Vivarium

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22
1984

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13:15:34 PM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXII (1984)

Jerold
. Frakes

TheAncientConceptofcasus and
itsEarlyMedievalInterpretations 1

Paul M.J.E.Tummers

AlbertusMagnus'Viewon theAngle
withSpecial Emphasison His
and Metaphysics
35
Geometry

JoelBiard

L'unitdu MondeselonGuillaume
Ockham

BooksReceived

63
84

ThomasS. Maloney

RogerBacon on Equivocation

85

P MarijkeVan Der Biji

- Les
PetrusBerchorius
Redivivus
Sermonsde Bersuire

113

JohnP. Doyle

Prolegomenato a StudyofExtrinsic
Denomination
intheWorkofFrancis
121
Suarez,S.J.

13:15:34 PM

Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
The AncientConceptof casus
and its Early Medieval Interpretations
JEROLD C. FRAKES

is that
The essential conflictin Boethius' De Consolatione
Philosophiae
between the principlesof divine order and random events. The problematic is articulated primarilyin terms of the relationshipbetween
the Boethian Prisoner and the personifiedFortuna, the traditionally
is
ficklecontrollerof earthlygoods. Ultimately Fortuna (and fortuna1)
over
control
denied any intrinsicvalue,2 as well as any independent
worldly affairs,since she is subjected to fatum, the manifestationof
divine ordoin the material world, and thus also to divine prouidentia
itself.By thismeans Fortuna is integratedinto the divine ordo, and the
seeming disorder caused by fortunain the world may be explained as
the result of man's epistemological limitations: instances of the
metaphysical hierarchywhich exist on a higher level than man are
beyond his powers of comprehension.3Even afterthe Prisonerhas accepted Philosophia's specificarguments concerningfortuna,however,
he is not yet prepared to accept the abstract principle necessitatedby
this analysis: i.e. that the all-encompassing divine ordoprecludes the
existence of any and all random events.
Thus Boethius presents in Cons. V, pr. 1 a brief analysis of the
abstractconcept of casus. This treatmentis heavily dependent on the
Aristotelianand post-Aristoteliananalyses, but Boethius omits much
1 A terminological
and sometime
between'Fortuna',thepersonification
distinction
in thefollowing
is maintained
, thegeneralconceptof fortune
deity,and 'fortuna'
pages.
2 Thisdenialofvalueisbasedon threearguments:
the
togrant
1) Fortunas inability
bonm
onetruegood,thesummum
goods,
(II, pr.iv,25); 2) thelackofvalueinmaterial
to
duetotheirinherent
andarbitrary
gainandloss,i.e. without
regard
ephemerality
tothedivineorderandthus
ultimate
merit
subjection
(II, pr.iv- pr.viii);3)fortuna's
aretotheediifepistemologically
action(IV, pr.vi).References
obscure,
teleologica!,
1957.
tionoftheConsolatio
byLudwigBieler,CCL 94, Turnhout
3 On theepistemological
see myDie
restrictions
imposedbyBoethius'metaphysics,
zur
durch
undNotker
desBoethius
derneuplatonischen
, in:Beitrge
Alfred
Metaphysik
Rezeption
106(1984).
Geschichte
derdeutschen
SpracheundLiteratur,
1

13:15:42 PM

of the traditionalmaterial and incorporatessubtle alterationsinto his

argument, especially in changing the emphases of the Aristotelian
presentation, resulting to a certain degree in a new definitionof
chance. The concept naturallyundergoes furthermodificationsin the
of
post-Boethiantradition. The firstattemptsto assimilate the system
in
the Consolatio the vernacular were the translations by Alfred the
Great in the ninthcenturyinto Old English and by Notker Labeo at
the turnof the eleventhcenturyinto Old High German. They further
modifythe traditionderived fromantiquity, not only by translating
the text of the Consolatio
, theirprinciple source forthat tradition,but
also by attemptingto translate Boethius' systemof thoughtin such a
fashion as to render it accessible to their own cultures. The present
study investigatesthe concept of casus as it is developed by Boethius,
Alfredand Notker in the context of the tradition. The analysis must
then begin by establishingthis context,and thus Aristotle'sdiscussion
of the topic mustbe brieflytreated,since his was the firstfullexamination of the problem, which then throughBoethius' adaptation became
the basis formedieval analyses.
Aristotledevotes threechaptersof his Physics(II, 4-6) to the problem
of chance, the firstof which deals with the concept as treatedby his
predecessors, especially Democritus.4 Various partial theories of
chance are mentionedin II, 4 only to the extentnecessaryto show that
a fullanalysis of the problem had not yetbeen conducted. Many ofthe
pre-Socratic philosophersdenied the existence of chance, an opinion
stronglyrefutedby Aristotlein II, 5: "For we know that thingsof this
kind are due to tuchand things due to tuchare of this kind"
(1965-17).5 His argument is a detailed analysis of the nature of
chance events. He firstdistinguishesbetween three kinds of events:
the necessary, the usual and the unusual (1960-15). Among the
4 On Aristotle's
andFatefrom
Fortune
conceptof chance,see VincenzoCioffari,
Democritus
toSt. Thomas
Solmsen,
Aquinas
(Diss. Columbia1935),1-32;Friedrich
InWorld
Aristotle's
Mansion,
, Ithaca,NY 1960,102-108;
System
Augustin
ofthePhysical
la physique
2nded., Louvain1946,292-314;W. D. Ross,
troduction
Aristotlicienne,
undZufallin der
Aristotle
, 5thed., London1949,75-81;HeleneWeiss,Kausalitt
ofchancein Democritus,
see
desAristoteles
, Basel 1942.Fora discussion
Philosophie
andEpicurus
Atomists
, Oxford1928rpt.NY 1964),121 &
CyrilBailey,TheGreek
ofBailey'sinterpretation,
andCioffari,
1-15,esp.hiscritique
139-143,
p. 6 ff.Henry
Aristotle's
ofchanceandBoethius'
Chadwick
characterizes
concept
interpretabriefly
: TheConsolations
tionofit,in Boethius
, Oxford
, Theology
, andPhilosophy
, Logic
ofMusic
1981,119& 244.
5 Citedaccording
ot
s Physics
toAristotle
, ed. W. D. Ross,OxfordlyJb.iranslations
thisandall otherpassagescitedin thefollowing
pagesaremyown.
2

13:15:42 PM

unusual events are those which are to be called chance events,

characterizedalso by theiroccurrenceperaccidens( katasumbebkos
), i.e.
incidental to the final cause (196b23-24).6 Additionally, and despite
the factthattheyare unexpected and unintended,chance events serve
a purpose and thus have teleologicalimport(1967-22). The example
given is of a man who decides to go to the market, which he rarely
does, and while there meets one of his debtors, who happens to have
just made some collectionsof his own and is thus able to repay his own
debt (196b33 - 197a5). The repayment was neither expected nor
directlysought at that time, but it was indeed a teleological event,
since it served a purpose and would have been sought,had it been anticipated. As Vincenzo Cioffaripoints out in referenceto another of
Aristotle'sexamples of a chance event, the discoveryofthe buried gold
A, 30; 1025al4-19),7 the farmer's discoveryof the gold,
{Metaphysics
while plowinghis fieldis attributableto chance, while his findingdead
leaves would not be, since it would have neitherpositive nor negative
value.8 Finally, chance is by nature inconstant(197a30-32). Aristotle's
preliminarydefinitionof chance ( tuche)is thus: "It is evident thenthat
tuchis an incidentalcause in connectionwiththose actions forthe sake
of something which involves a deliberate choice ( kata proairesin
)"
(197a5-6).
In PhysicsII, 6, however, Aristotleproposes a twofolddistinctionin
the concept of chance, hithertoconceived as a unity:9between tuch
and automaton.
The distinctionis not altogetherclear as elucidated by
has two significations:1) it is the generic
Aristotle,since automaton
termsignifyingchance events in general, including tuchas a subclass
(197a36 - 197), and 2) it denotes the species of chance events which
affectinanimate objects, beasts and children- all of which participate
in nature (phusis) but not in intelligence(nous)- i.e. theiracts are not
deliberateand purposeful(197b6-13). Tuch, on the otherhand, has to
do with those events which come about as a result of the intentionof
rational beings- those which participatenot only in phusisbut also in
nous(197-6 and 1978-22).10
6 On theexceptional
andaccidental
nature
ofchanceevents,
seeRoss,Aristotle
, 75and
18-24.
Cioffari,
7 Ed. byW. D. Ross,Oxford1924.
8 Cf.Cioffari,
83.
9 Thedistinction
is already
at inII, 5 (197a6-8)inthelinking
hinted
oftuche
, proairesis
anddianoia.
10Herethedistinction
isbetween
andproairesis
phusis
(197b22);andlateritisbetween
anddianoia
andnous(198a5-6andMetaphysics
K, 8 1065b4).
phusis
(198a4)andphusis
3

13:15:42 PM

In addition to this analysis of the physical nature of chance, Aristotle also examines its metaphysical nature in order to determine its
causal function.In II, 5 he already notes that chance is no more than
an incidentalcause: 4'and tuchis an incidentalcause, but strictlyit is
are in factinthe cause of nothing" (197al3-14). Tuchand automaton
mentioned:
cidental to the two efficientcauses already
from
areandhowtheydiffer
whatautomation
andtuch
Nowithasbeenexplained
of
eachother.Bothbelongto thetypeofcauseswhichdealswiththemanner
oran intelligent
a natural
foreither
agentis alwaysthecause,butthere
changes,
ofsuchcauses.(198a1-5)
is an infinite
number
This being the case, tuchand automaton
only simulate the teleologyof
the efficientcauses, since theyproduce resultswhich ostensiblymight
have been produced by nous and phusis (and in fact are caused by
them), respectively(198a5-6); the simulation is due to the essential
as unintentional,indeterminateand
character of tuchand automaton
incomprehensible.To take the instance of the buried gold as an example: the burierof the gold hid the treasure(efficientcause) withthe intentionof later recoveringit (final cause); the farmerdug his field(efficient cause) withthe intentionof planting(final cause). His discovery
of the gold is thus incidental to both final and both efficientcauses,
which is however, not to say withoutcause: that the gold was in his
fieldand that he plowed his fieldeach has a clearlydiscerniblecausal
series. That the two 'accidentally' coincide is chance. As Ross aptly
4
summarizes, 'chance is simplya name forthe unforeseenmeetingof
two chains of rigorous causation."11
Thus Aristotle integrates even chance events into his system of
causality. In doing so, he points beyond the immediatepurposes of his
argument, as in indicated at the end of II, 6:
orphusis
be
forwhich
nous
arecausesofeffects
andtuch
Butsinceautomaton
might
and
comestocausethesesameeffects
thecause(whensomething
incidentally),
is priortothatwhichisperse, itis clearthatno
whichis incidental
sincenothing
to
areposterior
andtuch
causeispriortoa causeperse.Thusautomaton
incidental
nomatter
howmuchautomaton
andphusis
nous
; consequently,
maybe thecauseof
and
andphusis
arenecessarily
theheavens,
nous
priorcausesofboththeuniverse
in it.(198a5-13)
manyotherthings
Just as substance must always be antecedent to 'accidents' (attributes
and Ross(ed.
naturalimpulseandthought,
is between
In eachcase thedistinction
in thissense.
areusedsynonymously
andproairesis
thatdianoia
, 518)suggests
Physics
11Aristotle
m
tothatusedinlaterdevelopments
hereis similar
, 78. Ross terminology
causisin Cons.V, pr.i, 13; seebelow,pp. 8-10.
thetradition:
exconfluentibus
4

13:15:42 PM

and relations),12so must determinateand teleological causality always

underlie chance events. The cosmos and all events and acts contained
by it are caused and purposeful.This cosmic order, only hinted at in
Aristotle'stechnicalanalysis of chance, becomes Boethius' overriding
concern and determineshis method of dealing with chance and incorporating casus into his metaphysicalsystem.
The definitionof chance in Boethius' Consolatiohas legitimately
been labelled Aristotelianin its general plan. That it strictlyadheres to
Aristotle'sanalysis, however, as H. R. Patch suggests,is untenable.13
Boethius' argument also makes use of post-Aristotelianthought,and
his definitionof the concept of casus, at least in the Consolatio
, is much
less detailed than Aristotle's. This brevitymust not be understood as
an indication of disregard, however. The discussion of casus is set
ratherin the contextof the whole of the Consolatio
, withwhich it forms
a unity and fromwhich it indirectlyderives furtherdefinition.Fortuna, traditionallythe vacillating controllerof the material realm, is
reduced to a low-levelministerin the divine order, responsibleforthe
distributionof material goods, by means of which men are rewarded,
punished, correctedor tested.14Casus in the popular sense of causeless
events is denied by Boethius, since the divine order permeates all
aspects of the material realm. His technical analysis, set in this context, has differentpoints of emphasis and proceeds somewhat differentlythan does Aristotle's.
The firstindication that such an analysis of the physical concept of
chance is in the offingcomes in IV, pr. v, after Philosophia has
presentedher case forthe problem of evil and the ultimatepunishment
of the wicked in theirinabilityto attain the summum
bonm(IV, pr. iv).
Here the Prisoner once more voices his dissatisfaction with
Philosophia's recurringargumentin favorof a beneficentorderingof
events. His complaint here seems to differonly in degree fromhis initial emotional lament in I, m. i:
12Aristotelis
ed. L. Minio-Paluello,
Oxford1949,cap. IV-V (Ib25-4bl9).
cateeoriae,
13PatcharguesthatBoethius'
is merely
the"personification
ofAristotle's
'infortuna
cause'whichis ultimately
cidental
to a rational
subservient
deity"[TheTradition
of
Boethius
: A Study
inMedieval
Culture
, NewYork1935,118].Certainly
ofHisImportance
theBoethian
andchancecouldbe related
insomesuchmanner
Fortuna
the
(although
is actually
muchmorecomplex),
and
buttheidentification
ofAristotelian
relationship
Boethian
chanceis inaccurate.
14IV, pr.vii,3. Fortuna
themediation
is subordinate
of
todivineprovidence
through
fatum
(IV, pr.vi, 11& 19)
5

13:15:42 PM

wonder
arechanged
"Now I greatly
around,viceversa
, andthe
whythesethings
whichareduethewicked
thegood,whilethewicked
seize
punishments
oppress
therewards
duethegood,andI wouldliketolearnfrom
youwhatmight
appear
tobe theexplanation
ofsuchunjustconfusion."
(IV, pr.v, 4)
But the differenceis in fact much greaterthan merelyone of degree,
'
'4
forthe Prisoner no longer complains of his personal fortunes,' but
inquires into the nature of a philosphical concept, which he, the
erudite student of philosophy, has found in all systems of ancient
thought.Philosophia's argumentationhas shown that the confusionof
random events, ruled byfortuna
, does not obtain; rather,a rigidsystem
of divine order regulatesthe cosmos. The acceptance of thistenetdoes
little to placate the Prisoner's inquietude, however: "since he frequently grantsdelightsto the good and unpleasant thingsto the wicked, and at other times, grants the wicked theirwishes, while meting
out harshness to the good, why should God's rule seem any different
casibus), unless the cause be
from that of random chance (<a fortuitis
discovered" (IV, pr. v, 6). The confusionin the world is no longer attributedto the personifiedFortuna, since she has disappeared fromthe
work(afterthe firstsectionsof Book III), dispelled fromthe Prisoner's
mind by Philosophia's remedia.The underlyingconcept of random
casibus, remains, however, and is dealt within V, pr.
chance, a fortuitis
1, where the dichotomybetween the supposed orderof the cosmos and
the chaos of everyday actuality is finallyeliminated. As such, this
discussion of chance in V, pr. i is the logical and necessaryconclusion
to the problemoffortuna,as stated in Book I, and not at all a tangential
problem, as Philosophia hints that it mightbe (V, pr. i, 5).
Interveningbetween this last complaint in IV, pr. v and the explanation of chance in V, pr. i are two prose passages and two metra,
in one of which is found Philosophia's expositionof the nature of and
During this discussion, she
relationshipbetweenfatumand prouidentia.
mentions almost as if it were an offhandremarkthat since prouidentia
controlsall things,nothingis leftto chance: "For a certainorder embraces all things, so that whatever departs fromthe appointed order
revertsto another, albeit differentorder, so that nothingin the realm
of providence is leftto chance ( temeritati
)" (IV, pr. vi, 53). The second
the
notion
that "all fortunais absolutely
concerns
interveningpassage
good" (IV, pr. vii, 2), since it is part of the divine plan.
The way has been prepared, therefore,for the final definitionof
chance by also making it subordinate to prouidentia
, which can only be
as
well.
chance
Philosophia denies
beneficent,therebyrendering
good
6

13:15:42 PM

immediatelythat chance exists at all, if defined as random events

without cause: "If indeed anyone were to define casus as an event
(ieuentus
) produced by random motion ( temerario
motu)and not by a
causal nexus, then I would declare that casusis nothingat all" (V, pr.
i, 8). The initial argument presented concerns the all-embracing
divine order: "For what place can remain forrandomness ( temeritati
)
when God imposes order on all things?'' (V, pr. i, 8). Secondly,
Philosophia calls on ancient philosophical authorityin the use of the
phrase nihilexnihiloas a denial of chance events (V, pr. i, 9). Her use
of this topos is strikinghere since it has a novel application. In the
philosophicaltradition,its application had always been to the originof
matter,whichnecessarilyexistedwithoutbeginningand end, whereby
creatio
ex nihilois denied.15The Christian doctrineof divine creation of
matter adamantly opposes such a tenet, of course, and as August
Hildebrand has pointed out, Boethius was oftencastigated by Christian interpretersfor followingthe pagans here.16 But Philosophia's
purpose at this point is obviously quite differentfromany denial of
divine creatioex nihilo. Rather, using the phrase in a new sense
concerning causality- she emphasizes even more stronglythe illegitimacyof a concept of chance which is based on the principle of
causeless events. In addition, by using the phrase, she manages at
least indirectlyto derive some semblance of authorityfromthe ancient
philosophers.
The dissatisfactionof the Prisonerwiththis total denial of chance is
expressed in words which already hint at the conclusion of
Philosophia's argument: "Well then, is there nothingwhich can proOr is there
perly be called chance or accidental ( casus uelfortuitum)?
somethingto whichthese termsare appropriate,althoughhidden from
common people?" (V, pr. i, 11). This query calls forththe thirdof
Philosophia's arguments concerning chance, this time based directly
on Aristotle,as Philosophia herselfindicates: "My Aristotledefinedit
"
17
succinctlyand near the truthin his Physics (V, pr. i, 12). The initial
definitiongiven is indeed drawn fromPhysicsII, 5, but it is also clear
thatthe definitionis strippedof a number of its essential components:
15See Joachim
De consolatione
zu Boethius
Gruber,Kommentar
Philosophiae
(Berlin
1978),379-80on theuseofthisconcept
priorto Boethius.
16AugustHildebrand,
Boethius
undseine
zumChristentmer
1885,
Stellung
Regensburg
90-93.
17Grubercites
from
thepre-andpost-Aristotelian
thelatter
of
traditions,
examples
whichmayhavebeenofimportance
in Boethius'
analysis
(pp. 380-81).
7

13:15:42 PM

' 'Whenever

somethingis done forthe sake of some particularpurpose,

and forcertain reasons somethingoccurs otherthan what was intend"
ed, it is called casus (V, pr. i, 13). The immediatelyfollowingexemplum, that of the gold discovered by the plowing farmer,does not
It is introducedby Boethius
occur in Physics
, but ratherin Metaphysics.
4
as conciselyas by Aristotle: 'As, forthe example, ifsomeone digging
in the ground in order to cultivate a field were to find a quantityof
gold" (V, pr. i 13). The subsequent explanation of the exemplum is,
however, not found anywhere in the works of Aristotle,but seems to
have been derived from ancient commentaries on the Aristotelian
text:18
tohavecomeaboutfortuitously
butitdoes
Nowthisis indeedbelieved
(fortuito),
and
notresultfrom
nothing
(denihilo
); forithasitsowncauses,theunforeseen
a chance
concurrence
ofwhichseemsto haveproduced
unexpected
(concursus)
ofthefieldhadnotdugtheground,
Forifthecultivator
andifthe
event(casum).
hadnotburiedhismoneyinthatplace,thegoldwouldnothavebeen
depositor
whichis produced
found.Thesearethusthecausesofthatfortuitous
profit,
by
one anotherand comingtogether
sibietconfluentibus
causesmeeting
(exobviis
theonewhohidthegold,
oftheagent.Forneither
causis
), notbytheintention
thefieldintended
themoney
tobe found,
northeonewhoworked
but,as I said,
andcomesabout(concurrit)
thatwheretheoneburiedit,the
ithappens(conuenit)
otherdug.(V, pr.i, 14-17)
While Aristotle'sexplanation (note 7, above) deals only with the notion that the findingof the treasure is incidentalto the digger( tioruttonti
), and thus by extension incidental to the final cause, Boethius is
concerned not only with the resultas incidentalto the finalcause ( non
exgerenti
intentione
prouenit
), but also withthe meetingof two streamsof
et
obuiis
sibi
causality (ex
causis). Based on the explicationof
confluentibus
this exemplum, Philosophia gives her final definitionof casus: "Thus
we may definecasus as an unexpected event due to the conjunctionof
causes (ex confluentibus
causis) with action done forsome purpose" (V,
difference
of note between thisdefinitionand that
The
1,
only
18).
pr.
offeredin V, pr. i, 13 is the phrase exconfluentibus
causis, a formulation
18PierreCourcelle
from
theNeoplatonic
schoolinAlexanarguesfora commentary
on thePhysics
andPhiloponus
thecommentaries
, based
dria,probably
bySimplicius
onthatworkbyAmmonius
dePhilosophie
onthe(nowlost)commentary
[La Consolation
deBoece
Antcdents
etPostrit
dansla tradition
littraire.
, Paris1967,213-19];healsopoints
treatment
ofchanceand thediscussion
outthesimilarity
between
theBoethian
by
in histractDeJato[Boece
Alexander
ofAphrodisia
etVcole
d'Alexandrie
, in: Mlanges
hasunconvincingly
etd'Histoire,
52(1935),esp.p. 218].JanSulowski
d'Archologie
as thesourcehere,since"Boethius'
ontheTimaeus
Porphyry's
commentary
proposed
'
ofPlotinus"[?]: TheSources
allotherworks"[sic]depend"on thatdisciple
ofBoethius
in:
68.
De consolatione
29
Philosophiae, Sophia (1961),
8

13:15:42 PM

which does not occur in Aristotle, nor does any expression of an

equivalent thought. Yet, as Cioffaripoints out, the phrase and idea
had long been part of the tradition,used by Simplicius, Themistocles
and in the Pseudo-Plutarch; in Chalcidius' commentary on the
Timaeusa similar phrase is found:19
evenfortune
be defined
thus:fortune
istheconTherefore,
{fortuna
) canproperly
currence
oftwocoincident
causes{concursus
.. . cadentium
causarum
which
duarum)
an intention;
from
deriveinitially
from
thisconcurrence
is
something
surprising
thatwhich
wasintended
cum
in
produced
beyond
spent
(praeter
admiratione).
{Comm.
Tim.159)20
The significanceof the phrase for Philosophia becomes clear in the
next sentence, which puts chance, newly defined, into relationship
with the otheraspects of the Boethian metaphysicalsystem: "But the
concurrence(iconcurren
of causes is effected
) and confluence {confluere)
by thatorderwhichproceeds by the inevitablecausal nexus and which
descends fromthe providentialsource, orderingall thingsin theirproper places and times" (V, pr. i, 19). Thus, chance events are not uncaused, but, mediated by the hierarchyof metaphysicalinstances, indeed caused by prouidentia
itself.In fact,the explanation is reminiscent
in its terminologyof the discussion of the cosmic order itself,where
conceives and fatumexecutes (IV, pr. vi, 7-8). In this way,
prouidentia
casus(in its reduced sense) also becomes an integradpart of the divine
ordo. The only reason fordesignatingevents casu at all seems to be that
they are unintentional and unexpected by humans. Chance is,
therefore,as already hinted at earlier in the prosa, a name devoid of
meaning, an inanisuox(V, pr. i, 8).
The specific
details of Aristotle'sdefinitionof the concept of chance,
already modifiedin the post-Aristoteliantradition,are omitted from
the Consolatio
. The omission is, however, not due to Boethius' lack of
understandingof the conditions inherentin Aristotle's definition,for
he examines themin detail (with specificreferenceto the Physics)in his
commentaryon Cicero's Topica. He notes that thereare threetypesof
events: 1) necessary ("immutable and always, as the rising of the
sun"), 2) usual ("frequently, as a horse born with four legs"), 3)
unusual ("rarely, as a horse withfiveor threelegs") [In top.Cic. comm.
V; PL LXIV, 1152C-D]. Among the unusual acts are those termed
19Cioffari,
91. See alsoGruber,381,on othersimilar
phrasesusedin thetradition
before
Boethius.
20Ed. by H. Waszink,
PlatoLatinusIV (London1962).
J.
9

13:15:42 PM

'
fortunaeand casus, which occur incidentallyto the final cause: 'incidentaticause ... of effectsproduced in those things done for some
'
purpose' (1153B). The distinction between tuchand automatonis
maintained, in that acts of fortunapertain to events of human will
, as the
( uoluntas
), while casushas to do with the non-rational{de natura
term is used here; 1153C-D). That such events are teleological is not
emphasized by Boethius in his argument at this point, but since
chance events occur in the contextof natural or volitional acts, they
are by definitionteleological, since uoluntasand naturaare necessarily
purposeful.
In the Consolatio
, on the other hand, there is no explicitanalysis of
any of the three conditions. In V, pr. i, 13 (quoted above, p. 8),
it is indicated that a chance event is one which occurs insteadof the intended outcome of an action; but that the chance event is itself
'
4
teleological is not explicitlystated. The reason for this 'omission'
may be found, however, in the contextof the discussion: since casusis
no more than an 4'event due to a confluenceof causes" (euentus
exconcausis
from
then
is
and
these
causes
derive
casus
,
fluentibus
prouidentia
),
definition
since
the
ultimate
by
teleological,
guided by
orderingprinciple. The exceptional and accidental characterof chance events is also
: theyare exceptional since they
implicitin the contextof the Consolatio
seemto occur outside the controlof divine ordo(IV, pr. v); theyare accidentadinsofaras theyresultexconfluentibus
causisand not froma clearly discernible efficientcause.
Further, Boethius does not explicitly analyze the distinctionbetween tuchand automaton
, which was so importantto the Aristotelian
of
and
which
was retained in the post-Aristotelian
chance,
concept
Boethius'
tradition, including
commentary on Cicero's Topica
(1153C-D), with few exceptions. The traditionalLatin equivalents of
the Aristotelianterms(also used by Boethius in his commentaryon the
- tuchand casus- automaton
, as is seen in Chalcidius'
Topica) arefortuna
on
There
in the Aristotelian
the
Timaeus.
casus
is
retained
commentary
sense, applying to non-rationalbeings and things: "Thus casuswill be
the concurrence ( concursus
), at one and the same time, of accidental
causes without plan ( accidentium
sine rationecausarum
) in inanimate
or
inarticulate
animals"
Comm
in
Tim.
,
things
159). The use offor(
tuna, also strictlyAristotelian,is seen in the passage quoted above (p.
9) from the same chapter of Chalcidius' commentary. Chalcidius
does not, however, retain Aristotle's subordination of the incidental
causes casus and fortunato the efficientcauses phusis and nous, but
10

13:15:42 PM

rathersubjects them both tofatum.21And, as has already been noted,

Boethius' practicehere is similar to Chalcidius', since he attributesall
earthlyevents to the directcontroloffatum, and thus ultimatelyto the
control of prouidentia.No explicit distinctionbetween the operative
areas of Aristotle's two incidental causes is attempted. It is for this
reason thatJan Sulowski despairs at Boethius' confusionof casusand
There is no confusion,however; Boethius' argument,as exfortuna.22
pressed by Philosophia, is clear, despite the factthat in V, pr. i it differsfromAristotle'sin PhysicsII and fromhis own in the commentary
on Cicero. In the Consolatio
he is concerned specificallywiththe larger
contextof the metaphysicalordoand views the problem of casus from
that perspective.In this contextthe main issue is that which also concerns Aristotleat the end of PhysicsII, 6: the ultimate order of all
events, even those which occur ostensiblywithoutcause. The explication of this order need not incorporate the Aristotelianprinciples of
phusis and nous, since it deals primarilywith divine providence, to
which both casus and fortunaare subject.23Viewed fromthis perspective, there may or may not be two differentessential causes, depending on ontological distinctions, but that is not the point. The
Aristoteliandistinctionis, therefore,omittedhere. Casus is subjected
, which is prouidentia.
directlyto the single causa efficiens
Yet, while omittingthe Aristoteliandistinctionbetweenfortunaand
casusas incidentalcauses in the technicalanalysis in V, pr. i, Boethius
maintains, during the whole of the Consolatio
, the two as discreteentitiesin essentiallythe same contrastiveconstellationas that found in
Aristotle:fortunais never used in any context in which the technical
concept of chance is the subject. On the other hand, the terminology
used in this technical discussion is not that which is used in the
analysis of the goddess Fortuna, the goods under her control, or the
state effectedby her goods. Additionally,based on the specificcontent
of the Boethian discussion of fortunaand casus, there is an implicit
distinctionbetweenthembased on theiroperative fields:fortunais used
in referenceto those events which have application to the realm of
human activityand valuation (i.e. the granting and loss of wealth,
power, public offices,glory and pleasure), while casus applies to the
mechanics of natural events (i.e. the course of rivers,the location of
material events (i.e. the course of rivers,the location of material ob21On Chalcidius'
seeCioffari,
system,
esp. 71-78.
22Sulowski,
87-88.
23Cf. note14above.
11

