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414969
Introduction
Cultural-historical activity
theory and interventionist
methodology:Classical
legacy and contemporary
developments
Annalisa Sannino
Berthel Sutter
Abstract
The article discusses the growing interest in cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) and its
potential to promote change in work and educational practices through research interventions.
Seeds for research interventions in CHAT are identified in the rich heritage of the works of
Vygotsky and other classic authors. Particular attention is devoted to Vygotskys epistemic
reasoning in The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology and to his emphasis on the
use of an indirect method in psychological investigations. In The Historical Meaning of the
Crisis in Psychology, Vygotsky formulated a program for the development of psychological
theory and methodology. The article points out that the future of activity theory depends on
the understanding and creative development of this heritage. On this basis, interventionism is
presented as a central aspect in CHAT. Historical and theoretical foundations of CHAT are
connected to current methodological implementations of interventionist research such as the
Change Laboratory, the Clinic of Activity, and the Fifth Dimension.
Keywords
activity theory, Change Laboratory, Clinic of Activity, Fifth Dimension, interventionist
methodology
Corresponding author:
Annalisa Sannino, University of Helsinki, Center for Research on Activity, Development, and Learning,
Institute of Behavioural Sciences, P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 5A), FIN-00014, Finland.
Email: annalisa.sannino@helsinki.fi
558
Although Vygotsky does not use the term intervention, the kind of new psychology
that he foresees is obviously interventionist: that is, a psychology with appropriate methodological tools to develop its theories while analyzing and changing practices:
A psychology which is called upon to confirm the truth of its thinking in practice, which
attempts not so much to explain the mind but to understand and master it, gives the practical
disciplines a fundamentally different place in the whole structure of the science than the former
psychology did. There practice was the colony of theory, dependent in all its aspects on the
metropolis. Theory was in no way dependent on practice. Practice was the conclusion, the
application, an excursion beyond the boundaries of science, an operation which lay outside
science and came after science, which began after the scientific operation was considered
completed. Success or failure had practically no effect on the fate of the theory. Now the
situation is the opposite. Practice pervades the deepest foundations of the scientific operation
and reforms it from beginning to end. Practice sets the tasks and serves as the supreme judge of
theory, as its truth criterion. It dictates how to construct the concepts and how to formulate the
laws. (p. 306)
559
Vygotsky points out the need for psychology to adopt what Marx called the reverse
method (p. 235), namely paths of investigation which reverse the path taken by nature.
Natural paths of investigation suggest moving from the simplest psychological formation as it can be observed in the ape to the highest complexity of human psychology.Instead, according to Vygotsky:
[T]he investigator need not always follow the same path that nature took; often the reverse path
is more advantageous. A certain stage of development and the process itself can only be fully
understood when we know the endpoint of the process, the result, the direction it took, and the
form into which the given process developed. Having arrived at the end of the path we can
more easily understand the whole path in its entirety as well as the meaning of its different
stages. (p. 235)
A methodological approach based on the path taken by nature relies on gathering objective
data through direct observations ofexternal manifestations. According to Vygotsky, this
560
orientation has emerged in empirical psychological inquiries not because of any factual
difference in the phenomena, but rather because of the inapplicability and epistemic barrenness of psychological categories and concepts (p. 235). Vygotsky gives the example
of reflexology, which represents a turning point in the history of psychological research
in that, unlike preceding traditional psychology, it reoriented the methods of investigation toward the paths taken by nature:
Formerly the animal mind was defined and described in concepts and terms acquired in the
study of man. Nowadays the behavior of animals gives the key to the understanding of the
behavior of man, and what we call human behavior is understood as the product of an
animal which, because it walks and stands erect, has a developed thumb and can speak. (p. 236)
Marxs notion of the reverse method is further developed in The Historical Meaning of
the Crisis in Psychology with the notion of an indirect method. This method, according
to Vygotsky, should be used within psychological investigations in order to be able to
uncover the complexity of reality, which is not immediately accessible as elementary facts
in traditional empirical inquiries. Psychology, according to Vygotsky, must proceed as other
sciences do in the study of what is not immediately given. The indirect method consists in
reconstructing or re-creating the object of study through interpretation of its traces and influences (p. 272). This can be done with the help of specifically constructed instruments.
