty
as referred to in Public Law 95-144 [18 USC 4100 et seq.] [and] to act as an agent
of the United States to receive the delivery from a foreign government of any person
being transferred to the United States under such treaty

0.96 Delegations
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or perform any of the
authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon the Attorney General by any
law relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of persons (including insane
persons and juvenile delinquents) charged with or convicted of offenses against the
United States

Regulations above conclusively demonstrate that (1) the United States and the United
States of America are separate and distinct entities, and (2) the United States of America
is foreign to the United States. Further, the Union of several States party to the
Constitution are prohibited by the Constitution at Article I 10.1 from entering treaties,
alliances and confederations so they may not be party to the "United States of America"
scheme identified in Title 48 statutes and Title 28 regulations cited above:

Article I 10, Constitution


Section 10. No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation

Therefore, the "United States of America" scheme, effected via Congress' Article IV 3.2
legislative authority in the geographical United States, cannot legitimately involve the
Union of several States party to the Constitution: When Congress legislates under Article
IV 3.2 authority, the legislation is for the self-interested, geographical United States,
exclusive of the Union of several States. This is clarified by application of terms found in
Rule 54 (c ), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for United States District Courts:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the
District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.
"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

Applications above rely on the restrictive term "includes", where two principles of law
govern: The example represents the class, and that which is omitted was intended to be
omitted. In other words, when the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are the named
examples, they are representative of a class broadly construed to be territories of the
United States. Where no State which is one of the several States party to the Constitution
is named, the Union of several States was intentionally omitted and is not included.
In the context of these provisions for use in determining application of Acts of Congress
which prescribe offenses against the United States, there must be some express provision
conveying application under Congress' Article I delegated authority or the Act, meaning
the law and attending penalty, does not reach the Union of several States and the
American people at large.
What might be described as the "American Empire" includes 51 semi-sovereign, selfinterested, geographical entities, each of which is in many respects autonomous, and in
the framework of private international law, foreign to the rest. The geographical United
States under Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction is as foreign to Kansas and
Oklahoma as Kansas and Oklahoma are to each other. While the Union of several States
are generally accommodating to each other, and practice what is described as comity
(diplomatic courtesy and accommodation), each officially retains its sovereignty.
Likewise, the geographical United States may be accommodating of and accommodated
by any of the several States, but has no legitimate authority in or over any of the several
States and people indigenous to or otherwise located in the several States.

This distinction is relevant where the instant matter is concerned as Congress cannot
amend the Constitution through treaties, nor can the President amend it through
administrative agreements. A treaty or executive agreement that affects the Union of
several States and the American people at large must fall within powers enumerated in
the Constitution. Therefore, applicability of treaties, executive agreements, and the like
must be determined both by scope and underlying authority what capacity was
Congress acting in via Public Law 95-144 (18 USC 4100 et seq.), which authorizes
treaties pertaining to exchange of prisoners with foreign governments?
The matter is resolved at 4101(I) of Public Law 95-144 (91 Stat. 1213):

"(I) 'State' means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States"

The definition of "State" above for all practical purposes restates application of the term
"State" in Rule 54(c ), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for United States District
Courts. All examples are territories, commonwealths, etc., under Congress' Article IV
3.2 legislative jurisdiction. There is no provision for extending reach of this authority to
the Union of several States party to the Constitution and the American people at large.
Conclusion
Where the instant matter is concerned, Petitioner is a native of Kansas, and for most of
his adult life, has been a Citizen and qualified elector of Oklahoma, both being among the
several States party to the Constitution of the United States where said Constitution is the
law of the land (Article I 1, Oklahoma Constitution). Petitioner is by definition a
"national of the United States", as that term is defined at 8 USC 1101(a)(22) and (23),
he is not a citizen of the United States, as the term is defined in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner lives on privately owned land in Oklahoma which is