13:15:42 PM

jects and their reaction to natural laws). All essential aspects of the
Aristotelian definitionof chance are thus maintained by Boethius,
althoughtheyundergo a major change of emphasis, due to his concern
withthe largercontextof the metaphysicalorder, ratherthan withthe
details of the specificmanifestationof that order.
The concept of chance is expressed primarilywith the use of the
three termsfortuita!
, temeritas
fortuitus
(and its derivative forms- the
adverb temere
and the adjective temer
arius)and casus.The threeprimary
terms are often found togetherin one sentence in various combinations of adjective and noun forms,withoutclearcut individual distinction in meaning. Both temerarius
and fortuitus
can modifycasus: "Do
the
world
is
that
think,
then,
you
governed by random and chance
events ( temerariis
. . . fortuitisque
casibus), or do you believe that some rational principle ( regimen
rationis)rules it?" (I, pr. vi, 3). The chance
event is contrasted through each term with the rule of reason.
Temerarius
could well be interpretedin its usual sense, "without direction or plan," whilefortuitus
raprovides a similar contrastto regimen
tionisin the common and rathernon-specificsense which it stillhas in
modern Englishfortuitous
,24In the sentence immediatelyfollowingthis
the
terms
seem
almost to be "remixed," and it becomes
example,
clear thatfortuitus
and temerarius!
are not to be interpretedas
temeritatus
I
terms:
could
never
believe thateventsof such
"Certainly
contrasting
temeritate
regularityare due to fortuitoustemerity{fortuita
)" (I, pr. vi,
4). The contrastis ratherto be found between the combined signification of this group of termsof the semantic field "chance" and that of
"divine order." The in-depthanalysis of chance in V. pr. i makes use
of all three terms. But in the two definitionsof chance given by
Philosophia, the term casus alone appears: the term which had tradiand which
tionallybeen used in Latin to render Aristotle'sautomaton
was to become the standard term forchance in subsequent medieval
Latin analyses.25
The question remains, however, what significancethe Boethian
distinctionbetween the two termsfortunaand casusmighthave. It is not
as simple as Patch and Cioffari maintain- that casus is merely the
technical term forthe underlyingprinciple of causless events (Patch
specifies"chance" as conceived by Aristotle),whilefortunais the personificationof thisprinciple.26Fortunais used in a number of verydif24 Thesaurus
Latinae
onfortuitus.
Linguae
(Leipzig1926),VI/1,1172-75
" Ibid.(Leipzig
III, 576-70on casus.
1906-1912),
26Patch,118;Cioffari,
89.
12

13:15:42 PM

ferentsenses: as the name of the personified Fortuna, but also in

referenceto her giftsand to the state of happiness which these gifts
cause. Casus signifiesthe confluence of causes which, dependent on
, produces events in the world which are unexpected or
prouidentia
unintentional.The Aristoteliandistinctionseems not to be applicable
in a strictsense forthe same reasons- fortunahas a wider spectrumof
significationsthan is present in Aristotle's analysis.27 The basic
distinctionbetween them is thatfortunais applicable to the realm of
human affairs,and casus to the mechanics of natural events.
The Aristotelian analysis of chance, which Boethius greatly
modifies, is furtheradapted in Alfred's work. The source of the
general argument concerning chance is identifiedby Alfred in his
translation of Cons. V, pr. i as Fisica (140, 9), 28 but none of the
Aristotelianconditions necessary foran event to be termed apo tuches
,
all but one of which were omitted fromexplicit mention in the Contreatedby Alfred.Yet here, as in Boethius' text,
solatio,are analytically
it is the case that the Aristotelian conditions are in fact present,
althoughin radicallymodifiedform.The unexpected result( unwenunga
, 140, 10-11) of an act is similar to Aristotle's rare/unusual
gebirede
event. That chance is not an efficientcause, but only incidentalto an
efficientcause, is presentin Alfred's denial that anythingoccurs outside of God's ultimatecontrol.And that such events are teleologica! is
assumed in this subjection to God's beneficent order. Aristotle's
distinction between tuchand automatonand their operative areas,
essentially retained by Boethius in the concepts fortunaand casus
(although not specificallyanalyzed as by Aristotle),are abandoned by
Alfredin his restructuring
of the Boethian methaphysicalsystem.Due
to the magnitude of this restructuring,a briefexplication of the Alfredian modifications,as it bears on the concept of casus, is in order.
27The laterdevelopment
of tuche
in manyrespects
similarto (and
is, however,
influential
offortuna
in itsliterary
, especially
possibly
in) thesemantic
development
use.SeeW. C. Greene,
Moira
Mass.
, Fate
, Good
, andEvilinGreek
, Cambridge,
Thought
1948.
28Alfred's
textis citedbypageandlinenumber,
to theedition W.
according
' De consolatione by J.
OldEnglish
Version
Sedgefield,
KingAlfred's
ofBoethius
philosophiae,
inAlfred's
translation
oftheCon1899,(rpt.Darmstadt
1968).Thetextual
problems
solatio
aremanifold,
dueespecially
totheCottonfireof1731,whichseverely
damaged
theearliest
LondonM Cotton
OthoA. VI. Sedgefield
the
manuscript:
supplemented
ofthismanuscript
fromOxford,
Bodleian180
readings
(as basetext)withreadings
thelatter
initalicinhisconflated
edition.
Thereaderisreferred
to
(2079)andprinted
editionforthistextual
information.
Sedgefield's
13

13:15:42 PM

In his preface to the translationof Gregory's Liberregulae

,
pastoralis
Alfredexplains his method of translationas "hwilum word be worde,
hwilum andgit of andgiete" ('sometimes word for word, sometimes
meaning for meaning').29 His translation of Boethius' Consolatio
adheres to the latterprincipleeven in renderingthe general argument
of the work, forAlfred's text is much less a translationthan an interpretiveparaphrase with commentary.He abandons to a great extent
the dialectical progress of the Boethian argument, since he accepts
controloffortuna
both Philosophia's ultimate denial of the independent
divine
incontrovertible
of
the
affirmation
affairs
and
the
over human
ordoand then imposes his own interpretationof thisphilosophicalposition onto the work even in the early stages of his translation.30He
eliminates Fortuna, the grantorof material goods, fromthe work and
substitutesthe personifiedWisdom, an attributeof divine providence
) in that role (17, 11-14). When strippedof its active
foreponc
(godcunde
4
role as grantor,fortunais reduced to littlemore than the stateof one's
fortunes' or 'lot'. This state is essentially the same as fatum, the
manifestationsof the providentialplan in the materialworld. This being the case, when Alfredtranslatesfortunain the sense of 'lot', he uses
Since casus, as the principle
the same termas he does forfatum- wyrd.zx
of random eventsopposed to the manifestationof divine order, can be
dealt withonly in relationto thatorder, a briefexcursus on wyrdmust
be included here.32
29KingAlfred's
Pastoral
SaxonVersion
West
Care,ed. HenrySweet,EETS
ofGregory's
45 & 50 (1871;rpt.London1958),7.
30On Alfred's
.
seemyDieRezeption
oftheBoethian
argument,
restructuring
31JosephBosworthand T. N. Toller[AnAnglio-Saxon
, Oxford1882,
Dictionary
andsuppl.byT. N. Toller(Oxford1921),751]list'whathappens,
1287-88
fate,forofwyrd.
Thetermis usedinnumerous
partune,chance'as thegeneral
significations
sors
ticular
senses:I. glossofLatincasus
; II. fate,theother, eventus,
fors,
fortuna,
fatum,
III. ina personal
orderofthings;
wisethanhumanly
sense,oneoftheFates
appointed
IV. an event:1)
fate,fortune;
('WeirdSisters',Parcae);Ilia, as a personification,
orfate,
ofprovidence
withthespecialideaofthatwhich
bythedetermination
happens
fact,whatisdone,
circumstance,
incident,
sense,an event,occurence,
2) ina general
Va. fate,
toa person,
a deed,an action;V. whathappens
lot,condition;
fate,fortune,
is somewhat
translation
Boethius
The usageinAlfred's
death;VI. chance,accident.
citation
Bosworth-Toller's
here(cf.however,
as willbedemonstrated
morerestrictive,
of
in
translation
from
the
Boethius
ofAlfredian
II, III,
significations
support
passages
IV 2, V).
32A comprehensive
here.See E. G. Stanley's
ofwyrd
cannotbe attempted
analysis
ofwyrd
onthescholarly
ofmaterial
collection
forAnglo-Saxon
[TheSearch
interpretation
der
zumSchicksalbegrijf
1964,92-122;GerdWeber,Wyrd:Studien
, Cambridge
Paganism
Sakrale
Wurd:
das
Ladislaus
Literatur
Berlin
altnordischen
und
Mittner,
1969;
,
altenglischen
listedunder
information
inderaltgermanischen
Epik.Bern1955;andthebibliographical
14

13:15:42 PM

The scholarlyliteratureon this subject is vast and varied. Wyrd'ibs

been interpretedas a pre-ChristianGermanic concept or goddess of
fateby some scholars.33Other scholars deny a pagan significationof
wyrdin Old English literature,but assume that wyrdwas a pagan deity
in the pre-Christian period.34 In his study of Beowulf,Friedrich
Klaeber was one of the firstto recognize the illegitimacyof interpretations which assume the paganism of a text and then seek only to strip
offthe 'Christian trappings' in orderto reveal the originaltextin all its
pagan splendor.35Here Klaeber documents the essentiallyChristian
withrespectto the use of wyrd
characterofBeowulf
, especially
, since God
is presented as the controllerof man's fate and the grantor of all
material goods.36 This recognition of the influence of RomanChristian thoughton Old English semantics has led to many fruitful
studiesdealing with wyrdand related topics, among them those by W.
F. Bolton and K. S. Kiernan on the Old English Deor'37 This poem,
long held to be an example of the pagan survival of wyrdin Old
English, is demonstratedto be largelydependent forits structureand
argumenton Boethian notionsof fateand fortune,perhaps even deriving these conceptsfromthe Old English translationofthe Consolatio.F.
P. Pickeringhas made a plausible case forthe influenceof Boethius'
concepts of fortune and fate on the narrative strategies of early
medieval secular literature (in Latin and the vernacular).38 This
in A. Cameron,A. Kingsmill
and A. C. Amos,OldEnglish
:A
Word
Studies
wyrd
Word
andAuthor
List, Toronto1983.
Preliminary
44
33Characteristic
ofthisinterpretation
is GustavEhrismann
's statement:
Die Wyrd
istdasheidnische
fatum.
Es istdas verderbliche,
feindliche
das
unheilvolle,
geschick,
und unerbitterlich
ber dem menschenwaltet"
geheimnisvoll,
unbarmherzig
zum germanischen
in: Beitrgezur
Frhchristentum,
[Religionsgeschichtliche
Beitrge
Geschichte
derdeutschen
35 (1909),235]. WalterBaetke
Spracheund Literatur,
writesin thesametone:"Das Schicksal
istdas ganzundgarUbermchtige,
das
aberauchdas allenGedanken
undGefhlen
es ist
Unabnderliche,
Unzulngliche,
die unbedingt
Macht"[Germanischer
, in: NeueJahrbcher
berlegene
Schicksalglaube
frWissenschaft
undJugendbildung,
10 (1934),231]; similarstatements
maybe
foundin Stanley's
collection,
pp. 92-122.
34AdolfWolf,Die Bezeichnung
inderangelschsischen
, Diss.
frSchicksal
Dichtersprache
Breslau1919,48; .J.Timmer,
andPoetry,
Prose
in:Neophilogus,
WyrdinAnglo-Saxon
26 (1941),24.
35Die christlichen
in Beowulf,
Elemente
in: Anglia,35 (1911), 111-36& 36 (1912),
169-99.
36Ibid.35 (1911),117-18& 36 (1912),171.
37Bolton,
Boethius
and"Deor"Again,
in:ModernPhilology,
69 (1972),222-27;
, Alfred
Boethius
MitKiernan,"Deor":TheConsolations
, in:Neuphilologische
ofanAnglo-Saxon
79 (1978),333-40.
teilungen,
38Noteson FateandFortune
to
(forGermanisten
), in: MedievalStudiesPresented
Frederick
Norman(London1965),1-15,laterexpandedintoa two-volume
study:
15

13:15:42 PM

general acceptance of non-nativeinfluenceon the Old English concept

of fateand fortunecan, however, lead to extremeinterpretationsalso,
as in J. D. A. Ogilvy's denial of all non-Christianconnotationsin Old
English wyrd(and other Old English terms).39
Studies of Alfred's use of wyrdin his translationof the Consolatio
exhibit the same variety of interpretationsas those found in general
studies of wyrdand analyses of the term in other works. F. A. Payne
maintains that wyrdis a force 4'other than God's whose extensive influence Alfred recognizes."40 She also contends that the Latin concepts offatumand fortunahave 'littleifany relevance to a definition"of
4
, since theyare 'colored ... in medieval contextsby Boethius" (p.
wyrd
91). Yet it is preciselybecause
fatumand fortunaare Boethian and their
medieval interpretationshave a Boethian basis that theyare of the utmost relevance to a definitionof wyrd
, especially when we are concerned, as with Alfred, with a translation of the Consolatioand of these
specificconcepts by the Old English term wyrdlKurt Otten argues in
his excellent study of Alfred's translation that Alfred opposes wyrd
throughout the work and denies the concept a place in his
cosmology.41In the most comprehensivestudy of wyrdto date, Gerd
Weber demonstrates that the influence of Romano-Christian
literatureon Old English semantics was so profound that the lateantique concepts of fate and Christian predestinationpermeated the
intellectualand spiritualworld of the literateAnglo-Saxons to such an
extent, that the importanceof wyrdin Old English literature(200 occurrences) might well stem fromthis influencealone.42 Thus Weber
, was 'diluted'
rejects the notion that a pagan Germanic concept, wyrd
by Christianityto the extentthatit occurs only rarelyin medieval texts
in the old pagan sense. Rather, he sees the semantic developmentof
the termproceedingfromthe verygeneral 'Geschick' to a progressively more fatalisticsignification,due to the ever increasinginfluenceof
the late-antique Latin traditionoffatum!
fortuna.He thus emends B.J.
Timmer's conclusion- " Wyrd had lost all associations with the
oderBoethius?
undepische
imMittelalter
undinder
Geschichtsschreibung
Dichtung
Augustinus
Neuzeit
, Berlin1967-76.
39Beowulf,Alfred
and Christianity
, in: Saints,Scholarsand Heroes: Studiesin
MedievalCulturein Honorof CharlesW. Jones,ed. M. H. Kingand W. M.
MN 1977,59.
Stevens,
Collegeville,
40KingAlfred
of
andBoethius
: AnAnalysis
Version
oftheOldEnglish
oftheConsolation
Madison1968,79.
Philosophy,
41Knig
Boethius
, Tbingen1964,64 & 68-70.
Alfreds
42 Wyrd
, 18-21.
16

13:15:42 PM

heathen belief in a superhuman, blind and hostile power which

destines the lot of men" (Timmer, p. 30) to "Wyrd doesnotshowany
associations ..." (Weber, p. 66). This statement shows the general
tendencyof Weber's study,which seeks to disprove the traditionalnotion that Alfred's wyrdhad any pagan associations; Weber accomplisheshis purpose by arguing that wyrdfunctionsin Alfred'stext
as a translationof Boethius' fatum, fortunaand casus, without further
connotations.43His conclusions reflectthis tendency: wyrdhas the
general significations'Geschick' and 'zufalliges Geschehen', which
have fourspecificaspects: 1) a single event, 2) the cosmic process, 3)
the fateof an individual, 4) an active grantorof fate(including wyrdas
nomenagentisof Fortuna) [pp. 65-66]. The firstthreecategoriescorrespond to Boethianfatum, the last to Boethian Fortuna; casus as such is
lacking in Weber's explanatory schema (unless it is subsumed under
one of the othercategories,which would obscure its basic, traditional
signification).Weber's analysis of the particularaspects of 'Geschick'
seems, however, not to correspond to the Alfredianuse of wyrd:the
semantic categories 'active grantor' and casus are not representedby
wyrdin the text.
As noted above, AlfredsubstitutesWisdom forBoethius' Fortuna in
the active role as the grantorof material goods, and it is also Wisdom
who assumes Fortuna's prosopopoeia in II, pr. ii (which is of seminal
importanceforBoethius' personificationof Fortuna). While Boethius
never denies Fortuna the role as grantor(but only stipulatesthat she
functionsin this role as a mediator between prouidentia
and men),
Alfred's Wisdom never attributesthis power to wyrd.Weber's argument (p. 23) that wyrdis the grantorin 27, 18-23 is untenable, since
Wisdom specifiesthatMod only says(cwyst)that wyrdis responsiblefor
the gifts;the implicationis that Wisdom denies that they are granted
by wyrd:"Hwaet haefstu aet am gif e Jducwyst seo wyrd eow
gife" ('What do you have fromthe giftswhich you say wyrdgives you'
27, 21-22). In the entire work there are only two brief passages in
which it seems that wyrdmay functionas grantorof the goods "aes ilcan is to wenanne to eall daem gesaelume seo wyrdbrengd isses
andweardan lifes" ('the same is to be thoughtof all the goods which
wyrdbrings in this present life' 37, 30-38, 1) and "be eall )
woruldgesaeldume seo wyrd brengd" ('concerning all the worldly
43See esp.p. 42,whereWeber,paraphrasing
Otten(p. 62) arguesthatAlfred's
wyrd
theLatinfortuna.
closely
approximates
17

13:15:42 PM

44
goods which wyrdbrings*39, 10). Yet by this point in Alfred's text,
Wisdom had already been established as the grantor of material
goods, and Boethius' Philosophia has already deemphasized Fortunat
role as agent and begun to concentrate on the material goods
themselvesand the 'state of fortune'which the goods effect(Cons. II,
pr. vi).45 The correspondingterm in the Boethian text at this point is
indeed fortuna
, but it does not signifythe goddess, as the context
shows: ' 'Finally we may draw the same conclusion concerningfortune
as a whole, in which, it is clear, thereis nothingworthseekingand no
intrinsicgood; it is not always associated with good men, nor does it
make those good with whom it is associated" (II, pr. vi, 20). In this
context,the Alfredian "1 seo wyrd brengd" signifiesno more than
'quas sors fert,'with no connotation of a grantingagent.46
47his
Yet Wisdom never denies the existenceof wyrd'
only concernis
to establish its subjugation to providentialcontrol, correspondingto
Philosophia's concern withfatumand fortuna.For this reason, the idea
that wyrdis a forceoperating outside the bounds of divine ordois rejected as consistentlyby Wisdom as by Philosophia. In Mod's initial
complaint, God's control of wyrdis assumed: "Hwy '>u la Drihten
aefrewoldest p seo wyrd swa hwyrfansceolde" ('Why, Lord, would
you ever want wyrdto change so' 10, 17-18 = fortunaI, m. v, 29). It is
only God's allowing wyrdto be capricious that is at issue here, not
wyrs independence of divine control. Further along in the same
metrm,fortunais again translated with wyrd(10, 23-25), and here
again divine control is emphasized, since the independent power of
wyrdis presentedas a hypotheticalconstructand not an existententity.
In his translation of the following prosa, Wisdom summarizes the
reasons for Mod's 'exile' from his native land (of Wisdom/
philosophy), one of which is: "[u] wendest '> seo weord as woruld
44The former
as an exampleof Ilia, 'a perpassageis citedby Bosworth-Toller
sonification,
fate,fortune,'
p. 1288.
45Elsewhere
thepowerofgranting
material
inthetext,Alfred
denieswyrd
consistently
attributes
thegoodstofortuna
(forgoods:e.g. 25,28-31and27,21-22,whereBoethius
ontheConsolatio
tnete
dona
, II, pr.v, 2). TheSt.GallAnonymous
commentary
glosses
and
avoidsanysuchinterpretation
as dee(Einsiedeln
179,121a).Alfred
clearly
fortunae
evenanyambiguity
whichwouldpermit
suchan interpretation.
46Cf. however,
is here"die Gabenverteilerin
Weber(p. 23), whoarguesthatwyrd
in allegorischer
'Fortuna'... zumindest
Vorstellungsweise."
47OttenobjectsthatAlfred's
wecallwyrd1
hatad"('thatwhich
128,18
"f)[)wewyrd
= IV, pr.vi, 10)hasas itspurpose
ofwyrd
thedenialoftheactuality
, sinceWisdom
wordsdirectly
doesnotsay "f>J>wyrdbid" ('thatwhichwyrd
is'); in fact,Alfred's
translate
Boethius'
uocetur.
fatum
18

13:15:42 PM

wende heore agenes donees buton Godes geeahte 7 his afunge 7

monna gewyrht" ('[You] thoughtthat wyrdgoverned this world accordingto its own order and outside God's order, his permission,and
the meritsof men' 11, 5-7). There is no correspondingstatementin
the Consolatio,and Alfred's insertionof this comment furtherstresses
divine controlof wyrd.Other similar instances are: "Gelefst du 1seo
wyrd wealde isse worulde, odde auht godes swa geweordan maege
butan aem wyrhtan? ... Ne gelyfe ..." ('Do you believe that wyrd
governs this world or that anything good can occur without the
creator? ... I do not believe [it]' 12, 16-18); "du saedestb'>u wende b
ios slidne wyrddas woruld wende buton Godes geeahte" ('You said
that you thoughtthis cruel wyrdgoverned this world outside of God's
order' 13, 24-25); "nu du geliefast sio wyrd urh hie elfe butan
Godes geeahte as weoruld wendan ne maege" ('now you believe
that wyrdcannot govern this world by itself,outside of God's order'
13, 30-32). Weber argues (pp. 37-38) that in these passages wyrd
signifiesboth Fortuna and the general randomness of events. Yet in
none of the Boethian passages is the subject Fortuna: the firstis I, pr.
vi, 3 (cf. above, p. 12): the second- "You thinkthese alternationsof
fortunes(Jortunarum
uices)vacillate withouta governor" (I, pr. vi, 19);
the third- "We have the greatestrekindlerof your health in yourtrue
beliefconcerningthe governance of the world: that it is subject not to
the haphazards of chance ( casuum temeritat)
but to divine reason
((diuinaerationi
)" (I, pr. vi, 20). Only in the second passage is fortuna
its
but
present,
plural formcan only signify'one's fortunes'and not
the
other
two passages deal withcasus. It is clear that Mod at
Fortuna;
one time thought that wyrdcontrolled {wealde!wende)earthly events
withoutGod's ultimate control, but there is no evidence in the text
that Mod conceived of wyrdas an active agent, in the manner of Fortuna, and certainlynone that Wisdom (or Alfred)would supportsuch
an opinion. That wyrdis equivalent to casusand thus signifiesrandom
events is equally unsupportedby the text, since in each case Wisdom
emphasizes that it is inaccurate to think that wyrdcontrols earthly
events, if wyrdis thoughtto act independentlyof divine control( buton
Godesgepeahte!
)cemwyrhtan
).48 But, as Alfredconsistentlyargues, it is
48The "butan"-clauseshavean
onlyin thesecondBoethianpassage
equivalent
where
uices
i.e. wherethetraditional
andnotcasusis thesubject,
of
Jortunarum
concept
casusas random
eventsis notimmediately
the4'butan"-clauseis
otherwised,
present;
Alfred's
addition
tothetext.
19

13:15:42 PM

not the case that wyrdacts independently,but ratherit is incorporated

into the divine ordoin the same manner as Boethius' fortuna!
fatum.
This most importantaspect of Boethius' treatmentoffortunais expressed most succinctlyin IV, pr. vii, 2, where Philosophia statesthat
since fortunacorrects,rewards, punishes and exercises, 44all fortunais
absolutelygood." There is no connotationof the goddess or grantorof
goods here, since Philosophia has just presentedher argumentconcerning the structureof the divinely ordered metaphysical system:pro-

uidentiaorders, fatumexecutes, and fortunais one attributeof fatal execution. Here fortunais no more than earthlyeventsrelevantto the ac'
quisition and loss of material goods, i.e. the state of one's fortunes.'
Alfred accepts Boethius' judgment and translates: "aelc wyrd bio
good" ('every wyrdis good' 137, 3), and adds later: "aelc wyrdis nyt
ara e auder ded, odde laerd, odde wyrcd" (every wyrdis useful
which either instructsor exercises' 137, 21-22) and "aelc wyrd bid
good ... sam hio sy rede, sam hio sie wynsum" ('every wyrdis good ...
whetherit be severe or pleasant' 138, 11-12). He does not, therefore,
deny wyrda place in his cosmology,as Otten argues (p. 69), but in fact
incorporateswyrdinto the systemin the same manner as Boethius integratesfortunainto his metaphysical system.
The Boethian concept offatumundergoes fewerchanges in Alfred's
translationthan does fortuna.In the Consolatio
, fatumis the manifestation of the providential plan in the material world (IV, pr. vi, 10).
Alfredtranslates:"Se foregoneis sio godcunde gesceadwisnes; ... Ac p
1) we wyrd hatad, Jbbid Godes weorc f>he aelce daeg wyrcd" ('Providence is the divine intellect. . . But that which we call wyrd
, that is
God's workwhich he performseveryday' 128, 15-19). Wyrdis related
toforegone
in the same manner as fatumto prouidentia
, and is thus subordinate to providence: "[mos wandriende wyrd{ we wyrdhatad faerd
aefterhis [sc. Godes] foronce7 aeft~hisgeeahte, swa swa he tiohhad
, proceeds accor hit sie" ('This vacillating wyrd,which we call wyrd
ding to his [God's] providence and according to his order,just as he
determinesthat it be' 128, 29-30). On the basis of these passages, it
becomes clear whyAlfreddenies wyrdindependentpower earlierin the
work: forpreciselythe same reasons that Boethius deniesfortunasuch
forpower- since the divine ordois incontrovertible,wyrd(and fatum!
in
the
function
thus
as
the
context
of
can
exist
ordo'
they
only
tuna)
lowlevel ministersof providence in earthlyaffairs.
Man's attributionto chance of the control of earthly affairsis,
therefore, according to Alfred as to Boethius, due to man's
20

13:15:42 PM

epistemologicallimitations:man is by nature incapable of understanding the divine order "Ac hit nis nanum men alefed aethe maege
witan eall p God getiohhod haefd, ne eac areccan b he geworht
haefd" ('But it is grantedto no one to know all that God has planned
nor to explain that which he has done' 135, 6-8; the passage expands
on IV, pr. vi, 56).
In his translationof Boethius' technical analysis of chance in V, pr.
i, Alfreddenies that any events take place by chance: "hit nis nauht p
mon cwid, > aenig ing weas gebyrige" ('it is nothingthat men say,
that anythinghappens by chance' 140, 3-4). While Philosophia bases
her argument(V, pr. i, 8) on the all-encompassingordoand the notion
of nihilex nihilo, Alfred's reasons fordismissingrandom events is quite
simple and his argument quite circular: "Fora aelc ing cimd of
sum ing, forhit ne bid weas gebyred" (Tor everythingcomes
from some cause, since it does not happen by chance' 140, 4-5).
Boethius' argumentis in general drasticallyreduced; in factlittlesurvives intactexcept the exemplum of the buried gold (140, 9-17), which
Alfreduses to illustratethe principlethatchance (weasgebyred)
signifies
no more than unexpected events ( unwenunga
gebirede).No other conditions are presented. That the discoveryof the gold is nonethelessa
caused event is clear, but the justificationis not made in terms of ex
causisor ineuitabili
conexione
confluentibus
(Cons. V, pr. i, 18-19). Wisdom
the
rather
sees
to be simplythe pervasive divine ordo, governcausality
ed by providence: "Ac sio godcunde foretiohhunglaerde one e he
wolde { he gold hydde, 7 eft done e he wolde hit funde" ('But
divine providence taught the one whom he wished to hide the gold,
and afterwardsthe one whom he wished to findit' 140, 15-17 = deproV , pr. i, 19). 49No intermediarycauses between God and
uidentiae
Jonte
earthlyevents, such as Aristotle'sphusisand nous, or even Boethius'
fatumare admitted here, and no term 'chance' can any longer be
legitimatelyused: it was only 'formerly'used ('gio' 140, 10) and has
now ceased even to be a 'sound withoutsignificance'(inanisuoxW, pr.
i, 8), not translatedby Alfred,but retainedin se nama('the name' 140,
7), which translates Boethius' uocabula(V, pr. i, 11). Only in the
reduced sense 'unexpected or inexplicable event' (which is nonetheless
49Theninth-century
ofAuxerre
also
ontheConsolatio
Latincommentary
byRemigius
is glossed"ambitusdispositendsinthedirection
as theonlycause:ordo
ofprouidentia
tionsdei.extraquem,etpraeter
quemnihilumquamfuit.est.auterit"('theorbitof
everwas,is orwillbe' Paris,BN
ofwhichnothing
God'sorder,beyondandoutside
lat. 15090,75r).
21

13:15:42 PM

governed by providence) does casus survive, and this only in the

general Alfredian term wyrd: " we onne hatad wyrd, x>nne se
gesceadwisa God, 1 aelces monnes dearfe wat, hwaet wyrcd odde
, when the rageafad aes e we ne wenad" ('This then we call wyrd.
tional God, who knows the need of each person, does or permits
somethingwhich we do not expect' 132, 20-22).
As the text citations in the foregoinganalysis demonstrate,Alfred
relies on two termsin his discussion of chance: wyrdand weas.50Yet as
has been argued above, wyrdis the term used by Alfred for the
manifestationof the providentialplan in theworld. How thencan wyrd
render Boethian casus or the traditionalconcept of chance? Timmer
maintains that wyrdhas "the secondarymeaning of chance, thatwhich
51 Gerd Weber
happens accidentally."
argues similarly: "'Wyrd'
4
[wird]zum Inbegriffder Wandelbarkeitder Welt' schlechthin."52On
the other hand, Payne, Otten and Ludwig Helbig deny that wyrdhas
anythingto do with mutabilityor chance events,53and in a certain
sense this assessment is valid, although not for the reasons they
give they see wyrdas the Germanic power of fate, which by nature
could not be mutable, since inexorable. But, as has been argued
above, wyrdwas not a pagan Germanic fate; it is essentiallyequivalent
to Boethius' fatumand fortuna(as 'lot'), under divine control. Thus
wyrdis never used by Alfred as the translation of casus unless it is
qualified by a clause whichhypothesizesa directcontrastbetween wyrd
and the providentialordo: e.g. casusmay be translatedby "weord ...
buton Godes geeahte" (an event ... outside of God's order' 11, 6-7)
and "wyrd ... butan aemwyrhtan" ('an event ... withoutthe creator'
12, 16-17), but not by wyrdalone, since wyrdalwaysparticipatesin the
divine ordo(128, 28-30). The "butan "-clause signifiesthe imaginary
randomness which would obtain were God's controlnot to apply, and
4
wyrdaccompanied by the 'butan "-clause accurately renders casus.
In his translationof the technical analysis of casus, however, Alfred
uses only the term weas (139, 19-140, 17 = V, pr. i). Its direct correspondence to the semantic value of casus is seen in the fact that
50v. weasin Bosworth-Toller,
p. 1178:'bychance,byaccident,
fortuitously.'
si WyrdinAnglo-Saxon
andPoetry
Prose
, 30.
52 Wyrd
i.e. theverypassagewhichsubordinates
, 31. He cites128,29 as evidence,
toprovidence
wyrd
(citedabove,p. 20)!
53Payne,KingAlfred
andBoethius
Boethius,
61-62;Ludwig
, 83; Otten,KnigAlfreds
des
indenAugustinus
undBoethius
Helbie:,AItenglische
Bearbeitungen
Schlsselbepriffe
Alfreds
1959,37.
, Diss. Franfurt
Groen
22

