Vivarium

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23
1985

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VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
AGES AND RENAISSANCE

editors

advisory
committee
publishers
published

to the profane side of

vivariumis devotedin particular
andtheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddleAges
mediaeval
philosophy
and Renaissance.
- L. M. de Rijk,(Leyden)- H. A. G.
C. J. de Vogel,(Utrecht)
- F. F. Blok,(Amsterdam)
-J. IJsewijn,
Braakhuis,
(Nijmegen)
(Nijmegen).
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oftheEditorial
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13:10:25 PM

CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

Irene Rosier:
Paris

XXIII (1985)

Relatifset relativesdans les traits

terministes
des Xlle etXlIIe sicles
1

partie
)
{premire
L. M. de Rijk:
Leiden

WaltherBurley's Tract De exclusivis. An Edition

23

J. M. Thijssen:
Nijmegen

BuridanonMathematics

55

L. M. de Rijk:
Leiden

.
MartinM. Tweedaleon Abailard
a
Criticisms
Some
of Fascinating
81
Venture

C. H. Kneepkens:

in
The Quaestionesgrammaticales
theMS Oxford,CorpusChristiCollege250 : An Editionof theSecond
Collection

Nijmegen

98

Leonard A. Kennedy C.S.B.:

Houston,Texas

Late-Fourteenth-CenturyPhiloat Oxford
124
sophicalScepticism

Reviews:

VitaeSanctaeWiboradae.Die ltesderheiligen
tenLebensbeschreibungen
Wiborada, hrggvon W. Berschin
( G. Bartelink
)
G. R. Evans, Alan ofLille. The
Frontiersof Theologyin theLater
Twelfth
Century
{J. vanLaarhoven)
Alexander
Broadie,
George
Lokert, Late-ScholasticLogician
( G. Nuchelmans)
Barbara
Howard
Traister,
:
Necromancers
The
Heavenly
in
Renaissance
Magician
English
Drama(A. A. MacDonald)

79

152

154

157
158

Books Received:

13:10:25 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 1 (1985)
des Xlle et XlIIe sicles*
Relatifset relativesdans les traitsterministes
IRENE ROSIER

: Termes
etrgles
Premire
ourelatifs
)
d'anaphore
(relatio
anaphoriques
partie

Cette tude a pour point de dpart une recherchecollective,historique et thorique, sur le problme des deux types de propositions
relatives*. Il est souvent admis que c'est dans la Logique de PortRoyal que se trouvel'origine de ces deux types. L'opposition relatives
dterminatives/relatives
explicatives relve en fait d'une distinction
applique au pronom relatifqui1.
gnrale dtermination/explication,
Cette oppositionprendrapar la suite d'autres formes(relativesrestricou non dterminatitives/nonrestrictives,dterminatives/appositives
ves, defining/qualifying,
spcifiantes/nonspcifiantes), formes pas
toujours quivalentes2. Excepte l'analyse de Geach3, qui indique la
prsence d'une telle opposition dans les traitsmdivaux, mais sans
en montrerprcismentla gense, nous ne connaissons pas de travaux
tudiantce phnomne dans les traitsterministes.C'est prcisment
l'objet de la prsente tude. Or ce que nous considrons comme un
problme un aujourd'hui, se trouve clat dans divers chapitres des
traitset abord, implicitementet parfois explicitement, partir de
* Etudemeneau seinde la RCP 665duCNRS "ELSAP"
sur
(Etudeslinguistiques
etla paraphrase).
l'ambigut
1 "() PourArnauld
etNicole(LA LOGIQUE OU L'ART DE PENSER)la reladel'idedupretiveexplicative
estune' 'addition"quinechangepasla comprhension
ne restreint
de cetteide.(...) La
miertermeetqui, en consquence,
pas l'tendue
sont
charitables
commecellede Leshommes
relative
, estune
dterminative,
quisont
pieux
le mothommes
restreint
ne
l'tenduedu premier
terme,
addition,
qui,au contraire,
Lesdfinitions
classismantiques
plusqu'unepartiedeshommes."cf.Kleiber,
signifiant
relative
restrictive!
relative
, dans: Revue de linguistique
appositive
quesde l'opposition
chezPort-Royal,
45 (1981),1-16,p. 2. Pouruneanalysede cetteopposition
romane,
Etudes
surleXVillesicle,
Grammaire
etPonctuation,
Unicf.aussiJ. Cl. Pariente,
, Logique
M. Dominicy,
Beauze
dePortversit
deClermont
II, 1979,pp. 105-120;
, critique
Royal,
nPVIII,d.del'universit
deBruxelles,
lathorie
durelatif
surleXVIIIesicle
1981,
, Etudes
paratre
as linguistic
dans
andthesynthetic
pp. 95-107;S. Auroux,Theanalytic
topics,
TOPOI, (1984)etc.
2 Cf.Kleiber,
opuscit.
3 P. I. Geach,Reference
medieval
andmodern
andgenerality.
Anexamination
theories
,
ofsome
Ithaca,NewYork,1968,chap.5.
1

13:10:30 PM

questions diverses. D'un ct ce que nous appelons propositionsrelatives recouvrait au moyen-ge toutes les propositions contenant un
termeanaphorique; c'est pourquoi nous avons dans un premiertemps
tudi les termes anaphoriques et les rgles d'anaphore. Celles-ci,
donnes comme si elles concernaienttoute anaphore, s'appliquent en
fait diffremmentselon que le relatifest un unom" (ex. qui) ou un
'
'pronom" (ex. ille). C'est propos du fonctionnementde anaphore
que se rencontrela distinctionentre deux interprtationspossibles de
la propositionrelative. Elle se rencontre,en second lieu, dans les traits sur la restriction:parmi les diffrents
typesde restriction,se trouve
la restrictionper implicationem
, c'est--dire par la propositionrelative.
Or cette restrictionse trouve parfois empche, la relative fonctionnant alors comme une proposition part entire, sans valeur restrictive. Enfin on trouvecetteopposition dans les textestraitantdes quivalences entre propositions,et en particulierentrepropositionscontenant un nom relatifet propositionscontenantun pronom relatif{qui =
etille). Le faitque la distinctionqui nous intressaitapparat dans des
chapitresdistincts, propos de questions dont le lien entre elle n'est
pas toujours explicit,expliquera la dimensionde l'tude, car il nous a
paru important,pour vitertoute tentationanachroniste,de resituer
ce problme dans le contexteo il se posait l'poque.
1. Les termes
ou relatifs
anaphoriques
On trouve,dans les traitsde logique terministe,un certainnombre
de chapitresconcernantles termesanaphoriques {De relativis)
ou anaphore {De relatione
)4. Quelques grammaires,on le verra, traitentgalement de ces questions mais gnralementles grammairiensne s'intressentpas au problmes logico-linguistiquesde la corfrence,bien
que leurs dfinitionssoient le point de dpart des rflexionsdes logiciens. Ceci correspond un ' 'partage des tches" accept aux XIIXHIe sicles, selon lequel le grammairien traite des problmes
4 Cf. en particulier
dansle Tractatus
de Pierred'Espagne(ed. par L. M. de Rijk,
VIII De relativis
Assen1972),le chapitre
dansla Logicade Lambert
(pp. 185-193),
De relationibus
d'Auxerre
(pp. 235-245).Danslestextes
(ed. Alessio1971),le chapitre
modernorum
antrieurs
ditsparL. M. de RijkdansLogica
(Assen1962et 1967),cf.le
dansle Tractatus
deUnivocatione
Monacensis
Derelatione
chapitre
(vol.II, 2 p. 394),lechadansle Tractatus
deproprietatibus
sermonm
pitreDe relativis
(vol.II, 2 p. 721),certains
etunchapitre
du Tractatus
du5e trait,
etc.Lespropassagesdansle 3e trait
Anagnini
blmes
sontabords
dansdenombreux
autres
lisauxrelatifs
passages
quineleursont
consacrs.
pas exclusivement
2

13:10:30 PM

), le logicien
morphologico-syntaxiqueslis la correction( congruitas
des problmeslogico-smantiqueslis la vrit,avec des interfrences obligatoires.
Les termesrelatifsou anaphoriques fontl'objet de discussions nombreuses portantsur leur mode de rfrence,sur la relationde celui-ci
avec le mode de rfrencede l'antcdent, sur la valeur de vritdes
propositionsrelatives,i.e. contenantun termerelatif,etc. C'est parce
"
que les relatifs" sont souvent cause de difficultsdans les sophismes
que, dit Lambert d'Auxerre, leur connaissance est utile en logique5. Il
s'agit bien ici des termesrelatifscomme anaphoriques, que l'on dfinit
en suivant Priscien (cf. infra) et non de ces termes relatifsdont parle
Aristotedans les Catgories
(chap. 7). De nombreux auteurs commencentpar poser cettedistinctionentreles relatifsselon les grammairiens
et les relatifsselon les logiciens6.
La division des termesrelatifsest tout faitcanonique. Les termes
se divisentselon deux critresprincipaux. D'une part selon qu'ils rfrent quelque chose qui est une substance (relatifsde substance) i.e.,
en fait,un substantif,ou quelque chose qui est un accident ou une
proprit(relatifsd'accidents) en fait un adjectif. D'autre part selon
qu'ils rfrent la mme chose (substance ou accident) que dnote
leur antcdent(relatifsd'identit) ou qu'ils rfrent une chose diffrente (relatifsde diversit). Le tableau ci-dessous schmatise cette
divisiondes relatifset nous y ajouterons simplementdeux remarques.
(1) Les mdivaux suiventPriscien en faisantde ce que nous appelons
aujourd'hui pronomrelatif(ex. qui) un nom relatif,d'o la distinction
entre anaphore nominale ( relationominalis)(par qui par exemple) et
anaphore pronominale ( relatiopronominalis)
(par ille par exemple).
(2) Le pronom est dfinicomme signifiantune pure substance, une
substancesans dterminationde forme,sans qualit, la diffrencedu
nom. D'o les remarques de Lambert d'Auxerre: a) le pronom ne
peut tre relatifque de substance et jamais d'accident, puisqu'il ne
signifieque la substance; b) le pronom ne peut tre relatifque d'identit, puisque toute diversitprovient d'une diffrencede qualit (p.
, unautre(nom) renvoie
237). En effetdans Socratecourtetunautredispute
quelque chose le dsignantcomme substance et porteurd'une ' 'qualit propre" diffrentede celle de Socrate.
5 Logica
p. 235.
6 Cf. Pierred'Espagnep. 185,SUM. MET. II, 1 480,etc.
en
p.
[Nousabrgeons
lestextes
cits,cf.la liste la finde l'article].
majuscules
3

13:10:30 PM

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2. Uanaphore
2.1 Dfinition
L'anaphore ou relatioest dfinie, en suivant Priscien, comme rei
'
antelaterecordatio
'rappel d'une chose pose antrieurement" (cf. par
Lambert
d'Auxerre p. 235 ou TRACT. DE PR.SERM. II, 2
exemple
'4
ou
antelate
cognitionis
p. 721)
representatioreprsentationd'une connaissance antrieure" (Robert Blund ed. par Kneepkens (1977) p.
, ibid.).
repetitio
167) ou encore antelatesignificationis
( Summade Relativis
Ces dfinitionsposent d'emble deux problmes.
(1) Le premierest li au faitque l'on parle d'une chose poseantrieurement
. Or, remarquent certains auteurs, ceci n'est pas toujours le cas
pour ce que les grammairiensmdivaux appellent la relatiointrinseca
, involuta.Cette anaphore est particulireen
(Robert Blund) ou implicita
et
ce qu'elle ne met en cause aucun antcdent,ex. idemestgrammaticum
musicum
ou idemest analys comme comportanten lui-mme, outre sa
propresignificationde relatif,celle de l'antcdent (Robert Blund, op.
cit p. 16 et Summade Relativis
, ibid p. 21). D'o la rectificationapOn
relatio
nihilaliud estquamsecundacognitio.
Robert
Blund:
porte par
ne dit pas connaissance seconde cause d'une connaissance premire
qui la prcderait. On entend par connaissance premire une connaissance principale, se suffisant elle-mme, n'exigeant rien hors
d'elle-mme. Et par connaissance seconde une connaissance secon, Socrateconstitue une
daire, dpendante. Ainsi dans Socratecourt
premire mention et si on dit celui-ciest mu, le relatif fait ici une
seconde mention (ibid).
(2) Le second problme apparat dans les dfinitionsfaisant appel
une " connaissance antrieure". Il s'agit en effetde savoir ce qui est
objet de connaissance: "En effet,si quelque chose n'est pas d'abord
apprhend et pens, on ne peut ni en faire un rappel ni y rfrer"
(TRACT. DE PR. SERM. II, 2 p. 721). Or si, dans un mot, le
signifiest objet de connaissance, ce n'est pas le cas de ses accidents
enimnonsuntcogitata
grammaticaux ou consignifications( consignificata
apprehensa
, ibid). D'o l'incorrection:homolegitet id estactivigeneris
o id reprendraitla voix active, consignificationdu verbe legitUn
autre problme, li celui-ci, a une solution controverse: le relatif
7 C. H. Kneepkens
intheGrammatical
Tracts
(1977),Therelatio
simplex
ofthelateTwelfth
andEarlyThirteenth
A: Robert
, dans:Vivarium
XV, 1, pp. 1-30[Appendix
Century
inartegramatica
B: Anonymi
Blund,Summa
, cap. De Relativis
, pp. 16-20;Appendix
derelativis
Summa
, pp. 20-30].
5

13:10:30 PM

reprend-il un terme distribu ou non-distribu? ou, en termes

modernes,l'antcdent est-ille nom ou le groupe nominal compos de
sa tte (le nom) et, par exemple, un signe de quantification(<omnis
)?
2.2 Regles
La dfinitionque donne Priscien, et sa suite les grammairiens
mdivaux, de anaphore, contient deux lments importants.Plus
exactement,ces lmentsconcernenttoujours d'abord anaphore pronominalemais fonctionnentcomme s'ils concernaienttoute anaphore,
ce qui n'est jamais pos explicitement.
(1) Le pronom est mis pour un nom propre8et renvoie toujours un
rfrentdtermin. Pour cela il faut (la) que son antcdent ait une
rfrencedtermine,puisque c'est la relationd 'anaphore qui spcifie
la rfrencedu pronom anaphorique et (lb) que le contextede la proposition dans laquelle se trouve le pronom lui permetted'avoir effectivementle mme mode de rfrenceque son antcdent,ceci d'aprs
le fonctionnementgnral de la thoriede la supposition.
(2) Lorsque le relatifest au nominatif,dit Priscien, et qu'il rfre un
antcdent au nominatif,ils rfrent" la mme personne". Cette
" identitde
personne" permetde dfinirtoute constructionintransitive (sujet-verbe, antcdent-relatif,substantif-adjectif,etc.). Ceci
impose (2a) que l'antcdent et le relatifdnotentdes personnes,donc
aient suppositionpersonnelleet (2b) qu'ils dnotentla mmepersonne.
Ces conditions soulvent de nombreuses difficults,
(la) L'antcdent doit avoir une rfrencediscrtedonc soit tre un
nom propre, soit avoir une rfrencedtermine,ce qui n'est pas ralis en particulierdans les cas suivants:
- lorsque l'antcdent est l'object d'un verbe (ou le sujet du passif)
comme promettre
, objet qui est, comme nous dirions
, souhaiter
aujourd'hui, non spcifi. Les auteurs s'accordent pour considrer
que l'anaphore est impossible, ex. iste desideratsanitatemet ilia est
(TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. II, 2 p. 350).
- lorsque l'antcdent est un indfinicomme aliquid(cf. infra).
- lorsque l'antcdent est prcd de omnis, tantum
, etc., exemples
dont la correctionest controverse(cf. infra).
8 Cf.parexemple
dialectices
TRACT. ANAG.II, 2 p. 322ou RogerBacon,Summule
,
enRoger
1937
Baconi
hactenus
inedita
Oxford
XV,
Steele,
[abrg
Rogeri
Opera
(ed.
BaconXV]), p. 167.
6

13:10:30 PM

(lb) L'antcdent et le relatifdoiventtredans des contextestelsqu'ils

leurs permettentd'avoir le mme mode de rfrence.Cette rgle est
clairementnonce par Lambert d'Auxerre:
lui convenant
sousunecercommun
un prdicat
un terme
"S'il estattribu
sous
ilfautquel'anaphore
luiattribue
luiconvenant
unprdicat
taineacception,
est
sinonl'expression
la mmeacception
que cellequ'il a commeantcdent,
fausse"9.
Puisque, en effet,la relationanaphorique revient attribuer l'antcdentle prdicatqui est attribuau termerelatif,il fautque ce prdicat soit du mme typeque celui de l'antcdent, pour que l'antcdent
ait, sous les deux prdications, la mme acception. Lambert
d'Auxerre en tire la rgle trs gnrale que l'antcdent et le relatif
doivent avoir la mme supposition, rgle gnralement accepte10.
Selon les troismodes de rfrencepossibles, il y troispossibilitspour
l'anaphore:
(i) l'antcdent a suppositionpersonnelle(il est mis pour un de ses
;
appellats ou suppts): ex. homocurritqui disputt
(ii) l'antcdent a suppositionmatrielle(il est mis pour le son, pro
;
generis
voc)'ex. homoestdissillabuset istudestcommunis
a
est
mis
son signifi,sa
l'antcdent
pour
supposition
simple
(il
(iii)
simum
est
et
est
homo
istud
ex.
specialis
species
(ibid p. 240).
forme):
Si le prdicat attribu au relatifest tel qu'il lui confreun mode de
rfrencediffrentde celui de l'antcdent, la phrase est fausse: ex.
homoest dissillabumet istecurrit(ibid p. 240). Ceci vaut, quelles que
soient les combinaisons des trois types de supposition: cf. encore les
est
exemples donns dans la TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. magister
nomenet ipse legit(II, 2 p. 350) ou homoestspecieset ipseest(p. 350).
Cette analyse de Lambert d'Auxerre ne se rencontrepas, en ces termes, chez les logiciens de son temps ou les logiciens antrieurs,d'un
9 p. 240"Iuxtahocnotandum
communi
attribuitur
aliquodprequodalicuitermino
dicatum
ei conveniens
subunaacceptione,
necesseestquodrelatio
attribuai
aliquod
subillaacceptione
subqua antecedebat
autalitereritlocutio
ei conveniens
predicatum
falsa."
10"Itemsciendum
ad terminm
relatum
ydemptitatis
proregulaquod relativum
refert
communem
ipsumeo modoquo antecedens"
(p. 239).Cf.la mmerglechez
nonreciprocum
debethabereeanPierred'Espagne:"Omnerelativum
idemptitatis
demsuppositionem
quamhabetsuumantecedens"
(p. 191)ou dansla SUM. MET.
habetantecedens,
talemrelativum"
"Qualemsuppositionem
(II, 1p. 458),rgles
que
un relatif
a unerfrence
l'on donnegnralement
pourmontrer
que, parexemple,
estdistribu.
distributive
Cf.aussiRogerBacon(XIV p. 202)
lorsquesonantcdent
"Cum hocpronomen
'ille'sitrelativum
identitatis,
igitur
proeodemresumit
singnatumantecedents
proquo statsuumantecedens"
(etp. 166).
7

13:10:30 PM

ct cause de l'exigence (2) sur l'identit des personnes dnotes,

que lui-mme d'ailleurs accepte, ce que nous verrons par la suite,
mais d'autre part cause d'un ensemble d'exemples qui la contredisent directement.
2.3 Infractions
aux rglesd'anaphore
Les commentaires de Boce et d'autres logiciens fournissentces
exemples qui enfreignent,en particulierl'exigence (2) sur l'identit
des personnes dnotes, comme: homoestanimalquodestgenus, Socrates
esthomoqui estspecies
noms don, iustusquodestqualitas.Aprs diffrents
ns ces typesparticuliersd'anaphore ( relatioindijferens
, confusa
, impropria), particuliersen ce que le relatifet l'antcdent ne dnotentpas
des personnes mais ont ce qu'on appellera - une foisla terminologie
terministestabilise - suppositionsimple, on donne cetteanaphore
le nom d'anaphore simple, relatiosimplex
, pour l'opposer anaphore
servira
dsigner tous les cas
Ce
terme
relatio
personnelle(
personalis).
d'anaphore impropremme quand ni l'antcdent ni le relatifn'ont
suppositionsimple, on y reviendra. Nous prsentonsici brivementet
schmatiquementles deux cas d'anaphore qui enfreignentles conditions (2a) et (2b) ci-dessus, en renvoyantaux deux articlesfondamentaux de C. H. Kneepkens, pour un dveloppementdtaill et complet
de la question11.Prcisons que, pour simplifier,nous utiliseronsuniquement les termes supposition simple/personnelleet anaphore simple/personnelle,sans tenir compte de la gense de la terminologie
, confusa
, impropria
,
appellation
suppositionet relatio indijferens
( nomination
simplex...), qui a t dcrite par ailleurs.
(2a) La condition sur 1" 'identit de personnes" impose que l'antcdent et le relatifdnotent une personne, donc aient supposition personnelle. Ceci explique que, pour certains auteurs, le seul mode propre de l'anaphore est celui o l'antcdent est "mis pour quelque
appellai" (TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. II, 2 p. 350). L'auteur
anonyme de ce traitest, du faitde ce principe, amen exclure les
exemples homoestspeciesetipseest(p. 350) non pas, comme le feraLambert d'Auxerre, parce que le relatifet l'antcdent n'ont pas mme
mode de rfrence,mais parce que l'antcdent n'a pas supposition
11C. H. Kneepkens
A Note
Salvavit.
ontheEarly
quaeDamnavit,
Develop(1976),"Mulier
ment
XIV, 1 et. H. Kneepkens
, dans:Vivarium
oftheRelatio
simplex
(1977)op. cit
note7.
12Cf. L. M. de Rijk(1967),Logica
modernorum
, vol.II, 1.
8

13:10:30 PM

personnelle13.Il ne discute pas le cas o antcdent et le relatif

auraient un mme mode de supposition,autre que personnelle. Il peut
galementexclureles cas o l'antcdent est le sujet d'une proposition
ngative (le signe de ngation prcdant le sujet), o antcdent est
, lorsqu'il est prcd d'un signe
l'objet d'un verbe comme promettre
comme tantum
, etc., cas que nous avons dj rencontrs.Cette condition est donc mise en difficult
dans les cas d'anaphore o l'antcdent
et/oule relatifn'ont pas supposition personnelle. Elle ne conviendra
en faitqu' un type particulierd'anaphore, l'anaphore personnelle,
o l'antcdent et le relatifdoivent,en plus respecterla condition(2b),
donc dnoterla mme personne.
(2b) Tous les exemples qui ne respectentpas (2a) ne respectentbien
entendu pas (2b). De plus, (2b) n'est pas respecte lorsque l'antcdent et le relatif,tout en ayant supposition personnelle, ne dnotent
pas la mme personne. Des exemples tirsdes textessaints sont remarsalqus dj par Ablard, dont le plus clbre est mulierquae damnavit
vavitaque l'on trouve discut dans de nombreux traitsde grammaire
et de logique aux Xlle et XHIe sicles (cf. Kneepkens (1976)). Si
l'antcdent mulieret le relatifquae dnotaient la mme personne, la
phrase serait fausse: l'antcdent dnote une certaine personne,
Marie, et le relatifune personne diffrente,Eve. Bien que l'antcdent et le relatifaient tous deux supposition personelle, il n'y a pas
identitde la personne dnote. Avoir mme mode de rfrenceet
avoir suppositionpersonnelle ne suffitdonc pas faire une anaphore
propre. Il y a, remarquaitAblard, deux typesd'identitdans les choses, une identitde personne (ex. idemestMarcusquod Tullius) et une
identitde nature ou d'espce (ex. idemestPetrusquodMarcus)1*.Il y a
deux types d'anaphore, selon les deux types d'identit possibles. La
"
seconde, appele par Ablard anaphore indiffrente",rend compte
de l'exemple ci-dessus puisque l'antcdent et le relatifrfrent deux
individus identiques selon l'espce, deux femmes.Cette anaphore est
rejetepar les grammairienscomme constructionimpropreou figure
(par ex. Thierryde Chartres) et, pourjustifierle faitque de tels exem13"Sive dictioponatur
in subiecto
sivein predicato
et nonponatur
proaliquosuo
ad ipsumnonpotestfierirelatio,
ut ' istedesiderat
etillaes. Item.
sanitatem
appellato,
nomenponitur
ad ipsumnonpotestfieri
Quandocumque
relatio,
prosuosignificato,
ut4homo
estspecies
etipseesnichil
dictuest.Item.Quandonomenseipsum
ad
subponit,
*
'
fierirelatio,
ut magister
estnomen
etipselegitnichilest." (TRACT.
ipsumnonpotest
DE UNIV. MONAC. II, 2 pp. 349-350)
14Abaelardia
inedita
, ed. Minio-Paluello,
, II, Roma1958,p. 116.
Twelfth
Century
Logic
9

13:10:30 PM

ples se rencontrent,on dira que le texte sacr n'a pas se soumettre

aux lois des grammairiens,formulequi serten diverses occasions. Ce
second type d 'anaphore sera appel, comme le premier, anaphore
simple.

2. 4 Anaphoresimpleetanaphore
personnelle
Il y a anaphore personnelle lorsque l'antcdent et le relatifont
mme mode de rfrence,qu'ils ont suppositionpersonnelleet dnotent la mme personne: on a alors proprement 4'identit de
personne", c'est le cas (i) chez Lambert d'Auxerre (ex. homocurrit
qui
disputt).Il est parfoisadmis un second type d 'anaphore personnelle,
lorsque l'antcdent et le relatifont mme mode de rfrence,et ont
une supposition matrielle,peut-treparce que le nom commun a ici
valeur de nom propre, c'est le cas (ii) de Lambert d'Auxerre (ex. homo
estdissillabumestistudestcommunis
generis).
Les deux typesde anaphore personnellevalent, notons-le, la fois
pour une anaphore nominale:
la
"L' anaphoreest personnelle
et son antcdent
dnotent
lorsquele relatif
mispourle
mmechoseou le mmeappellat,
ex. homo
movetur
, ou sont
quicurrit
"
de
mmenom,ex. anthropos
estGrecum
vocabulum
homo
quodinterpretatur
{Summa
relativis
, ed. parKneepkens
(1977)p. 21)
et pour une anaphore pronominale:
et le pronomrfrent
la
lorsquel'antcdent
"L'anaphoreest personnelle
ducitur
inurbem
etipsereus
mmepersonne,
ex.homo
fitou au mmenom,ex.musa
estnomen
etilluddeclinatur
sic" (ibidp. 28).
appellativum
Dans les autres cas on aura anaphore simple, que ceux-ci soientlinguistiquementacceptables comme le cas (iii) de Lambert d'Auxerre ou
non. Du fait du nombre de possibilits recouvertes par anaphore
simple, c'est ngativementque celle-ci est le mieux dcrite, cf. par
exemple Robert Blund: anaphore est simple lorsque le relatifet
l'antcdent ne sont pas mis pour la mme chose.
Si on retientcomme anaphore personnelle,en plus du cas (i), le cas
(ii), qui est acceptable et pas le cas (iii), qui l'est toutautant, c'est probablement parce qu'on a baptis anaphore impropreanaphore simple: ceci conduit parfois penser que lorsque les termesont supposition simple, on a anaphore simple, de mme que lorsqu'ils ont suppositionpersonnelle,on a anaphore personnelle(cf. SummadeRelativis,p.
28); ou, ce qu'on trouve aussi, qu'on a anaphore personnelle quand
on a identitin numero
et anaphore simple quand on a identitin specie.
10

13:10:30 PM

Or dans l'exemple mulierquae damnavitsalvavitasi on n'a pas identit

selon le nombre, on n'a pas non plus identitselon l'espce, puisque
ce n'est ni le mme individu qui est dnot, ni la mme espce, mais
de la mme espce. L'antcdent et le relatif
deux individus diffrents
donc
avoir
tous
deux
supposition personnelle et tre en relapeuvent
tion d'anaphore simple, et inversementtre en relation d'anaphore
personnelle,sans avoir supposition personelle, mais matrielle.
En conclusion, il ne faut pas confondre supposition personelle et
anaphore personnelle,suppositionsimple et anaphore simple. D'autre
part, il ne fautpas rduire anaphore personnelle une identitsur les
modes de rfrencepuisque deux cas "corrects" d'anaphore simple
respectentcette condition (supposition personnelle+ non-identitde
rfrent;suppositionsimple de l'antcdent et du relatif).Enfin,il y a
de nombreuxcas d'anaphore simple o le relatifet l'antcdent n'ont
pas tous deux supposition simple. Le tableau que nous prsentonsen
annexe, et les exemples qui l'accompagnent en donneront une ide
plus prcise.
On peut ajouter que la distinctionentre simple et personnelle ne
concernepas uniquement anaphore mais galementla deixis (<demonstratio
, la rciprocation,ce qui tmoigne
), les appositions, les adiectiones
d'une conscience de ce que les rgles dveloppes propos de la
repriseanaphorique concernenten faitle phnomne plus gnral de
corfrencedont elle faitpartie.
Nous terminerons sur ce point en prcisant, avec Lambert
d'Auxerre, que l'anaphore personnelleconcerne le plus gnralement
les relatifsde substance. Dans Socrateestblancet telestPlaton, la blancheur de Socrate ne peut en effettre identique numriquement la
blancheur de Platon. Le seul cas o on peut avoir anaphore personnelle avec un relatifde qualit est celui, o, prcisment,le mme
accident appartient la mme personne dans les deux propositions:
ex. Socrates
estalbusettalisdicitur
esse.A part exceptiondonc, les relatifs
de qualit font ncessairementune anaphore simple (pp. 237-238).
Cependant le faitque ce soit galement parfoisle cas pour les relatifs
de substance contredit leur dfinition, d'o cette qualification
d'impropre. On trouve l'anaphore simple avec les relatifsd'identit
. .) et avec les relatifsde diversit(ex. H scribitur
interalias lit(ex. mulier.
teras).Roger Bacon note l'exemple Sorsedetinteralios asioso le relatif
doit tre compris comme dnotant un ensemble d'individus dont
l'antcdent ne faitpas partie, sans quoi la phrase seraitfausse. Signalons enfin qu'il peut y avoir ambigut, dans certains exemples,
11

13:10:30 PM

comme celui-ci, donn par Ablard: homosculpitqui pingit

, puisqu'il
:
peut s'agir du mme homme qui sculpte et peint ( relatioad personam
d'un
homme
non
ncessairement
ou
identique,
anaphore personnelle)
: anaphore simhomme rfrant l'homme en gnral ( relatioad speciem
ple) (Kneepkens (1976) p. 7).
de l'antcdent
2.5 Supposition
confuse
des prcdentsdans la
Le cas de la suppositionconfuseest diffrent
mesure o l'antcdent ne suppose ni pour son nom, ni pour son signideterminata
fi, ni pour un individu de manire dtermine( suppositio
),
mais de manire indtermine(suppositioconfusavel indeterminata
). Le
problme se rencontrefrquemmentet se prsenteen particulierlorsomnis{suppositio
confusa
que l'antcdent est prcd du signe distributif
. Nous envisagerons ici principalementle cas de l'anaetdistributiva)15
et reprendronsultrieurementcelui de anaphore
phore pronominale
nominale.
Les auteurs divergent sur ce problme, ce dont tmoignentpar
exemple les discussions, dans le TRACT. ANAG. sur la supposition
de relatiflorsque l'antcdent est aliquid (II, 2 p. 322). On rencontre
le
textesquatre solutionsqui dfinissentdiffremment
dans diffrents
fonctionnementde anaphore lorsque l'antcdent est distribu:
(i) Il ne peut pas y avoir anaphore lorsque l'antcdent a supposition confuse.
que le relatifanaphorise, autrement
(ii) C'est un antcdentdistribu
dit, la distributionprcde anaphore.
que le relatifanaphorise, autre(iii) C'est un antcdentnondistribu
ment dit anaphore prcde la distribution.
(iv) Il y a ambigut entre les solutions (ii) et (iii).
On trouve la solution (i) dans le TRACT. ANAG.: un relatifne
peut pas anapho riserun termeen suppositionconfuse;la phrase omnis
n'est "pas latine" et ne peut servirde resolutio
homocurrit
etipsemovetur
16
movetur
omnishomoqui currit
(II, 2 p. 269) . De mme "on ne dit pas"
prexfit ab ilio et ego exaudioearn. On trouve la mme chose dans le
15Pourlesdfinitions
De RijkII,
desupposition,
cf.enparticulier
desdiffrents
types
1 pp. 581et sv.
16Dansle chapitre
surlesequivalences
entre
du mmetrait
propositions
{Deequipolallerdesoi(ex.
semble
dequienet+ nomrelatif
la rsolution
quiesticirejete,
lentibus)
estanimal
etipsum
currit
omnis
homo
estanimal
omnis
homo
, II, 2 p. 240).
; ergo
quodestrisibile
l du
alorsqu'il s'agissait
estici le prdicat
On noteracependant
que l'antcdent
sujet.
12

13:10:30 PM

TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. comme nous l'avons dj not: il ne

peut y avoir anaphore quand l'antcdent a une significationconfuse
parce que anaphore pronominale est ncessairementcertaineet que
le pronom doit renvoyer un rfrentdtermin. Or dans l'exemple
sanitasoptatur
, sanitassignifieconfusmentpuisqu'on ne peut demander: quaesanitas? Sont donc des non-sensdes noncs comme istedesideratsalutemet illa estvelnonest(II, 2 p. 340).
La solution (ii) est dfendue par exemple par Pierre d'Espagne, en
vertu de la rgle que tout pronom relatifd'identit a mme supposition que son antcdent(cf. supra). Quand on dit omnishomocurrit
et
ille
omnis
ille movetur
tout
homme
et
le
sens
est17:
homo
,
suppose pour
. C'est la solution galement adopte, en
curritet omnishomomovetur
vertu de la mme rgle, par Lambert d'Auxerre, mais sa glose est
etisteomnishomocurrens
lgremmentdiffrente:omnishomocurrit
disputt(pp. 244-245).
Le traitementle plus exhaustifque nous ayons trouvdes solutions
(ii) et (iii), par le nombre d'arguments donns en faveurde chacune
d'elles, se trouvechez Roger Bacon (XIV, p. 165 et sv.)18. Ce texteest
d'autant plus intressantque Roger Bacon va ensuite critiquer les
argumentsdonns en faveurdes solutions (ii) et (iii) pour adopter la
solution (iv) qui est la plus frquemmentretenue. Nous ne pouvons
reproduireici les neufargumentsen faveurde (ii) et les sept en faveur
de (iii) et leurs contre-arguments.Plusieurs parmi ceux-ci se trouvent
dans d'autres texteset cette discussion de Roger Bacon semble vraiment fairele tour de la question, comme c'est souvent le cas chez cet
auteur, qu'il s'agisse de logique ou de grammaire.
La solution (iv) fait appel aux notions de sens compos et divis,
d'Aristote. Une phrase comme
empruntesaux Rfutations
Sophistiques
etilleestgrammaticus
omnishomocurrit
est susceptiblede deux interprtations:
(a) le pronom relatifrfreau termedistribu,i.e. homme pris uni17Le sensattribu
danscestextes
unexemple
commeomnis
homo
etillemovetur
currit
est interprter
commeunesolution
unproblme
technique
possible
propose
logique,etnoncommeunerelleglosesmantique,
puisqu'ilestclairqu'untelexemple
estininterprtable
enlatin(cf.suprala remarque
du TRACT.ANAG.selonlaquelle
unetellephrasen'est"pas latine",pourrejeter
cettesolution).
Cettesolution
estjustifiepardesconsidrations
de la rgle anaphore)
etnon
thoriques
(fonctionnement
pardesarguments
linguistiques
d'usage.
18RogerBacon,Summa
desophismatibus
etdistinctionibus
, ed. Steele,Operahactenus
ineditaRogeriBaconiXIV, Oxford1938[abrgen RogerBaconXIV].
13

13:10:30 PM

versellement(sens compos) et cette phrase est fausse (sens: "tout

homme court et tout homme est grammairien,,) = solution (ii).
(b) Le pronom relatifrfreau termenon distribu(sens divis) et la
phrase est vraie (sens: "tout homme court et quelque homme est
grammairien") = solution (iii)19.
On remarque cependant que le mode proprede l'anaphore est le premier (solution (ii)), ce qui est conforme la rgle gnrale de l'anaphore qui avait fait adopter cette solution par Pierre d'Espagne ou
Lambert d'Auxerre (TRACT. DE PROPR. TERM. II, 2 p. 721).
Notons que cette solution, dont nous aurons reparler propos de
l'anaphore nominale, vaut non seulement lorsque antcdent est
,
prcd de omnismais encore lorsqu'il est accompagn de solus, tantum
en
Guillaume
de
etc.
Sherwood,
,
particulier
Syncategoremata
(cf.
praeter
ou le TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. p. 340 et 349).
L'explication que donne Roger Bacon pour la solution(iv) est celle
d'une double constructiondu discours ( generatio
) (XIV, p. 168:24 et
terme
le
est
d'abord
distribu
en
puis ensuite anaphoris,
(a)
sv.):
c'est pourquoi c'est un terme distribu qui est anaphoris; en (b) le
terme est d'abord anaphoris puis distribu,c'est pourquoi le relatif
anaphoris un terme non distribu. Cette solution apenesgenerationern
"
sermonis
(p. 171:6) permetde respecterla rgleselon laquelle le relatif
a le mme mode de suppositionque son antcdent(p. 170:34). Plusieurs objections sont souleves contrele faitque l'anaphore prcderait la distribution.En particulierle fait que le signe distributifprcde dans le discours le terme relatif.La rponse de Roger Bacon,
dont il se serten d'autres occasions, c'est que intellection,la manire
d'interprter,de comprendrele discours est abstraite et ne suit pas
ncessairementla "gnration" effective, "expression actuelle" du
discours (p. 169:14 et sv.): rien n'empche de comprendreles choses
autrementqu'elles n'apparaissent; l'ordre logique et l'ordre linguistique peuvent tre distincts.
Laissons-l le texte de Roger Bacon pour en terminerprovisoirement avec le problme des antcdents suppositionconfuse avec le
cas particulierde l'anaphore par le rciproque, que les grammairiens
nommentrelatiointrasumpta,
parce que le relatifet l'antcdent se trouLa
vent dans la mme phrase, par opposition la relatioextrasumpta.

avec
ou
sans
sa
"disposition"?
rciproque rfre-t-il son antcdent
19On classed'ailleurs
selonla division,
dansle
commeparalogisme
cetteambigut
surlesRfutations
cadrede commentaires
Sophistiques
(DIAL. MONAC. II, 2 p. 573).
14

13:10:30 PM

Si on suit la rgle gnrale de l'anaphore (le relatifd'identit doit

dnoterles mmes individus que ceux dnots par son antcdent) on
est conduit dire que, si l'antcdent est pris universellement,le rciproque doit trepris universellement(solution de Pierre d'Espagne ou
du TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM.). De l suivrait que omnishomo
videtse quivaudrait omnishomovidet hominem.Or ceci est
inexactcomme le montreLambert d'Auxerre sur un cas particulier(p.
242). Si on pose que n'importe quel homme se voit seulement luimme, il est vrai que tout homme se voit, mais il n'est pas vrai que
touthomme voit tout homme. La conclusion de Lambert est triple:(i)
le rciproque rfre son antcdent avec sa "disposition" quand
celui-ci est un terme discret( Socratesalbus videtse = Socratesalbus videt
Sortem
album);(ii) si l'antcdent est un termecommun, le relatifrfre
celui-ci avec sa 'disposition" s'il s'agit d'un adjectif( homoalbusvidet
se = homoalbus videthominem
album) mais (iii) s'il s'agit d'un signe de
le
relatif
rfre

son antcdentet dnote bien les individistribution,

dus que dnote son antcdent,mais pas sur le mme mode: l'antcdent les dnote sur le mode universel, le relatifsur le mode discret.
Lorsqu'on a omnishomovidetse, se dnote tous les individusque dnote
omnishomo
, mais pris de manire particulire,et non collectivement.
C'est ce qu'exprimait dj Ablard en disant que dans un tel cas il n'y
a pas "multiplication" pour le relatifcomme pour son antcdent
(Kneepkens (1976) p. 11).
2,6 L 'appellatiodicti
Le dictumou contenu propositionnela la formed'une proposition
infinitiveet est quivalent un nom propre. C'est pourquoi les motsle
composant sont, dit-on, comme ses syllabes, et n'ont donc aucune
rfrencedtermine.Un terme contenu dans Yappellatiodictine peut
de ce fait pas tre anaphoris: il n'est "pas latin" de dire verumest
et ipsemovetur
Socratem
currere
(TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. II, 2 p.
il
est
possible qu'un relatifsoit dans Yappellatiodictiet
350). Cependant

l'antcdent
soit
l'extrieur: ex. De Socrateestverumipsumesse.
que
3. Les phrasesrelatives
On a rencontr propos de la discussion sur la suppositionconfuse
le problme que posait le mode de rfrencedu relatif.Ce problme
est essentielcar on ne peut comprendrele statutde la phrase relative,
i.e. contenantun termerelatif,que si on connat le mode de rfrence
15

13:10:30 PM

du relatif.Ici deux lments entrenten conflit,d'un ct le principe

gnral selon lequel un termetireson mode de suppositiondu contexte
de la propositiondans laquelle il se trouve et d'un autre ct le principe de anaphore qui lie le mode de rfrencedu relatif celui de son
antcdent, conflitque nous avons dj vu l'uvre.
3.1 Restriction
temporelle
On sait que le temps du verbe faitvarierla suppositiondu sujet. Or
lorsque le sujet est suivi d'une proposition commenant par un nom
relatif,ex. aliquisquifuitnonest, ce n'est pas le verbe dont l'antcdent
est le sujet (est)mais le verbe de la phrase relativequi confre l'antcdent son mode de supposition:
'
l'antcdent
d'un termecommun
parun nomrelatif,
'Quand il y a anaphore
duverbedesonrelatif'(TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM. II, 2
tiresa supposition
p. 724et aussiTRACT. ANAG.II, 2 p. 268).
Inversement,le pronom relatifne tire pas sa suppositiondu verbe de
la propositiondans laquelle il se trouve, mais de la propositiondans
laquelle se trouve l'antcdent:
d'unterme
lerelatif
tiresa supporelatif,
parunpronom
"Quandilya anaphore
Ainsilorsqu'on
dithomo
sition
du verbede sonantcdent.
, bien
fuitetillenonest
illesoitsujetd'unverbeau prsent,
ilrendla locution
vraiepourles
que le relatif
non-existants"
(TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM. ibid).
Ces deux rgles rendentl'argumentation suivant non valide:
Homo fuitet ille non est
ergo homo fuitqui non est
En effet,si nous figuronspar des flchesla restrictiondu termepar ce
qui le restreinton a:
homo fuitet ille non est
1
t
le pass du verbefuitrestreintille supposer pour des individuspasss
alors que dans:
homo fuitqui non est20
t
I
20Nosflches
Le mcanisme
notent
le rsultat.
del'anaphore
simplement
quiyabouhomofuitetillenonest(le verbe
homo
etle relatif
titestpluscomplexe:
fuitrestreint
1
2
t
Homofuitqui non
de sonantcdent).
est verbeestrestreint
tiresa supposition
le
t i t I (le
restreint
la supposition
de sonantcdent).
relatif,
qui parsa natureconjonctive,
16

13:10:30 PM

le verbe de la relativeamne antcdent supposer pour des individus prsents21.Voici un exemple de diffrenceentre anaphore nominale et pronominale et un argumentcontre quivalence qui = et +
pronom relatif. Nous reviendrons sur ce problme dans notre
deuxime partie, car certains auteurs envisagent une solution diffrente, partir d'une autre interprtationde la proposition relative
qui.. .
3.2 Statutde la phraserelative
La question du statutde la phrase contenantun relatif(il s'agira ici
d'abord d'un pronomrelatif)est lie celle du mode de suppositiondu
relatif.Elle fait l'objet d'un texte trs intressantdans le TRACT.
ANAG. II, 2 p. 322 et sv.) et nous faitrevenirau cas o l'antcdent
du relatifsignifieconfusment.
Il s'agit de dterminersi la phrase relativea ou non une valeur de
vrit,ce qui exige une argumentationen plusieurs points.
(1) Le relatifest une "partie de phrase" {parsorationis)
par consquent
ce dont il est une partie est bien une phrase.
(2) Cette phrase contientsuppt et appt, elle est donc complte.
car elle ne peut tre d'aucun autre
(3) C'est une propositiondclarative
type.
(4) Pour savoir si elle est susceptiblede vrai ou de faux, il fautensuite
dterminerle mode de rfrencedu relatif,ce qui est examin propos
du cas particuliero l'antcdent est aliquid. Diverses opinions sont
d'abord cartes:
- le relatifa une rfrencencessairementdiscrte
puisqu'il tientlieu
d'un nom propre, ce qui est rejet pour plusieurs raisons;
- le pronom relatifrfrant un mot de
significationconfuse signifie
de la mme manire que celui-ci et suppose sur le mme mode (rgle
gnrale de anaphore, cf. supra). Si tel tait le cas, on pourraitremplacer le relatifpar son antcdentsans changer la valeur de vritde
l'ensemble. Or il est clair que aliquidestalbumet ipsumestnigrum
et aliest
album
et
est
ne
sont
quid
aliquid nigrum
pas quivalentes puisque la
seconde est toujours vraie, pas la premire.
21Le cas de Yappellatio
dicticommenant
estparticulier.
Dans
relatif
parun pronom
Dealiquo
homine
estverum
tiresa supposi, lenomappellatif
l'exemple
ipsum
fasseCesarem
tiondu verbede appellatio
dicti.
ci-dessus
donc dealiquo
L'exemple
quivaut
quodest
estverum
Cesarem
vel
ipsum
fuisse
fuithomo
(TRACT. DE UNIV. MONAC. II, 2 p. 348).
17

13:10:30 PM

- la proposition commenant par un pronom relatif signifie un

nonable qui n'est ni vrai ni faux. De nombreuses objections sont
souleves contre cette thse. Ainsi par exemple:
*
puisqu'il semble une consquence naturelle de dire: si aliquidest,
, c'est que le consquent a une valeur de vrit;
ipsumexistit
* si la
proposition contenant un relatifn'avait pas de valeur de
vrit,les deux propositionsaliquidestet nonipsumestSocrateset aliquid
estetipsumestSocrates
, o la mme chose est nie et affirmedu mme
Cf. sur ce pointPierre d'Espagne
ne
contradictoires.
seraient
pas
sujet
la
critiquer, une opinion des "anciens"
qui note, galement pour
selon laquelle aucune propositionne commenantpar un relatifn'a de
contradictoire(p. 190-191). Cette opinion des "anciens" est dfendue
22
dans le TractatusImplicitarum
(p. 50).
* la
copulative aliquidfuit et ipsumnonest ne pourrait tre vraie si
chacune des propositionsn'avait pas une valeur de vrit.
La solution finalementretenue pour dterminerle mode de rfrence
du relatifest le suivant: le relatifli un antcdentsignifiantconfusment tire sa significationen partie de la significationde son antcdent, en partie de la supposition. Quand on dit aliquidesthomoetipsum
estasinus, ipsumtire sa supposition en partie de aliquid, en partie de
homo.Si on prend les deux exemples:
(1) aliquid est asinus et ipsum non est homo
(2) aliquid est homo et ipsum est homo
si aliquidsignifiaitla mme chose en (1) et en (2), ipsumsignifieraitla
mme chose en (1) et en (2) or ce n'est pas le cas, ce que nous pouvons
illustrerpar les gloses:
() quelque chose est un ne et c'est ce quelque chose qui est un ne
qui n'est pas un homme
(2') quelque chose est un homme et c'est ce quelque chose qui est un
homme qui est un homme.
et faitvarierla signification
Aliquidvarie en fonctionde son suppositum
du relatif. Consquence: la proposition contenant un relatifa une
valeur de vritmais celle-ci n'est pas indpendanteparce que la rfrence de son sujet n'est pas indpendante23.Ipsumesthomoet ipsumnon
esthomone peuvent donc pas tre dclares contradictoiresavant de
connatre les antcdentsdes deux relatifs.
22Ed. Guisberti
(1982).
23La Logique
de savoir"si cettefaustraite
de ce problme
de Port-Royal
galement
&lesjugements",
cf.chapVII, 2e parsetnese rencontre
quedanslespropositions
tie.
18

13:10:30 PM

Le problmediscut ici est essentielpour la dfinitionde la proposition. L'autonomie rfrentiellede la proposition est-elle ncessaire
pour que cettedernirese voite assigner une valeur de vrit?Ce problme a un cho dans les grammaireslorsque Ton se demande si une
phrase constitue d'un pronom sujet et d'un verbe est complte au
mme titreque si son sujet tait un nom. Les interfrencesentrelogique et grammaire sur ce point son particulirementmanifestesdans
certainstexteso on pose la question: Uttumpronomen
potestsupponete?,
question qui est ambigu: est-ce que le pronom peut tre sujet/est-ce
que le pronom a une rfrence?Ces deux acceptions se mlentd'ailleurs parfois dans l'argumentation, lorsque l'on dit que le pronom
peut tresujet parce qu'il a une rfrence(cf. par exemple Ps-Albertus
Magnus, ed. L. G. Kelly, Amsterdam 1977).
La dterminationdu mode de rfrencedu relatifdpend toujours
de savoir ce qui est anaphoris. Certes, l'antcdent est anaphoris,
mais quels sont les lmentsde la propositionqui le sont avec lui? On
a vu ce problme pos propos des signes de quantification(cf. 2.5),
des modificateursde type adjectif,du temps verbal (cf. 3.1) , etc. et
ici propos de la significationde l'antcdent. Ce n'est pas dans le
seul cas o l'antcdent est indfinique le relatifanaphoris un antcdent dont la significationest modifiepar le prdicat. Si on considre le plus souvent que c'est l'antcdent seul qui est repris (cf.
etille.. . = omnishomocurrit
etomnishomo.. .
supra, p. 13 omnishomocurrit
chez Pierre d'Espagne) certains auteurs adoptent l'autre solution:
homocurrit
, je ne m'occupepas de l'hommeen tant
"Lorsqueje dis omnis
maisde l'homme
Si je veuxrfrer
ce quej'ai pens,je
courant.
qu'homme,
l'homme
rfre
courant"(TRACT. DE PROPR. SERM. II, 2 p. 722).
et
(cf. aussi la glose propose par Lambert d'Auxerre: omnishomocurrit
isteomnishomocurrens
La
dfinition
stricte
de
, supra p. 13).
disputt
l'anaphore telle que nous la donnions plus haut ne permetpas d'intgrerce genre de paramtre,ce qui tientau typede thoriegrammaticale et logique enjeu. D'un ct les grammairienstendent analyser
toute constructioncomme une relation entre motset mme parfois
entredeuxmots:l'anaphore concerneun relatifet son antcdent,et les
lments smantiques ou rfrentielsqui jouent sur cette relation ne
sont pratiquementpas analyss. De l'autre les logiques, si elles considrentles paramtres contextuelsdivers qui influentsur la rfrence
d'un terme, ont parfoisdu mal en considrerplusieurs simultan19

13:10:30 PM

ment et surtout envisager que ces paramtres interviennent des

niveaux diffrents.Dans l'exemple ci-dessus, il est difficile,dans un
tel cadre, d'envisager qu'un mme terme homo
, dans une mme
mmes
les
n'ait
propritssmantiques en tant que sujet
pas
phrase,
des
l'ensemble
il
dnote
hommes) et en tant qu'antcdent (o il
(o
dnote les hommes courants) et que ce ne sontpas les mmes proprits smantiques d'un termequi sont en cause dans chacune des fonctionsdiffrentes
qu'il peut remplirdans la phrase24.Les seuls lments
ce sens seraientles rflexions,par exemple, de Roger
iraient
dans
qui
Bacon, que nous notions plus haut, propos du problme de l'anaphore d'un termedistribu: bien que l'antcdent soit distribudans
sa proposition,c'est en tant que non distribuqu'il peut treanaphoris. Roger Bacon parle d'ailleurs ce momentde gnrationdu discours, ce qui permetune distance entreles formesrsultantdes oprations de constitutiondes noncs, et ces oprations elles-mmes,qui
dterminentl'interprtationsmantique.
Universit Paris 7
de Recherches
linguistiques
Dpartement
C.N.R.S. (U.A. 381)
du relatif
de l'anaphore,
selonle modede rfrence
: lesdiverses
Annexe
possibilits
inarte
tableauetexemples
etceluide l'antcdent,
gra(d'aprsRobertBlund,Summa
derelativis
Summa
etAnonymi
medica
, ed. parKneepkens
, cap. derelativis
(1977)).
de supposidansle tableauci-dessous,
On remarquera
que,enplusdestroisformes
unesupposition
les grammairiens
tion(personnelle,
distinguent
simple,matrielle),
desverbesditsvocatifs
, celledesattributs
(je m'appelleAdrien).Ils ajoununcupative
ainsiparexemple
tentd'autrepartdescasd'ambigut
lorsquel'antc(equivocatici),
ensignifie
unautre.Les seulscas
unsensdu motchien,etque le relatif
dentsignifie
sontles cas A etB.
de supposition
personnelle
24 enva demmepourlesproprits
ontdumal consilesauteurs
grammaticales:
un
drer,parexemple,
permettre
puissent
proprits
grammaticales
que certaines
diffiluipermettre
d'trergi.Il noussemble
etd'autres
motd'trergissant
quecette
en relation
desmots
estconuecommemettant
cult,qui tientau faitque la syntaxe
- rsolueparles
au moins
est- partiellement
commeentits
considrs
indivisibles,
au mot,celuidesesproModistes
opre unniveauinfrieur
pourlesquelsla syntaxe
en
mettent
Les rglesde construction
ou modesde signifier.
grammaticales
prits
de deuxmots,etce sontces
de proprits
nondeuxmots,maisunensemble
rapport
Les
les fonctions
de dfinir
de proprits
ensembles
grammaticales.
qui permettent
etrfabsolument
Modistes,
smantiques
paslesproprits
cependant,
n'intgrent
ne lesfontpasfoncau fonctionnement
rentielles
et,dansleurslogiques,
syntaxique
surce point.
tionner
commeles modesde signifier
20