not within jurisdiction of the United States, as defined at 18 USC 7(3), and has no
connection with territories of the United States under Congress' Article IV 3.2
legislative jurisdiction the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa,
the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, etc. Petitioner does not have business or
dealings in United States maritime jurisdiction, as defined at 18 USC 7 in general.
The Constitution of the United States and Titles 18, 19, 21, 26 & 28 of the United States
Code vest authority and standing in a governmental entity identified and known as the
United States. The Constitution and titles cited above do not vest authority in a
governmental entity known as the United States of America. The United States of
America is authorized as a principal of interest only in Title 48 of the United States Code,
relating to United States territories and insular possessions, and by evidence of 28 CFR,
Part 0.96b and other regulations cited supra, the "United States of America" is foreign to
the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution.
Therefore, the "United States of America" does not have standing as a principal of
interest where the instant matter is concerned so lacks authority to prosecute Petitioner in
courts of the United States located in the Union of several States party to the
Constitution.
4. Petitioner alleges that contrary to the prohibition at Article 1, Section 9, clause 3 of the
Constitution of the United States, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, being a legislative-statutory court of the territorial United States,
has effected a bill of attainder against Petitioner by depriving him of liberty without
substantive due process of law as contemplated by the "arising under" clause at Article III
2.1 and the Fifth Article of Amendment guarantee of due process of law.
The relevant constitutional provisions are as follows:
Article I 9.3:

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

Article III 2.1, in relative part:

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority

Fifth Article of Amendment:

No person shall be deprive of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

Intent of the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder is treated extensively in


United states vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.ed. 2d, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1707. The simplest,
most direct definition of what a bill of attainder is within the framework of constitutional
intent was cited by Justice White, with Justices Clark, Harlan, and Steward joining, in a
separate opinion (p. 462):

"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."
Cummins v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, 323, 18 L.ed. 356, 363.

Within this simple, direct definition, the Article IV United States District Court, being a
legislative court created under Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, is

condemned this legislative, statutory court does not have Article III constitutional
powers, and does not represent the judicial branch of government as a separate, distinct
entity. Due to the law it imposes, it functions in approximately the capacity as viceadmiralty courts of King George III, which were largely responsible for the American
Revolution in 1776.
Chief Justice Warren wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Brown, commencing
the formal opinion with a somewhat lengthy history of the object of the prohibition
against Federal government imposing bills of attainder at Article I 9.3, and against State
governments imposing bills of attainder at Article I 10.1. The matter is important
enough that Chief Justice Warren's account is worth reciting at length [footnote cites
bracketed]:

A logical starting place for an inquiry into the meaning of the prohibition is its historical
background. The bill of attainder, a parliamentary act sentencing to death one or more
specific persons, was a device often resorted to in sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
century England for dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt, to
overthrow the government. In addition to the death sentence, attainder generally carried
with it a "corruption of blood," which meant that the attainted party's heirs could not
inherit his property. The "Bills of pains and penalties" was identical to the bill of
attainder, except that it prescribed a penalty short of death, e.g., banishment, deprivation
of the right to vote, or exclusion of the designated party's sons from Parliament. Most
bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties named the parties to whom they were to
apply; a few, however, simply described them. While some left the designated parties a
way of escaping the penalty, others did not. The use of bills of attainder was not limited
to England. During the American Revolution, the legislatures of all thirteen States passed
statutes directed against the Tories: among these statutes were a large number of bills of
attainder and bills of pains and penalties.

While history thus provides some guidelines, the wide variation in form, purpose and
effect of ante-Constitution bills of attainder indicates that the proper scope of the Bill of
Attainder Clause, and its relevance to contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought
by attempting to discern the reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it
was designed to eliminate. The best evidence, the writings of the architects of our
constitutional system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a
narrow, technical(and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an
implementation of the separations of powers, a general safeguard against legislative
exercise of the judicial function, or more simply trial by legislature.
The Constitution divides the National Government into three branches Legislative,
Executive and Judicial. This "separation of powers" was obviously not instituted with the
idea that it would promote government efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a
bulwark against tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy
can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application,
and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its
unchecked will. James Madison wrote:

"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." [The Federalist, No. 47, pp. 373374, (Hamilton ed. 1880)]

The doctrine of separated powers is implemented by a number of constitutional


provisions, some of which entrust certain jobs exclusively to certain branches, while
others say that a given task is not to be performed by a given branch. For example,
Article III's grant of "the judicial Power of the United Stats" to federal courts has been
interpreted both as a grant of exclusive authority over certain areas, Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60, and as a limitation upon the judiciary, a declaration to certain

tasks are not to be performed by courts, e.g. Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 55
L.ed 246, 31 S.Ct. 250. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 379,
96 L.ed. 1153, 72 S.Ct. 863, 26 ALR2d 1378.
The authors of the Federalist Papers took the position that although under some systems
of government (most notably the one from which the United States had just broken), the
Executive Department is the branch most likely to forget the bounds of its authority, "in a
representative republic where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly
which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not
so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions ," barriers had to
be erected to ensure that the legislature would not overstep the bounds of its authority and
perform the functions of the other departments. [The Federalist, No. 48, pp. 383-384
(Hamilton ed 1880) (Madison); see generally The Federalist Nos. 47 (Madison), 48
(Madison), 49 (Hamilton), 51 (Hamilton) and 78 (Hamilton)] Alexander Hamilton wrote:

"Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify
momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents which
afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification,
disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous consequences
of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens at
pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small number of
partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may banish at discretion all
those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or trial, no man
can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing faction. The
name of liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of common sense."
[III (John C.) Hamilton, History of the Republic of the United States, p. 34 (1859)
(balance of footnote not reproduced here)]

Thus the Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one implementation of a
general principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected the Framers' belief that the
Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the
task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon,
specific persons.

"Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its numbers and organization, and
from the very intimate dependence of its members upon the people, which renders them
liable to be peculiarly susceptible to popular clamor, is not properly constituted to try
with coolness, caution, and impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in
which the popular feeling is strongly excited, -- the very class of cases most likely to be
prosecuted by this mode." [1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 536-537 (8th ed
1927)]

By banning bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to guard against
such dangers by limiting legislatures to the task of rule-making. "It is the peculiar
province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government society; the
application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other
departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136, 3 L.ed. 162, 178.
It is in this spirit that the Bill of Attainder Clause was consistently interpreted by this
Court until the decision in American Communications Assn. V. Douds, 339 US 382, 94
L.ed. 925, 70 S.Ct. 64 In 1810, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138,3 L.ed. 162, 178, stated that "[a] bill of attainder may
affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both." This
means, of course, that what were known at common law as bills of pains and penalties are
outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause. The Court's pronouncement therefore served
notice that the Bill of Attainder Clause was not to be given a narrow historical reading
(which would exclude bills of pains and penalties), but was instead to be read in light of

the evil the Framers had sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of
specifically designated persons or groups. See also Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat 213, 6
L.ed. 606, 631.
In footnote 18, Chief Justice Warren quoted James Madison from The Federalist No. 44,
as follows:

Bills of attainder, ex post facto Laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some
of the state constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these
fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional
fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the
convention added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private
rights The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has
directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden
changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in
the hands of enterprising and influential speculators; and snares to the more industrious
and less informed part of the community. (The Federalist, No. 44, p. 351 (Hamilton ed
1880))

In footnote 20, Chief Justice Warren included Thomas Jefferson comments:

The same thought is reflected in the writings of Thomas Jefferson: "173 despots would
surely be as oppressive as one [L]ittle will it avail us that they are chosen by ourselves
[T]he government we fought for [is] one which should not only be founded on free
principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced
among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits,

without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. For this reason that
convention, which passed the ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis,
that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments should be separate and distinct,
so that no person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time
If the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to
be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that case they may put their
proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the
other branches. They have accordingly in many instances, decided rights which should
have been lift to judiciary controversy " Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, pp.
157-158 (Ford ed 1894).

The bill of attainder definition cited by Justice White is worth repeating as it boils the
matter down to a single succinct sentence: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."
The matter at hand is therefore axiomatic: The United States District Court is a legislative
court under Congress' plenary power as that power extends to Article IV 3.2 legislative
jurisdiction over the geographical United States, as United States jurisdiction is defined at
18 USC 7. In this century, at least, the "bill of attainder" has generally been addressed
in the framework of what one law does or doesn't do, but by intent demonstrated above,
American founders implemented the prohibition against bills of attainder as an absolute
ban against legislative rather than judicial courts. The United States District Court is in
fact a legislative rather than a judicial court, and is absolutely devoid of Article III
character.
The first known address of the character and authority of United States territorial courts
was by Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet.
511 (1828):

These [territorial] courts then, are not Constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are
incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general
rights of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which
enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory
belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is
conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body
possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be
exercised in the States in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the 3d
article of the Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of the
State government.

Territories which have not been admitted to the Union of several States party to the
Constitution are not parties to the contract known as the Constitution, so the rationale
which has been imposed via Congress' morally colorable claim to authority is that
Congress can do as Congress pleases in territories belonging to the United States. That is
not the case, however, where the Union of several States party to the Constitution is
concerned, nor where the sovereign American people are concerned: The Article I 9.3
prohibition against bills of attainder, as articulated variously by Madison, Hamilton,
Jefferson, Marshall and others who were close to and participated in establishing the
nation under constitutional rule the prohibition specifically condemns legislative courts
as having authority to deprive the sovereign American people of life, liberty and property.
In this century, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the character of the
United States District Court definitively in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312
(1921):

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under Article
III of the Constitution to administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under
Article IV, Section 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction
to that of true United States courts in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting
to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere
territorial court.