13:15:42 PM

Alfredtranslatescasuswithoutadditional termsof qualificationin Old

4
English (i.e. without 'butan" -clauses or the like). Only in the firstuse
of the phrase is there any explanation of it, and there it is clearly for
the purpose of defining a newly introduced technical term (125,
12-14). The distinctionbetween wyrdand weas is shown in Alfred's
translationof Philosophia's list of topics remaining to be discussed
(IV, pr. vi, 4), which includes de fati serie('the chain of fate') and de
casibus('unexpected events'); Alfredtranslates "hwaet wyrd
repentinis
sie 7 hwaet weas gebergie" ('What wyrdis, and what happens by
chance' 127, 19). In the chapters which followthis list, Alfredincorporates wyrdinto his systemof divine order and reduces weasto a notion of historical interest, since it was only legitimately used gio
('formerly'). The pervasive divine order renders the concept
untenable and the term superfluous.
Notker's treatmentof the problem of casus is characteristicof his
acworkingmethodin general: he reordersthe Latin textad erudiendum
to
established
of
ordo
naturalis
to
the
,
cording
principles
conforming
principles elucidated in the St. Gall tractate, "Quomodo VII circumstantie rerum in legendo ordinande sint".54 Following the
reordered Latin text is a phrase-by-phraseor sentence-by-sentence
translationinto Old High German. Technical termsof the Latin text
are often 'rephrased' in Latin and incorporated into Notker's text.
This pedagogical Mischprosapossibly reflectsthe usage of Notker's
classroom.55 Notker's Mischprosahas serious consequences for an
analysis of his interpretationof any philosophical concept or semantic
field, since the translator is thereby freed from the obligation to
establisha consistentsystemofterminologyin the vernacular- despite
54Itisnotclearwhether
Notker
istheauthor
ofthetreatise,
contained
inBrussels
Ms.
andeditedbyPaul Piper,DieSchriften
10615-10729
Notkers
undseiner
Schule
, Freiburg
In hisrecentstudyofNotker's
oftranslation
method
in Mar1882-83,
I, xiii-xlix.
ianus Capella'sDe nuptiis
etcurii,HerbertBackesdemonstrates
that
Philologiae
Notker's
oftheLatintextinaccordance
withtheprinciples
ofordo
naturalis
reordering
is notmerely
a simplification
ofthetextfortheconvenience
ofhispupils,butrather
is
itself
a scholarly
oftheLatinsyntax
ofthe
analysis
bymeansofitsreorganization
oftheLatintext:Die Hochzeit
desMerkurs
undderPhilologie
phrasalelements
, Sigmaris infourparts,ofwhich
be given
ingen1982.Thetractate
onlythefirst
mayproperly
thetitle"Quomodo..." (cf.Backes,32).
55Thistheory
is advancedby ErnstSchaumann,
Studien
zu Notkers
, in:
Mischprosa
desGymnasiums
derk. - k.Theresianischen
Akademie
inWien(1911),
Jahresbericht
38.
23

13:15:42 PM

all Old High German 4synonyms' given, the Latin term is always
'dfinitive'.56
Following the translation, Notker often adds comments and explanations, some of which take the formof short excurses of several
pages. The comments and excurses never blatantly Correct' the doctrine of the Boethian text, since, as Ingeborg Schrbler points out:
" Notker will nicht
Besserung von etwas Miliebigem geben, sondern
er ist berzeugt von der Rechtglubigkeit seines Textes- oder
wenigstens: er gibt keinem Zweifel daran Raum."57 Yet Notker's
method is that of an exegetical commentator- the Consolatiois seen as
latently Christian and demands exegesis in order to reveal and
elucidate its hidden Christian meaning. This exegesis ultimately
results in major alterations in the Boethian text, oftento the extent
that the Boethian system is scarely recognizable in Notker's translation.58
In his translationof the technicalanalysis of casusin V, pr. i, Notker
does not initiallyattempta translationof casus, but ratherretainsthe
term in his Old High German text. But this is only one of the three
discussions of the general concept. Long beforehand,Philosophia and
the Prisonerbroach the subject, as the latterfirstvoices concern about
the lack of order in the world. In his translation of I, m. v, 45,
"homines quatimur fortunaesalo" ('We men are buffetedby the seas
of fortune'), Notker glosses fortune(retained in his translation) with
uuluundigi
('variability withina brieftime period'),59 indicatingthat
56Jrgen
comments:
"Der Bezugauf die lat. Terminologie
verschafft
Jaehrling
alsoeinerseits
Notker
denRaum,indemersprachschpferisch
kannbis
ttigwerden
hin zum sprachlichen
ohneda ihnbei jeder Abweichung
von der
Experiment,
derVorwurf
der Ungenauigkeit
treffen
kann.Die lat. TerprzisenUbersetzung
ihnandererseits
bewahrt
umjedenPreiszu verdavor,eineUbersetzung
minologie
nichtkorrekten
suchen,d.h. um den Preis einerungenauenoder sprachlich
Notkers
desDeutschen
inseiner
der
Terminologie
Wiedergabe"
[Diephilosophische
Ubersetzung
Aristotelischen
or Notker's
, Berlin1969,140].He impliesthusthatNotker
Kategorien
German(orboth)was sometimes
ofprecisely
Boethius'
textin
incapable
expressing
Old HighGerman,an argument
whichNotker
's creativetranslation
consistently
refutes.
' De consolatione
57Notker
III. vonSt. Gallen
als bersetzer
undKommentator
vonBoethius
Hermaea
n.s.
2
6.
Philosophiae,
(Tbingen
1953),
58Herbert
Bolender
discusses
indetailNotker
's method
ofcommentary
andadaptaSchrbler's
ideaofinterpretado
Christiana
tion,modifying
(Schrber,
1-20)inhisNotker's
Consolatioalswiderpruchsfreie
: EineHypothese
Praktik
zurGeschichte
, Beitrge
Rezeption
derdeutschen
aremore
102(1980),325-38.The adaptations
SpracheundLiteratur,
in themetaphysical
thanin theconcept
ofcasus.
pronounced
system
59Notker's
textis citedbypageandlinenumber
oftheedition
byE. H. Sehrtand
24

13:15:42 PM

his interpretation
ofthe Prisoner's complaintextendsbeyond Fortuna,
the personality,to the abstract problem of unordered events.60
Philosophia's response to the Prisoner(I, pr. vi) initiatesthe discussion of chance as such, and Notker introduceshere many of the terms
with which he will handle the concept throughoutthe work:
Putasnehuncmundum
et fortuitis
casibus?An credisinesseei
agi temerariis
ullumregimen
rationis?
Uunesttudiseuurltlichen
uerlzene
uren.
geskhte
ndestzzelingin?
Aideuunesttudr-nauusendehinarhtifter
redo?
thatthesewordly
events
without
andatrandom,
control,
('Do youthink
proceed
ordo youthink
thereis anyrational
orderin them'51, 7-11).
Nokter's Prisonerthendenies (just as did Boethius') thatthe cosmos is
ruled by chance and affirmsthe beneficentdivine order. Afterhaving
established the fact of God's rule, Philosophia's questioning of the
Prisoner concerningthe governance of the cosmos leads her to delve
furtherinto the actual means of control:quibusgubernaculis.
The phrase
is most reasonably to be understood in this passage in the general
sense 'by what means [of governance]'. Notker translates as mt
uulemo
rodere
('with what kind of rudder' 52, 6-7) and adds the comment: "S uulta in lren dz prospera nde aduersa dero uurlte
gubernacula snt" ('She wanted to teach him that properous and
adverse thingsare the governorsof the world' 52, 7-8). In thiscontext,
roder
may well have no significationbeyond the Boethian 'means of
in
control', but one can also argue that Notker understoodgubernacula
the alternatesense of 'rudder', associated the referencewiththe iconographicallywell-knownrudderof Fortuna, and inferreda referenceby
Boethius here to "prospera et aduersa fortuna" as God's tools of controlin the world (i.e. according to Boethius' finalposition concerning
s place in the divine order).61The incorporationoffortunainto
fortuna'
the divine hierarchyunder God's controllater in the work is not lost
on Notker, and he expands on that notion and manages to include it
Notkers
desDeutschen
Werke
here45,
I, ATB 32-34(Halle/Saale
TaylorStarek,
1933-34),
19-20.
60Othertechnical
references
tounordered
eventsaretranslated
a
without
byNotker
'
consistent
rebus... teuuessldn"('fleeting
fortunes'
strictly
vocabulary:'fortuitis
rebus... an disnzuuelign
86,22-24)and"in hisfortuitis
dingen"('in theseuncertainthings'
havespecific
reference
neither
toFortuna
norto
94, 21-23).Theseterms
theabstract
ofcasus
refer
tothegeneral
ofinevitable
, butrather
concept
simply
concept
change.
61The varioussymbols
associated
withFortuna
areillustrated
and discussed
byR.
Fortuna
Lexikon
der
undrmischen
Peter,
, in:Ausfhrliches
, ed. W. H.
griechischen
Mythologie
Roscher,
1/2,1503-58.
Leipzig1886-90,
25

13:15:42 PM

here, where the Boethian textmakes no reference,even implicitly,to

fortuna.
Afterthe Prisoner has accepted Philosophia's protractedargument
concerningthe rule of the cosmos by a beneficentorder, thereremains
a doubt about how one is to understand the seeming
disorder of daily
events. The Prisonerexpressesthisprincipleof disorderagain withthe
words fortuitiscasibus (IV, pr. v, 5-6). Notker translates with in
nguissn
geskihten
('in indefiniteevents' 289, 26) and finedienuulouuanchigngeskihten
( vacillating events' 290, 7-8); in each case, the adjective expresses the uncertaintyand ephemeralityof chance events.
Notker then followsBoethius in opposing the Prisoner's objection by
God's rule and declaring man epistemologically
yet again reaffirming
since
unable
he
is
to recognize the divine order: "quoniam
limited,
bonus mundum rectortemperai . . . uunda ber got rhtareist . tr
dia uurlt mtemt" ('but because the governorwho ordersthe world
is good' 290, 13-17). This exchange promptsPhilosophia to launch into the discussion of metaphysics, which dominates most of the remainder of the work.
The initial presentationof the technical subject of casus in V, pr. i
seemingly raises some difficultiesfor Notker, since there was apparentlyno single termin his vocabulary withwhichhe could precisely
render the unifiedconcept of casus (as inheritedfromantiquity), and
he introduces no new Old High German term, adapted to this
signification.The retentionof the Latin termin his translationwould
not have lessened this difficulty,had it not been the case that the
Boethian text also seeks to definecasus. As it is, however, Notkermay
simply translate as literally as possible, retain the Latin term as
definitive,provide 'synonyms' when necessary,and thus mark offthe
boundaries of the semantic field in Boethian fashion.
The Boethian denial of the existence of casus, ifdefinedas
causeless
events (V, pr. i, 8), is translated directlyby Notker: "be oman
heizet casum . ina stuzzelingn uurtena geskht . nde ne llero
dingo mchunga ... S chdo ih pldo . dz casus neht nes" ('If
anyone calls casus an event occurring at random and without the
causality of all things ... then I would say confidentlythat casus is
nothing' 332, 20-23). If understood in this sense, casusmust be called
simply "einen bren nmen . ne bezichennisseda" ('an empty
name, withoutsignification'332, 24-25; cf. Boethius' inanisuoxV , pr.
i, 8). It is an empty sign, a signifierwithouta signified.
Notker then inserts a lengthy comment on the nature of the
26

13:15:42 PM

definitionthus far, firstbrieflyexplaining the idea of causation and

lack of it:
motu.
Causa isto conexazoderoeuentu.Fonediu . dz manchttemerario
causarum. dz is l in"
ndesinecausa. ldesineconexione
joinedtotheevent.Thusitis thatonesays"by random
('The causeis always
a "causalnexus."Theyareallofone
cause"orwithout
motion"and"without
andthesamesor332,26-333,1).
There followsa listof synonyms'forthe puzzling concept ofcauseless
events (333, 1-6).62 Continuing with the idea that casus conceived as
causeless events is an emptysign, Notker concludes: "Uuir mugen iz
sprechen . uuir nefndnis o neht" (We may say it, but we cannot
findi 333, 7-8). The idea of temeritas
is reduced to the state of deceit
and sin: "Temeritas ist mbe-dncheda . nde ngeuurehit . nde
ghscrcchi . nde nordenhfti. fruali . nnderskit . nrhti"
('Temerity is imprudence, indiscretion,rashness, irregularity,error,
confusion,disorder*333, 8-10). 63The reasons forthislack of signification by and existenceof casusis, of course, the absolute controlby God
of all events: "Uur mg tz sn . dz man chtstzzelingn. nde rdingn . nde ne rhti . gte llu ding tuungentemo ze rhti?"
('Whence can that come, that one calls at random, causeless, without
order, when God imposes order on all things?' 333, 16-18).64
The treatmentof the nihilex nihilopassage, which Notkertranslates
with "fne nehtenehte uurden ('nothing comes fromnothing' 333,
62The passageis: "Tz chtllez. stuzzelingn
. rdingn
. nddrftes
. nerhab.
. nesculde. nerde.... slbuuga. ldeslbhui
neUrspring
. ihmino. lsodz
. ndefneimoslbemouuirdet"(333,
ist. beshehtfneimoslbemoerhuet
and rdingn
's
Abstract
Terms
inNotker
, see H. G. Reinmuth,
1-6).On stzzelingn
Boethius
: A Semantic
and Etymological
, Diss. Northwestern
1937,29-30and
Study
between
andarchaic
modern
GerSchrbler,
113,whodrawsa connection
stzzelingn
manstutz.
Thetermrdingn
is usedearlier
alsointhedenialofcauseless
events
(303,
'without
i.e. without
a causalnexus.Thetermrhab
27). ndrftes
signifies
necessity,'
is derived
from
therootoftheverbin-heffen
andis usedconsistently
inthe
byNotker
senseofcausa
intotheMiddleHighGermanperiod(Schrbler,
, whichitretained
98).
is found
as thetranslation
ofortus
rsprng
(1726-7; 334,18-19)andcausa(310,11-13;
isclosely
connected
withthedivineorigin
of
andcontrol
335,22-23).Assuch,theterm
theworld;nersprng
wouldthenimplythateventsthustaking
placewouldhaveno
suchconnection
withdivinecausality.
Scld
appearsinthesenseofcausaonlyoneother
timeinNotker's
andtwiceintheglosses
toNotker's
Psalms(c. 63,6 &c. 68,
Boethius,
ofcausais foundonlytwiceintheworkoutside
5, ed. Piper).Rdaas thetranslation
thispassage(290, 1-6& 285, 13-17),whileitis oftenusedas thetranslation
ofratio.
Thetwoterms
andslbhui
areexplained
as events
whoseorigin
is
slbuuga
byNotker
within
without
external
latteris a hpl.).
themselves,
causality
(the
63See Schrbler,
115-18on theseterms.
64The finalphraseis a 'dativeabsolute'whichrenders
Boethius'
ablativeabsolute:
"cohercente
inordinem
cunctadeo" (V, pr.i, 8).
27

13:15:42 PM

20), is quite interesting,for Notker seems to betray an acquaintance

with the tenets of Epicureanism, as Schrbler points out, possibly
natura.65
But it is more likelythatNotker's
throughLucretius' De rerum
commentsstem fromthe commentarieson the Consolatio.Remigius offersa lengthycomment on the phrase, mentioningEpicurus by name
and giving a precis of the relevant doctrinal position (Paris BN lat.
15090, 74r). As noted above, Boethius points out thatthe nihilexnihilo
conceptwas not intended by the ancients to referto the origins of the
subiecto
cosmos, but ratherdealt with material objects (de materiali
V,
Notker's
of
the
adheres
problem
closely to the
pr. i, 9).
explanation
tenorof Boethius' argument,explaining in termsof thefundamentum
of
natural substances, the four universal elements, etc. The phrase de
materiali
subiecto
is interpretedand translatedby Notkerwiththe phrase
66
dinge('concerning seminal things' 333, 26). The confnesmhftemo
cept demands explanation, and Notker adds:
. diusmenhbent. ndenednuurden
S arTiu sntsmhfte
nemgen.
. Tuhizent
boressintndeherbe. ndelluanimantia
subiecta. quia subiaccidentibus
suis.
ciuntur
areseminal
which
haveseeds,andwithout
that[seed]theycannot
('Thosethings
cometo be. Thusaretreesand grass,and all animate
things.
Theyarecalled
attributes'
becausetheyaresubjectto theiraccidental
333,26-334,1)
subjects,
The smenas the essential aspect of substance is certainly akin to
nat. I, 150-184).67The purpose of this
Lucretius' seminarerum
(De rerum
digression is to put into context the argument concerning causality,
and since causality necessarilydeals withsubstance (smhfte
ding),the
concept must be explicated. Then Notker again proposes the argument against casus,since causality in the sense just defineddenies any
relevance to the concept of chance, forall events, acts and objects are
caused:
Natures arboressntndeherbe. ndellucorpora. de neuurdent
neht
. siehbenttelicha
. dnnnsiuuurdent
. tahizeter
materiam
stuzzelingn
fundamentum.
Keskhet
nuheht. tsisttelh
causa.Tu istberfundamen. uuz iro fundamentum
tm.Etelhratioisto tugenulde ffenu
s .
uunnnsiuuurdn. ldeuunninehtkeskhe.
andtheydo notcomeaboutat
('Thustreesandherbsandall bodiesarenatural
random.
from
whichtheyarise;itis calleda founmaterial,
Theyhavea certain
dation.Ifanything
the
happenstothem,ithassomecause,whichis,however,
65Schrbler,
107-12.
66Schrbler
is translating
a glosson thetexthere,rather
maintains
thatNotker
than
thetextitself,
comment
which
follows
andthushealsoaddstheexplanatory
(p. 109).
67Cf. alsoAristotle,
II, 4 (196a24-b5).
Physics
28

13:15:42 PM

obscure
toeachprinciple,
itisalwayseither
ormanifest,
Withregard
foundation.
itcomesorwhence
toit' 334,
whatitsfoundation
is,whence
something
happens
10-16).
Notkerseems littledisturbedby the relationshipbetween the Christian
exnihiloand the Boethian affirmation
of nihilex
doctrineof God's creatio
nihiloin relation to substance. Yet the passage drew much attention
fromthe ninth-centurycommentatorson the Consolatio.The St. Gall
Anonymous makes the Christian dogma explicit: "conditor ex nihilo
cuncta creauit" ('the creator created all things from nothing' Einsiedeln 179, 173b). Remigius offerstwo comments: "a deo omnia ex
nihilo facta sunt" ('all thingswere made by God fromnothing' Paris
BN Lat. 15090, 74v) and "sciebant enim illi quod conditorex nihilo
cuncta crearet" ('For they know that the creator created all things
fromnothing' ibid.). Here Notkerhas gone intomuch more detail concerningmaterial causality than did Boethius, yet withoutofferingthe
which is otherwisecharacteristicof his translation,
Christiana
interpretatio
and forwhich there were also models in the commentarytraditions.
His rendering of Boethius' arguments concerning casus is quite
direct,preservingthe exemplum of the discovered gold and the salient
aspects of the definition. Chance events are incidental to the final
cause: "So man chd er teuur mbe teuuz tot ... Unde dr
teuunnn eht nderes keskhet . tnne dr-mbe man iz tot ...
Tz heizet casus" ('Thus one says that he does somethingfora purpose ... and for some reason something else happens than that for
which it was done ... That is called casus' 335, 11-15); unusual (since
unexpected): "N moz h chdan geskhtuusen . dz ngeuundo
gebret" ('Now I must call thatcasuswhich takes place unexpectedly'
causis: "Fne zesmine
336, 21-23); and they result ex confluentibus
geullenn dingen . diu man mbe eht tot" ('from the concurrence
of things,which one does for some purpose' 336, 24-25). 68 The efficientcause ofthisconfluenceofcauses is the same as thatpostulatedin
the Consolatio
and in Alfred'stranslation:"diu ordena . s. fati. diu-dir
chmentiu fne gtes prouidentia" ('the order, i.e. of fate, which
comes fromGod's providence' 336, 27-28 = V, pr. i, 19). In this
cause, the teleology of chance events is guaranteed. Boethius' final
comment on the inevitable chain of causality, dependent on prouidentia, promptsNotker to give a precis of the metaphysicalhierarchyby
means of which all eventstake place in theirproperorder: "Prouiden68Remigius
remarks
on theBoethian
definition
(V, pr. i, 18): UERADEFINITIO
CASUS(Paris,BN lat. 15090,75r).
29

13:15:42 PM

tia uuiz tu dng sment . fatum rcchet siu efnzn" ('providence

comprehends the things simultaneously; fate executes them individually' 337, 3-4). The exemplum used to illustratethisprincipleis
again the hiding and the discovery of the gold, which actions God
directs,while fateexecutes; and since the firsttwo providentiallycaused actions- the hiding of the gold and the farmer'sdigging- occur,
the thirdis bound by the necessityof the divine plan to take place : "do
geskh foneden note daz trtta"('then the thirdtook place of necessity' 337, 8).
This idea, thatso-called chance eventsare not onlycaused, but even
necessary, is taken up again in the translation of the following
metrum,which illustratesthe redefinedconcept of casus, and to which
Notker adds a comment which furtherrestrictscasus. Since he has incorporatedcasusinto the chain of divine causality underfatum, he contends that so-called chance events are themselvesbound to a causal
nexus. The finallines of the metrum(concerningthe courses taken by
the Tigris and Euphrates) and the translationare:
Sicquae permissis
fluitare
uidetur
habenisforspatitur
frenos
ipsaquelegemeat.
whichseemsto wanderwithloosedreins,submits
to the
('Thus chance{fors),
toa law.' V, m. i, 11-12).
reinsanditself
proceeds
according
. trdirdnchet
So fret
casuspeduungen
... ndenea
frenmbe-dungen
nefret
er.
under
restriction,
('Thus casus,whichseemsto youto occurwithout
proceeds
... anditdoesnotoccuroutsidethelaw' 338,11-13).
constraint
Notker comments:
. teduungent
in. deszzent
imoa . Fnediuisttz
Causdecasummchnt
fors. ndecasus. ndeinopinatus
euentus
. tztiecausemchnt
. offene
. lde
tugene.
casus
: they
control
itandimpose
an orderonit.Thus
produce
('The causeswhich
thatisfors(' fortune'),
casus
eventswhich
thesecausesproduce,
, andunexpected
orobscurely'
either
338,14-17).
manifestly
Once again the causal order- even law- is emphasized, and all
semblance of randomness has been eliminated. Thus Notker disposes
of chance in almost the same manner as did Boethius, adding explanations and comments, but not changing the ultimatereason forthe illegitimacyof the concept God's control and the chain of causality
which extends from God's providence through fate to individual
events in the world.
The Old High German term most often employed by Notker in
translationsof Boethian casus is geskiht
. Yet the prevailing scholarly
opinion that casusin the sense of 'chance' is renderedby Notker with
30

13:15:42 PM

congeskiht
per se is inaccurate.JrgenJaehrlingmaintains thatgeskiht
sistentlyrenderscasus in the sense of 'chance' in Notker's translation
69Yet the term
of Aristotle'sCategories.
(in various grammaticalforms)
is in fact found in the Categories
consistentlyin the sense 'event/ 'to
happen' or in referenceto grammatical case.70 In Notker's D inter, the standard translationequivalent is again found: allegeskiht
pretation
= quejiunt('that which happens').71 The usage in Notker's Consolatio
is consistentwiththatfhis otherworks. In 51, 7-11 (quoted above, p.
functionsin the phrase diseuurltlichengeskihte
, which taken
25), geskiht
as a unit translateshunemundum
i.e.
'those
events
which
take place
,
agi
in the world.' Geskihtsignifies no more than euentus,which is the
generalsignificationproposed by Schrblerforthe term,in additionto
"das Geschehen" and "quae ... acciderunt."72In fact,geskiht
is rarely
Notker's translationforcasusin the sence 'chance', unlessqualified by
an adjective whichmodifiesthe basic significationsof the term{euentus)
toward the signification 'causeless events.' In 41, 15-17 and
is used withoutadjectival modificationand translates
elsewhere,geskiht
In 79, 2-9 it appears in a commentby Notkeras thetranslation
euentus.
of casus, used as the designation forone of the methods of rhetorical
defense.73Even here, however, a qualifier is necessary in order to
specifymore clearly the meaning of the Latin term:
geskiht('unexpected event' 79, 5).
ngeuundiu
To render the concept 'chance', geskihtalmost always takes a
qualifier which indicates randomness: "de repentiniscasibus . Fne
ghngeskhten" ('concerning unexpected events' 295, 7-8) and "si
misceriomnia fortuitiscasibus crederem . . . be ih llu ding kelubti
turn in nguissn
geskhten" ('If I believed all thingsto be confused
uncertain
events'
289, 24-26). Most clearly illustrativeof the
by
of
necessity qualifyinggeskihtin order to render casus as 'chance' is a
statementby Notker himself: "be dz ngeuundo geskhet . tu
geskihtheizet casus" ('If that happens unexpectedly,the event is call69Jaehrling,
22. He also considers
casusin thesense'Zufall'a non-philosophical
usage,whilein thesenseofgrammatical
case,itis philosophical
[?1.
70In 100,11-15=
case(amr);100,25-27= facta
factaest'100,17-20= grammatical
= une
est
; 94,23-25- abaliquohuiusmodi
telchero
; ed.J. . King.Die Werke
geskihte
Notkers
desDeutschen
V, 73 (Tbingen1972).
71Ed. byJ. .
desDeutschen
Notkers
VI, ATB 81(Tbingen
King,Die Werke
1972),40,
12-13.
72Schrbler,
112.
73The othermethodsmentioned
are necessitasi
not('necessity')and imprudenza/
nuuzenhit
79,6-9).
('ignorance'
31

13:15:42 PM

'
ed casus 338, 4-5). only when somethingoccurs (geskihet)
unexpectedly
may it be called 'chance'.74 This practice correspondsto Alfred's use
of a ' 'butan" -clause with wyrdin order to translate casus.
As noted above, Notker most oftenretains the Latin term casus in
his German textduring the technicaldiscussion of casus.75Toward the
end of the analysis, however, he renders the term twice with geskiht
without adjectival modification,but only afterthe definitionof casus
has been reduced to "improuisus inopinatusque concursus" ('unforeseen and unexpected concurrence' 335, 23-24) and "inopinatus euentus" ('unexpected event' 336, 21); casus no longer signifies'chance'
thus signifiesno more than an euenwhen geskiht
is so used, and geskiht
and beyond the epistemological powers of
tus caused by prouidentia
men.
The other terms in the shortpassage, 51, 7-11, are equally important for the discussion of chance in the remainder of the work. The
semantic significanceof "temerariis et fortuitiscasibus" is translated
the firstof which emphasizes the lack of
and stuzzelingn,
by uerlzene
the
latter
while
order in temerariis
,
(in Old High German used only by
ariusand its derivativeforms
Notker) is a common translationof temer
elsewhere in the work: "productum euentum temerariomotu ... ina
stuzzelingn uurtena geskiht" (332, 18-21); "temerario motu ...
stuzzelingn" (332, 27-333, 2); "temeritas ... stuzzelingn" (333,
15-17).
Just as in the Boethian passage, one findsin Notker's translationa
concern forthe establishmentofclearlydefined,opposing categoriesof
arius etfortuituscasus and rdovs.
order and disorder: ratiovs. temer
The
Prisoner affirmsthe rule of
uerlzenelindestzzelingn
geskihte.
God's ratioand denies the control of disorder: "Atqui inquam nullo
modo existimauerim. ut tam certa moueantur fortuitatemeritate.
Truuo chd ih . tz nechme nomr in mnen sin . tz s gussiu ding
. frn fter uunchelnero nrhti" ('Cerainly, I said, it never occured to me that such certainthingsoccurredaccordingto a vacillating
lack of order' 51, 11-15). Later in the same discussion, the opposition
74Further
useof
ofgeskiht
evidence
ofthebasicsignification
maybe seeninNotker's
Ittranslates
a termfound
works.
msseskht
forasperitas
onlyinNotker's
('misfortune'),
ofragingfortune'
seuientis
tune
26,9-10),aduersa
fortuna
('adversefortune'
('harshness
offortune'
88, 10-12).In eachcase,therefore,
42,4-6)andaduersitas
('adversity
fortune^
the
itexpresses
thestateofbadluck,thenegative
aspectofwhichmaybe takenfrom
useofunwyrd
andtheOld HighGermanmi'ssi-.
Cf.Alfred's
Latinasperitas
, aduersitas
ictibus
offortunae
III, pr.i, 2).
('bytheblowsoffortune'
(50, 17)as a translation
75331,20; 332,20 & 23; 334,22; 335,1.
32

13:15:42 PM

is furtherclarifiedby the use of different

termsto translatethe Latin:
4
non
earn
credis
'quod
[sc. gubernationem mundi] subditam
temeritaticasuum .i. temerariiscasibus . sed diuine rationi ... dz t
sia neuunst ndertna nrdenhftn geskhten . nube gtes
uushite" ('that you do not believe it [the governance of the world] to
be subject to unregulatedevents, but ratherto divine intelligence'55,
16-21). Again there is the opposition between divine order and
casuumand translated by
disorder, the latter expressed by temeritati
.
nrdenhftn
geskhten
In the furtherdiscussions of the concept, Notker oftenemphasizes
divine control, even when Boethius does not. Divine wisdom, personifiedby Alfredas the principleof providentialorder, appears in a
commentby Notker as the guarantorof the cosmic order. Philosophia
mentionsthe ratiowhichgovernsthe heavens; Notker commentsTu
rda ist ktes uustom" ('this reason is God's intelligence' 177, 25).
Just as forAristotle,Boethius and Alfred,thereis forNotkeran order
which governs all events.
Through his analyses offortunaand casus, Boethius establishesan incontrovertiblecosmic order, in which chance events are no more than
unexpected events. His argument moves dialectically from the
Prisoner's vague belief in the control of the cosmos by a principle of
disordertoward a rigidsystemof providentialcontrol.The structureof
his argumentis thus quite different
fromAristotle's. The latterbegins
his analyses with a detailed investigationof chance and ends by placing the resulting definitionin the context of a principle of order.
Boethius' argument is in a certain sense a mirror image of the
Aristotelian,in that he establishes the larger context of divine order
beforeincorporatinga briefdiscussion of the technical subject of casus
intothe analysis near the end of the work. The metaphorof the mirror
is, of course, imperfect,since Aristotle'sdiscussion takes place in the
, and since Boethius, in
larger contextof the whole text of the Physics
his analysis offortuna
, deals withthe problem of disorderfromthe very
beginning of the Consolatio.But the metaphor at least illustratesthe
contrastin perspectivewhich determinesto a great extentthe analyses
by Aristotleand Boethius. The details of Aristotle's analysis are not
lost in the Consolatio
, but merelydeemphasized and incorporatedinto
the larger context of Boethius' all-pervasive providentialorder.
Alfred'sargumentscarcelyresembles that of the Consolatio
, since he
the
of
Boethius'
ordo
in
established
,
accepts
legitimacy
finally Book V,
and deemphasizes counter-arguments throughout the work. His
33