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The indirect method invests the instruments used in empirical research with a new
role which is not always obvious (p. 273). In traditional experimentation, instruments are used to amplify the sensory perception of the experimenter, who has direct
access to the phenomena under scrutiny. In order to explain the difference between
instruments used in traditional experiments and those serving the indirect method,
Vygotsky uses the example of the microscope and the example of the thermometer:
The use of a thermometer is a perfect model of the indirect method. After all, we do not study
what we see (as with the microscope)the rising of the mercury, the expansion of the alcohol
but we study heat and its changes, which are indicated by the mercury or alcohol. We interpret
the indications of the thermometer, we reconstruct the phenomenon under study by its traces,
by its influence upon the expansion of a substance. To interpret, consequently, means to
re-create a phenomenon from its traces and influences relying upon regularities established
before (in the present casethe law of the extension of solids, liquids, and gases during
heating). There is no fundamental difference whatsoever between the use of a thermometer on
the one hand and interpretation in history, psychology, etc. on the other. (p. 273)
Vygotsky emphasizes that the use of the indirect method in psychological investigations is a necessity if psychology wants to overcome the historical separation between
concepts and facts:
For psychology the need to transcend the boundaries of immediate experience is a matter of life
and death. The demarcation, separation of the scientific concept from the specific perception,
can take place only on the basis of the indirect method. The reply that the indirect method is
inferior to the direct one is in scientific terms utterly false. Precisely because it does not shed
light upon the plenitude of experience, but only on one aspect, it accomplishes scientific work:
it isolates, analyzes, separates, abstracts a single feature. After all, in immediate experience as
well we isolate the part that is the subject of our observation. (p. 274)
The indirect method is substantively an interpretive method. Vygotsky argues for this
way of acquiring knowledge in psychology by referring to the way the basic coupling of
a reaction to a stimulus has been traditionally understood in the history of psychology
and to the advantage of understanding it with the help of interpretation:
The very concept of reaction implies the necessity of interpretation, of sense, connection,
relation. Indeed, actio and reactio are concepts that are originally mechanisticone must
observe both and deduce a law. But in psychology and physiology the reaction is not equal to
the stimulus. It has a sense, a goal, i.e., it fulfills a certain function in the larger whole. It is
qualitatively connected with its stimulus. And this quality of the interrelation, is not given in
experience, but found by inference. To put it more easily and generally: when we study behavior
as a system of reactions, we do not study the behavioral acts in themselves (by the organs), but
in their relation to other actsto stimuli. But the relation and the quality of the relation, its
sense, are never the subject of immediate perception, let alone the relation between two
heterogeneous sequencesbetween stimuli and reactions. The following is extremely
important: the reaction is an answer. An answer can only be studied according to the quality of
its relation with the question, for this is the sense of answer which is not found in perception but
in interpretation. (p. 276)
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Vygotsky argues that psychology must rely on indirect methods of interpretive analysis
and experimentation, much as Marx did it in creating Das Kapital:
[A]nalysis and experiment presuppose indirect study. From the analysis of the stimuli we infer
the mechanism of the reaction, from the command, the movements of the soldiers, and from the
form of the fable the reaction to it. Marx says essentially the same when he compares abstraction
with a microscope and chemical reactions in the natural sciences. The whole of Das Kapital is
written according to this method. Marx analyses the cell of bourgeois societythe form of
the commodity valueand shows that a mature body can be more easily studied than a cell. He
discerns the structure of the whole social order and all economical formations in this cell. He
says that to the uninitiated its analysis may seem the hair-splitting of details. We are indeed
dealing with details, but such details as microscopic anatomy is also dealing with. He who can
decipher the meaning of the cell of psychology, the mechanism of one reaction, has found the
key to all psychology. (p. 320)
Referring to Engels, Vygotsky writes that one steam engine demonstrates the law of
transformation of energy no less convincingly than 100,000 engines (p. 309). This one
steam engine, however, is of a particular form; it is the cell of all steam engines, that
is, the process of production of steam devoid of all additional features. It is a pure form
... it represents the process in a pure, independent, and undistorted form (Engels as cited
by Vygotsky, p. 321).