It is, of course, axiomatic that only those territorial courts of the United States
empowered to prosecute felony offenses under title 18 of the United States Code at 18
USC 23, and Rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States District Courts (the United States District Courts of Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the Virgin Islands, and formerly the United States District Court for the
Canal Zone), have standing to prosecute felony offenses as 18 USC 3231 vests original
jurisdiction for prosecution of offenses against the United States in Article III district
courts of the United States (18 USC 3231). Therefore, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other United States District Courts located
in the Union of several States party to the Constitution, are incompetent so far as having
authority to prosecute offenses save misdemeanor and petty offenses cognizable under 18
USC 3401, in the framework of regulations promulgated by the Defense Logistics
Agency and the Bureau of Land Management (see notes following 18 USC 3401).
However, even in those areas where United States District Courts have statutory authority
to prosecute felony offenses, the statutory grant of authority must yield to the
Constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder where the sovereign American people
are concerned as the prohibition against bills of attainder at Article I 9.3 is an integral
part of the delegations of authority and prohibitions conveyed in the governing
instrument which establishes the relationship between the sovereign American people and
United States Government application, including prohibitions, is universal, it is not
territorially bound.

Conclusion
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, and all other
United States District Courts, are legislative-statutory courts of the United States,
established under Congress' Article IV 3.2 legislative jurisdiction in the territorial or
geographical United States. Because they are not judicial courts established under
authority of Article III of the Constitution, they may not deprive the sovereign American
people of life, liberty or property (Fifth Amendment) as Article I 9.3 of the Constitution
prohibits bills of attainder. The prohibition against bills of attainder is broadly construed
as a bar against legislative or executive branches of the national government assuming
judicial powers.
Summary and Conclusion
Memorandum elements above remove the continuing debate concerning Federal
authority from the ethereal realm of abstract principle to the concrete world of, "This is
what the law says." As a consequence, counsel for the "United States of America" and the
Internal Revenue Service must prove constitutional standing for the de facto foreign
government, and must prove origin and sources of authority for the Internal Revenue
Service, as well as proving authority for the United States District Court, the Department
of Justice, the United States Attorney, the Bureau of Prisons, and Federal Civilian
enforcement agencies.
Additionally, the character of the United States District Court must be disclosed and
established by proof of legal authorities: If it is a legislative court, as petitioner alleges it
is, the indictment, judgment and sentence against petitioner must be thrown out as
legislative courts cannot deprive the sovereign people of life, liberty or property without
inflicting bills of attainder, prohibited at Article I 9.3 of the Constitution. The
Constitution of the United States is the first and last authority on the matter.

Petitioner alleges that the cast of characters responsible for prosecuting the instant matter
cannot take shelter under pleas of ignorance as they have repeatedly been confronted with
the allegation that the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the Department of the
Treasury, Puerto Rico since as early as October 1995, and even after dismissing the first
Moore-Gunwall case in November 1995, failed and refused to disclose taxing and
liability statutes in the 1996 Moore-Gunwall indictment. It is obviously impossible to
interfere with administration of an internal revenue law if no taxing statute is in evidence,
and the government fails to prove liability for a prescribed tax.
The original indictment against the Moores and Mr. Gunwall was obviously in defense of
tyranny and plunder, nothing more without taxing and liability statutes, a penalty statute
has no force and effect, and without general application regulations published in the
Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act, taxing and liability statutes
would be of no force and effect.
The matter at hand is as obviously predicated on antecedent actions that were patently
fraud, initiated with absolutely no constitutional, statutory or regulatory authority.
By my signature, I certify that all matters herein are to the best of my current knowledge,
belief and understanding accurate and true.
Notice of Service
By my signature, I attest that this instrument is being sent to the Office of the Court Clerk
for The United States Court of Appeal for the Tenth Circuit, Denver, Colorado, via
Certified Mail in the U.S. Post Office with green return. It is also being sent certified with
return cards to the following:
Stephen C. Lewis, Neal B. Kirkpatrick
U.S. Attorneys Office

333 W. Fourth Street, Suite 3460


Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
H. Dale Cook, Judge/Magistrate
c/o United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
224 S. Boulder, 2nd Floor
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
_______________________ ________________
Gail Meador Date
P.O. Box 2582
Ponca City, Oklahoma 74602
405-765-1415; fax 765-1146