13:10:30 PM

Le relatif
dnote

sa chose

sonsignifi

sonnom

nuncupative

L 'antcdent
dnote
sa chose

A
cas gnral
mme
2
chose
1 ambigut
chosediffrente
2'

ambigut

3
cas gnral
3'
synonyme

sonsignifi

5
cas gnral
5'
ambigut
9

6
cas gnral
6'
ambigut
10

cas gnral7
T
synonyme

casgnral
1
synonyme

14

cas gnral15
15'
synonyme

sonnom
nuncupative

13

12
16

de classerlesexemples
du tableaupermettent
ci-dessous]
[Leschiffres
in urbemetipsereusfit
A HomoestMarcus,qui estTullius;homoducitur
mitisZefrus
reuerit
1 mulierque damnavit
aufert,
salvavit;et quas Boreespiritus
literas,
albo;homoinuenit
frondes;
quiinuequicoloralbuserat,nuncestcontrarius
nitdialecticam
1' canishiclatrat,
hic,qui natatinmari;
qui etiamnatatinmari;canisestlatrabile
sunt
manusmeeque uos fecerunt,
clauisconfixe
homoinuenit
2 homoestSocrates,
literas,
creatura;
quiestdignsquiestdignissima
articulus
simacreaturarum;
hocdiscernit[ur]
apudGrecos,quiapudLatinosnonest;
hiediscernit
articulus
apudeos,qui apudnosnoninuenitur.
in mari
2' canishiclatrat,
qui habundat
- quod deriuatur
ab humo;
3 homoest Socrates,quod est nomenappellatiuum;
id
Marcus
currit, estTullius;uideoAnchisiaraboni,quod interpretatur
magister;
dem,id estEneam
3* homoestSocrates,
quodapudGrecosestnomencommune
4 isteestSocrates,
qui illeuocatur,
quicquides, id uere,care,uoearis,aue; nonego
sumtantiquodnoncenseris
inique;homoest,qui ipseuocatur
homoestdignissima
5 homoestdignissima
creatura,
creatura,
qui
qui estSocrates;
estcallidissimuni
inuenit
animal,qui uenitad mulierem
litteras;
serpens
in mari,qui etiamhielatrat
5' canishabundat
- cui solicompetit
uti
creatura
cui parentceteraanimancia;
6 homoestdignissima
crescit
in
orto
herba
crescit
in
orto
eadem
tuo;hocpiperquoduendimeo,
ratione;
que
substurhie,uenditur
Rome;hocarguit
sensus,
quinullusineisinuenitur;
(ostendit)
tantiaestquiddamet ipsaestgenus
in mariBrisiuedomesticum
6' canisestamicissimum
animal,qui etiamhabundat
tannico
ab humo
7 homoestdignissima
creatura,
quodderiuatur
T homoestdignissima
creatura,
quodapudGrecosestnomencommune
censetur
8 homoestdignissima
creatura,
quodanimairationale
ex ueropositum
9 homoestnomenappellatiuum,
permansit
Equirqui estSocrates;
rianomen,
que deuse campoprospicit
(prospexit)
creatura
10 homoestnomenappellatiuum,
(creaturarum)
qui estdignissima
B- homoestnomenappellatiuum,
ab humo;musaestnomenappellaquodderiuatur
sic
tiuumetilluddeclinatur
21

13:10:30 PM

1 homoestnomenappellatiuum
canisin
quodapudGrecosestnomencommune;
dicitur,
linguabarbaraforte
simpliciter
quodapudnosmultipliciter
estnomenproprium,
homoestnomen
12 Socrates
quiisteuocatur;
qui
appellatiuum,
animairationale
uocatur
13 isteuocaturSocrates,
qui ipseest
14 animalrationale
uocatur
creatura
homo,qui estdignssima
(creaturarum)
15 isteuocaturSocrates,
isteuocatur
Socrates,
quodestnomenproprium;
quodest
nomeneius
uocatur
15' animalrationale
homo,quodapudGrecosestnomencommune
16 isteuocaturSocrates,
qui etilleuocatur.
La seulechosequisoitprcise
propos
decesexemples,
c'estqueA et sontlesseuls
ce qui
On nedonneaucuneindication
de correction,
casde supposition
personnelle.
du moins,
sontdescitations
pourcertains
exemples
parle faitquecertains
s'explique,
de bonsauteurs
Priscien,
Ovide,Evangile...).
(Boce,Porphyre,

Textes
cits
A contribution
ArsEmer.II, 2: ArsEmmeram
, ed.parL. M. deRijk,Logica
Modernorum,
terminist
tothehistory
, volII, part2, Assen1967.
ofearly
logic
ArsMel. II, 1: ArsMeliduna
, ibid,vol.II part1.
Ars Mel.: ArsMeliduna
, ed. complte
parF. Guisberti
fora study
(1982),Materials
scholasticism
ontwelfth
century
, Napoli.
notes
De insoluDeInplicationibus,
ed. parL. M. deRijk(1966),Some
onthe
Medieval
tract
theendofthe12th
theedition
with
bilibus,
, dans:Vivarium,
ofa tract
dating
from
century
IV, pp. 83-115.
Monacensis
Dial. Monac.II, 2: Dialctica
, ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967)vol.II, part2.
duXlIIesicle
latine
indite
Fierville
ed., Unegrammaire
, Paris1886.
Guillaumede Sherwood,Syncategoremata
, ed. O'Donnell(1941),dans:Mediaeval
Studies3, pp. 46-93.
Lambertd'auxerre,Logica(Summa
Lamberti
"),ed. F. Alessio,Firenze1971.
cumsitnostra
Log. Cumsit nostraII, 2: Logica
, ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),volII,
part2.
Pierred'espagne,Tractatus
, ed. L. M. de Rijk,Assen1972.
ed. parJ. E. Toison(1978),
Priscianum
Pierre Helie, Summa
constructionum,
super
du MoyenAgeGrecet Latin,27-28.
dans:Cahiersde l'Institut
inarte
RobertBlund,Summa
, ed. parKneepkens
grammatica,
cap.derelativis
(1977),
in theGrammatical
Tracts
Therelatio
,
ofthelate12thandEarly13thcentury
simplex
XV pp. 1-30.
dans:Vivarium
desophismatibus
etdistinctionibus
hacteRogerBaconXIV: Summa
, ed. parSteele,Opera
Baconi
nusinedita
, Oxford1937.
Rogeri
dialectices
RogerBaconXV: Summule
, ibid.vol.XV, 1940.
ed. parKneepkens
derelativis
Summa
(1977).
(anonymi),
Metenses
Sum.Met. II, 1: Summe
, ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),vol.II, part1.
deLocisArgumentationum
TLA: Tractatus
, ed. parYukioIwakuma(1981),Instantiae.
anEdition
with
A Study
ofMs ParisBN
Century
Technique
ofArgumentation
ofTwelfth
du MoyenAgeGrecetLatin,38.
lat.6674fi -5., dans:Cahiersde l'Institut
ed. parL. M. de Rijk(1967),vol.II, part2.
Tract. Anag.11,2:Tractatus
Anagnini,
Monacensis
deunivocatione
Tract, de Univ.Monac. II, 2: Tractatus
, ibid.
sermonm
deproprietatibus
Tract, de pr. Serm.II, 2: Tractatus
, ibid.
Tractatus
, ed. parGiusberti
Implicitarum
(1982).
22

13:10:30 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 1 (1985)
WaltherBurley's Tract De exclusivis. An Edition.
L. M. DE RIJ

Some years ago the late Jan Pinborg drew our attentionto Burley's
early work on propositions which contains some syncategorematic
'
'
terms effectingan exclusion (' tantum
', solus'; only'). The intrinsic
importanceof this topic has been well shown by Pinborg (' Walther
fromthe end of the
Burleyon Exclusives' in EnglishLogicandSemantics
twelfthcenturyto the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th
European Symposion on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, LeidenNijmegen, 23-27 April, 1979 edited by H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H.
Kneepkens, L. M. de Rijk. Nijmegen 1981, 305-26).
The treatise is found in only three manuscripts, and one of these
contains only its beginning. It belongs to the oldest group of logical
writingswhich may be assigned to this famous English logician [see
Pinborg, 1981: 306] whose great renown is mainly due to his
sagacious tract De puritateartis logicae[in two versions; see edition
Boehner 1955]. The earlier corpus comprises six tractswhich in fact
forma course of logic in general use in those days:
(1) De suppositionibus,
recentlyedited by Brown (Stephen F. Brown,
WalterBurleigh'sTreatiseDe suppositionibus and Its Influenceon
Williamof Ockham,in: Franciscan Studies, 32 (1972), 15-64)
De
exclusivis
, which will be edited here
(2)
De
, which will be edited in the next issue of thisjournal
exceptivis
(3)
De
(4)
consequents,edited by Green-Pedersen (Niels Jorgen GreenPederson, WaltherBurley's {tDe consequents' An Edition, in:
Franciscan Studies, 40 (1980), 102-66)
De
insolubilibus
des
, edited by Roure (M. L. Roure, La problmatique
(5)
insolubles
au
XlIIe
siecle
et
au
du
dbut
XIV
suivie
de
l'dipropositions
e,
tiondes traits
de W. Shyreswood,
W. Burleighet Th. Bradwardine
, in:
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen ge, 45
(1970), 205-84)
De
, not edited so far. For the MSS tradition,see J.
(6)
obligationibus
Mertonense,in: Mediaeval Studies, 31
Weisheipl, Repertorium
23

13:10:38 PM

(1969), [174-224], 196. Its incipitruns: In disputatione dialetica

sunt due partes scilicetopponens et respondens. Opus opponentis
est sic inducere orationem ut faciat respondentemconcedere improbabiliora que propterpositionem sunt necessaria concedere...
1. TheManuscripts
Our tract has been handed down complete in London, British
Museum, RoyalMSS, 12 F XIX, ff.123ra-126rb (our L). This MS is
writtenin an English hand dating fromthe early 14th century.On f.
148rb this hand notes the year 1302. L presents quite a good text,
which sometimes gives the impressionof being a revised redactionof
the text as it has been transmittedby the Bruges manuscript. The
work is ascribed to Walther Burley at the end (f. 126rb).
Our second copy is found in the Stadsbibliotheek at Bruges,
Belgium (our B). It dates fromthe 14th centuryand was also written
in an English hand. It contains the whole work, withthe exceptionof
just one chapter (our 91). It contains some trivialerrors(e.g. distinctio
for other examples, see our apparatuscriticus).
instead of distribution
However, it is of some use forcorrectingL. The work is anonymous
in this manuscript.
Finally, just one page of this tract has been preserved in Cambridge, UniversityLibrary, Gonvilleand Caius 434/434, f. 6v (our C).
Obviously, this copy is of littlehelp forthe constitutionof the text.
The connection between L and is not very clear. Following
Green-Pedersen (104-07) we may see them as belonging to two difis
ferentgroups (his BFP versus CLO). As far as the De consequentiis
concerned we can agree with Green-Pedersen (105) that "in a good
many cases where the textof BFP is acceptable, the othergroup (CLO)
has readings which look like deliberate changes froma less clear expression into a more clear one [...] In otherwords, it appears thatthe
model of CLO in some places made deliberate changes (corrections)
''
fromthe original text as it is preserved in BFP .
Indeed, it is possible thatV s variants are due to deliberatechanges
to the extentthat they indicate a revision. However, I do not wish to
maintain that the text of L as it stands merely presents a doctrinal
revisionof an earlier redactionin the proper sense, whichcould be the
work of the original author, since L too oftenpresentsa textwhich is
free from the obvious scribal errors found in B. Doctrinal improvementsas such hardly occur at all in L.
24

13:10:38 PM

2. The PresentEdition
As faras the constitutionof the textis concerned, the editorcannot
help but feelhimselfin a ratherunfortunateposition. The deliberate
changes made by L would surely suggest its unreliability as a
testimonyto the original formof our tract. However, in quite a few
cases what looks like an errorcaused by haplography in can be corrected by following L. Besides, seems to abbreviate our text,
'
9
especially by using the formula etc. instead of giving the complete
sentences (mostly sophisms); sometimes a specific sophism is only
4
'
repeated as sophismain where L gives it in its fullwording. In all
such cases the textual differencesdo not automaticallyprove the correctnessof 5' s readings.
The most reasonable thing to do, therefore,seemed to be to pay
separate attentionto every single difficultplace and to make one's
choice afterwards(cf. Green-Pedersen, 105). However, the alternative readings are always also given in full in the apparatusto
facilitatethe reader's own decision.
The text has been divided and numbered by the editor in accordance with its obvious articulations.
The most the editor can hope for is that the present edition will
provoke some furtherresearch. For some initial investigationsthe
reader may be referredto Pinborg [1981], 311-20.
3. Contents
Chs
1 Regula la : dictio exclusiva addita subiecto removet
predicatum ab oppositis subiecti
2 Regula 2a: dictio exclusiva addita predicato removet opposita predicati a subiecto
3 Regula : quelibet propositio affermativaconvertiturcum
eadem, dictione exclusiva addita predicato
4-7 Dubitatiode secundaregula
8 Regula 4a' dictio exclusiva addita alicui nichil excludit de
quo possibiliterdicitur inclusum
9 Regula5a: dictio exclusiva addita subiecto respectu alicuius
actus negati attribuitpredicatum cuilibet alii ab incluso et
removet idem predicatum ab incluso
10 Regula 6a: ex omni exclusiva sequitur universalis de terminis transpositis,et econverso
25

13:10:38 PM

11-22 Dubitatiode istisregulis

15 Regula7a : si subiectum (sc. in exclusiva) sit in obliquo, non
oportet quod infrtexclusivam de terministranspositis
Regula 8a' si subiectum sit in recto: si sit universalis affirmativa, tunc infertexclusivam de terministranspositis;si
sit universalis negativa, tunc non infertexclusivam
Regula9a : si exclusiva sit negativa, tunc infertuniversalem
de terminisoppositis, sed non de terministranspositis
23 Dubitatioutrumsubpredicatoexclusive
descendere
contingat
Regula10a : sub predicato exclusive contingitdescendere ad
supposita per se et non ad supposita per accidens
24 Regula Ila : in exclusiva negativa predicatum removetura
subiecto et attribuiturcuilibet alii a subiecto
25-30 Dubitatioan sequatur
: 'nichilcurrit;igituraliquidcurri
31 Regula 12a : propositio habens multas causas veritatisconvertiturcum illis acceptis sub disiunctione
32-34 Distinctiola : quandocumque dictio exclusiva additur alicui
subiecto distributo sub aliquo modo, multiplex est talis
propositio ex eo quod potest fieri exclusio generalis vel
specialis
: TANTUM OMNIS HOMO CURRIT
Sophisma
35-37 Contraistamdistinctionem
arguitur
38-41 Distinctio2a : si excludatur totum integrale vel totum
numerale, multiplex est propositio ex eo quod potest fieri
exclusio gratia formevel gratia materie
39 Sophisma
: TANTUM DOMUS EST ALBA
40 Sophisma
: TANTUM
HOMINES
SUNT
QUATUOR
HICINTUS
42 Distinctio: quando dictio exclusiva additur alicui composito ex substantiaet accidente, multiplexest locutio ex eo
quod potest fieri exclusio ratione unius partis vel ratione
aiterius partis vel ratione totius
: TANTUM HOMO ALBUS CURRIT
Sophisma
43 Distinctio4a: quandocumque additur dictio exclusiva dicto
alicuius propositionis respectu veri vel falsi, possibilis vel
impossibilis, distinguendumest ex eo quod potest fieriexclusio ratione verbi principalis vel verbi secundum quod
ponitur in dicto
: TANTUM
HOMINEM
ESSE HOMINEM
Sophisma
EST VERUM
26

13:10:38 PM

44-48 Contraislamdistinctionem
argutur
49-59 Dubitatioutrumexclusivainfrt
negativam
exponentem
: TANTUM SORTES SCIT SEPTEM ARTES
Sophisma
50 Sophisma
: TANTUM
VIDENS
SIBI SIMILE
EST
HOMO
51 Sophisma
: TANTUM SORTES VIDET SE
52 Sophisma
: TANTUM COMMUNE EST COMMUNE
6 1-88 De suppositione
terminorum
in exclusiva
61-62 Regula13a : subiectum in exclusiva stat confuse tantum
63 Regula 14a : subiectum in opposito exclusive supponit confuse et distributive
Distinctio5a : distinguendum est de exclusiva quia aut fit
exclusio respectu actus affirmatiaut respectu actus negati
64 Regula 15a : in exclusiva si fiat exclusio respectu actus affirmati,tunc predicatum supponit confuse et distributive
65 Regula 16a : de exclusiva cuius preiacens est negativa,
subiectum stat confuse tantum et predicatum confuse et
distributiveimmobiliter
66-78 Dubitatio utrumpredicatumin exclusivaaffirmativa
supponat
mobiliter
7 1 Regula1 7a' in exclusiva affirmativapredicatum statconfuse
et distributive pro suo per se supposito, ita quod ad
quodlibet per se suppositum predicati contingitdescendere
79-85 Dubitatioan hec dictio *aliud3 habeatnaturamconfundendi
terminmimmediate
ei sequentem
et
distributive
confuse
80 Sophisma
: SORTES EST ALIUD AB HOMINE
: SORTES
EST
AB HOMINE
ALIUD
Sophisma
A SORTE
PRETERQUAM
84 Regula 18a' hec dictio aliud' habet duplicem virtutem,
scilicet mobilitandi immobilitatum et immobilitandi
mobilitatum
86 Regula 19a: quandocumque predicatur inferius de suo
superioriuniversaliteraut convertibilede convertibilisuo,
affirmativauniversalisinfertuniversalemnegativam in qua
predicatum removetura quolibet alio a subiecto
} dicatur
88 Dubitatioquaretalispropositio'tantum
homocurrit
magis
exclusivaquam inclusiva
89-90 Circaconversionem
exclusivarum
Dubitatioan aliqua exclusivahabeatconverti
Regula20a: exclusiva proprie non habet converti; si velimus
27

13:10:38 PM

91-108
91
92

93

94-96
97-98
99-100
101-103

104-108

convertere tales propositiones, debent converti in universales de terministranspositis

De hac dictione(solus'
1
Regula 21a : hec dictio solus1convenit in significandocum
'
4
hac dictione tantum
1
Regula 22a : solus9differa signo precedenti eoquod per
' maior
hanc dictionem ' tantum
precisio importaturquam
'
in
alio differunteoquod hec
et
hanc
dictionem
solus'
;
per
'
indifferenter
addi adiectivo vel
dictio 4tantum
potest
' solus9solum substantivo
dictio
sed
hec
substantivo,
Distinctio6a: quandocumque in aliqua oratione sunt duo
signa officialia vel idem bis sumptum, distinguenda est
oratio ex eo quod una dictio potest includere aliam vel
econverso
VIDT
OMNEM
SORTES
:
SOLUS
Sophisma
HOMINEM
dictadistinctio
Dubitatioestquam multiplicitatem
operatur
SOLUS SORTES
VIDETUR
:
A
SOLO
SORTE
Sophisma
in
due
:
si
sunt
exclusiones
aliqua propositione,
Regula 23a
semper ilia exclusio que includitaliam debet exponi, et alia
non
Circa hanc dictionem'solus' est dubitatioquando poniturin
oppositapredicatia subiecto
predicato:an removeat
Sophisma:SORTES DIFFERT A SOLO PLATONE.

4. Sigla
=
L
codexLondiniensis(British Museum Royal MSS 12 F XIX, ff.
123ra-126rb)
L
Lc = manusquae correxit
= codexBrugiensis(Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek, cod. 500, ff. 81vb85va)

5e = manusquae correxit
5. Text
Walter Burley
De Exclusivis
L 123;
B82vb

1 Circa dictiones exclusivas est sciendum quod dictio exclusiva

currere]
1 dictiones]
L exceptivas
etadd. dictio]. dicto]L dicendo
exponitur
solum]L . hec]L istasicsaepius
L predicatimi
sic]L debetsic
exponi
28

13:10:38 PM

addita subiecto removetpredicatum ab oppositis subiecti. Ut sic dicto: ' tantum

homocurriremovetur4currenab omni alio ab hominem
t attribuiturhominisolum. Ideo hec: ' tantumhomocurriexponitur sic:
khomo
curritet nichilaliud ab hominecurri.
2 Sed dictio exclusiva addita predicato removetopposita predicati
a subiecto. Ut sic dicto: ' homoesttantum
albus' denotaturquod homo sit
albus et quod homo non sit aliud quam album. Unde si dictio exclusiva addatur predicato, debet sic exponi: lhomoestalbusethomonon
.
estaliud quamalbum*
3 Et ex isto dicto notandum est quod quelibet propositio affirmativa convertiturcum eadem, dictione exclusiva addita predicato.
Unde ista duo convertuntur:' homoestalbus9 et ' homoesttantumalbus*.
Nam ex hoc ipso quod aliquod predicatum attribuituralicui subiecto,
opposita eiusdem predicati removenturab eodem subiecto et dictio
exclusiva addita predicato solum removetopposita predicati a subiecto, ut dictum est.
{Dubitatio)
4 Sed ex hoc oriturdubitatio. Si dictio exclusiva addita predicato
removet solum opposita predicati a subiecto, sequeretur quod hec
1
curri. Sed hec
consequentia foretbona: Sortescurrit,
igiturSortestantum
non
valet.
Ut
Sortes
currat et
consequentia
probatur: posito quod
' Sortescurri tarnenhec est falsa: '
tunc
hec
est
vera:
Sortestan;
pugnet,
tumcurri, quia sequitur: 4Sortestantumcurrit
; igiturnichilaliud agi' et
ultra: 4igiturSortesnonpugna; quod tarnenfalsum est per casum.
5 Item. Sequitur per illam regulam: ' SortesvidtPlatonem;igitur
' Sed ista consequentia non valet, quia
SortestantumvidtPlatonem
4
posito quod videat Platonem et Ciceronem, tunc hec est vera: Sortes

vidtPlatonem*
' tamen hec est falsa: SortesvidttantumPlatonem' quia
1Sortesvidttantum
Platonem;igiturnon vidtCiceronem*
' quod
sequitur:
falsum est per casum.
homo]LB1. Unde]L ut
2 sicdieto]L si dicitur
3 et...est]L Ex istopatet eadem]L . predicati]
L .
4 Sed...dubitatio]
L Ex istisoriuntur
duo removet]
Lc movet
L solum] .
L sequeretur...
Ut probatur]
per(anproprobatio?)
Lc
bona]L tuncsequitur
. L tunc]L . tamen]L et quia...currit]L . Sortes]L .
tamen]
L . percasum]L .
5 Item...percasum]L Itemnonsequitur
sortes
vidtplatonem
sortes
tantum
igitur
vidtplatonem
quia aliquidstatcumantecedente
quod nonstatcumconsequente
vidensciceronem
statcumantecedente
Sortes]
Lc
quodnonstatcumconsequente
L tantum]
Sortestantum
V . L
29

13:10:38 PM

6 Ad primm argumentumdiciturquod bene sequitur: 4Sortescurrit; igiturSortestantumcurri. Ad argumentumin contrarium,quando

supponitur quod Sortes currat et pugnet, ad hoc dico quod hec est
vera: 4Sortestantumcurri: Et quando arguitur: 4Sortestantumcurrit;igiturnichilaliud agi , dico quod non sequitur. Sed ista: 4Sortestantum
curriexponitur sic: 4Sortescurritet Sortesnichilaliud est quam currens
cum quo bene stat quod Sortes pugnet.
7 Ad aliud dicitur quod bene sequitur: 4SortesvidtPlatonem;igitur
' Et dico quod nichil stat cum antecedente
SortestantumvidtPlatonem
cum
illud
stat
consequente. Unde dico quod ista simul stant:
qui<n>
' et 4Sortesuidet
4SortestantumvidtPlatonem
. Ad probationem
Ciceronern
4
dico quod non sequitur: SortestantumvidtPlatonem;igiturnon videt
9debet sic
. Sed ista: Sortestantum
videtPlatonem
aliuma Platone*
exponi:
' . Cum
4SortesvidetPlatonem
etSortesnonestaliudquamvidensPlatonem
quo
bene stat quod videat Ciceronem.
8 Unde breviterregula in exclusivis est quod
addita alicui nichil excludit de quo
dictio exclusiva
dicitur
inclusum.
possibiliter
Et cum hec sit possibilis: 4vidensPlatonemestvidensCiceronem[B 82ra]
incluso uno non excludituraliud. Ideo stat simul quod Sortes tantum
videt Platonem et quod videt Ciceronem, quia utraque est possibilis.
9 Sciendum quod dictio exclusiva addita subiecto respectualicuius
actus negati dnott predicatum attribu cuilibet alii ab incluso et
removet [L 123rb] idem predicatum ab incluso. Ut sic dieto: tantum
'
4
homonon curri attribuiturhoc predicatum currenscuilibet alii ab
homineet removeturab homine.Ideo exponitur sic: 4homononcurritet
curri. Tarnen principaliterexponitursic: 4homo
aliudab homine
quidlibet
noncurritet nichilaliud ab hominenoncurri. Et sic ista: 4nichilaliud ab
4
hominenoncurrivalet istam: quidlibetaliud ab hominecurri.
L dicendum
quando...ad hoc]L . hecestvera]L
6 argumentum
dicitur]
L . dico...pugnet]
L necestsuaexponens
Et...tantum
nonsequitur
currit]

nonestaliudquamcurrens
sedistasortes
argumentum
nichilstat...dicoquod]L . probationem]
7 dico]L dicitur
L

videt
tantum
ista...
sic
sortes
L tantum
L
exponitur
exponi]
non]L
videt]
L .
non Cum...ciceronem]
estexclusum
L et...sit]L
8 breviter...
est] regulaestquodLc. L excludit]
unde ista est non excludituraliud] L reliquumnon excluditur
L .
Ideo...possibilis]
attribuii
L ab
9 negati]L negari dnottpredicatum
predicatum
attribu]
utsicdicto]L
idem] . L ab incluso]
L a subiecto
L a subiecto
incluso]
verbi gratiasic dicendo attribuitur...
(!) quod
exponitur
sic] L significai
L etsicdebetexponi
Tarnen...
ab homine
currit]
30

13:10:38 PM

10 Et sciendum quod est una regula in exclusivis quod

universalis
de terminis
omni exclusiva
sequitur
transpositis <et econverso).
4
. Et
; igituromnecurrensest homo9
quia sequitur: tantumhomo currit
esthomo;igiturtantumhomocurri.
econverso: ^omnecurrens
ex

{ Dubitatio>
11 Circa istam regulam contingitdubitare, quia dato quod ista
'
; igiturtantum
regula esset bona, tunc sequeretur: tantumhomomovetur
homocurri, ubi antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito
casu possibili. Probo quod antecedens sit verum sine consequente, ut
posito quod nichilmoveatur nisi homo et quod homo moveatur solum
motu saltationis,tunc hec est vera: tantumhomomovetur
, hec tarnen
est falsa: 4tantumhomocurri, quia sequitur: tantumhomocurrit;igitur
homocurri. Ultimum consequens est falsum. Igitur antecedens. Probo quod ista consequentia valeat, dato principali, quia sequitur: ' tan9
'
tumhomomovetur;
igituromnemovensesthomo. Et ultra: igituromnecur'
homocurri. Igitura primo: 4tantum
. Et ultra: igiturtantum
rensesthomo9
homomovetur;
igiturtantumhomocurri.
'
homoestanimai;igiturtantum
homo
12 Item. Tunc sequeretur: tantum
estasinus9. Ubi tamen est fallacia consequentis inter affirmativasexponentes. Et probo quod sequatur, quia si tantum homo est animad,
'
, et
igituromne animal est homo. Et ultra: igituromnisasinusesthomo9
'
ultra: igiturtantumhomoestasinus9. Igitur a primo.
homononestnon-homo9
.
13 Item. est una exclusiva vera: ' tantum
Et tamen hec non infert universalem affirmativamde terminis
transpositis,quia si inferat aliquam, non infertaliam, ut videtur,
4
. Sed hec est falsa.
esthomo9
quam istam: omnisnon-homo
regulain exclusivis
10 Et...exclusivis]
estL ex]L in quia sequitur]
L sicut
L .
hec(!) omne...
currit]
L quam quia...tunc]L quodregulanon
11 circa] contraL istamregulam]
Lcpositopossibili
valeatvidetur
L casu]Lc.
quiasi sic positocasupossibili]
probo...
ut] quia L quod homomoveat]L et hoc hectamenest]Lc hec
. L ista]L . datoprincipali]
L
tamenL ethecest quia...antecedens]
tantum
L etc.
homo...
positopossibili
currit]
LB etc.add.
si] . L primo]
12 quodsequatur
quia]L quiasequitur
. L inferat
13 tamenhec]hecL tamen affirmativam]
aliquam]inferat
aliamL aliqua(!) inferret
non...istam]utvidetur
aliamquamistamL
noninfert
omnisnonhomoesthomo] omnequodestnonhomoest
essethecutvidetur
homoL
31

13:10:38 PM

14 Ad oppositum. Exclusio dnott mensuram precisam predicati

ad subiectum, ita quod predicatum dicitur de subiecto ita quod de
nullo alio. Nichil enim continetursub predicato quin illud idem continetursub subiecto. Quidlibet igitur quod continetursub predicato
continetursub subiecto. Et hoc denotaturper universalemde terminis
transpositis.Igitur universalis sequitur ad exclusivam.
15 Ad hanc dubitaiionem dico quod aliquando universales inferunt exclusivam et aliquando non. Pro quo sciendum est quod
subiectum in exclusiva sive in universali aliquando est in recto et aliquando in obliquo. Si subiectum sit in obliquo, non oportetquod infrt exclusivam de terminis transpositis. Unde non sequitur:
cuiuslibethominisestasinus
; igiturtantumasinus esthominis etiam
1tantumhominisest
asinus; ergoomnisasinus est hominis' Si
sequitur:
subiectum sit in recto,aut ista propositioest affirmativaaut negativa.
Si sit universalis affirmativa,tunc infert exclusivam de terminis
transpositis;si sit universalisnegativa, tunc non infertexclusivam. Si
exclusiva sit negativa, tunc infertuniversalem de terminisoppositis,
sed non de terministranspositis.Unde non sequitur: ' tantum
homonon
'
sed
estnon-homo;
non-homo
est
omnis
homo'
igitur
sequitur: igituromne[
'
, esthomo
82rb] quod nonestnon-homo
16 Ad primum argumentumdico quod non sequitur: tantum
homo
.
curri
Ad
tantum
homo
dico
bene
semovetur;
igitur
probationem
quod
' tantumhomo
'
omne
mo
vens
est
homo
Sed
non
semovetur;
quitur:
igitur
quitur ultra: 'omnemovens[L 123 va] est homo; igituromnecurrensest
homo', quia posito casu priori antecedens est verum et consequens
falsum.
4
17 Ad aliud dico quod bene sequitur: tantumhomoestanimai; igitur
'
tantumhomoestasinus . Nec obstat quod interaffirmativasexponentes
14 Ad] L Dicendumad precisam
L predicari
predicati]
(!) enim] igitur
L . et hoc]L hec univerL illudidem] . L quidlibet...
subiecto]
L etc.
salem]L universalis...
exclusivam]
L aliqua universalis
15 dico]L . aliquando]
L universalis
infert
inferunt]
aliquando]L alia exclusiva...
universali
siveexclusiva
L aliuniversali]
L
quandoest]L autest ti alterum
quodinfrt]
aliquando]L aut oportet
asinusesthominis]
L asinusestcurrens
infert
estasinus]L asinuscurrit
est
hominis? hominisasinusest currens
est hominis ista...est]L est propositio
. L tunc]L . de...transpositis]
L . universalis]
situniversalis]
L . tunc] . L tunc]L . sed...terminis]
L etnon
L bene]L . sequitur
16 dico] dicitur
ultra]L valet
bene] . L licet]sed L etsi sicut]L valet
17 aliud]L aliamrationem
L
L . negativa]
L . eodem...
de terminis
exponentem]
transpositis]
.
32

13:10:38 PM

fit fallada consequentis, quia antecedens bene potest inferre

antecedens licet consequens non inferat consequens. Sicut patet:
universalis negativa infert universalem negativam de terminis
transpositiset tarnen particularis negativa non infertparticularem
negativam de terministranspositis;et tarnenparticularisnegativa est
consequens ad universalem. Eodem modo exponens est antecedens ad
exponentem.Et ideo non oportetquod si exclusiva inferatexclusivam,
quod exponens inferatexponentem.
'
18 Ad aliud dico quod huic: 1tantumhomonon est non-homocoresthomo'
respondethec universalis: 'omnequod nonestnon-homo,
Contra
ad
19
responsionem
primum argumentum probo hanc
esthomo
esthomo' quia
; igituromnecurrens
consequentiam: 'omnemovens
' currens
condistributo
est
movens
est
homo'
homo;
sequitur:
igitur
Igitur
' omne
distributum.
antecedens
sequente sequitur
Igitur sequitur:
.
esthomo1
movens
esthomo;igituromnecurrens
20 Item. A superiori distributoad suum inferiusdistributumest
1
consequentia bona. Sicut patet hic: omneanimalcurrit;igituromnishomo
'
'
curri. Et cum movenssit superius ad 4currens sequitur: 'omnemovens
esthomo;igituromnecurrens
esthomo'
'
21 Ad primum dico quod licet sequatur: currensest homo; igitur
movensesthomo' non tarnenoportet quod distributoconsequente sequitur antecedens distributum.Sed est regula intelligenda: quando
est inarguitura per se inferioriad suum superius per se. Sed currens
feriusper accidens ad movenssicut homoalbus ad hominem.Ideo licet
'
sequatur: homoalbus currit;igiturhomocurri, non tarnen sequitur:
' omnishomo
currit;igituromnishomoalbus curri.
22 Ad aliud dico quod arguendo ab inferiori per se ad suum
superius per se cum distributioneest consequentia bona. Verumtamen a superiori ad suum inferiusper accidens non valet conseL . hecuniversalis]
L huicuniversali
nonestnonhomo]
18 huictantum]
L quodestnonhomoBcquodestnonnon(!) homo
L primam
19 responsionem...
responsionem
primeregule alterum
argumentum]

L igitur
sequitur
igitur]
estbona et cum]L cumigitur
20 suum]L . hic]L hec consequentia
ad] L quam
L etc. ab in21 licetsequatur]L benesequatur sequitur...
distributum]
suumsuperiusper se] L perse superius
feriori
perse] L a...per se inferiori
L sub
ad hominem]
sub movente
est...movens]L per animalcontinetur
prius
L
L undesequitur
ideolicetsequatur]
Ideosedsequatur
homine
currit]
L oportet
. sequitur...
quodsi omnishomocurrit
quod
igitur]
L . verumtarnen]
tarnen
L suum] . L sed]L
22 cumdistributione]
L .
unde et...distributio]
33

13:10:38 PM

quentia cum distributione. Sed movensest superius per accidens ad

Et ideo non valet distributio.
currens.
23 Adhuc dubitatur, cum semper predicatum in exclusiva stet
confuse et distributive, utrum sub predicato exclusive contingit

descendere, et tunc sequetur: tantumhomomovetur;

igiturtantumhomo
curri. Et dico quod sub predicato exclusive contingitdescendere ad
per acsupposita per se et non ad supposita per accidens. Sed currens
cidens continetursub movente.
24 Sciendum quod in exclusiva [ 82va] negativa predicatum
removetura subiecto et attribuiturcuilibet alii a subiecto. Ut in hac:
' tantumhomo non curri removetur currereab homineet attribuitur
cuilibet alii ab homine.Unde hec: ' tantum
homononcurriexponitursic:
'homononcurritet
aliud
ab
curri.
homine
quodlibet
'
25 Sed ex hoc oriturdubitaiio an sequatur: nichilcurrit;igiturali
, igiturnon
quid curri. Quod sic, videtur. Nam sequitur: nichilcurrit
'
curriet ultra: ' igitur
tantum
homocurri, et ultra: igituraliud ab homine
aliquid curri. Igitur a primo. Probatur quod hec consequentia est
bona: 'non tantumhomocurrit;igituraliud ab homine[L 123vb] curri.
Nam sequitur: ' nontantumhomocurrit;igiturtantum
homononcurri, et
ultra: 'igiturquodlibetaliud ab hominecurri, et ultra: ' igituraliud ab
hominecurri. Igitur a primo.
4
26 Huic diciturquod non sequitur: nichilcurrit;igituraliquidcurri.
Ad probationem dico quod non sequitur: ' nontantum
homocurrit
; igitur
aliud ab hominecurri. Tunc ad probationem illius dico quod non se
; igiturtantumhomonon curri. Unde
quitur: non tantumhomocurrit
4
sciendum quod hec: non tantumhomo curri habet duas causas
veritatis;aut quia nullus homo currit,aut quia aliud ab homine currit. Ideo ibi est fallacia consequentis: 4nontantum
homocurrit;igituraliud
ab hominecurri, quia sequitur econverso et non sic.
'
27 Contra istud ostendo quod hec consequentia sit bona: non
tantumhomocurrit
; igituraliud ab hominecurriquia ex opposito conseinfertur
quentis
oppositum antecedentis. Sequitur enim: 'nichilaliud
L descendere]
LB ad perse supposita
utvidetur
. L utrum]
23 semper]
L sup supposita]
L suppositum
L supposita]
add.L et dico] dicendum

positum
probatur
duosi sequitur
L oriuntur
25 oritur...
quod]L . est]L
sequatur]
L aliquid
aliudab homine]
videtur
L .
homocurrit]
aliud...tantum
26 igitur
LB .
homine
sitbona]L . igitur
27 ostendo
currit]
quod]L ostenditur
nonesthomo]
L . etultra...
L . igitur]
quiaest...estaliudab homine]
L .
esthomo currit]
Lc. L etultra...
34

13:10:38 PM

'
estaliud ab hornin*
ab hominecurrit;igiturnullumcurrens
; et ultra: igitur
nonesthomo1
estnonhomo?
nullumcurrens
, et
, et ultra: 'igiturnullumcurrens
4
4
ultra: igituromnecurrens
esthomo', et ultra: igiturtantumhomocurri.
4
homocurrit;igiturtantum
28 Item. Videtur quod sequitur: nontantum
homononcurri, quia opposita eorum convertunturvel sunt realiter
eadem. Nam oppositum huius: 4tantumhomononcurriest istud: 4tantumhomocurri, et similiteroppositum huius: 4nontantum
homocurri.
4
currit
29 Ad primumdico quod non sequitur: nichilaliudab homine
;
non
.
Ad
tantum
homo
curri
dico
probationem
quod
sequitur:
igitur
4nullumcurrens
estnon-homo;
nonesthomo1
, quia hec
igiturnullumcurrens
est negativa: 4nullumcurrens
estnon-homoet hec est affirmativa:4nullum
.
currens
nonesthomo?
homononcurri
30 Ad aliud dico quod ista non sunt eadem: 4tantum
et 'non tantumhomocurri eorum opposita sunt eadem. Unde ista
duo non contradicunt: 4tantumhomocurriet 4tantumhomononcurri.
Sed opposita huius: 4tantumhomononcurriest ista: 4nontantumhomo
non curri. Et hec habet duas causas veritatis: aut quia aliud ab
homine non currit,aut quia nullus homo non currit.
31 Et ideo notandum quod propositio habens multas causas
veritatisconvertiturcum illis acceptis sub disiunctione. Unde ista duo
noncurrit
vel
convertuntur:4nontantum
homononcurriet 4aliudab homine
omnishomocurri.
32 Sciendum quod quandocumque dictio exclusiva additur alicui
subiecto distributosub aliquo modo, multiplexest talis propositio ex
eo quod potest fieriexclusio generalis vel specialis. Ut sic dicendo:
4tantum
omnishomocurrihic potestfieriexclusio generalisvel specialis.
33 Si fiatexclusio generalis, tunc excludit opposita, quia tunc ex28 sequitur]LBCnon sequitur non tantum]LR tantum quia] L .
vel...eadem]L . oppositum]
L opposita oppositum]
L op opposita
currit]
LB estidemoppositum
add.L
L igitur
29 igitur]
igitur
(!) nonest]L estnon quia...nonhomo]LB.
est]L .
30 eadem]LB eorumopposita
nonsunteademadd. tantum.
..sunteadem]L
nontantum
homocurrit
et tantum
homononcurrit
Unde...noncurrit]
.
L opposita]
L oppositum
ista]L istud currit]
LB preponendo
negationem
add. nullushomonon]L omnishomo
31 Et ideo]L . duo]Lc. LB homonon]L nonhomo
L quando subiecto
32 quandocumque]
distributo
L subiecto
ex
distributo]
eo quod...specialis]
. L sicdicendo]
. L currit]
LB exeo quodpotest
fieri
exclusio
velspecialis
add.L hic...specialis]
. L
generalis
33 fiatexclusio]
L . excludit]
LB opposita]
L omnia excluditur]
includit
LBC. omni]LBC. et]L . et] . L exponentis]
. L ponit
quod]L . etideo]L quia
35

13:10:38 PM

cluditur generaliter quodlibet quod non est inclusum. Et ideo ex

etnichilaliud [ 82 vb] ab omnihornin
curponitur sic: omnishomocurrit
ri. Et ideo infertista duo: 'Sortescurriet *Sortesnoncurri. Ratione
affirmativeexponentisponit istam: ' Sortescurriet ratione exponentis
'
negative ponit quod Sortes non currit.Et ideo sequitur: nichilquodnon
estomnishomocurrit
; igiturSortesnoncurri.
34 Si autem fiatexclusio specialis, non excluditurquodlibet aliud
ab incluso sed excludunturspecialiterspecies opposite sub isto modo
. Ideo hec: tantumomnishomocurriexponitursic: ' omnishomo
'omnis9
currit
omnisleo1. Et ideo cum ista: ' tantum
etnonomnisboscurrit
omnis
homocurristat quod aliquis asinus currit,sed non stat quod omnis
asinus currit.
35 Contra istam distinctionemarguitursic. Data hac responsione
ista starentsimuli ' tantumomnishomoestrisibilis9
et ' aliquisasinusest[L
', quia per se tune non excluduntur species opposite
124ra] risibilis
simplicitersed solum sub isto modo 'omnis'. Sed quod ista duo non
stant simul probo quia: Sequitur ' tantumomnishomoestrisibilis
; igitur
. Ex qua sequitur ' tantumrisibileest homo et
omnishomoest risibilis9
'
ultra: ' igiturtantumrisibileest risibile
', et ultra: igiturtantumhomoest

. Igitur a primo: tantumomnishomoest risibilis

risibilis9
; igiturtantum
. Et ultra: ' igiturnullusasinusestrisibilis'; que rpugnt
homoestrisibilis1
huic: 'aliquis asinusestrisibilis9
.
36 Huic dico quod ista non stant simul: 'tantumomnishomoest
9 et
risibilis
'aliquis asinusestrisibilis'. Sed ista duo stant simul: 'tantum
omnishomocurriet 'aliquis asinuscurri. Sed quod ista non stantsimul,
non est ratione negative exponentis sed ratione affirmativeexponentis, quia negative exponentes non stant simul sed solum affirmative.
9
Sicut patet: ista duo <non> stantsimul: 'asinusestrisibiliset 'nonomnis
9
asinusestrisibilisetnonomnisbos etc. Verumtamen ista duo [non] stant
9
simul: 'asinus est risibilis et 'omnis asinus est risibilis9
, ut patet per
dictum.
argumentum superius
L
L . omnis] . L boscurrit]
34 excluditur...
sed] . L specialiter]
bos etideo]L unde nonstat]L non
L istaratione
tantum]
L . tuncnon]
35 sic]L . hecresponsione]
L similiter
non L tunc oppositesimpliciter]
(!) opposite omnis] .
LR
tantum
sicsaepius
L probo]L probatio
omnis]L solum igitur...
risibilis]
etultra...
a primo] . L tantum]
L et ultraigitur
. Ex qua sequitur]
. L
tantumhomoestrisibilis]
. LB omnis...
LB istatamennonstantsimultantum
36 nonstant...
ista]L . asinuscurrit]
add. sedquod...affirmative
et aliquisasinusestrisibilis
omnishomoestrisibilis
. L et non omnis
L . quia...omnisasinusest risibilis]
exponentis]
L
Bc. LB prius
superius
dictum
bos...omnisasinusestrisibilis]
factum]
36

13:10:38 PM


37 Tu dicis quod, facta exclusione speciali, non excluduntur
species opposite nisi sub isto modo sub quo accipitur inclusum. Igitur
stat attributiopredicati alicui speciei disparate. Dico quod ratione
exponentisnegativeexcludunturspecies opposite solum sub isto modo
' omnis' sub
quo accipiturinclusum, sed ratione affirmativeexponentis
excludunturspecies opposite absolute.
38 Alia distinctioest communis:
Si excludatur totum integrale vel totum numerale, multiplexest
propositioex eo quod potest fieriexclusio gratia formevel gratia
materie.
39 Si gratia forme,sic quelibet talis excludit opposita. Ut hic: ' tantumdomusestalba' 'tantumquatuorhominessunthicintus9
f quia tunc excluditur quodlibet quod non participai formam inclusi. Et tunc ex4
t et raponitur sic: domusestalba et nichilquod nonestdomusestalbum*
tione affirmativeexponentis ponit ista quod siliqua pars domus sit
alba, et ratione negative exponentis ponit quod nulla pars domus sit
alba.
' est
40 Similiter ista: 1tantum quatuor homines sunt hicintus
distinguenda eadem distinctione: "si fiatexclusio gratia forme,tunc
includit opposita". Et tunc significai quod quatuor homines sunt
hicintuset nulli alteriquam quatuor homines sunt hicintus[B 83ra] et
ratione affirmativeexponentis ponit quod quatuor homines sunt
hicintuset ratione negative exponentis ponit quod duo homines non
sunt hicintus.
41 Si autem in talibus propositionibusfiatexclusio gratia materie,
tunc tales propositiones sunt possibiles, ut 'tantumdomusest alba' et
tunc debet sic exponi: ' domusest alba et nichilaliud a domo, vel preter
1
domum,estalbum' Et hoc est possibile. Similiter hec: tantumquatuor
37 quod] . L subisto...quo] sub modosubquo L subisto predicati]
L
alicui]L alicuius solum]L . omnis]L . opposite
abpredicali
L appropriate

solute]
38 excluditur]
includatur
L includitur
numerale]numerali(!)L universale
multiplex
estpropositio]
L . forme]
L materie
materie]
L forme

39 sic] L . excludit]includitLB hic] L . excluditur]

excludit
L quodlibet
non [estinclusum]
quod] L quicquidquod (f)B non participt]
L inclusi]
inclusam
L ista] . L aliqua]L alia sit] estL
participt
40 si] L si autem et]L quia nullialteri]L nichilaliud ratione]
L ratio
ponit]quodL quodBc. quatuor]
duoL et]L .
41 propositionibus]
. L propositiones]
. L debetsic exponi]L exsimiliter
preter

ponitur
domum] a partedomosL hoc]L hec hicintus]
intusL ettunc] . L quam...homines]
L .
37

13:10:38 PM

sunthicintus'
. Et tunc exponitursic: 4quatuorhomines
homines
sunthicintus
'
et nonplura quam quatuorhominessunthicintus.
42 Sciendum quod quando dictio exclusiva additur alicui composito ex substantia et accidente, multiplex est locutio ex eo quod
potest fieriexclusio ratione unius partis vel ratione alteriuspartis vel
ratione totius. Ut sic dicto: 4tantumhomo albus curri, hec est
distinguenda ex eo quod potest exclusio fieriratione hominisvel ratione [L 124rb] albi vel ratione huius totiushomoalbus. Si fiatexclusio
4
ratione hominis
etnullusbos
tantum,tunc exponitursic: homoalbuscurrit
albus currietc. Si fiatexclusio ratione albi, tunc sic exponitur: 4homo
albuscurrit
etnullushomonigercurri. Si fiatexclusio ratione totius,tunc
4
etnichilaliudquamhomoalbuscurri. Sed
exponitursic: homoalbuscurrit
exclusio ratione totius est modus excludendi potentissimus, intelligendo quod exclusio non infert universalem de terminis
transpositisnisi fiatexclusio ratione totius.
43 Sciendum quod quandocumque additur dictio exclusiva dicto
alicuius propositionisrespectuveri vel falsi,possibilis vel impossibilis,
distinguendumest ex eo quod potest fieriexclusio ratione verbi prin
cipalis vel verbi secundum quod ponitur in dicto. Ut ista: tantum
'
estverumest distinguenda ex eo quod potestfieri
essehominem
hominem
exclusio respectuhuius verbi 'est' vel respectuhuius verbi 'esse'. Si fiat
4
4
exclusio respectu huius verbi est', sic est falsa et est sensus: tantum
estverum',hocest: hoc dictum tantumest verum:
essehominem
hominem
4hominem
' Si fiat exclusio respectu huius verbi 'esse', sic
essehominem
est ulterius distinguendum secundum compositionem et divisionem;
4
et in utroque sensu est verum. Sensus compositus est iste: tantum
4
estverum'
essehominem
hominem
, hoc est: hec est vera: tantumhomoest
est verum,
esse hominem
est
tantumhominem
iste
divisus
.
Sensus
homo'
locutio]L ista locutio vel ratione]L et
42 additur]L adiungitur

partis...
totius]L . dicto]L dicendo hec] . L distinguenda]

. L tantum
L huius] . L fiatexclusio]
tunc]tantum
distinguendum
tunc L et...etc.] L et nullusasinus currit? . fiat exclusio]Bc .