13:15:42 PM

numerous other adaptations of the work contribute also to this

recasting and reinterpretationof the entire structureof the Boethian
is a conargument. For Alfred, casus is non-existent; weas gebyrian
tradictionin terms. Wyrdy'that which happens in the world,' is by
definitionunder divine control, and argument is hardly necessary.
Anglo-Saxon Christian dogma, along with Boethius' argumentation,
has dispelled the concept of chance fromthe stockof possible topics of
discussion.
In Notker*s treatment of the problem, however, one sees the
the
scholar-pedagogueat work,not actually explaining or interpreting
concept of casus so much as commentingon and annotatingthe text
with peripherallyrelevant material. This is especially the case in his
digressionson the nature of substance and the smen, where he in fact
departs fromthe Boethian argumentto the extentthatone mightquestion his comprehensionof the Boethian deemphasis of substance and
physical (intrinsic)causality in favorof directdivine causality. Yet in
the end, his translation
of the text reveals no such major modifications:
casusis rejectedby Notkerwiththe same basic dialectical argumentsas
by Boethius.
Strictlyspeaking, one cannot comment on the retentionor loss of
the Aristoteliandefinitionof chance in the textsof Alfredand Notker,
since theydeal with topic throughthe Consolatioand withoutaccess to
the Physics.Even so, one remarksthat the basic elementsof Aristotle's
definition(the incidental, exceptional and teleological character of
chance events) are presentin the translations- to the same extentthat
, with the additional Boethian element (in
they are in the Conslatio
Notker's translation)of the confluenceof causes.
Boethius transforms the Aristotelian concept through his
'metaphysical' perspective; Alfred treats Boethius' transformation
with the reverencewhich he deemed appropriate foran ancient work
of Christianphilosophy,but in doing so transformsthe concept again;
and Notkerpresentsan annotated translation/edition.
One sees in the
three textsthree quite distinctmethods and products, and thus three
differentstages in the interpretationand reception of the ancient
philosophical concept of chance.
Los Angeles,
University
ofSouthern
California

13:15:42 PM

Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
AlbertusMagnus3 View on the Angle with Special Emphasis on His
and Metaphysics*
Geometry
PAUL M. J. E. TUMMERS

Albertus Magnus is not famous for his special interests in

mathematicsand his philosophical views concerning this subject are
commonly considered to be Aristotelian.1 He opposes, e.g. in his
as well as in other works, the so-called errorPlatonis:the
Metaphysics
view that mathematicsis concerned with a realitywhich unerlies and
is the principle of physical reality.2 Nevertheless, Albert did write
some mathematical works;3 as regards geometry,a commentaryon
4 can be mentioned,as can the tracton 'inEuclid's Elements
ofGeometry
5 Moreover, in the Aristotelian
divisible lines', insertedin his Physics.
paraphrases, he sometimes elaborates on the geometrical examples
given by Aristotle;he indicates explicitlythe correspondingtheorems
of Euclid, and insertsgeometricalitemswhich are not foundin Aristotle's text.6
One example of these geometricalitemsis a digressionwhichAlbert
: there,he discusses
gives in the chapter on quantity in his Metaphysics
* A first
draft
ofthispaperwasreadat the'TableRondede C.N.R.S. pourle seple Grand',Institut
timecentenaire
d'Albert
Paris,16-18oct. 1980.
catholique,
1 See A. G. Molland:Mathematics
intheThought
in:Albertus
Albertus
of
Magnus
Magnus,
andtheSciences,
Commemorative
, 1980, ed. byJ. A. Weisheipl
(P.I.M.S.), ( =
Essays
StudiesandTexts49),Toronto1980,463-478.
2 See J. A. Weisheipl:
Albertus
andtheOxford
Platonists
, in: Proceedings
Magnus
ofthe
American
Catholic
32 (1958),124-139.
Association,
Philosophical
3 B. Geyer,Die mathematische
35 (1958),
desAlbertus
, in: Angelicum
Schuften
Magnus
159-175.
4 B. Geyer,op.cit.
Uber
eine
in:
Eukliddiedem
Albertus
wird,
J. E. Hofmann,
zugeschrieben
bearbeitung
Magnus
Proceedings
Conpress
oftheInternational
ofMathematicians
, 1958,ed. T. A. Todd,Cambridge1960,554-566.
P. M.J. E. Tummers,
TheCommentary
onEuclid's
Elements
in:AlberofGeometry,
ofAlbert
tusMagnus
andtheSciences
, (seenote1), 479-499.
5 1Liber
deindivisibilibus
lineis
libri
sexti
vol.
, ed. Borgnet,
quifacitadscientiam
physicorum'
andcommentary
onthepseudo-Aristotelian
workof
3, 463-481.Thisis a paraphrase
thesamename.
6 See theindices
oftheColon,edition
s.v. Euclides.See
ofAlbertus
Magnus'works,
IX 4,5 (ed. Colon.
also,e.g.: De celoII 2,3 (ed. Colon.V/1,131-132),
Metaphysics
I 2,1 (ed. Colon.
elementorum
XVI/1,428); X 1,5(ed. cit.436);De causis
proprietatum
etcorruptione
V/2,61-62);Degeneratone
11,11 (ed. Colon.V/2,120).
35

13:15:51 PM

the nature of the angle. Aristotle's text does not mention the angle,
and thereforetwo questions immediatelyarise: why is this digression
made here in the Metaphysics
, and what could be Albert's source or
sources?
As a provisional answer to the firstquestion one might say that
geometrydeals with quantity, that the angle is a geometricalobject,
and that the angle must thereforehave a place in a chapteron quantity. Aristotle,however, gives as the normal kinds of (mathematical)
continuous quantityonly: line, surfaceand body. To the second question: Avicenna had already made some remarks on the angle in the
place correspondingto those remarks in Albert's work, namely the
Furthermore,a similardiscuschapter on quantityin his Metaphysics.1
sion concerningthe nature of the angle can be foundin the Geometry
(a
commentaryon Euclid), attributedto Albertus Magnus.8
This paper considers these provisional answers with the help of an
analysis and comparison of the discussions on the angle in Albert's
and Metaphysics.
Geometry
The introduction(section 1) gives some remarkson the status of
geometricalobjects in general and on the historyof the problemof the
nature of the angle up to Albert's time.
Section 2 is an examination of the relevant passage in Albert's
Geometry
compared with that of Anaritius' commentaryon Euclid,
which has turned out to be Albert's main source.
and gives a
Section 3 deals withthe passages in Albert's Metaphysics
and
the
the
the
of
of
Geometry
Metaphysics.
comparison
arguments
In section 4 the views of Roger Bacon and other XIII/XIV^1centuryauthors are compared with those of Albert.
In the appendices the text of the relevant passages of Albert's and
will be
Anaritius' commentarieson Euclid and of Albert's Metaphysics
given.
1. Introduction
1.1. Geometrical Objects
Albert's view on the objects of geometryin general is quite clear; it
will thereforebe sufficientto quote only a few passages statingthis
7 See 3.1. G. Verbeke,
in hisintroduction
to theeditionofAvicenna
(seenote50),
doesnotsayanything
aboutthispassage.
8 Seenote4. Thisattribution
toAlbert
theGreatisinmyopinion
correct.
Seemyforedition
thcoming
(Spring1984).
36

13:15:51 PM

: geometria
cummateria
view. One is fromhis Metaphysics
(sit) de conceptia
is
the
:
rationem
another
from
secundum
esseetseparatissecundum
;9
Geometry
theremathematicsis described as the philosophyconsiderans
formamque
rationem
est in materiamobili tarnenestconceptacumipsa secundum
difwhat
the
remains:
Nevertheless,
question
significationdo
finitivam.10
these words have, what objects does Albert have in mind? A look at
Aristotlewill help us to solve this.
For Aristotlethereis a distinctionbetween two kinds of geometrical
objects: on the one hand the line, surfaceand body, togetherwiththeir
principle,the point; on the otherhand the geometricalfiguressuch as
the circle and the square.11 The formerprovide the base, the underly, extening matterof the latter; the nature of the formeris quantitas
as
in
two
and
three
Aristotle
one,
sionality
says in the
(dimensions),
4
in
the
latter
are
considered
be
the
to
;12
Metaphysics
category quality'.
Albert makes the same distinction:in his discussions of Quantity*
he deals with line, surface, body while the figuresare treated in his
chapters on 'quality'. Let us look at these chapters.
:
Albert discusses quantity in his Predicamenta
and in his Metaphysics
in
in the firsttractas mensura
the
substantiae
second
,
corporeae
proutpendet
13Albert
ex ente.In the Predicamenta
says that of the praedicabiliawhich
belong to the nature of the accidents of a substance, the firstis quantity, and he gives the divisions of quantity; one species is the continous,
to which belong: line, surface and body (but also the nonmathematical: tempusand locus). Albert gives the reasons why these
three are continuous quantities (ch. 3): the main reason is that the
point by itsfluxusgenerates the line, the line the surface and so on.
To thishe adds thatthisfluxusis onlyintellectual.14Furtherhe dwellson
several difficultiesconcerning the line, surface and body (ch. 7-8);
in these chapters (as well as in this whole tracton quantity) he gives
the mathematicalpropertiesof these objects and also quotes Euclid in
9 Metaphysica
III 3, 1 (ed. cit. 139,65); see also Metaphysica
11,1 (1); III 2, 13
andAnal.Post.I 4, 7
(135-137);IV 1, 1 (162);VI 1, 2 (304-305);XII 1, 3 (549-551),
vol.2, 105).
(ed. Borgnet,
10MS Vienna,Dom. 80/45,f. 105r(myedition
p. 1).
11See: Ian Mller,Aristotle
on Geometrical
der
, in: ArchivfrGeschichte
Objects
52 (1970),156-171;RogerJ. Rigterink,
Aristotle's
Philosophie,
Conception
ofGeometrie
1973(no. 73-21.176);D. O'Brien,Aristote
etla catgorie
dela
, Diss.Wisconsin,
Objects
Divisions
dela quantit
33 (1978),25-40.
, in: Les Etudesphilosophiques,
quantit.
12
VI 3, 1061a 33.
13Metaphysica
III (ed. Borgnet,
Predicamenta
vol. 1, 194-221).
14ibidem
: 195a-199b.
37

13:15:51 PM

four passages.15 In the chapters on quantity in the Metaphysics

, 16
Albert, following Aristotle, firstdefines quantity as that which is
divisible (in a specific manner). He also gives divisions of quantity
here. One kind of quantityis the continuous, examples of which are:
se or better
line, surfaceand body. These belong to the quantasecundum
et
se
secundum
suam
substantiam
the secundum quanta
quia quanquiditatem
Aftera discussion concerningthe posieorumdiffinitiva.
titasestin ratione
tion of tempusand locusas quanta, Albert begins with the digressionon
the angle, the subject of the thirdsection of this paper. As his second
declarans
esseetnaturam
quanchapteron quantityAlbertoffersa digressio
titatis
, in which he says that the subject of the geometeris quantityas
accident. This whole digression is interesting,but forthe purpose of
this paper I shall only mentionthat Albertagain opposes Plato in this
chapter, namely Plato's statement according to Albert that a point
constitutesa line, a line a surface, and that thereforea point is the
most substantial of the three. For Albert, not this, but ratherits converse is true: when it is said that the point constitutesby itsfluxusthe
solam, non
line etc., this is meant- he says- secundumimaginationem
secundumrei naturami1Contrary to the Predicamenta
, Albert does not
quote Euclid or passages from the Elementsin this tract of his
Methaphysics.
Albert discusses the second kind of geometricalobjects in his tracts
18Albertmakes a distinctionbetween
on quality. In the Predicamenta
forma and figura, explaining this with a mathematical example; in the
. 19 But figura is also
definition of figura he uses the word angulus
and terminatio
twofold: quantitasterminata
quantitatis.20
Only in the first
15ibidem:
cap. 3 (198b);cap. 7 (205ban(j206b);cap. 13(219*)
16Metaphysica
V 3, 1-2(ed. cit.,250-2).
17ibidem:
p. 260,23-24.
18Predicamenta
V 8 and9 (ed. cit.,259-262).
19ibidem
insuperficie
linearum
autemhaec,quiamodusterminationis
259a:Differunt
... et sicdicetur
substantialem
scilicet
referri
velcorpore
potestad intra,ad formam
in
scilicet
sicvelsicterminatam
ad extra,ad quantitatem
forma.
Potestetiamreferri
talesveltalesngulos,etsicdicitur
figura.
cumsicvelsic
nisigenere
nonconvenit
enimquodestformae
Ibidem
259b:Continere
esseacutoangulovelrectovelhebete.
angulatum
20Ibidem
idquod
secundum
dicitur
autemscirequodfigura
259ab: Oportet
dupliciter:
estetiamfigura
idquodestingenere
etsicdicitur
estquantitas
terminata,
quantitatis;
ethocmodonondicitnisiidquod
terminatio
id quo estfigura
secundum
quantitatis,
II
sedhaecqualitasestcircaquantitatem
estingenere
posita.cfr.DeAnima
qualitatis,
1,11(ed. Colon.VII/1, 81,30-34).
38

13:15:51 PM

Albert
aspect is figurestudied by the geometer.21In the Metaphysics22
definesthe fourthmodus of quality, viz. formavelcircaaliquidconstans
continua
quantiand he
acceptaor as terminatio
figuraas qualitasin quantitate
23
refersto the Predicamenta He goes on to say that it is not the task of
the geometerbut that of the metaphysicianto prove that these figures
exist. In this connection he names the sphere ( sphaera
), the cylinder
the
cone
or
and
the
circle
pyramid {pyramis
{columna),
),
(which is the
of all figures),which are all mathematical figures.
radixetprincipium
Summing up, one can say that for Albert as for Aristotle continuous quantity, or quantity as extension, is the subject for the
geometer,and that the basic objects are line, surface and body while
the point, mathematicallyspoken, is their principle. Figures are the
othermathematicalobjects. They belong to the category'quality', but
they are mathematical only in as far as they are limited quantities.
Figures can have the quality of having angles.
This is the context in which we must place Albert's question: to
which categorydoes the angle belong.
1.2. Discussions on the angle up to Albert's time
Beforewe can go to Albert's text,we must begin witha shortlook at
Euclid's Elementsof Geometry
, the fundamental textbook,specially for
(the definitionsof) the objects of geometry.
Euclid24begin the firstbook of his Elementsof Geometry
with definitions of all the objects of geometry,the firstbeing that of the point.
Successively he definesthe line and the straightline; the surface and
plane surface; the plane angle and its varieties; the boundary and
figure,figurebeing that which is contained by any boundary or boundaries. Then followthe definitionsof varieties of (plane) figuressuch
as the circle and rectilinearfigures.Euclid ends his definitionsin book
I with that of parallel lines. To sum up: Euclid defines all the basic
mathematical objects (except the body, which is treated in a later
book), he definesthe figures,and he also definesthe angle. The angle
21IdemV 9 (ed. cit.,
dicendum
261a).Adhocautemquodde mathematica
objicitur,
mathematica
est,sed rationequantitatis
quod figuranonrationefigurae
cujusest
etab ipsaabsolvinonpotest.
Velpotest
est
dici,sicutdictum
est,quodfigura
qualitas,
mathematica
secundum
secundum
autemquodestterterminata;
quodestquantitas
minatio
a mathematico.
quanti,sicestqualitas,ethocmodononconsideratur
22Metaphysica
V 3, 5 (ed. cit.,263-264).
23Ibidem
263,4-5;264,38-39.
24Euclides,
Elementa
vol.I, Leipzig,1969,1-4.
, ed. Heiberg-Stamatis,
39

13:15:51 PM

is the only object whichdeserves (and rightlyso) a place in the Elements

, but forwhich no proper definitionis to be found in the
of Geometry
chapterson quantityor quality in Aristotle'sworks. Perhaps thatis the
reason why after Euclid, in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the
question could arise: what in Aristoteliancategories is the nature
of the angle, as definedby Euclid?
For indeed, we find such discussions in mathematical and
philosophical works, which are in many cases discussions concerning
the interpretationof Euclid's definitionof the angle.
tothefirstbookofEuclid's Elements
, gives a
Proclus,25in his Commentary
of
of
the
of
the
the possibilities
nature
survey
angle, startingwith
Euclid's definitionof the (plane) angle as the inclinationof two lines.26
He says that the ancients put the angle eitherin the categoryof relation (Euclid), or in that of quality or in that of quantity. But he gives
arguments against all these views and concludes that the angle is
somethingthatresultsfromall of these and is notjust one ofthem: one
may definethe angle as a qualified quantity,constitutedby such-andsuch a relation.27Proclus does not mention Aristotlebut the quality
28 that
view seems to stem fromhim. For Aristotlesays in his Physics
'angle, straightand circular' are typesof figuresand this means that
the angle is quality. The text, however, is not undisputed, and some
editors read instead of 'angle': 'angular'.29
The workof Proclus seems not to have been known duringthe Middle Ages in the Latin West, except by way of passages contained in the
- for the purpose of this
commentary of Anaritius; therefore
- we do not need to go furtherinto the details of his remarks.
paper
The next stage is the Arabic mathematicaltradition. Here we find
on Euclid30whichwas
an extended discussion in Anaritius' Commentary
25Proclus(412-485A.D.), Inprimm
Librum
ed. G.
Elementorum
Euclidis
Commentarti,
Friedlein,
1967),121-128.
Lipsiae1873(Hildesheim
26Euclid,Def.8. A planeangleistheinclination
oftwolinesina plane
tooneanother
line.See: SirT. L. Heath,The
anddo notlie in a straight
whichmeetoneanother
Elements
Thirteen
Books
ofEuclid's
, NewYork2( = Dover,1956),176-178.
27Proclus,
withintroducBooks
A Commentary
ontheFirst
Elements
, translated
ofEuclid's
Princeton
N.T. 1970,98-102.
tionandnotesbyGlennC. Morrow,
20Physica
15, 188a 25. See T. L. Heath,op.cit.(note26).
29See ThomasAquinas,Physica
I 10(76): rectum,
anguiareetcirculare.
Simplicius,
theviewthattheangleis a quality.
commentator
Aristotle's
(VIthc. A.D.), supports
inDe CeloII 14,ed. I. L. Heiberg(Comm.inArist.Graeca,
Comm.
See: Simplicius,
vol.VII), Berolini,
1894,538,21-22.
30Anaritius,
al-Nairizi,fl.897,died922.SeeDictionary
, s.v.,vol.
Biography
ofScientific
10,5-7.See note40.
40

13:15:51 PM

translatedby Gerard of Cremona in the second half of the XIIth century and was thus known to the Latin West. His discussion will be
treated in section 2.2. But beside Anaritius there were more Arabic
authorswho wroteon this subject, forexample, Ibn al Haitam,31 who
says thatthe angle belongs to the categoryof 'position' but neitherthis
work nor otherswere available in the Latin West.
As regards the Arabic philosophical tradition,Avicenna and Averroes give a few lines to the subject in their Metaphysics
which were
available in a Latin translationin the XIIIth century.These passages
will be looked at in section 3.1.
The available sources being so few,it is remarkablethatwe find,in
the Geometry
of Albertas well as in his Metaphysics
, an elaborate discussion on the nature of the angle.
2. Albert'sdiscussionin theGeometry
2.1. Albert's Geometry
Albert's Geometry
, a commentaryon Euclid,32was writtenbeforehis
and
,
Metaphysics
probably in approximately 1260. Internal evidence
1235
as
terminus
gives
postquem, and because the author does not use or
mention Campanus' edition of Euclid ( 1259), which was the most
widelyspread edition of Euclid, we may assume that thisworkcannot
have been writtenmuch afterCampanus ' version. The work is based
largelyon the Adelardus versions33of Euclid and on Anaritius' Comon Euclid, but it incorporatesmore.34
mentary
Definition6 of Book I is concerned withthe angle, and states35that
the plane angle is the connection
of two lines, lying on one surface.
31See B. S.
onthePremises
Elements
,
Hooper,IbnAl-Haytham's
Commentary
ofEuclid's
BookI - VI, Diss.Princeton
1974(no. 75-23.243),
vol.I, 37-40.
32See note4.
33See forthetranslations
andeditions
ofEuclidattributed
toAdelardofBath:
- M. Clagett,TheMedieval Translations
the
Arabic
, with
form
oftheElements
ofEuclid
Lttin
ontheVersions
Special
Emphasis
ofAdelard
ofBath,in: Isis,44 (1953),16-42.
in:Dictionary
, s.v. Euclid,vol.4, 437.
-J. E. Murdoch,
ofScientific
Biography
- SisterMarySt. Martinvan RyzinO.S. F., TheArabic-Latin
Tradition
ofEuclid's
Elements
intheTwelfth
1960(no. 60-3277).
, Diss.Wisconsin
Century
34See my
edition
andanalysis
ofAlbert's
a new
whichincludes
forthcoming
Geometry
edition
ofAnaritius'
commentary.
35Angulus
linearum
alternus
contactus
estsupra
planusestduarum
quarumexpansio
nondirecta.
Translatio
ex arabicodicitsic:angulussupersuperficiem
applicatioque
ficialis
estinclinatio
duarumlinearum
in una superficie
sibiobviancium
nonsecundumrectitudinem
positarum.
(MS cit.,f. 106r,myedition
p. 8).
41

13:15:51 PM

Albert goes on directlywith an alternativedefinition:the angle is the

of two lines, lyingon one surface. The firstdefinitionis that
inclination
of the Adelard36version, the second is that of Anaritius. Aftersome
remarks on these definitions,Albert begins the discussion on the
nature of the angle. The text is given in Appendix 1.
Albertopens withthe statementthat some people say thatthe angle
is a relatio
, and that there are four arguments in favour of this view.
(These arguments, however, are in fact arguments against the view
that the angle is a quantity).
1. a An angle is not a line because it has no latitude (/. 4).
An angle is not a body because it does not necessarilyhave
depth (/. 5).
An
Y
angle is not a surface,because it is not divisibleas a surface. An angle is only divisible in longitude,see Euclid Book
I, Prop. 937(/. 5-7).
2. (This argument I will call the 'doubling-argument':) When a
quantity is doubled, it remains a quantity. There is an angle
se
which does not: the rightangle. Thereforethe angle secundum
a
not
is
quantity (/. 8-10).
3. No quantity is an accident of quantity. The angle is an accident, because a surface or a body can be angular. (Note the
transitionfrom'angle' to 'angular') (/. 11-13).
4. The angle is a species of quality, because angle belongs to
figureand thatis a species of quality (viz. the fourth)(/. 14-16).
There are four arguments against this view, and thus in favourof
the quantity-theory.
A. Bigger and smaller are specificaccidents of quantity.They are
accidents of the angle. Therefore the angle is a quantity (/.
18-19).
B. To a thingto whicha property{passio) is ascribed, the subject of
thatpropertyis also due. Acuteness and obtusenessare passiones
of a quantum
, and are ascribed also to an angle. Thereforean
a
is
quantity
(/. 20-21)
angle
C. That which is divisible as such, is a quantity. The angle is
divisible, as one can see fromEuclid Book I Prop. 9. Thus the
angle is a quantity (/. 22-24)
36See vanRyzin,op.cit.147.
37EuclidI prop.9: Datumangulumperequaliasecare;alia translatio
habetsic:
induasdividere
datumangulum
, MS cit., f.11lr,my
Geometry
(Albert,
equalespartes.
edition
p. 42).
42

13:15:51 PM

Everythingwhich has dimension(s), is a quantity. The angle

has, viz. longitudeand latitude. Thus the angle is a quantity(/.
25-26)
Conclusion of Albert: an angle is a quantity, but to be angular
) is a quality belonging to a quantity (/. 27-28).
(<angulatio
As argumentagainst the firstpoint (that the angle is not a line, nor a
surface,nor a body), Sambelichius38is quoted as sayingthatthe plane
angle is a medium between a line and a surface,and the solid angle a
medium between a surface and a body.
Then followdefinitionsof Apollonius, Aganiz and Yrynus.39This
last part (viz. the textof Sambelichius and the alternativedefinitions)
Albert borrows almost completelyfromAnaritius.
D.

2.2. Anaritius as Albert's source

Beforea furtherexamination of Albert's text,one must look firstat
Anaritius' discussion. Anaritius' Commentary
on Euclid40is- as faras I
know the only Arabic Euclid-commentarywhich was translatedinto
Latin in the Middle Ages. For this reason alone it deserves attention,
but it is also Albert's main source beside the Adelardus versions, as
can be seen in thispassage. The textof the relevantpassage is given in
the Appendix 2.
Anaritius begins with the definitionof angulussuperficialis
, as given
Albert
as
the
second
definition.
Then
follow
some
remarks
of
by
Sambelichius on this definition.
Our passage begins by stating that some interpretEuclid's definition so thatthe angle is only a relationand not a quantity.Then follow
argumentsin favourof the quantity view.
A. Biggerand smaller are aspects of quantity,but also of an angle
(/. 4-5). This is the same as Albert's argumentA (see 2.1.)
38Sambelichius
= Simplicius
of Aristotle,
and
(VIthc. A.D.), thecommentator
author
on Euclid.
ofa commentary
39Apollonius
ofPerga,about200 B.C. Work:Conica.Aganiz,unknown,
perhaps
student
ofProclus,
about500A.D. SeeA. I. Sabra,Journal
ofWarburg
and
Agapius,
31 (1968),13 note6. Yrynus,unknown,
Courtauld
Heroonof
Institutes,
probably
Ithc. A.D.
Alexandria,
40Anaritii
indecern
libros
Elementorum
Euclidis
commentarti
Gherardi
, exinterpretatione
priores
in codice
Cremonensis
Cracoviense
569 servata
, ed. Maximiiianus
Curtze,( = Euclidis
etH. Mengeedd.,Supplementum)
Operaomnia,I. L. Heiberg
Leipzig1899.Today
moreMSS ofthislatinversion
areknown
anda newedition
isbadlyneeded.I willuse
oftheMSS. forthetextgivenintheappendix.
TheMS M (MadridB.N.
mycollation
willsoonbe published.
ofAnaritius
10010)appearstobe thebestMS. A newedition
43

13:15:51 PM

An angle has quality, viz. obtuseness and acuteness (/. 6-7).

Albert's argument is the same qua content.
C. An angle is divisible, as can be seen fromEuclid I 9 (/. 8-9).
Albert's argument is the same, including the referenceto
Euclid I 9.
D. An angle is divided by a line as ifit were longitudeand latitude
(/. 10) . In argumentD Albertspeaks about the angle as having
dimensions, namely longitude and latitude. This is evidently
the same argument.
Thus it is clear that Anaritius and Albert give the same four
argumentsin favour of the quantity view.
Anaritius followswith the arguments against this opinion:
1. A surface is divided by a line in longitude and in latitude, an
angle in longitude alone. Thus an angle seems to have no
latitude. Other lines (e.g. lines which meet the two lines containing an angle) do not diminish the angle (/. 11-15). Albert
gives as argument 1 only the firstpart of this statement.
2. A corporeal angle has no depth, because it is not so divided
(/. 16-17). Albert gives the same point (l) but uses another
reason.
3. The doubling-argument, the same as Albert's argument 2
(/. 18-19).
Albert gives- as can easily be seen- all the argumentsof Anaritius
against the quantity view (but not in exactly the same form) and he
adds some: Albert's arguments 1 a, 3 and 4.
Anaritius' conclusion is that Euclid's view is thatthe angle is in any
between a line and a surface
case a relatio
, because the angle is a medium
quantumad quantitatem.Then follow definitionsof Apollonius (for
whom the angle is a quantity), and of Aganiz, and a definitionof an
unknown author, by Albert (who gives the same definitions)called
Yrynus.
B.