In The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology, Vygotsky formulated a program for the development of psychological theory and methodology. This program
requires the application of dialectical materialism through an indirect method for studying human practices:
The direct application of the theory of dialectical materialism to the problems of psychology
is impossible, just as it is impossible to apply it directly to history and sociology. Like
history, sociology is in need of the intermediate special theory of historical materialism which
explains the concrete meaning, for the given group of phenomena, of the abstract laws of
dialectical materialism. In exactly the same way we are in need of an as yet undeveloped but
inevitable theory of psychological materialism as an intermediate science which explains
the concrete application of the abstract theses of dialectical materialism to the given field of
phenomena. In order to create such intermediate theoriesmethodologies, general
scienceswe must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the laws of their change,
their qualitative and quantitative characteristics, their causality, we must create categories and
concepts appropriate to it, in short, we must create our own Das Kapital. It suffices to imagine
Marx operating with the general principles and categories of dialectics, like quantityquality,
the triad, the universal connection, the knot [of contradictions], leap, etc.without the abstract
and historical categories of value, class, commodity, capital, interest, production forces, basis,
superstructure, etc.to see the whole monstrous absurdity of the assumption that it is possible
to create any Marxist science while bypassing Das Kapital. Psychology is in need of its own
Das Kapitalits own concepts of class, basis, value, etc.in which it might express, describe
and study its object. (p. 330)
In the last pages of The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology, Vygotsky
spells out what can be seen as his still largely unfulfilled testament statement:
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Our science will become Marxist to the degree that it becomes truthful and scientific. And we
will work precisely on making it fruitful and to make it agree with Marxs theory. We cannot
master the truth about personality and personality itself so long as mankind has not mastered
the truth about society and society itself. In contrast, in the new society our science will take a
central place in life. (pp. 341342)
The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology was originally written in 1926,
eight years before Vygotskys death. For political reasons during his last years he could
not pursue this program and neither could his closest colleagues do so for several years
after his death. When Stalin succeeded Lenin in 1924, the Soviet Union gradually turned
into a dictatorship. This led to 30 years of stagnation during which intellectuals and academics who deviated from the Stalinist ideology were politically attacked for their work
and eventually eliminated. Vygotskys colleagues had to flee to Ukraine for safety. The
years when Vygotsky and his colleagues were all in Moscow were, claims A.A. Leontev
(2005), a dangerous time: The position of Vygotsky and his team at the Institute of psychology became less and less secure with each year (p. 27). From this period on, it
became increasingly difficult for these scholars to pursue their work. The pedologist
movement in which Vygotsky was involved was condemned, and even after Vygotskys
death, his books were taken away from his archives.
However, Stalinism was not immediately seen as a reactionary and anti-human
regime. The communist ideals in the Soviet Union were highly human and millions of
people believed that in the name of these ideals they were all building a better future. In
the years when Stalin was in power, few in the West could understand the extent of the
internal terror in Soviet Union. Great intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and prominent
artists like Pablo Picasso were supporters of Soviet communism, which they considered
as a real alternative to capitalism and American imperialism. Only in the late 1950s did
the horrors of Stalinism gradually begin to come to light. The realization of what actually
happened in the Soviet Union during the regime of Stalin led numerous scholars from all
over the world to turn their attention to banned or previously unknown works produced
by Russian academics.
A few years after Stalins death, A.N. Leontev received the Lenin Prize. This was an
important sign that the new kind of psychology initiated by Vygotsky was finally acceptable. This event, however, was not a sign of a consistent positive atmosphere with regard
to the work of these scholars. As late as the 1980s, scholars such as Davydov were prevented at times from traveling abroad. Until 1990, when the Soviet Union ceased to
exist, the legacy of Stalin continued and the state system he built continued to be based
on coercion and extreme control. The reception of the interventionist legacy of Vygotsky
within cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) must be understood in the context of
this complex historical framework.