LBC. nigercurrit]
niger mdiusL fiatexclusio]
L si...albuscurrit]
L pessimus
L modus...
. L exclusio]ex (!)B modusexcludendi
potentissimus]
. L
intelligendo...
modusexcludendi
totius]
L quando additur] . L exclusiva]LB additaadd.
43 quandocumque]
utista]
L distinguendum...
velimpossibile
possibile
velimpossibilis]
L possibilis
.
hecestdistinguenda
esttalislocutiout estdistinguenda]
L distinguenda

essehominem]
. L hocest...
L fieri]
L esse est]L . fiatexclusio]
est L est
. L fiatexclusio] . L sic...distingu
endum] distinguenda
L hoc...esthomo] . L estiste]LR .
verum
L vera estverum]
verum]
. L
hocest...
estverum]
38

13:10:38 PM

hocest: dictum hominem

essehominem
est verum et nichil aliud quam
essehominem
est verum.
hominem
44 Contra istam distinctionemarguiturquod hec sit falsa in omni
sensu: tantumhominem
est verum
' Ostenditur. Nam seesse hominem
1tantumhominemesse hominemest
verum;igituromneverumest
quitur:
hominemesse hominem.Igitur hoc verum Deum esse est hominemesse
hominem
. Sed consequens est falsum. Consequentia patet, quia exclusiva inferiuniversalemde terministranspositis,ut prius visum est.
Et in hac 1tantumhominem
esse hominem
est verum',hoc totum dictum
hominem esse hominem est subiectum.
45 Item. Sequitur: tantum
hominem
essehominem
estverum;igiturnichil
aliudquamhominem
essehominem
estverum'
. IgiturDeum [B 83rb] essenon
est verum.
46 Ad primumdico quod accepta hac ut sit exclusio respectuhuius
verbi 4es , sic sequitur: 4tantumhominem
esse hominem
est verum;igitur
omneverumest hominem
essehominem1
. Et sic antecedens est falsum et
consequens similiter. Si fiat exclusio respectu huius verbi 'esse', sic
non sequitur hec universalis, quia, facta exclusione tali, non est hec
exclusiva. Et ideo non oportet quod inferatuniversalem de terminis
transpositis.
47 Ad aliud dico quod accepta hac ut vera: tantumhominem
esse

est
hominem verum,sequitur ista: nichilaliud quamhominem
essehominem
estverum, ita quod iste sit sensus: hec est vera: 'nichilaliud quamhomo
esthomo'. Et tunc dico quod non valet sillogismus factus, quia solum
debet fieri suppositio sub eo quod distribuitur. Sed nichil aliud
distribuiturnisi homo. Ideo est sic arguendum: nichil aliud quam
44 quod] sic quod L in] L . ostenditur]
. L esse hominem
est
L etc.sicsemper
igitur...
essehominem]
L . Sed...falsum]
conseverum]
L quiasequitur
deumesseesthominem
essehominem
add. et]L .
quensfalsum
dictum
hominem
essehominem]
dictum hominem
essehominem
L subiecessehominem
add.
tum]LB hominem
45 estverum]LB consequens
estfalsum
nichilaliudetc.seddeum
quia sequitur
essealiudquamhominem
essehominem
add.
46 sic] . L etsic] sedL facta...
L utsic hec]L .
exclusione]
47 dico] dicendum
L ut]L sicut sequitur
L ita]
igitur
ista] sicsequitur
L ut homoesthomo]L hominem
essehominem
valetsillogismus
L sefactus]
esse estverumdeumesseestaliudaum
quiturultranichilaliudquamhominem
hominem
essehominem
deumessenonestverum
add. quia...suppositio]
L
igitur
sed fitdistinctio
sed solusfitdistinctio
Bf distribuitur]
L distinguitur
sed
nichilaliud] etaliudL distribuitur]
L distinguitur
homo]L aliudquamhomo
estverum]
L . deumesse...nonestverum]L deumnonestomneverum
sicut] sicutpatetL omnem]
hominem
tantum
L sillogizandum]
L
<esse>f
sortes
est...hominem
currere
estverum]
L .
arguendum
39

13:10:38 PM

hominem
est verum; Deum esseest aliud quam hominem
essehominem
esse;
essenon est verum: Sicut, accepta hac in sensu
igiturDeumessehominem

, sic sillogizandum est:

composito: hominemcrreteest verum'
' hominem
est
currere
estverum;Sortesesthomo
> currere
; igitur<Sortem
' hominemcurrere
non
Sortem
currere
est
et
sic:
est
verum;
verum',
hominem
currere;
igituretc.'
48 Si arguatur contra responsionem prime rationis: in omni sensu
essehominem
videturhec esse exclusiva: ' tantum
hominem
estverum'
, quia
sit
cum
hic
exclusiva
ab
dicitur
exclusione;
exclusio,
igitur
propositio
in omni sensu videtur hec esse exclusiva, - dico quod propositio
dicitur exclusiva ab exclusione que est respectu compositionis formalis, sicut propositio dicitur negativa a negatione respectu negationis compositionis formalis. Verumtamen sicut propositio non
dicitur negativa nisi neget compositionem formalem, sic nec propositio diciturexclusiva nisi exclusio excludat respectucompositionis
formalis. [L 124rb] Sed, facta exclusione respectuhuius verbi 'esse',
solum fit exclusio respectu compositionis materialis. Et ideo in ilio
sensu non erit exclusiva.
<Dubitatio>
49 Dubitatur circa exclusivas utrum exclusiva inferatnegativam
exponentem. Quod non, videtur. Ut supposito quod Sortes sciat
septem artes et Plato quatuor et Cicero tres,ita quod nullus alius sciat
'
septem artes nisi solummodo Sortes, tunc hec est vera: tantumSortes
1
seitseptemartes'; hec tarnenest falsa: nullialii quamSortessciuntseptem
artes', quia Plato et Cicero sciunt septem artes.
50 Item. Supposito quod omnis homo sit albus et quod omnis
4
homo videat album et nigrum, tunc hec est vera: tantumvidenssibi
'
simileesthomo', quia sequitur ex hac omnishomovidetsibi simile'. Et
L contramentionem
estverum]
48 Si arguatur...
primeregulein omnisensuquod
L
igitur...
L inclusione
tantum
tres(!) etc. exclusione]
sitexclusiva
exclusiva]
L . compositionis]
VB consequente
L sicut...
. ab exclusione]
formalis]
L fiat huiusverbi] . L erit]L est
excludat]
. L nisi]L si negatio
exL dictiones
exclusivas
est L exclusivas]
Dubitandum
49 Dubitatur]
L negationem
exponentis
exponentem]
clusiva]L dictioexclusiva negativam
L
positoL quatuor]
L videtur
quodnonvidetur]
quodnon utsupposito]
L . nullialii]L nichil
tres tres]L quatuor alius] . L solummodo]
sortesseitseptem
tantum
aliud sciunt]L seit artes]LB tuncnonsequitur
etc.add.
nichilaliudquamsortes
igitur
sequitur
ex hac] ex hac verasequitur
sicsemper
50 simile]L similem
quod
L homo]L . ettarnen
hec] sedistaL sit] estL
40

13:10:38 PM

tarnenhec est falsa: 4nichilaliud quamvidenssibisimileesthomo9

, quia ex
hoc sequitur quod nullus videns sibi [B 83 va] dissimile sit homo.
4
Igitur non sequitur: tantumvidenssibi simileesthomo;igiturnichilaliud
.
quamvidenssibi simileesthomo9
51 Item. Supposito quod quilibet homo videat se tantum,tunc hec
est vera: 4tantum
Sortesvidetse9> quia tantumSortes videt Sortem; igitur
tantum Sortes videt se. tarnen est falsa: nichilaliud quam Sortes
videtse' quia sua opposita est vera: 4aliud quam Sortesvidetse9.
52 Item. Non sequitur: 4tantumcommuneest commune;igiturnichil
9
aliud quamcommune
estcommune
, quia antecedens est verum et consefalsum.
Falsitas
quens
consequentis patet, quia sua opposita est vera:
4aliud
9
commune
est
commune
, quia aliudquamcommune
quam
predicaturde
9
4
pluribus, cum hec sit vera: Sortesest aliud quam communeet hec
similiter:4Plato estaliud quam commune
9
53 Ad oppositum. Exclusio dnott predicatum removeri a
quolibet alio ab incluso. Et hoc denotaturper negativam exponentem.
Igitur negativa exponens sequitur ad exclusivam.
54 Ad questionem dicendum quod sic, quia exclusio dnott
predicatum precise inesse subiecto. Et si predicatum precise insit
subiecto, non inest alii a subiecto. Sequitur igitur per exclusivam
remotio predicati a quolibet alio a subiecto. Et hoc significaturper
negativam exponentem. Igitur etc.
55 Ad primam rationem dicendum quod supposito quod Sortes
sciat septem artes et Plato quatuor et Cicero tres,hec est vera: 4tantum
9 et hec similiter:
Sortesseitseptem
artes
'nichilaliud quamSortesseitseptem
. Sed hec est falsa: 1nullialii a Sortesciuntseptemartes9
artes9
; est hec
negativa exponens alterius. Unde dico quod ista duo stant simul:
4tantum
9
Sortesseitseptem
artes9et 4alii a Sortesciuntseptem
artes. Ista tarnen

51 supposito] supponoL homo] L . priustantum...

quia] L .
igitur...
tantum
sortesvidetsortem
sortes
se] L . et sequitur
igiturtantum
videtse add. hectarnen]
etistaL sua...vera] p. (proplato)L quamsortes]
L a sorte videtse]LB quia platovidetse add.
52 patet]L apparet predicatur]
diciturL vera]LB platoest aliudquam
commune
etadd. ethec...commune]
L .
53 exclusio]
exclusiva
L
54 questionem]
quodL noninest...
L removetur
igitur
predicati]
etc.] .
L
55 quatuor]L tres tres]L quatuor hec] . L nuliialii]L nullaalia
negativa]
L . duo] . L aliia sorte]
L aliaquamsortes
istatarnen]
L et ista tantum...arteset] . L aliud] nichilaliudL quamsortes]

sorteL artes]LB etaliudquamsortes

seitseptem
artesadd.L
41

13:10:38 PM

9 et 'aliud
non stant simul: 4tantumSortesseitseptemartes
quam Sortesseit
.
septemartes9
Sortescurriet iPlatoet
56 Contra. Igitur ista starentsimul: 4tantum
4
Cicerocurrun
, sicut ex ista parte ista stant simul: tantumSortesseit
9
4
.
septemartes et Plato et Cicerosciuntseptemartes*
9
4tantum
Ad
dico
ista
simul:
aliud
stant
Sortesseitseptem
artes
57
quod
4
et iPlato et Ciceroetc.'; ista tarnenduo non stant simul: tantumSortes
. Cuius ratio est quia ad hoc quod Plato
curriet 'Plato etCicerocurrun
et Cicero currantoportet quod Cicero currat et Plato similiter,quia
currere
non potest inesse duobus coniunctim ita quod neuter divisim,
sed hoc quod dico scireseptem
arteshabet tales partes quod potestinesse
duobus coniunctim, ita quod nulli divisim.
58 Ad aliud dico quod supposito quod omnis homo sit albus et
quod omnis homo [B 83vb] videat album et nigrum, hec est vera:
4tantumuidenssibi simileesthomo'.
[L 124vb] Et ex hac sequitur: 'nichil
. Sed ex hac non sequitur quod
aliud quam videnssibi simileest homo9
videns sibi dissimile non sit homo. Pro quo sciendum quod, incluso
aliquo, nichil excluditurde quo possibiliterdiciturinclusum. Sed hec
9 et econverso.
est possibilis: 4videnssibi simileest videnssibi dissimile
9
4
Unde ista duo stant simul: tantumvidenssibi simileesthomo et 4videns
sibi dissimileesthomo9. Sicut ista duo stant simul: 4omnishomovidetsibi
.
simile9 et 4omnishomovidetsibi dissimile9
Sortes
59 Ad aliud diciturper unam viam quod hec est vera: 4tantum
ex
hac
Sed
homo
videat
tantum.
videtse9ysupposito quod quilibet
se
9
non sequitur quod nichil aliud a Sorte videt se secundum quod li 4se
9
aliud refertin exclusiva et in negativa exponente: in exclusiva li 4se
refertSortem, sed in negativa exponente refertaliud a Sorte. Ideo
LR
56 piato] sortesetplatoL et cicero]LCB. ex ista] ex L tantum]
artesL etc.
. sciunt...
57 Ad aliud]L . stant...
duo] . L platoet cicero]L sorteset plato
nonpotestinesse]LB*.
L uterquecurrat
cicerocurratet platosimiliter]
hoc...scire]hocquoddico scireL habetquod]L . itaquodnulli]L etsi

LB ineo quodhabettales<partes>
noninsit divisim]
nonvidens
58 homo]UB albumL sedex hac]L quare quodvidens]L igitur
L sequitur
LB1 simile sit]L est quo] LR . sciendum]
dissimile]
L hoc
hecestpossibilis]
L posterius
possibiliter]
L excipitur
excluditur]
L quod
et econverso
estpossibile
unde]L . stantsimul] convertuntur
Lc esthomo]L . stantsimul]L .
delevit
omnis
aliamviam quilibet]
secundum
59 dicitur
perunamviam]L dicendum
videtse sedadd.
sortes
L sed]LB [exhacnonsequitur
et]quodhecestveratantum
te...exL hac] L hoc quod] L . secundum
quod] quia L exponen
aliuda
et
in
ista
nichil
sortem
li
se
videt
videt
se
in
tantum
sortes
L
ista
(/)
ponente]
sortevidetse li se
42

13:10:38 PM

ista: ' tantumSortesvidetse*exponitur sic: Sortesvidetse et nichilaliud a

.
SortevidetSortern
60 Ad aliud concedendum quod hec sit vera: ' tantumcommune
est
'
commune'
; et sua negativa exponens similiter: nichilaliudquamcommune
' . Et sua

'
estcommune
estcommune
,
opposita est falsa: aliudquamcommune
'
ista tarnenest vera: aliud a communi
estcommune'
hoc
subiectum
, quia
'
' aliud a communi
potest supponere pro intentione. Sed ista duo non
'
' et '
estcommune
nichilaliud a communi
est
opponuntur: aliud a communi
commune'
estspecies'et 4nullushomoestspecies'.
, sicut nec iste due: khomo
terminorum
in exclusiva
{De suppositione
)
61 Circa suppositionem terminorum in exclusivis est sciendum
'
quod subiectum in exclusiva stat confuse tantum. Ut in hac: tantum
homocurriiste terminus ^homo'stat confuse tantum, quia non con'
tingitdescendere disiunctivenec copulative. Non enim sequitur: tantumhomocurrit;igiturtantumistehomocurrit,etistehomo', quia supposito
quod omnis homo curratet nichil aliud ab homine currat,tunc hec est
vera: tantum
homocurri, hec tarnenest falsa: ' tantum
istehomocurrit
vel
tantum
istehomocurri. Et ideo stat confuse tantum,quia terminusstat
confuse tantum quando non contingitdescendere copulative nec disiunctive sub eo.
62 Similiter patet quod subiectum in exclusiva stat confuse tantum, quia in conversionibus termini eodem modo supponunt. Sed
universalis et exclusiva de terminis transpositisconvertuntur.Ideo
sicut predicatum in universali supponit, sic debet subiectum in exclusiva supponere. Sed predicatum in universali supponit confuse
tantum. Ideo subiectum in exclusiva supponit confuse tantum.
63 Ex [B 84ra] hoc patet quod subiectum in opposito exclusive
supponit confuse et distributive,quia in contradictoriistermini oppositos modos supponendi habent, ita quod terminussupponens confusetantumin uno oppositorumstatconfuseet distributivein reliquo.
L deicendum
60 concedendum]
sit]L est ista...estcommune]
L . a
L quamcommune
non]L . istedue]L ista
communi]
61 exclusivis]
exclusiva
L non]L sequitur]
L arguitur
istehomo
currit
et istehomo]L istecurrit
nichil]LBCnon currat
tune]L . hec
ethecL vel]L et homo]L . subeo ff. LB
tarnen]
62 conversionibus
convertibilibus
L sicut]LCB. L sed]
terminis
termini]
etL supponit]
L statsicsemper
ideo...tantum
L igitur
etc.
63 Ex] Et exL oppositos]
UB diversos
L quod] quodistesitsensusL op contradictoriarum

positorum]
(!) L undebene]L verumtamen
43

13:10:38 PM

Unde bene sequitur: 4nontantumhomocurrit;igiturnontantumistehomo

curri.
64 Similiter in exclusiva predicatum stat confuse et distributive.
Verumtamen est [L 125ra] distinguendumde exclusiva, quia aut fit
exclusio respectu actus affirmatiaut respectu actus negati. Si affirmati, tunc predicatum supponit confuse et distributive.Ut in hac:
4tantumhomoest
animai; igiturtantumhomoest asinus9. Sequitur enim:
4tantum
homoestanimai;igituromneanimalesthomo'; et ultra: 4igituromnis
4
asinusesthomo9
, et ultra: igiturtantumhomoestasinus9. Igitur a primo.
Ita patet quod predicatum stat confuse et distributive. Ideo in sua
9
opposita stat particulariter.Sicut in hac: 'non tantumhomoestanimai
4
iste terminus animal9stat particulariter,quia potest inferriex illa
4
homoestanimai;igiturnontantum
singulariter,quia sequitur: nontantum
homoesthocanima .
65 Sed de exclusiva cuius preiacens est negativa est sciendum quod
subiectum stat confuse tantum et predicatum confuse et distributive
9
immobiliter.Ut patet. In hac: 4tantum
homononestnon-homo
subiectum
statconfusetantumet predicatumconfuseet distributiveimmobiliter.
Quod patet sic. Stare confuseet distributiveimmobiliterest stare pro
quolibet sui singulari, ita quod ad nullum inferius contingit
descendere sub predicato nec supra predicatumascendere. Ut in hac:
4tantum
homononestnon-homo9
. Non enim sequitur: 4tantum
homononest
4
non-homo
; igiturtantumhomononestasinus9. Nec sequitur: tantumhomo
non est non-homo;igiturtantumhomonon est ens9. Nam antecedens est
verum et consequens est falsum, quia ex consequenti sequitur quod
homo non est ens.
66 Circa suppositionem predicati in exclusiva affirmativa est
dubitatio utrum predicatum in exclusiva affirmativa supponat
mobiliter. Quod non, videtur. Nam si sic, sequeretur: 4tantumSortes
64 quia]L . respectu]
affirmativi
L . affirmati]
L autrespectu]
L
vel negati] negativi
L si] LB respectu
actusadd. affirmati]
affirmativi
L predicatum]
L . igitur...
asinus] . L sequitur
enim]L quia sequitur
ita patetquod] illudpatetquod L quia statparticulariter
sicut]L parte
animal]L . quia...singulari
ter]L . hoc] . L
65 estsciendum]
sciendum
L predicatum]
LB statadd.L predicatum]
LB stat
add.L immobiliter]
L . sui singulari]
sui . L ad nulluminferius]
La
non(?) subpredicato...
L tualiternecad superius
ascendere
contingit
sequitur]
nunc(!) contingit
in hoc(!) nam]L . alterum
subpredicato
descendere
est]
L . prius
est]L .
66 affirmativa
L
L stat nam]L quia sortes]
L homo sortes]
supponat]
homo casu] . L et]L . ut] . L nisi]UB . L nonvideatnisi]
videatL itaquod]L et sequeretur]
L sequitur
videret]
L videat
44

13:10:38 PM

vidtanimal;igiturtantum
Sortesvidtasinum'. Sed antecedens est verum,
et
casu
possibili, consequens falsum. Ut posito quod nullum
posito
animal videatur nisi a Sorte et quod Sortes non videat nisi bovem ita
'
quod nullum asinum, hec est vera: tantumSortesvidetanimal', hec
'
tarnenest falsa tantum
Sortesvidetasinum', quia ex hac sequereturquod
Sortes videret asinum; quod est contra casum.
'
67 Item. Sequitur: tantumSortesvidet hominem;
igiturtantum
'
SortesvidetPlatonem'
, quia in hac: 'tantumSortesvidet hominemli
4hominem'stat confuse et
distributive; igitur sub eo contingit
descendere.
68 Sed quod hec consequentia non valeat ostenditur.Nam: Posito
quod quilibet homo alius a Sorte videat se tantum et quod Sortes
videat omnem hominem et quod nullus alius videat omnem
'
',
hominem, hec est vera: tantumSortesvidetomnem[B 84rb] hominem
hac
ex
sed hec est falsa: 'tantumSortesvidetPlatonem'
, quia
sequitur
quod Plato non videret Platonem.
69 Item. Si exclusio in subiecto confunderetpredicatumconfuseet
distributive,hoc non esset nisi per virtutemalietatis importate per
exclusionem. Sed ratione illius non confunditpredicatum, quia tunc
alietas posset confunderepredicatum. Sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc
'
sequeretur: aliud ab homineestanimai; igituraliud ab homineesthomo'
Sed hec consequentia non valet, quia antecedens est verum et conse4
quens falsum. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia sequitur: aliud ab
*
homine
esthomo;igiturhomoestaliud ab homine'
, et ultra: igiturhomonon
esthomo'.
70 Ad oppositum. Universalis et exclusiva de terministranspositis
convertuntur.Sed in universali subiectum statconfuseet distributive.
Igitur [L 125rb] predicatum in exclusiva.
71 Ad questionem dicendum quod in exclusiva affirmativa
predicatum stat confuse et distributivepro suo per se supposito, ita
quod ad quodlibet per se suppositum predicati contingitdescendere.
LCB. L tantum]
L homo
67 omnem]
L . hominem
exomnem]
quilibet]
L . a] LB se add. se] L . alius]L
68 Posito]L supposito
asinus sedhecest]L ethec videret]
L videt
LB stareadd.L virtute]
ratione]
L pervirtutem
L ratio sed
69 predicatum]
hec...homo]L .
L .
70 subiectum]
L predicatum
predicatum]
quodL in exclusiva
L predicatum
affirmativa
in
71 questionem]
predicatum]
suo]LB et add. prdicat]
L . et pro...quod]L verumtamen
exclusiva
animal]LCBhacanimalL non]LBC. subpredicato]
L . subiecto
in
patetinistaconsequentia
L
universali
inL estquia...sequitur]
superscr.
45

13:10:38 PM

Et pro ratione in oppositum dicendum est quod ad suppositum per

animalest
accidens non contingitdescendere, quia non sequitur ' tantum
homo
; igitur tantumanimal est homo albus9, quia antecedens est
necessarium et consequens contingens. Et ratio quare non contingit
descendere sub predicato ad suppositum per accidens est quia in
universali non contingitdescendere ad suppositumper accidens. Non
.
enim sequitur: ' omnishomoestanimai:igituromnishomoalbusestanimai*
72 Ad rationem primam dico quod non sequitur tantumSortesvidet
. Cuius ratio est quia in hac:
animai; igiturtantumSortesvidetasinum9
9
9
'
' tantum
Sortesvidetanimai hoc totum: videtanimai est predicatum,et in
9
9
4
hac: tantumSortes videt asinum hoc totum: 4videns asinum est
predicatum; sed vidensasinumest inferiusper accidens ad vidensanimai
73 Tu dicis quod asinusper se continetursub animali; igiturconsequentia bona. Dico quod non sequitur, etsi asinusper se continetur
sub animali. Tamen vidensasinumper accidens continetursub hoc
communi quod est vidensanimai.
'
74 Contra istud probo hanc consequentiam: tantumSortesvidet
1
Sortesest
Sortesvidetasinum9
, quia sequitur: tantum
animai; igiturtantum
'
et
ultra:
vidensanimai; igituromnevidensanimai estSortes9
;
igituromne
a
accidens
cum
vidensasinumestSortes9,
quia hic arguitur superioriper
distributionead inferius.Igitur a primo ad ultimum. Huic dico quod
non sequitur.

75 Ad aliam rationem dico quod non sequitur: tantumSortesvidet

. Et in hac: tantum
hominem;igiturtantumSortesvidetPlatonem9
9
confuse tantum,
Sortesvidet hominemstat iste terminus ^homo9
quia per regulam communem: quicquid immobilitat mobilitaium,
mobilitat immobilitatum. Sed dictio exclusiva addita subiecto
mobilitat predicatum prius stans immobiliter. Ideo immobilitat
predicatum quod prius stetitmobilitatum.

sortes]
L
dicendum
72 Ad rationem
argumentum
primam
dico]L ad primm
L homo cuiusratioestquia]cuiusratioestL ratioquarequia
homo sortes]
LB videns
. L predicatum]
vidensasinum]
add. totum
totum]
LB sortes
asinumadd.L sed]L
73 tudicis...vidensanimal] . L
. L et ultra] . L hic] .
74 istud] . L quia...priusigitur]
L suumperaccidensdistributum
inferius]
L distributo
L per...distributione]
L .
igitur...
sequitur]

mobilitatum]
75 etinhac]L homo]L . tantum
quia]L etdistributive
L immobilitat
L immobilitat
addita]L in mobilitat]
L mobilitat]
mobilitata
L mobilitatum

mobiliter]
L immobilitatum
immobiliter]
46

13:10:38 PM

'
76 Contra. Probo hanc consequentiam: tantumSortesvidet
' Nam sequitur: tantum
Sortes
SortesvidetPlatonem
hominem;
igiturtantum
videt hominem
; [ 84 va] igituromnevidens hominemest
Sortes et ultra: 1igituromnevidensPlatonemestSortes
', quia sequitur sine
distributione;nam esse videns omnem hominem est Sortes; et ultra:
'
'
igituromnevidensPlatonemestSortes et ultra: igiturtantumSortesvidet
. Igitur a primo etc.
Platonem'
77 Huic dico quod consequentia non valet ''omnevidensomnem
hominem
estSortes
', quia sequitur
; igituromnevidensPlatonemestSortes
sine distributione:' vidensomnem
estSortes
hominem
; igiturvidensPlatonem
estSortes',et non econverso. Ideo, addita distributioneeodem ordine,
est fallacia consequentis arguendo ab inferiori ad superius cum
distributione.
78 Ad principaledico quod predicatum in exclusiva stat mobiliter,
et hoc non est virtutealietatis importateper exclusionem sed virtute
negationisalietatis. Sicut patet: si dicatur 'tantumhomoestanimai', ex'
ponens negativa est: nichil aliud ab homineest animai', et in hac
predicatumstatconfuseet distributive,et hoc non virtutealietatis sed
virtutenegationis alietatis, quia in negativa exponente cuiuslibet exclusive est alietas circa subiectum.
<Dubitatio>
'
79 Ideo potest dubitare an hec dictio 4aliud habeat naturam confundenditerminmimmediate ei sequentem confuse et distributive.
Quod non, videtur, quia si sic, hec consequentia esset bona: 'omne
animalesthomo;ergonichilaliud ab animaliesthomo'' que consequentia
non videturesse formalis. Nam non sequitur: 'omneanimalestasinus;
igiturnichilaliud ab animaliestasinus'.
80 Probo quod hec consequentia valeat, dato quod hec dictio
UBf.
LCB. L nam]L quia etultra...
estsortes]
76 omnem]
L ideoaddendonotamdistributionis
estfallacia
cumdistributione]
76-77 etultra...
eodemordine
consequentis
arguendo
et...sed]
L dicitur
cumalietate
L dicatur]
alietatis]
78 dico]L dicitur
. L
. L circasubiectum]
L . ei...distributive]
L .
79 Ideo] Circasubiectum
(!) L terminm]
LB . si] L . nam]L quia asinus]L album
quia...nonvidetur]
asinus]L album
L confunderet
80 hec] . L valeat valetL hecdictio]L . confundat]
immediate homo] LB data ista responsioneadd. et ultra] .
L sequitur
L sequitur...
priusest homo] . L consequentisinfertur]
L . et tunc...esthomo]L nichilaliudab animaliesthomo
antecedentis]
omneanimalesthomo
igitur
47

13:10:38 PM

4aliud19confundat
quia: Ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum
antecedentis. Nam sequitur: 4aliud ab animaliesthomo
; igituraliudab [L
4
125 va] homineest homo et ultra: igiturhomoest aliud ab homine9
> et
4
et
ultra:
est
ultra: 4igituranimal est aliud ab homine'
animal
non
,
igitur
. Igitur a primo sequitur: 4aliud ab animaliesthomo;igituranimal
homo9
. Et tunc ex opposito consequentis inferturoppositum
non est homo9
antecedentis.Et tunc est ista consequentia bona: 'omneanimalesthomo;
igiturnichilaliud ab animaliesthomo'.
4
81 Item. Si sic, sequeretur: Sortesestaliud ab homine;igiturSortesest
9
9
9
4
aliud a Sorte. Et tunc in hac: Sortesestaliud ab homineIi 4hominestaret
confuse et distributive.Sed a termino stante confuse et distributive
4
potest fieriexceptio. Igitur hec exceptio esset propria: Sortesestaliud
9
a Sorte.
ab homine
preterquam
4
82 Ad oppositum. Sequitur tantumSortescurrit;igiturtantumhomo
curri. Igitur negativa exponens antecedentis infertnegativam ex4
ponentem consequentis. Igitur sequitur: nichilaliuda Sortecurrit;igitur
. Igitur ex opposito sequitur oppositum:
nichilaliud ab hominecurrit9
4aliud ab homine
.
a Sortecurrit9
aliud
currit;ergo
83 Item. Ad diversitatem prioris sequitur diversitas posterions.
Sed hec dictio aliud9 importtdiversitatem.Igitur sequitur: 4Sortesest
9
aliud ab homine;igiturestaliud a Sorte.
9
84 Ad questionem dico quod hec dictio 4aliud habet duplicem virtutem, scilicet mobilitandi immobilitatum et immobilitandi
mobilitatum. Sequitur enim: 4Sortesestaliud ab homine;igiturSortesest
. Sed non sequitur: 4Sortesestaliud ab omnihomine;igiturest
aliud a Sorte9
4
aliud a Sorte9
, sed est fallacia consequentis, quia hec: Sortesestaliud ab
9
4
omnihominevalet hanc: Sortesnonest idemomnihomini9
, et hec valet
9
. Sed hec: 4Sortesestaliud a Sorte
hanc: 4Sortesalicui homininonestidem9
'
valet istam: [B 84vb] SortesnonestidemSorti9,immo hic est fallacia
4
consequentis: Sortesalicui homininonest idem;igiturSortesnonestidem
9
Sorti.
85 Ad primum argumentumdico quod bene sequitur: 4omneanimal
statL exceptio
81 sic]L . homine]
homoL staret]
esset]L exceptiva
est
L currit]
L .
igitur
82 consequentis
consequentis
igitur]
L differentia
L differentiam
hec dictio]L .
diversitas]
83 diversitatem]

diversitatem]
L differentiam
L virtutem
sed]
duplicem...
84 questionem
scilicet]
dico]L istuddicendum
quiahecsortes
estaliudab
quiaL immo...
idemSorti] . L consequentis]
Bf
homine
add. delevit
hoc] L hec
primam(!) L dico]L dicendum
85 primumargumentum]
L album]L animalalbum
unde] tarnen
48

13:10:38 PM

. Sed hoc est gratia

est homo; igiturnichilaliud ab animali est homo1
materie. Unde non sequitur: 4omneanimalestalbum;igiturnichilaliudab
animaliestalbum9.
86 Pro quo sciendum est quod
quandocumque predicaturinferiusde suo superiori universaliter
aut convertibilede convertibilisuo, affirmativauniversalis infert
universalem negativam in qua predicatum removetura quolibet
alio a subiecto.
Unde bene sequitur: 4omneanimalesthomo;igiturnichilaliud ab animali
. Similitersequitur: 1omnishomoestrisibilis
esthomo9
; igiturnichilaliudab
4
' Tamen non sequitur: omnishomoestanimai; igitur
homineestrisibile
9
nichilaliud ab homineest animal . Nec etiam sequitur: 4omnishomoest
. Nec potestista consequentia
estalbum9
albus; igiturnichilaliudab homine
tali modo ostendi sicut alia consequentia est ostensa.
9
4
87 Ad aliud dico quod in ista: Sortesest aliud ab hominestat iste
'
terminus 4homo
universaliter,ita quod sequitur: 'Sortesest aliud ab
. Ad argumentum in contrarium
homine;igiturSortesest aliud a Sorte9
dico quod hec non est propria: 4Sortesestaliud ab hominepreterquam
a
. Nec a quolibet terminostanteuniversaliterpotestfieriexceptio.
Sorte9
Sed oportet quod stat universaliterratione negationis libere vel ratione actus distributionis.
88 Dubitatur nunc quare talis propositio 4tantum
homocurridicatur
in
exclusiva
cum
omni
tali
quam inclusiva,
magis
propositione sit
aliquid inclusum et opposita illius excludantur; quare magis tunc
denotaturab exclusiva quam ab inclusiva. Dico quod hoc est quia hec
9 de suo officiosolum
dictio 4tantum
importtexclusionem sive remotionem predicati ab aliis ab incluso, sed non attribuitpredicatum
subiecto. Unde hec: 4tantumhomocurriexponitur sic: 4homocurritet
nichilaliud ab hominecurri. Unam [L 125 vb] exponentem habet ratione dictionis exclusive, ut istam: 4nichilaliud ab hominecurri; sed
L . suo] . L universaliter]
. L aut]L
86 predicatur]
uniformiter
alia(!) . L universalem]
L omnishomo
vel suo] . L affirmativa]
L omnerisibile
L omnihomine
estrisibilis]
esthomo etiam] . L homine]
talimodo]L . alia...ostensa]
L erit(!) aliaconsequentia

L omnihomine prius
87 quodin ista...in contrarium
dico]L . homine]
distributionis
vel ratione
ratione]L respectu negationis...
distributionis]
libereL
negativis
L .
L . solum] . L predicati]
88 nunc] . L cum...inclusiva]
ab] UB . L non] . L attribuit]
L attribuitur
unam...habet]unam
L et hoc est habet]L habetur
istam]istaLB habetratione]
exponentem
L subiecto

ratione
habetrationem
L homocurrit]
habetur
49

13:10:38 PM

istam: ' homo curri habetur ratione preiacentis, quoniam hec est
preiacens: 'homocurri.
exclusiuarum
{De conversione
>
89 Circa conversionem exclusivarum potest dubitari an aliqua
exclusiva habeat converti. Dico quod exclusiva proprie non habet
converti, quia conversio principaliterordinatur ad sillogismum,sed
exclusiva non est sillogizabilis. Verumtamen si velimus convertere
tales propositiones, debent converti in universales de terminis
'
transpositis.Ut ista: tantumhomocurrihabet sic converti: 'omnecurrensesthomo et hec est conversio per accidens, quia mutaturquantitas, nam prima est indefinita,secunda est universalis.
90 Tu dicis: in conversione per accidens non est mutua consequentia. Dico quod aliquando est mutua consequentia in conversione
'
'
per accidens. Sicut patet in ista: Sortesesthomo convertitursic: 'igitur
' Et hec est conversio per accidens. Et tamen sequitursic
homoestSortes
et econverso.
' hec dicta sufficiant.
De hac dictione 'tantum
{De hac dictione'solus')
91 Sciendum quod hec dictio 'solus' convenitin signification cum
hac dictione ' tantum*
. Sed quia hec dictio *solus' nomini semper additursubstantivo,ideo | excipiendo actum a nomine vel passionem ab
opposito nominis, quia eius officiumest ex re passivi t; idem enim
4
significai quod non cum alio', sicut dicitur a Prisciano.1 Ex quibus
manifestumest quod non valet hec:
' tudas unumsolumdenarium

etnonhabesunumsolumdenarium
das quodnonhabes' ,
igitur
sed commutaturad aliquid in quid, immo debet sic concludere:
'
das utnonhabes' .
igitur
89 aliqua]L . habeat]debeatLB dico]L dicendum
principaliter...
ad]L
dicitur
velimus
. L propositiones]
LB deprincipaliter
propter
convertere]
L . habet]L debet hec] L .
bentconverti
add. L in universalis]
quia]L et nam]L .
ista]
90 in conversione...
L consequentia
conversione]
mutuaestnonconversio
L istis sicigitur]
. L conversio]
. L tamen]LBC
91 Sciendum...
ut non habes]L . exsipiendo
(/) L dicitura Prisciano]
L
excludere
dicendum
in postremo
(!) L concludere]
1 Cf.Arist.,Soph.El. 178b1-2.
50

13:10:38 PM

9
'
92 [ 85] Solus differta signo precedentieoquod per hanc dic4
tionem tantummaior precisio importaturquam per hanc dictionem
solus'. Sicut
patet, si eorum significationesexponantur in aliquo alio
'
'
Et in alio
, tantum tantsoulement.
ydiomate; sicut hie: solum': soulement
9
differunt eoquod hec dictio 4tantum potest indifferenteraddi
adiectivo vel substantivo, sed hec dictio 4solus9 solum substantivo.
Ideo, quia in significaiione et officioconveniunt, regule date de hoc
9 sunt hic
dictione 4tantum
supponende.
93 Circa officumhuius dictionis ' solus9 est sciendum quod
quandocumque in aliqua oratione sunt duo signa officialiavel
idem bis sumptum, distinguendaest oratio ex eo quod una dictio
potest includere aliam vel econverso.
94 Sicut patet in hoc sophismate. Sit ita quod quilibet homo alius a
Sorte videat seipsum tantumet quod Sortes videat omnem hominem.
Queritur de hoc sophismate: SOLUS SORTES VIDET OMNEM
HOMINEM. Probatur sic. Sortes videt omnem hominem. Et nichil
aliud a Sorte videt omnem hominem. Igitur sophisma verum. Im
; igitursolus Sortesvidet
probatur sic. Sequitur: sophismaest verum
. Consequens falsum; igiturantecedens.
Platonem9
95 Ad sophisma dico quod hec est distinguenda: isolus Sortesvidet
ex eo quod hec dictio ' solus9 potest includere hoc
omnemhominem9
9vel ab eo includi. Si includat hoc
4omnis
, sic [L
signum
signum 'omnis9
126ra] vera est et tunc immobilitaturdistributioimportata per hoc
. Et tune non sequitur: 1solusSortesvidetomnem
hominem;
signum 'omnis9
solus
Platonem9
sed
hic
Sortes
videt
est
fallacia
,
igitur
consequentis inter
1nichilaliuda Sortevidetomnem
sic:
hominem
; igitur
negativasexponentes,
'
nichilaliuda SortevidetPlatonem9
, quia sequituraffirmative:aliuda Sorte
videtomnem
hominem;
; et non econverso.
igituraliuda SortevidetPlatonem9
precedente
92 precedenti]
L Sicut] ut L exponantur]
L exponerentur
aliquo] . L hic]L patet solum] solusL tantsoulement]
L tansoulement vel]L et date] dicteL hic]L .
93 oratione
L signa]L . distinguenda]
sumuntur
L
sunt] propositione
includere]
excludere
L
distinguendum
94 sicut] ut L ita] . L homo] . L seipsum]L se omnem
LBChominem
etc.L sequitur...
hominem]
(/)omnes sophisma
verum]
verum]
solussortes
L igitur
videtomnem
hominem
. L
antecedens]
95 hec] . distinguenda]
LB sic add.L videtomnemhominem]
L etc.
sic] tuncL distributio]
et]L etiam videt...
L distinctio
.
sortes]
L hic]hec . L
51

13:10:38 PM

96 Si autem distributio importata includit exclusionem, sic est

, quia ex hoc
falsa; et tune est iste sensus: omnishomovidetsolumSortem
sequitur quod Platonem videt solus Sortes. Et rationes procedunt in
suis viis.
<Dubitatio>
97 Dubitatio est quam multiplicitatemoperatur dicta distinctio.
Potest dici quod est fallacia figuredictionis ex eo quod provenitex
diverso modo supponendi, quia secundum quod li *solus9includithoc

signum omnis' iste terminus'homo' stat immobiliter.Sed secundum

'
'
'
quod li omnis"includitli 'solus', sic li hominemstat mobiliter.
98 Preterea. Potest dici quod ista distinctio operatur fallaciam
amphibologie ex eo quod provenitex diversa constructione.
99 Per hanc distinctionem solvitur hoc sophisma. Sit ita quod
quilibet homo alius a Sorte videat seipsum tantum [ 85rb] et quod
Sortes videat se et omnem alium hominem. Tunc proponitur hoc
SOLUS SORTES. Prosophisma: A SOLO SORTE VIDETUR
'
batur sic. Utraque exponens istius exclusive est vera, scilicet a Sorte
'
solusSortes'. Igitur exsolus Sortes et 'a nulloalio a Sortevidetur
videtur
clusiva vera. Improbatur sic. A solo Sorte videtursolus Sortes. Igitur
solus Sortes videt solum Sortem. Consequens falsum; igitur
antecedens. <Falsitas consequentis patet) quia ex consequente sequitur quod Sortes videt solum Sortem; sed hec est falsa, quoniam
Sortes videt alium a Sorte; igiturnon videt solum Sortem.
100 Ad istud est dicendum quod hec est distinguenda: ' a soloSorte
solus Sortes'ex eo quod li 'solus' potest includere li 'solo', vel
videtur
econverso. Si li 'solus' includat li 'solo', sic est falsa; et est sensus: 'solus
L . tuncestiste]L est quia...sortes]
L . Etrationes]
96 importata]
responsiones
etideorationes
(!) L insuisviis]L viissuis
L fallaciam
ex eo] eo L quia]L .
97 dicta]L talis quodestfallacia]
L . li hominem]
L .
li]L . secundum]
L . fallaciam
LB enimadd.L istadistinctio]
. L potest]
98 Preterea]
ex eo] eo L
L figuram
amphibiologie
amphibiologiam
amphibiologie]
99 sophisma]LB Aliud sophismaest li solo sortevidetursolus sortesadd.
L homo...sorte]homoL aliusa sorte seipsumtantum]
seipsum se tantum
L quod] L . se...alium] se et alium L omnem tunc] L .
LBC. a
L . prius
. L istiusexclusive]
proponitur...
sortes
sortes]

estverum igitur
L sequitur
antecedens]
sophisma
sorte]L . a... sortes]
L quia
. L quoniamsortes]
L includit
soloincludat]
dicoL solo]L solus includat...
100 Ad...dicendum]
. L est]L .
tunc]L sic solo]L . solus]LB . eta... sortes]
L estfalsa
a solo...sortes]
52

13:10:38 PM

9
9 et tune est altera
'
Sortesvidetur
a solo Sorte
exponens falsa. Si li solo
4
includat li solus', tunc est vera; et est sensus: a solo Sortevidetur
solus
Sorteseta nulloalio a Sortevidetur
solusSortes.Et est affirmativaexponens:
' a soloSortevidetur
solusSortes9
.
101 Unde sciendum quod
si sunt due exclusiones in aliqua propositione,semper illa exclusio
que includit aliam debet exponi, et alia non.
102 Contra illud probo quod hec sit falsa: 4solusSortesvidetur
a solo
Sorte9
solus
videt
.
Sortes
solum
Sortem9
, quia sequitur: 'igitur
Consequens
falsum,quia ex consequente sequitur quod [solus] Sortes videt solum
Sortem, que est falsa. Ista consequentia patet, quia omnis passiva infersuam activam.
103 Huic dico quod hec consequentia non valet. Ad probationem
dico quod activa correspondenshuic passive: ' solusSortesvidetur
a solo
9est ista: 1solumSortem
9et non ista: ' solusSortesvidet
Sorte
videtsolusSortes
.
solumSortem9
( Dubitatio
)
'
9
104 Circa hanc dictionem solus est dubitatio [L 126rb] quando
ponitur in predicato an removeat opposita predicati a subiecto. Sit
igitur mud sophisma: SORTES DIFFERT A SOLO PLATONE.
Quod probatursic. Sortes differa Platone. Igitur Sortes differa solo
Platone. Antecedens est verum; igitur et consequens. Consequentia
patet, quia ad differentiamsuperiorissequitur differentiainferioriset
Plato est superius ad solumPlatonem.Igitur sequitur: ' Sortesdiffert
a
Platone
a solo Platone9.
; igiturSortesdiffert
105 Sed contra. Sortes differta solo Platone. Igitur non differtab
101 in...semper]
L . non]LB debetexponiadd.
LB sophisma
add.L sortes]
sortes
102 illud]L . hec] . L sequitur]
L solus]seclusi
sortes
coll.99,10 que...Ista]L . passiva] activaL suam
passivam
L
activam]
quorespondens
103 hec]L . activa]LBCpassiva correspondens]
(/)
L solus...sorte]L a solosortes
etnon...sortem]
videtur
solussortes
L .
104 quando...predicato]
L . sitigitur
sortes]
LB
illud]L sitistudigitur
add.L probatur
alterum
igitur
sic] L sic probatur
sortes] . L et] L .
consequentia
estsuperius
ad solumsortem
nam
patet] . L quia]LB sortes
sequitursolus sortescurritigitursortescurritet non econversoigituradd.
L superioris]
L prioris
inferioris]
L posterions
et plato-...
.
platonem]
L sequitur...
soloPlatone]L etc.
105 non]L nonnon( /) piatone]
. L differt]
L sortes
piatone]
LB differt
add. sit] estL sequitur]
LBC. ex qua...differt]
L igitur
non et
ultra...
eteadem...homo]
. L
est]L igitur
53

13:10:38 PM

9. Et ultra:
a nulloalio a Platone
alio a Platone. Et ultra: 'igiturdiffer
4
igiturestidemcuilibetalii a Platone'. Per hoc potestprobari quod Sortes
a
a Platone;igiturdiffert
sit omnis homo, quia <sequitur); ' Sortesdiffert
solo Platone'; ex qua sequitur quod Sortes non differta Cicerone; et
. Et eadem ratione est alius homo.
ultra: igiturSortesestCicero9
a solo
106 Ad sophisma dico quod hec est distinguenda: ' Sortesdiffert
9
9
4
Platone ex eo quod [B 85 va] li a solo Platone potest precedere hoc
verbum ' differvel subsequi. Si prcdt, sic est falsa; et est sensus:
Si subsequatur, sic est vera; et est sensus:
Sortesa solo Platonediffert.
' Sortes
a
ab
eo
est
solus
Plato9; et tunc exponitursic: Sortesdiffert
differt quod
ab eoquodnonestaliudquamPlato. Et hoc est verum.
PlatoneetSortesdiffert
107 Ad probationem dico quod si li la solo Platone9 subsequatur li
'
a
ldifferet construatura parte post, sic bene sequitur: Sortesdiffert
.
a
a
si
solo
Platone1
Sed
construatur
Sortes
Platone;igitur
parte ante,
differt
a soloPlatone
a Platone;igiturSortesdiffert
sic non sequitur: ' Sortesdiffert
',
.
sed ' a solo Platonediffer
a solo
108 Ad improbationemdico quod non sequitur ' Sortesdiffert
la
li
solo
a
Platone
secundum
ab
alio
non
Platone
; igitur
quod
differt
9
'
a
Sortes
solo
Platone potest construia parte post. Sed sequitur:
differt
ab eo quodnonestaliudquamPlato9. Ex quo non
Platone
; igiturSortesdiffert
sequitur quod Sortes non differta Cicerone.
EXPLICIUNT

EXCLUSIVE

MAGISTI

W. DE BURLEYE

L hec] . L distinguenda]
dicendum
106 sophisma
dico] hocsophisma
Lca solo
L a solopiatone]
L etc. li a olopiatone]
a solopiatone
distinguendum
quod] qui L plato]L sortes
L li solus subsequatur]
L subsequitur
difL a piatone
veladd.L
fera piatone]
differt
aliud]LB a piatone
L subsequitur
construatur]
sorteL subsequatur]
107 si]L . piatone]
. L differt]
LBCdifferunt
L construitur
sic]L etsic sortes]
piatone]

L . sed
. sortes]
sorteL sed] . L a parte] exparteL sortes]
L .
solopiatone
differt]
V probationem
LB dico] dicendum
L sequitur]
LB quod
108 improbationem]
hoca solosorte(!) construatur
add.
add. li...construi]
L plato]LB vela piatone
EXPLICIUNT...BURLEYE] L .
FilosofiseliInstituut
P.O.B. 9515
2300 RA Leiden

54

13:10:38 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 1 (1985)
Buridan on Mathematics*

J. M. THIJSSEN

Introduction
A historicalreviewoffourteenthcenturyphilosophyshows thatduring that centurytwo ratherimportantdevelopmentstook place in the
treatmentof various topics in natural philosophy. One development,
headed by Thomas Bradwardine (1295-1349) at Merton College (Oxford) began to use mathematical argumentswhen dealing with subjects of natural philosophyin order to gain a betterunderstandingof
them. The otherchampioned by John Buridan (1300-after 1358) and
his Parisian School set out to apply semantic analyses, known as "the
language of supposition", to such subjects.1
Such traditional black-and-white presentation of these developments could give the impression, that Buridan completely ignored
mathematics.Buridan's 1Physical, however, contains a number of interestingpassages in which the author displays a very specificview on
mathematics that perhaps explains why one does not find mathematical argumentsin the furthercourse of his natural philosophy.
This articleis an investigationof all the passages in Buridan' s Questioneson Aristotle's Physicswhere there is mention of geometryand
arithmetic,the two most importantthemes of medieval mathematics.
My discussion is divided into two parts. FirstI will deal withBook VI
* I wantto
drs.C. H.
acknowledge
mydebtto Prof.dr. H. A. G. Braakhuis,
anddr.P. M.J. E. Tummers
fortheir
comments
onthefirst
verKneepkens
helpful
sionofthisarticle.I alsowantto thankH. H. Thijssenforrendering
theEnglish
from
theoriginal
translation
Dutchedition.
1 Thislastexpression
is from
Murdoch
totheapplication
of
(1975)287-88.It refers
thesupposition-theory
toproblems
ofnatural
andevenmoregenerally
to
philosophy,
theapplication
ofall proprietates
A wellknownexampleofa semantic
terminorum.
madebyother
meansthanthesupposition-theory
is thedistinction,
madeby
analysis,
some14thcentury
between
thecategorematical
andsyncategorematical
philosophers,
useoftheterm'infinitum'
whendealingwiththeproblem
natural
(from
philosophy)
oftheinfinitum
andthecontinuum.
I refer
toBraakhuis
(1979)fora further
explanationofsyncategoreumata.
55

13:11:15 PM

q. 1 and 2, and Book I q. 5, containingBuridan's view on geometry.

Secondly I willl discuss Book III q. 17, where Buridan makes his
remarkson arithmetic.Also included is some backgroundinformation
as to Buridan' s suppositiontheory,especially as to the meaning of the
term 'de virtute
sermonis' Finally I shall brieflydiscuss a passage of
VI q. 2 on the division of science.
Buridan's Metaphysics
Buridanon geometry
Buridan' s dealings with geometryshould be seen in the lightof the
fourteenthcenturydiscussion on the structureof the continuum, a
discussion which, in general lines, followed the Aristotelianway of
thinking.2Since Aristotlehad raised the question of the structureof
the continuum in his PhysicaVI, the followinggenerationsconsidered
it as a matterof fact,that the question belonged there; in otherwords
it was a subject of natural philosophy.
However it must be said that in the fourteenthcenturydebate one
also comes across non-Aristotelian elements, as for example the
mathematicalargumentsagainst the view that held that continua are
.3 These argumentswere to prove the incomcomposed of indivisibilia
patibilityof the atomisticstandpoint holding thatcontinua are composed of ultimatelyindivisibile parts and geometry. The way the
argumentwent,was as follows:the assumptionthatcontinua are comrendersa numberof geometricaltheoremsinvalid.
posed of indivisibilia
This cannot be; ergo indivisibilismmust be rejected.4An example of
such theoremis: the diagnal of a square is incommensurablewith its
sides. This is a good example of what is meant by application of
mathematical arguments in natural philosophy. In other words
mathematical arguments play a part in solving problems of natural
philosophy.
mathematice
also play a part in
What strikesme is that these rationes
Buridan's argumentation against atomism although one would not
2 The mostrecent
canbe foundin
ofthemedieval
debateon thecontinuum
survey
Murdoch
(1982).
3 Thesemathematical
from
Al-Ghazali's
seemtooriginate
Metaphysica.
arguments
fromthefactthatDunsScotusmadeuse ofthem.Cfr.
theirprestige
Theyreceived
la basequi permettait,
Murdoch(1974) 19: "...Donc Algazelet Scotfournissaient
etunemultiplication
prodigieuse."
pourainsidire,unelaboration
4 Murdoch
de
a tous, estla tentative
(1974)19: "Au fond,ce qui leurestcommun
et
entrela gomtrie
videntes
ou mmeimplicites
les contradictions
faireressortir
l'atomisme."
56

13:11:15 PM

expect this from the traditional presentation of Buridan' s natural

philosophy. In Buridan' s discussion of the continuum problem
one
the
well-known
1
finds
VI
and
2
geometricalargument
q.
Phys.
of the diagonaliof a square being (in)commensurable with its sides. In
question 2 Buridan asks himselfwhetherlines are composed ofpoints,5
and draws a number of conclusions, one among which is: if points
were indivisible parts (res) a finiteline would be impossible; firstly,
because the composition of an infinitenumber of such points is im6
possible, on groundsof a formerconclusion; and, secondly,because a
composition of a finite number of such points would render the
theoremof the incommensurabilityfalse, since the points of a square,
consistingof fourpoints, would be commensurable with one side.7
Question 2 is in factnothingbut a referenceto a formerdiscussion
of this problem in Book VI q. 1. The question there was whether
points of a line are contiguous.8 Buridan considers two possible
answers. Contiguous points- taken as indivisible res- either forma
line or they don't. Buridan rejects both alternatives,concluding that
points of a line are not contiguous. Briefly his arguments are as
follows:Speaking of points that are at the same time contiguous, and
yet do not forma line is nonsense. On the otherhand, however, con( in
tiguous points forminga line would cause a number of difficulties
convenientia
), of which the firstis the above mentionedcase of the fourpoint-square.9Since the other 'inconveniences' are not relevantto our
case I will not treat of them at this point.
The followingis a briefreconstructionof this argument. Suppose a
square were composed of four contiguous points a, b, and d. The
lines would thenbe ab, be, cd and da. The diagonal would be the line
5 Questiones
ed. Venice1502
ultimam
secundum
lecturam;
superlibrosPhysicorum,
citedas Phys.)VI, 2, f.94rb:"Utrumlinea
Frankfurt
1964)(hereafter
(Reprinted
ex punctis."
componitur
6 The preceding
estquodsi
was(Phys.VI, 1 f.94vb):"Primaconclusio
conclusion
utin
in
linea
finita
infinita
non
essent
in
res
linea
essent
indivisibiles,
puncta
puncta
extofurther
I havefounditnotnecessary
toourarticle
lineapedali."Withrespect
ofthisconclusion.
patiateon thediscussion
7 Phys.VI, 2 f.94vb:"Secundaconclusio
estquodsi punctaessentresindivisibile,
infinitis
expunctis,
nullalineafinita
perprecedentem
quianonexpunctis
componetur
dictain
inconvenientia
necex finitis,
conclusionem,
quiasequerentur
quodprobatur
diameter
alia questione
punctorum
quodquadratiquattuor
(seil.VI, 1), secundum
coste."
essetequalisvelcommensurabilis
8 Phys.VI, 1 f.94rb:"Utrumpunctasintsibiinvicem
in linea."
prxima
9 Phys.VI, 1 f.94rb:"Item,si duo punctasibiinvicem
in lineanonconprxima
et si conut dicebatur,
stiturent
linealem,essentfrustra
aliquamextensionem
inconvenientia."
extensionem
stiturent
linealem,
sequerentur
57

13:11:15 PM

. In the case of contiguityof points thisdiagonal would equal a side.

In the case of non-contiguityof points(when a point can be foundbetween a and c), this diagonal would be commensurablewith one side.
Either case is in contradictionwith the mathematicaltheorem of incommensurability.10
It is evident that this is a clear case of mathematicalargumentation
in natural philosophy. However there are importantdifferencesbetween Buridan' s use of this mathematical argument and the uses by
other authors. Whereas Buridan once only, they use this sort of
11
argumentstimeand again; and secondlyBuridan uses thisargument
in the contextof discussing the question whetherthe points of a line,
when taken as res,are contiguous or not (Book VI q. 1); whereas the
traditionalcontextof introducingand developingthisargumentwas to
prove that a line cannot be composed of points at all, which is quite a
different
thing.12In PhysicaVI q. 2 thismatteris being dealt withas we
have seen. Buridan deems a mere briefreferencesufficientto dispose
of the matter.
The question thatcould be asked next is: whyis it that 'geometrical'
arguments against atomism played such small part in Buridan' s
work.13 Do we seek the answer in Buridan' s alleged neglect of
mathematics, or is it possible to find a more precise answer in the
texts?
10The in footnote
9 citedtextproceeds:"Puta, primosequiturquod diameter
essetequaliscosteilliusquadrati,
quadrati
quodestcontra
geometriam.
Consequentia
invicem
etsintillapuncta
probatur,
punctase tangentia
quadrati
quiaponoquattuor
estab etaliaestbc,tertia
ested,etquarta
a, b, , d itaquodunacostailliusquadrati
estda. Tuncergodiameter
estac ettuncigitur
a et tangunt
se,vel
egoqueroutrum
estaliquidintermedium
si tangunt
se. Tuncsequitur,
cumitasintindivisibilia
sicuta
etb, quodnonconstituunt
maiorem
lineamquama et b, et sicdiameter
estequalis
coste.Si verodicatur
hocnonpotest
esse
quodintera et estaliquidintermedium,
minusquampunctum,
et sicdiameter
eritlineatriumpunctorum
etlatusduorum.
Ideo diameter
eritcommensurabilis
est in
demonstratum
coste,cuiusoppositum
geometria."
11Anexampleofsuchotherpresentation
ofRimini.He
is theonemadebyGregory
the
no
less
nine
detailed
mathematical
atomistic
than
theory.
gives
against
arguments
Cfr.Gregorius
ofRimini(1979)Sent.II, dist.2 q. 2, pp. 279-285.
12Besidesthealreadymentioned
ofRimini,alsothefollowing
philosophers
Gregory
ofthe(in)commensurability
ofthediagonalofa square
usethisgeometrical
argument
cannot
be
withitssides,inordertoprovethata line(andtherefore
alsoa continuum)
DunsScotus
number
ofpoints.Al Ghazali(1933)p. 121.18-30;
ofa finite
composed
(1639)Vol. VI, 1 p. 232; Marsiliusof Inghen(?) (1518) Lib. VI, q. 1, f. 64vb;
ThomasBradwardine
(1957)p. 425-426.
13I mustalsomention
in
ofthecontinuum
thefactthatindealingwiththestructure
mundo
De
celo
et
in
the
libros
De puncto
and
quattuor
Quaestiones
super
(ed. 1965)
at all.
arguments
(ed. 1942),Buridanusesno geometrical
58

13:11:15 PM

Let us have a look at Phys. I q. 5, where the question is at issue,

whether,in orderto have perfectknowledgeof an effect,it is necessary
to have knowledge of all it causes.14 Buridan makes a distinctionbetween the question as stated and its preambula, as to whetherperfect
knowledgeof an effectis at all possible in the firstplace.15
He thinksthat perfectknowledge in a real sense (simpliciter)
is not
possible, except in God where knowledge and causality of realityare
one and the same. Whetherperfectknowledgeis possible is thereforea
matterof human science only, especially demonstrativesciences (seientie demonstrative).
Within these Buridan makes a distinctionbetween
whichis nothing
immediateknowledgeof an effect(scitumimmediatum),
but the conclusionof a demonstration,-and mediate knowledge( scitum
remotum
), which is knowledge of the meaning of the termsin the conclusion. To Buridan this sort of knowledge of a conclusion is central,
since this is the way to gain knowledge of the res.16
Once having made this distinctionBuridan proceeds to his conclusions, ofwhichonly the firstand the second are relevanthere. His first
conclusionis: perfectknowledgecan be had ofthe conclusion 'the sum
of the angles of a triangleequals two square angels', as a scitumimmediatum
, or as Buridan puts it, per modumconclusions,without any
knowledgeof the causes of a triangle. Perfectknowledge of a conclusion will thereforedepend on whetherit is obtained by demonstrations
(<demonstrationes
), where conclusions are drawn in an evident manner
fromevident premisses.17
14Phys.I, 5 f.6va:"Utrumad perfette
sciendum
omnes
aliquemeffectum,
oportet
causaseiusscire."
15Phys.I, 5 f.6vb:"Istaquestiounumsupponit
enimquod
etaliudquerit.Supponit
de aliquo,immode aliquoeffectu,
habereperfectam
et postea
scientiam,
possumus
ad illamhabendam
omnescausasilliuseffectus.
Et
queritutrum
oportet
cognoscere
tarnen
estdubitabile."
suppositum
quamquesitum
16Phys.I, 5 f.6vb:"De supposito
manifestum
estquodsi volumus
loquide perfecto
nichil
nisiDeus,utpatetquintoMetaphysice,
estperfectum
etetiamnulla
simpliciter,
estperfecta
scientia
nisiscientia
si
divina,que estipseDeus. Sedbeneestdubitatio,
volumusloqui de scientiaperfectanon simpliciter
sed in generescientiarum
etcumloquamur
de scientia
demonstrativa
humanarum,
expedit
distinguere
duplex
scitum.Unum scitumpotestvocari'scitumimmediatum'
quod est conclusio
demonstrativa.
Aliudpotest
vocari'scitum
remotum',
quodestressignificata
perterminosconclusionis
etcredoquodnosnoncuramus
scireconclusiones,
demonstrate,
nisiperhoccrederemus
haberescientiam
de illisrebus.
17Phys.I, 5 f.6vb:"Ponoigitur
conclusiones.
Primaestquodad sciendum
perfecte
' trian
istamconclusionem
permodumconclusionis
gulushabettresngulosequales
duobusrectis'nonoportet
scireinspecialiomnescausastriangulorum,
quiaconclusio
sciturperfecte
earnconevidenter
per modumconclusionis
per demonstrationes
etex evidentibus
cludentes
etaliternonscitur
conclupremissis,
perfecte
permodum
sionis."