2.3. Albert's arguments

is based on
It is evident that the passage in Albert's Geometry
.
in
the
at
the
Anaritius. Let us now look again
Geometry
arguments
First of all, Albert gives no argumentsin favourof the relationview,
but only arguments in favour of or against the quantity view.
Albert begins by saying that the angle is not one of the three 'normal' kinds of continuous quantity, viz. line, surface and body. The
44

13:15:51 PM

reasons he uses, are correct,but note thathe makes no distinctionbetween the plane and the corporeal angle, only implicitlyin the words
Later on, however (/. 41-44), he does make this distincnonnecessario.
tion.
The doubling-argumentis quite peculiar. As faras I know no exact
parallel for this property of quantity can be found in Albert's
Predicamenta
or Metaphysics
, but in his De Celothispropertyis mentionalso
one
in
the Predicamenta
ed;41
passage
might be a parallel, where
Albertsays thatto be divided and to be augmented in infinitum
are conof
but
dividi
is
valid
for
the
continuum
and
sequences quantity,
only
for
numbers.
augerionly
The othertwo argumentsof Albertare not in Anaritius,but one can
where Albert says that to have
compare passages in the Predicamenta
'
to
the
angles belongs
category figure' and is a quality.42
The argumentspro quantitate
are the same as in Anaritius, but one
can compare them also with statementsin Albert's (Metaphysics
and)
:
Predicamenta
The firstargumentcan be compared with the propertyof quantity:
inaequaleand aequale.43Maius etminusare then to be identifiedwithinacquale. There is no referenceto aequale, but that cannot be expected
because the acute angle and the obtuse angle are smaller or bigger
respectively,compared with the rightangle.
Comparisons for the second argument are more difficultto find,
because acuteness and hebetudo
are not mentioned as such, but the
44
passages already quoted of the Predicamentacan be used.
The thirdand fourthargumentreferto the verypropertiesof quanand Metaphysics
.45
tityas stated in the Predicamenta
41De CeloI 2,8
... itaincontinuis
nonest
(ed.ColonV/l, 54,65ff.):sicutinnumeris
intellectum.
aliquamquantitatem,
accipere
quae duplarinonpossitsecundum
Predicamenta
III, 13(ed. cit.,220*):Suntautemetalia multaquantitatem
consequenin continuo
autem
tia,sicutdividivelaugeriin infinitum:
quidemdividi,in numero
augeri.
Thesignificant
ofquantity
areinAlbert's
: divisibility,
Predicamenta
dimenproperties
' non
*
'nonhabere
etminus
inintensione
etremissione'
contrarium'
, esse
sionality,
suscipere
magis
vel
.
See
Predicamenta
III.
aequale inaequale1
42Pred.V 8 (see note
nihiladdit
19); and: ad hocautemquoddicitur
quod figura
dicendum
est:additenimmodumqualitatis
supraquantitatem,
quodfalsum
qui non
est quantitas,
vel
qui est acutumvel rectumvel hebesin angulis,vel rotundum
sedsuntres.(Pred.V 9, ed. cit.,261a).
tantum,
planum:quae nonsuntrationes
43See Pred.III 14(ed. cit.,220):De
earnaequantitatis
proprio
quodestsecundum
qualevelinaequaledici.
44See notes42 and 19.
45Pred.
Ill 1(ed.cit.,194);Metaph.
V 3, 1 (ed. cit.,256):quantum
dicitur
idquodest
divisible
...
45

13:15:51 PM

The conclusion of Albertis not the same as thatof Anaritius. Albert

makes a distinctionbetween angulus(quantity) and angulatio(quality),
and Anaritius says that the angle is in any case a relatioand is
somethingbetween line and surface as regards quantity. Thus Albert
not only does not borrow his conclusion fromAnaritius, but he says
nothingabout the relation-aspectof the angle. Concerning the distinction between angulus(quantity) and angulatio(quality), one may firstof
all say that this is a good 'solution', which saves all the arguments
Albert gives.
Secondly, one can remarkthatthe subject of the geometeris quantity,46and that this is perhaps the reason why Albertwants to definethe
angle as a quantity, beside, of course, the argumentswhich he had
47
already given. In the Predicamentathere is a passage in which Albert
says that angulatiois a quality, and the definitiongiven forangulatioin
the Geometry
as qualitasaccidensquantitatiis in factthe same as the one
: qualitascircaquantitatem
dicta. Also we can
given in the Predicamenta
of
as
the
definition
terminatio
quanti.**
figure
compare
The remaining part of the text is taken fromAnaritius. Note that
Albert gives Yrynus as the author of the last definition, while
Anaritius does not give a name.
3. Albert'sdiscussionin theMetaphysics
3.1. Avicenna and Averroes
, we
Having made these remarksabout the passage in the Geometry
can now turn to Albert's Metaphysics.But firstwe must look at two
Metaphysics tractswhich Albertcertainlyknew and used,49and which
both give some insightsinto our question.
46Pred.V 9 (seenote21).
47Pred
nonsuntquantitates,
enimet angulatio
sed
. Ill 13(ed. cit.,219a):circulado
illamqualitatis
circaquantitatem
dictaesecundum
quaeestforma,
speciem
qualitates
seucircaaliquidconstans
figura.
48Pred.V 8 (seenote20Y
49Cf. Albertus,
VIII: Albertus
commentum
Metaphysica
(ed. cit.), prolegomena,
anteoculoshabet.
Averrois
semper
dephilosophia
Liber
cfr.Avicenna,
, ed. cit.(note50), 136*:Parmilesauteurs
qui,
prima
le Grandoccupeuneplacede
Albert
au XIIIe sicle,citent
abondamment
Avicenne,
Avicenne,
surle Grandse rfre
de mme,Albert
choix... Danssa Mtaphysique
toutpourleschapitres
qu'il intitule
Digressio.
Albert's
between
tractV 3, 5 andthe
S. vanRietgivesas an examplea comparison
thechapter
onthe
inAnnexe3 (159*-163*),precisely
partofAvicenna
corresponding
orfigure!
fourth
kindofquality:form
46

13:15:51 PM

Tract 3, Chapter 4 of Avicenna' s Metaphysicsis concerned with

quantityand we findin thatchaptersome remarkson the natureofthe
angle.50Avicenna says thatsome people thinkthatthe angle is a quanfromthe surfaceand body. His conclusion is thatboth a
tity,different
surfaceand a body can be a reshabensangulum.Thereforeone can use
the word 'angle' for the quantity ( mensura
) itselfor for this quality
which is in the quantity, just as there are the names 'square'
(iquadratura
) and 'squaring* {quadratura).From the answer to an objection (that a surfaceis made when a line moves with its two endpoints,
an angle when only one point moves and that thereforethe angle is a
fourthkindof quantity)one can draw the conclusion thatforAvicenna
angulusis the same as surfaceor body. This conclusion is strengthened
by the fact that Roger Bacon attributes this opinion explicitly to
Avicenna as we will see in section 4.1. It is interestingthat we already
implicitlyfindin Avicenna the distinctionwhich Albert is to make in
his Geometry
between angulusand angulatio.
In Averroes'Metaphysics
we findin the chapter on parsbxa fewlines
50Avicenna,Liberdephilosophia
divina
, III 4 (ed. S. van Riet,
primasivescientia
Louvain
-Leiden,1977,129-130):
lamautemquidamputaverunt
deanguloquodipsesitquantitas
continua
aliaa superficieetcorpore:
undeoportet
considerare
hoccircaillum.Dico igitur
quodmensura,
sivesitcorpus
sivesuperficies,
iamaccidit
eicontineri
intrafines
inuno
quicopulantur
estinterhosfines,estreshabensangulum.<...> et,si
puncto:unde,inquantum
est huiusmodi,
volueris,
qualitatem
quae est ei, inquantum
appellabisangulum,
estsicutquadratum
et secundum
sicutquadratura.
Si autemposueris
primum
igitur
nomenanguliintentioni
primae,dices:"angulusestequalis,minoretmaiorsecundumquodest,quia eiusessentia
mensura
est": si veroimposueris
intentioni
secunmensuram
In hoc
dae,tuncpropter
quae estiniliodicesde iliovelutiquadraturam.
autemquodestangulussecundum
intentionem
primam,
possunt
ponitriaspatiavel
velsuperficialis.
duo,etesttuncmensura
corporalis
nisimoveretur
lineainaestimatione
Qui autemputatdicensquodnonessetsuperficies
cumduobussuispunctis,
earnlongitudo
quousquefacit
quaeveremotaestinlatumet
indeprovenit
latitudo
etob hocestlongitudo
etlatitudo,
si autem
postlongitudinem,
moveatur
lineaad faciendum
sed nee in longumsolumsicutest, in
angulum,
latumsicutcumfacitsuperficiem,
sed moveatur
ex uno suorumcapitum,
et fiet
hieangulum
inmensuris.
Causaautemhuiusreiestigangulus:
ponitgenusquartum
norantia
intentionis
de hocquoddiximus,
scilicet
velduabus
quodreiopusesttribus
dimensionibus
ad hocutangulussitcorporalis
velsuperficialis,
nosti
postquam
igitur
tuncnondebetaudiriab intelligentibus,
eo quodhomo
quiaquoddixitnonsequitur,
illepreasumpsit
etturbatus
tenuit
ei,quiobliviosus
loquideeo quodnonconveniebat
reveraestquadratus
velpartealteralongior
et nihilaliud,sedhoc
quodsuperficies
verbum
eiusnonesttalede quocuraredebeamus.
Iamigitur
nostiessemensurarum
etquodsuntaccidentia
etquodnonsuntprincipia
etquoderror
nonconcorporum,
inhocnisiexeo quodtunosti.
tinent
51Averroes,
V() Metaphysicorum
InLibrum
Aristotelis
Commentarius
, ch.23 (Commentum30),(ed. R. Ponzalli,Bern1971,211-212):Deindedicit:"Et angulusetiamest
47

13:15:51 PM

on the angle. The angle is- says Averroes- a part of 'figure',thatis to

say in quantity and in quality. Thereforesome have doubts about the
genus of magnitudes to which the angle belongs. Some people make
the angle a fourthgenus.
3.2. Albert's Metaphysics
We can now take into consideration Albert's Metaphysics
, written
about 1264. In Book V, Tract 3, chapter 1 {de modiset naturaquantiet
the
Albertgives, afterthe division of quantity,the dubitatio,
quantitatis)
text of which is given in the Appendix 3.
Albert begins by saying that forsome people the angle is a special
kind of quantity, and he gives as arguments:
1. a The angle is not a line because it is contained between two
lines, as is evident fromthe definition(/. 3-6).
The angle is not a surfacebecause the angle is not divisible
in latitude {secundumlatum), but only in longitude. The
reason is thatthe angle is the indivisible
contactoftwo lines (/.

2.

6-9).
Y The angle is not a body, because it has no depth. Between
only twoline there is, indeed, no depth (/. 9-11).
The doubling-argument.But Albert formulatesthis argument
: a doubled quantity remore stringentlythan in his Geometry
mains in the same kind of quantity {in eademspeciequantitatis
et

modo)(/. 12-15).
The firstconclusion ofAlbertis thatthe angle seems, indeed, to be a
special mode of quantity, forin any case it is a quantity.
As argument forthis view Albert brings forward(/. 16-19):
A. a thing that can be called 'bigger and smaller', is a quantity.
sic:Et angulusetiamestparsfigurae
hisduobusmodis,quanpars'*.Potestintelligi
Vel sic:Et angulusetiamdividitur
inngulos:divisio
titate
enim
scilicet
etqualitate.
et qualitatem.
Et ideodubitaverunt
quantitatem
anguliin ngulosest secundum
continetur
quidamin quo generegenerummagnitudinum
angulus.Adeo quod
iliumquartum
quodgenera
magnitudinum
quidameorumfecerunt
genus,etdixerunt
lineaet solidm.
suntquatuor:corpus,superficies,
Notethatone MS. hasangulusin steadofsolidm!
ishereinthe
TheonlyplacewhereAristotle
speaksabouttheangleinhisMetaphysics
V (),25, 1023b 22).
on 'pars':theangleis a partofa definition
{Metaphysica
chapter
theangleonlyin thesamechapter
on 'pars'inthe
ThomasAquinas,too,mentions
theangleis mentioned
ofwhatAverroes
, butnothing
by
saysconcerning
Metaphysics
V 21 (1089):angulusindefinitione
andV 21(1095):
him{Metaph.
trianguli
(ponitur),
sicutspeciei).
angulusautemestparstrianguli
48

13:15:51 PM

B.

a thingwhich is limitedas quantity,is a quantity. (That, in my

opinion, means: limited by lines or surfaces).
C. a thingwhichis constitutedout of the measures of quantity,is a
quantity. (That I interpretas: an angle has dimensions).
The conclusion of Albert is that an angle is not a special kind of
quantity,but that the angle indicates a quality concerninga quantity
(/. 20 ff.). The angle is a passio of a continuum
, limitedby a line. As 'to
be limited' is a quality concerning a quantity, so is 'to have angles'
and the angle itself.Albert goes on to explain why and to what extent
the angle followsthe line and the surface,so exponens
the argument 1.
Then he refutesthe doubling-argument(2), and opposes the view that
the angle is a mediumbetween a line and a surface.
3.3. Comparison between Albert's Geometry and Metaphysics
The conclusion in Albert's Geometry
must
, viz. that a differentiation
be made between angulus(quantity) and angulatio(quality), seems to be
differentfromthat in his Metaphysics
, viz. that angulusis a passio continui. To clarifythis, one can refer to a later passage in Albert's
, in the chapteron 'part',52the same chapterwhere (AristoMetaphysics
tle and) Averroes mentionedthe angle. Here he says that some people
say that the angle as such is a genus of quantity differentfromline,
surface and body, but that the geometer and not the metaphysician
must dispute this problem. That, in my opinion, can possibly explain
the differentconclusions in the Geometry
and the Metaphysics
: in the
Albert
a
makes
distinction
between
which
is
a basic
Geometry
angulus,
mathematicalobjector a quantity(and thishe does because oftheproperties of the angle given in the arguments), and angulatio
, which is a
quality (saying this because of the propertyof surface and body to be
, however, Albert does not go into those
angular). In the Metaphysics
his
concern
is
to exclude a special kind of continuous
details;
only
quantity.
But there is more: the differencebetween these two conclusions is
paralleled by the treatment of figure. In the Predicamenta
Albert,
52Metaph.
V 6, 2 (ed. cit.,282,72): Hoc etiammodoangulusestparsquaedamforesseperseunumgenusquantitatis,
malis,secundum
discretum
quamdicunt
angulum
a lineaet superficie
et corpore,
nosin Praecedentibus
quorumrationes
induximus,
licethocmagispertineat
ad geometram
ostendere.
quamad metaphysicum
In Metaph.
V 3, 2 (ed. cit.,260,79)Albert
refers
tothepeoplewhotaketheangleas a
fourth
dimension
kindofquantity):
Hi autemqui angulumponuntesse
( = fourth
amdimensionem
...
quart
49

13:15:51 PM

discussing the fourthmode of quality, makes a distinctionbetween

and as terminatio
, but in the
quantitatis
figure as a quantitasterminata
he defines figureonly as terminatio
quantior as qualitasin
Metaphysics
. 53This is exactlythe same differencewhich is
continuaaccepta
quantitate
to be found between the conclusions concerning the angle in the
and in the Metaphysics.
Geometry
Let us now look at the differencesbetween the arguments in the
A firstpoint is that Albertdoes not menand the Metaphysics.
Geometry
in
tion the solid angle his Metaphysics
; in the argumentsof his Geometry
he does mention it, at firstonly implicitly,but later on explicitly.
In both passages Albert's firstargumentis that an angle is not one
of the three (normal) kinds of (mathematical) continuous quantity.
in the two texts: concernBut the reasons which he gives are different
that the
ing the firstkind of quantity (line), he says in the Geometry
he
in
has
the
a
line
because
it
is
not
latitude,
Metaphysics uses as
angle
an argumentthe (Adelardian) definitionof the angle, viz. the contact
of two lines. Both arguments are correct.
Concerning the second kind of continuous quantity (surface),
that the angle is not a surfacebecause it is
Albert says in the Geometry
not divisible as a surface,that is to say, also in latitude,and he cites in
his argument for this statement Euclid Book I Prop. 9. In the
the argument is the same, but the reason is different:he
Metaphysics
uses an extended definitionof the angle, namely: the angle is the inis added, and seems
divisiblecontact of two lines. The word indivisibilis
to be correct,forthat contact is indeed a point and thereforeindivisible. But that point of contact cannot be indentifiedwith the angle.
This extended definitionI have seen used nowhere else (see section
41)The angle is not the third kind of continuous quantity (body),
Albertsays in the Geometry
, because the angle does not necessarilyhave
depth. He uses these words 'not necessarily' perhaps as I said
before because of the two kinds of the angle, plane and corporeal.
the
The corporeal angle does of course have depth. In the Metaphysics
reason why the angle is not a body is that two lines cannot contain
53Predicamento.
V 3, 5 (ed. cit.,263-264):Estetiamuna
V 8 (see note20); Metaph.
secundum
velcircaaliquidconstans
quodin
figura,
quaeestforma
speciesqualitatis,
continua
dictum
Praedicamentis
est,quae estqualitasinquantitate
accepta.Ethanc
earn
sedrelinquit
nosprobare
esse,eo quodhancessenonprobatgeometer,
oportet
quantitatis
(264,38).
(263,3). Figuraenimnihilaliudestnisiterminatio
50

13:15:51 PM

depth; this is correct for the angle only if one considers the plane
angle.
The second argumentin both tractsis the doubling-argument.The
and the Metaphysics
is that in the latter
differencebetween the Geometry
the argument is stated more stringently.There are- as far as I
know- no parallel referencesto be found discussing this propertyon
other works of Albert's except in De celo(see n. 41).
The thirdand fourthargument of the Geometry
are missing in the
- as has
- there are
but
said
been
Metaphysics
already
passages in the
which can be compared with these arguments.
Predicamenta
It is remarkablethat Albertdoes not mentionthe existenceof hornangles as an argument against the quantity view. These horn-angles
are an importanttopic in the XIVth centuryphilosophical treatiseson
the continuum,but also in the XIIIth centurythese angles and their
propertieswere well known.54Alberthimselfmentionsthistopic in its
III 15) and says that as regards geometry,the
proper place ( Geometry
of
be divided because in geometry'to divide'
cannot
angle contingence
means to divide with a straightline. But logically speaking, Albert
continues,it is shown in the firstbook that the angle is not a quantity
proper, and thereforethere can be an angle which is not to be
divided.55In this manner Albert fitsthe existence of horn-anglesinto
his opinions given in the earlierpassages thatwe have been discussing.
54See myarticle
inVivarium
XVIII (1980),112-142,
.
esp. 131ff
55NotaautemquodSophiste
istudtheorema
dicentes
omnem
quantitatem
inpugnant
esse divisibilem
in infinitum,
etiamdivididebetin inergoanguluscontingencie
finitum.
Etad hocattendendum
nichildicitur
dividinisiquod
quodapudgeometriam
linearectadividitur,
et quod linearectanondividitur,
diciturnonhabensquantitatem.
Et ideo < anguluscontingencie
> etiamminimus
dicitur
quia quantitatem
nonhabet;undeetiamillequi a circumferencia
et diametro
estquia
fit,maximus
a rectoper.id quod quantitatem
diminuitur
nonhabetin geometria.
Potesttarnen
dividicircularibus
divisio
lineis,sedhocideonondicitur
quiaaliamconstituit
figuram
nonhabentem
sicircumducatur.
Ethecquidemresponsio
estsecundum
angulum
propriaistiusscientie.
Potesttamendiciquodinprimoostendimus
estquantitas,
quodangulusnonproprie
etideoaliquisangulusestqui nondividitur.
Adhucetiamdicipotest
quodlicetforma
tamenmateria
eiusque estquantitas
ethec
angulimaneatindivisa,
spacii,dividitur,
solutiomagisestalterius
scientie.
Primaenimgeometrica
est, secundalogica,et tertiaprimephilosophie
(Albert,
ch.2.2.3part1, p. 34).
, III 15,MS cit.,f. 135v.See myedition
Geometry
Anaritius
alsogivessomecomment,
andmentions
oftheangle
e.g. thenondi
visibility
ofcontingence
because'divisible'
means:divisible
lines,andhe
bymeansofstraight
callsthatangle:'cuinonestquantitas'.
(Ms. Madrid10010,f.26r).
51

13:15:51 PM

, Albertgives as the first,in

Concerning the argumentsproquantitate
maiusand minusargument.
as well as in his Metaphysics
the
his Geometry
,
in the two texts.
different
The other argumentsare more or less
and the one concernThe argumentsconcerningacuitasand hebetudo
are missing in the
in
the
which
are
used
Geometry
ing divisibility
an angle has two
that
in
the
The
Geometry
argument
Metaphysics.
we findin the
that
which
the
same
as
in
dimensions, is
my opinion
, which states that the angle is constitutedex mensuris
quanMetaphysics
thereis a new argument:the angle is limited
In the Metaphysics
titatum.
as a quantity. All these arguments are correct. It is strange that
'divisibility'(the strongestargument in favourof quantity and given
as the base for the definitionof quantity in the beginning of this
is missing in the Metaphysics
, but one may
chapter in the Metaphysics)
has used the
Albert
the
fact
that
this
is
caused
that
by
perhaps suppose
was
an incalled
which
the
the
in
of
definition
extended
angle
angle,
divisible contact of two lines.
To explain in more detail the differencesin the conclusion and the
arguments would involve more questions than could be answered
Albertsays thatit
here. But, thereis one more point. In theMetaphysics
the
existence of the
is the task of the metaphysician to prove
mathematicalobjects, and not the task of the geometer. But given the
as
fact that Albert discusses the nature of the angle in his Metaphysics
is
for
that
ask
what
the
one
well as in his Geometry
,
proper place
may
discussion. To thisAlberthimselfgives the answer, forspeaking about
: licethocmagisperthis verypoint, the angle, he says in the Metaphysics
thus attributingthis
am quamad metaphysicum
tineatad geometr
ostenderey56
to geometry. A contemporary, however, namely Roger Bacon,
famous as a champion of mathematics, says, again concerning the
de hoc disputaresed ad
pertinetmathematico
same question:
veritatem
debet
mathematicus
a
acciperecum exposicione
methaphysicumquo
and
.57
Albert's
So
et
Roger's opinions are preciselythe
simplici fideli
which
one
would
of
that
expect. This brings us to our next
opposite
are
and in his Metaphysics
point: the discussion in Albert's Geometry
texts.
later
and
some
those
in
form
different
contemporary
quite
56See note52.
57Communia
vol.XVI, OxMathematica
inedita,
12,3 (ed. R. Steele,Operahactenus
onii1940,28). See note59.

52

13:15:51 PM

4. Contemporary
and laterdiscussions
4.1. Roger Bacon
Of the authors contemporaneous with Albert, Thomas Aquinas
does not say anythingof interestas to our question.58The philosopher
who is the firstto be looked at when one studies the development of
mathematics in the XHIth century, is, of course, Roger Bacon. He
the
Mathematica:59
has, indeed, a passage on the angle in his Communia
angle is accordingto Avicenna a surfaceor a body, and in general: the
angle is a space contained between more lines which meet in a point.
This definitionis not the Euclidian-Adelardian one, but probably
Roger's own. Afteran application of thisdefinitionto the two kindsof
angle, Roger continues: the plane angle is a surface because it has
lengthand breadth, though it is not closed in all parts; the corporeal
angle is a body because it has the threedimensions; thereforeEuclid's
definitionis incorrect,fora contactbetween lines is in a point and thus
58See note51. R. Grosseteste's
De Angulis
doesnotgiveanything
ofinterest
forour
question.
59Communia
Mathematica
I 2, 3 (ed. cit.,27-28):Capitulum
tercium
de anguloetde
et de divisione
eorum(aliterejus)grossapropter
continue
figura
speciesquantitatis
magiscognoscenda.
circafiguras
aliiscommunibus
Oportet
aliquidde angulisdicietde quibusdam
igitur
incommuni
ea que in sequentibus
nominantur.
propter
secundum
Avicennam
tercioMethaphysice
estsuperficies
velcorpus,
igitur
Angulus
namquidamangulusestsuperficialis
ethicestsuperficies,
et
quidamverocorporalis
hicestcorpus.Angulus
autemincommuni
estspacium
interplureslineas
contentum
in punctoaliquoconcurrentes,
estindirecta.
verosuperquarumapplicacio
Angulus
ficialis
seuplanusestspaciumcontentum
inpunctum
interduaslineasconcurrentes
unumquarumapplicacio
in unasuperficie
estindirecta,
quia cumdirecte
opponitur
unalineaaliinonestangulussedtanquamlinea.Angulus
verocorporalis
seusolidus
estspaciumcontentum
ad minusintertreslineasconcurrentes
in punctum
unum,
nonestdirecta
inunasuperficie
utpatetincorsedincorpore
quarumapplicacio
poribus
angularibus.
Quomodoautemdiffiniatur
angulusaliterpatetexXIo Euclidis,
oportet
nuncaliamdiffinicionem
haberi.Et quoniamangulussuperficialis
est
etlatum,licetnonex omniparteclausum,
etangulus
quiahabetlongum
superficies
estcorpus
latumetprofundum,
ideoinproprie
dicitur
ab
corporalis
quiahabetlongum
Euclidequodangulusestalterius
namhiccontactus
estindivisibilis
secuncontactus,
dumlongum
latumetprofundum,
eo quodsitinpuncto,
etideodiffinivi
angulum
per
Anaricus
verosuperlibrumElementorum
Euclidisin
quantitatem
spaciidivisibilis.
commento
hancquestionem
de angulo,scilicet
an sitspeciesquantitatis,
et
disputt
nichilsolvitquod valeat, pertinet
mathematico
de hoc disputaresed ad
a quo mathematicus
debetveritatem
methaphysicum,
acciperecum exposicione
etfideli... Figuraverodicitur
velterminis
clauditur
ut
simplici
que termino
undique,
contenta
infratresvelquatorlineasetdeinceps;
et secundum
hocangulus
quantitas
nonestfigura,
licetsitsuperficies
velcorpus,
sedcumfigura
dicitur
quamvisnonuntuncangulusestfigura.
diqueclaudatur,
53

13:15:51 PM

indivisible. Thereforethe angle is to be definedas 'quantity of divisible space'. Anaritius also discussed the question of the angle, but that
discussion does not have much value: to dispute the problem of the
angle is not the task of the mathematician,but ofthe metaphysician.A
few lines furtheron, Roger says that in one sense an angle is not a
figure(if a figureis definedas a closed quantity),but in anothersense
it is (if another definitionof figurebe given).
This opinion and treatmentis quite differentfromthat which one
finds in Albert.60 Roger opposes expressly the indiuisibiliscontactus
definitionwhich Albert uses in his Metaphysics.
61
Mathematica
In anotherpassage ofthe Communia
Roger refersagain
to these views. In the as yet unedited continuation of the Communia
62he
Mathematica
says once more that a plane angle is a surfaceand an
incomplete plane figure (incomplete because it is not closed on all
sides).
From these passages one mightconclude that Bacon's only sources
are Euclid, Anaritius and Avicenna and that he does not indicate any
acquaintance with Albert's views.63
A further conclusion is that- in comparison with Roger
have
and in the Metaphysics
Bacon - Albert's discussion in the Geometry
the same general structureand are quite consistent.This conclusion
will be strengthenedif one looks at XlV^-century texts.
60ButinhisQuestiones
libros
Aristotelis,
(ed.
questiode qualitate
Philosophie
prime
supra
vol.X, Oxonii1930,151)RogerBaconmakesthe
R. Steele,Operahactenus
inedita,
autprospacio
as Albert
samedistinction
figure:
Figuraequivocesumitur:
concerning
autpotestsumi
cumsitsuperficies,
et sic estquantitas
infraclausionem,
contento
hie.
estqualitas,etsicsumitur
etsicfigura
proipsaclausione
figura
' is a discussion
theangletobe found.
inthese'Questiones
Nowhere
concerning
61II 3, 1 (op.cit.,101):Recolendum
Avicenestex prioribus
quodsecundum
igitur
estcoretcorporalis
estsuperficies
veritatem
namet secundum
angulussuperficialis
habetedoceresinecontradiccione,
quia hechabetspecies
pus,sicutmethaphysica
esseinquibusestdubitacio.
probare
predicamentorum
62Ms. Oxford,
est
BodleianDigby76, f. 72r:Quia in veritate
angulussuperficialis
et figura
quia nonestundiqueconclusa terincompleta,
superficialis
superficies
minata.
63The possibility
timesof
is ofcourselimited
influence
ofreciprocal
bythedifferent
andRogeris a
oftheworks
ofAlbert
Butthechronology
originoftheseveraltracts.
matter:
verydifficult
ofAlbert 1260(seemyedition).
Geometry
totheColon,ed. p. VIII).
ofAlbert 1264(seeprolegomena
Metaphysics
ofRoger,part1 (ed. Steele,p. 71-135)late1250's(c. 1258);
Mathematica
Communia
part2 (ed. Steele,p. 1-70)after1267.
Science
BaconandhisSearch
, Oxford1952,88;
fora Universal
(See: S. C. Easton,Roger
111;186).
54

13:15:51 PM

4.2. XIIIth and XIVth century

For a fullsurveyof the discussions of the nature of the angle in the
XIIIth and XIVth centuries, two kinds of works should be studied:
mathematical works and commentaries or questions on the
As regards the Metaphysics-commentaries,thereis much
Metaphysics.
to be done. For thispaper it may be sufficientto say thatthe commentaries before 1350, as listed by Zimmermann,64do not seem to deal
with our question. As regards the mathematical works, the two most
famous XIIIth centuryauthors- beside the editors of Euclid translations and other translations of mathematical works- are Leonardo
Pisano and Jordanus de Nemore,65but theydo not treatour problem.
There are, however, tracts by unknown authors and one by the
famous XIVth centuryauthor Nicole Oresme, which contain discussions of the natureof the angle.66They all stem probably fromthe late
XIIIth or XIVth century,but- withtwo exceptions- theyhave not yet
been studied or edited. Therefore we must, for the present, restrict
ourselves in our discussion of them, making only some provisional
remarks.67A rough surveyof the formand the contentsof these tracts
gives the impression that they are quite differentfrom, and more
elaborate than, the passages we have seen in Albert: theyrepresenta
furtherdevelopmentof the question at hand.
The followingtractscan be mentioned:
1. an anonymous collectionof mathematicaltracts,to be foundin
a Firenze MS (edited);68
2. the Questionessuper Euclidem
, written by Nicole Oresme
(edited);69
64A. Zimmermann:
Verzeichnis
Kommentare
zurMetaphysik
undPhysik
des
ungedruckter
Aristoteles
ausderZeitvonetwa1250-1350
1971.
, BandI, Leiden-Kln,
65Leonardo(Fibonacci)
Pisano( 1180-1240),
Practica
Geometriae
ed. B.
, in: Scritti,
vol.II, Roma1862.
Boncompagni,
de Nemore(fl.1230-1260),
De Trianpulis
, ed. M. Curtze,Thorn1887.
Jordanus
66Thereareprobably
morequestiones
collectiones
butwe mustwaittillFolkers
proallthemedieval
MSS. hasbeenfinished
mathematical
fora fullpicjectofcollecting
ture.
an collection
Thereis,inaddition,
inMS Vat. Pal.lat. 1352,butthisistobe datedin
theXVthcentury.
67I hopeto makeeditions
oftheseXIVth-century
andothertracts
on the
questions
angleinthenearfuture.
68Ms. Firenze,
Bibi.Naz. Centrale,
Conventi
Soppressi
J IX 26,editedbyH. L. L.
Euklidkommentar
derRoger
Bacon
werden
kann
Busard,Einmittelalterlicher
, in:
zugeschrieben
Archives
Internationales
d'Histoire
desSciences,
24 (1974),199-218.
69NicoleOresme(1323-1382),Quaestiones
Euclidis
, ed. H. L. L.
super
geometriam
in:Scripta
27
Busard,Leiden1961.Seealsoreview
Mathematica,
byj. E. Murdoch,
(1964),67-91.
55

13:15:51 PM

a Liberde angulis, contained in two MSS (not yet edited);70

the Questiones
, found in an ErfurtMS (not yet
superEuclidem
edited).71
The first,a collection of mathematical tracts, attributedby the
editorto Roger Bacon, has one chapteron the angle.72The arguments
used in this chapter are: the angle is not a point (because it is
divisible), nor a line (because it is constitutedby the contactof lines),
not a body. The author gives three
nor a surface, and thus a fortiori
reasons forthe theorythat an angle is not a surface: an angle is closed
by two straightlines and a surfacecannot be so closed; an angle does
not alter with alterationsof the surface; ifthe angle is a surface,then
an acute angle would be a rightangle. The conclusion is thatan angle
utsitsuperficiem
seurespectu
is a surfaceor body sedcumquadamhabitudine
sic se habereutesseacutametc.The author ends by quoting Averroes.
I will not go furtherinto this text or into the question of who its
author might be; but it is sufficientto note that the structure,
arguments and conclusion are differentfromwhat we have seen in
Albert and in Roger Bacon. (This tract has much more in common
withthe view expressedby Nicole Oresme). ThereforeI thinkthatit is
more likely dated to the very late XIIIth centuryor XIVth century
than to the mid XIIIth century.
The second tract, the QuestionessuperEuclidemof Nicole Oresme
devotes several questions to the angle.73 Let us sum up only the con3.
4.