Today there is a rapidly growing interest across behavioral and social sciences in
CHAT. A recent special issue (Holzman, 2006) of Theory & Psychology was specifically
devoted to activity-theoretical contributions to current interdisciplinary debates. The
growing interest in this theory also concerns its potential to promote change in work and
educational practices through research interventions. Seeds for research interventions in
activity theory can be found in the rich heritage of the works of Vygotsky, Luria, Leontev,
564
and other classic authors. The future of activity theory depends on the understanding and
creative development of this heritage.
565
The article documents the history of activity theory as an activist and interventionist
approach. Since Vygotskys works with illiterates, practically all the founders of CHAT
for instance, Luria, Leontev, Galperin, and Davydovhave engaged in various kinds of
interventions in multiple settings. Responding to the critiques, Sannino argues that, combined with design and implementation of material transformations, structural models of
activity do not exclude subjectivity, sensuous experience, emotion, and ethico-moral
issues. These dimensions of activity are embedded in collective change efforts in which
both the models and the voices of corporeal subjects act as mediators.
Two interventionist epistemological principles stemming from the history of activity
theory are presented, namely the principle of double stimulation and the principle of
ascending from the abstract to the concrete. These principles are behind the dynamics of
transformation toward what Vygotsky called higher psychological functions. Double
stimulation may be seen as the principle underlying the genesis of will. Ascending from
the abstract to the concrete may be seen as the principle behind the genesis of theoretical
generalization. Elaboration on the intertwined nature of these two epistemological principles is seen as a key challenge for future activity-theoretical interventionist research.
Sanninos article examines three interventionist methods in activity theorythe
Change Laboratory, the Clinic of Activity, and the Fifth Dimensionas examples of
application of the two epistemological principles. In spite of their differences, the three
can be seen as consistent attempts to put into practice the interventionist epistemology of
activity theory. They are also ways of elevating the themes of subjectivity and conceptual
models explicitly to the level of methodology.
Yrj Engestrms (2011) article questions the potential of design experiments in
research on learning. The article argues that design experiments suffer from an
unquestioned assumption of the linear progression of the methodology which ignores
the learners agency. Referring to sociological literature, Engestrm points out the
necessity to carefully take into account resistance and subversion as elements of interventions which inevitably divert from the linear perspective offered by literature on
design experiments.
Formative interventions based on Vygotskys methodological principle of double
stimulation are introduced as a way to foster collective agency in interventions.
Engestrms article analyzes a Change Laboratory formative intervention, conducted to
transform the way of working in the surgical unit of a university hospital facing a nearcrisis situation. Grounded in data from the case, the article offers an argumentative grammar of formative interventions based on four epistemic threads.
The first thread concerns the material use of the model of the activity system as
unit of analysis by the practitioners and the researchers in the intervention. Through
the intervention the conceptual representation of the activity system becomes a concrete auxiliary tool which mediates the analysis and redesign of the current activity.
This way the unit of analysis ceases to be a model solely for academic inquiries and
becomes part of the practitioners own ongoing activity. The second epistemic thread
concerns the notion of contradictions as a source of change and development. The
redesign of the current activity and the emergence of the new arise from below,
through analyses of the contradictions in the current activity of the practitioners. The
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third epistemic thread includes agency as a layer of causality, together with an interpretive
layer and a contradictory layer. These layers of causality grant participants in interventions not only their own interpretations of the activities that they inhabit, but also
the possibility that their motives might be contradictory and the potential to initiate
individual and collective actions of transformation of their current circumstances.
The fourth epistemic thread concerns the formation of a new concept for the practitioners activity, unknown at the beginning of the intervention to all participants, the
interventionist included.
Through the lenses of these four epistemic threads, formative interventions appear as
characterized by multiple layers of reformulation of the initial problem to be tackled
(first stimulus) and of the conceptual tools representing the practitioners activity system
(second stimuli). In the case of the hospital, a new organizational chart was progressively
developed from a 1-page diagram to a 10-page document in which an increasing precision was reached. The organizational chart served as a material anchor for actual change
actions for implementing the model in the surgical unit. A formative intervention is
depicted as a dynamic longitudinal constellation in which stimuli are layered and the
objectives are constantly moving.