13:11:15 PM

Buridan' s second conclusion is, thatgeometryalone is not sufficient

to obtain perfectknowledge of the above conclusion about the sum of
the angles of a triangleequalling two square angles. His argumentis,
that geometricalprinciplesnecessary to draw this conclusion and, in
general, all geometrical conclusions are not known per se; and for
perfectdemonstrativeknowledge it is necessaryto know the premisses
per se, or the premisses as conclusions of other premisses that are
known perse. ApparentlyBuridan is of the opinion, that geometrical
principles are not knownper se and are thereforeof a dubious nature
and they will remain so unless other sciences can bring light in the
matter.18
Next Buridan proceeds to illustratethese pointswithexamples. It is
here that his discussion becomes of real interestto my question as to
the reasons Buridan might have had for avoiding geometrical
argumentsin the continuum-discussion.In order to supporthis thesis
that geometrical principles are not known per se, and therefore
dubious, Buridan, very interestingly,takes an example from the
continuum-discussion.In Buridan' s view geometryhas no business
discussing the continuum-problem;in other words it has no business
discussing the question as to whethera body is or is not composed of
indivisibleparts. The only option open to geometryis to simplyaccept
the basis fact(fromnatural philosophy)thata continuumis composed
divisibilia.Establishingwhetherthis is true or not is a matter
of semper
of physics or metaphysics, not of geometry. Therefore geometrical
principlesare not known per se, since geometrycan do littlemore but
lean on resultsof natural philosophyor metaphysics.Were geometry
not to obtain its assumptions on the structureof the continuumfrom
these sciences, all its conclusions would be dubious.19This last remark
is, in my view, of particular importance.
18Phys.I, 5 f.6vb-7ra:
"Secundaconclusio
(seil,
ponipotestquoddictaconclusio
conclusionis
habettresngulos
"triangulus
equalesduobusrectis")etiampermodum
nonscitur
etratiohuiusest,quiaconclusio
nonscitur
persolamgeometriam
perfecte
ut
nisipremisse
sintpersenotevelexpersenotisdemonstrate,
demonstrative
perfecte
est
ubidicitur
Posteriorum
etetiamprimo
quoddemonstratio
Topicorum,
patetprimo
suecognitionis
autex hiisqueperprimaetveraprincipium
exverisprimis
sillogismus
etperprimaintendit
quibusoportet
geometrie
sumpserunt
perse nota.Sedprincipia
et omnesaliasconclusiones
utiad demonstrandum
istamconclusionem
geomtricas
A French
notaperaliamscientiam."
nonsuntperse nota,sedmultadubia,nisifiant
19 maybe foundin Duhem(1954),
of thispassageand of footnote
paraphrase
704-705.
19Phys.I, 5 f.7ra:"Hec ergodeclaro,
dubitabele
estetfuitapudantiquiamagnum
vel non,sedesset
ex punctisindivisibilibus
quos, utrumcorpusessetcompositum
60

13:11:15 PM

It seems to me, that Buridan' s reasoning here is exactlythe reverse

of the reasoning that lies behind 'geometrical arguments'. According
to Buridan natural philosophy and metaphysics establish, whereas
geometryassumes. Natural philosophershowever who reject atomism
on grounds of geometricalarguments,are saying that continua must
be composed of semperdivisibilia
, otherwise geometrical theorems
would no longer be valid. In Buridan' s view one could accuse these
natural philosophers,when theyuse this sort of arguments,of assum.
ing withoutproofthat continua are not composed of indivisibilia
As far as I know, only one 14th centuryphilosopherwas aware of
this vicious cirlce. His name is Thomas Bradwardine. In his Tractatus
de continuoBradwardine rejects indivisibilismon grounds of a great
many geometricaltheorems. Afterhaving done so, however, he asks
himselfthe question, in how fargeometryleans on already established
assumptionsas to the structureof the continuum. He answers his own
question by saying that all traditionalgeometricaltheoremsare yet to
be proven, even though geometrypresupposes that magnitudinesare
.20
composed of some sort of indivisibilia
last
on
this
Exactly
point, however, Buridan seems to hold a differentview. In the textfromPhys. VI q. 2 Buridan argues thatthe incommensurabilityof a diagonal can no longer be proven, if one
assumes that points are indivisibleres.21
From what we have seen it seems evident, thatexactlyin a situation
where it would be quite acceptable to use mathematical arguments,
Buridan makes much less use of them than his contemporariesdo.
One could say thatBuridan, once he has divided sciences into physics,
metaphysics and geometry,is very consistent in taking the consequences of this division, except for that one short referencein Phys.
q- 2.
In summarizing one could reconstruct Buridan' s argument as
follows:It is not the task of geometryto investigatethe structureof the
continuum. Geometry presupposes and assumes this structure in
orderto be able to maintain its theorems.It would thereforebe inconEtillamdubitationem
nonpotest
tractare
insemper
divisibilia.
divisibile
per
geometer
et tarnen
sed tractanda
est per phisicamvel per metaphisicam,
suamscientiam,
ex indivisibilibus,
habetsupponere
nonsitcompositum
quod continuum
geometer
exindivisibilibus,
essent
omnespeneconclusiones
geometrie
quiasiessetcompositum
false."
20Murdoch
Atp. 580n. 47he
outthispointofBradwardine.
brings
(1982),579-580
de continuo.
theLatintextoftheTractatus
gives
21Cfr.n. 7.
61

13:11:15 PM

sistentto use geometricalarguments in physics or metaphysicswhen

dealing therewith the composition of the continuum.
Buridanon arithmetic
I now want to discuss Buridan's view on arithmetic,taking as my
point of departure Phys. Book III q. 17. In order to be able to place
this passage in its rightperspective,we must firstput our attentionto
two aspects of the "Buridan-semantics".
Buridan' s semantics
In the introductionwe have already mentioned the so called Parisian development, which made use of semantic analyses in natural
philosophy.The solutionto philosophicalproblemswas soughtin consideringwhat sortof suppositiona certaintermhad in a certainproposition. Let us thereforefirstrecall to mind some of the main pointsof
Buridan' s suppositiontheory.
22Buridan considersthe distinction
In his Tractatusde suppositionibus
between suppositiopersonalisand suppositiomaterialis.The firstoccurs
when a term in a proposition is used to stand for the thing that it
signifies.By the second is indicated that a termstands foritselfor for
the concept by means of which it is significative.23The suppositio
materialist
simplexof other authors is included in Buridan's suppositio
The second aspect we must discuss is the expression de virtute
sermonis.In the same Tractatusde suppositionibus
Buridan poses as dubium
:
' true or not true de
is the proposition homoestspecies
virtute
sermonis.
From his answer it becomes evident that the whole problemof what a
sermonis
can be reduced to the knowledge
propositionmeans de virtute
one has of the contentsof that proposition{materiasubjecta),because,
afterall, the primaryfunctionof the termsof a propositionis to stand
for their significates,that is, the things they signify.A proposition
sermonis
means thatthispropositionmustbe understood
taken de virtute
22The Tractatus
in a modern
de suppositionibus,
theonlypartoftheSummulae
waspublished
critical
edition,
byReina(1957).
23Reina(1957),2011. 34-41.
24Thes. simplex
semantics.
Fora survey
in 14thcentury
wasa pointofcontroversy
andBuridan,
ine.g. Ockham,
see
ofviewsonthismatter
anda confrontation
Burley
information
on
Pinburg(1972), 143-146and Henry(1981), 361. For further
see Pinborg
s supposition-theory
Buridan'
(1972),139-144and Scott(1966),29-42.
s semantic
can be foundin thecongressotheraspectsofBuridan'
Different
theory
on BuridanbyPinborg
edition
(ed.) (1976).
62

13:11:15 PM

propriamlocutionem
),
according to the proper rules of speech (secundum
that is, as Buridan points out, the words must be taken forwhat they
signifyand not forthemselvesor the concepts connected with them.
The proposition' homoestspecies'is thereforenot true. It would not be
properhowever,Buridan adds, simply(simpliciter
) to call this proposition false,since so many renomatedauthorshave thoughtit to be true.
In Buridan' s way of thinkingone must always tryto establish in what
manner (sensus)a propositionis true or not true.25
and suppositio
sermonis
Buridan does not simplysay that de virtute
personalis are synonymous, a view that Ockham seemed to hold.26
Buridan's view is in accordance with articles of the so called
Ockhamisticstatuteof 1340 in which the question of the truthand unsermonis
is treated.27These articlesreject
truthof propositionsde virtute
sermonis(or
the view holding, that propositions are false de virtute
when
of
are
taken in
fact
that
because
the
false,
they
) simply
simpliciter
to
sermonis
means according the said
the suppositio
personalis.De virtute
statute,that the terms of a proposition must be understood in their
usual imposition,which does not exclude, however, that those terms
can sometimeshave anothersuppositiothan the suppositio
personalis.
These brief remarks on Buridan' s semantic theory may, I hope,
serve to give a betterunderstandingof Book III q. 17.
In thisquestiowhich is part of a larger general discussion on the in, Buridan has a specificconcept of numbers in mind, a concept
finitum
which,later on, will be the cause of some difficultiesin dealing witha
fewbasic rules of arithmetic.
The issue of questio17 is the problem of the existence of infinite
. Suppose a continuum is composed of parts
multitudes(multitudines)
which in turn can be divided again, is it justified to say that for any
given number another, greater number is possible?28 The way the
25Reina(1957)p. 203/204
1.101-148.
atthree
HereBuridan
different
viewson
points
thelastofwhich(1. 123-148)
is hisown.
de virtute
sermonis,
26Atleastthisis thepurport
ofthestudyofPaque(1970).
27Paque(1970),74alsomeanttopointata certain,
almost
literal
between
a
similarity
s Tractatus
thestatute
andBuridan'
de suppositionibus.
the
Apartfrom
passagefrom
factthatthissimilarity
is notrelevant
forourdiscussion,
itmustbe pointed
outthat
else'sviewas the
ofsomebody
unfortunately
Paque hastakenBuridan'squotation
Forthispassagesee Reina(1957),203 1. 116-120:
view,heldbyBuridanhimself.
"Aliaopinio...
perusumauctorum."
28Phys.Ill, 17f.59vb:"Queritur
decimoseptimo
omninumero
utrum
estnumerus
estcompositum
ex indivisibilibus,
maior,supposito
quodnullumcontinuum
semper
estdivisibile
sedquodomnecontinuum
aliasab invicem
etquod
ita,quodhabetpartes
suarumpartium
etiamestdivisibilis
sivehabenspartes."
quelibet
63

13:11:15 PM

problem of infinitemultitudesis formulatedmust be seen in the light

of the traditional definitionof 'infinite number' as non tantusquin
maior.29
Since Buridan' s solution to thisquestion is not relevantto our
discussion, I will not go into it further.What is relevanthowever, is a
where he displays his
number of argumentsin Buridan's determination
we
will
views on arithmetic.On these
concentrate.
with giving an explanation of the
Buridan begins his determinatio
terms dumber', greaterthan' and 'smaller than' 'Number' can be
taken eitheras ratioanimewhich is the act of countingthings(rr),or as
vel
the counted or countable things themselves (pro rebusnumeratis
numer
abilibus).The counted or countable thingscan in turnexisteither
separately, not being part of each other nor being part of the same
whole, or theycan exist as distinguishableparts of one and the same
continuum. This last problem is the issue of Buridan's discussion de
sermonis
(see also later) in the above mentionedquestio.30
proprietate
'Number' stands forcounted or countable thingsbeing part of one
and the same continuum. Together with this definitionwe must keep
in mind Buridan's presuppositionon the structureof the continuumin
the beginningof this questio(f.69vb: . . .suppositio
quodnullumconsemper
ex indiuisibilibus).In the same way the terms
tinuumest compositum
'greater than' and 'smaller than' are taken here in the sense of
or proprieloquendo
, in otherwords these termsare to be taken
simpliciter
as referringto the extension of thingsand to the number of things.31
Departing fromthis definition,Buridan comes to a number of con29Withrespect
tothedistinction
infinite
andthedifferent
actually/potentially
waysin
whichmedieval
this,see Maier(1945),332-333.Atthemophilosophers
expressed
at a dissertation
mentI amworking
on Buridan's
viewson theinfinite.
44Benedifficile
30Phys.Ill, 17f.59vb/60ra:
estloquide istaquestione
de proprietate
sedprimo
Numerus
sermonis,
egoexcludoaliquade quibusnonestmagnadifficultas.
Aristotelem
velestratiodiscretive
animequa numeramus
enimsecundum
aliasresinutquodquattuor
homines
essent
telligendo
quotipsesunt,velestipseresnumerate,
velnumerabilibus,
Item,si numerum
capiamusprorebusnumeratis
quaternarius.
hoc potestessedupliciter.
Uno modoquod solumloquamurde rebusab invicem
existentibus
itaquodnecunasitparsalterius,
necplures
sintpartes
eiusdem
separatim
de partibuscontinui...
Alio modopossumus
totius,ita quod nichilloqueremur
nonab invicem
numerum
prorebusnumerabilibus
separatis
perdiscontinuaaccipere
Etde istis
ab invicem
sicutpartesmagnitudinis
continue.
sedtarnen
tionem,
diversis,
estdifficultas
tractare."
de qua volumus
31Phys.III, 17f.60: "Item,notandum
etproprie
loquendoillud
quodsimpliciter
dicitur
maiusaliovelminus,quodesteo maiusvelminussecundum
magnitudinem
scilicet
autemnonintelligimus
niside maiorivelminori
corpoream...Hic
simpliciter,
etminori
de
velde maiori
secundum
scilicet
secundum
multitudinem,
magnitudinem,
velde paucioribus."
pluribus
64

13:11:15 PM

elusions, which, at firstsight, are somewhat absurd.32 One of them,

his third, is for example: oneness (unity) is greater than binary or
centenary.Take a magnitudo
(a) and divide it into ten parts. The first
two parts forma binary (b). The magnitudo s oneness or unity is
greaterthan the binary, since the whole is always greaterthan one of
its parts. Thereforeeach oneness is greaterthan a binary.33

li

b
(b) is a binary, (a) is a unity. So: omnisunitasestbinariusmaior.
Anotherconclusion, his fourth,is: no number is uneven. This also
sounds strange,but is no problemforBuridan. The resultof a division
of a magnitudointo three parts is a ternary ( ternarius
). The same
can
also
be
divided
six
a
into
, however,
magnitudo
parts, sernary(sersermonis
every number is in facteven.34
narius).Therefore,de virtute
a

a
a =a
12

12

3 4 5 6

32The conclusions
hereare: 1) 4'...quod nullaestunitasinnotbeingdiscussed
estternarius
et centenarius";
binarius
omnis
divisibilis";
5) "...quod
2) "...quod
nullum
equalealicuiestinequalealicui,sedomnealicui
equaleestinequaleetnullum
equaleest alicuiinequaleet econverso";6) "...quod non suntplurespartesvel
veleconverso";7) "...quod nullatria
in lineab quamin eiusmedietate,
pauciores
estalio numeromaiorsecundum
suntpluraduobus"; 8) "...quod nullusnumerus
multitudinem".
33Phys.Ill, 17f.60ra:"Tertiaconclusio
maioret
estquodomnisunitasestbinario
indicta.Si ergotuvisponere
secundum
centenario,
quiaomnisunitasestmagnitudo
Sitillamagnitudo
contradietamuniversalem
conclusionem:
stantiam
b, quamdicis
etillahabetdecern
nonesseternario
decimas,
maiorem,
quarumtresprimesuntterestmaiussuaparte
b estmaior,quiaomnetotum
narius.Sedilioternario
magnitudo
etmillenario.
b. Etitaposset
estparsmagnitudinis
etilleternarius
arguidecentenario
sunt'binariusestcentenario
Et ita manifestum
estquod isteconcedende
maior',
'binarius
estcentenario
velternario
equalis'ethuiusmodi."
34Phys.III, 17f.60rb:
conclusionem
"Tuncegoponoquartam
quodnullusnumerus
estpar,ergo
estimpar.Dicosemper
de numero
quia omnisnumerus
magnitudinum,
sit
estimparsecundum
dietam
numerus
Quodautemomnisnumerus
significationem.
est
estsenarius,
quiaomnisternarius
quiestpar.Ergoomnisternarius
parprobatur,
65

13:11:15 PM

These two, and ther analogous conclusions, clearly show the way
Buridan thinks.He takes the term 'numerus' in itssuppositio
,
personalis
' stands for res. These resare
in which ' numerus
either
the
alternately
whole or its parts, a concrete magnitudo.It also becomes clear, that
Buridan, when taking a statement de virtutesermonis(in our case
'numerus')means thatthe termmustbe taken in thesuppositio
personalis.
He is aware of the fact,however,thathis conclusionsare contraryto
arithmeticalassumptions,at least to some ofthem. He remarksforexample, that his conclusions are not in agreement with the following
two mathematicalprinciples:firsta unityis indivisible;and the second
principle: numbers can be divided into even and uneven.35
The firstprinciple contradicts Buridan' s firstconclusion, stating
that no unityis indivisible,but can be divided into parts, and they,in
turn, can be divided again.36 The validityof these and the otherfour
conclusions of thisquestiois directlydependent on the truthof the first
formulation
conclusion, which, in turnis reallynothingbut a different
of the presupposition made in the beginning of this questio
: no continuum is composed of indivisibilia.37
In what followsBuridan deals withthese contradictionsbetweenhis
own conclusions and those of arithmetic.Again he sets out with a
semantic analysis of ' numerus
', which must be seen in the lightof his
formeranalysis of the term 1numerus'
. This term stands for( supponit
)
thingsin reality,implyingthattheyare counted or countable, in other
words, implyinga concept in the intellect( ratioanime).38
omnisquinarius
estdenarius,
est
qui estpar,etsicomnisquinarius
paret similiter
aliis.Ergoomnisnumerus
numerus
estnumerus
par. Et sicde omnibus
paret sic
esseconcedendum
de virtute
nullusestimpar.Hoc videtur
sermonis."
35Phys.Ill, 17 f.60va:"Istisconclusionibus
viderequomodoprinpositis,
oportet
inarithmetica
etconclusiones
ibidemprobate
etplurima
cipiasupposita
sepedictaet
ab Aristotele
debeant
videntur
contrariali
supposita
intelligi,
que omniaetsimpliciter
conclusionibuspredictis. Supponit enim arismeticus unitatem esse
indivisibilem...Item
arismeticus
dividit
numros
inparesetimpares,
etrepu
tatmembradivisionis
noncoincidere,
quia diffinit
'par' et 'impar'diffinitionibus
repugnanet pernonsic
tibus,scilicetperdividiin partesequalesnullaunitateremanente
dividi."
36Phys.III, 17f.60ra:"Primoconclusio
estquodnullaestunitasindivisibilis;
immo
omnisunitasestdivisibilis
etetiamquelibet
parseiusdivisibilis.
Egoenimnonloquor
et partibus
niside magnitudinibus
earum."
37Cfr.footnote
28.
38Phys.III, 17 f.60va/b:
istanotandum
estcumdiligentia
quodisteter"Propter
rebusab invicem
minus'numerus'
distinctis...et
connotai
quod
supponit
propluribus
illamultasintnumerata
velnumerabilia,
sintscitavelscibilia
scilicet
quotsuntperraanimediscretum,
scilicet
etintelligere
donemsiveperconceptum
quoanimaintelligit
ab invicem.
Etsicisteterminus
connotat
illapluradiscrete
etdivisim
'numerus'
potest
66

13:11:15 PM

It seems, however, that Buridan puts a differentemphasis on the

' as resnumerate.
elementsin his semantic definitionof ' numerus
Earlier
the emphasis was on res, and the conclusions were accordingly,
whereas now he puts the emphasis on numerate
, that is on the countabilityofthose res.With thisdifferent
emphasis in mind he takes a second look at those two principlesof arithmetic.
Apparentlyunity( unitas
) can be conceived in two different
ways by
the intellect(anima). One way is as being composed of differentparts
and understoodin termsof its parts, thus making a multitudo
out of a
Here
is
conceived
of
means
a
of
discretivus
,
unity.
unity
by
conceptus
which means: one is aware of the fact,that this unitycan be a binary
or a ternaryetc. at the same time although with everyn-ary in which
thisunityis being divided a different
discretivus
is necessary.39
conceptus
Anotherway of conceivinga unityis by way of a conceptus
.
privativus
This unityis conceived as one and is no longeropposed to plurality.In
9 is one
this way every unity is indivisible, in the same way as ' homo
because he cannot be divided into different'homines'* Buridan adds,
however,thata unity,conceived by means of a conceptus
, can
privativus
stillbe divided, but only into parts that are of a different
nature than
the unityitself.Thus a constellationcan be divided into degrees and
minutes,but not into other constellations.41
talemanimerationem...Ideo
nonconnotat
numerus
sint
quodresproquibussupponit
actu numerate
et scitequot sunt,et ideo non connotatillamrationem
anime
discretivam
sedtanquampossibilem
existere."
existentem,
39Phys.Ill,tanquam
17 f.60vb:"Deindeetiamconsiderandum
estquod,quamvisidemsit
duo et tria et binariuset ternarius,
tarnennon secundumeandemrationem
discretivam
dicitur
duo et dicitur
triaveldicitur
binariusetdicitur
ternarius;
ergo
nospossumus
inoportet
intelligere
quodomnemremunam,que estmultepartes,
discernendo
inter
scilicet
telligere
partes,
intelligendo
quodhecestetillaestethecnon
estilla.Etsicintelligimus
illaspartesessemulta,etcumseimusquodilludestpartes
seimusquodilludestmulta."
sue,concludendo
40Phys.III, 17 f.60vb:4'Deindeetiamilludpossumus
conceptu
intelligere
privativo
scilicet
non
discretivo,
opposito
conceptui
quo intelligimus
ipsumaliquapluralitate
essepluraet secundum
illamrationem
dicimusipsumesseunumunitateopposita
huiusmodi
uthominem
sedipseet
unum,quia nonestplureshomines,
pluralitati,
aliushomoessentplureshomines...Ideo ad istumsensumomneunumvelomnis
unitasestindivisibilis."
41Phys.III, 17f.60vb:"Et ad talemsensum
concedendum
est,quodomnisunitasest
in pluraminoravel sibidissimilia
aut diverindivisibilis...,
quamvissitdivisibilis
simodese habentia.Signumenimin celononestdivisibile
in signa,sed benein
gradusin gradus,sedbenein minutaetc."
gradus,
Fromthequotedpassagesitis evident
thatby'unitas'Buridan
meansarithmetical
unitasandnottranscendental
unitas(unumtranscendental)
. Buridanspeaksin the
samewayinMetaphysics
omnemensurabile
mensuratur
X, 1 (utrum
uno),ed. Paris
1518(Reprint
Frankfurt
a. Main 1964)f.61r: Multitudes
aremeasured
byunities,
67

13:11:15 PM

The conclusion is that on a conceptual level- that is fromthe point

of view of the term's connotation- thereneed not be a contradiction
between Buridan's conclusions and the firstprinciple of arithmetic.
From the point of view of a certainratioanimeone can conceive a thing
as one and indivisibleand fromanotherratioanimethat same thingcan
be conceived as an n-ary and thus as a plurality(pluralitas
).42
The ratiodiscretiva
, however, by which one conceives forexample a
ternary,is differentto the one by means of which a binary is conceived. Thereforethe same thingcan reallybe a binaryand a ternary
at the same time, provided thatthe terms'binary' and ' ternary*stand
forthe same resin reality.The terms'binary' and 'ternary',however,
correspond with differentrationesin the intellectand on this level a
binary is not the same as a ternary.43
After this Buridan has no problem with the second principle of
arithmetic.Accordingto a certainratiouneven numbersdo exist; fora
number can be called uneven, when the ratiodiscretiva
sees an uneven
number of unities, that is: a number of unities that cannot be divided
into two equal parts. De proprietate
sermonis
, however, no number is
since
number
is
even.44
uneven,
every
One is led to believe, that Buridan' s supportof the second principle
of arithmeticis due to the emphasis he puts on the exclusive nature of
thatcannotfurther
be dividedintopartsthatareofthesamenatureas theunity.
Whentherearetenpeoplein a room,oneknowsthateveryobjectin thatroomis a
humanbeing,becausenoneofthoseobjectscanbe dividedintomorehumanbeings.
Whenontheotherhand,onelooksat an objectfrom
different
ofview(discrepoints
inthatcase(justas inhisPhysics),
alsoconcludes
thenBuridan
thatforexamtiones),
a certain
andthatthis
plea linelookedat from
pointofviewofitsparts,is a binary
sameline,from
another
As faras I cansee,there
isno
pointofview,canbe a ternary.
ofan unumtranscendentale
in theworks
ofBuridan.
concept
42Phys.Ill, 17f.60vb/61ra:
"Deindeulterius
considerandum
estquodeandemrem
secundum
rationes
discretivas
suarumpartium
valdediversas,
possumus
intelligere
namaliaestratiosecundum
inter
medietates
lineeb, etaliasecunquamdiscernimus
intereiustertias."
dumquamdiscernimus
43Phys.Ill, 17f.60ra:"Et tarnen
nonobstat
etternarius,
quinidemsitbinarius
quia
nonimpediunt
rationes
terminorum
si terminus
diverse
veritatem
sive
propositionis,
termini
nulladuosunttria,
supponant
proeodem.Dicamergoquodad istumsensum
discretivam
eandemrationem
dicuntur
duo secundum
quia nullasecundum
quam
dicuntur
triaveleconverso."
44Phys.Ill, 17f.61ra:"Dicamergoquod,licetsimpliciter
etdeproprietate
sermonis
sitimpar,quia omnisnumerus
estpar. Tamenad istumsensum
nullusnumerus
interquas discernit
ratiodiscretiva
unitatum
dicitur
numerus
impar,quia rationes
talisnumerus
suntimpares,
dividisuffisecundum
quamdicitur
quia nonpossunt
contineat
illarum
in duas partes,quinuna illarumpartium
cienter
pluresrationes
diceremus...
sensum
nullum
unitatum
paremesseimparem."
quamalia.Etad istum
68

13:11:15 PM

bethe ratiodiscretiva
, forone must admit that it is truethata magnitudo
divided
into
three
a
ratio
discretiva
can
also
be
into
divided
parts by
ing
six parts, so that nullusnumerus
sit impar. On the otherhand, however,
also
since
it cannot be said that threeis six at
uneven numbers
exist,
the same time according to one and the same ratiodiscretiva.
The question is, what conclusions can we draw fromthissecond example? In the firstplace it seems that Buridan, being a semanticus,
sermonis
and that, according to
prefersanalyses of termsde proprietate
him, arithmeticdoes not provide such analyses. In situations where
semantic analyses seem to be contrary to principles of arithmetic
Buridan prefersto stick to his own view, even when it goes against
every mathematical assumption. A good example is Buridan' s statesermonis
mentthatdeproprietate
(the proper meaning of the terms)there
are only even numbers. In the second place it seems that Buridan
means by deproprietate
sermonis
that a term is to be conceived as standing forits denotatum, in otherwords, that the termstands in the sup: it stands for the concrete things out there (res).
positiopersonalis
Buridan's use ofthe term'numerus'in the suppositio
, fortheres
personalis
numerate
renders
his
conclusions
not
the
two
,
only
(and
mentioned)
contraryto the principlesof arithmetic.When, on the otherhand, using the same termas to itsconnotation,i.e. on the level of the concepts
in the intellect, Buridan accepts the principles and conclusions of
sermonis.*5
arithmetic;but this acceptance is not de proprietate
The objectsofmathematics
Buridan' s views on arithmeticas presented above can be seen in
relationwithwhat otherauthors have said about mathematics.A. G.
Molland, forexample, has pointed out, that Albertus Magnus in his
discussion on the infinitum
says that geometryhas imaginarythingsas
object and not thingsthe way theyare in reality.46In Buridan*s opinion and in that of Albertus, it seems, mathematical objects exist only
on an intellectuallevel.
Albertus makes this remark on the object of mathematics with
Aristotle'sPhysics
, Book III (206 b 16-27) in mind. Aristotlesays there,
that the thesis stating the possibilityof ever increasing magnitudes
cannot be held, since thiswould implythe existenceof an actual, con45Itmustbe mentioned,
thatBuridan,
as a rule,doesspeakoftheappelatio
ofa term
toindicate
cfr.De Rijk(1976).
itsconnotation,
46Molland(1981),470-471.
69

13:11:15 PM

crete infinitum.
This statementof Aristotleis a problem forAlbertus,
because mathematicsworkswithinfinitemagnitudes. Mathematicians
can imagine lines as long as they want to. In other words for each
given line they can conceive another that is longer.47Albertus solves
this problem by pointingout, that mathematicians,when it comes to
the infinitum
(and also the constructionof figures) operate secundum
and not according to the way thingsare in reality,where
imaginationem
there is really no need foraccepting such actual infinity.48
Walter Burley (1275-after1344), one of Buridan's contemporaries,
is anotherauthorwe may quote. He also commentson the above mentioned passage of Aristotle'sPhysics.*9
For a good understandingof Burley and Albertuswe need to know
what Averroes thinks on this point, because Burley oftenexplicitly
quotes him. A strikingsimilarityalso exists between Albertus' views
and those of Averroes, although Albertus, unlike Burley, does not
referexplicitlyto Averroes. Averroes' influenceon Albertus' Physics,
however, has received little attention in the literatureto this date.
Albertus' objection to Aristotle's text appears to be the same as
Averoes' objection: geometrycan indeed, forany given line, conceive
of a line that is longer; and thus in geometry, an addition of
magnitudes can go on indefinitely;and thus one is led to believe that
in geometryan actual infinityis being assumed.50
47Albertus
MagnusPhys.III, tr.II c. 17(Borgnet
235a/b):"...verumenimestquod
essein augmenti
extensione
quoddaminfinitum
ipsi(seil,mathematici)
supponunt
esseinfinitum
secundum
modum:
licetenimnosnegamus
perextensionem
quemdam
imacontinuae...,tamennon negamus,quin poni possitsecundum
quantitatis
adeo magnaquantamvolumus
earnhabere:et hocvocantinquantitas
ginationem
mathematici:
finitum
linea,cui nonaccipiamus
quia nullaadeo magnadescribitur
earnhaberead demonstrandum
si volumus
aliquid."
majorem
48Albertus
nonindigent
m
Magnus,op. cit.,loc.cit.(Borgnet
235b):"Mathematici
infinita
secundum
sua scientia
actum,quia nonaccipiunt
quantitatem
magnitudine
et procedunt
secundum
secundum
esse,sed secundum
potestatem
imaginationem,
reiimaet ngulos,etnonsecundum
potestatem
componentis
figuras
imaginations
ginatae."
49Thisis contrary
where
ThomasAquinas,andalsoJohnBuridan,
to,forexample,
on themethod
ofmathematics
in theircommentary
on
thereis no suchexpatiation
Phys.206b, 16-27.
50In thefollowing
it willbecomeevident
howsimilar
his
passagesfromAverroes
viewsarewiththoseofAlbertus.
Averroes,
Phys.III ed. Venice1562-1574
(Reprint
a. Main,1962)f.ll4ra:"Sed esthiequestiononmodica,quemadmodum
Frankfurt
ad
estaccipere
enimunumprincipiorum,
est,quoniampossibile
que ponitgeometer
etiamponit,quoniampossibile
estacomnem
linemlineamminorem
illa,similiter
ilia.Additio
ininmensure
procedet
igitur
ciperead omnemlineamlineammaiorem
sicuteiusdiminutio."
finitum,
70

13:11:15 PM

This is not the case however. According to Averroes geometryand

natural philosophy look at mensurain a differentway. All geometry
says is that one can imagine such an addition of magnitudes,whereas
natural philosophywould go one step furtherand assume a real infinity. Such an infinityis rejectedby Averroes. When it comes to division
thereis no oppositionbetween geometryand natural
(divisiol
diminutio)
Whether
division is being looked upon secundum
philosophy.
quodestin
as in
materia
as in natural philosophy,or secundum
quodestin imaginatione
case
can
in
this
in
either
division
on
sense,
indefinitely,
geometry,
go
that for each magnitude there exists a magnitude that is smaller.51
Averroesends his discussion withthe remarkthatall statementsabout
addition of magnitudes, about lines and planes in geometryare pro, and have no existence except in the mind.52
positionsopinabiles
We must thereforesimply conclude that, according to Averroes,
geometrylooks at a number of thingsin a manner differentfromthat
of natural philosophy,i.e. secundum
. It is also evident in
imaginationem
' and '
* have
these texts that ' abstractaa materia
secundum
imaginationem
'
the same meaning and could be seen as opposed to extraanimam'
At firstsight it looks as though Burley's commentaryon this text
fromthe PhysicsfollowsAverroescommentaryratherexactly.A closer
look will show, however, that Burley is giving an interestingtwistof
his own to Averroes' view.
Justas Averroeshe says thatgeometryand natural philosophydiffer
on the addition of magnitudes. He refersto Averroes' solution of the
problem: natural philosophyconsiders a line as a limitationof a corpus, whereas geometrylooks at the same line as an abstractionfrom
51Averroes
estsecunde mensura
enimnaturalis
Phys.III f.114rb:"Consyderatio
in materia.Consyderatio
verogeometriae
secundum
dumquodestfiniset existens
hisduobusmodis,inet cummensura
consyderatur
quodestabstraaa materia,
Convenientia
enimestin
et convenientes.
venitur
secundum
oppositas
dispositiones
siveconsyderetur
secundum
diminuitur,
hoc,quoniamsemper
quodestin materia,
sivesecundum
est,quoniam
quodestin imaginatione.
Propositio
igitur
geometriae
naturalis
ad omnem
linemlineamminorem
estimaginari
illa,etpropositio
possibile
in infinitum.
Et propositio
conveniens
istiestquodlineapotestdiminui
geometrica
estimaginari
dicensquodpossibile
ad omnemlineamlineammaiorem
ilia,estvera.
estfalsa,quiaconininfinitum
verodicensquodomnislineapotest
Naturalis
crescere
ex ea magnitudinem
in actu..."
esseinfinitam
tingit
52Averroes,
additiomensurae,
"Et universaliter
qua utititur
Phys.III f.114rb/va:
estde capitepropositionum
quae suntquasi fundamenta
geometer,
opinabilium,
absqueeo quod suntextraanimam,sicutut, cumimaginatur
quod
geometriae,
et similiter
habentpositiones,
facitlineam...
et quod,cumpunctus
movetur,
figurae
nonsecundum
estsic."
videtur
diminutionem
essesemper
quodextraanimam
ponere
71

13:11:15 PM

matter.53But then Burley poses a dubium

, which is in factnothingelse
but an explicationof the problem. He says thatin geometry,as well as
in natural philosophy,demonstrationsdepart fromtrue propositions.
Thereforeit would be difficultto maintain thatthereis a contradiction
between propositionsof geometryand those of natural philosophy- as
- because eitherfieldhas true
in the case of additio
propositions.54
In an effortto solve this problem Burley quotes Averroes almost
, does not have as proposition
literally: geometry,in its demonstratio
4'for
line
there
exists
a
line
that
is longer", but "it is possiany given
ble to imagine, foreach given line, another line that is longer". It is
not this latter proposition that is refutedin natural philosophy,but
ratherthe first.55
It is interestingto note the way in whichBurley gives
a reinterpretationof Averroes' view in the following: natural
philosophy states how things are in reality(in re), whereas geometry
stateshow theycan be thought;and thus therecan be no contradition
between the two sciences, even though in geometrya thing is being
imagined ( imaginatur
) that in reality (i.e. according to natural

53Walter
Hildesheim/New
York1972)
III, Ed. Venice1501(Reprint
Burley,
Physica
f.80vb:"QuartumnotabileestquodCommentator
movetet solvithieunamquestionemque talisest:sicutestunumprincipium
estacapudgeometriam:
possibile
illa,itageometria
cipereab omnilinealinemminorem
ponittanquamprincipium
estaccipere
ad omnem
linemlineammaiorem
ilia.Estigitur
quodpossibile
questio
ininfinitum
etnegatadquarePhilosophus
ponitdivisionem
magnitudinis
procedere
ditionem
in infinitum,
cumadditioprocedat
in infinitum
sicutetdivisio.
procedere
Istamquestionem
solvitCommentator
modosconsiderandi
naturalis
et
perdiversos
dicensquodconsiderano
naturalis
delineaestsecundum
geometrie,
quodlineaestterminuscorporis
naturalis
existens
in corpore
sedconsideratio
de
naturali,
geometrie
linea est secundumquod est abstractaa materia,quia geometerconsidrt
secundum
abstrahitur
a materia
etcontigit
inmagnitudinem
quodperintellectum
lineammaiorem
telligere
quacumquelineadata."
54WalterBurley,
dubiumexquopropositiones
Phys.III f.80vb:"Secundum
quibus
demonstratores
utuntur
debentessevere,cumdemonstratio
nonsitexfalsis,
necsuphabeatponerealiquamproposiponataliquodfalsum.Nonvidetur
quod geometer
tionem
cuinaturalis
contradici,
nececonverso.
Ergosi geometer
ponatquodinomni
data contingit
naturalis
nonhabeat
maiorem,
magnitudine
acciperemagnitudinem
huiccontradicere,
ettarnen
naturalis
quiaverumverononrpugnt
propositio
quam
estvera."
geometre
55WalterBurley,Phys.III f.81ra:"Ad secundum
dubiumdicendum
secundum
Commentatorem
noncontradicit
nececonverso;
immoproquodnaturalis
geometre,
utitur
suntpropositiones
vere.Undepropositio
positiones
quibusuterque
geometrica,
in demonstratione,
nonestistaquodpossibile
estacciperead
qua utitur
geometer
omnemlineamlineammaiorem
estimaginan
ad omnem
illa,sed estilla "possibile
lineamlineammaiorem
illa". Etnecestvera,necnaturalis
contradicit
huic,sedcontradicit
isti,scilicet
quodomnilineadatapotestesselineamaior."
72

13:11:15 PM

philosophy) cannot exist.56 Burley furthergives an explanation of

A propositio
Averroes' proposiiioopinabilis.56
, as
opinabilisor imaginabilis
is
a
propositionthat contains no contradicBurley sometimescalls it,
ex terminis).57
tions in terms( contradicho
formaliter
It is in Burley's interpretationof Averroes here, that, in my opinion, a development begins to show; a development that will play an
importantpart in natural philosophy in the fourteenthcenturyand
that will resultin the way natural philosophersare going to approach
The imaginarywill be taken as point
imaginationem.
problemssecundum
of departure for the search of reality, and it will not make any difference,whetherthatwhichis being imagined reallyexistsin realityor
not, as long as thereis no contraditionin the formulationof the propositions.58
All thiscould give the impression,that it was some sortof tradition
among medieval philosophers to place mathematical objects in the
realm of the imagination; a traditioncalled conceptualism by A. G.
Molland because of its analogy with the opposition realism/conceptualism in the universaliaproblem.59It is in thissense that,accordingto
prof. Molland, Albertus Magnus has conceptualistictendencies.60
I wonder, however, whetherthis is a true picture of the situation.
Firstly,prof. Molland's examples that are to illustrateAlbertus' conceptualistictendencies only referto certain aspects of mathematicsas
e.g. the addition of magnitudes and the constructionof figures.Only

56Walter
dicitquodsicestvelsicnonestin
Phys.III f.81ra:"Undenaturalis
Burley,
dicitquodsiccontingit
re,velquodsicpotestessevelnonessein re. Sed geometer
ettarnen
estsicimaginan
scilicet
etistanonrepugnant,
quod
quodpossibile
imaginan
sicessein re."
nonestpossibile
57Walter
quenoninquodomnispropositio
Burley,
Phys.III f.81ra:"Intelligendum
suntproEt huiusmodi
ex terminis,
estopinabilis.
formaliter
cluditcontradictionem
dari
datapotest
scilicet
quodomnimagnitudine
imaginatur,
quasgeometer
positiones
facit
lineam.Talesenimproposimaior,etquodpunctus
persuummotum
magnitudo
ex terminis
etideosuntimaginabiles
formaliter
contradictionem
tionesnonincludunt
on thelevelofthe
LikeAverroes,
etopinabiles."
Burley
putsa propositio
opinabilis
ofsucha
definition
heregivesa proper
52). Besides,Burley
imaginary
(cfr.footnote
propositio.
58Cfr.Murdoch(1974),69; (1975),281 and Oberman(1975),409. Williamof
viewson
toHeytesbury's
views.Withrespect
alsohassimilar
forexample
Heytesbury
footnote
65.
thispointCfr.Wilson(1960),25 especially
59Molland(1978),131.ThomasBradwardine
viewon
is an exampleofa realistic
cfr.op. cit.p. 174.
mathematics,
60Molland(1981),467: "...In thismatter
theconveersverymuchtowards
Albert
pole."
ceptualist
73

13:11:15 PM

in these examples Albertuscould be called a conceptualise61The same

is true of Burley and Averroes as we have seen.
But when it comes to primaryobjects of mathematics- such as line,
point, plane- neitherAlbertus, nor Averroes or Burley (nor Thomas
Aquinas), can be called conceptualists at all, since their thinkingis
firmlyrooted in the abstractiontheory,as can be seen in theircommentaryon Aristotle'sPhysicsII 193 b 22 - 194 b 9. As is well known
Aristotleexplains therethatphysicsstudiesobjects "that are separable
in respect of formbut involve matter"; mathematics studies objects
that can be thoughtof as "abstracted fromchange"; and metaphysics
studies objects that "can exist separately".62
All these authors are, like Aristotle, of the opinion, that the
mathematician reflectsupon an object as to its quantity, while abstractingfromperceptiblematter.63From the contextand the way the
term 'abstraction' is used it becomes evident, that these authors see
mathematical objects as ultimately rooted in perceptible reality.
Althoughthe act of abstractionis a mental one, mathematicalobjects
do not therebylose theirtouch with reality,because the nature of that
act consistsexactlyin the fact,thatit is performedupon real, perceptible objects.
In order to put an end to all confusionit would be better,I think,to
avoid the term conceptualism as a characterisationof the status of
mathematicalobjects.
Another question that still needs to be answered is: can Buridan' s
view with respect to primarymathematicalobjects be compared with
the view of the above mentioned authors? To give a satisfactory
answer to thisquestion we must firsthave a look at two otherpassages
in Buridan's work, PhysicaI q. 6 and Metaphysica
VI q. 2. 64
65
Question 6 is a commentaryon Aristotle'sPhysicsII 193 b 22 - 194
61Withrespectto Albertus'
viewsof mathematical
objectssee Tummers(1984)
ch.3.3.
62This quotationis takenfromRoss
viewon
(1955), 350-351.For Aristotle's
mathematical
objectssee forexampleMueller(1970).
63Averroes
Phys.II summa2 . 1 and2, ed.cit.;Albertus
MagnusPhys.II tract.1.
ThomasAquinasPhys.II lect.3 Par.157-165,
ed. Marietti
8, ed.cit.107-110;
(1954),
82-84;WalterBurleyPhys.II, ed. cit.f.42.
64Another
classicalpassageon mathematical
XI. Thereis no
objectsis Methapysics
- as appearsfrom
onthisbookfrom
Buridan
since
thetableof
commentary
available,
- Buridandidnotlecture
contents
on it("non soletlegi").
65Buridanus,
mathematici
ad
Phys.11,6f.34vb:"Queritursextode differentia
sub hac forma:utrumnaturalis
differ
a
naturalem,
sequendoverbaAristotelis
mathematico
diffnit
etmathematicus
sinemotu?"
perhocquodnaturalis
permotum
74

13:11:15 PM

b 9. A comparison of Buridan' s commentarywith that of the other

authors shows, that Buridan does not employ the same cognitive
theory for making distinctions between mathematics and natural
, materiasensibilisetc.
philosophy. One will not find terms as abstractio
Accordingto Buridan the objects of natural philosophyand mathematics are terms,the differencebetween the two sciences being the fact
thattheydeal withdifferent
terms.The objects of natural philosophy,
that
provided
they really belong there, must be defined in terms of
9

9 or the like.66For
lmotusor mutatio
example the term res ( quies) in
natural philosophyis being definedas 'the absence of motionin a subject that by nature is capable of being set in motion'.67 The
characteristicpropertyofmathematics,on the otherhand, is thatnone
9 or 'mutatio9
of its terms is being defined by ' motus
, because, when
measuringmagnitudesand numbersand settingout theirmutual relations, these terms do not enter the picture at all. Four remains two
times two, whetherthose numbers are moved or not.68
The same view is put forward in Metaphysics
VI q. 2. There the
question is being asked, whetherthe divisionof speculativephilosophy
into physics, mathematics and metaphysics is an adequate one.69
Before answering this question Buridan wonders how this division
came about in the firstplace. Whatever the case, thisdivisionwas certainlynot made on groundsof the factthatthese sciences each had different res for an object.70 Buridan seeks the justification of this
66Phys.11,6f.34rb:"Tunc ponoconclusiones.
Primaestquodomnisterminus
ad
scientiam
si perfecte
diffiniatur
ad scientiam
naturalem,
pertinens
proutpertinet
debetdiffiniri
'motus'vel'mutatio'
vel'movere'vel
naturalem,
peristumterminm
'moveri'
velperaliumterminm
insuaratione
istum
terminm
'motus'
implicantem
aut'mutatio',
etc.,autterminos
equivalentes."
67Phys.11,6f.34rb:"Undeisteterminus
huiuster'quies',cumsitprivadorespectu
mini'motus',diffinitur
statim
motusin subiecto
permotum,
quia estcarentia
apto
natomoveri..."
68Phys.11,6f.34rb:"Secundaconclusio
estquodnullusterminus
si
mathematicus,
diffiniatur
precise secundumillam rationemsecundumquam pertinetad
diffinitur
'motus'vel'mutatio',
mathematicum,
perillosterminos
quianichilpertinet
ad rationes
etnumerorum
ad sciendum
mensuras
etpropormagnitudinum
quantum
tioneseorumad invicem
sivemoveantur
sivenon,sivesintin substantiis
mobilibus
sivenon.Ita enimquattuor
essentduplaad duo secundum
rationes
numerorum
si
moverentur
sicutsi quiescerent."
69Buridanus,Metaphysica
VI, 2 ed. cit. f.33va: "Queritursecundo,utrum
et
philosophiaspeculativabene dividaturin physicam,mathematicam
metaphysicam."
70Metaphys.
estundeoriginaliter
VI, 2 f.33va/b:"Sed tuncconsiderandum
proveniattalisdivisio.Etprimo
Et istadivisiononsumitur
ex
ponoistamconclusionem.
distinctione
rerum
extraanimamexistentium,
scilicet
consideratorum
in ististribus
75

13:11:15 PM

threefolddivisionin the realm ofconcepts. These sciencesdifferin that

'
'
they respectivelyreferto 'mobile'y quantumand 'ens'.11
When I compare Buridan' s view on the proper object of
mathematicswith his remarkson arithmetic(our second example), it
occurs to me how consistenthe reallyis. In dealing witharithmetic,as
we have seen, he always speaks of connotationof terms. He seems to
have no problem with mathematical principles, as long as the terms
have their proper connotation. When arithmeticis being drawn into
the realm of reality,in other words, when arithmetictermsare being
used in the suppositio
personalis,then Buridan makes objections.72
By way of conclusion I thinkI can safelysay, that Buridan has a
tendencyto place the objects of at least arithmeticon the level of the
intellect. Mathematics also deals with terms, provided that they are
not taken in the suppositio
, thatis as referringto extra-mental
personalis
reality.
In Buridan' s view the relationofmathematicalobjects to realityis of
a semantic nature and not a matterof abstraction. Everythingpoints
in the direction, that Buridan' s distinctionbetween the reality of
mathematicalobjects and the realityout thereis stricterand more conclusive than it is in the work of the other fourauthors.
Conclusion
The philosophical problem of the nature of mathematical objects
still is an importanttopic in foundationalresearch today.73With this
ex conscientiis,
quoniameedemresin ististribusscientiis
considerantur...Igitur
sideratone
rerumsignificatorum
nonpotestbenediciquodiliadistinctio
sumatur."
71Metaphys.
concludoquod iliadistinctio
VI,2 f.33vb:4'Ideo finaliter
onginaliter
sumitur
ex distinctione
cumenimdebeat
aliquorum
principiorum
incomplexorum,
sumihecdistinctio
ex parterationum
siveconceptuum
ettarnen
nonex partecomnecprincipiorum.
plexorum,
quia necconclusionum
Sequitur
quodex parteincomsedtuncestdifficile
etquarenonitabene
plexorum,
assignare
qui suntillitermini
sunt alii. Ad quod ego dico quod illi terminisunt 'ens', 'mobile' et
'
etiamdistinctionem
ille
Secundum
illorum
trium
terminorum,
quantum'...
(f.34ra)...
tresscientie
contrase invicem
distincte."
ponuntur
Eventhough
inthispassageconcepts
areonthesamelevelas terms,
itstillwouldbe
betternot to use the termconceptualism,
in orderto preventthe possible
insomewayoranother,
wouldgethismathematical
thatBuridan,
misunderstanding,
objectsfromreality
bymeansofconcepts.
72Theterms
from
theconareBuridan'
s own.Itisevident
andconnotatio
suppositio
hereis meantsuppositio
text,thatbysuppositio
personalis.
73Fora survey
ofmathematical
seeforexofthedifferent
viewsonthenature
objects
the
Resnik(1980). Lehman(1979) defends
ampleBeth(1965) and morerecently
thatmathematical
entities
and thatmathematical
theory
objectsare realexisting
comesaboutbywayofsensory
knowledge
perception.
76

13:11:15 PM

in mind I have made an effortto spell out a littlemore some views that
were held in the middle ages.
FurthermoreI have shown, I hope, that Buridan's neglectof using
mathematical arguments in natural philosophy is due to the very
specificview he held on the nature of mathematical objects. In the
first,and more specifically,in the second example we have quoted, it
has become evident,thatmathematics,according to Buridan, does not
make statementson the realityof the res,because mathematicalobjects
level, and thatmathematicsmay therefore
play on an entirelydifferent
not get involved in explaining the realityof those res.Buridan himself
is very consistent in following this course, which is the course of
semantic analyses.
The traditional opposition Oxford/Paris,as mentioned in the introduction,stillremains as it is, but I hope, that I have throwna little
more light on its background, especially with respect to Buridan' s
position in this matter.
Nijmegen
K. U.
Instituut
Philosophisch
List ofcitedworks
A Medieval
Translation
, ed.J. T. Mckle,Toronto
Algazel(1933),Metaphysics.
cumAverrois
Averroes
commentants
, Vol. IV, ed. Venice(Reopera
(156z-74),Aristotelis
a. M., 1964)
printFrankfurt
AnIntroduction
tothePhilosophy
Beth,E. W. (1965),Mathematical
ofMathematics,
Thought.
Dordrecht
termen
H. A. (1979),De 13deeeuwse
tractaten
over
Braakhuis,
, Vol. I,
syncategorematische
Ph.D. thesisLeiden
du monde
: histoire
dePlaton
desdoctrines

Duhem,P. (1956),Le systeme

cosmologiques
, Vol. VII, Paris
Copernic
Vol. 2, Lyons(Reprinted
DunsScotus(1639),In lionsSententiarum
, ed. L. Wadding,
Hildesheim,
1968)
Ariminensis
etsecundum
Sententiarum
, ed. D.
super
primm
Gregorius
(1979),Lectura
Trappet al., Vol. IV, Berlin
andsignificatio
inEnglish
, in: English
Henry,P. D. (1981),Suppositio
Logic
Logicand
C. Kneepkens,
L. de Rijk,Nijmegen
Semantics
, eds.H. Braakhuis,
; ed. Veneti(Reprinted
JohannesBuridanus(1509), SuperoctolibrosPhisicorum
Frankfurt
a. M., 1964)
Frankfurt
a. M.,
Aristotelis
, ed. Paris(Reprinted
Quaestiones
(1518),In Metaphysicam
1964)
tothePhilosophy
Lehman,H. (1979),Introduction
, Oxford
ofMathematics
in derPhilosophie
des 13. und14.
desKontinuums
Maier,A. (1945), Dos Problem
in: Antonianum,
20, 331-368.
Jahrhunderts,
subtillisime
libros
secunMarsilius
vanInghen(?) (1518),Questiones
octo
super
Physicorum
dumnominalium
viam
Frankfurt
a. M., 1964)
, ed. Lyons(Reprinted
77

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, in: Archivefor
Molland,A. G. (1978),An Examination
ofBradwardine's
Geometry
ofExactSciences,19, 113-175.
History
in theThought
, in: Albertus
ofAlbertus
Magnusandthe
Magnus
(1980),Mathematics
1980, ed.J. A. Weisheipl,
Toronto
Sciences.
Commemorative
Essays
in:Articles
onAristotle.
3. Metaphysics
onGeometrical
,
Mueller,I. (1970),Aristotle
Objects,
R. Sorabji,London
eds.J. Barnes,M. Schofield,
: A PhiloandtheContinuum
intheFourteenth
Murdoch,
Century
J. E. (1957),Geometry
Ph.D.
Bradwardine's
Tractatus
deContinuo
, Unpublished
Analysis
ofThomas
sophical
ofWisconsin
Dissertation,
University
au
: Unaspect
durapport
desmathmatiques
etdela philosophie
Mathematice
(1962),Rationes
Ape.Paris
Moyen
deVatomismi
dela
etdveloppement
au basmoyen
, in: La science
gelatin
(1974),Naissance
etpratiques
: thories
nature
, Montreal
: AnAspect
Factors
Character
ofLate
oftheUnitary
(1975),FromSocialintoIntellelctual
Context
Learning
Medieval
Learning
, in: TheCultural
ofMedieval
, eds. J.Murdoch,
E. Sylla,Dordrecht
Medieval
andContinuity
, eds.
, in: TheCambridge
ofLater
History
Philosophy
(1982)Infinity
A. Kenny,
N. Kretzmann,
Cambridge
J. Pinborg,
ZurEntstehung
der
Nominalistenstatut.
desRealittsbegriffs
Paque, R. (1970),Das Pariser
Neuzeitlichen
, Berlin
Naturwissenschaft
imMittelalter.
Ein Uberblick
, Stuttgart.
Pinborg,
J. (1972).LogikundSemantik
on
, Actsof the3rdEuropeanSymposium
(1976),(ed.) TheLogicofJohnBuridan
MedievalLogicandSemantics,
Kopenhagen
di
Tractatus
desuppositionibus
in:Rivistacritica
Buridano,
Reina,M. E. (1957),Giovanni
and323-352.
storiadellafilosofia
12, 175-208
Ithaca
andthePhilosophy
Resnik,M. D. (1980),Frege
ofMathematics,
A Revised
Textwith
s Physics.
Introduction
andCommentaryt
Ross,W. D. (1955),Aristotle
Oxford
's Doctrine
, in: TheLogicofJohn
ofConnotation
Rijk, L. M. de (1976), On Buridan
Buridan
, ed.J. Pinborg,
Kopenhagen
andTruth
onMeaning
, NewYork
Scott,T. K. (1966),Sophisms
Aristotelis
ed. M. Maggiolo,
ThomasAquinas(1954),In octolibros
Physicorum
exposition
Roma
ThomasBradwardine
J. E. (1957)
(1957),cf.subMurdoch,
der
Tummers,P. M. (1984), Albertus
(Magnus)commentaar
op EuclidesElementen
Vol. I, Nijmegen
Geometrien
etquestiones
Aristotelis.
WalterBurley(1501),In Physicam
, ed. Veneti(ReExpositio
Hildesheim,
1972)
printed
: Medieval
. (1960),William
,
Wilson,
Heytesbury
Physics
LogicandtheRiseofMathematical
Madison
etlesconcepts
au 14ime
sicle
dupoint
, in: Medieval
Zoubov,V. P. (1961),JeanBuridan
andRenaissance
Studies5, 43-95