70Liberdeangulis
, Ms. Firenze,B.N.C. Con. Soppr.J I 32 ( = S. Marco206),f.
in Florenz
S. Marcohandschriften
34r-39v
, in:
(See A. A. Bjrnbo,Die mathematische
3<>F 12,1911/12,
Mathematica
Bibliotheca
207);Paris.B.N. lat.8680A, f.22v-28v.
thantheFirenze
MSS. At first
Theseare twodistinct
sighttheParisMS is better
one,butupona secondlookwe findthatthisis nottrueinallcases.
71Questiones
Wissenschaftliche
Euclidem
Bibliothek,
, XIVthc., MS: Erfurt,
Q
super
344,f.68r-87v.
deNicoleOresme
Euclidis
desQuestiones
, in:
superGeometriam
(See V. Zoubov,Autour
MedievalandRenaissance
Studies,VI, 1968,150-172,
esp. 151).
72MS Firenze
estinqua
Seddubium
(seenote68),f.48r(inmyowninterpunction):
cumsitdivisibilis
sitangulus,
(Busard:delineis),
quianonpunctus
speciequantitatis
a foretperconsequens
excontactu
lineacumconstituatur
earum,superficies
et
tioricorpus.Quodnonsitsuperficies,
pat
- quia angulusclauditur
ut
sicclauditur,
duabuslineisrectis,sed nullasuperficies
petitEuclides.Igitur;
- 2oquiaangulusnoncrescit
vel
ad augumentum
minuitur
(Busard:augmentum)
minutionem
superficiei.
Igitur;
(Busard:diminutionem)
- 3oquiatuncangulusrectus
essetacutus.Patetquianonestmaiorratio(Busard:recillaquam aut; sedsitaliquisilbestsuperficies
to)quareangulus trianguli
internum.
habetur
et
et
lorumrectus
acutus,
rectorum)
aliquis
(MS:
umnullumistorum
istasrationes
esse,sedeorumacangui
quidamdixerunt
Propter
56

13:15:51 PM

elusions, and the differencewithAlbert will be seen immediately.For

Oresme the angle is not a quality, nor an extended accident inhering
absolutely in a surfaceor body, nor a relation, but an accident, not,
however,an accident as an essence, but ratheran accident as a sic esse
or a taliteresse.
The thirdtractis the Liberde angulis, the last part of which concerns
the nature of the angle.74This workhas not yetbeen edited and this is
not the rightplace to make an attemptat edition, thereforeI shall only
mention the headings. Some say that the angle is a surface. The
author gives some argumentsin favourof and some against thisview.
He continues: others say that the angle is a point; in the same
'scholastic' manner argumentspro and con are given. A thirdopinion
is that the angle is a quality. As one of the argumentscontra, it is said
thatthe angle is a quantity,and that geometryis a discipline concerning quantities. The last opinion is that the angle is a quality of a surface. But forthis,too, the author gives pro's and con's, and he ends by
saying that he does not make a choice himself among the various
views.
This structureand these contentsare more like those of the two last
tractsthan those of Albert's passages. Concerning the dating of this
work, nothingmore can be said at this stage of research.
The fourthwork is the question-collectionof the ErfurtMS, one
question of which concerns the angle.75Just as was the case with the
seuconcursum
duarumlinearum
secundum
cidens,puta(MS: pta)contactum
quod
diffinitur.
Tunc potestdiciipsum(Busard:ipsam)esse superflciem
si estangulus
autessecorpussi estangulussolidus,sedcumquadamhabitudine
seu
superficialis,
utsitsuperficiem
sicse habereesseacutam(Busard:acutum)
etc.Etinhoc
respectu,
Commentatone*
dicentis
sequitur
vestigia
(Busardadd: in) 7 Metaphysice
quodens
esse.Et secundum
hocetiam*contra
(MS: n)dicitur
equivocead esseetad taliter
tuncquestio)protest
solvi.
(Busard:
* MS in
marg.
73NicoleOresme,Quaestiones note ed. Busard,56-66.
(see
69),
questio18: utrum
angulussitqualitas
inherens
<vel corpori
vel
questio19: utrum
angulussitaccidensabsolute
superficiei
> autcorpusextensum,
sicutymaginamur
de albedine,
persuperficiem
questio20: que ressitangulus.
74Liber
deangulis
f.38vb-f.
39va;Ms. Parisf.27v-28v,
(see.note70),Ms. Firenze
(inc.:)
Sequitur
quidangulus(F: anulus).Suntquidem(om.F) qui dicuntangulum
(F: an... (expl.)Superhocigitur
sua quelibet
trahit
nulum)superficiem
opiniomemovent
cumitaqueinhiisquidvis,dubiumsitdixisse:tutius(P: totius)reorsuper
singula,
quovisdubitasse.
f.69vb-71va,
et
uestiones
(seenote71),Ms. Erfurt,
(inc.:)Quenturconsequenter
tertio
utrum
circadiffinitionem
sextametalias,utrum
angulussitduarumlinearum
alternus
contactus
etapplicatio
nondirecta
illarum
etostenditur
superficierum
primo
quodnon.
57

13:15:51 PM

previous tract,the questions are not yetedited; and because ofthe fact
that these questions are quite clearlyXIVth centuryand that the starting point forthe question of the angle is only Euclid's definition,it
will not be dealt with here.
4. Conclusion
We have studied two passages in worksof Albertus Magnus on the
nature of the angle, one in the Geometry
(forwhich Anaritius' CommenIf we take
taryon Euclid is the main source) and one in the Metaphysics.
into consideration the differentcontext and purpose of the treatises,
these two treatmentsare consistent, the conclusions as well as the
argumentation.The differencesbetween these two discussionsand the
others in the XIIIth and XIVth century spoken of in section 4,
strengthenthe close kinship between the two passages.
It will now be possible to give a hypothesisabout the question of
was writtenby AlbertusMagnus,
sources. If- as I hold- the Geometry
before his
the theory is as follows: Albert wrote his Geometry
, his main source being Anaritius' commentary.ConcernMetaphysics
our
point of discussion, the nature ofthe angle, Albertadded some
ing
argumentsto those of Anaritiusand gave his own conclusion, different
fromAnaritius but in accordance with view he had also expressed in
For his paraphrase of Aristotle'sMetaphysics
the Predicamenta.
, Albert
took Avicenna' s remarkconcerningthe angle as a startingpoint fora
reintroductionto the question on the angle, withthe discussion of the
in his mind, but adapting this to the purpose of the
Geometry
Metaphysics.
There are, of course, argumentsagainst this theory:it may not explain in all respectsthe differencesbetween the two treatments;there
remain questions which are not answered. It is also strangethatAlbert
.76
in the angle-passage of the Metaphysics
does not referto his Geometry
But if this theoryis not correct,and if Albertus Magnus is not the
author of the Geometry
, more difficultiesarise; firstthe differencesbeand Anaritius are to be explained anew; secondly,
tween the Geometry
one has in any case to suppose that Albert knew Anaritius or the
Albert Geometry
, and borrowed the angle-discussionfromone of these
That would prove beyond doubt
tracts to put it into his Metaphysics.
76Normally
totheminhistracts.
ofhisownhandorrefers
Albert
quotesotherworks
tothe
tootherworks
ButinhisDe Fatoalsotherearenoreferences
(cfr.Prolegomena
Colon,ed., vol.XVII/1,p. XXXIII-XXXIV).
58

13:15:51 PM

that Albert had a fair knowledge of the relevant literature. But, of

course, this angle-discussion is not the only argument forthe theory
that Albertus Magnus wrote this Geometry.
The factthat Albert in his Metaphysics
has such an extended discussion of the nature of the angle, proves that he had a great interestin
mathematics,and this is a good illustrationof Albert's words in the
: Cura ergoampliorUli ( = mathematicis)
estab omnieo
Geometry
impendenda
veritatem.
qui scientie
queritattingere
Nijmegen (The Netherlands)
Instituut
Filosofisch
ThomasvanAquinostraat
3
APPENDIXI

10

15

20

25

30

f.
ALBERTUS(MAGNUS),GEOMETRIA,MS. VIENNA,DOMIN. 80/45,
106r(Myedition
p. 9-10).
dubiumutrum
etsi quantitas
Estautemplerisque
est,in
angulussitquantitas,
eo
Suntenimqui dicuntanguium esserelationem,
qua sitspeciequantitatis.
ad suesentencie
confirmationem
rationes
habentes
quaquodvocatur
applicatio,
cumnonnecestuor:- sc.quianonestlineacumhabeatlatitudinem,
neccorpus
susariohabeatprofunditatem,
necsuperficies
cumnonpossitdivididivisione
dividatur
sedsecundum
eo quodnullusangulussecundum
latitudinem
perficiei,
solamutinfrainnonoprobatur
theoremate.
longitudinem
- Adhucomnisquantitas
manet,sedaliquisangulusduplatus
duplataquantitas
nonmanetangulus,
nonmanetquantisc. rectus.
Ergoaliquisangulusduplatus
essevidetur.
se quantitas
tas,ergonecangulussecundum
- Adhucnullaquantitas
acciditquantitati.
autemaccidit
erquantitati,
Angulus
enimsuperficiei
esAccidit
velcorpori
goangulusnonestquantitas.
angulatum
se.
- Adhucnihilsecundum
se speciesexistens
estquantitas.
Sedangulus
qualitatis
estspecies
enimingenere
incidit
qualitatis,
figuergononestquantitas.
Angulus
reethecestde speciebus
qualitatis.
In contrarium
huiussuntetiamrationes
quatuor:
- cuienimaccidit
estquantitas.
essemaiusetminus,
Sedhecaccidit
angulo,ergo
angulusestquantitas.
Expansusenimestmaiorrectoetacutusminor.
- Adhuccuiconvenit
etsubiectum.
Acuitasautemethebetudo
passio,convenit
suntquantietconveniunt
passiones
angulo,ergoestquantitas.
- Adhuccuiperseconvenit
anessedivisibile,
estquantitas.
Hicautemconvenit
nonotheoremate
enimdividihabetur,
guloutinfra
ergoestquantitas.
Angulus
tursecundum
longum.
- Adhucomnehabensdimensionem
veldimensiones,
Sedangulus
estquantitas.
habetdimensiones,
sc. etlatitudinem,
longitudinem
ergoestquantitas.
Videtur
autemdicendum
sedangulatio
estqualitas
quodangulusestquantitas,
accidensquantitati.
rationem
autemprimamad secundum
Propter
problema
dixitSambelichyus
estmedium
interlineametsuperfiquodangulussuperficialis
etnonsecundum
earndividitur,
ethaciem,quiahabetdimensionem
superficiei
betdimensionem
lineeetsecundum
earndividitur.
autemcorporeus
est
Angulus
59

13:15:51 PM

nontarnen
divietcorpus,
mdiusintersuperficiem
quialicethabetprofundum,
latitudinem
ditursecundum
etlongitudinem.
ipsum,sedsecundum
meHocautemprobat
quisicdiffmit
angulum
tamquam
permagnum
Apollonium
autcorporis
ad unumpunctum
35 dium,dicens:angulusestconiunctio
superficiei
lineisterlineisnondirecte
sibioccurentibus
autsuperficie
que comprehenditur
sibioccurreminata.Dicitautem"nondirecte",sicutetEuclides
quia si directe
sedlinemunam.Aganyz
etiamquasiinhocconsennonfacerent
rent,angulum
duasvel
habensdimensiones
tirevidetur
dicensquodangulus< est> quantitas
ad punctum
unum.
40 tres,cuiusextremitates
proveniunt
diffnire
dicens:angulusestquantitas
autemvidetur
Convenientissime
Yrynus
ad unumperveeo existens,
vicinior
simplicior
quamcomprehendit
quantitas
lineisquia mediusestinter
enimcomprehenditur
nienspunctum.
Superficialis
unamethabentem
duasdimensiones,
etipsehabetduas;
habentem
quantitatem
mediusexistens
inter
haautemsuperficiebus
45 corporeus
terminatur,
superficiem
duasetcorpushabenstresdimensiones.
bentem
APPENDIXII
ANARITIUS, COMMENTARY ON EUCLID'S ELEMENTS. MS. MADRID, B.N. 10010,f. 14v(Myedition,
p. 131-132;See ed. Curtze,p. 12-14).

10

15

20

25

30

inhacdifinitione
secundum
hocquoddicitur
quodangulusnon
Quidamputant
tamenquodsitquantiVidetur
etquodnonsitquantitas.
sitnisirelatio
tantum,
tas.
- Cumenimangulusexpansus
etmaius
sitmaiorrectoetacutusrectositminor,
etminussintinquantitate,
ergoangulusestquantitas.
- Angulus
etacuitasquesuntinansc. quiaexpansio
quoquehabetqualitatem,
gulis,suntqualitates.
- Angulopreterea
innonafigura
utdividatur
induomediaquodcontingit
accidit
in duomedianonestnisiquantitas.
seddivisum
primepartislibriEuclidis'
- Preterea
etlatitudo.
cumlinea, si essetlongitudo
angulusdividitur
dividitur
cumlineainlonhocquodquequesuperficies
Verumtamen
secundum
de punctoad punctum
inlongitudine
etangulusdividitur
etlatitudine,
gitudine
- quoniamangulusnonminuitur
in latitudine
et nondividitur
partes
propter
comlineas
superduaslineasangulum
que protrahuntur
propter
que proveniunt
- ideoquevidetur
quodangulusnonhabetlatitudinem.
prehendentes
- Angulus
eo quodsecundum
nonhabetprofunditatem,
proquoquecorporeus
funditatem
nondividitur.
- Amplius
verorecremanet
cumduplatur,
etiamquantitas
quantitas.
Angulus
nonremanet
tuscumduplatur,
angulus.Ergoangulusnonestquantitas.
in
invenitur
ideodifinivit
Forsitan
tamenEuclides
ipsumperid quodmanifeste
linemetsuperfieo, sc. relatio,
quoniamproculdubioangulusestmedisinter
difinivit
universalem
ad quantitatem.
ciemquantum
angulum
IdeoqueApolonius
difinitione
et convenientiori
breviori
quod ipsesitmediusin
qua significatur
ad
aut corporis
cumdixitquod angulusest coniunctio
superficiei
quantitate,
acuta.Exhoc
a lineacurvaautsuperficie
unumpunctum
que comprehenduntur
estmedians,
etsignificavit
enimsignificavit
quodeiusspecies
quodestquantitas,
ea linea
etquodcomprehendit
ad unumpunctum
cumdixitquodconiunguntur
exverosociusAganiz
acuta.Noster
curvaautsuperficies
, eo quodvidit
Apolonium
uthecsituniversalis
suam,cumdixitquodnonconvenit
cepissepostdifinitionem
difinivit
ad coniungendas
sedconvenit
difinitio,
angulum
speciesetnumerandas,
cuiusextremitates
habensdimensiones
hocmododicens:angulusestquantitas

60

13:15:51 PM

35

40

45

50

Istequidemex hocquoddixit'habensdimensioad unumpunctum.

perveniunt
etinteletcorporeum,
communitatem
nes',coniunxit
que estinter
superficialem
lexitibiseparationem
que estintereos,et voluitutex verbiseiusintelligeretur
etlatitudinem,
etesthabensduas
habetlongitudinem
quodangulussuperficialis
esthabenstresdimensiones.
etanguluscorporeus
dimensiones,
inquantitate,
medians
se. utsuestutangulusponatur
Etforsitan
convenientius
suetlinem,
etcorporeus
sitmdiusinter
sitmdiusinter
superficiem
perficialis
aliquisdifiniet
angulumet dict:angulusest
perficieset corpus.Et forsitan
vicinior
quantitas
quantitatibus
que eo simplicioquamcomprehendit
quantitas
Eo auteminhacdifinitione
dictum
resexistunt,
ad unumpervenientes
punctum.
est'simpliciores',
quoniamsi fuerit
angulussuperficialis,
(f.15r)ipseeritmdius
idquodhabetunamdimensionem
etid quodhabetduas,ergocompreheninter
Etquod
denteumlinee;etsi fuerit
corporeus,
comprehendent
ipsumsuperficies.
estutsignificetur
inestindifinitione
dictum
earn',ideoadditum
'comprehendit
Lineeenimrectecumad unumconcurrunt
clinanocomprehendentis.
punctum,
nichilcomprehendent.
si secundum
rectitudinem
Angulusvero
coniungantur,
lineead unumconcurrentes
estquantitas
quamduecomprehendunt
superficialis
estinunopuncto;quialicetlineenoncomprepunctum,
quarumcomprehensio
hendant
noncomprehendant
undiqueautsuperficies
ipsumundique,
angulum
Ditamenflexio
illaetinclinatio
estaliquacomprehensio.
sicutfitinaliisfiguris,
navim.
cimusenimquodintroitus
portus
comprehendit
APPENDIXIII

10

15

20

25

ALBERTUS MAGNUS,METAPHYSICA LIBER 5, TRACT. 3, CAP. 1,

ED. B. Geyer,(ED. COLON. XVI/1),1960,p. 258-259.
satisrationabilis
moEstautemdubitatio
de ipsoangulo,utrum
ipsesitspecialis
essemodusquantietquantitatis.
Obiciunt
enimQUIDAM dicentes
angulum
dmspecialem
Constatangulumnonessequantumad modumliquantitatis.
enimcontactus
Alternus
neae,eo quodestinterduaslineasanguluscontentus.
estanetapplicatio
nondirecta
linearum
duarum
suprasuperficiem
expansarum
nonhabet.Similiter
autemnonhabet
gulus.Igiturmodumlineaeinquantitate
latumdividitur;
modumsuperficiei,
secundum
quia omnissuperficies
angulus
latumdividinonpotest,sed secundum
autemsecundum
solam,
longitudinem
duarumlinearum.
non
aliterenimnonessetcontactus
indivisibilis
Quoditerum
duastantum
liexhocpatet,quianonhabetprofunditatem,
sitcorpus,
quiainter
esseprofunditas.
neasnullapotest
estspeciescontinuae
Amplius,
quantitatis,
quaecumque
duplatamanetineadem
etmodo.Angulus
nonmanetin
autemaliquisest,quiduplatus
speciequantitatis
nullus
et modo,sicutangulusrectus,
eademspeciequantitatis
qui si dupletur,
manetlinearum
indirecte
contactus.
applicatarum
nonenimpotest
dicinon
videtur
modusquantitatis;
essespecialis
Angulus
igitur
maiuset minusessesecundum
essequantum
quantitaquoddam,cui convenit
et praecipue
ex
temet finitum
essesecundum
quantitatem,
quodconstituitur
mensuris
quantitatum.
Angulusautemest,cui omniadietaconveniunt.
nonestdifficile.
Dicemusenimangulum
nonesse
Haecautemetsimiliasolvere
sedpotiusangulusdicitqualitatem
cirmodum
quantivelquantitatis,
specialem
ca quantitatem
convenit
quantitatis
quandam;undefigurationi
angulus.Etideo
sicutterminatum
esseestqualitascircaquantitatem
esseet
dieta,itaangulatum
enimestpassiocontinui
finiti
linea,siveilludsitsuperfiipseangulus.Angulus
ciessivecorpussit.Etideoinaliquosequitur
lineametinaliquosequitur
superfi61

13:15:51 PM

30

35

40

45

ciem.Inquantum
enimpunctofinitur
sicutlinea,sequitur
non
ipsumlatitudine
autemestterminus
dividi,sedlongitudine.
Inquantum
superficiei
planae,sequituripsumduabuslineiscontineri.
Etquodangulusduplatus
rectus
sitnonanguex esseangulirecti,
diametri.
Cumenimsuper
lus,hocaccidit
quiaestmedium
liceatcircumduci
lineamfinitam
silineaperpencirculum,
quamlibet
descriptam
etincentro
diculariter
contactus
immobilis
pescircini
superlineamducatur,
pouniuspartislineaecirculus
circumscribatur,
natur,et ad quantitatem
angulus
rectus
etsi dupletur,
subtendetur
circuii
est,cuisubtenditur
quartaparscircuii,
tuncaliquidpraeter
medietas.Et ideononremanet
diametrum
circuii,nullo
circuii.
Idemautemaccidit,
modolinea
existente
siquocumque
anguloincentro
et angulusrectusdupletur
ducaturin continuum,
supeream. Cessanteautem
tamencontinuum.
anguloet sublato,remanet
accidere
continuo
Tamenpropter
huiNosautemdiximus
terminato.
angulum
essemedium
interlineametsuusmodiradonesQUIDAM dixerunt
angulum
Sedsecundum
istiussapientiae
dicendum
estmodopraeperficiem.
proprietatem
sedpotiussidicto,quia nonponitentitatem
aliquamquantialiamab inductis,
a lineatolliinunaparteetremanere
esse
terminans
cut,si intelligatur
punctum
lineainfinita,
itacumangulussitterminus
continui
si
lineae,remanet
expansi,
inrectianguli,remanet
tolliintelligatur
continuum
expansum
perduplationem
finitum.
NosenimSUPRAostendimus,
quodnonestdeessesuperficiei,
inquanlineavellineis,sicutnecestdeessecorporis,
tumestsuperficies,
quodterminetur
estcorpus,quodterminetur
velsuperficiebus.
inquantum
superficie
de modisquantietquantitatis
Haec igitur
dictasinta nobis;hicenimaliterhabentdeterminan
quamincategoriis.

62

13:15:51 PM

Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
L'unit du Monde selon Guillaume d'Ockham
(ou la logiquede la cosmologie
ockhamiste)*

JOEL BIARD

L'influence de Guillaume d'Ockham sur ses contemporainsou ses

successeurs est plus grande dans le domaine de la logique que dans
celui des sciences relles. Il n'est pas possible, pourtant,de dissocier
dans l'oeuvre ockhamisteune logique qui serait, au moins dans une
certaine mesure, novatriceet une physique ou une cosmologie qui ne
le seraient aucun titre.D'abord, la pense ockhamisteest trop systmatique pour cela. Ensuite, Guillaume prsenteexplicitementla logique comme l'instrumentqui permetde dvelopper les autres discours,
en particulierles sciences dites "relles". C'est ce dont tmoigne la
Prologuede la Sommede Logique:
Lettresinequa nulla
instrumentum,
"Logicaenimestomniumartiumaptissimum
scientia
sciripotest,
instrumentorum
usu
perfecte
quae nonmorematerialium
crebroconsumitur,
sed percuiuslibet
alteriusscientiae
studiosum
exercitium
continuum
incrementum"1.
recipit
Il s'avre par l mme que le rapport entre la logique et les autres
sciences n'est pas une simple application: la logique se nourrit en
retourdu dveloppementde ces sciences. Entre ces deux domaines, il
existe par consquent une causalit rciproque.
Je voudrais ici m'interrogersur cette unit complexe propos d'un
problme particulier:celui du monde, de son unit et de son unicit.
Car lorsque Guillaume, dans ses Quodlibetaou dans son Commentaire
desSentences
, aborde les problmes soulevs par le concept de monde
, il
ne manque pas, selon la dmarche qui est habituellementla sienne, de
mettreen oeuvre des principesd'analyse qui sont au fondementde sa
logique2.
* Uneversion
lorsdu 7meCongrsde la
abrgede cettetudea tprsente
SocitInternationale
Mdivale,qui s'esttenu
pourl'Etudede la Philosophie
du 31 aotau 4 septembre
Louvain-la-Neuve
1982.
1 Summa
Prooemialis
St. Brownet G. Gai,
, I, Epistola
, edit.Ph. Boehner,
Logicae
, I, Saint-Bonaventure,
Opera
Philosophica
New-York,
1974,1. 9-12,p. 6.
2 Les principaux
textesconcerns
se trouvent
dansle Commentaire
desSentences
et
danslesQuodlibeta
la Somme
deLogique.
Cela
, deuxoeuvres
Septem
quisontantrieures
63

13:16:01 PM

Dans quelle mesure les dveloppements ockhamistessur le monde

et son unit sont-ilsdpendants de thses logiques qui y sont investies
ou qu'ils induisent?Quelle est la logique de la cosmologieockhamiste?
Unit, Ordreet Harmoniedu monde
Le problme de l'unit du monde, c'est celui de savoir ce qui faitde
lui un tout, une totalitordonne et harmonieuse, et non un simple
agrgat de choses sans relationentreelles. Ce problmeest soulev par
l'ide mme de monde, mundus
, comme transcriptionlatine du grec
cosmos.Dans la pense grecque en effet,du moins dans ses courants
dominants, le monde est considr comme une unit organique ainsi
qu'en tmoigne la conception d'origine platonicienne du monde
comme vivant3,ce qui veut dire qu'il est irrductible la juxtaposition
de ses parties. Dans l'occident mdival chrtien, ce problme se
divise en deux questions, videmment lies: celle de l'ordre intrinsque du monde, c'est--direde la relationdu tout et des partiesau sein
de cette totalit unifie qu'est le monde; et celle de la relation du
monde Dieu. Pour lors, voyons si le monde possde en lui-mme,de
lui-mme, une unit.
Cette question est traiteessentiellementau moyen de la catgorie
logique de relation ( relatioou ad aliquid).
La conceptionde la relationdveloppe dans les textesockhamistes,
de VExpositioAurea la Sommede Logiqueen passant par le Commentaire
et les Quodlibeta
desSentences
, repose sur un principe constammentrappel: la relationn'est pas distinctedes choses absolues, c'est--diredes
substances et des qualits individuelles. Certes, en un passage de la
Sommede Logique, Guillaume reconnat ne pas avoir toujours cru que
terministe
la conceptualit
investie
qui
peutexpliquer
que n'ysoitpas massivement
deGuilla
doctrine
sait
ailleurs
la
Somme.
On
dans
seraexpose,
que
par
prcisment,
comme
surdesquestions
volution
laumed'Ockhamconnatunecertaine
cruciales,
une
Il seraitdonc la foisabsurde
etvainde rechercher
duconcept.
cellede la nature
dams
desoeusoussa forme
dela logiqueockhamiste,
acheve,
mcanique
application
deslments
danscelles-ci
Il n'empche
vresantrieures.
qui
qu'onpeutdjreprer

d'autantplusautoriss
Noussommes
deLogique.
dansla Somme
seront
systmatiss
nousavertit
ainsique,commenousvenonsde la voir,Guillaume
quelesdifprocder
en se fondant
maisse dveloppent
du savoirnesontpas autonomes
domaines
frents
l'un surl'autre.
3 Cf Time
de
de Platon,t.II, Bibliothque
in Oeuvres
franaise
Completes
(traduction
"La Pliade",Paris,1969),30 b: "... ce monde,vivantdouen vritd'meet
manifestation
de l'ordreimpos
vivantestla premire
Ce caractre
d'intelligence".
il l'amena l'ordre,
"de ce dsordre,
la matire:
que
ayantestim
parle dmiurge
mieuxque celui-l"(ibid.,30 a).
vautinfiniment
celui-ci
64

13:16:01 PM

tel tait l'avis Aristote4. Mais on ne trouve aucun texteo il aurait

en son nom propre soutenu une thorie faisant de la relation un tre
rel, distinctde la substance et de la qualit. Plus fondamentalement,
la SommedeLogiquedplace le problme qui consistait se demander ce
qu'est du point de vue ontologique la relation,et pose comme principe
ou ad aliquidne sontjamais que des termes,et plus
, relativum
que relatio
des
termes
de seconde intention,signifiantquelque chose
prcisment
au sujet d'autres termes:
" 'Relatio'sive'ad
eratnomensecundaeimposialiquisiveetiam'relativum'
tionsvelsecundaeintentionis
etnonnomenprimaeintentionis"5.
Dans ces conditions,ce qu'il importeau premierchefde prciser,c'est
ce qui permet de qualifier un terme de 4'relatif". Un nom est relatif
quand il dsigne son signifide telle manire qu'il ne peut pas convenablementle suppler dans une propositionsans qu'on doive lui ajouter un autre terme un cas oblique:
"Relationonestaliaresdistincta
ab omnireabsoluta;sedtantum
suntnomina
alicuinonpossunt
nisirespectu
alicuius
relativa,
alterius,
quaescilicet
competere
velsaltemoportet
adderevelsubintelligere
aliquodnomeninaliquocasu,genitivoveldativovelablativo"6.
La relationest quant elle un nom abstraitdont il importede ne pas
hypostasierle significar il ne renvoie qu'aux tres individuels. C'est
pourquoi s'interrogersur le statutobjectif,ontologique, de la relation,
c'est mal poser le problme - c'est tre dupe du langage. Ainsi la
paternitn'est en aucune manire une chose distincte de l'individu
4 CfS.L., I. c. 49, 1. 10-15, 154.
p.
5 S.L. , I, c. 49, 1. 50-52,p. 155-156.
CfaussiExpositio
inLibrum
Praedicamentorum
Aristotelis
NewYork,1978,. 12,
, edit.G. Gal,Opera
II, St.Bonaventure,
Philosophica,
1. 30-34,p. 239;etScriptum
inLibrum
Primm
Sententiarum
ordinatio
, dist.30,dit.G. I.
Etzkorn
etFr.E. Kelley,Opera
, IV, St Bonaventure,
New-York,
1979,qu.
Theologica
semblent
1, p. 309,1. 22-24.Seulsles Quodlibeta
plusambigussurce sujet.Dans le
se prononce
commeintenVI, qu. 22,Guillaume
Quodlibet
pourla thsede la relation
tionsecondemaisreconnat
la thsecontraire
commerationabilis
et souligne
l'avoir
admisedansunequestion
antrieure
, dit.J.C. Wey,
implicitement
(Quodlibeta
Septem

IX, StBonaventure,
New-York,
Opera
1980,1.25-27p. 667;ilfaitallusion
Theologica
lespredicaments
V, qu. 21, p. 559).Maiscettequestion
Quodl.
n'envisage
que dans
leurglobalit,
entantqu'ilssontlescatgories
dedireoudepenser
l'treet
permettant
uneporte
Ds ce niveautoutefois,
onpeuttout
ayantdanscettemesure
ontologique.
aussibiendired'unautrepointdevuequ'ilsdsignent
destermes.
cetteaffirSurtout,
mation
gnrale
perdde sonsens,dslorsque l'ondistingue
parmilesdivers
predicale rapport
l'trereln'tantpas le mmepourtous.
ments,
6 Expos,
inLib.Praedc. 12,1. 101-105,
p. 242.CfaussiS.L., I, c. 49,1.68-70,p.
156.
65