Jaakko Virkkunen and Marika Schaupps (2011) article is an attempt to systematize
the principle of ascending from the abstract to the concrete and the principle of double
stimulation in relation to interventions within CHAT. By referring to ongoing societal
transformations in complex and rapidly changing activity systems, the article points at
the increasing importance of theoretical generalization as a type of thinking which has
the potential to grasp essential relationships at the core of the development of interconnected activity systems.
The authors analyze empirical data from a Change Laboratory, focusing on the
competence and actions of an in-house developer within a Finnish road-building company. The competence and actions of the in-house developer expanded toward a developmental activity based on theoretical thinking. This type of thinking allows the
addressing of inner contradictions of activity systems in the process of analyzing and
modeling new solutions.
The empirical case analyzed in Virkkunen and Schaupps article shows the in-house
developers intuitive critical orientation towards given key tools in her work, such as
tools of team building and team coaching, which abstracted human relations from the
concrete activities of the production teams work. The intuitive orientation found its
contents and was articulated when the in-house developer acquired tools to carry out
theoretical analysis of activity systems as part of the Change Laboratory intervention
method. These new tools created a situation of double stimulation for participants in the
intervention and for the in-house developer in particular, and allowed a redefinition of
her zone of proximal development.
The article by Deborah Downing-Wilson, Robert Lecusay, and Michael Cole (2011)
establishes the ground for a spatial expansion of the concept of activity by focusing on
the idea of decentralization of an activity. Activities are viewed as taking shape in many
places and without being carried out by a centralized set of actors.
The authors contrast two strategies of collaborative after-school interventions between
universities and local community organizations, namely the strategy of design
567
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(i.e., the actual result of the work of practitioners), and the reality of activity (i.e., the
mostly hidden complex and contradictory core of an activity, which can be disclosed
through the process of intervention).
The intervention study presented in the article is a case of educators working within a
youth judicial protection service in centers for emergency placement of minors. As an
intervention, the case did not proceed as expected and could be regarded as a failure.
Ultimately what was commissioned to be an intervention for developing the professional
profile of the educators in the organization became an analysis of the organizations
institutional crisis. The diagnosis proposed by the interventionists was that the impersonal dimension of work (i.e., its institutional features) was underdeveloped while at the
same time personal defenses among educators were increasingly manifesting themselves
as ways to indicate the unbearable crisis in the organization. The lesson learned from the
intervention was the need for the institution to engage in a collective initiative to face the
crisis within the work organization. The intervention in spite of its limitations made it
possible to open up a zone of proximal development between the management and the
team of educators to question the object of their activity and the underdevelopment of
their work.
Berthel Sutters (2011) article points out the necessity of transcending the simplistic
notion of intervention as separated from theory. Going beyond interventions means to
problematize interventionism as a sterile and atheoretical technique.
The author criticizes the units of analysis currently used within CHAT as dominated by the researchers views and theories without including those developed by all
partners. A review of interventionist research conducted by the author and his colleagues results in a suggestion of a model for developmental activity research. The
conclusion of the author is that cultural-historical methodology may be expanded to
go beyond interventionism: that is, to include in the analysis the resources that the
participants of the other activity also potentially provide for developing the research
activity itself.
The special issue includes two commentaries. The first commentary is written by Falk
Seeger (2011), an educational psychologist. The second commentary is authored by
Frank Blackler (2011), an expert in organizational behavior and change. The commentaries open up a set of unexplored challenges. The entire special issue may be seen as an
invitation to collective explication and development of interventions as the methodological foundation of CHAT.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.
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Annalisa Sannino is Lecturer in the Institute of Behavioural Sciences at the University of
Helsinki in Finland. She completed her Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Nancy,
France, and worked as a Fulbright post-doctoral Fellow at the Laboratory of Comparative
Human Cognition and at the Department of Communication at the University of California,
San Diego. She worked as researcher in the Department of Education at the University of
Salerno, Italy. Her research is focused on discourse, experiencing, and learning in interventions in educational institutions and work organizations. She has published articles in refereed
journals in English, French, and Italian. Address: University of Helsinki, Center for Research
on Activity, Development, and Learning, Institute of Behavioural Sciences, P.O. Box 9
(Siltavuorenpenger 5A), FIN-00014, Finland. [email: annalisa.sannino@helsinki.fi]
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