78

13:11:15 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 1 (1985)
Review

Vitae
Sanctae
Wiboradae.
Die ltesten
derheiligen
Wiborada.
Lebensbeschreibungen
kritische
Editionund Ubersetzung
Einleitung,
besorgtvon WalterBerschin
(Mitteilungenzur VaterlndischenGeschichte,herausgegebenvom
Historischen
Vereindes KantonsSt. Gallen 51), Historischer
Vereindes
KantonsSt. Gallen1983,238S. Pr. 40 Schw.Fr.
Wiborada(Wiberat),
DieseneueAusgabederbeidenVitaederheiligen
derRekluse
durchdie berallVerheerung
aus St. Gallen,die 926 den Martyrertod
stiftenden
aus 1680 (spterer
Teildruck
der
Ungarnerlitt,ersetztdie Bollandistenausgabe
VitainMGH Scriptores
derzweiten
Vitavon
ersten
1841,S. 452-457,
4, Hannover
OSB 5, 1685,S. 61-66).Das Verfasserproblem
der
Mabillon,Acta Sanctorum
zu sein(Ekkehart
lteren
Vitascheint
als
jetztwohlgelst
I), ebensowieHerimannus
Vitagesichert
derzweiten
ist.
Verfasser
hatWichtiges
zurFeststellung
derUberlieferungsgeschichte
Berschin
beigesteuert.
derAugsburger
Hs. (A) imJahre1975durch
Dochvorallemdas Wiederauffinden
Der TextistimVergleich
R. Schmidt
hatdieseneueAusgabenotwendig
gemacht.
an zahlreichen
mitderAusgabederBollandisten
Stellenverbessert
worden.Htte
mitGoldastunddenBollandisten
manjedochS. 184nichtbesserhortor
handhaben
stattderhandschriftlichen
knnen
(hortar
Uberlieferung
) zu folgen?
verzeichnet
Im allgemeinen
sinddie Zitatesorgfaltig
worden.Doch lsstsich
Namentlich
die vergilianischen
vielleicht
auf
Spuren(teilweise
Einigesnachtragen.
sindhufiger
als sichaus den Angabendes
demWegederpoetischen
Tradition)
ablesenlsst.IchtrageFolgendes
nach:S. 38 diesultima,
cf.Aen.
Herausgebers
cf.Aen.1,172optata... barena;S. 60 per
illedies;S. 52 litusoptatum,
9,759ultimus
ordinem
pando,cf.Aen.3,179ordinepando;S. 60 ad utrumque
paratus,cf.Aen.
2,61 in utrumqueparatus;S. 68 millenocendiartes = Aen. 7,338: bereits
Stellechristianisiert
undwiein
Hieronymus
(Ep. 14,4)hatdieaufAllecto
bezgliche
aufdenTeufelbertragen;
S. 68 illaimmota
derVitaWiboradae
manens,cf.Aen.
miseri,
10,696ipsaimmota
manens;S. 82 fugite,
fugite= Aen.3,639;S. 138cum
essetmortalibus,
cf.Aen.2,268-9quiesmortalibus
... gratssima;
S.
quiesgratissima
154quidmecogis... loqui,cf.Aen.10,63quidmealtasilentia
S. 198
cogisrumpere;
famavolabat,cf.Aen.7,392und8,554famavolat;S. 230 fervente
opere,cf.Georg.
4,169undAen.1,436fervet
opus.
Horatianisch
istS. 176passiscrinibus
nudis:cf.Horaz,Sermo
1,8,24
pedibusque
derberschwenglichen
pedibusnudispassoquecapillo.Zu S. 112(foliaals Metapher
manHieronymus,
In Isaiam55,1quae nonestin foliisac flore
Rhetorik)
vergleiche
und Gregorius
folianon perquiras.
verborum
Der
Magnus,Ep. 5,53a verborum
iamnavigoin portu(S. 194)schliesst
an: Andr.
Ausdruck
ebensobeiderTradition
: nuncin portuiam
480 (ego in portunavigo)und Sedulius(Ep. ad Macedonium
S. 196 quia sequentium
rerumcertitudo
estpraeteritarum
exhibido
navigem).
inev.1,1(PL 76, 1078C).
Gregorius
Magnus,Horn,
79

13:10:49 PM

Die Belegeder biblischen

oderliturgischen
Reminiszenzen
lassensichebenso
cf.Mt.28,1;S. 44 potestas
vermehren:
S. 42 Vesperesabbatiquaelucescit,
et
ligandi
= Tit.3,5; S. 126in
cf.Mt. 16,19;S. 126perlavacrum
solvendi,
regenerationis
filiorum
Dei receptam,
cf.Gal.4,5,Eph.1,5;S. 140perhecoportuit
iladoptionem
in gloriam
iumintrare
... etitaintrare
in gloriam
suam,cf.Luc.24,26nonoportuit
cordissui = Luc.6,45;S. 146investimentis
ovium=
suam;S. 146de bonothesauro
Mt. 7,15; S. 146 dispergens
dditpauperibus,cf. Ps. 111,9 dispersit,
ddit
S. 156educitur
cf.Ps. 103,14uteducaspanemde terra;
pauperibus;
panisde terra,
S. 212fluentem
cerama facieignis,cf.Ps. 67,3sicutfluitceraa facieignis;S. 228
in tesperantium,
salusomnium
cf.OratiozumFestederh. Monnica:in tesperantiumsalus; S. 230 aspirandopraevenire
et adiuvandoprosequi,cf. Oratiodes
Osternfestes:
quae praeveniendo
aspiras,etiamadiuvando
prosequere.
Die Ubersetzung
verdient
diePrdikate
lesbarundgenau.Nuran einigen
Punkten
knnte
mananderer
denfnfzigsten
Psalmauswendig
Meinungsein.AlsWiborada
sie sichhurtig
lernenwollte(S. 40), "grtete
zurBetrachtung
", aberad meditandum
'
in diesemZusammenhang
"umzu rezitieren1
bedeutet
(siehefrdiesenHebrismus
Thes. L.L. 8,579"de hominibus
Ps. 36,30os iustimeditabitur
eloquentibus";
(=
Prov.8,7 veritatem
meditabitur
loquetur)
sapientiam;
guttur
meum).S. 90 sancta
iacebatwirdvonBerschin
bersetzt:
"die heilige
die
virgoque desperata
Jungfrau,
ist:"vondenrzten
S. 200
hoffnungslos
darniederlag"
(aberdesperatus
aufgegeben").
detestabile
vitium
cuius
cumsitsitissuiamatores
omniaexquirere
terra
avaricie,
potio
etmarisollicitt;
bersetzt:
Berschin
"O du abscheuliches
LasterderHabgier,dessen
Getrnk
seineVerehrer,
sieDursthaben
wenn
, reizt,alleszu Wasserundzu Landzu
Ich mchte
durchforschen"
"O du abscheuliches
LasterderHabgier,
vorschlagen:
davonzu gleich
Durst( = Wachsendes Durstes)bedeutet
das, da das Trinken
, seine
Verehrer
mitdersitisgleichgesetzt
etc." Dass diepotioinBezugaufdieavaritia
wird,
findetsichauch anderswoin der christlichen
Literatur.
Zusammenfassend:
eine
undwohlendgltige
in
schngemacht),
sorgfltige
Textausgabe
(auchtypographisch
dieklassischen
derallerdings
undbiblischen
ZitateundAnspielungen
nichterschpfendverzeichnet
worden
sind.
G. Bartelink

Nijmegen

80

13:10:49 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)
Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard.
Some Criticismsof a Fascinating Venture
L. M. DE RIJK
Some years ago Martin M. Tweedale wrote a book on a quite
fascinatingsubject: Abailardon Universais(North Holland Publishing
Company, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1976). One has no difficultyin agreeingwithTweedale' s remark{Preface,p. ix) that "if and
when a complete historyof logic in the West is written,Abailard's
' to
ideas will appear one of the ablest and most penetratingefforts'
establisha philosophicalfoundationforthe solution of one of the most
intriguingproblems of philosophy,which goes under the label of the
'question ofuniversais'. Indeed, Richard J. Aaron was entirelywrong
in thathe consideredit impossible to understandAbailard' s answer to
this question ( The Theoryof Universais
, Oxford, 1967, p. 13). He even
went so far as to make the general claim that "on the critical side
Abailard is excellent,but when he himselfattemptsto give a positive
theory,he fails to do so". It is however the case that Aaron confined
himselfto using McKeon's translation(dating fromas early as 1929),
which only contains a number of the relevant texts (I, 208-58), and
does not cover the important expositions found in Abailard' s most
mature work on the subject {Log. Nostr.petit.).
Bernard Geyer, the editor of the Log. Nostr.petit., also contributed
to the misinterpretationof Abailard' s answer to the question of
universais. Writingin 1913, he contended that Abailard "on the one
hand combats the view that thingsagree in a resor essentia
; and on the
otherhe says the contrary,thattheyagree in something". In thisway
Geyer originated the opinion that Abailard' s treatmentof the question was obscure and inconsistent. However, in his Untersuchungen
(1933), added to his edition of the Log. Nostr.petit,he revised- for
good reasons- his interpretationto the effectthat he no longer saw
any contradictionin Abailard's discussion of the matter.
Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm
impression that, as a logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a
tremendous achievement. Unfortunately,however, Tweedale, like
81

13:02:46 PM

Aaron and the 'early' Geyer, is on the wrong track in claim'

ing- throughouthis study that the modern interpreterhas to "ferret" Abailard's answers out of "rather obscure passages" (p. 7), and
that he is inconsistent(p. x and passim). Tweedale has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the
point several times and more than once this is due to his defective
knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedlyto my
conclusion.
In writingthis book, the author had two main objectives in mind,
as we learn fromthe Preface.First, "to present in a formeasily accessible to professionalphilosophers,theologians and historiansthose
scatteredportionsof Abailard's logical writingswhich seem to record
a very original scrutinyof the foundationsof logic and in particular
the problem of unversals". Secondly, "to interpretthe textsin a way
that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make
them intelligibleto contemporaryphilosophers." So chaptersI and II
tryto give an insightinto the classical and post-classicalbackground.
The core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III - V ; Chapter VI
contains a comparison between Abailard and Frege.
Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlargingthe modern
scholar's acquaintance with,and admirationof,Abailard as a logician
and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who
has had only a glimpse of the contentsof this rich essay, cannot help
experiencing a kind of thrillon realising that he is meeting in Peter
Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.
However, to writea successfulbook somethingmore is needed. To
my mind the author was heavily hampered in realisingthe two objectives he had set himself,as a result of his poor knowledge of (both
classical and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his
judgment of Abailard' s achievementsis incorrect,forno otherreason
than his inabilityto correctlyread Abailard' s concise language.
To keep this article to manageable size I will confine myselfto a
number of major errors I have found in Chapters III and IV of the
essay on Abailard, although Tweedale's expositionof the doctrinesof
Plato, Aristotle and Boethius and his translationof their words are
sometimes highlyreproachable.
p. 91: in delineating the second 'hard' Porphyrian question,
: "are the
Tweedale (henceforth T.) omits the core term essentiae
essentiae
or
and
incorporeal things(<
)?" The
species corporeal
genera
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13:02:46 PM

short glossary added (pp. 14-5) by T. to his introductorychapter

rendersessentia= 'essence, thing'. Now, T. knows very well that all
authors use 4essentia concretively for 'thing', where
twelfth-century
'thing' stands eitherforsome individual thingtaken as a whole (or the
beingof such an individual) or some individual propertyinheringin
such an individual. It should be noticed that in this connection 'concretive' refersto individualityratherthan materiality.For this reason
I would preferto avoid the ambiguous translation'essence' and rather
renderessentiaas beingin that broad sense which is as loose in English
as is that of the Latin essentia when used by twelfth-century
philosophersand theologians. It is remarkablethat althoughT. is fully aware (see p. 96 ff.;cf. his correctremarkon p. 153) of thissense of
essentiain twelfth-century
authors, he still translatesphrases such as
in
essentia
idem
identitas
, p. 143) as 'identical in essence' (and
penitus
(or
the like, passim) rather than as 'materially identical', as opposed to
'formallyidentical'. Even in cases where 'thing' clearly is the appropriatetranslation,T. gives (e.g. pp. 112, 117, 146, 206, 229, and
on many other occasions) the confusingtranslationessence.
. . . inciperet
: should be: "No doubt thisseems to
pp. 93-4: sedprojecto
have been (Aristotle's) line of thought
(ratio) that he considered the
"
(well-known) ten nouns in which ... etc. T.'s translation is rather
loose for one thing, and definitelyincorrectfor another. The final
sentencecontains the adverb quasi and so could not fail to confuse T.
so that he makes a howler of major importance. The Latin quasi
always has a causal function, even if sometimes this function is
somethingwhich the speaker merely claims, so that quasi comes to
mean somethinglike 'since, in the speaker's mind', and is, accordingly,the equivalent of the English phrase 'as if, 'as though'. In the
ceteris
passage concerned the text runs as follows: ideoqueea superposuit
et
rerum
naturaliter
continentia.
the
of
use
the
First,
quasi prima
digniora
determinativeword ideo, which has been omitted by T. (as single
words are quite oftenignoredin his translations,especiallywhere they
are unfavourable to T.'s interpretation)and refersto the following
quasi ('for that reason that...') definitelyexcludes any possibilityof
takingquasi here for'as though'. Secondly, the 'as though' translation
(found in T. : "he put themover the othersas though
theywere . . .etc.")
implies that Abailard does not share the Aristotelianview involved
here, whereas the contextclearly proves he does. Furthermore,T.'s
translationof the final sentence contains a syntax error and another
major mistake. He links prima to generaand renders quasi prima
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13:02:46 PM

naturaliter
et digniorarerumcontinentia
thus: "as though they were
the
nobler
first
contained
and
things" in stead of thus: "since
naturally
they containthose elements in things(viz. their universal characters)
which are naturally firstand of a higher rank". To take (with T.)
digniorarerumto mean the 'nobler things' implies some sortof mentad
block, if not a general inabilityto properlyunderstand Latin.
p. 108: first,veliein such contexts means just 'to pretend', 'to
accidentia... esse
claim', ratherthan 'to wish'. UndenecSocratespraeter
as
"so
more
exist
should
be
rendered
S.
can
no
withouthis acpotest
cidents." (T. has the quite incomprehensible: "over and about").
nonestmeans: "Consequently he is no basis
Quareeorum
fundamentum
etc." Similarlythe next passage should run: "just as a man is not the
basis for the differences"(instead of the pointless: "there is no man
etc.").
pp. 137-8 : and elsewhere. T. uses invertedcommas ('substantia',
'hic aer') indiscriminatelyboth in cases of autonymous use of a term
and for other purposes. He charges the editor of the Dialctica(who
makes a clear distinctionbetween the autonymous use of words, indicated by invertedcommas on the one hand, and words being used to
stand for genera and species, indicated by italics, on the other) with
inconsistency. However, T.'s practice seems to make the text less
clear. So in his translationwe indiscriminatelymeet phrases such as
" 'substance'
signifies" for'the term 'substance' signifies'and rather
obscure ones such as: "if 'air' is the species of thisindividual which is
'this air' and 'air' signifiesetc.". Indeed 'air' signifies,but 'air' is not
the species of 'this air' but air is the species of this air.
not Aristotle.
p. 143: Universaleis the subject term in hoccontrahit,
Further, sermonesuniversalesesse means: 'that expressions are
universal', ratherthan 'are universais'.
p. 144: The opening sentence of this quotation contains a big
howler. Abailard is here discussing another opinion about universais
. , p. 522, 10 ff.ed. Geyer).
sententia'
Log. Nostr.petit
(alia de universalibus
On p. 522, 33 ff.he makes some objections to it: Primumenimquaeritur
astruant
cur sermones
, which T. wrongly
, esse universales
j et non voces
translatesas: "firstit is asked why expressions but not utterancesare
construedas universal" instead of as: "why
they (i.e. the
adherents to the view under discussion) claim ... etc." Notice that
astruantis not a passivum and astruereis not construere.
Further the
should read: illudhabet etc.
sentence: idesthabetin se remdiffiniti
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13:02:46 PM

p. 145 projecto
(which word is nearly always not translatedby T.) illudiquodpraedicatur
depluribusetc.,nullatenus
diffinitionem
generisdiciposse
invenietmeans: "he will find that the phrase ( illud): 'which is
'
predicated of many etc. can in no way be called the definitionof
genus". In rendering "that which is predicated" T. completely
misses the point, which leads him to quite an erroneousjudgment of
Abailard's thrustin this argumentationas we shall see shortly.The
final sentence Aliterenim habeatis incorrectlytranslated by T., in
that he takes aliterto mean 'otherwise' ("otherwise, it could be ...
etc." instead of "in another way"). Thus we should connect in the
construction:aliter...non....nisi, the word aliterwith nisi. T.'s wrong
forposset.The result
translationapparentlyleads him to mistakepoterit
ofT.'s erroneous translationis that he arrivesat the exact opposite of
what Abailard really is saying.
It should be noticed, then, that T. reproaches Abailard that his
"proposal has a superficialplausibility,but obviously a determined
opponentwould have much more to say; forexample (T. goes on) one
could also object that on Abailard' s view we should also be able to
predicate 'is predicable of many etc.' of utterances, and not just 'is
that which is predicable of many etc.' ". The attentivereader who
does understand Abailard' s words will easily see that the reproach is
founded merelyon T.'s misreading the text.
p. 146-7. On these pages the key sentencesof Abailard's exposition
are discussed. As a whole, T.'s interpretationis here sound, but he
has apparently missed many subtle details in Abailard's exposition,
}
(see my The SemanticalImpact of Abailards Solutionof the Problemof
'
Universais in: Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142), Person, Werk und
Wirkung ed. Rudolf Thomas a.o. Trier 1980, 139-151). First, we
: 'haec essentia
again findT.'s less than fortunaterenderingof essentia
vocis' should definitivelynot mean the ratherclumsy "this essence of
utterance" (whatever that might mean!), but just "this individual
word", viz. thatword which Abailard had writtenon a sheet of paper
(on the black board of the schoolroom, so to speak).
For thatmatter,what are we, generallyspeaking, to understandby
such phrases as 'this essence of utterance', 'this matterof Socrates',
where the positioning of the demonstrative pronoun is a little
remarkable,to say the least? Would you not ratherexpect then: essentia huiusvocis(the essence of this utterance)? Furthermore,in the case
of "this matterof Socrates" the reader cannot help but thinkof mere85

13:02:46 PM

ly the material component of the creature involved. (See also below,

ad p. 147).
In his note 15 (p. 146) T. claims that 4'the Latin statusis used with
nouns in both the nominativeand the genitivecase, e.g. ' statusanimaV
here and 'statuslapidis' on p. 143; the English word 'type' is used in
two analogous constructions, e.g. 'type animal' and 'type of
animal'
However, T.'s introductionof such a distinctionagain
testifiesto his ignorance of the ins and outs of the Latin language,
since any such connectionof two substantivenouns in the same casus
is a fundamental offenceagainst Latin idiom. To be more precise,
"
English expressionssuch as "the noun, 'king' always runs in Latin:
nomenregis
, never nomen
, rex. Only combinations in which the other
is
a
are
noun
part
exception to this rule. Thus "the city of
proper
Rome" is urbsRoma, not urbsRomae. The rule is, indeed, so strong,
even in post-classical (including medieval Latin), that an English
'
phrase such as 'the word man' invariably runs in Latin: nomen
'
hominisand in case this expression be feltto be ambiguous (since it
mightalso mean 'the name of the man') use is made of what was the
old French definite article 7f , or of circumscriptionssuch as 'hoc
quod dico' and the like. Another procedure to avoid confusionis to
use an apposition, whereby the original word-orderis invertedand
conthe main substantiveis put in apposition (the so-called apponendo
So
to
medieval
authors
preclude ambiguity
(e.g. Abailard,
struction).
"
Ockham) write "rex, hoc (or: illud) nomen (to mean "the noun or
'
name, 'king' "), and this in contradistinctionto the phrase nomen
' when it is used to stand for'the name of the
King' or 'the King's
regis
name' (taken in oppositioneither
to the King's crown,stables etc., orto
other people's names). However, phrases such as 'nomen, rex' are
'
simply impossible in Latin. Likewise an expression such as status
'
animaV is definitelynever used but should run statusanimalis' or
' animal hie ille status'.
,
( )
Therefore,statusanimal, which is also read by Geyer (in his otherwise admirable edition) mustbe wrong. I have inspected the (only)
manuscript and it does read al' which is the usual abbreviation for
animal, instead of aV ( = animalis
), but these abbreviations resemble
each other so closely as to make their confusion very frequent. It
should be noticed, moreover,that anyone who is well acquainted with
Latin idiom (as the medieval readers usually were) would actually interpret,ifnot read, the abbreviational' preceded by statusas animalis.
The (correct) reading of statuslapidis, which is mentioned by T. and
86

13:02:46 PM

wronglyopposed to (imaginary!) formulassuch as 'status animal' is,

no doubt, mainly due to the far more differentabbreviationsforlapis
and lapidis. Incidentally, in Logica Nostrorum
petitioni,p. 515, 20 ed.
Geyer (Tweedale p. 97) the clumsy: animal, naturascilicetsubstantia
animalissensibilisshould likewise read: animalisnatura
, scilicetetc. It
should be remarked in this connection that T. correctlyrenders (p.
as "the subject noun 'man' ", as well as
subiectum
163) nomen'hominis3
on p. 206 correctly translates causae nomineas: "by the noun,
'cause' ".
'
harum,scilicet'voxestgenus*vel voxestspecies',
Againp. 146: Conversae
non sunt concedendae
essentiaeostendatur,
, cum per illas communitas
quae
similiterin omnibusreperitur
should be rendered as: "their converses,
viz. 'the utterance [i.e. 'animal' instanced before by Abailard] is a
genus', or 'the utterance[i.e. homo
] is a species' are not to be conceded, although
{cum)theyassert material identity<between the utterance
' animal' and the
'
'
genus animal, since animal is a generic word
(generale vocabulum)). T. renderscumas since9 and in so doing seems
to wronglysuggestthat the cumsentence should introducethe reason
for rejectingthese propositions. In this connection, the conjunction
' cum'
mightbe taken to mean since,at least, ifone were to understand
the text as meaning somethinglike: "to concede those propositions
since(cum) there is afterall material identity(which is indeed an apparent reason forconvertingthe original proposition) is, all the same,
not allowed"; in such caes however, modern languages preferto
rendercumby although.
p. 147: SocratesestmateriaSocratisshould be read Socratesest { haec)
materiaSocratis= "Socrates is this material thing, Socrates", where
the insertionof haec(which is missing in our ms.) is indispensable to
an adequate conversion,which is what Abailard intends. T. wrongly
translates this as "the matter of Socrates", which suggests that
Abailard is speaking of Socrates' material component. However, the
genitivecase Socratisis unavoidable in Latin in cases where in English
one can say: "This material thing,viz. Socrates", and thisbecause of
the rule which I have mentionedbefore(ad p. 146, n. 15). As a matter
of factthe Latin genitiveis here used as a so-calledgenitivus
,
explicativus
as in limenmortismeaning 'the thresholddeath is' (viz. that between
being alive and being dead), ratherthan: "the thresholdof death" (in
oppositionto death itself),which, of course, mightbe expressed by the
same Latin phrase, limenmortis
, where the genitivehas the same function as it has in pars domus(part of the house).
87

13:02:46 PM

It seems to be of some use to say a fewwords about the phrase ' haec
essentiavocis' used by Abailard in the same passage. T. translates(p.
146): "this essence of an utterance" which sounds ratherstrange, to
'

say the least; again one would expect essentiahuiusvocis ("the essence
of this utterance"). However, TVs main failure is his translationof
essentia('essence' instead of 'thing'), a failure,it is true, which might
well be the result of his being unacquainted with the golden rule I
have mentioned before. Following the rule, haecessentiavocismeans
"this thing,viz. the utterance", or "this utterancequa thing", and, of
course, not the clumsy 'this thing of the utterance'. It should be
recalled that phrases such as haecessentialapidisor haecsubstantia
lapidis
are used (especially by twelfth-century
authors) to stand for'this thing
(or being), stone', and 'this substance, stone', respectively(in op'
'
position to essentia (substantia) huius lapidis ( = the essence
(substance) of thisstone), the slightdifference,ifany, between the two
expressionsrestingon the factthathaecessentialapidisis focussedon the
stone's being, whereas ' haec substantialapidis' focuses rather on its
subsistentnature.
= " Ascertained
all this", rather than
p. 147: His ita determinatis
" Grantedall this".
p. 148: Immodicimusei esse oppositumdoes, of course, not mean:
"Rather we say the opposite of this" (why does T. omit the infinitive
esse?) but "we rathersay that it is its opposite" (lit.: 'opposite to it').
Regarding the next sentence it should be remarked that in phrases
such as Quod quando the word quod is not a causal conjunction
('because') as it was wronglytaken by T., but merelya neuterrelative
which turns the formula into a so-called 'relative conjunction or
association', which is also found in the well-knownsomewhat archaic
combination quodsiwhich stands for 'if or 'and if. Incidentally,like
quite a few of the medieval authors who are well acquainted with
Latin and Latin literatureof the classical period, Abailard is fond of
using archaic (or poetical) words and expressions, even in his nonliteraryworks. His intensiveclassical education indeed leftits mark in
his choice of words and syntacticpossibilities. In short, people like
Peter Abailard (and his friend,Peter the Venerable, among others)
at
were well versed in the Latin language, and had a richcopiaverborum
theirdisposal.
is oftenused in philosophical texts
p. 149: Of course Latin movere
for 'to change'. However, moverein esse means nothing else but 'to
bring intobeing (existence)'.
88

13:02:46 PM

p. 154 ff. T. proffershis interpretationwith some reservation,it

seems ("I believe he ( = Abailard) is implying,,). Now, T.'s (correct)
interpretationmay find perfect support in Abailard' s own words,
which are clear enough, it should be stressed. However, T. seems to
have missed the decisive linguisticturns in Abailard' s expositions. In
othercases, too, when T. makes suggestions(p. 159) about Abailard's
intention,he fallsvictimto his own poor knowledgeof Latin. Indeed,
to suggest that "the predicate 'is this matter of Socrates' means
"
roughlythe same as 'serves as the matteror material forSocrates' is
quite superfluous. The correct translation of the text (see above)
proves that the difficultieswhich T. is tacklinghere so industriously
are in fact of his own making. When he says (p. 159): "I suspect
Abailard did thinkof the firstsentence as an identity'in essence' and
thus somewhat analogous to what holds between utterances and expressions,but I have foundno firmevidence forthisconjecture", our
replymust be: "No need forany guessing, Sir, ifonly you are able to
understand Abailard", or to quote the famous words of Alberic of
Paris, reportedin an anonymous Perihermeneias
commentary(found in
Berlin, Lat. Fol. 624, f. 92 ra), "bene dixistiquod non invenisti,quia
non intellexisti"("quite right,Sir: you did not find it, indeed, since
you failed to understand").
subiectopredicatum,sed quia subiecto
p. 164: nonquod in eis predicatur
is translated by T. (rather strangely)as:
apponitur,
facit enuntiationem
"it is just thatin themthe predicate is not(!) predicatedof the subject;
rather, that it is attached to the subject it (!) makes a declarative
sentence". How on earth can Alberic of Paris (who is quoted here)
claim that in a propositionthe predicate is notpredicated of the subject? Of course, the man does not maintain any such unexpected but
merely says that its (i.e. the predicate's) being predicated is not the
' but ' the
cause that...etc. Incidentally,quod is not ' because
fact tha. So
we should translate: "it is not the fact that in them the predicate is
predicated of the subject but rather its being attached to the subject,
which makes (produces) a declarative sentence". Indeed, this was
Alberic's analysis of such propositions.
does, of course, not mean T.'s
formas. . . amitterent
p. 165: si resomnes
clumsy: "if all thingssentout forms" but "if things would loose all
their forms", omnesgoing withformas
, not with res, and amittere
('to
the
not
same
as
dimitiere
send
being
('to
loose')
away').
p. 168: "It seems to me that Abailard would allow ... etc.", T.
cautiously remarks. In fact,Abailard is most expliciton this account,
89

13:02:46 PM

but, as so often, T.'s lack of real acquaintance with Latin (and

especially the usage of Abailard, who wrote a clear, and mostlyquite
vivid Latin), preventshim fromunderstandingwhat Abailard is trying to explain here.
) which I have already cenp. 169 ff. T.'s talk of idea (for intellectus
'
sured once, is most unfortunatein this section, where intellectus

stands throughoutfor a mental act: 'understanding', intellection',

not some product of it. The sentence ...cum quidemde confusione
quae
erat
rationem
in
ad
intellectum
ducitur
runs
T.'s
rather
per
imaginationis ,
enigmatic translation (which contains the howler of mistaking the
adverb quidemforthe pronoun quod and taking cumwith the indicative
mood to mean 'since') as follows: "since what from confusion
belonged to imagination has been led by reasoning to an idea", instead of the clear statementfound in our author: "... whennamelythe
mind [the subject stillbeing the animusmentionedsome lines before]is
led by rationallyproceedingfromthe vagueness whichwas inherentto
the imagination to an intellection[in which the mind really comes to
discern the true natures of things]". Of course, to arrive at a correct
understandingof the passage, it is quite indispensable to know that(1)
cumwith the indicative is not since;(2) quidemis not quod' (3) animusis
the subject of ducitur
; (4) ducituris in the presenttense; (5) rendering
"what fromconfusion" would require the partitivegenitiveconfusionis
instead of de confusione1
. Finally, in the next sentence ( reisimilitudine
does not
contentus
est) animusis still the subject. Moreover, contentus
mean associatedbut content
.
p. 170 ff. T.'s whole attemptto exculpate Abailard fromany suggestion of some intermediate "sense datum" is completely
superfluous. That T. felt the need to do so may be viewed as an
unpleasant outcome of his repeated but incorrectequation of intellectus
and idea. Incidentally, it is quite incomprehensiblethat, even in the
, T. manages to (correctly)take sensusto
opposition,sensus... intellectus
to
mean the act ofsensingand still persistsin wronglytaking intellectus
mean idea. In rendering nec intellectus
forma est rei quam concipitas
"neither is the idea (!) the formof the thingit grasps", T. again forces
Abailard into the clumsyview thatideas conceive of ideas. As forthat,
how can anybody possibly translateAbailard' s definitionof intellectus
(intellectus actio est quaedam animae) "the idea (!) is a certain
action"?
p. 171 Here T. has succeeded convincingus of his abilityto fallinto any possible syntacticpitfall a passage offers.Whereas our text
90

13:02:46 PM

et veraaltitudo(correctlytranslatedby T.), the

speaks of veraquadratura
translator connects, some lines below, vera with forma instead of
etaltitudo.Mere consistencycould have preventedhim from
quadratura
doing so. From the introduction given to the passage by T.
("Abailard resistsetc.") it is clear thatT. did not properlyunderstand
it.
p. 172 contains another noticeable howler: animamilludesse, quae is
rendered as "the mind that is that which'' (/), where the translator
goes so far as to link the neuter illud(which refersto instarmentioned
some fourlines before)to the feminineanima. Desperate needs lead to
desperate deeds! The instarof which Abailard is speaking is that
counterpartin the human mind which representssomethingexisting
in the outside world. Abailard instancesour perceptionof a towerand
asks forits status.Some people hold, he says, (the Aristotelianview)
that the mind itselfis that instar, and in so doing theysee the human
mind in termsof its capacity to formitselfso as to expresslikenessesof
thisor that thing( singularum
rerum
, which T. has obviously misread as
in
a
such
way that it transformsitselfinto those
singularium
rerum),
likenesses. Abailard rejects any such identificationand is not willing
to view the instaras a form,or a substance either. I thinkthat TVs
translationof 'image' forinstarunduly facilitatesAbailard' s rejection
of the opponents' view. For thatmatter,to translate'instar' as imageis
to neglectthe proper connotation('counterpart', 'equal', 'substitute')
which the word instarclearly has.
p. 176: Cum enimhunchominemtantumattendoin naturasubstantiae
means: " For (or: indeed), when I attend to this man, in the nature of
substance only" rather that what T. (omitting enim) makes out of
Abailard' s words: "When I attend only to this man in the nature of
substance".
means: "I understandonly
nihilnisiquodin ea (feminine!)est,intelligo
what is in thatthing(not: in him)." Likewise in the next sentenceearn
is not him.
ut hochabensdoes, of
Non enimreshoc tantumhabetsed tantumattenditur
have
this
not
not
mean:
"for
he
does
course,
only
thing(res hoc, nota
to
as
but
is
attended
but
he
simply: "for the
only
having this",
bene!),
thingdoes not have only this (property) but ratheris only attended to
as having this".
ut
p. 177: Non enim ad hoc imaginesin animo colligopraesentialiter
esse
sic
vel
esse
attendam
sed
sic
antea
praesentialiter
contigisse contingendum
should be renderedas: "For I do not at present gather images in my
91

13:02:46 PM

mind such as to attend to theirbeing so at present,but ratherto their

'
having happened so beforeor going to happen.' T. did not correctly
discern the meaning of the phrase ut praesentialiter
, which is the key
notion of the passage and he also omits the crucial sic both times and
comes to render: 4For I do not now gatherimages in my mind [just]
so thatI may attendpresentlyto what is but also (renderingsic?) thatI
may presently(.p) attend to what happened beforeor what is going to
happen". In the final sentence of this passage the phrase sanae
conceptionisesse does not mean: "to be associated with valid
conceptions", as it is rendered by T., but: "To be theproductof
''
soundly conceiving. T. obviously does not know of this use of the
Latin genitive.
p. 179: The firstword inductishas not been translated by T.
means 'to confirm' (especially said of authorities
Moreover, astruere
which provide some 'adstruction' to one's view); T.'s translation'to
think' is wrong. The reader is next surprisedby a horribletranslation
of a key passage: Sed projectocumeas ab intellectibus
diversas
facimus,iam
tertia
exiit
T.
rem
et
intellectum
nominum
thisas
translates
praeter
significatio.
follows(the italicsare mine and indicate where offencesare committed
against Latin grammar or idiom): "But sincewe make them the nouns
diverse byideas, then there will be besides the thingand the idea stilla
fornouns". We may pose the preliminaryquestion of
thirdsignification
what on earth could be meant by a thirdsignification
of the noun in this
is itselfthe 'third thing' meant
context. In fact, the noun's significatio
by Abailard. This absurd translationcould have been avoided if T.
use of
had been well enough acquainted withthewell-knownpredicative
the
between
exiit
so
knew
difference
tertia
and
adjectives,
important
. As is usual with
nominum
and exiittertianominum
significatio
significatio
those who are devoid of any real acquaintance with a foreign
language, as is the present reviewer in the case of the English
language, one mistake leads to another. Note that (1) cumgoes with
the indicative here; (2) eas is feminineand cannot possibly referto
nomina
; (3) ab = 'by' onlywhen used in passive sentencesand (4) as far
as livingbeings are concerned; (5) here diversus
goes withab and means
'differentfrom'; (6) iam is often used to announce an inevitable
conclusion; (7) exiitis perfecttense; (8) tertiais predicativelyused; and
is a genitive,not a dative , and you will easily see that
(9) nominum
T.'s translationis totallywrong and should run somethinglike this:
"But certainly
omitted by T.) in that[the so-called cum iden(profecto
we
are
ticum'
making them [ = viz. the common forms, mentioned
92

13:02:46 PM

before, not the nouns] as diverse from the intellections, then inavoidably{iam) besides the thingand the intellection,significationhas
come out ('emerged') as a third 'thing' ('factor' or 'ingredient')".
Thus T.'s misunderstandingof what Abailard says made him miss
the crucial point, viz. Abailard's contradistinctionof formsand intellections (not of nouns and intellections which is found in T.'s
translation).
estintelligens
hunevelilium.
hominem
intelligens
p. 180: Omnisintellectus
terminorum
extremorum
Tunc quippemediusterminus
servaretur
et coniunctio
sedfalsa estassumptio.T. renders this as "Every
procederet}
pereumrecte
idea (!) that thinks(sic!) of man thinksof this or that man. Then obviously we keep the same middle term and we correctlygo on to the
"
joining of the extremeterms. In so doing he neglectsthe modusirrealis
(servaretur,procedure/),fails to take coniunctioas a nominative
(subject!) and omits per eum. Note that the Ms has (at 531, 12)
recte procederei (which was overlooked by Geyer).
argumentum
in181:
nonhabetquod(Geyer' s quid is an error) rationaliter
Auditor
p.
telligat.One must be reminded of the expression: nonhabeoquodvivam
(subjunctive) which means 'I have nothingto live on'. So we have to
translatethe above as follows: "The hearer does not have something
to rationallythinkof'. Hac voceprolatais not "by this spoken expression" but an ablativus absolutus construction;the translationis thus
somethinglike: "this expression having been pronounced", ...etc.
p. 182: T. says that in the opaque sense of an utterancewe do not
really have a grammatical object for the verb and he speaks of an
'apparent object'. However, the grammariansdo speak of an object in
such cases, the so-called internal
object (as in 'to fighta fight','to die a
to describe the action itself,mostly
where
the
intends
speaker
death'),
with an adjective noun added to the substance involved; thus, forin'
.
stance, ortem
pugnare1
pugnampugnare which equals lfortiter
ff.:
the
'common
cause
of
of
Here
T.
discusses
204
application'
pp.
universal nouns. In thisconnection(as in others,see above, ad p. 146)
Abailard uses the key termstatuswhich T. rendersas type.E.g. in statu
hominis= "in the typeof a man". For one thing,I do not understand
the indefinitearticlehere used by T. ('a man'). For another, I do not
thinkthat the term 'type' is a happy one. In fact, Abailard himself
gives us a clear (operational) definitionof status, when he says (Log.
,
Ingred.20, 3-4): cumscilicethuneet ilium(sc. hominem)in statuhominis
idestin eo quodsunthomines,
convenire
dicimus= "when we say that this
and thatman agree in the status of man, in theirbeing-men
, thatis". T.
93

13:02:46 PM

too stronglyrenders in eo quod sunthominesas "in this: that they are

men". However, such a translationis only due to an ignoranceof the
fact that, from Boethius onwards, the formula in eo quod sunt{est) is
frequentlyused whenever Latin writersintend to avoid barbarisms
such as in essendo(Greek authors may of course write en toieinai and,
fromthe fourteenthcenturyonwards, the phrase in essendois indeed
often found). Thus Abailard clearly takes statushoministo stand for
, which would
'being(a) man'. This status is said not to be an essentia
have to be here rendered as 'thing', not 'essence' as T. wronglyhas
(p. 205; and passim).
Two lines furtheron, Abailard repeats: Statumautemhominisipsum
esse hominemy
quod non est res, uocamus;which means: "we call, then
of man just {ipsum)the beinga man[ratherthan 'that
the
status
{autem),
he is a man', I would think]which is not a 'thing' {res)". He adds:
nominiswhich we have
causamimpositionis
quod etiamdiximuscommunem
"
to translate as and this(litt, which)is also what we havecalled the
common causeof the application of a noun", ratherthan with T. as:
"we also say that . .. etc. "
Next Abailard goes on to show that we oftenspeak of causes where
non-real 'things' are involved. E.g. "he was whipped because he is
, Abailard adds,
unwillingto go to the forum"; here nonvultad forum
nulla estessentia.Then he cocludes:
resipsas,in[Geyer'
s emendation
non
oftheMs reading
Statumquoquehominis
whichis maintained
statutas,
byTweedale]naturahominis
possumus
appellare.
illeconcepit
similitudinem
(Lop.
Quarumcommunem
qui vocabulum
imposuit.
20, 12-14)
Ingred.
As it stands the Ms reading seems to be defectiveand nonnaturais
ratherclumsy. However, T. who has paid much attentionto the Latin
text of this passage, maintains it and translates"we cannot call etc."
which is of course entirelyimpossible. If nonis maintained the negation can only determinewhat immediatelyfollows; so eithernaturaor
the whole phrase naturahominisstatutas
, but never the verb possumus.
This much seems to be certain, namely, that Abailard triesto give an
alternativeinterpretationof the term 'status' throughan allusion to
That he is giving an alternativeexplanation is supthe verb statuere.
ported by quoque('also'), which has been omittedby T., and is indeed
destructiveof his interpretation.Besides, on T.'s interpretationone
can neither properly understand the final sentence where Abailard
relates the common application of the common noun to the resipsaeof
94

13:02:46 PM

the previous sentence and, thus, ascribes to them the very function
which he had ascribed, some lines before, to statusitself.(20, 3-6)
For that reason the reading non' is undoubtedlywrong and an affirmativesentence is absolutely necessary here, quite apart fromthe
factthatthe location of nonin the Ms rules out the negative utterance
which T. is looking for. My guess is that we should read n (' nunc')
instead of n (' non'). For that matternuncis oftenused by Abailard in
the sense of praesentialiter
. Remarkably some lines beforeour passage
the Ms reads 'ea quae non sunt', where the nonis also untenable and
rightlydeleted by Geyer (followedby T.). Here, too, the reading nunc
makes good sense:
Abhorrendum
autemvideturquod convenientiam
rerumsecundumid acinnihiloea quaenunc
cipiamus
quodnonestresaliqua,tamquam
(nonMs) sunt
huneet iliumin statuhominis,
idestin eo quod sunt
uniamus,cumscilicet
convenire
dicimus...Sed nihilaliudsentimus
nisi...
homines,
"One hastorecoil,so itseems,from
theagreement
ofthings
in
understanding
sucha waythatitis notsome'thing'as though
wewereuniting
thatat
things
arein nothing,
inthatwe ...etc.(seeabove)...However,
wemean
present
(nunc)
."
that...etc
merely
So nuncstressesthe actual and real being of things.To my mind, nunc
should be read on p. 20, 13, too. The sentence, then, runs: resipsas
nuncnaturhominisstatutas
, where the simplex, statutas
, may be purposely used by the author(alluding to the substantivestatus
) in place of
its compositumconstituas.
The passage may be translatedthen as
"We canalso(quoque
omitted
ofman:thethings
themselves
byT.) callthestatus
thatat present
areestablished
likeness
bythenatureofman,thecommon
(nunc)
ofwhich
wasgrasped
themtheword<sc.'man')".
bythemanwhohasassigned
Of course T.'s translationof the final sentence ("when (?) he who
applies ( tensel
) grasps (tense!)a common likeness of them") is incorrect. The whole passage throwsa macabre lightupon T.'s conduct as
an interpreter,which is disappointinglyfar less valuable than his accuracy as a logician. He says (p. 207):
"True thesentence
considered
in isolation
makesmoresenseifGeyeris folmakesverylittle
senseinrelation
totherestof
lowed,butweseethathis'reading
' shouldremainin the
thetext.I think
thatthe non
and thatGeyer's
reading,
eventhough
thesentence
as itstandsin
changeis inall probability
misleading,
themanuscript
is probably
defective
insomeway.Itneedscorrection
butnotin
Geyer'sway."
An amusing detail is that T. rejectsGeyer's in but all the same does
exploit it in his translation(in the nature of man, instead of by the
nature of man).
95

13:02:46 PM

The main conclusion of all thismust be that T. comes to quite a lot

of bizarre proposals and interpretations,due all of themto his inabili'
ty as a philologist. Sometimes, he is even ignorant of philologists
usages. So he charges (p. 241, n. 39) the editorof Abailard's Dialctica
with " changingthesi he findsin theMs into 'sicut' in his edition". T.
is apparently not acquainted with the meaning of the usual sigla. In
fact the Ms has here the wrong reading sicutand, followingCousin,
the editorhas si[cut], where the bracketsmean: read57", in his edition {Dial. 158, 34).
T. tellsus that in order to accomplishhis firstobjective
In his Preface
a
in
form easily accessible to professionalphilosophers,
(to present
theologians and historians certain scattered portions of Abailard's
most penetratinglogical achievements) he has "translated and commented on relevantpassages fromAbailard's worksin such a way that
the reader, evenifheknowsno Latin (italics mine) can followAbailard's
train of thought." He apologizes forsome (almost awkward) renderings by remindinghis readers that "the original is rarelyany sort of
paragon of literarystyle". Besides, T. is of the opinion that Abailard
"so frequentlycontradictshimselfand talks in ways he himselfknew
(!) to be misleading."
Our conclusions must be (1) Mr. Tweedale has writtena most excitingstudyon a fascinatingsubject; (2) he has made many invaluable
observations, all due to his own sound insightsas a logician; (3) his
knowledge of Latin grammar and especially its syntax and idiom is
horriblypoor and this causes him to irritateall those of his readers
who do know Latin and to mislead those who do not (including
himself):(4) his reproach of Peter Abailard formaking logical errors,
sufferingfrominconsistenciesand talkingin ways "he himselfknew
to be misleading" findsno single support in the Latin text. For that
matter,there is even somethingridiculous in puttingforwardsuch a
charge against of all people Peter Abailard, that champion of logical
and verbal acumen. Perhaps, on hearing such a charge the
PeripateticusPalatinus will repeat what is to be found in his Confessio
fidei' (my detractors) "have reached this unfavourablejudgment by
conjecture rather than weight of evidence". One may derive some
comfort,then, fromrealising that Abailard used to indiscriminately
consider all his opponents to be malicious detractors.
Tweedale' s book is quite interesting(and vexing at the same time)
to all those who are well acquainted with Abailard's way of thinking
and can appreciate his vivid and sinewy language. Its author is,
96

13:02:46 PM

however, an unreliable guide to all those who are unable to

meticulouslycheck his translations,which, on many decisive points,
are entirelymistaken. If it is measured by the indispensable standards
of scientificinquiry, T.'s work as a whole is to be judged a most
regrettablemisachievement.
FilosofischInstituut
P.O. Box 9515
2300 RA Leiden
The Netherlands

97

13:02:46 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)
The Quaestionesgrammaticalesof the
MS Oxford,Corpus ChristiCollege250:
An Edition of theSecond Collection*
C. H. KNEEPKENS
The second collection of Quaestionesgrammaticalespreserved in
the MS Oxford, Corpus Christi College 250 is found on ff.51va53va' of the manuscript and forms a codicological unit with the
incomplete commentary on the Priscianus maior that has been
preserved on ff. 34ra-51va.2
The collection consists of fourteen independent quaestionesor
notae, all of which discuss topics belonging or related to the domain of the Priscianus minor, i.e. syntax. They comprise the
following items:
-

the construction of a word in the vocative case with the finite

verb (la)
appositive constructions and the ways in which a soloecismus
can occur (IIa)
- the concord between an
adjective predicate noun and a subject term consisting of two nouns heteroclitic in the plural
(Ilia)
'
the well-formedness and the constructional status of refert
'
mea and related sentences; appended is the question whether
the possessive pronoun used in such a combination allows the
joining of a relative clause or of an apposition (IVa)
- the semantic status of the predicate noun in the sentence
'
Socratesest gramaticum' and the consequences of this status
upon its syntactic behaviour (Va)
- the distribution of the subject nominative in the sentence

* Fortheeditionofthefirst
seeKneepkens
1983.
collection,
1 Cf. Bursill-Hall
1981(hence:BH), 192.10.3.
2 Cf.BH 192.10.2.A comprehensive
1983,
ofthisMS isgiveninKneepkens
description
hasbeeneditedwithan exon theff.18ra-24r
preserved
pp. 1-3.Thelogicaltreatise
inCIMAGL,
andL. O. Nielsen
K. M. Fredborg
tensive
introduction
bySt.Ebbesen,
46 (1983).
98

13:02:56 PM

'

cuiuslibei hominis est aliquod capu and the quantity of this

proposition {Via)
the semantic status of the finite verb suntand of the subject of
'
the sentence legereet disputaresunt duo significatauerboruir
{ Vila )
the referential function of the relative pronoun idem in the
combination idemqui! quod (eadem quae) {Villa)
the semantic status and the related syntacticbehaviour of nouns
used in what Ancient and Mediaeval grammar called adverbial
position3{IXa)
the semantic aspects and syntax of interrogativeand responsive
naming sentences with special attentionto the semantic status of
the name in predicate position {Xa)
the referentialfunctionof the pronoun idemand of the relativepronoun in general {XI)
the constructionalrelationshipsbetween the words of the sentence
'
estVirgiliumiA
and theirsemanticstatus; further,attention
legendum
is paid to the significativefunctionof the gerundivum
(Xlla)
the referentialfunctionand the syntacticbehaviour of the relative
pronoun ipsewhen it refersto an appellative noun (XHIa)5
the constructionaland semantic statusof the relative(pro)noun qui
in combination with the subjunctive mood {XlVaf

Unlike the firstcollection7these quaestiones

offerno otherevidence for
in
them
time
and
what
can be scraped together
situating
place except
fromindicationsof codicological and doctrinal nature.
The codicological and paleographical data by no means permit a
date of compositionlater than the firstquarter of the 13th century,
3 Thiswasa favourite
textbooks;cf.e.g.
topicin 12th(and13th-)
century
grammar
ofRobertofParis" Breve
sit", inwhicha separate
section
isdevoted
tothis
theSumma
Forthismaster,
Robertus
ofParis,see Fredborg
phenomenon
(editionforthcoming).
1981, p. 62.
1980, p. 71 andKneebkens
4 Thisexample,
which
wasfamous
inMediaevalgrammar,
IngoesbacktoPriscian,
stitutiones
discussed
inter
aliosbyWilliam
of
, XVIII, 63. It wasextensively
grammaticae
RobertBlundandPeterofSpain(nonConches,RalphofBeauvais,RobertofParis,
'
estMusas"
.
papa). One alsocomesacrossthevariantlegendum
5 WemustbearinmindthatfortheMediaevals,
whodidnotmakea clearcut
distinca nominal
tionbetween
wasa property
reference
of
respect,
(NP) anda nouninevery
a noun.
6 Theusualexample
forillustrating
thisphenomenon
wasthesentence:
ltuesdignus
qui
' or a variant
rem
ofit. The thirdcollection
ofquaestiones
publicam
regas
grammaticales
inthisMS openswitha noteon thesametopic.
preserved
7 Cf.Kneepkens
1983,pp. 5-6.
99

13:02:56 PM

whereas the contents of the quaestiones

point at an origin in the last
of
at
the
latest.
The
latterdate is derivedfrom
the
12th
century
quarter
the factthatwe findpositionsdefendedor attackedwhichwere held by
well-known grammarians of the second half of that centuryas e.g.
Robertus of Paris, Robert Blund,8 and Petrus Hispanus {non-papa),
the author of the Absolutacuiuslibet.9 A few examples will suffice.In
are mentioned which Peter
quaestioXIaO several types of relationes
Helias was not yet acquainted with as e.g. the relatiointrinseca
, inwhich
we
in
and
but
come
across
,
already
gramtrasumpta, personalis
matical writingsdatingfromthe 1160s and 1170s. Furthermore,attention is paid to the establishingof the constructionalrelationship(s)bet' or alteristorum'
ween thewords in combinationssuch as 'unus istorum
The question was raised whethertheirconstructionhad to be classified
among the transitiveor among the intransitiveones (<quaestioIlia). We
findthe same topic discussed in the writingsof the grammariansreferred to above: Robert of Paris supplies two solutions,11one ofwhichwe
findadvocated by Robert Blund.12The author of thisquaestiooffersa
thirdone.
On the other hand the absence of referencesto those writingsof
Aristotlewhichformedpart of the logicanova, and the lack ofinterestin
the term' modussignificant, (of course stillin its pre-technicalor rather
"
pre-modisticsense) which we do meet in the Summaof the pupil" of
master Robert of Paris, the Italian Uguccio,13 provide a fairsupport
fora date not later than the 1170s.