13:16:01 PM

qui est pre7; mais "pre" est un termerelatifparce qu'il ne peut tre
employ correctementdans une propositionpour signifierun individu
que si on lui ajoute un autre terme au gnitif.
Concernant le monde ou l'univers8,cetteconceptionde la relationa
une consquence qui apparat dans la Sommede Logiquesous la forme
d'une objection possible:
"Itemunitasuniversi
inordinepartium;
siergorelatio
consistit
nonestaliares,
illeordononeritalia res,et itauniversum
nonessetunum"9.
Dans la Sommede Logique, l'objection reste sans rponse. Mais le
: Utrumuniproblme est traitdans la Question8 du septime Quodlibet
tas universivel approximatio
causarumvel distantiarerumimportent
respectus
a rebusabsolutis.A cette question l'auteur rpond ngativedistinctos
ment. La principale raison invoque est le principe d'conomie:
verificabreviter
quodnon.Cuiusratioest,quiaquandopropositio
"Respondeo
turprorebus,si pauciores
sufTiciunt,
pluressuperfluunt"10.
Mais pour que l'argument ait quelque porte, encore faut-iltablir
que ce que l'on nomme "ordre" dans l'univers n'est pas quelque
chose qui vient s'ajouter aux parties de ce tout pour lui confrerunit
et totalit. Telle est bien la position de Guillaume d'Ockham:
"Ordo et unitasuniversi
nonestquidamrespectus,
quasi quoddamligamen
ad invicem,
quasi iliacorporanonessent
liganscorporaordinatain universo
ordinatanec universum
vereessetunumsinetalirespectu
(...) Sed illeordo
solumipsaabsolutaquae nonfaciunt
unamremnumero,
interquae
importt
unumab eodemplusdistatet aliudminus,etunumpropinquum
alterietaliud
distareplusvelminussineomnirespectu
itaquodinteraliquasit
inhaerente,
medium
universi
etinter
connexio
sinetaliresaliquanon.Etitameliussalvatur
pectuquamcumtalirespectu,,n.
7 "Paternitas
increaturis
nonimportt
hominem
etistum
plusnisiistum
quigenuit
vereisteest
hominem
est,quia istispositiset omnialio circumscripto,
qui genitus
I, dist.30,qu. IV, p. 367,1. 18-21);etaussi:"Et non
pateretilleestfilius"(InSent.,
sed
inilioqui estpatervelinilioquodestduplum,
estaliquaressubiective
exsistens
intentionem
estquaedamvoxquaeestad aliquidetnonresabsoluta;
quia secundum
vel
in ilioqui estpaternullaestresimaginabilis
Philosophi
quinsitverasubstantia
veraaualitas"(Exos.inPraed..c. 12.1. 38-42.d. 239-240V
8 Mundus
dugreccosmos
estla traduction
habituelle
, au sujetduquelseposela ques la totalit
deschoses
de sonunit.Ce mondequivaut
tionde sonordre,constitutif
estimepossible
crestantque Tonn'imagine
mondes.Or Guillaume
pas plusieurs
devient
demondes
La question
alorscelledel'unitdeVunivers.
unepluralit
(cfinfra).
Maisenralit,
Ockhamn'estpastoujours
prcisdansl'emploide l'unou l'autrede
In Sent.,I, dist.44, qu. unica).
cestermes
9 S.L., I,(cf
c. 54,1. 33-34,p. 178.
10Quodl
., VII, qu. 8, 1. 23-25,p. 727.
11Ibid.,1. 56-66,p. 728-729.
66

13:16:01 PM

On remarque un certainnombre de dplacements et de transformations dans les concepts et les questions. En premier lieu, le concept
Mme si l'univocit
central n'est pas celui de relatiomais de respectus.
n'est pas totale dans l'emploi de ces termes,on peut leur assigner une
diffrence.La catgorie de relatioayant t vide de son sens rel et
rduite qualifierdes termes,le problme subsiste de prciserce qui
faitqu'un termeest ou non relatif.Le respectus
seraitalors le rapporttel
que, selon certains du moins, il existe dans les choses. C'est cette
notion que Guillaume emploie de prfrencedans les Quodlibeta
ou le
Commentaire
des Sentences.Mais il s'attache constamment montrer
qu'il n'existe pas de tels rapportsindpendants des choses absolues12.
L'ordre de l'univers aurait pu tre considr comme un tel rapport
rel. Mais il n'en est rien, comme le montrela question 8 du septime
. A la question pose, il est tout simplementrpondu par la
Quodlibet
ngative. Et plus bas, il est expliqu:
"Destructo
iliorespectu
ordouniversi,
adhucuniversum
ordinabitur
quivocatur
absolutae
universi
tuncsicutnunc,sipartes
maneant
nondestructae
necmutatae
secundum
locum"13.
En ce point, il fauttreminutieux. Guillaume ne nie pas qu'il y ait un
ordre dans l'univers; au contraire, l'univers ockhamiste est, en un
sens, parfaitementordonn; son propos n'est pas une ngation simple
de l'ordre, faisantde l'univers un chaos. De la mme manire, il faut
admettrel'existence de relationsde causalit - charge de prciserce
qu'il fautentendrepar l - dans le cours naturel du monde14.Mais
son unit se rduitprcisment cet ordre15.La question est donc de
savoir comment penser un tel ordre.
Qu'est-ce, dans la perspective ockhamiste, qu'un ordre entre des
objets multiples? Guillaume se dmarque de la position scotiste qui
rduit bien l'unit de l'univers son ordre mais conoit ce dernier
12Cfparexemple
In Sent.,I, dist.30, qu. II, p. 322,1. 4-5.
13Quodl
., VII, qu. 8, 1. 45-47,p. 728.
14Surcettedifficile
de la causalit
onpeutse reporter
l'article
naturelle,
question
de M. Me. CordAdams,WasOckham
a Humean
about
, in: Franciscan
efficient
causality?
Studies
reconnaissance
del'efficace
y39(1979),pp.5-48.Ajoutons
qu'unecertaine
proestdcisivepourtoutl'difice
de la smiologie
ockhamiste
predes causessecondes
entantquesignenaturel,
estcausparcedont
(doncdela logique)puisqueleconcept,
il estsigne.
1
15 4Secundum
intellectum
debetconcediquodunitasuniversi
estordo
Philosophi
ad invicem,
esseunum'est
partium
quianihilaliudintelligit
quamquod'universum
'partessicordinari'"(In Sent.,I, dist.30,qu. 1, p. 317,1. 6-9).
67

13:16:01 PM

dans le cadre d'une tout autre thorie de la relation16.D'une part,

Guillaume affirmeque Tordre n'est pas distinctdes choses ordonnes;
d'autre part (et dans le mesure o il n'est pas question d'ordre temporel), il estime que ce concept dsigne simplementla disposition spatiale d'lments.
Ainsi, ce sont les catgoriesde disposition,d'unit et de multiplicit
qui se trouvent investies dans la conceptualisation de l'ordre. Elles
doivent tre distingues de la relation au sens strict- ce que Guil17- mais elles n'en conrelationis
laume appelle parfoisrelatiodegenere
cernent pas moins directementle problme ici examin, comme le
prouve un passage de la deuxime question de la distinction30:
et eodemmodopartescaelihaberent
si 'ubi' essettalisrespectus,
"Praeterea,
et quaelibet
eademratione
ad centrum,
taiesrespectus
quaelibetpropinquitas
falessettalisaliares.Sedhocestmanifeste
alterius
uniusreirespectu
distantia
sitalia res,sequeretur
sum,quia si talisdistantia
aliquod
quodquandocumque
essetaliquavera
inqualibetrecorporali
etspirituali,
moveretur
corpusinferius
resquae priusnonfuit"18.
La proccupation et la dmarche de Guillaume restenttoujours les
mmes: savoir si ces termesdsignentou non des rapportsexistantde
manire relle et distinctedes choses absolues. Et la thse constamment raffirmeest que unit et multiplicit,totalitet parties, lieu,
dispositionet ordre ne dsignentjamais rien d'autre que les lments
eux-mmes19,ralits absolues en dehors desquelles rien n'existe ni ne
peut tre imagin:
nullaresestimaginabietqualitates,
substantias
scilicet
"Praeterresabsolutas,
illaseasdemresdiversanomina
Verumtamen
lis,necin actunecin potentia.
diversimode
significant"20.
Tout en renvoyant,dans chaque cas, des tres absolus, les termes
relevant de telles catgories les signifientd'une certaine manire. Ici,
16CfJeanDuns Scot:"Unitasuniversi
interse etad priestin ordinepartium
interse etad ducem(...)
exercitus
estinordinepartium
mm,sicutunitasexercitus
..." (Ordinario,
esseremextraactumintellectus
relationem
contranegantes
II, d. 1,
d'Ockhamcitece passage
t. VII, p. 111).Guillaume
qu. 4-5,n. 223,dit.vaticane,
danssonCommentaire
desSentences
(I, dist.30,qu. I, p. 286),maisc'estpourcritiquer
Guilde la relation,
la thorie
les conclusions
gnrale
qu'en tireScot;concernant
d'enfaireunechose:44Una opinioestquae(...) ponitquodrelatio
laumeluireproche
absolutis"(dist.30,qu. 1, p. 283,1.
estalia resab omnireabsolutaet ab omnibus
les arguments
de sonprdcesseur.
avantd'grener
14-17),nonce-t-il
17Cfparexemple
In Sent
., I, dist.30,qu. I, p. 321,1. 14-15.
18Ibid.,qu. II, p. 325,1. 11-17.
19"Positio
inhaerentem
toti
formaliter
velsitusnondicitaliquemtalemrespectum
velpartibus"(Ibid..dist.30,qu. II, p. 326,1. 10-11).
20S.L., I, c. 49, 1. 23-25,p. 154.
68

13:16:01 PM

rapparat une autre constante de la dmarche ockhamiste: son

analyse logico-smantique et la thorie du langage qui s'y implique.
Ainsi, il est prcis propos de la ressemblance:
4'Sortesestsimilis
omnialiovelinrevelin intelPlatonipropter
solaabsoluta,
inresunt
absoluta.Quia tarnen
lectucircumscipto.
Et itain renihilestpraeter
diversimode
potestintellectus
exprimere"21.
pluraabsoluta,
Que deviennentdans ces conditionsl'ordre et l'unit de l'univers?
Ils doivent trouverune explication suffisantedans la disposition des
objets individuelsqui composentl'univers. L'ordre n'est rien d'autre
, et non plus
que les tres absolus, mais penss ensemble, coniunctim
dans leur existencesingulire,divisim.Cette coexistencedes absolus ne
constitue aucun rapport rel sparable des objets eux-mmes. Il
apparat, encore une fois,que Guillaume d'Ockham n'en vient pas
l'ide d'un univers chaotique o les objets, de par leur caractre discret,n'auraient aucun rapportentreeux. Il ne nie pas qu'un objet ressemble un autre ou soit la cause d'un autre. Mais il ne s'agit pas de
liens distinctsdes objets eux-mmes et qu'il serait possible d'autonomiser par rapport ces derniers. Peut-on alors parler d'unit au sens
strict?Ici encore, il faut tre prudent. A maintes reprises,on l'a vu,
Guillaume parle d'unit, comme il parle de l'ordre de l'univers. Mais
si l'on entend par unit celle des tres individuels qui seuls existent
rellement,d'aprs Guillaume lui-mme, tel point que tout le reste
du pensable doit s'y ramener,alors on ne pourra pas parler d'unit au
sens strict concernant le monde. Effectivement,c'est de manire
"
impropreque le monde est dit un":
"Alia destinctio
estquod unumaliquidest proprie
et stricte
(...) Aliquidest
unumimproprie
etlarge,sicutregnum
dicitur
unum,velpopulusunusetmundusunus"22.
A moins que cette unit et cet ordre ne trouventleur raison suffisante dans une relation un termeextrieur- extrioritqui par ailleurs rend caduque l'ide grecque de totalit- , un autre termequi en
serait l'origine et le garant. Un passage des Quodlibeta
le suggre, par
une comparaison, au moins titred'hypothse:
4
estin ordinepartium
ad se invicem
et ad primm
ens,
'Quia unitasuniversi
sicutunitasexercitus
estinordinepartium
exercitus
interse etad ducem"23.
21In Sent.,
I, dist.30, qu. I, 316,1. 14-16.
22Ibid., I, dist.24,qu. I, p. p.
77,1. 4-7.
23Quodl.
estreprise
du textedeJean
VII, qu. 8, 1.5-9,p. 726.Cettecomparaison
DunsScotcitplushaut(cf. 16).Remarquons
qu'ellesuitla locution
galement
quod
sicdansunequestion laquelleGuillaume
d'Ockhamrpondra
il
parla ngative;
n'assumedoncpas pourlui-mme
ce dveloppement.
69

13:16:01 PM

Cet trepremier,qui seraitaux autres tresde l'univers comme le chef

d'une arme est aux soldats de cette arme, ne pourrait tre que le
Dieu crateur de cet univers.
II. La Relationdu Monde Dieu
Pour un thologien,la question de l'unit intrinsquedu monde et
celle de la relationde ce mme monde Dieu sont insparables; plus
exactement,la premirerenvoie tt ou tard la seconde. Car l'ordre,
l'harmonie, voire la beaut de l'univers que la plupartdes cosmologies
antiques avaient dj mis en avant, deviennent dans la philosophie
chrtienneles marques mmes de l'action divine. Je ne citerai qu'un
seul exemple, particulirementloquent, celui de Jean de SaintAmand, au XIIIo sicle:
etordinem
nomine
ordinationem
mundum
"Graecinominaverunt
sign[ifc]ante
a primacausacuiusestvestigium,
ordinans
(...) ordinatus
(...); estenimmundus
omniaquae ineo sunt"24.
Auquel cas doivent tre inscritesrellementdans le monde des marques qui fontsigne vers Dieu. On sait que Bonaventure, par exemple,
est prolixe sur ce thme:
etlegitur
Trinitas
inquo relucet,
"Creaturamundiestquasiliber
repraesentatur
scilicet
fabricatrix
secundum
permodumvestitriplicem
gradumexpressionis,
.
etsimilitudinem"25
imaginis,
gium,
Ces ides sont prsenteschez de nombreuxauteurs mdivaux, commencer par Augustin. Mais cela suppose que la relation du monde
Dieu soit inscritedans l'tre mme du monde. Cela reste-t-ilpossible
lorsque l'on rduitl'ordre la dispositiondes parties,celles-cin'tant
elles-mmes rien d'autre que les choses absolues, c'est--direles tres
individuels?
du Premier
LivredesSentences
De fait,dans le Commentaire
, la rponse
de Guillaume d'Ockham la premirequestion de la distinction30 "Utrum Deus realiter vel secundum rationem referatur ad
creaturam" - est embarrasse de prcautions. Sur cette question
comme sur celle des relations entre les trois personnes divines - les
deux questions n'tant pas sans rapportpuisque dans les deux cas est
en cause la possibilitd'appliquer la catgorie logique de relation la
divinit- , la vritchappe la raison et le philosopheen est rduit
24Die Concordanciae
..herausgegeben
vonJ. L. Pagel,
Amando.
deSancto
desJohannes
Berlin,1894,p. 206.
25Bonaventure,
t. V, p. 230.
de Quaracchi,
, II, 12,edition
Breuiloquium
70

13:16:01 PM

alignerdes raisonnementsfondssur des principesnaturelsdont il faut

reconnatrequ'ils paraissent contredirel'enseignement de l'Ecriture:
- volensinniti
"Ideo,dicoaliterad questionem
quod- quidquidsitde veritate
iudicare
expurisnaturalibus
esthomini
rationi,
prostatuisto,
quantum
possibile
de genere
relationis
essealiam
omnem
talemrelationem
facilius
teneret
negando
rem- modoexposito
quae non
prius- quameiusoppositum
(...) Rationes,
talemremin nullo
et dictisSanctorum,
ad probandum
innituntur
Scripturae
Etideodicoquodsicutille,quivelietpraecise
suntefficaces.
sequiradopenitus
auctoritatem
nemet nonrecipere
Sacrae,diceret
quod in Deo non
Scripturae
possentesse trespersonaecumunitatenaturae,ita qui velietinnitipraecise
non
nobisprostatuisto,haberet
rationi
aequebenetenere
quodrelatio
possibili
essetaliquidtaliin re,sicutmultiimaginantur"26.
Le raisonnement de Guillaume d'Ockham se dveloppe simultanmentsur deux plans, ce qui risque d'entraner une certaineconfusion.
D'une part, il se donne comme une rponse la question, telle qu'elle
a t nonce plus haut, du rapportentre la cratureet Dieu; d'autre
part, sa formulationexpliciteen reste une thse gnrale sur la relation. D'ailleurs, ce passage vientau termed'une longue discussion sur
la nature de la relation et la raison de ce dtour a t expose
d'emble:
de relatione
"Haec questiopraesupponit
quidsit"27.
Mais aussi bien la comparaison avec le problme pos par la trinit
divine que l'insistance sur la diffrenceentre argumentationfonde
sur la raison naturelle d'un ct et donnes de l'Ecriture de l'autre,
montrentbien que l'auteur garde en vue le problme plus prcis du
rapportentre monde cr et crateur.
On peut ds lors reconstituerle raisonnement.Sous son aspect positif,c'est la reprisedes thses que Guillaume a constammentsoutenues
depuis VExpositioAurea:la relationest un nom ou un concept au moyen
duquel on dsigne d'une certaine manire les tresabsolus, substances
ou qualits individuelles. Sous son aspect ngatif,toute cettepremire
question de la distinction 30 constitue une polmique contre Jean
Duns Scot. Mais la complexit de la position scotistecontraintGuillaume d'Ockham de nombreuses nuances et prcisions.
Scot, en effet,ne faitpas de la relationquelque chose d'absolument
distinctde la substance, de telle sorte que certaines de ses formulations, surtoutquand elles sont ngatives et si on les considre isolment, ne contredisentpas franchementcelles de Guillaume. C'est le
cas prcisment propos de la relation entre la crature et Dieu:
26In Sent.,I, dist.30,qu. I, p. 306,1. 13- p. 307,1. 9.
27Ibid., p. 281,1. 14-15.
71

13:16:01 PM

creaturae
ad Deumnondiffert
realiter
a creatura"28.
quodrelatio
"Ipseostendit
Et cela correspond bien tel passage de VOrdinatioscotiste:
omnicreaturae,
estidemrealiter
"Relatioad Deum,communis
fundamento;
nontamenidemformaliter
praecise
idem(...) Quia illudquodproprie
dicitur
inessealicui,sinequoilludnonpotest
estidemsibirealiessesinecontradictione,
inestlapidi,etsineea nonpotest
ter,relatioautemad Deumproprie
lapisesse
sinecontradictione"29.
L'tre-cr ne diffrepas rellementde la cratureelle-mme; ce n'est
pas quelque chose qui s'y ajoute car cela constitueson tre. Mais l
s'arrtentles convergences. Au nom de la conceptionque nous avons
dj expose, Guillaume d'Ockham critique tout aussi bien l'identit
relle de la relation et de son sujet:
seddicoquodvel
"Non ponoquodrelatioestidemrealiter
cumfundamento,
in animaimporsedtantum
intentio
etconceptus
relatio
nonestfundamentum
et
tanepluraabsoluta,velestpluraabsoluta,sicutpopulusestplureshomines
sitmagissecunnullushomoestpopulus.Quae tamenistarum
propositionum
dumproprietatem
sermonis
discutere
quamad theolomagisad logicm
pertinet
gm"30.
Guillaume d'Ockham rcuse donc totalement,on le voit une fois de
plus, la problmatique qui consisterait s'interrogersur l'identit ou
la diffrencerelles de la relation et de son sujet. Du mme coup se
trouventinvalides simultanmentet l'ide d'une distinctionformelle
a parterei, et celle d'une relationde raison. Il est bien connu que la distinctio
formalisa parterei, dans la perspectivescotiste,n'est ni la distinctio
realisqui concerne les choses physiquementsparables, ni la distinctio
rationis
qui ne correspond aucun objet formelsaisissable comme tel et
antrieur l'acte intellectuel.La distinctio
formalisa partereise double
d'une identitrelle dans le sujet, et c'est justementce que Guillaume
critiquedans le texteci-dessus en rappelant que la relationdsigne un
type de concept ou de signe, ne pas confondreavec l'objet dsign.
Mais la relation n'est pas pour autant conue comme relationde raison; cela va de soi ds lors que l'on dfinitla relationde raison comme
l'effetd'une opration de comparaison par l'intellect.
Dans la Somme de Logique, Guillaume d'Ockham semble aller
jusqu' rcuser la distinction entre relation relle et relation de
raison31. Dans les oeuvres antrieures, il conserve cependant, avec
28Ibid.,p. 295,1. 21-22.
29
DunsScot,Ordination
II, Dist. 1, q. 4-5,nn260-261,t. VII, p. 128-129.
30Jean
In Sent
., I, dist.30, qu. I, p. 314,1. 14-21.
31CfS.L., I, . 52,1.62-63,p. 173:"ApudAristotelem
nullaerattalisdistinctio
interrelationem
rationis".S'il se couvrede l'autorit
realisetrelationem
d'Aristote,
72

13:16:01 PM

une certaine prudence et quelque distance, cette terminologiehabituelle. Une relation sera dite de raison si elle dpend exclusivement
d'un acte de l'intellect,comme c'est le cas pour la relation du sujet et
du prdicat. Mais il fautse garderde gnraliser l'ensemble des relations. Car une relation telle que la ressemblance n'est certes pas
4'relle" si l'on entend
par l qu'elle dsignerait quelque chose de
de
la
et des qualits; mais elle est bien relle
distinct
substance
rel,
dans la mesure o elle signified'une certaine manire des choses relles et que celles-ci sont sans interventionde l'intellect telles qu'elles
sont signifiespar le terme relatif:
"Et ideosecundum
eum[sc.Philosophum]
itavereet realiter
suntistarelativa
alia"32.
sicutquaecumque
'causa', 'dominus'ethuiusmodi
Socrate et Platon se ressemblentparce qu'ils sont rellementblancs.
Une telle relationne dsigne pas un trede raison, pas plus qu'elle ne
rsulte d'une simple opration de l'intellect.
En ce sens, la cration elle-mme est bien une relation relle:
dicialiquomodorealis,nonquidemquodistarelatiositali"Potestistarelatio
verasresquae nonrequirunt
intellectus
qua res,sedquia importt
operationem
ad hocquoduna sitcreansetalia sitcreata"33.
Dieu est rellementcrateur et le monde est rellement cr. Rien
n'est moins fictifque cette relation.
Mais est-ce dire, pour en revenir notre interrogationinitiale,
que ce monde porte en lui une marque de la cration divine?
Reportons-nous la premire question du septime Quodlibet.Elle
porte sur la cration et sur la conservation; il s'agit de savoir si elles
diffrentrellementdes choses absolues. Comme on peut dsormais
s'y attendre,la rponse est ngative, et pour justification,se trouve
'
prcis ce que dsigne, propos d'un tre du monde, le terme 'cration":
"Creatiolapidissiveactivasivepassivanonsignificai
distincaliquidpositivm
tuma Deo et lapide,sed importt
et connotat
negationem
lapidisimmediate
esse lapidis,hoc est,importt
praecedere
quod lapismodositet quod prius
immediate
nonfuit.Et quandocumque
sicest,sineomnialio respectu
dicitur
Deus crearelapidemetlapiscrearia Deo"34.
Guillaume
Thomasd'Aquin:cfSomme
, I. qu. 28,
s'opposeimplicitement
Thologique
a, resp.
32S.L., I, c. 52,1.59-60, 173;dansle mmesens,cfInSent.
I, dist.30,qu. V, p.
p.
385,et Quodl.
VI, qu. 25, pp. 678-679.
33In Sent.,
I, dist.30,qu. V, p. 385,1.9-12.
34Quodl.
, VII, qu. 1,1. 45-51,p. 705.
73

13:16:01 PM

On peut donc dire tout aussi bien que l'tre-crne diffrepas rellement de la crature35et que la cration connote quelque chose de tout
fait extrieur la chose telle qu'elle existe actuellement: sa nonexistence antrieure. Dans cette perspective, il n'y a aucune place
pour cette espce de caractre internepar lequel, selon d'autres thologiens, la chose cre faisait signe vers son crateur.
Ce qui vaut pour un tre cr vaut, de ce point de vue, pour le
monde dans son ensemble. Aucun caractreparticulierne peut treen
lui la marque signifiantedu crateur. De mme par consquent que
son unit se rduit la dispositionde ses lments, de mme il serait
vain d'y chercher une organisation dont l'tre divin serait l'origine
fondamentale,le garant et le signifiultime.
D'aucune manire par consquent, l'unit du monde n'est une relation distinctedes objets multiples qui le constituentet l'ordre n'est
rien d'autre que la dispositiondes parties. Cette conceptionmodifiela
vision de l'univers comme unit organique, conception hrite de
l'antiquit. Dans ce dernier cas, le monde, dont tous les composants
taient dpendants d'un seul principe, ne pouvait qu'tre unique. Il
n'en va plus de mme.
III. L'Unicit du Mondeen Question
La question de la pluralit des mondes est aborde par Guillaume
d'Ockham dans la question unique de la distinction44 de son Commen: ' 'Utrum Deus posset faceremundum
tairedu Premier
LivredesSentences
melioremisto mundo". La question ainsi pose est plus complexe que
celle de la pluralitdes mondes. Elle recoupe le problme du mal et de
sa rationalitdans la cration, et introduitun aspect qui l'on pourrait
dire "qualitatif". Ce faisant, elle recoupe galement notre premire
interrogation,puisque la notion d'ordre peut treprise soit en un sens
descriptif,o un ordre se distingue d'un autre ordre possible - tendance qui est apparue comme celle d'Ockham - soit en un sens qualitatif,o l'ordre seraitquelque chose de mieux que le dsordre.Je laisserai ici ces aspects de ct, pour ne considrerque la question de la
pluralit des mondes.
Guillaume d'Ockham estime probable {probabile
), c'est--dire
dmontrablepar des raisonnementssusceptiblesd'emporterla conviction mme s'il ne s'agit pas de certitudeabsolue, que Dieu pourrait
faire un autre monde (et, en l'occurrence, un monde meilleur) que
35CfIbid.,1.81-82,p. 706.
74

13:16:01 PM

celui-ci, distinctnumriquementde lui. Prcisons par avance qu'il ne

s'agit pas d'imaginer un ou plusieurs "mondes des possibles" qui
prexisteraientde quelque manire au rel et seraient comme en
attente d'effectuation. Le possible n'existe d'aucune manire, pas
mme comme ide divine; la crature n'a qu'un seul mode d'tre:
l'existence relle. Mais, comme l'a soulign P. Vignaux, ceci
n'empche ni le faitque la toute-puissancedivine n'est pas rductible
ses effetsactuels, ds lors que l'on considre ceux-ci de potentiaDei
absolutac'est--dire dans leur contingence radicale, ni que l'entendement (divin ou humain) doit bien d'une certaine manire penser le
possible indpendammentdu rel, puisqu'il juge avant que la volont
dcide. 4'Aussi faut-il admettre une connaissance du possible sans
imaginerun monde des possibles"36. Nous jugeons donc des possibilits et pas seulement des ralits. C'est dans ce cadre que Guillaume
estime possible la cration d'un autre monde. Quels sont ses arguments?
de naturemtaphysique
a) Un argument
Cet argument s'appuie sur le principe de l'omnipotence divine.
Dieu pouvant faire tout ce qui n'implique pas contradiction,il peut
produire une infinitd'individus de mme nature que ceux qui existent. Mais rien ne l'oblige les produire dans ce monde-ci. Il peut
donc les produire en dehors de ce monde et faire avec eux un autre
monde, comme il a faitun monde avec les individus dj produits.
Cette manire d'argumenter suppose dj une transformationdu
concept de monde. Selon la dfinitionhabituelle ou dominante, le
monde dsigne la totalitdes tres crs ou existants37.Dans le texte
de Guillaume d'Ockham, le monde constituesimplementun ensemble
dtermin.L'auteur a d'ailleurs procd d'emble aux indispensables
prcisions de vocabulaire:
"Mundusdupliciter
omnium
rerum
accipitur:
aliquandoprototacongregatione
sivesintsubstantiae
siveaccidentia;
creatarum,
aliquandoaccipitur
prototoquodamcomposito
velaggregato
ex multiscontentis
ab unocorporeet ilioconti36P. Vignaux,
deThologie
Nominalismi
yinDictionnaire
Catholique
(1931),t. XI, 1re
partie,col. 765-766.
37Cl Bede: Mundusestuniversitas
excoeloetterra,
omnis,quaeconstat
quatuor
elementis
inspeciem
orbisabsolti
ab orntu
cosmos
globata(...) Nametapudgraecos
Rerum
LatineXC, 192A - 194A). Et,plus
, III, Patrologie
appellatur"
{De Natura
Alexandre
de Hals: "Mundusenimestuniversitas
creatarum
ordinatarum
rcents,
ab unoet in unum"(Quaestiones
, XLV, 2, 1, p. 772);ou RogerBacon:"Mundus
natusestcontinere
omnia"(OpusMaius,IV, dist.4, c. 10; Oxford,
1897,1,p. 154).
75

13:16:01 PM

velindifvelpraecise
nente;ethocdupliciter,
quaesuntsubstantiae,
propartibus
ferenter
proomnibus"38.
La modificationconceptuelle laquelle procde Guillaume d'Ockham apparat nettementsi l'on compare cette dfinition celle de
Richard de Middleton, un de ses prdcesseursdans l'affirmationde
la pluralit des mondes, qui le Venerabilis
Inceptor
emprunteune partie de sa dfinitionet certains arguments:
44
infra
unamsupercreaturarum
universittm
vocandouniversum,
Respondeo
infra
illamuniversitcontinetur
fciem
contentarum,
quaea nullaaliasuperficie
continentem"39.
etiamsuperficiem
tm,compraehendendo
La deuxime partie de la dfinitionpropose par Guillaume d'Ockham est proche de celle de Richard de Middleton. Mais le dbut est
original. Outre la caractre typiquementockhamistede la dmarche
consistant distinguer les multiples acceptions d'un terme, il faut
noter l'clatement du mot ' 'monde" en totalitdu cr d'une part et
totalit restreinte, physiquement dtermine d'autre part. A ce
momentdu raisonnement,aucun de ces deux sens n'est encore privilgi. Guillaume d'Ockham prcise seulement qu'il entendra par
4'monde" un ensemble de
substances, excluant donc la considration
des accidents. Mais cette distinctionparat tre une subdivision du
second sens. On peut donc estimerque l'auteur a cart de son propos, par dcision mthodologique de vocabulaire, l'ide du monde
comme totalitdu cr. Rien n'empche ds lors de penser plusieurs
mondes, la seule condition de pouvoir rcuser les objections de
nature proprementphysique.
Une telle dcision n'est pas une simple convention. Elle suppose
que le monde ne soit pas autre chose qu'un ensemble d'individus,
autrementdit que ce soit seulement de manire impropre,comme on
l'a dj vu, que le monde est dit 4'un". Certes, ces tres individuels
doivent tre contenus dans un lieu dtermin; n'importe quel agrgat
ne constitue pas un monde. Mais en mme temps, ce lieu lui-mme
n'est pas distinctrellementdes choses localises en et par lui.
Le problme est ainsi transpos sur le terrainde la physique.
38In Sent.,I, dist.44, qu. unica,p. 651,1.9-14.
39Clarissimi
Petri
Sententiarum
libros
deMediavilla
Riccardi
quatuor
super
Maistri
Theologi
Subtilissimae
Lombardi
(Brixiae,1591),L. I, dist.XLIIII, art.1,qu. 4, f.392
Quaestiones
datedesannes1280.
b. Ce commentaire