LIST OF BOOKS

REFERRED

TO

A Census
LatinGrammatical
G. L. Bursill-Hall,
, Stuttgart-Bad
ofMedieval
Manuscripts
1981
Cannstadt
L. O. Nielsen,Compendium
excodice
Porretanum
St. Ebbesen,K. M. Fredborg,
logicae
Christi
250:A ManualofPorretan
Doctrine
Oxoniensi
Corporis
bya PupilofGilCollegii
duMoyen-Age
bert's
' in:Cahiersdel'Institut
grecetlatin(CIMAGL),46(1983),
III-XVII & 1-113.
K. M. Fredborg,
Universal
Grammar
toSome
Grammarians
, in:Hisaccording
12th~Century
7 (1980),69-84.
toriographia
Linguistica,
8 On thisgrammarian,
seeDe Rijk1967, p. 256andKneepkens
1981,pp. 59-61.
9 On thisgrammarian,
seeHunt1975.
10See alsoquaestio
IXa on pp. 000and000.
11On thisgrammarian
andhisedition,
see above,n. 3.
12An edition
is forthcoming.
oftheSumma
ofthisgrammarian
13See Pinborg
ofParis,
toRobertus
andhisrelationship
1967, p. 35. On thismaster
seeKneepkens
1981, p. 62.
100

13:02:56 PM

R. W. Hunt,ABSOLUTA. TheSummaofPetrus
onPriscianus
in:
minor,
Hispanus
2 (1975),1-22.
Linguistica,
Historiographia
C. H. Kneepkens,
Robert
Blund
andtheTheory
, in:English
ofEvocation
LogicandSemantics
totheTimeofOckham
andBurleigh.
Actsofthe4th
theEndoftheTwelfth
from
Century
on MediaevalLogicand Semantics,
Leiden-Nijmegen,
EuropeanSymposium
L. M. de Rijk,
C. H. Kneepkens,
23-27April1979,ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis,
1981,59-97.
Nijmegen
TheQuaestiones
Christi
C. H. Kneepkens,
, Corpus
grammaticales
College
oftheMS Oxford
250: AnEdition
21 (1983),1-34.
, in: Vivarium,
oftheFirstCollection
Die Entwicklung
derSprachtheorie
imMittelalter
, Mnster/W-Kopenhagen
J. Pinborg,
1967.
totheHistory
L. M. de Rijk,LOGICA MODERNORUM. A Contribution
ofEarlyTerminist
andEarlyDevelopment
, Vol. II, PartOne, TheOrigin
oftheTheory
of
Logic
, Assen1967.
Supposition
TEXT14)
The Quaestiones
on ff.51va-53vb
QVAESTIO la
Dicunt quidam quod uocatiuus nullus potest construicum uerbo exigitiue. Qui Prisciano uidenturcontrarii.Dicit enim quod secunda persona inperatiui modi asciscit uocatiuum.a Ratio quoque uidetur eis
obuiare. Nam cum o aduerbium uocandi ex institutionesit, ui adiectiui uerbi oportet,ut ipsum in aliqua oratione possit innitiuerbo. Quod
secundum illos numquam contingit.Nam cum diciturlo Petrelege' dicunt quod intelligiturtu nominatiuus, qui reddit personam uerbo. Et
sic hoc aduerbium o quod preponituruocatiuo1), non innititurilli uerbo, quia uocatiuus ille non construiturcum eo.
Item. Vocatiuus ille Petreest diccio casualis personalis et per se
constructibilis;ergo potest construicum uerbo exigitiue.
Item. Iste uocatiuus est diccio casualis, et co* non potest construi
cum uerbo transitiue;ergo potest construicum eo intransitiue.
Item. Dicunt quod nominatiuussolus supponituerbo secunde persone
'
precedentetarnenaliquo, ut o Petretu lege'
Ad quod sic obicitur. Iste nominatiuus tu supponit2)secunde persone inperatiuiet sie posituspotesteuocare nominatiuumnominis,ut ' tu
Petruslege ergo ad illum nominatiuum constructumcum uerbo eiusdem persone et eiusdem modi potestfierirelatio per nomen relatiuum
'
substantie,ut dicatur tuqui lege, disputa'; quod nemo reeipit.
14The orthography
but the
adoptedhereis based on thatof the manuscript,
andcapitalization
havebeenadaptedtomodern
punctuation
paragraphing,
usage.
101

13:02:56 PM

Item. Queri potestab eis an possitadeo competenterdici ' o Petrelegite*

,
ut 'o Petrelege' Si enim diuersitasaccidentiuminpeditquare non possit
dici illud sicut istud et est in illa constructionesoloecismus ex diuersitate accidentium, ergo iste uocatiuus construiturcum ilio uerbo exigitiue.3)
Item. Queratur ab eis an possit dici 'o Petrelege' ut ad aliud dirigatur
sermo per ilium uocatiuum et ad aliud per uerbum. Si autem hoc dici
non potest, queratur quid inpediat, cum ille uocatiuus nullam habeat
iuncturam cum ilio uerbo.
Item. Cum ille casus solus sitpropriussecunde persone, mirumest ipsum cum ea nullo modo posse construi.Dicimus ergo quod solus uocatiuus aut oratio eius loco supponit secunde persone inperatiui.
Si autem obiciaturde nominatiuo, qui iungiturcum ilio modo in secunda persona, ut lo Petretuipselege' quia tuest ibi nominatiuus(quod
constat per ipseilli appositum), dicimus ad hoc quia idem facitnominatiuus sic iunctuscum secunda persona inperatiui,quod facituocatiuus iunctus cum secunda persona indicatiui. Nam sicut nominatiuus
ille pertinetad eandem personam ad quam illud uerbum - Vnde dicitur cum eo construiintransitiue,non tamen redditei personam, sed
nominatiuus - , sic et in hac constructione4Petretuipselege' hec uox tu
ipse pertinetad eandem personam ad quam lege.Iccirco construuntur
intransitiue.Non tamen hec oratio tu ipseredditpersonam illi uerbo,
sed tantum uocatiuus. Si queratur a quo exigatur iste nominatiuustu
aut ipse, dico quod a nullo exigiturnec quicquam exigit. Sicut nec uocatiuus iunctus cum indicatiuo. Ponuntur enim absolute.
Si inferatur:ergo sunt ablatiui, fallacia: 4dextrahecmei construitur
cum uerbo transitiue;ergo est accusatiui casus. Sicut enim non solus
accusatiuus construiturcum uerbo transitiue,ita nec solus ablatiuus
ponitur absolute. Nam nominatiuus et uocatiuus, ut ait Priscianus,b
absolti sunt.
'
Item. In hac oratione ' o PetreetRoberte
legitecopulanturduo uocatiui et
eis siue orationi constantiex eis et coniunctionereddituruerbum plurale; ergo ibi est conceptio personarum. Quo concesso cum non sit ibi
aliqua diccio personalis nisi secunde persone, uidebitursecunda concipere secundam; quod rpugntunitatisecunde persone. Argumentation ergo talis deturfallacia. Ego legoetdisputo'. In hac oratione copulantur duo uerba et eis redditpersonam unus nominatiuussingularis;
ergo ibi est conceptiopersonarum. Vel sic. Woj legimus'In hac oracione unus solus nominatiuus reddit personam uni soli uerbo; ergo ibi
102

13:02:56 PM

non est conceptio. Aliud enim est conceptio, aliud copulacio. Et potest
utrumque esse sine altero.
Si queratur an secunda persona copuletur secunde, cum dicitur o
Petreeto Roberte
', dico quia non, sed diccio diccioni copulatur, persona
a persona concipitur,sed non ibi.
Si queratur an eadem secunda signifceturhoc uocatiuo Petreet hoc
uocatiuo Roberte
, dico sic, idest eodem modo significatiste uocatiuus
secundam quo ille. Vnitas enim tam prime quam secunde persone in
'

singularitateofficiiconsistit.Qui uero dicunt in hac uoce noslegimus

conceptionemnon fieripersonarum,quia in ea nulla diccio est nisi prime persone [f. 51vb]et prima non potest concipere primam, similiter
dicant in hac 4egoPriscianuslego9non fierieuocationem, quia in ea nulla
diccio construiturnisi in prima persona, et prima non potesteuocari in
aliquam.
a Prise.Inst.gram.
XVII, 208
b Prise.Inst.gram.
XVIII, 2
1 nominatino
MSC
MS,sedcorr.
2 uerboMS, sedexp.MSC
3 uelexigente
add.MSC

QVAESTIO Ha
Queritur nec immeritoquare magis dicatur pronomen tercie persone
apponi prime quam prima tercie.
Ad hoc dicimus quod id meritodiciturapponi, quia a persona sua se
patitureuocari, ut ille cum sit tercie persone, ibi adiunctione prime a
terciaeuocatur ad hoc quod ibi sit prime. Et non redditurei uerbum in
sua persona, sed in eius, cui additur. Et sic meritoipsum prime, non
prima ei dicitur apponi persone.
Item. Queritur quomodo ille persone cum sint diuerse, copulentur,
utrum soloecisticenecne.
Soloecismus enim uideturesse, quod ita repugnantespersone ut prima et tercia in eadem parte orationisabsque interpositionecopulatiue
coniunctionisconstruuntur.
Ad quod solutio est quod soloecismus multis modis fit.
'
Quandoque in principali significationeipsius uocis, ut huncegosi
'
dolorem.a Ponitur enim sperare
sperare
potuitantum
quod ad bonum perti.
timere
hec
Et
dicitur
et
net, pro
figura acirologia immanualis sermo,
idest qui non habetur ad manm. Notandum uero quod hec figura
103

13:02:56 PM

non est in constructione,sed in diccionis positione. Nam alia figura

constructionis,alia positionis diccionis.
Quandoque in modo consignificationis,et cum optatiuus pro1 indicatolo ponitur.
'
ueni et hec intoleQuandoque in iunctura diccionum, ut dominum
rabilis est.
Quandoque in consignificationediccionis, ut ubi ponitur singulare
1
pro plurali, ut armatomilitecompienti
In coniunctioneuero diccionum multis modis fitsoloecismus et uarie generanturfigure.Alia enim in coniunctionediuersorumcasuum,
alia in numerorumdiuersitate.
Fit ita quandoque figurauna, que diciturprolemsis,que ab Ysidoroc sic describitur:prolempsisestpreposteratio
casuumin prolatione.Hec
enim in ordinatione diccionum consideratur, ut quando relatiuum
'
eius in montibus
proferturante id quod ipsum refert,ut ibi fundamenta
sanctisdiligitDominusportasSyonetc.'dAlio uero modo eandem figuram
describitDonatus et Fulgentiusescilicetsic: prolemsis
estpreoccupatio
sententealicuius. Quod hic fit ' inter
ea regesingentimoleLatinusprocedunt
f Cum enim posuisset plurale et deberet sequi uerbum eius nucastris*
meri, interposuitintegramorationem interuerbum et nominatiuum,
cui seruit. Sicque isti duo auctores Ysidoro uidentur contrarii.Quod
falsumest, quia preoccupationem in uocibus Ysidorus dixit prolempsim, illi uero preoccupationem in rebus. Et hic innuiturquedam accidental diuisio, quod alia fitin uocibus, alia in rebus.
Fit item alia figura,que dicitursilemsis,que ab Ysidoro^ sic describitur: silempsisestintransitiua
coniunctio
diuersorum
casuum. Hec est igitur
4
figuraper quam diuersorumcasuum dicciones copulantur,ut attendite
'
Hesperidum
populemeuslegemmeamhet alibi 'corniger
fluuiusregnator
aquarum.i Hie enimfluuiuscum tantum sit nominatiui casus, tamen construiturcum uocatiuo, scilicetcorniger.
Sed notandum quod Donatus et
aliud
de
de
ista
sicut
precedenti
quam Ysidorus sentiunt.
FulgentiusJ
Aiunt enim sylemsinconsisterein diuersitatenumerorum,idest quando dicciones diuersorum numerorum intransitiueconstruunturuel
quando uerbum pluralis numeri construiturcum nominatiuo singulari
uel quando uerbum singularisconstruiturcum nominatiuo plurali, ut
ibi hicillius arma hic currus
fui .k Hic enim curruscum sit singulare,
construiturcum nominatiuo plurali, scilicetarma.
Sunt quidam qui dicunt ibi esse figuram,que diciturzeuma; quod
falsum, quia zeuma est, quando diuerse clausule ad idem copulantur
104

13:02:56 PM

uerbum, quandoque positum in principio, quandoque in medio,

quandoque in fine.
Quando in principio, diciturzeuma a superiori; quando in medio,
zeuma ab
diciturzeuma a medio; quando uero in fine, interpretatur2
diuumqui numinaFeti ettrpodasClariietcelisiinferiori,ut ibi lGraiugena
')
derasentis
Fit etiam alia figura,que diciturprocidentia, quando diuersa genera intransitiue< construuntur> , ut 'pars uisuriEneadas, pars et certare
parati'.mIn hoc uicium est, quod adiectiuum masculinum intransitiue
adicitur; in hoc quidem excusatio quod in isto femininoparsintelligitur
ibi masculinus.
a Verg.Aen.IV, 419
b Verg.Aen.II, 20
c cf.Isid.Etym.
1, 36, 2
d Ps. 86, 1-2
e Donatus,Arsmaior
, III, 5 (397, 14)
f cf.Verg.Aen.XII, 161
8 Isid.Etym.
I, 36, 5-6
h Ps. 77, 1
1 Verg.Aen.VIII, 77
J Donatus,Arsmaior
, III, 5 (397,23)
k Verg.Aen.I, 16
1 Verg.Aen.III, 359-60
mVerg.Aen.V, 108
1 perMS
2 add.
MSCinmarg.
QUAESTIO Illa
Queritur de etheroclitisuariantibus genera cum numero qualiter eis in
singulari numero geminatis reddendum sit adiectiuum, ut utrum dicendum sit ' hoccelumet illudsuntalta' an 4hoccelumetilludsuntalti1. Similiter4hocepulumet illudsuntlauta an laute', lhecdieset ilia suntclarean
clari'.
Dicunt quidam quod adiectiuum semper innititursubstantiuoposito uel intellecto,ut ' hecdiesetilla diessuntclari', idest sunt dies clari. Et
icciro uolunt, ut adiectiuum reddatur secundum formamsubstantiui
cui innititur,ut dicunt, et non secundum formamcopulatorum. Sed
non in omnibus possunt assignare quod dicunt, ut1 6istebosetilleasinus
suntboni'. Non potesthic assignari cui substantiuoeiusdem numeri innitaturhoc adiectiuum boni.Non enim sunt boni boues2 nec boni asini. In multis quoque huic similibus deficiteorum regula.
105

13:02:56 PM

Opponunt tarnensic. Huic singularidiesgeminato cum pronominibus demonstratiuisconiunctionecopulatiua tantuminterpositaconuenienter reddituradiectiuum plurale in femininogenere. Aliquod est
plurale huius singularisdies. Ergo ipsum non est tantummasculinum,
uel ergo illi plurali potest conuenienteraddi adiectiuum in feminino
'
aliudestbonum
,
genere. Fallacia. Secundum eorum opinionem epularum
'
aliudestmalum huic plurali epularum
reddunturduo nomina diuidua in
neutro genere, uel ergo hoc plurale non est, uel ergo isti plurali potest
conuenienteraddi nomen diuiduum plurale neutrigeneris.Idem enim
iuditium de diuisis et copulatis, dicentes quod diuisum debet repeti
cum diuidentibusin idemptitateaccidentium,ut ' epularum
aliudestepu4
lumbonum
alia estcarbasusalba,3alia
, aliud malum' Similiter carbasorum
. Hoc autem ipsis maxime uidetur eis aduersari. Dicunt enim dinigra1
uidentes nominatiuos intransitiueconstrui cum genitiuo diuiso. Ex
quo inferripotest: ergo in idemptitateaccidentiumuel non est congrua
constructio, aut ergo non in diuerso numero et genere aut illa
constructiofiguratiuaest.
Item. Dicunt quod in huiusmodi orationibus 4alteristorumcurri,
' unusistorum
esthomo' nomen mobile adiectiue ponituret innititurnominatiuus singularisgenitiuo plurali et cum eo construiturintransitiue, genitiuusautem cum nominatiuo transitiue.Ex quo uidetur sequi
quod anceps sit constructio.Hoc tamen dicunt tali rationissimilatione
seducti, quia nominatiuus ad intellectumpertinet,qui non complectitur genitiuo. Genitiuus uero amplectiturquod non separat nominatiuus. Non est autem uerisimilequod nomen adiectiuum adiectiue positum innitaturalicui substantiuo in diuersitategeneris et casus et numeri.
Dicimus ergo quod in talibus orationibus nominatiuus casus
substantiueponiturnec innititurgenitiuo,a quo tamen attrahitnon ex
defectu adiectiuitatis, sed ex ratione diuisionis. Et sunt omnes hui'
usmodi constructiones' unusistorum'' alteristorumtransitiue;quod ex
uarietate accidentium construendipalam est.
Sed obiciunt quod cum hoc nomen unusponatur ibi substantiueet
cum genitiuo construaturtantum transitiue,quare non potest illud
non adeo competenterin femininogenereuel in neutroponi ut in masculino. Propter diuisionis naturam, ut dictum est. Potest autem et in
eodem exemplo illis fierisimilisquestio et argumentations, siquam fecerint,instantia reperiri.Dicunt enim quod in tali oratione genitiuus
construitur cum nominatiuo transitiue propter predictam rationis
ymaginem.
106

13:02:56 PM

Item obicitur. Nomen adiectiuum ponitursubstantiue; ergo in neumea'. In hac oratione ponitur adiectiuum
tro genere. Fallacia. ' Interest
pro substantiuo,quia possessiuum pro primitiuo,ut Priscianus docet;a
ergo in neutrogenere. Vel ne habeant quid oblatrare possint,talis de' construiturnomen cum
turinstantia.In hac oratione lpudetmeSocratis
uerbo transitiue;ergo in accusatiuo casu. Nam sicut accusatiuus frequentius iungitur transitiue cum uerbo quam alius obliquus casus,
non tarnenille solus, sic adiectiuum sepius ponitursubstantiuein neutrogenerequam in alio, non tarnensemperin ilio, sed aliquando in fe'
cerminino, ut unampetiietc.'^ quandoque in masculino, ut 'gramatici
tantetadhuc<sub> iudicelis es .c
In diuisionibusergo ponunturfrequenterdiuidua substantiua. Trahunt < genus > inde a genitiuodiuiso seu significantediuisum. Vnde
dicendum est epularum
alia estbona, alia estmala , lcelorum
alius superior
,
aliud
aliud
ex
alius inferior
carbasorum
album
illorumcon;
,
; quod
nigrum'
cessis facile potest inferri. Dicunt enim quod nomina diuidua
construunturintransitiuecum diuiso et innitunturei ut substantiuo,
cui adiciuntur; ergo ilia diuidua debent poni in eodem genere in quo
4
poniturdiuisum. Similiterest in copulatis, ut hecdiesetilla diessuntclare' dicendum est. Quod sic probatur. Vtraque istarum orationum hec
dieset illa diessupponituerbo singulariet utrique illarumapponiturconuenienteradiectiuum singulare in femininogenere. Ille orationesconuenienterpossunt coniungi in una oratione que congrue supponit
uerbo plurali; ergo illi orationi uel copulatis in ea conuenienterpotest
addi adiectiuum plurale in femininogenere. Similiterdebet ad illam
orationem [f. 52rb]fierirelatio, ut ' hecdieset illa eruntet illesuntfuture1
uel ' hecdieset illa que suntfuture,erunt'. Si queratur, cui innitaturillud
adiectiuum, dico quod orationi que loco nominatiui pluralis supponit
uerbo plurali.
a Prise.Inst.pram.
XVII, 92
b ubi?
c Hor.A.P. 78
1 nonMS
2 homines
MSCi.m.
MS,sedcorr.
3 bonaMS uelalbaadd.MSC

QVAESTIO IVa
Refert mea. Hec constructioest conueniens et transitiua.Oratio autem est inperfecta;ad cuius perfectionemsuppleri potest legereuel stu107

13:02:56 PM

dereaut aliquid tale non-personale. Nam si nominatiuus personaliter

mea' non1 uidebiturillud
positus illi supponerethoc modo 'lecciorefert
uerbum inpersonaliteresse positum. Cum autem diciturrefert
meastu'
et meaest transitio.Hec constructio'refert
meastudere
derei interrefert
tantum transitiuaest.
Obicitur autem hoc modo. Hoc inpersonalerefert
est inpersonaleuocis actiue deriuatum ab aliquo perfecto;istud inpersonale2construitur
cum aliquo obliquo; ergo eius perfectumconstruiturcum eodem. Fallacia. Iste genitiuus huiusest obliquus inflexusab aliquo nominatiuo;
iste obliquus componiturcum aliquo; ergo eius nominatiuus cum eodem; quod non est uerum. Dicitur enim huiusmodi
, non tarnenhicmodus
una diccio reperitur.Sicut ergo rectus non componiturcum quocumque obliquus, sic non cum quocumque construiturinpersonale actiue
uocis, et eius perfectum. Excipiuntur enim interestet refert
, que
construunturcum quinqu ablatiuis possessiuis, de quibus querituran
adiectiue ponantur. Quod uidetur posse ostendi ex illa auetoritate,3
Nam si subintelligiturut substantique dicit subintelligireuel utilitate.
uum cui hoc possessiuum debet inniti,et illud3in aliqua orationeconuenienter coniungitur; ergo post illud uerbum possunt conuenienter
4
mea utilitate'Non ergo ponitur ibi mea loco genitiui
coniungi interest
primitiui.
Respondeo. Non semper potestcongrue apponi quicquid subintelligitur. Nam cum diciturlnullusfaturnisiego', intelligiturprima persona
huius uerbifatur; non tamen potest apponi. Dicitur autem subintelligi
re uel utilitatequantum ad sensus expositionem et non quantum ad
constructionissuppletionem. Ponitur enim mea ibi substantiue, quia
loco primitiui,ut Priscianus dicit.b
Vnde an <ad>
illud sic positum possit fierirelatio aut appositio
per pronomen appositiuum, queritur.
Quod sic uidetur posse probari. Primitiuo pro quo ponitur, potest
fieriappositio; ergo illi quod loco eius ponitur. Fallacia. Proprium nomen potest euocari ab una persona ad aliam; ergo et hoc pronomen
'
ego, quod eius loco ponitur. Vel sic. Ipse lego'. Ipse poniturloco pronominis prime persone, quod potesteuocare pronomen secunde persone,
ut 'ipse*ettu legimus
'; quod neminem reciperecredo. Non enim potest
uice-dominus quicquid potestdominus; nec uicarius quicquid canonicus.
Siquis recipiat quod potest illi ablatiuo fieriappositio, ergo et in eodem casu et in eodem genere. Et sic eritconueniens locutio ' interest
mea
loco
Ad
illud
ipsa9; quod nusquam reperitur.
ergo possessiuum
primi108

13:02:56 PM

tiui positum nec relatio nec appositio fieripotest nisi substantiue, ut

lihicestseruusmeuscuiusereemptusest".c Nam ad primitiuum,quod in
possessiuo intelligitur,fitrelatio per cuius.
Nobis autem non uidetur talis constructiorecipienda, quia non est
omnis figurain consuetudinemet consequentiam trahenda.
a Prise.Inst.gram.
XVII, 92
b Ibid.
c Prise.Inst.gram.
XVII, 194
1 namMS
2 perfectum
MS
3 iliaMS
4 egoMS
QVAESTIO Va
Socrates est gramaticvm. Hoc nomen gramaticum
hie substantiueponitur. Sic positum significatsubstantiam cum qualitate adiectiua uel
substantiua, idest adiectiue uel substantiue significata. Si adiectiua,
ergo non poniturhie substantiue; uel ergo ad ipsum non potestfierirelatio per relatiuum substantie, sicut nec ad eius masculinum gramaticus.
Dicimus quod significatcum qualitate substantiua. Vnde conuenienter fit ad ipsum per relatiuum substantie. Contra. Significat
substantiamcum qualitate substantiua; ergo potestresponden ad quid.
Instantia
. ' Oratoretc. ' .
Item. Queritur cum nomen substantiamsupponat, solam uero qualitatemapponat, quomodo ad hoc appositum gramaticum
possit fierirelatio substantie. Propter solum modum significandi.Significatenim
substantiamcum tali qualitate. Solum uero qualitatem apponit.
Item. Significatsubstantiamcum adiectiua qualitate et non ponitur
in ui nominisabsolti; ergo potestdeterminan eius significadoadiectiua qualitate; ergo hoc nomen gramaticum
potest recipere adiectiuum.
Verum est mediante etconiunctione, ut ' Socratesestgramaticum
etmusicum'. Contra. Gramaticum
hie substantiue ponitur, ut potest recipere
hoc adiectiuum musicum
et nulla adiectiua qualitate determinatur;ergo
'
immediate potest ei addiungi hoc adiectiuum musicum
, ut Socratesest
'
. Instantia. Vnushomogramaticus
musicum'
curri. Hic adicigramaticum
unturduo adiectiua1uni substantiuo; ergo debent copulari per copulatiuam coniunctionem.
9
Notandum quod hec locutio ' Socrates
estgramaticum
etmusicum
potest
dupliciter intelligi. Vel ut utrumque illorum adiectiuorum ponatur
109

13:02:56 PM

substantiue,et eritsensus: Socrates est res gramatica et res musica; et

sie falsa est. - Duo enim substantiua uel adiectiua substantiueposita
non possunt uere eidem subiecto copulari. Duo uero adiectiua possunt
- .Vel ut gramaticum
ei adiciatur. Et
substantiue2ponatur et musicum
ita uera potest esse locutio. Vnde conuenienter ex parte subiecti
construiturcum uerbo singulari,ut 'gramaticum
etmusicum
estSocrates'
.
habet
sic
Gramaticum
nominis
probatur.
Quod
signifcationem[f. 52va]
; ergo significairem prout detergeneralis et huius femininigramatica
minatur signification huius nominis gramatica
; ergo si significatum
debet determinan alia qualitate, oportetcohuius nominisgramaticum
pulatiuam coniunctioneminterponere;ergo conuenienterdicitur'gra.
maticum
etmusicum
estSocrates'
1 substantiua
MS, sed. con. MSCi.m.
2 adiectiue
MS
QVAESTIO Via
CvivsLiBEThominisest ALiQVODCAPVD.Hec est aliqua constructio,in
qua hoc nomen capudredditpersonam uerbo ante ipsum prolato;1ergo
V
fittranspositaprolatio. Fallacia. In hac constructione' quidestSocrates
hoc nomen Socratesredditpersonam uerbo ante prolato; ergo fittransposita prolatio.
Item. Hic fittranspositaprolatio; ergo ille nominatiuusdebet intelligi ante uerbum. Instantiain predictoexemplo. Non enim concedimus
hie esse transpositamprolationemnisi quia nominatiuus positus post
uerbum redditpersonam uerbo ante posito. Quod in multis similibus
'
'
patremdiligit
filiussuus1.
contingit,ut Socratisestaliquodcapud', omnem
Et forsanex constructioneuolet aliquis probare hanc propositionem
esse uniuersalem sic: hec oratio est propositio,et nominatiuus est intelligendusante uerbum; ergo est de subiecto; ergo sie est intelligenda
'
hominiscapudestaliquodcapu . Sed hanc constat
propositio: cuiuslibet
etc.'. Instanesse falsam, nisi sic intelligatur^omnecapudalieuiushominis
tia ad predictumargumentum. In hac constructione' Socratesestalbus'
hoc nomen albus adicitur nomini, quod est ante uerbum; ergo est de
subiecto. Quod non sequitur. Incidit autem in huiusmodi disputatione
commixcio gramaticiet dialetici. Dialeticus enim non curat nisi ut de
aliquo loquatur per substantiuos terminos2siue sit obliquus siue rectus. Nec est concedendum quod nominatiuus hic copuletur obliquo,
quia iste nominatiuuscapudconstruiturtransitiuecum hoc genitiuoho110

13:02:56 PM

miniset intransitiuecum hoc uerbo est,nec tarnenbis intelligitur.Et similiterde omnibus similibusintelligendumest. Et bene licet uerbum
substantiuumsie interponerenominatiuo et obliquo. eque nominatiuus copulaturobliquo sicutdictumest, quia illud propriediciturcopulan alicui, quod de ilio predicatur.Sed testeAristotileahic non ponitur
aliquid de aliquo, sed hoc huius. Nam capud ostendituresse hominis.
Alia est enim hec propositio ' cuiusbethominisestaliquodcapu et alia
es uel cuiuslibethominis
ista ' aliquodcapudcuiuslibethominis
aliquodcapud
'
es . Nam he due uoces sunt una propositio indefinita;hec uero cu'
hohominis
estaliquodcapu est uniuersalis; hec autem quemlibet
iuslibet
'
Nam
est
ist
uideo
tantum
eadem
minemego uideo est
*ego
singularis.
hominem'
, quocumque modo proferatur.Et ita talia sunt diaquemlibet
letice considerationiset gramatice.
a cf.Arist.Cat.8 a 15sqq.
1 prolatum
MS
2 substantiuis
MS
terminis

QVAESTIONE Vila
Legere et dispvtare svnt dvo significata verborvm. In hac
constructioneponiturhoc uerbum suntpersonaliteret aliquid supponit
ibi aliquid locutioni; ergo illud reddit personam illi uerbo in illa
constructionepersonaliterposito; ergo et illud personaliteribi ponitur.
etdisputare
sustinetuerbum pluralis numeriin
Item. Hec oratio legere
constructioneintransitiua;ergo in ea est conceptio personarum; ergo
ibi prima uel secunda uel tercia concipit aliam.
Item. Ibi est conceptio personarum; ergo concipiens et concepta ibi
significa< n > turuna diccione uel diuersis. Vna earum ibi significatur
et alia diccione disputare
hac diccione legere
; ergo utraque illarumibi facit aliquam cognitionemde persona; ergo neutra illarum ponitur ibi
non-personaliter.
etdisputare
Item. Hec oratio legere
aliquid subicitlocutioni personaliter posita et redditpersonam uerbo personali pluralis numeri et proprie ponitur; ergo eadem oratio proprie posita non sustinetuerbum
'
etdisputare
singularisuocis. Quod negans dicat quid debeat1 dici legere
' aut '
'? Vitima magis absuntdiuersaagere
estdiuersaagere
etdisputare
legere
sona et minus uidetur frequentata.Qui primam approbat, dicat quid
uerbum singularisuocis in constructioneilla sustineat, quia si oratio
sustinensuerbum plurale cum hoc uerbo singularisuocis inpersonali111

13:02:56 PM

ter ponatur, et illa oratio sustinens illud inpersonaliterponitur. Hec

oratio proprie ponitur inpersonaliterposita. Illa eadem proprie poniturreddenspersonam uerbo personali; ergo proprieponiturpersonaliter et non-personaliter;ergo proprie ponitur ad discernendumpersonam et non ad discernendum personam; ergo est alicuius persona et
nullius.
Solvtio. Concedendum est quod in prima oratione illa oratio reddit
personam uerbo personali et est quasi conceptio personarum propter
diuersitatemsignificatorumque copulantur copulatiua coniunctione
interposita.Non enim concedimus fiericonceptionemsed quasi, quia
neutra diccionum copulatarum personaliteraliquid habet significare.
Item. Concedendum quod illa oratio non personaliterposita potest
et propriesustinereuerbum positum non-personaliter,eoquod constat
ex diccionibus copulatis non-personalibus. Est igiturutraque [f. 52vb]
constructionumnon-propriaet in una earum ponituroratio personaliter et proprie, in alia non-personaliteret proprie.
Cauenda est tamen compositio et diuiso. Conceditur enim diuisio
propter compositionem, que falsa est, que componit orationem proprie poni personaliteret inpersonaliter.
1 bisposuit
MS
QVAESTIO Villa
Legere est idem qvod agere. In hac constructioneponiturhoc pronomen idemrelatiuumsubstantiueet relatiue; ergo itrtcognitionemde
persona non in dissimili genere et numero illius quod refert.
Item. In hac constructionereferthoc pronomen idemrelatiuumpersone hanc diccionem legere;ergo hec diccio legerefacitcognitionemde
persona cuius itrtcognitionemhoc pronomen idem; ergo aut utraque
istarum diccionum est alicuius persone aut neutra.
Item. Legereest ibi alicuius persone; ibi habet uim nominis ipsius
rei; ergo non ubicumque est infinitum,caret numero et persona.
Item. Siquis neget referrehoc pronomen idemad hoc uerbum legere
,
tunc quere de ista ' legere
estidem'. In hac enim idem
estagereetdisputare
refertagere.Sic igiturhic possunt fieriargumenta superius facta.
Solvtio. Negandum est idemreferrelegere.Generale est enim documentum: quocienscumque duo relatiua continuanturin una oratione,
sese referunt1.Siquis secundam obuiat, concedimus idemreferreagere
et esse relatium substantie neque tamen sequi argumentumsuperius
etPlato
factum:ergo non in dissimilinumero. Refertenim hic ' Socrates
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13:02:56 PM

suntidem'et in dissimili numero. Quod quomodo et unde contingat,

alias dicendum. Instantia2in secunda argumentation, hac scilicetrelatiuum persone refertillud; ergo de eadem persona facitcognitionem
de qua illud refert.
1 inferunt
MSC
MS, sedcorr.
2 illatam
MS

QVAESTIO IXa
Nomina adverbialiter posita manent indeclinabilia*. Contra quod
obicitur. In hac constructione' egouadoRomam1hec diccio est nomen;
ergo nomen aptotum uel monoptotumuel diptotumuel triptotumuel
aliquod aliorum. Sed eque aptotum eque monoptotum; ergo aliquod aliorum, ergo declinabile est.
Item. In hac constructioneest hoc nomen Romamindeclinabile; ergo
uel hoc nomen Romamibidem est indeclinabile uel hec diccio et illa
non sunt idem nomen. A diffinitione.
Item. Hoc nomen in ilia constructionemanet indeclinabile; hoc nomen Romaest declinabile; ergo uel Romamnon est ibi hoc nomen Roma
uel est idem nomen ei. Ab accidente.
Item. In ilia constructioneest Romamnomen indeclinabile; ergo uel
ibidem non est alicuius formeuel est tantum aptotum uel monoptotum.
Item. Hec diccio Romamibi est aduerbium et aduerbialiterponitur;
ergo ex eius tali positione non est figurain constructioneuel ponitur
pro alio aduerbio.
Item. Hec diccio Romamibi est aduerbium; ergo ibi non significai
substantiamet qualitatem; ergo relatio personalis substantie non potest fieriad illud, ut dicatur isteuaditRomam, que estbonaciuitas'
Item. Hoc nomen est nomen indeclinabile; ergo per diuersos casus
suos non potest nomen ibi positum poni aduerbialiter.
Item. In hac constructionehoc nomen Romamnon facitmentionem
de aliqua persona; ergo in ilia constructionenon est alicuius persone;
ergo nec alicuius numeri. Locus a comitantepari.
Item. In ilia constructioneest Romamaduerbium; ergo in ea non est
alicuius casus uel bis in ea ponitur. Si non1 est alicuius casus; ergo nec
accusatiui prime declinationis. Dicant igitur ubi accusatiuus proprii
nominisalicuius loci prime declinationisponatur aduerbialiteret quid
hoc sit. Et sic de omnibus reliquis oppone.
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13:02:56 PM

SoLVTio. Auctoritas sic est intelligenda. Nomina aduerbialiterposita

manent indeclinabilia, licet diuersis casibus socientur,idest in una uoce circueuntdiuersos casus, ut ' sublimeuolans' ' sublimeuolantis' ' sublimeuolantV
. Vel potestdici subtiliusquod manent in tali positioneindeclinabilia, quia in tali significationeminime suscipiunt inflexionem;
quod per discretionempotest discerni. Quippe cum predictus casus
poniturnominaliter,discretioest2articuliin Romano; et potestei apponi adiectiuum proprie,ut 'isteuidetbonamRomam' Fallacia autem in
appositione est secundum quid et simpliciter.Vnde simile inuenies in
Potest enim hie homo alicubi
his terminishie homo
, decanus
, prepositus.
erit
esse decanus, ubi non
prepositus uel econuerso; neque tamen
quod sit idem huic homini. Ab accidente. Primi hec est instantia. In
hac constructione4dominusueni hoc nomen est alieuius forme; ergo
aptotum uel monoptotumuel aliquod aliorum. Secundum hanc terminationem neque unius est neque plurium, quia si unius est, est aptotum uel monoptotum et ita indeclinabile. Et si secundum nominatiuum diuersarum formarumest, erit mobile. Vel adminus ilia terminatio communis erit obliquis.
Siquis querat, que pars sit ibi, dico quod nomen aduerbialiterpositum uel ibi est aduerbium; non tamen est aduerbium, sed nomen.
aPrisc.Inst.gram.
XV, 7
1 siaMS
2 discretionem
MS

QVAESTIO Xa
In hac oratione Qvis vocatvr iste? ponitur hoc nomen interrogatiuum cum uerbo [f. 53ra] uocatiuo; ergo ad illud in responsionedebet
reddi nomen propriumuel nullum aliud.
Item. In hac constructioneponiturhoc nomen interrogatiuumcum
uerbo uocatiuo et est intelligendumex parte appositi uel post uerbum;
ergo in responsione ex parte appositi debet poni propriumnomen et
nullum aliud, cum interrogatiosit de propria qualitate.
Item. Ponatur quod in responsioneproferaturaliqua uox, que nondum est instittaad significandum,ut buba, ut sit responsio 'isteuoeatur
buba' Sic respondensuerum uel falsumdicit uel conuenienterrespondit; ergo orationem protulit.Quod si est, est oratio partium suarum;
ergo est congrua ordinaiio. Quod orationemprofrt,sic constat,quia
proponit. Quod sic probatur. Falsum dicit; ergo proponit.
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13:02:56 PM

Item. Si oratione respondit,ergo uoce constanteex diccionibus; ergo ex uocibus significatiuisuel consignificatiuisuel talibus quarum altera talis et alia talis. Quod si est, tunc hec uox bubasignificaiuel consignificat.
Item. Sic respondens satisfacitquestioni; ergo earn responsione absoluit; ergo cum sit de propria qualitate, in responsione ponitur proprium nomen uel aliquid loco eius et ita bubaest uox significatiuauel
eius loco posita.
Item. Predicatus terminuspropositionisquam1 respondet,est complexus; ergo oratio; ergo est congrua diccionum ordinatio. Vel sic.
Predicatus terminusconstat ex duabus uocibus quarum utraque in eo
ponitur ad construendumet constituendum;ergo utraque ponitur in
eo ad significandumet consignificandum,uel una ad significandumet
altera ad consignificandum.
Item. Predicatus terminusoratio est; ergo est uox significatiuaad
placitum; ergo ex institutionefactain se uel in partibussuis. Si ex partibus, ergo non tantumuna earum poniturad significandum.
Item. ' SocratesuocaturPlato' Istius orationis est aliqua constructio;
ergo transitiuauel intransitiuauel neutra; ergo in actu tantum uel in
personis uel in utroque. Nominatiuo significaturaliqua persona cum
qua personaliterconstruituruerbum; et est transitiuain personis; ergo
eo quod ponitur post2 uerbum, significaturalia persona, cum nonpersonaliter construaturcum uerbo. Vel sic. Nominatiuus proprii
nominis primi construiturcum uerbo intransitiue;et est constructio
transitiuain personiset tantumsunt tresuoces eius partes; ergo tercia
consignificaturaliud quam prima uel alia persona.
Item. Predicatus terminus est complexus; ergo significat complexum intellectum;ergo intellectumconstantemex simplicibusintellectibus. Et ita oportebitcum tantum sint due eius partes, quod utraque significetibi simplicem intellectum.
Solvtio. In primisduobus argumentisest obuiandum sic. Ista oratioV queriturde propria substantia et construitur
ne 'quis uocaturSocrates
nomen interrogatiuumcum uerbo uocatiuo; ergo non debet responderi nisi propriumnomen. Et sic in eisdem terminisalii argumentofallaciam adapta. Eo tamen notato quod in interrogationenon est concedendum esse appositum uel suppositumque tantumin categorica propositione inueniuntur. Propositioni uero facte sic est respondendum
quod bona oratione respondet et falsum dixit et eius partes congrue
construunturet quod predicatus terminusest oratio constans ex duabus diccionibus. Non tamen sunt due dicciones ille due uoces ex qui115

13:02:56 PM

bus constat. Sed tarnenaltera est uox et altera uox non-significatiua.

Ponitur tarnen cum alia ad constituendum orationem, sicut reinseparabilis prepositiocomponiturcum alia et diciturilia composita
ex duabus diccionibus uel resolui in duas. Et tarnennon sunt due dicciones in quas resoluitur.Et uersus pentameterconstatex quinqu pedibus; non tarnensunt quinqu pedes in eo. Et his terminisomnibus
superioribusargumentisaptes fallaciam, nisi aliqua eorum uideantur
tibi digna recipl.
Item. Notandum quod recipimus hanc locutionem signifcantem
buba1. Negamus tamen hanc 4isteestbuba9
uerum uel falsum'isteuocatur
et etiam ea aliquid significan. Non enim quicquid cum uerbo uocatiuo, et cum uerbo substantiuonec econuerso. Hec est enim interea differentiaconstruendi.Verbum substantiuumsimpliciterponit suppositum esse. Vnde cum eo tantumconstruiturintransitiueet ei totuminnititurnichil conferensapposito. Vis autem uerbi uocatiui distrahitur
ad suppositum et ad appositum tam huic quam illi aliquid attribuens.
Rei enim suppositi attribuituresse et uoci sequenti esse nomen eius.
Ideoque cum uocibus non-significatiuispost se positis construitur,
quia eas traheread signifcandumnitituret quia nichil significai,est
falsa locutio. Si autem per futurumproferaturuerbum, ut 'isteuocabiturbuba', polliceturuoci officiumsignificandoIdeoque illa recipiturlocutio nec tamen ibi quicquam significai,sed uox illa ex duabus diccionibus constat, ut dictum est.
1 quemMS
2 postadd.M&

QVAESTIO Xla
Socrates est idem platoni. In hac constructioneponituridemrelatiuum substantieet refertnomen [f. 53rb]antecedens in dissimiligenere; ergo inconueniensest constructio.
Item. Hoc pronomen ponitur in hac constructioneet non est in ea
intrinseca1relatio; ergo in ea duo ponunturuerba uel unum geminatum.
Item. In hac constructioneconstruiturnominatiuus qui est ante
uerbum, cum uerbo personaliteret ei redditurpersona uerbi. Post
uerbum ponitur alius nominatiuus personaliteret eius persone non
reddituruerbum et construituraliquo modo cum uerbo; ergo transitiue.
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13:02:56 PM

Item.2 Inter uerbum et consequentem nominatiuumtransido est in

personis; ergo uel nulla est inter ea constructiouel transitiuaest in
personis.
Item. Ad eos qui pronomen sic positum negant significarerelatiue.
Hoc pronomen ibi positum non signifcat ibi relatiue eque demonstratiue et est tantum pronomen relatiuum; ergo cadit a demonstrationeuel relatione; ergo a signifcatione.
Item. Hoc pronomen idemtantum unam ibi significaipersonam et
earn ibi diffinit;ergo eam demonstratiueuel relatiue ibi significai.
Item. ' Idemestistiduo'. In hac constructionehoc pronomen singularis numeri construiturcum uerbo personaliteret dicciones post uerbum de aliis personis faciuntcognitionemet alio modo construuntur
cum uerbo; ergo transitiue.
Item. In illa constructionesignificaiuel facitmentionemnominatiuus singularisde eadem persona de qua illi duo nominatiui pluralis
numeri qui cum eo construunturintransitiue;ergo nominatiuus ille
qui sustinetuerbum, non est uoce et signifcationesingularisnumeri
uel illi duo non sunt uoce et signifcationepluralis.
Item. Ad eos qui negant hanc constructionemtransitiuam,sic procede. ' Socrates
estreseademPlatoni'. In hac constructionehoc pronomen
construiturcum hoc nominatiuo reset significaialiam personam quam
nominatiuus ante uerbum est3 uel datiuus post uerbum et est ex eis
constructio4et constructiotransitiuauel intransitiua;ergo transitiua.
Ad hoc inquiunt quod pronomen relatiuum non significai ibi
substantiamquam significainominatiuuscum quo construitur,sed relatiue propriamqualitatem persone datiui attribuitpersone nominatiui qui est ante uerbum. Et si eiusdem persone ibi significaipropriam
qualitatem, tunc est aliquod propriumnomen.
Item. Si relatiuum est et cum alio construitur,et aliud refert;ergo
nominalem facit relationem et non pronominalem. Hic enim differ
nominalis a pronominali.
Item. Interrogatide illa 4Socratesestasinus, qui curriaiunt quod hoc
nomen qui refertibi subiectum predicati et non predicatum subiecti.
Vnde idem ibi significaiquod Socrates.Et <de> eadem, inquiunt,
persona facit ibi mentionem hoc nomen asinusaponendo ei communem qualitatem. Et ex his inferendum:ergo uel Socrates non est Socrates uel Socrates est asinus qui currit,posito quod Socrates curratet
asinus. Hoc enim necessarium, cum utraque sit unum et idem suppositum et post uerbum posita de eadem mentionemfaciantpersona.
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13:02:56 PM

Hac ratione et fortassemeliori dicendum quod hec constructio'Socratesesthomo' est transitiua,ut predicta uitemus inconueniencia et similiteristam ' SocratesestidemPlatoni. Neutram enim personarum referpronomen, sed intrasumptamibi facitrelationem,idest personalem, idest exigitiuam consortii; compositam enim quodammodo facit
relationem. Equipollet enim cuidam5 composito ex Greco articulo et
litosrelatiuo pronomine et ita duorum relatiuorumuim habet idem,
quia semper exigit pluralitatemsiue personarum, ut 'Socrateset Plato
sunt idem' et hec ipsa constructioet transitiua, aut accidentium, ut
' idem
legitet disputai. Vndecumque ponitur, relatiue est positum. Sed
exinde proteruientesinfrantsic: Semper idem facitsecundam cognitionem; ergo aliquid facitprimam ei. Cui sic instandum:Ama est secunda persona singularisnumeriuerbi inperatiuimodi; ergo aliqua est eius prima singularis. Neutrum sequitur. Non enim in talibuslocutionibus nomina ista sunt ordinalia, sed quasi cuiusdam noue proprietatis
positiua. Est enim dicere 'diccio facitprimam cognitionem',idest sufficitsibi ad faciendumde persona sua mentionem.Cum uero dicimus
aliquam secundam facere,eius notamus debilitatem,quia nullum relatiuum sibi sufficitabsque consortiopluralitatisnisi et ipsum similiter
sit demonstratiuum,ut ille.
Siquis uero diligentiusde relatiuorumpositione nobiscum uelit calculare, dicimus relatiuum relatiue positum aliquid referresiue quod
cum eo ponitur, ut ' idemhomolegitet disputa- intelligiturenim per
neutrum substantiue positum femininum- , uel ex natura ipsorum
uerborum que significantactus rationali creature conuenientes, subauditur homoet sic de ceterisiudica relatiuis. Prudenteriudicandum
quando transitiueet quando intransitiueconstruaturcum uerbo antecedenti uel subsequenti.
1 transitiua
MSC
MS intransitiua
2 itemadd.MSCinmarg.
3 ensMS
4 constructio
: uerbo
MS,sed.con.MSC
5 grecoarticulo
MS, sed.exp.MSC
QVAESTIO Xlla
[f. 53va] Legendvm est virgilivm. In hac constructioneest hoc nomen
gerundiuum nominatiui casus et construiturcum uerbo substantiuo
personaliterposito nec est adiectiuum nec adiectiue positum; ergo ad
ipsum sic positum potest fieripersonalis relatio.
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13:02:56 PM

Item. Hec oratio est propositioet eius subiectus terminusest nomen

nominatiuicasus nec est signum nec habet uim signi nec adiectiuum
est; ergo ei potestpreponi signum ad sui determinationem.
Item. Illud gerundiuum nominatiuus casus est; et potest copulari
alicui alii gerundiuoconuenienter,utrumque quorum per se construiturcum uerbo substantiuosingularisnumeripersonaliter;ergo illa copulata possunt construicum eodem uerbo pluralis numeri personali'
etamandumsuntVirgiliurr
.
ter, ut sic dicatur legendum
Item. Ad eos qui dicuntquod gerundiuumest nominatiuicasus, sed
ex parte appositi est intelligendum.Illud uerbum est personaliterpositum in illa oratione et post ipsum sequitur nominatiuus qui non
construiturcum uerbo personalitereque aliquid positum in illa oratione; ergo aliquis nominatiuuspotestpreponi uerbo qui illud sustineat.
Item. Illud gerundiuum est nominatiui casus; ergo singularis uel
pluralis numeri. Quod si est alicuius numeri, et alicuius persone; ergo
cum illa constructiosit transitiuain actu, et in personis. Quod si uerum est, tunc ille tresdicciones diuersis reddunturpersonisuel de diuersis personis faciuntcognitionemet ideo non uidebitur proprie positum illud gerundiuum.Quippe omne gerundiuumideo caret numero,
quia caret persona uel econuerso. Numerus enim et persona communitersunt accidentia.
Item. Illud uerbum substantiuum in hac constructioneest tercie
persone; ergo non construiturconuenienteret intransitiuecum eo ex
'
parte suppositiobliquus prime uel secunde persone, cum dicitur a me
uelteestlegendurr
.
His rationibuscompulsi satis esse duximus gramaticisequi uestigia
dicentes gerundiuumin -umubicumque ponatur esse accusatiui casus
et uerbum cum eo positum esse non personaliterpositum.
Nostre quoque positioni sic obicitur. Hec constructio4legendum
est
est
transitiua
iste
accusatiuus
actus;
Virgilium'
significaiperVirgilium
sonam pacientem; ergo aliqua diccio in eadem oratione posita significat personam agentem. Fallacia. Huius imperfecteorationislegereVirgilium constructiotransitiua est; obliquus significaipersonam pacientem; ergo aliqua ibi significai agentem. Adhuc instant sic. Ista
constructio1est transitiuaactus, in qua nulla diccio signifcatactum
pretergerundiuum; ergo ipsum significaiactum transeuntem.Instantia. ' Iste nonlegitVirgilium'
. Hec est transitiuaactus; nichil preteruerbum significai actum in illa oratione; ergo ipsum significai actum
transeuntem.

119

13:02:56 PM

Item. In hac constructioneponiturinfinitiuusinterduos accusatiuos

et habet aliquod uerbum personale; ergo suum inpersonale non
construituruel non conuenienterponiturintereosdem duos accusatisui peccatiestuerurr
. In hac oratione poniuos. Instantia
. lIstumpenitere
tur infinitiuusinter duos obliquos, qui descendit2a uerbo indicatiui
modi; ergo uerbum indicatiui modi non construiturcum eisdem uel
non ponitur intereosdem.
Siquis deinceps rationemconstruendiinterrogetinteruerbum et gerundiuum, dico quia non est inter ea aliqua exigentia. Vnde neque
transitiue neque intransitiue coniunguntur. De tota oratione dico
quod sit inperfecta.Vnde siquis uelit constituerepropositionem,oportet, ut ablatiuus cum prepositione3apponatur sic lab istoestlegendum
' Et exigentia gerundiui quidem similem passiuo habet terVirgilium
minationem et construiturcum eo sicut inpersonale passiue uocis.
Siquis querat quid uerbum substantiuum ibi significet,respondeo
quod ibi significaiut consignificet,idest tantumponituribi ad significandum modum sicut et tempus, idest ad explendum officiumillud secundum quod potestesse nota eius quod de altero dicitur,sicut ponitur cum participio preterititemporisloco preteritipassiui deficientis.
Et ibi dsignt modum indicatiuumet personam. Neque potestin tali
loco poni aliud uerbum quam uerbum hoc substantiuumsum, licetaliud idem significet,ut existo.Sicut neque4 uado poniturubicumque eo,
licet principaliteridem significent.Nemo enim dicit ' uololectum
uadere'
sicut ' lectumire' usu et inconcinnitateloquendi hoc prohibente.
De significaiione gerundiuorum dico quia duplex est. Significai
enim actiue et passiue; secundum quas significaiiones diuersas sortiuntur constructiones.Actiue5enim significantiaexigunttransitiueaccusatiuum; passiue uero intransitiue.
1 diccioMS, sed.con.MSC
2 descendunt
MS
3 propositione
MS
4 enimMS
5 accusative
MS
QVAESTIO XHIa
Homo cvrrit et ipse1 est socrates. Dicunt quidam quod hoc pronomen ipsein hac constructioneponiturloco apellatiui nominissignificatone et constructione.Ergo ipsum ibi non poniturpropriein ui pronominis. Vel ergo ipsum ibi non excludit transitmapellationis et incidentiam equiuocationis.
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Item. Hoc pronomen ipsein hac constructioneponituret significatione et constructioneloco huius nominis homoin eisdem accidentibus
[f. 53vb] construendi in quibus ponitur hoc nomen homo in hac
constructione' homocurrit
ethomoestSocrates'
. Vera est hec locutio ' homo
'
'
currit
ethomoestSocrates. Ergo uera est ista homocurrit
etipseestSocrates'
.
Item. Hoc pronomen poniturloco apellatiui. Plura sunt ad quorum
quodlibet pertineteius positio ibi positiet in eo non intelligituraliquod
signum; ergo illi potest apponi signum uniuersale.
Item. ' Homo curritet ipse mouetur
' In hac constructionehoc pronomen referthoc nomen homoet ibi positum pertinetad quodcumque
hoc nomen homo
; ergo potestreferrehoc nomen homopositum cum signo uniuersali, ut dicatur lomnishomocurrit
.
et ipsemouetur'
Item. Homocurrit
etipseestSocrates'
et ipseuidetSocratem'
.
, 'homocurrit
Ad unam et eandem personam tantum pertinethoc pronomen ipsein
his duabus constructionibuset iste nominatiuuset iste obliquus Socrates
in eisdem constructionibuspositi pertinenttantum ad unam et eandem personam. Iste nominatiuus Socratestantum pertinetad eandem
et
personam ad quam hoc pronomen ipse. Ergo iste obliquus Socratem
hoc pronomen ipsenon pertinenttantum ad diuersas personas.
Item. Hoc pronomen ipseproprieponituret in ui pronominiset facit
personalem relationem. Non ergo ponituribi loco apellatiui. Vel ergo
non significaisubstantiamcommuniter.
Dicimus itaque quoniam significaiatque supponit eandem personam quam hoc nomen homoquod refert;sed nomen infinite,pronomen finiteet excludittransitmapellationis et incidentiamequiuocationis; quod est: ipsum loco propriinominis poni.
1 mouetur
add.MS, seddel.MSC
QVAESTIO XIVa
Dignvs antinos QVi MENDiCARET
ad axes.* Queritur an huiusmodi
constructiosit conueniens et an hoc relatiuum qui relatiue ponatur et
6
quid referatur,cum dicitur isteestdignusqui regatpopulumIsraheV.
Si refertibi hoc pronomen iste,et ponitur in idemptitateaccidentium cum eo et est nomen relatiuum;ergo potestponi cum ilio ex eadem
4
parte orationisad faciendumeundem sensum, ut dicatur istequi mendiceteestdignus.1
Item. Qui poniturin hac constructionein nominatiuo casu et refert
hoc pronomen iste'ergo eius obliqui possunt idem referre,ut dicatur
121

13:02:56 PM

'
'
' isteest
, isti
, isteestdignusa quo regatur
inperium
dignuscuiusheresregne
suntdigniquorumuterque
, isteestdignusa cuiusfilio regatur
populus'.
regne
Item. Quia in hac constructioneponiturinproprie,aliqua diccio potest ibi poni proprie; et nulla potest ibi poni proprie et relatiue; ergo
hoc nomen qui non ponituribi relatiue. Instantia.In hac oratione 'mu'
lierque dampnauitetc.
Item. In predictaconstructionehoc nomen qui construiturcum subiunctiuo, quod pecedit indicatiuus eiusdem uerbi; ergo qui potest
construi cum ilio indicatiuo eisdem diccionibus precedentibus que
'
nunc precedunt, ut dicatur 'isteestdignusqui regitinperium
hoc
nomen
Si uero dicatur quod hoc relatiuumqui ibi refert
,
dignus
quod est adiectiuum et adiectiue ibi positum, cuius appositione sola
qualitas ostenditurinesse, ergo ipsum refertibi siue significatqualitatem et non substantiam uel neutrum. Sed item uidetur significare
substantiam,quia reddituerbo personam. Vnde oportetquod ad eandem rem pertineantillud relatiuum < et uerbum> , cui redditpersonam. Sed uerbum illud pertinetad substantiamsignificatamhoc pronomine iste;ergo qui ad eandem pertinet.
Si autem dicatur quod referthoc nomen homosubintellectum,quod
conuenienterpotestibi poni, ergo conuenienterpotestdici *isteesthomo
.
< dignus> qui regatinperium1
Si uero dicatur quod refertibi hanc orationem homodignuset neutram illarum potest ibi conuenienter referre; ergo neutra istarum
'
constructionumest conueniens 'isteesthomoqui regatinperium'
, isteest
.
dignusqui regatinperium'
Si dicatur non esse constructio,hoc contra auctoritatemet usum
dictum esse uidetur, quod ex premissispatet exemplis.
Huic tamen opositioni solutio potest adhiberi quia auctores sepe
utunturfigurisquibus non licet nobis uti, ut Virgilius qui dicit 'pars
et Cato 'noneodemcursuetc.'c.
equis9**,
puluerulentus
'
Obicitur tamen. Ista constructio'isteestdignusqui regatinperiumest
inconueniens. Ista diccio qui cum nullo construiturin idemptitateaccidentium ex aliqua exigentia; ergo non magis inconueniens est ista
'
constructio 'iste est dignusque regatinperiumquam predicta. Fallacia.
'Turba ruun. Ista constructioest fguratiuaet construiturhec diccio
turbaibi cum uerbo pluralis numeri et non ex aliqua exigentia; ergo
non magis inconueniens est ista constructio'turbaruunquam predicta. Dicitur igiturquod qui facitibi articularemrelationemet ponitur
causam significaiet personam
coniunctionaliteret relatiue
determinatio
uerbo supponit. Et est tota hec oratio qui regatinperium
122

13:02:56 PM

huius nominisdignus.Vnde non potestdici 'isteestdignuslaudequi regat

. Et est hec locutio
Sed potestdici 'isteestdignusregere
inperiurrC.
inperiurri*
Ex
hoc
nomen
quasi expositio precedentis.
quo patet
dignusper sequentem orationemdeterminan, ut dictum est. Refertautem hoc nomen qui hoc nomen dignuset tamen significaisubstantiam,licet illud
significaisolam qualitatem. Sicut hoc nomen que referthoc nomen Romani et significatsubstantiam siue personam, licet Romam ponatur
aduerbialiterin hac constructione' isteuaditRomamque estbonaciuitas'2
a luv.sat.IV, 117
b Verg.Aen.VII, 624-5
c Cato,Disi.II, 18,2
1 isteestdignusqui mendicet
MS, sedcon.MSC
2 significat
substantiam
licet.... ciuitasinmarg.
inj.
Nijmegen
KatholiekeUniversiteit

123

13:02:56 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)
Late-Fourteenth-Century
PhilosophicalScepticismat Oxford
LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C.S.B.

Evidence forphilosophical scepticismat Oxford can be foundin the

notebook of Stephen Patrington,writtenin the 1380's. This evidence
is important because there are few published texts of this period,
especially from England. Patrington's text is extant in three
manuscripts, none of them containing the original work: C (Cambridge, St. John's College, D 28, ff.lr-103v, 109r-116r);F (Florence,
Laur., Plut. XVII, sin. 10, ff. lr-113r); and V (Venice, Bibi. Naz.
Mare., Z. lat. 280, ff. lr-9v, 21r-131r).
Patringtonbecame a Carmelite by 1366 and received his doctorate
in theologyby 1389. Chosen as Bishop of St. David's, he died in 1417.
An earlier article by the present author has given a fulleraccount of
Patrington's life, a descriptionof his notebook, and a transcriptionof
its index.1 The book consistsof questions to which, usually, veryshort
answers are given. Only a fewquestions are fullytreated.One of these
few is the firstquestion, transcribedas an appendix to this article. Its
titleis: Thata wayfarer
cannotbyanyactbecertain
oftheexistence
ofa thing
." I have previously shown the
distinct
fromhimselfin place and subject
deep scepticism in England some decades prior to Patrington's
writing;2his notebook witnesses to the continued existence of this
trend.
One cannot be sure that the question here transcribed is
Patrington's own. His book for the most part consists of reportsof
discussions he has heard or read. It is quite possible, however,thatthis
question is his, since it is the firstone in his book and since it is complete. In any case it indicates that philosophical scepticismwas being
Oxford.
taught in late-fourteenth-century
The earlier articleon Patringtonhas shown that F and V are derived directlyor indirectlyfromC. Thus C is used here as the basic text.
1 A Carmelite
Notebook
32 (1985).
, in: Carmelus,
Fourteenth-century
Theological
2 L. A. Kennedy,
inEngland
intheMidFourteenth
, in: ViCentury
Philosophical
Scepticism
varium
, 21 (1983)35-57.
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13:03:02 PM

V has been used as a correctiveto C in the few places where V has a

betterreading. V is ofteninferiorto C. Some variant readings make
no significantdifference,but a few lines are omittedin V, and some
serious misreadings occur. Another difference between the
'
'
manuscriptsshould be noted: V oftenuses quod to mean 'because,'
where C used quia. Anothercharacteristicof C, an idiosyncraticone,
is using oi foro in many formsof omne;e.g., oteforomne.F has been
reported only in the few instances in which both C and V are unsatisfactory.The paragraphs of the text have been numbered by this
transcriberin order to facilitatereferencesto it. These referenceswill
be indicated in parenthesesin what follows.
The text being considered teaches that there are two kinds of certitude,which is, generallyspeaking, firmadhesion, and is opposed to
doubt or to opinion. The higher kind of certitudeis called science,
knowledge,evidentknowledge,or demonstrativeknowledge. All these
names, in Latin, include the word scientia.This kind of certitude
belongs to self-evidentprinciplesand conclusions deduced fromthem.
It is a contradictionforit to be false. The lower kind ofcertaintyis called belief(fidesor estimado).It is compatible with falsity.The Catholic
Faith has this kind of certitudeand to this extent is subject to falsity;
but, as a matterof fact,foranother(unspecified)reason, it is not false.
A great many otherthingshave this kind of certaintyalso, as we shall
see (61, 67, 73, 76).
One might think that the author (let us call him S) is making a
distinctionbetween two kinds of certitude in order to teach that,
though one kind is superior to the other, both are good. In reality,
however,he will play down the value of thelesserkind considerably.A
comparisonwithJohn of Mirecourt and Nicholas ofAutrecourtwill be
helpful. Sceptical statementsofJohn and Nicholas, both teachers at
Paris, were condemned in the 1340's. Both these men had distinguished a higher kind of knowledge (which has very few objects) froma
lower kind (by which most convictionsare held). In his second official
defence, John claimed that conviction given by the lower kind of
but Nicholas made no such claim.3 We shall
knowledgeis trustworthy,
see that S is closer to Nicholas than to John.
Let us consider S's doctrineconcerning"certitudes" held by belief.
1. Sensory
objects.A person in thislifecan believe, but not know, that
a sense-objectexists. S's general principleis thatone cannot know the
3 Ibid., 39-40.
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13:03:02 PM

existence of anythingoutside himselfthat is in a place other than his

and in a subject otherthan himself.S takes sensation as the paradigm
of intuitive knowledge, and teaches that intuition never gives
knowledge of the existence of anythingoutside the person sensing.
There are two principal reasons forthis.
The firstis that, because there are sensoryillusions, one can never
know that what he senses is there. S lists common examples of illusions, forexample an after-image,a rotatedlightproducinga circleof
light,or a stickpartlyimmersedin water and appearing bent ( 13-15,
37, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47). He then gives argumentsto show thatwhat is
sensed in these cases is the external object (not, for example, an intramental species) and that thereforethese illusions are trulydeceptive, givingintuitionof a non-existingobject (41-43, 45, 62). One can
thereforenever know that what he senses exists.
The second principal reason forclaiming that intuitionnever gives
knowledge of the existence of anythingoutside the person sensing is
that the sensation is other in being than the object of sensation; that
God, being omnipotent,can keep such a being in existencewithoutthe
object; and that He can produce withoutsecondary causes whatever
He ordinarilyproduces with them (1, 3, 9, 10, 39). God can produce
or conserve a sensation without an external object as easily as a
substance can remain when an accident goes (2).
There are other reasons for thinkingthat there can be intuitionof
what does not exist. God knows thingswhich do not exist, and all His
knowledgeis intuitive(4). The same is trueof theblessed in heaven (6,
7). And some saints on earth have been given a vision of what did not
exist at the moment they saw it (8).
Of the two principal reasons given for denying to any wayfarer
knowledgeof the existenceofwhat he senses (sense illusionsand God's
interferencein the natural order), it is clear that the latteris the more
importantfor S. When he asks whether a sensory species can be as
perfectwhen a sense object is absent as when it is present,he says he is
unwilling to say it can be, since he has no experience of it being so,
but, since he cannot deny it, he is willing to allow it: Nec debetnegari
nature(48). And he adds that, whatever
naturequodnonpotestrepugnare
one says about nature, thereis no doubt thatthedivine power can produce intuitionwithoutan object: Quicquidautemsitde hiis,satisestcertum
Dei , quodcogniciointuitiva
potestesse, nonexistence
perpotentiam
quod, saltern
of this article,
remainder
the
as
will
be
seen
And,
through
objecto(48).
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13:03:02 PM

appeal to divine omnipotencewill be the only reason forrelegatingto

beliefwhat other philosophersclaim to be knowledge.
This considerationleads to another: is S's teachingphilosophical or
theological?Does he thinkthat it is possible to establish in philosophy
theexistenceof an omnipotentGod whose arbitraryintrusionsinto the
natural order are to be constantlyfeared, or is divine omnipotence
known only by his Christian faith?Since we have no assurance that S
has writtenany ofthe otherpartsof thisbook, we must findthe answer
to the question only in the text at hand. This text does not deal with
how God's existence and attributesare established. But it contrastsa
theologian with a philosopher(or is it with The Philosopher, Aristotle?) by sayingthatthe formeradmits divine omnipotenceand the latterdoesn't (72). If one had to judge by thisstatementalone, he might
say that the author is using a matter of faith to undermine
philosophical certitude. At any rate, this is generally true of
fourteenth-century
scepticismthough it is rarelypointed out. Beginnwith
William
of
Ockham, many theologians, whose philosophy
ing
could not demonstratethe existenceof an omnipotentGod, used their
faithin divine omnipotenceto furthercreate distrust,in philosophy,in
the abilityofthe human mind to know truthin the natural order, even
in basic matters.We thus findphilosophical scepticismproduced not
by philosophybut by theology.
There is an aside in S's textwhich says that man can be certain of
God's existence: Deus autemnon distinguitur
loco a quocumque'et ideo,
nonestad propositum
, tarnen
quamvishomopossitessecertusde eiusexistencia
since
inserts
S
this
statement
to
And,
(66).
distinguishcertaintyof
God's existencefromcertaintyof the existenceof a physical thing,the
certaintyhe speaks of is that of knowledge, since one can have the
certainty of belief concerning the existence of a physical thing.
However, the reason given forthe distinctionis not a satisfactoryone,
since S, as we will see, will show that an object's lack of distinction
fromtheknowerin place or subject is not in itselfa protectionfromS's
ultimate sceptical principle. This aside must therefore remain
thoroughlyproblematic.Perhaps it is insertedforpolitical motives,to
avoid ecclesiasticalcensure. More likelyit is a statementof S's conviction thatGod can be foundin theology,whateverproblemsmay be encountered in philosophy.
Having taught that there can be intuitionof non-existingsensible
, not scientia
objects, S must distinguishintuitiveknowledge ( cognitio
)
fromnon-intuitivein such a way as to respectthe differencebetween
127

13:03:02 PM

sensation and imagination,and yetallow forintuitionexistingwithout

an object. His distinction: intuition is of a thing as if it werepresent
, not
(whetherit is presentor not) and non-intuitiveknowledge( cognitio
The
is
in
from
the
here
of
a
abstraction
and
now
thing
(49).
scientia)
author thus findsit necessaryto disagree withDuns Scotus, and those
like him, who claimed that intuitionby definitionsimplycannot exist
withoutan object; any otheruse of the termis a figureof speech (24,
25, 29). S however points out that intuitiveand non-intuitive(called
abstractive) knowledge differintrinsically,the formerbeing always
betterand clearer than the latteras regards the same object under the
same external conditions, and that as a result they cannot differ
primarilyby a relationshipto an object (30-31). Scotus said that,when
intuitiveknowledge seems to remain afterits object is removed, it is
not intuitiveactually but habitually. But S thinksthis is simply an
evasive answer (32). If the object is removed the act is the same as it
was, and should be called by the same name (33-35, 47). There is then
no need to say that intuitiveknowledge becomes abstractive,or vice
versa (50-53).
S considers the positionof persons such as William of Ockham that
that therecan be intuitionof existingthingsor of non-existingthings,
but that intuitionalways give knowledge {scientia)of the existence or
of it object (11). But thispositionis rejectedbecause, ifthe
non-existence
did
not exist, there would be nothing to account for the
object
knowledge that it didn't, since the intuitiveknowledge would be the
same as when it existed (12).
S accordinglycan conclude that no one in thislifehas knowledgeof
the existence of any sensoryobjects. And no definitionof " intuition''
can establish otherwise.
2. One'sfaith. As one cannot know that sensory objects exist, one
cannot know thathe has faith.A person's awareness of his faithis one
thing; his faith is another. These thereforeare separable by divine
power. One can thus be aware of his faith without it existing (19).
Moreover, one cannot argue that the awareness and the faithare in
the same subject and thereforeare not subject to the general principle
concerningwhat cannot be known, because S now enlarges his printhings{due
ciple. Since faithand the awareness of it are two different
resabsolute
), one can exist withoutthe other (20).
3. One's actions.One cannot know most of his actions. St. Augustine
taught that a person can know that he exists and is alive, but S holds
that the existence of most of one's actions is unknown to him. S's
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13:03:02 PM

reason is the same as in the case of faith:reflexknowledgeof an action

is one thing,the action is another; there is no relation between them
such as thatof matterand form,quantityand shape, or substance and
necessary accident; thereforeone can exist withoutthe other. As one
cannot know that he has faith, so one cannot know that whatever
seems to him to be an action of his really is so.
4. One's soul. S's enlarged sceptical principle knows few limits. S
uses it to claim that,since knowledgeand the soul in which it existsare
differentthings, the knowledge can be in a soul other than that in
which it seems to be, or even exist in itself.A person thereforecannot
know his own soul or, indeed, any soul at all. This means that St.
Augustine was wrong; one cannot know that he exists or is alive (23).
5. One's body.Even if a person could know what is in his soul, he
could not know that his soul is united to his body (22).
6. SecondaryCauses. According to the principle that God can do
withoutsecondarycauses what He can do withthem,one cannot know
that there are any, at least in a particular case (68, 73).
Since accidents may be in a substance or not, one can7. Substances.
not know that a substance exists merelybecause an accident is known
(69, 74). (Presumably the reason an accident need not be in a
substance is that God can bring into existence, or keep in existence,
what is otherthan somethingelse, even ifit usually is accompanied by
it, as we see in the case of the accidents of bread and wine in the
Eucharist in relation to the substance of bread and wine).
8. Naturalscience.One cannot know that a sensoryobject exists, or
thatan effecthas a cause otherthan God. As a result,science based on
experienceis impossible(67). One mightlearn somethingincidentally
(forexample, thatan eclipse is caused by the interpositionof the earth
between the sun and the moon) and such a general principlecould be
called scientific. But one can never know scientificallyhow any
physical state of affairsis to be accounted for,or what it will lead to
(72). Some authorities,such as Robert Grossetesteand St. Augustine,
claimed that contingentevents can be known by means of our senses,
and enable us to know the regularityin nature (71). But they used
4'know" in a sense differentfromthat used
by S. Contingent events
can
be
and their regularity
the object of fides or estimado
, but not
knowledge (76).
9. Ethics. Since ethics deals with human actions, which are contingent,therecan be no science of ethics (70). It is true that a certain
129

13:03:02 PM

amount of ethicshas to do which what is necessary(S does not give examples), but forthe most part it belongs to belief, not science (75).
"
souls. Some per10. The liknowledge
possessedbyangelsand separated
sons thinkthat angels and separated souls can know that objects exist
because these beings are partial causes (along with these objects) of
theirintuitiveknowledge and would not cause it unless the objects of
this knowledge existed (16, 63). But God can cause intuitionwithout
objectsjust as He can forsouls stillwayfaring(17). If it is argued that
the angel or separated soul would not thenbe aware of causing the intuition,the replyis that,by divine power, theycould be aware ofhaving caused the intuitioneven though theyhadn't caused it, since this
fromits object. Besides, even ifan inawareness is somethingdifferent
tellectwere the cause of an intuition,God could supply the part of the
object withoutthe intellectknowingit, and the intellectwould stillbe
mistaken (18, 64, 65). Thus angels and separated souls cannot know
that any real thingsexist. They are no betteroffthan wayfarersare.
"
11. The " knowledge
possessedby the blessed.A theory of intuitive
in
the
fourteenth
centuryinevitablybecame related to an
knowledge
vision
since all agreed that thisvision is inbeatific
explanation of the
tuitive. A theoryof intuitiveknowledge which held that therecan be
intuitionwithout an object had to answer the question whetherthe
beatific vision could exist without an object. It seems scandalous to
Christiansthat a person could enjoy the beatificvision withoutactually seeing God. S thereforewants to avoid saying this, but his basic
position in regard to intuitiveknowledge in general makes it difficult
forhim to do so. One mightargue, to help S out, that it is impossible
forthe beatificvision to existwithoutGod being grasped because only
God can cause it (26). S distinguisheshowever between God as efficient cause of this vision and God as object of it; God could be the
formerwithoutbeing the latter,since God can bringinto existence,or
keep in existence, any knowledge withoutits object being real (27). S
does, nevertheless,argue thatGod is a real object of the beatificvision
since He is everywhereand thereforemust be presentin thisvision as
its object (54). This argumentis poor because, on the basis of it, one
should see God face to face all the time. S seems to realize thissince he
next argues thata person would be blessed in thebeatificvision even if
God were not the object of it (54). He has to face the expected objection thatsuch a person would not be beatifiedbecause he would not be
perfectlyhappy: he would want to see God as a real object (55). S
dodges this objection by implyingthat no one can be beatifiedby one
130

13:03:02 PM

act, and then by switchingthe discussion to state that whoever has a

vision of God and is in the state of grace "possesses" God. His position is thus that one should be happy enough to see God, and to
'
4
'possess' him in thisway, even ifwhat he sees or possesses is not really God (56). Besides, S adds, perhaps it is against God's immutability
to be presentin the beatificvision if He has not already been present
(57). His position is then, except for one (poor) argument in his
shotgun approach, that the blessed do not know that they see God
ratherthan a vision of Him.
We now can conclude that S has taughtthat,forthe wayfarer,sensoryobjects, his faithand most of his actions, his soul or body, secondary causes, substances, natural science and most of ethics,cannot be
known but are accepted only by belief; and that separated souls, the
angels, and the blessed are similarlylimited.
As stated above, this would not be an extremescepticismprovided
beliefwere fairlyreliable. However, not only the tone of the work,but
its teaching,leads us to have littleconfidencein belief. It is true that S
calls it a kind of certitude,even thougha lesser kind, and declares that
he is certain,with this kind of certainty,that he is sittingin his chair
and sees his pupils (66). But the basis of this kind of certaintyis the
general principle that God administers His creatures so as to allow
themto performtheirown actions. S declares thatbe accepts thisprinciple unless, because of revelation or another good reason, it is
violated in a particularcase (66). But the question is: what kind ofcertitude attaches to this principle? Is it knowledge? Does it guarantee
that the only violations of it are the few mentioned? Or, rather,is it
itselfonly believed, so that it is only as "certain" as the types of
knowledgeit is supposed to bolster?For S the answer is clear: it is held
onlyby belief,as a common opinion. It is not evidentfromits termsor
in any other way (77-78).
Because of the threatof arbitrarydivine intrusioninto the natural
world, our author, quite possibly Stephen Patrington, has left for
human knowledge only a few platitudes; all else is abandoned to
belief,the guaranteeof which is itselfa matterofbelief. What else was
to be expected froman epistemologyin which even those in heavenly
glory could not be sure they were seeing God? Early-fourteenthcenturyphilosophical scepticismwas reaping a harvestdecades later.

131

13:03:02 PM

Cambridge, St. John's College, Ms. D 28, ff. lr-3r

Quod viator non potest per aliquem actum esse certus de
EXISTENCIA
ALICUIUSREI A SE DISTINCTELOCOET SUBIECTO
Ir

1 Arguitur: quia aut per noticiam abstractivam aut intuitivam.

Sed primo modo non, quia abstractiva abstrahit ab hie et nunc, et
eque potest esse sive res sit sive non. Igitur etc. Nec per intuitivam
quia talis, saltem per4potentiamDei, potestesse rei non existentisvel
non presents. Igitur etc. Assumptum quia omne absolutum distinctum loco et subiecto ab aliquo potestDeus conservare,ymo facere,sine alio. Sed tunc cognicio, cum sit subiective in cognoscente, distinguiti^ loco et subiecto ab omni eo a quo distinguitursuum objectum
loco et subiecto. Igituretc. Maior quia si distinguanturloco et subiecto non potest esse unum illorumcausa alteriusnisi vel efficiensvel finalis; sed in utroque genere cause potest Deus, prima causa sine secunda causa, quicquid potestcum secunda causa ex quo perfeccionem
cause secunde multo eminencius continet. Nec potest inter talia esse
maior connexio quam intercausam et causatum, et ideo omnem coneccionem inter ilia potest prima causa Deus absolvere.
2 Confrmaturper Beatum AugustinumseptimoDe Trinitate,capitulo nono vel 32. "Corpus," inquit, "dicitur substantia eo quod
accidentibus substat. Accidentia vero sunt que subiecto insunt,ut color et forma. Et ideo, si desinai esse color ille vel forma,non adimunt
corporicorporisesse quia non est hoc eius esse quod illam formamvel
ilium colorem retiere." Hec ille.5 Cum igiturde duobus distinctisloco et subiecto verum sit quod unius esse non est alterumretierequia
esse suum est formaliterin se cum sit formaliterseipso ens, igitur,etsi
unum eorum desinat esse, potest Deus saltem alterum conservare.
3 Item idem, 15 De Trinitate, capitulo 13 vel 34. "Nostra,"
inquit, "scientia amissibilis et receptibilisest quia non hoc nobis est
esse quod scire vel sapere. Sed scientia Dei ist inamissibiliseo quod eius idem est esse quod sapere." Hec ille.6 Cum igiturduorum loco et
subiecto distinctorumnon sit idem esse, videturquod unum sine alio
sine contradiccionepotest esse.
4 Ytem idem, 12 Confessionum,capitulo 15. "Expectado," inquit, "rerum futurarumfitcontuituscum venerint;idemque contuitus
4 C additpo
5 St. Augustine,
De Trinitate
, VII (V, 10),Turnholti
1968,260.
6 Ibid.,
XV (XIII, 22), 495.
132

13:03:02 PM

fitmemoria cum preterierint.Omnis porro qui ita variatur mutabilis

est, et omne mutabile eternumnon est." Hec ille.7 Cum igiturDeus
sit eternuset inmutabilis,cognicio eius de preteritisnon est memoria,
nec de futurisexpectacio, sed, tam preteritorumquam futurorumet
presencium, contuitus.
5 Item ex eodem sequiturquod non semperin cognicione intuitiva
oportetobiectum in propria existencia movere potentiam. Deus enim
habet noticiam intuitivam creaturarum,que tarnennon movent intellectum eius quia tunc vilesceretcum perficereturviliori seipso.
6 Ytem beatus in Verbo habet noticiam intuitivamalicuius non
existentisquia alias esset cognicio eadem quandoque intuitiva,quandoque abstractiva. Consequens falsumcum ille notitiesint specierum
oppositarum realiter. Et consequentia arguiturquia, quando res est,
habet beatus in Verbo noticiamintuitivamde illa, sed actus beatificus8
manet9idem quando res est et quando non est, quia, secundum Au44
gustinum,15 De Trinitate,capitulo 16 vel 41: non eruntibi volubiles cogitationes, ab aliis ad alia euntes et redeuntes, sed omnem
scientiamnostramuno simul conspectu videbimus." Hec ille.10Igitur
eadem cognitio est quandoque intuitiva, quandoque abstractiva, vel
beatus numquam potest videre in Verbo rem aliquam que nunc non
existit,vel iam videt aliquam nunc non existentem.Igitur etc.
7 Item alias posset aliqua cognicio rei in genere proprio esse perfectiorquam visio in Verbo, sive quecumque eius cognicio in Verbo,
quia, re existente,potest cognicio intuitivaeius haberi in genere proprio, et, ipsa non existente, non potest haberi talis cognitio eius in
Verbo. Sed cognitio intuitivaest perfectiornon-intuitivarespectu eiusdem obiecti. Igitur perfectiuscognoscetur res in se, quando est,
quam in Verbo, quando non est. Quod tarnen videtur falsum cum
cognicio in Verbo sit clarssima.
8 Item Beatus Benedictus habuit cognicionem intuitivamrerum
sibi non presencium. Sic enim de ipso scribitBeatus Gregorius, secundo Dialogorum: "Res," inquit, "mira, omnis mundus velut sub uno
solis radio collectus ante eius oculos adductus est." Non autem adducebantur ante eum omnia presencia quia, ut dicit Gregorius post,
exemplificanspossibilitatemhuius facti: "Non celum et terracontrac7 St.
Latinae
Cursus
, XII, 15,in:PL (Patrologiae
Augustine,
Confessions
), Paris1844-64,
XXXII, 832.
8 beatificus
/sicF CV beneficus
J
9 manet] sic
V C videt
10St. Augustine,
De Trinitate
, XV (XVI, 26), 500.
133

13:03:02 PM

ta sunt, sed videntisanimus dilatatus, qui in Deum raptusvidere sine

difficultatepotuit omne quod infraDeum est". Hec Gregorius.11Ex
quibus patet quod12 habuit visionem multorumsibi non presencium.
9 Quod nullus potest certificande alico a se distinctoloco et subiecto per visionem arguiturquia, si sic, detur quod de celo. Consequentia non sequitur "Vides celum; igiturcelum est," quia eque potest Deus causare visionem celi, ipso non existentesicud existente,
quia, sicud supra argutum est de omnibus absolutis distinctisloco et
subiecto, potestDeus causare unum sine reliquo, ymmonon existente
altero. Igitur,cum visio celi sit res absoluta, potestDeus causare illam
etsi celum non sit. Igitur non ex visione celi potes scire celum esse,13
saltem certiusquam per fidem.Cum igiturnon possis scirecelum esse
cercius quam per visionem,videturquod nullo modo potes scirecelum
esse.
10 Confirmaturquia, si scias celum esse, et ilia scientia qua hoc
scis est aliquid absolutum loco et subiecto distinctuma celo, igiturpotestesse celo non existente,vel etsi celum non esset, et per consequens
statquod tu scias celum esse ipso non existente.Vel, e contra,si tu scires celum non existere, posset Deus creare celum conservando illam
scientiamin anima tua, cum ad creacionem unius rei non sequituradnihilacio alterius ab ea totaliterdistincta.
11 Contra arguitur,quia, si scientia huius ' 'celum est" sit in te,
tu scis celum esse, cum inpossibile sit aliquam scientiamin aliquo esse
que non denominet; sed, si scientia illius "celum est" sit in te, potest
esse in te etsi celum non sit; igitur,si scientiaistiuspotestesse in te, tu
potes scire celum esse, etsi celum non sit; consequens falsum. Dicitur
hic uno modo quod possum scire celum esse, et hoc per cognicionem
intuitivam,quia, etsi per cognitionemabstractivamnon possim scire
an res sit an non, tarnen per noticiam14intuitivampossum, quia,
quamvis cognicio intuitivapotest esse de re non existente,tarnen,si
cognitio intuitivasit in me, per illam sciam an res st an non.
12 Sed contra hanc rationem arguitur sic. Idem, manens idem,
semper facitidem, et hoc maxime de agente naturali. Cum igiturcognicio intuitivaA maneat idem per te sive A sit sive non sit, et existente
A, causat scientiamhuius "A est"; igitur,et A non existente,causabit
idem. Et sic, A non existente,eritscientiahuius "A est", quod est im11St. Gregory,
, II, 35, in: PL, LXVI, 198-199.
Dialogues
lpatetysicV u pztz
13esse] sicV C e
L. addiiet
134

13:03:02 PM

possibile. Confirmaturquia A nihil facitad scientiam huius "A est"

nisi mediante intuicione, quia scilicetcausai intuicionem, et intuicio
scientiam. Igitur cum intuicio se habeat uniformitersive existitsive
non, uniformitercausabit scientiam. Et per consequens si, A existente, causai scientiam,et non existentecausabit scienciam. Et propterea
statprima ratio quia, si intuiciocausat scientiamA manente, cum illa
sit absolutum distinctumab A loco et subiecto, potestilla scientia manere destructoA. Et per consequens, A non manente, scieturquod A
est quia inpossibile est quod scientia illius sit nisi illa sciatur.
13 Preterea falsum accipit responsio, scilicet quod per cognicionem intuitivampotestscirian res sit an non, quia, secundo De Sompno et Vigilia, vult Philosophus quod visio manet per aliquod tempus
post absentacionem visibilis, et ita de aliis sensibus. Unde verba sua
sunthec: "Sensibilia secundum singulumorganum sentiendinobis affichantsensum. Et quod fitab eis non solum inest organis sentiendi
dum sensus agunt sed eciam dum abeun'15 Cum igiturnihil fiatab
eis nisi sensacio, igiturnec a visibili nisi visio. Igitur et visio manet
abeunte visibili, et tamen, manente visione post recessum visibilis,
non potestvidere an visibile sit presens vel non per visum. Dico: sed,
si hoc iudicas, est per alium sensum, particularemvel superiorem,aut
per intellectum.Igitur, si non esset aliqua potentia cognitiva nisi visus, visus non iudicaret,nec tu per visum, an sensibile adesset an non,
saltem pro tunc. Igitur, si cognicio intuitivamaneat in singulis sensibus et in intellectuin absencia rei vise, per nullam intuicionempotes
certificanan res sit an non.
14 Confirmaturquia, de candela vel de ligno ignito et velociter
moto circulariter,apparet visui circulus ignitus. Et, si non esset alius
sensus iudicans de obiecto, inpossibleesset videntemscire ibi non esse
circulum. Igitur,si omnis virtuscognitivaeodem modo afficiturin absentia rei et presencia, sequitur quod nulla sit certitudopresencie rei
vel absencie.
15 Eadem est sentencia Augustini 11 De Trinitate, capitulo secundo vel sexto: "Cum", inquit, "diu solem attendimusaut quecumque luminaria, et deinde oculos clauserimus, lr/lv quasi versanturin
conspectu quidam lucidi colores varie sese comutantes, minus minus16
que fulgentesdonee omnino dsistant". Hec ille. Et, si dicas quod
nihilmanet ibi nisi species, patet per eundem ibidem, capitulo eodem,
15Aristotle,
De Somniis,
Libri.
..cumAverrois.
.. Commentariis
2, in: Aristotelis
, Venice
1562,VI, parsII, 28 AB.
16St.Augustine,
De Trinitate
, XI (II, 4), 337.
135

13:03:02 PM

quod vel species est visio vel non sine visione.17Et idem potestprobari
quia, cum species cum sensu sitprincipiumsufficienssensacionis, possunt ilia duo causare sensacionem, aliis eodem modo se habentibusvel
diverso. Ponit alia multa exempla ad predictum. Vide ibidem.18
16 Aliter dicitur. Concedo quod intuicio potest esse rei non
existentis.Et ideo pro statu isto non potesthomo esse certusper quamcumque intuitivaman res sit an non. Angelus tarnenvel anima separata bene potest quia potest scire utrum intuicio causetur ab eo vel
non. Et, si causetur ab eo, seit quod res est quia intellectusnon causai
in se cognicionem intuitivamalicuius nisi illud existt.
17 Sed contra hoc sunt eadem media que prius, et precise quod,
cum illa scientia sit res absoluta, potest manere post A.
18 Et, si dicas quod illa intuicionon causai scientiametc. inmediate, discurrendosic (quia, quando intuiciocausatur ab intellectu,rsultat quedam relatio inter ipsam et intellectum,scilicet effectusad
causam, que non rsultatquando inmediate causatur a Deo, et ideo
intellectusvidens illam relacionem potestscire se causasse illam intuicionem), contra: Idem est argumentumde relatione sicud de re, quia
illa scientia, per quam seit relacionem esse, est absolutum distinctum
ab illa relacione; igiturpotest esse sine illa relacione cum nec scientia
sit in illa relacione nec e contra; et per consequens non potestesse certus an relatio sit an non.
19 Si eciam omne absolutum potestesse sine alio sequitur ut prius quod nullus potestscire se habere fdem,nec per consequens esse fidelem, cum illa scientia sit absolutum quid etc., ut supra.
20 Nec obstat quod scientia et fides non distinguntursubiecto
quia sunt in eadem anima; cum enim sintdue res absolute potestDeus
conservare unam, destruendo alteram, Igitur etc.
21 Augustinus, 15 De Trinitate, capitulo 12 vel 31, contra
Achademicos (qui posueruntnihil sciri), dicitquod homo seitse19vivere, it in hoc non potestfalli. Nec hoc solum, sed seit se scire se vivere,
'
et sic de infinitissi addantur.20Sed omnes iste sunt contingentes: 'fides est in te", "tu vivis", etc. Igituraliquod contingenspotestsciri. Si
autem concedis to posse scire te esse vel vivere, etc. (quia, si aliquid
seis, potes scire quod illa scientia non sit separate a te, quia tune non
esset tibi principiumsciendi, et sic per consequens potes scire te esse,
17Ibid.
18Ibid.,337-338.
19se sicV C de
20St.] Augustine,
De Trinitate
, XV (XII, 21),491.
136

13:03:02 PM

sed de contingentidistinctoa te loco et subiecto est inpossible te hoc

scire), contra probo quod tu non potes scire istam "Hec fides est in
te", nec aliquem actum reflexminesse tibi. Quia illa scientia per
quam seis fidem vel aliquem actum talem inesse tibi est absolutum
quid distinctumrealitera fideet a tali actu. Tunc capio istam propositionem eque probabilem sicud primam, "Omne absolutum potest
Deus faceresine omni eo absoluto cuius non est formanec e contra".
Hec non habet instanciamnec de materia et forma,nec de quantitate
et figura,nec de subiecto et eius passione. Sed hec scientiaqua scis fidem vel actum sciendi inesse tibiest huius. Igiturpotestinesse tibi sine
coexistenciaillorum,et per consequens per illa non potest sciri illa inesse tibi.
22 Item. Videtur quod non potes scire te esse, nec per consequens
potes scirete scirealiquid, quia illa scientiatantumest in anima et potest esse eque in ea sive fueritseparata sive coniuncta. Et per consequens per illam non potestscire se uniri nec utrumex se et corpore resultei homo. Igitur etc.
23 Item talis scientia,ex quo est absolutum, potestseparari et esse
per se vel in alia anima. Cum omnes anime sint eiusdem rationis et
per consequens eque receptive cuiuscumque qualitatis, igitur potest
esse hec scientia sine hac anima.
24 Quod ad hanc materiamdicit Scotus in suo quolibet, questione
13a, quod abstractivaferturin rem non ut in se presens est potentie
cognitivesed in aliquo alio, sive sit species sive aliquid virtualitercontinens illus vel eius noticiam; intuitivavero ferturin aliquid, in rem
scilicetut presens est in se, ita scilicetquod, in cognicione illa, res cognita in propriaexistenciasit motiva potentiecognitive,et non aliud ipsum virtualitervel representativecontinens. Exemplum primi in potentiasensitivaest quod ymaginativaferturin rem sive sit presens sive
non, sed ut abstrahitab21 hie et nunc. Visus autem ferturin rem ut
presens est in se. Et eodem modo est in intellectude abstractiva,non
est dubium. Et de intuitivasatis patet quia per talem visionem beatificamur, scilicetper facialemet ciaram visionem. "Cum enim apparueritvidebimus eum sicuti est" (prima Johannis, tertio), "et similes ei
erimus".22 Et confirmaturquia perfectionisest posse attingereobiectum in se, ubi nunc vilescit potentia ex inperfectioneobiecti. Igitur,
cum hoc conveniat sensitive,non debet negari intellective.23
21ab /sicV C ut
22/John
, III, 2.
23DunsScotus,Quaestiones
Omnia
, XIII, 8 and10,in:Opera
, XXV, Paris
Quodlibetales
1895,521-522.
137

13:03:02 PM

25 Ex hiis dictis sumentesaliqui occasionem dicunt quod, nec potentia nature nec Dei, potest intuicicio esse nisi obiecti presentis. Et
potest pro eis24sic argui. Si enim formalisratio intuicionisest ferriin
rem ut in se presens est, ex dictis,et actus non potestmanere nisi maneat eius ratio formalis,igituretc.
26 Preterea, si posset esse visio sine invisibili,posset quis esse beatus non habendo Deum pro obiecto sibi presente.Consequens falsum,
ut videtur. Et consequentia patet quia habens visionem Dei est
beatus,25et per te non rpugntvisionem esse sine obiecto visibili; igitur etc.
27 Et, si dicas quod non sequitur (quia nihil potestcausare visionem alicuius absentis nisi contineatvirtualitervel ipsum vel eius cognitionem; modo nihil continetDeum virtualiternec eius cognitionem
intuitivamnisi ipsemet; ideo, si per inpossibileipse foretabsens, nihil
posset causare intuicionem eius vel eius visionem), contra: Non est
idem causare visionem et obici potentievisive, quia aliquid potestcausare visionem etsi non obiiciturvisui, ut satis patet. Igituret Deus potest causare visionem in potentia cui se non obieceritpresencialiterin
ratione obiecti.
28 Preterea, posset esse visio qua26 tarnennihil vel nonens videretur quia posset esse visio, anihilato visibili; quod tarnenhabet [Scotus]
pro inconvenienti.
29 Et, si arguitur contra eum sic (omne absolutum potest Deus
etc.; hec intuicio est absolutum tale; igituretc.) dicit quod est figura
dictionis,sicud hie, "Quicquid heri vidistihodie vides, etc." Quia intuicio addit, supra actum, relacionem actualem ad objectum existens.
Et ideo quando est talis relatio est intuicio; et quando non, non.
30 Item non videturquod per illam relationemfiatintuicio. Quia
sic idem actus quandoque intuitiva,quandoque abstractiva,quod non
videtur cum sint27sensaciones realiter opposite vel essentialiterdistinctequia una est universaliterperfeccioret clarioralia respectueiusdem obiecti in eodem lumine. Et hoc conceditidem doctor,ut prius.28
Sed tunc dicit quod, si possit manere visio sine relacione ad obiectum,
adhuc foretbeatus habens talem visionem.29Et probatur quod beati24eisysicV C ois
25beatus] sicV C homo
26qua ] sicV C que
27sint/sicV C sit
28DunsScotus,op.cit..,XIII, 10; 522.
29Ibid.,16; 544.
138

13:03:02 PM

tudo Dei non est aliqua talis relatio ad obiectum, et tamen secundum
Philosophum30consistitin operacione.31Sed secundum ipsum, ut prius, nullus est actus beatificusnisi intuitvus;igitur,ut videturde formali ratione actus intuitivi,non est habere actualem relacionem ad
obiectum. Et per consequens, si actus possit manere sine relacione tali, ut concedit, adhuc foretintuitivus.
31 Confirmaturper eundem. Intuitiva et abstractivasunt species
qualitatis essentialiterdistincte. Etsi non differrent,probari posset,
quia universaliterquelibet intuicio in eodem lumine,32in eadem potentia,et eiusdem obiecti, perfecciorest abstractiva. Sed nulla species
qualitatis distinguituressentialiterab alia per solam relacionem(quod
etiam concedit idem doctor ibidem,33etiam in operacionibus istis).
Igitur nec per istam constituiturformaliterrelacionem quia per idem
constituituret distinguitur,saltem essentialiter.Igitursi possitmanere
actus sine relacione adhuc erit intuitivus.
32 Sed dicit ulterius quod illa cognitio que, manente relacione
reali, est intuitiva,destructa relacione, non est abstractiva quia tunc
nec est intuitivanec abstractiva actualiter, habitualitertamen est intuitiva.Contra. Omnis cognitiorei vel est eius ut est vel ut non est, vel
ut est indifferens
ad esse et non esse, ut scilicetabstrahit.Sed secundo
modo non est cognitiode qua est sermo quia tune non esset rei presents. Et, si tertiomodo, est abstractiva. Si autem primo modo, est intuitiva per differentiasasignatas. Et confirmaturquod, sicud cognitio
abstractivanon dividiturin actualem et habitualem, loquendo de cognitioneque est actus secundus, ita nec intuitivadebet sic dividi, ut videtur.
33 Item. Idem est actus per te qui prius. Igitureodem modo fertur
in obiectum quo prius et sub eadem ratione. Sed prius ferebaturin
obiectumut presens erat, per te. Igitur et modo. Igitur et nunc est intuitivasicud tunc. Consequentia patet per supra positam differentiam
interintuitivamet abstractivam,vel non-intuitivam.Et prima consequentia patet quia actus est formaleprincipiumpotentie tendendi in
obiectum, et non ipsum obiectum. Manente autem eodem principio
formali,sequitur idem effectusin eadem potentia eodem modo disposta. Idem enim ignis in eadem materia non est quandoque principium
30Aristotle,
Ethics
, X, 6; 1176bl.
31DunsScotus,op.cit.,XIII, 16; 544-545.
32inysicV C omittit
33ibidem
] sicV C idem
139

13:03:02 PM

unius effectus,quandoque alterius, nisi propteraliam dispositionem

materie.
34 Et confirmaturquod actus in propositonihil est nisi tendentia.
Et propterea talis relatio, si ponatur alia res ab actu, est posterioreo.
Et per consequens non dat actui motum tendendi in obiectum, lv/2r
quia motus est intrinsecusactui et presupponituripsi relacioni. Si autem relatio non sit alia res, tunc omnino nulla eritvariatio in actu ex
hoc quod res non existit.Et per consequens, si prius intuimuset modo
'
non, non dicitur 'intuimus" denominacione extrnseca,propterscilicet existenciamobiecti, quia eadem ratione abstractivaforetintuitiva
quando obiectum est, immo proptermotum tendendiin obiectum qui
manet idem dum actus manet idem, sive obiectum sit sive non. Et
ideo, si obiecto corruptomanet actus idem et prius erat intuitivus,igitur nunc.
35 Item, aut relatio est eadem res fundamento aut non. Si sic,
tunc eadem res manet et eadem cognitio,destructoobiecto, que prius.
Si non, non videturquod propterrelacionemdiciturcognitiointuitiva,
set quedam species qualitatis que non constituiturformaliterper relacionem.
36 Et confirmaturquia beatitudo nostra consistitin cognitioneintuitiva, et non videtur quod proptersolam appositionem34relacionis
fiatquis beatus et propterremocionem miser cum beatitudo consistt
in actu et actus potestesse eque perfectussine relacione sicud cum ea,
saltem si potest esse sine obiecto. Quod probatur per rationem
pretactam35quia, si Deus potest actum36istum conservarevel creare
sine obiecto, igituret istum actum eque perfectumin absentia obiecti.
Cum igiturpotentia non perficiturobiecto nisi mediante actu, eque
perfectaerit potentia et etiam actus absente obiecto37sicud presente.
Videtur igitur quod tam intuitiva quam abstractiva sit absolutum
quid, et ideo potest Deus causare illam et conservare sine obiecto.
37 Sed numquid naturaliterpossit esse sine ilio est magis dubium,
et potest suaderi quod sic. Nam secundo de Sompno et Vigilia dicit
Philosophus, secundo capitulo, quod singulis organis sentiendi inest
sensacio non solum agentibus sensibilibus38sed etiam abeuntibus.
34appositionem
] sicV C ppm
35pretactamsic
V C practicam
36actum] sic]V C actus
37obiecto
] sicV C obiecte
38sensibilibus
] sicV C sensibus
140

13:03:02 PM

Exemplificai autem in visu et auditu.39 Cum igitur virtualiter

exteriores40non sint abstractive,videtur quod sensacio manens post
abcessum sensibiliserit intuitivacognicio.
38 Confirmaturquod visibile non causat visionem eius nisi quia
immutetmedium, et medium immutatsensum, ut patet primo Physicorum, commento 12. 41Cum igiturimmutatione42medii, species scilicet causata in eo, si ponatur, potest aliquando43 manere in absentia
visibilis, ut videtur Philosophus dicere secundo De Sompno, ubi
prius.44Et exemplificaide motis localiter: post quietem primi motus,
movet unum aliud, et illud aliud donee defeceritvirtusprimi motus.
Sic autem, dicit ipse, est immutacio sensibilis. Et ideo recedenteprius
movente, quod est sensibile, potest medium ab eo motum etiam sensum movere, et per consequens causare in eo intuicionemsicut prius,
quia agens idem et paciens idem. Nec obstat quod sensibile non est
presens quod non agit in sensum nisi per medium; igitur,si medium
uniformiterse habeat, ipso presente et absente, uniformitercausabit
intuicionem.
39 Et, si dicas quod medium non potest per aliquod tempus uniformiterse habere sensibiliabsente sicud ipso presente,quamvis huius
oppositumdirectedicat Philosophus,45hoc tamen non solvit.Quia per
te, cum prima causa possit seipsa quicquid potestcum causa secunda,
potestsaltem facereseu conservaremedium uniformiterdispositumet
per eandem formam,in absentia sensibilis sicud in presencia. Cum
igiturforma,a quocumque causetur, equaliter et eque naturaliteroperetur,sicud oculus46productus naturaliteret reductus miraculose, et
sicud accidentia separata, quamvis non existentseparata per naturam,
tamen naturaliteragunt in sensum, sequitur a pari quod medium sic
immediate disposituma Deo naturalitercauset intuicionemin sensu.
Et habetur propositum.
40 Item, aliud potestesse experimentm.Ex poniturab Augustino, 11 De Trinitate, secundo vel sexto capitulo, quod, si quis diu
respiciatcorpus splendidum etc.47Et idem dicit Philosophus, secundo
39Aristole,
De Somniis.
2, in: op.cit.,28 A-F.
40exteriores
/ neV C exiiores
41Aristotle,
De Somniis,
2, in:op.cit.,28B.
42immutatione
sicV C immutacio
]
43aliquando
] C, F, V aliter
See n. 37.
45Ibid.
46oculus] sicV C oculos
47See n. 15.
141

13:03:02 PM

De Sompno, capitulo quo prius, sic dicens: 44Si ad solem perspicientes, vel aliquod splendidum, oculos concluserimus,observantibusquidem videtur secundum direccionemqua accidit visum videre.48
41 Sed fortediciturquod, oculo clauso, manet in eo quedam lux
prius causata a corporelucido, que lux videturet non corpus. Sed contra: eque videtur lux causata a lucido indigere presencia illius, sicud
intuiciopresencia intuibilis,quia lux non solum causatur a lucido sed
etiam conservatur,ut patet quia aliterad clausionem fenestrenon excluditurlumen.
42 Et potest addi ad rationem49immediate precedentem50quod51
intuicio habet unam causam conservantem in absentia obiecti,
scilicet52potentiamque est causa parcialis eius, lux vero nullam quia
solum est a corpore lucido effective.Igiturvideturquod minus potest
lux manere, absente lucido, quam intuicioabsente intuibili.53Et propterea avertaturoculus et aperiatur. Si manerettalis lux in eo possetalius oculus prope existensvidere illam cum sit in corpore terminato,et
excellenciorluce in medio. Et hoc iudicat sensus, et non decipiturcirca
proprium sensible. Oppositum autem consequentis apparet sensui.
43 Item tu numquam probares mihi quod videam corpus splendidum quia dicerem quod non corpus sed lucem ab eo causatam. Quia,
cum sensus uniformiteriudicet in absentia et presencia, non potest
manifestari,nec alia experientiadoceri, quod corpus est presensquam
quod absens quia per te eque est lux causata in absentia corporislucidi
sicud in presencia. Igitur etc.
44 Preterea, aliud experimentmponit Philosophus secundo De
Sompno, ubi supra, quod, aliquo velocitermoto, etiam ipso quiescente videt motum, ut patet de aliquo velociter moto circulariterqui
post54motum illum, in quiete, videtquasi motumceli et terrecirca se.
Idem55patet de aliquo moto in navi. Talis autem motus non est quia
nec in oculo, nec in medio, nec in obiecto, quia, etsi hec omnia quiescant quiete opposita motui locali, non minus videtursibi motus localis.
48See n. 40, 28D.
49rationem
] sicV C ram
50precedentem
V precedente
] C presedentem
51quod] sicV C quia
52scilicet
] C, F, V, quia
53intuibili
sicV C intuibilibus
54post] sic] V C prius
55Idem] sicV C Item
142

13:03:02 PM

45 Nec valet dicere quod non vidt motum sed speciem eius quia,
cum motus non immutetorganum nisi intencionaliter,non causai speciem in eo nisi eadem56sitmedium cognoscendi et videndi motum. Et,
si hoc, vel illa species est quando videturvel57non. Si sic, nunc causai
visionem motus sicut prius, per rationem prius factam. Si non, habetur propositum,quod scilicetsensibile non existens videtur.
46 Item. Ad idem est experimentmde aliquo ligno velocitermoto circulariterubi apparet circulus, cum tarnennon sit, et de bculo
aque immerso secundum unum extremum qui ideo apparet fractus,
cum tarnennon sit.
47 Item aliter non possent sensus illudi, cuius oppositum experitur. Quod etiam concedit Scotus, libro primo, questione prima, ponens quod visio potestesse rei absentis, ut patet in illusione sensuum.
Dicit tamen quod tales visiones non sunt ita perfectesicutvisionespresencium.58Sed dubium est verisimiletamen quod, si posset eque perfecta species causari in medio ab alia causa quam a re cuius esset,
quod eque perfectavisio foretin oculo, re non existentesicud existente. Nam causa immediata, que non movetura mediata nisi quia ab ea
producitur,causai eque perfectumeffectumprima non agente, si sit
eque perfecta,sicud ipsa agente.
48 Et si queris an naturaliterpossit causari eque perfectaspecies
in medio, absente obiecto sicud presente,non audeo hoc asserere,cum
non appareturexperimentaliter,nec etiam negare, cum tam largus sit
sinus nature ut a magis Pharaonis subito ex virgis fiant serpentes.59
Nec debet negari nature quod non potest probari repugnare nature.
Quicquid autem sit de hiis, satis est certumquod, saltem per potentiam Dei, quod cognicio intuitivapotest esse, non existenteobiecto.
49 Quomodo igitur2r/2v differuntabstractiva et intuitiva,dico
quod formaliterex se, ex natura scilicetintrinseca,60sicud quecumque
res seipsa61differta quacumque alia.62 Si autem queris de differentia
qua cognosciturhoc differreab ilio, videturmihi dicendum quod per
hoc differunt,
quod intuitivaferturin rem ac si esset presens, sive tamen sit presens sive non, abstractiva vero in rem non ut est presens
56eadem] C, F, V idem
57C, F, V, additquando
58Thisreference
couldnotbe located.
59Exodus
, VII, 8-13.
60intrinseca
] sicF C intrinca
61seipsa] sic
V C seipso
62aliaysicV C omittit
143

13:03:02 PM

sed abstrahendo ab omni differentiatemporiset loci vel situs. Sicud

autem abstractiva, quamvis non sit rei existentisut existentis,vel ut
est existens,potesttarnenesse existentisnon ut existensest, sic intuitiva, quamvis tendatin rem quasi existensest, potesttarnenesse rei non
existentisquasi tamen existeret.Intuitiva igiturest visio clara qualem
nata est res in existenciapropria causare et que tenditin rem ac si presens adesset, quamvis tamen non oportetearn semperesse presentem.
Abstractivavero minus perfectaest cognitio; nec tenditin rem ut est
presens sed magis abstrahitab omni differentiatemporaliet situali.
50 Arguunt tamen aliqui quod eadem cognicio sit quandoque intuitiva,quandoque non. Et primo sic. Cognitio intuitivalatitudinis,et
cognicio intuitivacorporis, possunt simul esse in intellectu.Igitur intellectuspotest illas componere. Igiturpotest illa propositioin memoria conservan. Igitur in abstractiva intellectuali potest illa cognitio
manere, et tunc not erit intuitiva. Igitur etc.
51 Item. Cognicio intuitivacause, secundum quod cause, est cognicio Creatoris, et tunc vel est abstractiva(et habetur propositum)vel
intuitiva(sed talis non habetur de Deo hic in via). Igitur etc.
52 Item, cognoscatur lapis abstractiveet postea presentetursensui. Tunc aut sit nova cognitioin intellectu,et desinitantiqua; aut illa
cognitioque fuit63abstractiva modo fitintuitiva;aut adquiriturnova,
cognicione manente antiqua. Primm non est dandum quia tunc posset lapis inmediate transmutareintellectumet corrumpereformamin
eo quia, si lapis visus64absentaretur,corrumpeturuna formaque prefuitin intellectu,et a nullo corrumpente. Nec ultimum est dandum
quia tunc intellectusagens non causaret illam cognitionem.Igitur relinquitur medium, quod est propositum.
53 Per predictam differentiamintuitive et abstractive potest
responden ad primm argumentum(50) opposite opinionis (25) quia
formalisracio intuicionis non est ferriin rem presentemsed ferriin
rem ac si presentialiteradesset, quod bene potest etsi res sit absens.
54 Ad aliud (26), cum dicitur"Posset aliquis esse beatus sine presencia Dei in ratione obiecti", negatur consequentia, et diciturquod,
ex quo Deus de necessitatenature sue est presens cuicumque, non potestvisio eius esse in aliquo cui non sitpresens ipsemet. Si tamen Deus
non esset ubique, et ipsemet vel alius posset causare visionem eius
indistinctam65ab eo (inquam visionem ciaram qualis erit in patria),
63fuit] sicV C fit
64visus] sicV C viso
65indistinctam
] C, F, V indistincte
144

13:03:02 PM

non videturquin talis foretbeatus, quia haberet in se formaliterbeatitudinem. Homo enim formaliterbeatificaturper visionem (vel fruicionem, non curo modo) et non per ipsum Deum nisi quatenus est obiectum, vel efficienssuam beatitudinem. Sicud enim impossible est albedinem inesse alicui quod non sit album, sic nec visionemet fruicionem
in alico quod non sit beatus.66 Antecedens autem huius deducti non
claudit contradictionem,ut verisimileest. Quod autem Deus de necessitate sit ubique patet Monologion, 14: "Necesse est", inquit,
4
'quod, sicud nihil factum est nisi per creatricem presentem essentiam, ita nihilvigeat nisi per eiusdem servantempresenciam". "Quod
si ita est, ydeo", inquit, "quia ex necessitateita est consequenter ut,
ubi ipsa non sit, nihil sit".67 Hec ille.
55 Sed fortedicis quod taliter beatificatusnon haberet quicquid
ordinateposset velie,68quia non ipsum Deum. Et per consequens non
foretbeatus quia, 13 De Trinitate, octavo vel 15, dicit Augustinus
beatum esse formaliterqui habet quicquid vult et nihil mali vult.69
56 Dico quod beatitudo ibi non accipitur pro alico uno actu sed
pro aliquo qui in se aggregat statum omnium bonorum. Et ilio modo
non est aliquis beatificatusnisi habeat quicquid vult. Deus autem aliterhaberi non potestnisi per inhabitantemgratiamper intellectumvel
voluntatem.Et ideo, si videturquod eo fruatur,et fruenssit in gratia,
sequiturquod ipse habeat Deum quia per gratiamet actum. Unde Augustinus, primo Soliloquiorum, capitulo secundo: "Videre Deum,
hoc est quod habere,,.7 Et De Beata Vita, in finem: "Hoc aio habere
Deum, id est fruiDeo' ' 71Hec ille. Et ideo, si videturDeus, et eo fruens sit in gratia, habet Deum per gratiam et actum quamvis per incompossibile ipse non foretpresens sibi.
57 Et fortesi72non esset presens non posset esse presens nisi esset
mutabilis, quod non est dicendum de Deo.
58 Ad aliud (28) conceditur quod possibile est non-ens videri in
Verbo quia anima Christi multa non-encia videt in Verbo.
59 Ad aliud quo potest instariquod scilicetmagis, vel saltem non
minus, dependet intuitivain esse absoluto quam abstractiva. Patet per
66beatus1C, F, V beatum
67St. Anselm,
omnia
, 14-15,in: Opera
, I, Stuttgart
1968,27.
68velieI sicV Monologion
C veliet
69St. Augustine,
De Trinitate
, XIII (VIII, II), in: op.cit.,396.
70St. Augustine,
, I (I, 3), in: PL, XXXII, 870.
Soliliquies
71St. Augustine,
De BeataVita
, cap. IV, 34, ibid.,976.
72Et forte
yC repetit
145

13:03:02 PM

differentiam
Scoti supra positam (2mA); 73sed cognitioalia, abstractiva puta scientia, per nullam potentiampotestesse sine obiecto74quia,
destructoscibili, destruiturscientia (in predictis,capitulo de "Ad aliud");75 igiturmulto magis intuitivanon potest esse sine obiecto.
60 Nec valet dicere quod, destructo scibili, destruiturscientia
quoad relacionem in ea quia ista non manet nisi manentibusextremis;
absoluter tarnenmanet. Contradictio est quod scientia sit et per earn
tamen nihil sciatur, vel quod falsum sciatur, quod tamen sequitur si,
destructoscibili, maneret scientia.
61 Ad istud dico quod est possibile de aliqua intuicionequod magis sine obiecto quam certa abstractiva, et alica abstractiva magis
quam certa intuitiva. Et, cum dicitur,destructoscibili, quod destruitur scientia, dico quod scientia non est nisi habitus alicuius complexi,
ut Philosophus ibi loquitur,76alicuius scilicetconclusionis vel princi77
pii. Et contradictioest talem scientiam esse nisi tale complexum sit
verum, saltem si terminicomponantur. Et ideo non78potest scientia
manere, destructoscibili et ventate complexi cuius est scientia. Si tamen tale complexum sit vel possit esse verum, destructoobiecto cuius
est (ut, si hec sit vera, homine non existente: "homo non est
risibilis''), tune non oportetscientiamdestruiad destruccionemobiecti cuius est. Sufficeretenim naturalitertunc ad habendam scientiam
quod maneretaliquid (vel aliqua) quod (vel que) possunt causare conceptus extremorum,et intellectuscomponens illos ad invicem. Si dicatur (posito quod ante hoc scivi A, et A nunc non sit) quod illud idem
quod prius fuitscitum79iam non est scitum,80contra: Tunc illud idem
in die milesies fieritscita et non scita vel ignorata, quod non videtur
verum. Unde dicitPhilosophus septimoMetaphysice quod de singularibus non est scientiaquia, illis abeuntibus, non manet de illisnisi estimado, quod non differetsi idem posset quandoque esse scientia,
quandoque non. Quia tunc sensibilis presents posset esse scientia
que, eodem absente, posset esse estimacio.81Et ideo Commentator
73See paragraph
tothesecondfolium
oftheoriginal
ma24. The 2mAis a reference
ofthiswork.
nuscript
74C add.it
necvaletdicere
75Paragraph
26.
76Aristotle,
Posterior
I, 2.
Analytics,
77principii
C, F} V,principium
]
78non] C omittit
scitum
JsicV L,scita
80scitum
/sicV C scita
81Aristotle,
.
VII, 15; 1039b27-1040al
Metaphysics,
146

13:03:02 PM

ibidem, commento54, dicit quod sicud necessariorumest scientia sic

sensibilium estimacio quia remanet eorum informacioin anima sed
non ita quod sit quis, per eum, certus.82
62 Item tu dicis quod, clausis oculis post visionem splendidi,videtur ibi lux, non corpus splendidum (41). Sed certum est quod sit
visum83quantum est ex iudicio visus: magis iudicat se videre corpus
splendidumquam lucem. Igitur,ex hoc quod videtlucem, non est certus de luce tali quod sit in tali situ, et sic sine corpore lucido. Item edam potest argui ex aliis experimentissupra positus.
63 Aliter dicitur,concedo, quod pro statu isto non potest aliquis
esse certusde existentiacuiuscumque rei ab eo distincteloco et subiecto, quia hic non potestscire an intuiciocausetur ab obiecto an non, et
ideo non potestiudicare an res in se sit presens an non; angelus tamen
vel anima separata potest,quia est causa parcialis intuicioniset potest
scire quando causai et quando non. Non enim causai nisi coagente
obiecto. Et ideo potest scire quando est obiectum presens et quando
non (16).
64 Sed contra istud sunt eadem media que prius. Si enim illa intuicio quando causatur a potentia et obiecto certificetvidentem de
existencia obiecti, igitur, si eadem intuicio seu cognitio causetur a
Deo, eodem modo certificabitquia idem, manens idem, semper facit
idem. Et propterea eadem cognitio que causatur a re potest manere,
ipsa re destructa,ut tu concedis. Igitur, si prius certificabit,et modo
ex quo manet invariata. Et, si dicis quod ex intuicionesola
certificabit,
non certificaturintellectussed ex hoc quod, quando intuiciocausatur
ab intellectu,consurgitquedem relatio in ipsa intuicione ad intellectum, producentisscilicetad productum,et intellectusvidens illam relationem 2v/3r seit quod causatur ab intellectu,contra: Supponendo
modo tecum quod sit talis relacio, potestDeus eque causare84cognicionem eius in te sine ista sicud cum ista sive scilicetsit sive non sit. Non
enim est maior ratio quare potestcausare intuicionemobiecti85sine eius existenciaquam relacionis, posito quod relatio possit videri. Et per
consequens non es magis certificatusex hoc quod vides relacionem
quam aliunde. Et propterea,posito quod intellectussit causa parcialis
cum obiecto, potestDeus, ut videtur,supplere vicem obiecti non sup82Averroes,
InMetaphysicam,
..ComLibri.
..cum
Averrois.
VII, comm.53,in:Aristotelis
mentariis
, Venice,1562,VIII, 202EF.
83visum] C, F, videns V visus
84causare/C repetit
85obiecti
yC, F, V abiecti
147

13:03:02 PM

plendo vicem potentie,ita scilicetquod Deus et potentiacausent intuicionem. Et tunc intuicionisad intellectumest relacio realis. Et tamen
ex hoc non potest videri quod obiectum sit.
65 Item, posito quod angelus posset scire, cum illa scientiasit absolutum distinctumloco et subiecto ab obiecto, posset manere sine ilio. Et per consequens posset angelus scire rem esse quando non esset,
quod est inconveniens.
66 Quantum igiturad istum articulum,distinguode certitudine.
Aliquando enim accipitur pro firmitateadhesionis prout distinguitur
contra dubitationem. Alio modo pro evidencia rei, prout scilicetdistinguiturcontra fidem. Primo modo est homo certusde articulisfidei
quamvis de illis non habeat noticiam evidentem vel scientiam. Non
enim dubitat aliquis fidelisDeum esse trinumet unum et tamen hoc
non seit aliquis viator. Secundo modo est noticia conclusionisevidens
deduete ex prineipiisper se notis, et noticia etiam principiiper se noti
ex teminis vel aliquo alio modo. Et ita certitudonullo modo secum
compatiturfalsitatem;contradiccionemenim claudit quod tu scias aliquam propositionemfalsam. Altera autem certitudo,quantum est a
parte sui, secum compatiturfalsitatem.Etsi enim fidei catholice non
subsit falsitas, tamen quantum est ex generali ratione fideibene stat
falsitas cum ea. Loquendo igiturde certitudinesecundo modo, dico
quod per nullum actum potestviatoresse certusde rei existenciaab eo
distincteloco et subiecto. Quia quelibet talis res est contingenset potest, ipso existente,non existere. Et omnem cognicionem possibilem
de eo potest Deus causare eque ipso non existente sieud existente.
Quare per nullam talem cognicionem potest esse certus quod existt.
(Deus autem non distinguiturloco a quocumque; et ideo, quamvis homo possit esse certusde eius existentia,tamen non est ad propositum).
Loquendo vero de certitudineprimo modo, sic potesthomo esse certus
de talibus quia, secundum Augustinum, septimo De Civitate Dei,
30: "Sic Deus res administraiut eas agere motus propriossinat."86
Et nono Metaphysice, commento septimo: 4'Qui auferta rebus actiones proprias aufertetiam essentias; et taies non habent cerebrumaptum ad bonum.''87 Et Damascenus, tertioSententiarum,15: "Quorum accio una, et substantiauna, et e contro. Quia unaqueque essena sanctia habet propriamaccionem.,,8S Unde hoc est ita uniformiter
86St. Augustine,
De Civitate
Dei, VII, 30; inPL, XLI, 220.
87See n. 82, IX, comm.7; 231HI.
88St.JohnDamascene,
DeFideOrthodoxa
, III, 15,6-7,in:DeFideOrthodoxa
, St.Bonaventure,
1955,232-233.
148

13:03:02 PM

tis et prophetisproclamatum quod non possum dissentire89quin res

causet suam accionem nisi oppositum mihi aliunde apparuerit et per
aliam causam, ut per revelacionemvel aliam causam. Et ideo sum certus tali certitudinequod modo sedeo in cathedra, et quod vos video, et
de talibus, quamvis de istis non sim certus secundo90modo.
67 Dicis, secundum hoc, quod perireiomnis via adquirendi scientiam per experientiamquia, ex hoc quod vides talem sanari post talem
pocionem, non sequitur quod ille sit sanatus post talem pocionem, sicud nec sequitur "Vides istum; igiturscis istum esse."
68 Item periret omnis demonstracio ab effectuad causam quia
non posset sciri quod aliquis effectussit a quacumque causa secunda.
69 Item sic accidentia non conferrentad cognicionem substantie,
contraPhilosophum,primo De Anima.91Consequentia patet quia non
posset sciri cuius substantieesset hoc accidens.
70 Item tunc moralis scientia non esset scientia quia, primo Ethicorum, capitulo secundo, non potesttanta certitudohaberi in moralibus sicud in mathematicispropterhoc quod materia moralis scientie
est contingensut operaciones humane, que se possunt aliter habere.
71 Item Lincolniensissuper primumPosteriorum,capitulo secundo: "Scientia communiterest veritatiscomprehensio, et sic sciuntur
contingentiaerratica. Scientia proprie est comprehensio veritatiseorum que semper vel frequenteruniformiteres habent."92 Sed per te
nec contingencia erratica nec contingencia naturalia93possent sciri.
Item 15 De Trinitate, 12 vel 32 capitulo: "Absit ut que per sensum
didicimus vera esse dubitemus.,,94
72 Ad primum istorum (67) dico quod, isto posito, potest experientiaesse causa occasionalis acquirendi scientiam. Verbi gratia, ponatur quod aliquis videat eclipsim et non tarnen sit eclipsis. Ex hoc
quod videt illam potestcredere illam esse, et sic causam eius querere,
et tandem deveniread istam propositionemscibilem: interpositioterre
intersolem et lunam est causa eclipsis. Vel ad istam: quocienscumque
interponiturterra inter solem et lunam, luna eclipsatur. Supposito
quod Deus lunam aliunde non illuminet,tarnenex visu solo non potest adquiri scientia huius: luna eclipsatur. Nec huius: talis herba sa89dissentireC distendereF, V, discentire
]
90secundo
] C, F, V primomodo
91Aristotle,
DeAnima,
I, 1; 402b15-25.
92RobertGrosseteste,
InAristotelis
Post.Anal.Libros
, Frankfurt
1966,I, 2; f.aiiv.
93naturalia
/C, F, V nata
94St. Augustine,
De Trinitate
, XV (XII, 21),493.
149

13:03:02 PM

nat. Philosophus tarnen,qui dixit Deum non omnia posse agere immediate, habuit dicere quod ex experiencia alio fortemodo quam occasionaliter, theologus autem non.
73 Ad secundum (68) quero a te unde seis quod iste est effectuset
hec eius causa nisi quia hoc sequitur ad hoc, et virtuteeius. Et hoc non
potes scire de alica causa secunda. Igiturnec, ex hoc effectu,potes arguere talem causam esse, demonstrativedicendo.
74 Ad aliud (69) dico quod accidencia conferuntad cognoscendam substanciam. Sed non sequitur: igiturad scienciam substancie,
ita scilicetquod ex illis possit sciri substanciam esse. Quomodo enim,
ex accidente quod95 potest inesse et non inesse, et non potest sciri
quando inestet quando non, potestconcludere scientificesubstantiam
esse?
75 Ad aliud (70) dico quod moralis sciencia, quoad illam partem
in qua tractat de necessariis et evidentibus intellectui,est scientia;
quoad illam partem in qua de contingentibus,non, isto modo loquendo de scientia. Qualis autem habitus sit, diceturubi diceturqualis habitus sit theologica.
76 Ad Lincolniensem (71) dico quod accipit scienciam pro firma
adhesione96prout scilicetdistinctacontra opinionem. Et isto modo est
fides scientia. Ad Augustinum, concedo quod ilia que per sensum didicimus non dubitamus. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ilia sciamus.
77 Ad oppositum autem principale est Ysidorus 10 Ethimologia'
rum, secundo: 'Credere non possumus que videmus."97 Et Augustinus similiter,Joannes, omilia 40: "Si vides, non est fides."98 Quod99
non esset nisi visio rei causaret omnem certitudinemrei et maiorem
certitudinemquam fidei quam secum non compatitur,ut volunt iste
auctoritates.Maior autem certitudoquam fideinon est alia nisi scientia, et maxime que non permittitsecum fidem. Igitur oppositum conclusions.
78 As istud dico quod loquitur secundum opinionemvulgi qua accipiturhoc tanquam manifestum,quod Deus permittitres agere proprias actiones. Hoc autem supposito tamquam scito, et cum hoc quod
nullus alius sensus nec ratio iudicat oppositum, sequitur quod in eodem lumine non crediturquod videtur. Illa tarnenpropositio quam
95quo] sicV C que
96adhesione
] sicV C adhesine
97St. Isidore,
Libri
, Vili, 2, in: PL, LXXXII, 296.
Etymologiarum
98St. Augustine,
In Iohannis
1954,355.
, XL, 9, Turnholti
Evangelium
99Quod] C, F, V quia
150

13:03:02 PM

omne concedunt sicud manifestam,scilicet, quod Deus administrt

res ut eas agere propriosmotus sinat, non est evidens ex terminis,nec
sequitur ex alico evidenti. Et ideo est tantum eredita. Et ideo quod ex
ea sequitur non oportetesse scitum, cum nec ipsa sit scita.
Houston, Texas
Center
Studies
for Thomistic

151

13:03:02 PM

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)
Reviews

in theLaterTwelfth
G. R. Evans,AlanofLille. TheFrontiers
,
of Theology
Century
Cambridge
(Cambr.Univ.Press)1983(249 pp.; 25.00).
AlanofRijssel(for"terijsel"wastheFlemish
nameofhisnativecity)is a problematicman:hisbiography
is a lacuna,histheology
an enigma,and hispoetry
a
thereare greatdoubtsas to chronology
ofhis
andauthenticity
Moreover,
mystery.
sodifferent
fields
as apology,
liberal
dialectics,
arts,
manyworks,
covering
preaching,
All mediaevalists
willagreewiththefirst
sentence
ofG.
exegesis,and casuistry.
Evans'latestbook:"AlanofLille(d. 1202-3)possessed
a richly-stocked
andmanysidedmind".Theywillalsoadmire
thedaring,
ifnottheboldness,
ofa modern
author
to do whathermedieval
heroneverdid,viz. toturnchaosintosystem.
venturing
Thelasttermmaysoundexaggerated
ifappliedtoa manwhocomposed
125regulae
and whosedistinctiones
dictionum
fillmorethan300 Mignetheologicae
theologicalium
columns.
research
andpastoral
Yet,hisrestless
care,his
activity,
combining
scholarly
enormous
fromlearnedpoemsto theological
and
dictionaries
productivity
ranging
and his itinerary
Parisianschools,Cistercian
homiliaries,
practical
including
(and
and heretical
in Southern
monasteries,
France,seemchaotic
disputes
Benedictine?)
therangeofanomnivorous
mind.Truly,hewasa "doctoruniverenoughtoillustrate
salis" and,as such,a typically
to be classified
in a 'system',
elusiveman,refusing
seemstheintention
ofMrs.Evans.
this,however,
Precisely
ofthePreface
...; helovedsubtleDespitethewarning
("Alanisnotan easyauthor
andobscurity",
statesfrankly:
"We must
tyandcomplexity
p. viii),herIntroduction
- nottosaygrandiose
- framework
lookatAlan'sworkas a whole,within
thegrand
of
histheological
purpose"(p. 12).AndherTableofAlan'swritings
(p. 14-19)suggests
thatall hishighly
different
hisowntheological
works"are setoutwithin
scheme"(p.
14).
tothestructure
ofherbookthisschemeis verysimple.After
but
a short
According
useful'Who'swho'(p. xiv-xviii;
in thesamewayas inherbookonAnselm
anda new
and a generalIntroduction
, Oxford1980,p. xiv-xvii)
generation
(p. 1-14),PartI
inthree
the"TheologiaSpeculativa"
soto
describes,
chapters,
(p. 21-85),thetheory,
PartII, in chapters
4 and5, dealswiththe"Theologia
speak,ofitsobject,whereas
Practica"(p. 87-132),whichaimstoapplythetheological
toa goodChristian
subject
life.The thirdParthas a somewhat
different
approach;undertheheading"The
Man" (p. 133-165)
itsonechapter
6 synthetizes
Alan's'anthropological'
conperfect
in "thegrandview:MakingMan Anew".
cepts,culminating
Of course,thissimpleschemehas to be filledup. The authorsubdivides
the
"speculative
theology"
(PartI) in twosections:
"TheologiaRationalis"(ch. 2, p.
studiesthedivineand
64-80)and "TheologiaMoralis"(ch. 3, p. 81-85).The first
itmaybe called"superior"or"coelestis";theseconddeals
therefore
angelicnature,
anddoctrine
withmatters
ofethicswhichcompared
tothematters
offaith
inthefirst
Thegreatest
section
or"subcoelestis".
of
however,
portion,
maybe called"inferior"
152

13:03:07 PM

on the"Handmaidsof
PartI is occupied
bya largeandin factintroductory
chapter
andthinking
Theology"
(p. 21-63),i.e. theliberalartsandthenewrulesofspeaking
whichAlanappliedtohis'speculative
theology'.
Thesubdivision
ofthe"practical
Herethetwo
theology"
(PartII) isquitedifferent.
arecalled:"Expedimenta"
chapters
(ch.4, p. 87-101)and"Impedimenta"
(ch.5, p.
andthings
imi.e. things
which
oradvancethescienceoftheology
promote
102-132),
it.The lastonesareinfacttheobjections
"withwhichheretics
pedingorobstructing
... createstumbling-blocks
toorthodox
forinstance
theCreedsarefull
faith",whereas
with"expedimenta"
sounddoctrine
tothefaithful.
teaching
wonderifitwas
The schemewouldseemto be simpleand clear.Butonemight
as so manyothers
didbefore
Alan'sscheme.Of course,he madethesedistinctions,
To makethem,however,
thepillarsofa
him(HughesofSt Victorforinstance).
is another
ofa theological
thecorner-stones
reconstruction,
story.In her
'system',
whichhe
conclusions
Mrs.Evansstates:"He (Alan)alwayshadplentiful
materials,
hislisteners"
(p. 167).She mayhavemadean
putintoorderso as notto confuse
ForinAlan'sview,both"theologia
herreaders.
whichcouldeasilymislead
ordening
as wellas "practical";and "exrationalis"
and "moralis"can be "speculative"
too.Evans'
or "impedimenta"
maybe foundin"speculative
theology"
pedimenta"
hersubdivisions
ofPartI regard
titles
ofPartI andII regard
thelevelofapplication,
or negative
thecontents,
and thesubdivisions
of PartII thepositive
approachof
nonestadaequata!Of
In otherwordsand in scholastic
jargon:distinctio
theology.
ofthe
knowsthatverywell,as is testified
course,theauthor
byherowncomposition
hasitbeenclarified
above.Nowhere,
tableofAlan'sworkmentioned
however,
why
ofthebook
withthemainstructure
thatintroductory
scheme
is sowholly
inconsistent
thatfollows.
Alan'scosmological,
inthatitaimstoconnect
PartIII is better
political
organized
visionofthe
and anthropological
views(p. 137-147)withhisfinal(eschatological?)
and hisposition
in theworld
'homoperfectus":
hisbody,hismindand character,
of
section(p. 147-152)givesa suggestive
qualification
(153-165).Its intermediate
Alan'smostfamous
as "a theological
laudianus,
experiment"
(It is a pity
poem,Antic
arenotlistedin theTableofContents).
thatthetitlesofthesmaller
subdivisions
of
A short
conclusion
Appendices
(on theauthority
(p. 166-171)andtwotechnical
De
De artecatholicae
and,strangely
, p. 172-187,
fidei
enough,on PetertheChanter's
thisoriginal
studywhich,however,
byitsmany
trop
loquendi,
p. 188-197)conclude
notes(p. 198-230;
unfortunately
theyhavebeenputattheendofthebook)anditsextheauthor'sdebtto so manyscholars
tensive
bibliography
(233-245)acknowledges
whohavestudied
oftheIndex,finally
onthisenigmatic
man.Theshortness
(247-249),
doesnotexplainwhynotall thepersonal
namesarelisted,or,whengiven,notallthe
nor
toAlan'sworks
arefarfrom
complete),
pagesarementioned
(eventhereferences
areindexed.
andfivegeneral
whyonlytwoLatinterms
concepts
at
thisbookin itsentirety,
as a stimulating
itmustbe qualified
study,
Considering
leastintworespects.
notonly
Firstofallbecauseitsupplies
us witha lotofmaterial,
and poetsas wellas
from
Alan'sworksbutalso fromhis'colleagues',
philosophers
andarTheauthor
doesnotisolatenorexaltherherobuttriestodescribe
theologians.
inconfronticulate
his'novitas',
Alan'snewwaysandepistemological
'experiments',
A seandopinions
ofpreceding
andcontemporary
thought.
tingthemwithsolutions
condstimulus
ofMrs.Evans'bookisherstress
onAlanas a theologian,
indeeda venandat the
oftheology",
anddaringone,at timesgoingbeyond"thefrontiers
turing
- andthisis stressed
sametime
a rather
eclectic
and
byEvanstoo- inmanyrespects
traditional
whoperhapsshowsmoreaffinity
withthefirsthalfof the
theologian,
twelfth
ofthetheological
than"withthelatertwelfth
Heranalyses
century
century".
function
as a
ofthe"artes"(in chapter1) and herapproachof theAnticlaudianus
stimuli
of
be themostfruitful
experiment
theological
(in chapter
6) willpresumably
thisbook.
153

13:03:07 PM

Nevertheless
itmustbe addedthatthesetwoadvantages
havetheir
too.
drawbacks
withandiuxtaposition
ofother
doesnotonThecontinuous
confrontation
theologians
thereader
withthecourseoftheexposition
butthreatens
alsotooverwhelm
lyinterfere
I had theimpression
to havelearntmore
details.Sometimes
withmanydiverting
andPeterofPoitiers
aboutother
thanaboutthecenforinstance)
theologians
(Gilbert
of theauthor'sintention
and
tralfigureof thebook.It is partlya consequence
The seconddisadvantage
nothavebeen
ofcomposition.
ofhermanner
might
partly
the
The vividlighton Alanas a theologian
inevitable.
eclipsesalmostcompletely
askedbyHuizingainhisfamous
articleUber
ofthepoet.Theurgent
questions
figure
inthe
beiAlanus
deInsulis
dieVerknpfung
mitdemTheologischen
desPoetischen
(mentioned
in thistheological
in thenotes)arenotanswered
butquotednowhere
bibliography
- theological
Alan'schoiceofpoetry
musthavemoresignificance
significance
survey.
ofhistheological
a little"(p. 151)orto
innovation
too!- than"to cloaktheaudacity
in waysto whichpoeticalimageslend
allow him "to treatideas associatively
themselves"
(p. 152).Huizingaand,inourdays,Dronkehavegivenus morefoodfor
thought.
andstimulating
bookmaygivea
remains
So, there
enoughtobedone.Thisoriginal
research
on him"qui totumscibilescivit".
newimpulsetofurther
Nijmegen

JanvanLaarhoven

AlexanderBroadie,George
Late-Scholastic
, Edinburgh
Lokert,
Logician
(Edinburgh
University
Press)1983,pp. 252,17.50,ISBN 0 85224469X
toourknowledge
contribution
ofa periodinthehistory
Thisbookis a mostwelcome
beenpaidtoit.Itsfirst
oflogicthatdeserves
moreattention
thanhashitherto
chapter
acinwhichthephilosophical
offers
a detailed
ofthehistorical
circumstances
picture
and suchotherScottish
tivities
of Lokert(c.1485-1547)
logiciansas JohnMajor,
de Hangest
andJerome
WilliamManderston
David Cranston,
RobertCaubraith,
of
ingiving
a verylively
andsympathetic
tookplace.The author
succeeds
impression
thefruitful
betweenthecollegesofParisand thenewlyfounded
intellectual
traffic
in thosepre-reformation
universities
Scottish
years.Whattomostofus wereat best
havethusbecomeinteresting
ofa logic-text
personalities,
justnameson thetitle-page
The restofthe
ofgreatlocalimportance.
in a richcultural
movement
participating
ofthe
it is a competent
and faithful
bookhas a quitedifferent
flavour;
exposition
thatfits
ina lucidandrather
ofLokert's
mainfeatures
style
impersonal
logicalworks,
thesubject-matter
verywell.
about
hastosayaboutterms,
moreinparticular
2 dealswithwhatLokert
Chapter
between
and aboutthe difference
and supposition,
the notionsof signification
theusualdistinctions
It further
andhypothetical
highlights
propositions.
categorical
and synamong terms:mental,spokenand writtenterms,categorematic
and non-ultimate
terms,absoluteand connotative
terms,ultimate
categorematic
terms.
andsecondintention
intention
and first
common
and singular
terms,
terms,
that
views
on
Lokert's
3
concentrates
is,
propositions,
concerning
exponible
Chapter
in whichsuch
and propositions
and reduplicative
exclusive,
propositions,
exceptive
occur.Due attenandsuperlatives
andcease
orcomparatives
verbsas begin
essentially
a
hastobecarried
outincaseswhere
theexposition
tionis calledtotheorderinwhich
In
thatinvites
morethanoneproblematic
contains
analysis.
expression
proposition
andillustrated
4 thenotionofconsequence
is introduced
bythelawsregardchapter
andthelawsofthe
thevarioustypesofproposition
between
ingthelogicalrelations
toa
thatwillbe mostfamiliar
It is thischapter
traditional
doctrine
ofthesyllogism.
coursein thatpartofsystematic
modern
reader;itcouldstillserveas an elementary
154

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)

13:03:07 PM

of thetheory
of opposition,
logic.Chapter5 is devotedto Lokert'selaboration
understood
as therelationship
thatare contradictories,
conbetweenpropositions
In thatconnection
traries
or subcontraries.
attention
is drawnto thespecialquantifiers
thatweredevisedinordertoformulate
therulesbywhich,
givenanyproposiis to be constructed.
or subcontrary
These
tion,itscontradictory,
opposite
contrary
as Ofsome
rulesbecomerather
whensuchforms
B some
A is notC are
complicated
takenintoaccount.Finally,aftera briefepilogueconcerning
Lokert'splace in
from
medieval
added42 pagesofLatintexts,mostly
logic,theauthorhashelpfully
butsupplemented
A
Lokert's
fromMajorandCaubraith.
works,
bysomeexcerpts
a bibliography
andan indexconclude
thebook.
listofLokert's
works,
published
On thewhole,the authordeservesour gratitude
forthissolidand carefully
whichwillno doubtbe ofgreatassistance
to thoselogicians
designed
monograph,
whowanttoacquaintthemselves
withan unduly
neglected
phaseinthedevelopment
oftheirsubject.The following
havethesamepositive
remarks
purpose.Practically
thesolepassagewheretheauthor's
is histreatgripis a bitlesssurethanelsewhere
mentofreduplicative
propositions
pp. 102-106;cf.pp. 221-223).Ofsuch
(especially
there
arefourtypes:
A insofaras itisB isC, Every
A insofaras itisB
propositions
Every
isnotC, andthenegations
either
ofthesetwo.Eachtypecanbe analysed
concomitanter
orcausaliter.
Lokertmentions
thesecondkindofanalysis,
he concentrates
Although
on thefirst
kind.It is therefore
touse thewordcause(in theAristotelian
misleading
thatis
withtheway of analysing
reduplicative
sense)in connection
propositions
ourselves
tothefirst
concomitanter.
was
Now,ifweconfine
clearly
type,itsanalysans
A is C andEvery
A is B andEvery
B is C andIf
usuallygivenas theconjunction:
Every
is B, then
itis C (in theparaphrase
shouldbe conditional
on p. 103condition
,
something
and similiter
shouldnotbe translated
or uniformly
, butratherbyequally
,
bylikewise
inall fourcases).A concrete
maninsofaras heisranamely,
examplewouldbe Every
tional
is risible
is rational
itis risible
as thefourth
Lokert,
, withIfsomething
exponent.
as Ockham(Summa
deviates
from
suchwriters
, II, 16),Burleigh
however,
logicae
{De
artis
tractatus
, II, 2, 2, 3, ed. Ph. Boehner,
p. 175ff.)andJohn
longior
puritate
logicae
theform
Si rationale
estrationale
,
Major(thisbook,p. 223)inthatheapparently
prefers
estrisibile.
His rule is thatin the antecedent
of the fourth
exponentthe
ipsum
ofitssynonym
or ofa transcendental
term{deeius
termis predicated
reduplicated
sinonimo
veltranscendente
Mr.
), but in pointof facthe alwaysuses thesynonym.
can be made
Broadiefindsthispuzzlingand offers
an explanation
which,I think,
and moreplausible.According
to Burleigh
exposimpler
(p. 177,179),thefourth
a consequentia
necessaria
nent,iftrue,expresses
, as opposedto themerely
contingent
Or, as Ockhamputsit, theconseuniversality
expressed
by thethirdexponent.
ad
a speciesand a genus{ab inferiori
quenceis ofthesamenatureas thatbetween
thatarelogically
twopropositions
orbetween
equivalent
{exunoconvertibilium
superius)
Thismeansthat,givena trueantecedent,
theconsequent
is trueof
sequitur
reliquum).
Casesin whichtheantecedent
is nottrueorcannotbe true,aretherefore
necessity.
A genuine
is a conditional
inwhichthe
andirrelevant.
uninteresting
counterexample
is trueorat leastassumedtobe true,buttheconsequent
is false.In that
antecedent
as false,
the conditional
Si a esthomo,
a estcoloratum
spirit,Ockhamconsiders
Dei homo
essesine
glossnotes)becauseperpotentiam
potest
presumably
(as a marginal
inEucharistia.
It seemstomethatLokertprefers
sicut
dicendum
estdeChristo
colore,
forte
inordertoensurethetruth
oftheantecedent;
theform
Si rationale
estrationale
andthat
is rational
itis bestreadas Ifsomething
toberational)
, or
(thatindeed
happens
accordingly
as Iftheantecedent
is rational
is true.
that
something
Anotherpointconcernsthe objectionthatsome of the fourexponents
are
ofthe
superfluous.
Major,forinstance
(thisbook,p. 223),heldthattheconjunction
secondand thefourth
on thegrounds
that
exponent
yieldsa sufficient
analysans,
thesetwoentailthetruth
ofthethird
thefirst
andthat,moreover,
exponent
exponent
155

13:03:13 PM

to thisobjection
follows
fromthesecondand thefourth.
Lokert(p. 222) refers
by
to beginwiththata reduplicative
can be satisfactorily
mentioning
proposition
cumultima
conditionali.
Thissentence
is followed
analysed
exponentes
by
perduasprimas
Et itavidetur
datedempta
, translated
quodsufficiunt
byBroadieas "and
exponentes
prima
thusitseemsthattheaforementioned
aresufficient".
Thiscannot
(three)exponents
The
be right:
thefirst
cannotbe simultaneously
included
andeliminated.
exponent
can be solved,I suggest,
Etiam(or Et item)
forEt itaand
by substituting
difficulty
- fortheelimination
Etiam
as thewordbywhichthesecondground
ofthe
considering
is
This
first
introduced.
emendation
is
confirmed
byLokersreplytothe
exponent
he first
deniestheallegedredundancy
ofthefirst
objection.
exponent
Chiastically,
theredundancy
and subsequently
ofthethirdexponent.
Broadiefindsbothrefutahavea closerlookat eachofthem.
tionspuzzling.Letus therefore
ofthecriticism
thatthefirst
Lokersrejection
canbe inferred
from
the
exponent
is basedon theconsideration
secondandthethird
thatas a rulethisis true
exponent
withregardto reduplicative
ofthefirst
and thesecondtype,sincein
propositions
ofthereduplicated
thosecasesdistribution
termis notblocked;
butthatthesameis
nottrueforall fourtypes{Inomnibus
illudnonestverum
tamen
utpatet
Well,
consideranti).
thefirst
threeexponents
ofa reduplicative
ofthefirst
A is
proposition
typeare:Every
A is B, andEvery
B is C. A syllogism
oftheform
B is C, Every
A is B;
C, Every
Every
A is C is valid;thereduplicated
But
term,
B, is atleastoncedistributed.
Every
therefore
ifwetakea reduplicative
ofthethird
ofoneof
proposition
type,whichis thenegation
thefirst
B is C, or the
ofEvery
type,and supposethatit is madetruebythefalsity
truth
B is notC, thenthesyllogism
ofSome
hastheform
Some
B isnotC, Every
A isB;
A is C. Andthatsyllogism
is notvalid,becausenowthemiddle
term,
B,
therefore
Every
is twiceundistributed.
Beforeturning
to Lokersrejection
of thecriticism
thatthethirdexponent
is
itis perhaps
worthwhile
toaskourselves
superfluous
whyitwasthought
wrongheaded to reducetheexponents
to a numberthatis lessthanfouroffive.Ockhamand
formofa reduplicative
is theproposiBurleigh
agreethatthestrongest
proposition
tionthathastobe analysed
causaliter.
Sucha proposition
hasfiveexponents:
ifitis of
thefirst
isB, then
itis C,
above,theconditional
type,thethreementioned
Ifsomething
anda lastproposition
totheeffect
thatB is thecause(in theAristotelian
sense)ofC.
Without
thefifth
theproposition
can stillhavea sensethathas to be
exponent,
Theseexponents
can be regarded
as a conjunction
oftruthanalysedconcomitanter.
but at thesametimetheyalso markthedifferent
conditions,
pointsat whicha
so thatitsnegation
can be falsified
becomestrue.Let us
reduplicative
proposition
takesomeexamples
fromOckhamand Burleigh.
Homoinquantum
habens
animam
inestsusceptibilis
tellectivam
offivetests,
oneafter
passesthewholeconjunction
disciplinae
theother.Homoinquantum
estsusceptibilis
risibilis
failsthelasttest,
, however,
disciplinae
so thatitcan be takenonlyas reduplicative
concomitanter
, butnotcausaliter.
Further,
inquantum
Socrates
esthomo
three
estalbuspassesthefirst
tests(assuming
thateveryman
is white),
butis falsified
failstobe true:although
there
bythefactthattheconditional
is a contingent
thereis no consequentia
necessaria.
On theotherhand,the
universality,
Socrates
inquantum
estanimal
esthomo
doesnotevenhavea truethird
exproposition
animal
esthomo
is alreadyfalse.Andalongthesamelinethesecondand
ponent:Omne
thefirst
tolookat therest.The
exponent
mayprovetobe false,so thatitis needless
- in thatrolethey
truth-conditions
then,do notonlyserveas positive
exponents,
- but theyare also indications
of theseveralwaysin whicha
mightbe reduced
assertion
exreduplicative
maygo wrong.Andifwe wanttoknowinwhichrespect
assertion
is at fault,eachofthefouror fiveexponents
is inactlya reduplicative
at eachpointon thelinefromthefirst
to the
dispensable.
Theoretically,
exponent
fifth
a falsification
is possible;
andtheimportant
is thatineachcaseitwillbe a
thing
falsification
are
fora different
reason.Moreover,thepossibilities
of falsification
156

13:03:13 PM

tobe false,there
is
ina certain
thefirst
ordered
exponent
happens
way:ifforinstance
andso on.
no needtocontinue
theexamination,
thatthethird
to return
ofthecriticism
to Lokersrejection
Nowwe areprepared
Omnis
deusin
is supported
His rejection
is superfluous.
bytheproposition
exponent
thatitis falsified
estens, ofwhichhe contends
ensnecessaro
protertia
exponente
quantum
deusnecessario
estens,
are Omnis
The first
threeexponents
ofthisproposition
precise.
thata medieval
Omnis
deusestens
ensnecessario
estens.Assuming
, andOmne
philosopher
twotests,
believes
thatthere
isonlyoneGod,theproposition
passesthefirst
naturally
conditions.
Of course,itwoulda fortiori
ofthefurther
butfailsto meettheweakest
butthatis irrelevant
whenithasbeen
and thefifth
on thefourth
strand
exponent,
totranslate
falsealready
It is seriously
rendered
misleading
pro
bythethird
exponent.
tertia
as "bythethird
alone",as ifthefourth
exponent
might
exponent
exponente
precise
hasbeen
thatoncethethird
notbe false.WhatLokertmeansis, I submit,
exponent
of
to one meaning
can be brokenoff(according
foundto be false,theexamination
. At thesametimeone has thenexactlyisolatedthepointat whichthe
prae-cidere)
proposition
primarily
goeswrong.
reduplicative
Leiden

GabrielNuchelmans

inEnglish
Renaissance
TheMagician
Necromancers'.
BarbaraHowardTraister,
Heavenly
ofMissouriPress,1984).xii + 196pp.
Drama(Columbia,Miss.: University
Price DFL 89.05. EuropeanDistributors:
Harper & Row, Publishers,
The Netherlands.
68, 1221AB Hilversum,
Noorderweg
magicmustformanypeoplehaveplayeda roleroughly
DuringtheRenaissance,
- mystifying,
oftenmerely
to thatof sciencefiction
alarming,
today
comparable
notwiththesubjectin
is concerned
Dr
s
Traister'
book,however,
entertaining.
ofthemagician
butwiththeepiphenomenon
stage,inthe
upontheEnglish
general,
is probably
wise:others
theCivilWar.Thelimitation
hundred
(notably
yearsbefore
remains
thewiderissues;toTraister
FrancesYatesandKeithThomas)havetreated
stillcapable
a surprisingly
smallcorpus,ofwhichthespecimens
thetaskofanalysing
ofdramatic
appealmaybe reducedto fiveplays:RobertGreene'sFriarBaconand
D'Ambois
Friar
Marlowe'sDrFaustus
;
; GeorgeChapman'sBussy
; Christopher
Bungay
in
Traister
TheTempest
; and Milton'sComus.
givesa generalsurvey
Shakespeare's
If the
thendevotesone chapterto each of theforegoing.
herfirsttwochapters,
- thoughthereare several
is a trifle
obvious,theresultis competent
methodology
havebeenbroadened
out.Forexmightto advantage
placeswherethediscussion
a stagerof
as
activities
receive
short
Ben
shrift;
Prospero's
parodies
ample: Jonson's
of HernotonlywithPaulina'srevivification
showsmighthavebeenconnected,
in
Tale(p. 132),butalso withtheDumbShowselsewhere
mionein TheWinter's
and theauthoroughtsurelyto havecontrasted
Pericles)',
Shakespeare
(e.g., Hamlet,
of the
of Prosperowithhis caricature
seriousportrayal
Shakespeare's
apparently
IV: PartOne).The bookhas a good
Welshmagician,
Owen Glendower
{Henry
ofMericCasaubon's
discussion
butreaders
liketonotea recent
bibliography,
might
thetitle)in: WayneShumaker,
withAngels
(to abbreviate
JohnDee's Conversations
Renaissance
Curiosa
N.Y., 1982),pp. 15-52.
(Binghamton,
is thechild
Traister
claimsthatthedramatic
In herbrief
magician
opening
chapter
and mediaevalromance,and thatthe
of theunionof Renaissance
neoplatonism
firstfruits
ofthisunionaretobe seenintheromance
epicsofBoiardo,Tasso,Ariosto
is a noblesoul,in themouldof
andSpenser.Putsimply,
theneoplatonic
magician
andspiritual
intellectual
everstriving
forgreater
PicodellaMirandola,
illumination,
157

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)

13:03:13 PM

an unlettered
whilethemagician
ofromance
is characteristically
freak
(e.g.,Merlin),
wellprovided
withpotions,spellsand glasses,but one whois deficient
in high
ofthefirst
is tobe,ofthesecondtodo. Thegeneralisation,
seriousness.
Thefunction
likemanyothers,
butdemands
foronething,
a magimaybe helpful,
qualification:
in TheFaerie
ofComus
ciansuchas Busirane,
themasquefigure
, anticipates
Queene
thephilosopher
of
otherprotagonists,
rather
morethanTraister's
and,foranother,
Tale, is clearlyan intellectual
of
Orleans,in Chaucer'sFranklin's
type,suggestive
withthedramatisation
ofthe
As thepresent
out,theproblem
Prospero.
studybrings
one:howtogivevisibleandnarrative
form
wasa practical
tomental
magician-hero
akintothoseofPico,Agrippa,
achievements
BrunoandDee, whileat thesametime
theattention
ofthegroundlings.
The result
Faustus
is typified
,
holding
byMarlowe's
andrather
dethtre.
withitsuncomfortable
combination
ofheroicrhetoric
sillycoups
account
Traister's
ofFaustusis surely
whenshestresses
theself-delusion
which
right,
leadsFaustustosignthewitch'spactwiththedevil:forhertheplay'presents
a very
viewofman'spossibilities'
pessimistic
(p. 106).
thatthecrucialcontrast
withProspero
It is inthisveryrespect
mustbe made,the
becausehe knowshislimitations
and works
magicianwhois successful
'primarily
within
them'(p. 135). TheTempest
is distinguished
notso muchbythe
productively
of magicas by therenunciation
whenpolitical
is
thereof:
harmony
performance
thereis no longeranyneedforsuperhuman
itis in
restored,
powers.Paradoxically,
thismostromance-like
ofplaysthatwe findperhaps
theonlyfully
treatsatisfactory
mentof the magician'smentaldrama,and theendingshowsthediscarding
of
in favour
ofa reaffirmation
ofhumanvalues.Thattheplayis goodtheatre
wizardry
toTraister,
from
thefactthatitis 'theculminating
treatment
... of
derives,
according
rather
thanHamlet
magic'smetadramatic
possibilities'
(p. 145).Forher,Prospero
wouldbe thedramatic
heromosttruly
oftheRenaissance.
representative
The authornotesthedwindling
ofthemagician's
theatre
rolein post-Restoration
sheis silent,however,
and mentions
theetiolated
on hersubject'sreKingArthur:
in the age of Romanticism,
the age of Goetheand Die Zauberflte.
emergence
Traister's
bookremains,
a usefulexploration
ofa restricted
field.
nonetheless,
A. MacDonald
Alasdair

Nijmegen

BooksReceived
Le carte
delmonastero
diS. Salvatore
di Vaiano
(1119-1260
), a curadi RenzoFantappi,
Societ Pratesedi Storia Patria,Prato1984,252p.
Le carte
delmonastero
di Coiano
diS. Martino
(1159-1464
), a curadi RenzoFantappi,
Societ Pratesedi Storia Patria,Prato1982,131pp.
''
. Introduzione,
Ducciodi Amadore
e commento
di
, Il Cincturale"
testo,traduzione
CesareGrassi,Societ di Storia Patria,Prato1984,161p.
Aldo Landi,Il papadeposto
nelGrande
Scisma
, Claudiana
(Pisa1409).L'ideaconciliare
Editrice,Torino1985,333p. ISBN 88 70160254
T ranslated
TheLetters
from
theLatinbymembers
Ficino.
oftheLanguage
ofMarsilio
of the Schoolof EconomicScience,London.Prefaceby Paul
Department
OskarKristeller,
GingkoPress, 1985,3 vols. (repr.London1975)ISBN
0 805260005/6001
3/60021
e Valdismi
e proposte
diricerca
medievali.
Itinerari
Grado G. Merlo, Valdesi
, Claudiana
Editrice,Torino1984,158p. ISBN 88 7016015 7
158

Vivarium
XXIII, 2 (1985)

13:03:19 PM

undBcherP. so Mller /Carl Pfaff,Thesaurus

Fabariensis.
DieReliquien
-, Schatzverzeichnisse
imLiberViventium
vonPffers.
von Werner
Mit einerEinfhrung
Vogler,St. Gallen1985,134p. ISBN 3 90804804 4
A critical
Nicholas
Elements
editionwith
ofMethone,
ofTheology.
Refutation
ofProclus'
an introduction
D. Angelou,The
on Nicholas'lifeand worksbyAthanasios
Academyof Athens/ E. J. Brill, Athens-Leiden
1984,LXXXII & 204 p.
ISBN 90 04 077499 (CorpusPhilosophorum
MediiAevi:Philosophi
Byzantini,
vol. 1)
A Synthesis
Peter
in LatinofMoraliainJobby
Remediarium
Conversorum.
of Waltham,
theGreat
, editedby JosephGildea,O.S. A., Villanova University
Gregory
Penn.-LondonandToronto
Press/
AssociatedUniversity
Presses,Villanova,
1984,492p. ISBN 0 845345079
AlbertClementShannon,O.S. A., TheMedieval
College
, Augustinin
Inquisition
D.C. 1983,VII & 153p. ISBN 0 96123361 3
Press,Washington,
William
5 ofRulesforSolving
andminima.
,
, On maxima
Chapter
Sophismata
Heytesbury
withan anonymous
discussion.
withan Introduction
Translated,
fourteenth-century
and Study,byJohnLongeway,
D. Reidel Publishing
DordrechtCompany,
Boston-Lancaster
1984,X & 201p. ISBN 90 277 18687
de
Lectures
mdivales
de Virgile.
Actesdu Colloqueorganispar l'cole franaise
Rome(Rome,25-28octobre1982),cole Franaisede Rome,1985,443 p.
ISBN 2 72830083 6 - Contents:
Introduction
parJ.-Y. Tilliette;L. Holtz,
La redcouverte
conservs
de Virgile
aux Vili e et IXe sicles
;
d'aprsles manuscrits
Il Virgilio
del
etla renaissance
duXllesicle
B. MnkOlsen,Virgile
; G. Billanovich,
dansla littrature
desexempla
sicles
Petrarca
; J. Berlioz,Virgile
(XlIIe-XVe
giovane
);
Insulamegenuit.
L 'influence
del'Enide
latine
duXIle sicle
surl'pope
;
J. Y. Tilliete,
chezles matres
; P. Klopsch,Mittellateinische
parisiens
L.-J. Bataillon,Virgile
etla posie
P. Bourgain,Virgile
latine
dubasMoyen
Les
Bukolik;
Age; J. Monfrin,
vernaculaires
de Virgile
au Moyen
De l'Enide
translations
Age;Ch. Marchello-Nizia,
: lesattributes
dufondateur,
A. Roncaglia,Les troubadours
et Virgile
l'Eneas
; A.
Presenza
di Virgilio
e tracce
?; P.
Limentani,
d'epicalatinaneipoemi
franco-italiani
C. Beaune,L'utilisation
du mythe
des
Dronke,Integumenta
politique
Virgilii;
enFrance
lafinduMoyen
liber
Maronis
origines
troyennes
Age;M. Oldoni,L'ignoto
et lesavatars
auxerrois
medievale
tradotto
dall' antico;
G. Lobrichon,
SaintVirgile
de l'Eneidedansles manuscrits
de la IVe Eglogue;
J. Courcelle,Les illustrations
duXeauXVesicle;
Conclusions,
parPierreGrimai.
Comitatus.A Journalof Medievaland RenaissanceStudies,vol. 15 (1984) ' in
4
: Chaucer's
Contraire
Contents:
G. TurleyHouston,' White
Effect
byBlack'
the
Translated
D. Martin,Selected
Troilus
andCriseyde;
(LovePoems)
from
Ghazalyt
Classical
Persian
' Sa'd,andRm;M. E. Ralston,TheFourDaughters
ofKhqni
A. Van Velzen,Two Versions
oftheFuneral
ofGodin TheCastell
'
' ' ofPerseverance;
Carew's
"... ElegieUpon... Donne"
.
Elegy.
Henry
King's TheExequyandThomas
undGemeinsamkeiten.
von
Vortrge
herausgegeben
Renaissance-Reformation.
Gegenstze
Wiesbaden
1984,297p. ISBN 3 447024763
Buck,Otto Harrassowitz,
August
- Contents:
F. Baudouin,Religion
undMalerei
nach
AugustBuck,Einfhrung;
Humanismus
inItalien;
E. Iserloh,
derNiederlande;
A. Buck,Christlicher
derTeilung
inderitalienische
S. SeidelMenchi,
undKatholische
Renaissance;
Reform
Evangelismus
in derSpiegel
deritalienischen
undReformation
Humanismus
Inquisitionsprozessakten;
Brunos
: Giordano
Verhltnis
zu den
nemico
e d'ogni
P. R. Blum,D'ognilegge
fede
mitdem
Humanismus
inderSpanischen
K. Kohut,DieAuseinandersetzung
Konfessionen;
Kritik
zur
anRonsard;
H. Holeczek,Erasmus'
Kl. Ley,Calvins
Scholastik;
Stellung
Melanchton
H. Schreible,
zwischen
humanitatis
undKirchenreform;
: Studia
Reformation
in derAuseinanderB. Hgglund,
Die Frage
derWillensfreiheit
Luther
undErasmus;
Stadtstaat
und
zwischen
Erasmus
undLuther;
H. R. Guggisberg,
setzung
Reformierter
159

13:01:59 PM

: Baselin derzweiten
des16.Jahrhunderts
Zentrum
derSptrenaissance
; G. R.
Hlfte
zwischen
Renaissance
in
undZusammenarbeit
undReformation
Elton,Auseinandersetzung
undReformation
vonRenaissance
in der
; J.-D. Mller,Zum Verhltnis
England
L. Finscher,
Die musikgeschichtliche
des16. Jahrhunderts
deutschen
Literatur
Folgen
";
LeuteKinder
derReformation
". Frsten; N. Hammerstein,Grosser
frtrejflicher
Humanismus
undReformation
zwischen
; R. Toellner,Die medizinischen
erziehung
derReformation.
Fakultten
unter
demEinuss
in theMiddle
TheTradition
the
Niels J. Green-Pedersen,
Ages.TheCom' ' of Topics
mentaries
andBoethius
onAristotle's
, PhilosophiaVerlag, MnchenTopics'
Wien1984,459p. ISBN 3 88405046X
ascribed
toGerard
TheLatintranslation
version
oftheArabic
ofEuclid'sElement
commonly
editionand critical
Introduction,
by H. L. L. Busard,
apparatus
ofCremona.
E. J. Brill, Leiden1984,XXVIII & 503col. ISBN 90 04 075968
etlatin
deCopenhague),
Vol.44(1983)
duMoyen-Age
del'Institut
Cahiers
grec
(Universit
- Contents:
Some
Remarks
onthe
St. Ebbesen,IGLM25years;
G. Amargianakis,
; G. Stathis,The
, OxeiaandKouphisma
, Petaste
Orthography
oftheSignsOligon
A Short
andPostbyzantine
; A. D. Conti,
Compositions
ofByzantine
"Abridgements"
' William
The'Compendium
universalia
Scotist
Handbook
onUniversais:
super
quinqu
of
Revisited
Russell
Instantiae
In; St. Ebbesen& Y. Iwakuma,
, OFM; Y. Iwakuma,
"Schools Chr.Knudsen,
Dasgewisse
Wort.
and12thCentury
stantiae
Johann
Georg
Tradition
undVernunftkritik'
M. Sirridge,
Socrates'
Hamanns
zwischen
Sprachtheorie
inJordanus
andKilwardby'
K. Tachau,Peter
andSyntax
Aureol
Hood.Lexical
Meaning
Intuitive
S. Balle,Anonymous
andthe
onIntentions
ofNon-existents'
quaestiones
Cognition
onFuture
Richard
Lavenham
deastronomia
inCLM 14401; P. 0hrstrom,
;
Contingents
Table ofContents.
Cahiers1-44
Vol.45(1983)
etlatin
deCopenhague),
duMoyen-Age
del'Institut
Cahiers
grec
(Universit
- Contents:
A Byzantine
Treatise
onMusicalTheory.
TheHagiopolites.
Preliminary
editionbyJ. Raasted(99 pp.)
etlatin
deCopenhague),
Vol.46(1983)
duMoyen-Age
del'Institut
Cahiers
grec
(Universit
- Contents:
L. O. Nielsen,Compendium
St. Ebbesen,K. M. Fredborg,
logicae
Christi
250:A ManualofPorretan
Docexcodice
Oxoniensi
Porretanum
Collegii
Corporis
A
Porretanum:
trine
; Chr.J. Martin,TheCompendium
logicae
bya PupilofGilbert's
theSchool
ofGilbert
ofPoitiers
Logic
from
Survey
ofPhilosophical
Cahiers
de l'Institut
du Moyende Copenhague),
Vol. 47
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
Annette
andMorning
Psalms
(1984)- Contents:
Jung,TheSettings
oftheEvening
Sinai1255' B. MnkOlsen, TheCistercians
totheManuscript
andthe
According
Classical
Culture
& StenEbbesen,Thirteenth
notes
on William
; JanPinborg
Century
Treatise
onProperties
AnEdition
et
Dubitationes
ofSherwood's
ofTerms.
ofAnonymi
notabilia
circaGuilelmi
de Shyreswode
introductionum
V from
Tractatum
logicalium
msWorcester
Cath.Q. 13.
Cahiers
de l'Institut
du Moyen-Age
de Copenhague),
vol. 48
grecet latin(Universit
P. Weincke,
A NewPageofAndreaskiti
18; B. Schartau,
(1984) - Contents:
MusicinDenmark
; B. SchartauandJ. Raasted,Indices
Manuscripts
ofByzantine
totheGreek
in Constantin
Floros
Neumenkunde
III ; J. Raasted,
, Universale
Examples
1'
Zur Analyse
der bulgarischMelodiedes Doxastikons
griechischen
Bogonachalnim
'
4
manoveniem"
or Variant
A Pariser
; B. Schartau,Mini-Gloss
; F. S. Pedersen,
Astronomer
of1290'St. Ebbesen,Radones
quodsic.

160

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