76

13:16:01 PM

physique
proprement
b) Une argumentation
Le problme de la pluralit des mondes, pris au sens strictc'est-dire sous son aspect quantitatif,comporte l'vidence une dimension
physique, tant pour des raisons internesque pour des raisons historiques.
Car ce problme a une histoire.Dans le Traitdu Ciel, Aristoteavait
dnonc comme absurde l'ide qu'il pt v avoir plusieurs mondes:

il n'ya qu'un ciel,maismmeil estimpossible

"Non seulement
qu'ily en ait
jamaisplusd'un"40.
Mais en 1277, Etienne Tempier avait, parmi 219 articles,condamn
la thse suivante:
"Quod primacausanonpossetpluresmundosfacere"41.
Cet vque rtif la pntrationde l'aristotlismevoyait en effetdans
la thse cosmologique selon laquelle plusieurs mondes ne peuvent
coexister, une limitation, qu'il jugeait intolrable, la puissance
divine42.Bien qu'elle ne fitpoint l'unanimit, la condamnation fournit quelques penseurs l'occasion de dvelopper ds la findu XIIIo
sicle des ides originales par rapport la cosmologie aristotlicienne.
Cela ne signifiepas ncessairement,d'ailleurs, qu'ils aient faitpreuve
d'audace novatrice. Richard de Middleton, par exemple, s'attache
plutt mnager la chvre et le chou, Aristoteet Etienne Tempier43.
Mais comme l'aristotlismerestaitl'lment scientifiquede l'poque,
il fallaitdbattresur son propre terrainet rfutersur le plan physique
les argumentsqui interdisaientde concevoir plusieurs mondes.
Guillaume d'Ockham est ainsi amen examiner deux objections,
toutesdeux fondessur des passages du Traitdu Ciel.Je passerai rapidement sur l'une d'entre elles. Elle consiste dire que ce qui est compos de toute sa matire ne peut tre multipli44.Guillaume rpond
40Aristote,
Trait
duCiel(textetabliettraduit
parP. Moraux,Paris,"Les Belles
Lettres",1965),I, 9, 277b 29-30.
41Erreurn 34. Cf Denifle-Chatelain,
Chartulanum
Parisiensis
Universitatis
, (Pans
t. I, p. 543.
1889-97).
42On se reportera
de R.
l'analyse
dansl'ouvrage
decetteproposition
condamne
surles219aidescondamns
Parisle7 mars
1277(Philosophes
MdiHissette,
Enqute
etParis,Vander-Oyez,
Universitaires
1977,pp.
vaux,XXII), Louvain,Publications
64-65.
43CfA. Koyr,Le Vide
auXIVosicle
d'Histoire
delaPense
etl'Espace
, in:Etudes
Infini
rdition
yParis,Gallimard,
1971,en part.,pp. 63-72.
Philosophique
44Cf Trait
duCiel, I, 9, 278a. Aristote
selonlequelil
un raisonnement
reproduit
fautconsidrer
pourle cielcommepourtouttrel'uniondel'essenceetdela matire;
77

13:16:01 PM

que le ciel est bien compos de toute la matire qui est dj faitemais
pas de toute celle qu'il est possible de crer45.Il apparat d'ores et dj
que s'opposent la vision antique du cosmos comme totalitparfaiteet
la conceptionchrtienned'un monde qui n'est rien en regardde l'infinie puissance divine.
L'autre objection consiste dire que s'il y avait plusieurs mondes,
la terrede l'autre monde se mouvraitvers le centrede ce monde-ci46.
En son fond,la rponse revient multiplierles centresen mme temps
que les mondes. Mais l encore, il est intressantde saisir les nuances
entrele raisonnementde Guillaume d'Ockham et celui de Richard de
Middleton. Celui-ci affirmesimplement, comme une vidence, que
chaque monde ayant un centre, la terre de chacun des mondes tendrait naturellementvers le centre de son monde47. En toute rigueur
aristotlicienne,cela suscite une difficult:attribuerainsi deux terres
des lieux naturels diffrents,c'est leur attribuerdes formessubstantiellesdiffrentes
et les rangerpar consquent dans des espces distinctes. A vrai dire, Richard de Middleton ne tombe pas dans ce pige
puisqu'il prcise que la terred'un autre univers, si elle tait place au
centre de ce monde, y reposerait48.Mais Guillaume d'Ockham va
pousser plus loin le raisonnement,ce qui quivaut remettreen chantierla notionde lieu naturel. C'est la fonctiond'un dveloppementsur
le feu qui ne figurepas chez Richard de Middleton.
Si l'on prend en considrationdeux feux,placs en des endroitsdiffrentsde la terre,ils vont se mouvoir vers des lieux numriquement
savoir vers des points diversde la vote cleste. Pourtant,
diffrents,
ces feux sont de la mme espce. Certes, dans le cadre de sa rflexion
et "partout
o l'essenceestralisedansla matire,
lestresspcifiquement
identiilrpond
la multipliquessontmultiples";
cependant
qu' "on nedevrapasconclure
citrelleou possibledes cieux,si notreciel nousestform
de la totalit
de la
matire.
Or cettehypothse
bien la ralit".CfGuillaume
d'Ockham,
correspond
loc.cit.,p. 656,1. 19-21.
45Ibid., p. 660,1. 8-11.
46CfAristote,
Trait
duCiel, I, 8, 276a: "Ds lors,c'estverscecentre-ci
queseportentnaturellement
lesparties
de terre
de l'autremonde,etverscetteextrmit-ci
que
se portele feude l-bas.Or celane se peut:si celase passaitainsi,c'estncessairementversle hautque,danssonmondepropre,
la terre;
le feu,lui,gagneseporterait
raitle centre".
47"Sicutterraistiusuniversi
naturaliter
incentro
huiusuniversi,
etita
quiesceret
terraalterius
universi
naturaliter
in centro
alterius
universi"
quiesceret
(Richardde
loc.cit.,f.392b).
Middleton,
48"Et si terrailliusuniversi
in centrohuiusuniversi,
naturaliter
ibi
poneretur
huiusuniversi,
etterra
sia Deo poneretur
incentro
alterius
natuuniversi,
quiesceret;
raliter
etiamibiquiesceret"
(ibid.)
78

13:16:01 PM

sur la possibilit d'un monde meilleur, Guillaume s'interroge sur

rventualit d'une diffrenced'espce entreles mondes et leurs composants. Il considre bien comme "probable" que Dieu pourraitfaire
un autre monde, meilleur que celui-ci et distinctspcifiquementde
lui. Mais cette hypothsene joue par la suite aucun rle effectif
en ce
La
concerne
du
base
du
raiqui
problme.
l'aspect cosmo-physique
sonnement est alors l'ide d'une production d'autres individus de
mme espce en dehors de ce monde-ci. Les diffrentesterres sont
donc considres comme des corps de mme espce49. Une telle identit spcifique tait d'ailleurs galement suppose par l'objection
La rponse cette objection s'effectuepar gnraliaristotlicienne50.
sation partirde l'exemple du feu. Il apparat que des tresde mme
espce ne se meuventpas ncessairementvers des lieux totalement(ou
numriquement) identiques51. Ce raisonnement n'est pourtant pas
encore pleinementconvaincant. Car de mme que tous les corps graves de la terre convergentvers le mme centre, de mme les feux se
dirigentvers un seul et mme ciel qui constitueleur lieu naturel,ce qui
semble suffire diffrencierle cas de l'hypothse discute52. Guillaume d'Ockham balaie cette dernire rticence par une rponse
rapide et assez curieuse: la similitude est suffisantepour rendre la
comparaison opratoire parce que, mme si les diverses parties de la
vote cleste constituentune vote, les feuxne s'en dirigentpas moins
et - ce qui me parat le nerfde l'argument
vers des parties diffrentes
- on pourrait imaginer une discontinuitentre ces
parties:
"Si illaepartesnonfacerent
unumcontinuum
sedessetdiscontinuatio,
manifestumestquodcumnonaequaliter
Uliignesapproximantur
diversis
circumferenmoverentur
ad eas, sedad distinctas
circumferentias
movetiis,nonaequaliter
rentur"53.
En somme, il n'y a rien, ni dans l'exprience physique ni dans le
simple raisonnementqui oblige poser l'unit relle du ciel comme
lieu naturel expliquant le mouvement de tous les feux.
On peut se demander si ne s'opposent pas implicitement- sans
que Guillaume en explicitevraimentles tenantset les aboutissants deux manires diffrentesde considrerle lieu. La premireferaitdu

49Cfparexemple
Guillaume
d'Ockham,loc.cit.,d. 656. 1.2. et d. 657.1. 3.
50Cf Trait
duCieLI, 8, 276b 1-5.
51CfGuillaume
d'Ockham,loc.cit.,d. 657,1. 2-11.
52CfGuillaume
loc.cit.,p. 658,1.6-9:"Si dicatur
d'Ockham,
quodistudnonest
caeliestunuslocusnumero
simile,
quiatotacircumferentia
ipsiusignis,nonsicsunt
diversamediaindiversis
mundisunuslocusnumero,
ergononestsimile..."
53Ibid., p. 658,1. 23 - p. 659,1. 2.
79

13:16:01 PM

ciel le lieu, substantiellementunique, vers lequel tendraientpar leur

nature les diffrentsfeux et qui rendrait compte de ce mouvement.
L'autre dissout cette unit substantiellepar la fictiond'une discontinuit entre les diffrentesportions de la circonfrencecleste. Cette
fiction,dont il seraitdifficilede donner une image physique, est plutt
l'expression logique d'un renversementde perspective. A partir du
mouvement (constat) du feu, on appelle "lieu naturel" simplement
le point (ou le morceau de ciel puisque le point est une abstraction)
vers lequel il se dirige. Ce lieu, en tout cas, perd toute unit, ce qui est
parfaitementcohrentavec la redfinitionockhamistedu lieu en gnral. Guillaume d'Ockham, en effet,combat toute manire d'hypostasier le lieu et plus largement de l'autonomiser par rapport aux substances individuelles. Classiquement dfinicomme le corps logeant, le
lieu est plus prcismentla surface de ce corps logeant, laquelle bien
entendu n'est rien de rel distinctdu corps lui-mme54.En ce sens, le
lieu est rel, et il n'est pas d'espace qui serait pensable en dehors des
corps, comme ce sera le cas l'ge classique. Mais il n'est pas non
plus en lui-mme une ralit. Ne restenten jeu que des substances
individuelles, en l'occurrence corporelles, disposes de telle ou telle
manire, ce qui nous renvoie une foisde plus la thoriedes rapports
extrinsques telle qu'elle a t analyse plus haut. En imaginant que
feux pourraientne pas conles termesdes mouvements des diffrents
stituer une ralit substantiellementunique, Guillaume d'Ockham
une. Une
rcuse l'ide que l'ultime sphre cleste serait ncessairement
fois de plus par consquent, c'est l'ide que le monde est ncessairement un qui se trouve remise en cause.
Conclusion
Les diffrentesparties de cette tude convergentvers la remise en
cause de l'ide de monde conu comme un, aussi bien au sens de Y unit
que de Yunicit.L'unit du monde n'est autre que l'ordre de ses parties
et cet ordre n'est autre que ces parties elles-mmes,disposes de telle
ou telle manire. Tout se ramne donc des relations entre objets
individuelset ces relationssont elles-mmesrductiblesaux tresindividuels - substances et qualits. D'un autre ct, rien ne s'oppose
ce que l'on conoive d'autres mondes; leur existence, sans tre affirme comme relle, est pense comme possible.
54Surle lieu,cfTractatus
NewPh. Boehner,
StBonaventure,
deSuccessivis
(dition
York,1944),II, pp. 69-96.
80

13:16:01 PM

J'ai essay de replacer ces thses dans le systmeockhamiste, plus

prcismentde voir si systmaticitil y a entre d'une part quelques
uns de ses principeslogiques, d'autre part cette ide du monde et ces
principescosmologiques. Dans les passages concerns ne se trouvent
pas systmatiquementmis en oeuvre le vocabulaire terministeet la
thorie de la supposition. Nanmoins, les positions de Guillaume
d'Ockham sur l'unit du monde, ou plus exactement celles qui font
qu'un tel concept se trouve vid de sa substance, reposentsur un certain nombrede principesthoriques qui fondentgalementsa logique.
L'essentiel est de considrerque la catgorie de relation,au sens propre, ainsi que les six catgories qui dsignent des rapports
extrinsques55, savoir les six dernirescatgoriesde la liste aristotlicienne, ne signifientpas quelque chose d'absolu, distinctdes substances et des qualits individuelles. Cette thse logico-ontologique n'est
pas ncessairementlie au terminismepuisqu'il existe, non seulement
au XIIIo sicle mais encore au XIVo, des terministesralistes. Mais
elle est mise en oeuvre par Guillaume d'Ockham pour dvelopper
d'une part sa thoriedes termesuniversels,d'autre part son interprtation non-ralistede l'ensemble des catgories, intentionssecondes
dsignant toutes des termes et non des choses. Les positions d'Ockham dans ce domaine s'affirmentds YExpositiosur l'Organond'Aristote et culminentdans la Sommede Logique, d'une manire qui lui permet de systmatiserla logique terministeet, de ce fait,d'en impulser
un nouveau dveloppement. A vrai dire, systmatisationet impulsion
nouvelle sont essentiellementdues un recentragesur le concept de
signe; cet lment dcisiftransparaten certainsendroitsde YExpositio
Aureamais n'est pleinementexpos, explicitet dvelopp que dans la
Sommede Logique.Je fais ici abstraction de ce point. Ce qui compte,
c'est que ce sont bien les mmes principes qui guident Guillaume
d'Ockham dans l'laboration de sa logique et qui fondentles thses
cosmologiques analyses plus haut.
Est-ce dire que la conception ockhamistedu monde dcoule
, mcade
ces
les
ne
choses
sont pas si
niquement,
principeslogiques? Certes,
simples et la dpendance n'est pas unilatrale. Mais est-ce que ces
principessont investis,mme si c'est dans une formequi ne constitue
pas encore l'tait le plus labor de l'ockhamisme, dans les passages
o est analys le concept de "monde"? Assurment.
55CfIn Sent.,I, dist.30, qu. II, p. 320.

81

13:16:01 PM

Premirement,la catgoriede relationest applique au problmede

l'unit (et, par voie de consquence, de l'unicit) du monde.
Deuximement, dans les deux domaines, est prsuppos un univers
peupl d'individus et ne contenantrien de rel en dehors des substances et des qualits individuelles.
Troisimement,mundusest pris comme un termedont il fautoprer
une analyse smantique: 4'mundus dupliciter accipitur...". Si l'instrumentde l'analyse n'est pas encore autant au pointqu'il le sera dans
la Sommede Logique, l'attitude d'esprit est la mme. A chaque mot ne
correspond pas forcmentune chose56. Il n'y a pas une chose qui
s'appelle le monde; le monde fait l'objet d'une dfinitionnominale.
On le dit un, mais improprement. L'ensemble de la cosmologie
devient objet d'analyse smantique. Cette dmarche est celle de Guillaume d'Ockham dans les traits physiques - un bon exemple se
. Soumettre ainsi le langage de la
trouve dans le Tractatusde Motu51
science l'analyse smantique, selon des critreslabors en logique,
sera l'une des lignes directricesde la physique au XIVo sicle.
Dira-t-on enfin que par l et grce cela Guillaume innove en
matirede cosmologie? Concernant la pluralitdes mondes, il reprend
les dfinitions,thses et argumentsde thologiensqui ont exerc leur
activit la fin du XIIIo sicle, aprs la condamnation d'Etienne
Tempier. Mais grce aux principes logiques et mthodologiques mis
en oeuvre, il transformenotablementles noncs de ses prdcesseurs
et leur donne plus de teneuret de poids. Ses successeurs immdiatsne
reprendrontpas leur compte l'ide de l'existence de plusieurs mondes - preuve, s'il en est besoin d'une, que l'autorit de l'Evque de
Paris pouvait tre contourne - ; mais le problme ne s'teindra pas
et l'ide resurgiraultrieurement.
avec le Venerabilis
Inceptor
A. Koyr affirme,dans une note de son texteLe Videetl'EspaceInfini
aux XIVo sicle que "la pluralitdes "mondes" (...) [n'a] jou aucun
rle dans la formationdes concepts de la science moderne"58. C'est
sans doute vrai si l'on considre ce problme isolment. Mais il n'en
reste pas moins vrai que la science classique ne pourra s'tablir, avec
Galile et Descartes, que sur la base d'une dconstructiondu cosmos
56Cf Philosophia
inLibros
Naturalis
) (Rome,1637),III, 7:
Physicorum
(ou Summulae
inphilosophia
distincto
errorum
multorum
"Et ideohocestprincipium
quodsemper
distinctum
vocbulocorrespondeat
significatum".
57CfDe Successivis.
p. 37.
58CfEtudes
d'Histoire
dela Pense
, p. 37,n. 2.
Philosophique
82

13:16:01 PM

aristotlicien59.
La manire dont Guillaume d'Ockham traiteles questions affrentes l'unit du monde, manire dont nous avons vu
qu'elle n'est pas indpendante de sa logique, rcuse, de fait,certains
principes de base de la cosmophysique aristotlicienne:unit organi, unicit du monde, et jusqu'au lieu naturel qui, sans
que du cosmos
tre remis en cause, faitl'objet d'une approche diffrente
voire d'une
certaine dvalorisation: sans tre critiqu de front,ce concept est
apparu peu opratoire dans les passages mentionns.
Le progrsen histoiredes sciences n'est ni rectiligneni univoque. Et
sans doute Guillaume d'Ockham innove-t-ilplus en logique qu'en
physique. Lorsque dans ce dernier domaine il fait preuve d'originalit, ses propositionssont en porte--fauxpar rapport au mouvement
historique- qu'il s'agisse de son analyse de la quantit, de son refus
de Y impetus
comme de toute virtusimpressa
, de la pluralitdes mondes.
Il n'en participe pas moins, sa manire, un vaste mouvement de
remise en cause de l'univers aristotlicien,qui se dessine nettement
ds le XIVo sicle. Il ne s'agit certes que d'un lment parmi beaucoup d'autres. La ruptureentre pense mdivale et pense classique
ne sera consomme, au terme d'un long processus, que lorsqu'un
espace infiniet susceptiblede gomtrisationaura t substituau cosmosgrec. Nous en sommes loin: la pluralit des mondes n'implique
pas par elle-mme la pense de l'infini. Elle est tout de mme une
absurdit du strictpoint de vue de la doctrine aristotlicienne.Cela
signifie,pour ne pas en rester des formulesngatives, que ds cette
poque, travers des lments disparates, et par des avances dont
certainesse rvlerontdes impasses, une autre conceptionde l'univers
commence apparatre.
Paris
C.N.R.S.
59A. Koyrle rappelle
lui-mme:
cfEtudes
Galilennes
, Paris,Hermann,1966,p.
15.

83

13:16:01 PM

Vivarium
XXII, 1 (1984)
BooksReceived

TestidellaI Settimana
in San Bonaventura
e San Tommaso.
Il concetto
di "sapientia"
ottobre1981.A
Residenzialedi StudiMedievali,Carini,Villa Belvedere,
di
: Premessa
Palermo1983.Contents
curadi Alessandro
Musco,Enchiridion,
alla
e scuole
ordini
mendicanti:
Alessandro
Musco;G. Barone,Universit
Parigi
degli
nelconcetto
di
cristiana
classica
e innovazione
met
delXIII secolo
; A. Poppi,Eredit
dell'atto
e Tommaso
inS. Bonaventura
; C. Fabro,L'emergenza
d'Aquino
"sapientia"
Determinae la rottura
delformalismo
scolastico
inS. Tommaso
diessere
; N. Incardona,
sullaconannotazione
Fr.Corvino,
dellacognitio
e cognitio
zione
Qualche
sapientiae;
X + 95 pp. lire10.000
inBonaventura
da Bagnoregio.
cezione
della"sapientia"
. Editedby David L. Wagner,Indiana
TheSevenLiberalArtsin theMiddleAges
1983. Contents:D. L. Wagner,TheSeven
UniversityPress, Bloomington
the
K. F. Morrison,
Incentives
Liberal
ArtsandClassical
forStudying
Scholarship;
M. Camargo,Rhetoric
Liberal
; E. Stump,DialecGrammar,
Arts;
J. F. Huntsman,
tic; M. Masi,Arithmetic
; CI. Kren,
; L. R. Shelby,
; Th. C. Karp,Music
Geometry
theLiberalArts.XVI + 282 pp. $ 25.00
; R. Mclnerny,Beyond
Astronomy
ISBN 0 253 351855
Wiborada.
derheiligen
Dieltesten
Wiboradae.
Vitae
Sanctae
Einleitung,
Lebensbeschreibungen
Historischer
vonWalterBerschin,
Editionundbersetzung
kritische
besorgt
VereindesKantonsSt. Gallen, St.Gallen1983,237pp.ISBN 3 90639530 8
oftheSupA FirstCritical
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: Treatises
ontheProperties
Marsilius
oj Terms.
ojInghen
withIntroducand Alienationes
, Restrictiones
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Ampliationes
positions,
Notes and Appendicesby EgbertP. Bos, D. Reidel
tion,Translation,
Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster
1983, X + 274 pp.
ISBN 90 277 1343X
ontheNature
theBoundaries
Holcot,
Questions
ofGodbyRobert
oj Reason.Three
Exploring
OP. EditedbyHesterG. Gelber,PontificalInstituteof MediaevalStudies,
Toronto1983,VIII + 139pp. ISBN 0 88844062 6
' Elementen
derGeometrie.
'. Commentaar
Albertus
P. M.J. E. Tummers,
opEuclides
(Magnus)
en uitgave
vanBoek1, 2 vols.,Ingenium
Inleidende
studie
Publishers,
} analyse
Nijmegen1984,329 pp.+370 pp. ISBN 90 7041907 6
The
DesmondPaul Henry, Thatmostsubtlequestion
(QuaestioSubtilissima).
andContemporary
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Heidelberg

13:16:12 PM

Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
Roger Bacon on Equivocation

THOMAS S. MALONEY

Many of the things in the world differfrom one another to a

substantial degree and yet we findourselves oftenusing one and the
same word to referto these objects. The resultis sometimesconfusing
to those in attendance, especially when the truthvalue of an expression is affected. "I just saw the dog a moment ago" is a less than
helpfulresponse froma backyard astronomerhavingjust looked at the
dog-star when his neighbor has inquired about his own canine pet.
And since the truthvalue ofpropositionsplays a substantialrole in the
constructionof sound deductive arguments, it is no wonder that
Aristotletreated equivocation as one of the causes of deception that
constitute an argument a fallacy.1 Interestingly,however, while
Anselm made a great contribution in developing a theory of
paronomy2 and 12th and 13th century logicians advanced the
philosophy of language through their theories of the properties of
terms, the theory of equivocation laid down by Aristotle was not
altered in any significantway throughoutthe Middle Ages and, with
one exception, his triple division of species of equivocation was
tampered with only with great reserve. The exception was Roger
Bacon who, having given a traditionalexpos once in 1252, returned
to the question in 1267 and 1292 with a freshnesswhich led to, in the
words of Jan Pinborg, "an original systematization of possible
changes [in signification]or equivocations, which has no medieval
parallels."3 In thisarticleI propose (Section I) to give a briefoverview
1 Foran excellent
ofequivocation
seeJosephOwens,The
studyofAristotle's
theory
Doctrine
inthe
Aristotelian
3rd.ed. (Toronto:
Pontifical
Institute
of
ofBeing
Methaphysics,
Mediaeval
Forananalysis
andcritique
ofAristotle'
s fallacy
Studies,
1978),pp.107-135.
called"Equivocation"see Christopher
AndtheSo-Called
Kirwin,Aristotle
Fallacy
of
29 (1979),35-46.
, in:The Philosophical
Equivocation
Quarterly,
2 See DesmondP. Henry,TheDe Grammatico
: TheTheory
,
ofSt.Anselm
ofParonomy
NotreDame, Ind. 1964,and hisCommentary
onDe grammatico
: TheHistoricalLogical
Dimension
s, 1974(Synthese
Historical
vol.8).
ofa Dialogue
ofSt.Anselm'
Library,
3 Roger
Bacononsigns
: A NewlyRecovered
PartoftheOpus Maius, in: Miscellanea
Mediaevalia,13(1981),410.
85

13:15:08 PM

of the way logicians at mid-13th centurypresented the Aristotelian

theoryand divisions of equivocation so that (in Section II) a contrast
becomes apparent in Roger Bacon's second and original approach to
the problem of divisions. Finally, I shall offer(in Section III) some
suggestionson why Bacon saw fitto do what no one else had done.
I
A mid-13thcenturyteacher in the facultyof arts, wishingto testhis
student's knowledge about Aristotle's notion of equivocation, would
no doubt have smiled benignlyupon hearing referenceto the Categories
and the rote recitation:
*
when,though
'Thingsaresaidtobe named'equivocally'
theyhavea common
withthenamediffers
foreach."4
name,thedefinition
corresponding
He would perhaps even have been moved to pride (of the less sinful
Refiita
sort) were his studentto have gone on to mention On Sophistical
tionsand distinguishthree types of equivocation:
morethanonemeaning,
(1) "when... thenamehas strictly
e.g., 'dog';
weuse themso;
(2) "whenbycustom
(3) "whenwordsthathavea simplesensetakenalonehavemorethanone
in combination;
letters'."5
meaning
e.g., 'knowing
Those who wrote textbooks in logic had the option of including a
chapter on the predicaments- not strictlynecessary for the study of
syllogism,the goal of logic so when teacherslike Peter of Spain and
this
Roger Bacon exercised
option theypassed on the definitionfrom
1 with littlealteration:6
Categories
to that
whosenameis commonand consequent
"Equivocaisare thosethings
substance."
namethereis a different
notionof[their]
(Peter)
"... equivocais
ofwhichonlya nameis common
arethosethings
and[ofwhich]
thenotionof[their]
substance
is different."
(Bacon)
Bacon then goes on to add that by 'the notion of [their]substance' is
meant theirdefinitionor description.But whetheror not the definition
4 1. lai -2,E. M. Edghill,
,
tr.,in RichardMcKeon,ed., TheBasicWorks
ofAristotle
NewYork1941,p. 7.
5 4. 166al4-19,W. A. Pickard-Cambridge,
tr.,in W. D. Ross,ed., TheWorks
of
Aristotle
, vol. 1., 1928(reprinted
1937).
6 Peterof Spain, Tractatus
Summule
calledafterward
, ed. L. M. De Rijk, Tractatus,
ed. RobertSteel,
dialecticesf
, Assen1972,p. 26.8-9,andRogerBacon,Sumule
logicales
henceforth
cited
Baconi
inedita
hactenus
, fase.15,Oxford1940,p. 204.8-26,
Rogeri
Opera
in thenotesas Sd.
86

13:15:08 PM

was passed on in these summulaeall their authors

fromthe Categories
found occasion in the opening lines of their treatmentsof the fallacy
'
called " Equivocation' to give a shorteneddefinition:7
areunitedin simply
the
notions
ofthings
occurswhendifferent
"Equivocation
samename."(Peter)
of thesame utterance
thedifferent
is therefore
signification
"Equivocation
)." (WilliamofSherwood)
(<dictio
ofdifferent
is thedesignation
underonevocalsound."
things
"Equivocation
(Bacon)
1
By the mid-13thcentury,then, Aristotle'sdefinitionfromCategories
had hardlybeen altered; the essence of equivocation was consideredto
consistin thisthatone termis used to signifymore than one thingdifferingin substance and definition.
But such was not the case with the triple division in On Sophistical
4. A quick look at the major (known) summulaereveals that
Refutations
authors like Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, and Roger Bacon
saw the need to speak in more detail than Aristotle,but were extremely cautious about departingfromhis tripledivision. Peter, forexample, says that Aristotleofferedonly three species of equivocations:8
different
(dictio
) equallysignifies
things.E.g.,
(1) whenthesameutterance
a sea creature,
a star,andan animalthatbarks.
'dog',signifying
different
in a primary
andseconsignifies
things
(2) whenthesameutterance
etposterius).
E.g., 'runs',as saidofan animaland
darysense(secundum
prius
oftheSeineriver.Itsignifies
thefirst
byproper
imposition
imposi
(expropria
andthesecondbycustom
tione)
(exassuetudine).
has different
consignifications.
E.g., 'suffering'
(3) whenthesameutterance
noworsuffering
on thetenseof
meanssuffering
then,depending
(laborans)
theverbwithwhichitis used.
Clearly there is no great departure form Aristotle's intent here,
grantedthat Peter's (2) and (3) are considerablymore specificin their
treatmentsthan Aristotle's. However, having discussed the topic in a
formatclearlyreflectiveof Aristotle's,Peter, in a concludingreflection
in the section on the fallacy of equivocation, allows himself to re''
7 "... equivocatio
estcum
diverse
rerum
rationes
ineodem
nomine
uniuntur.
simpliciter
(Peterof
Trac
"Est
eiusdem
dictionis
diversa
Spain, tatus,
p. 98.25-26.)
ergo
equivocatio
signification
inlogicam
Introductions
ed. MartinGrabmann,
"Die Introduc(WilliamofSherwood,
tionsinlogicam
desWilhelm
vonShyreswood
derBayerischen
Akademie
, Sitzungsberichte
der Wissenschaften,
Phil-hist.
Abt. 1937, Heft 10, Mnchen1937,p. 87.19.)
"
estdiversorum
..." (RogerBacon,Sd, p. 330.28-30.)
subunavoce
Equivocatio
designado
8 Tractatus
, pp. 99.28-104.11.
87

13:15:08 PM

division. An utterance,
presentthe same threetypesbut in a different
he says, signifiesmany things:9
(1) bysignification
(1.1) equally{depari)
sense{perpriusetposterius)
andsecondary
(1.2) in a primary
(2) byconsignification.
When we turn to William of Sherwood we findthatthe examples give
evidence thatthe threetypesof equivocation remain the same but that
William, while willing to recast the Aristoteliantypes into a double
division (thereby recalling Peter's second division) does this froma
point of view quite differentfrom Peter's. An utterance, he says,
signifiesmany things:10
{dese)
(1) byitself
(proprie
). E.g., 'dog'.
(1.1) properly
sense{transumptive).
E.g., 'runs'.
(1.2) in a transferred
term.
with
another
'suffering'.
E.g.,
(2) byconjunction
William notes that equivocation (2) is possible only in cases where the
utterancewas imposed as a sign of a complex intentthat involved the
"
relation "primary/secondary," i.e., when it is a sign of an intentio
. ,,
priusetposterius
participataa pluribussecundum
Around 1252 Roger Bacon also addressed the Aristoteliandivision
and presentsus with a thirdvariation. Equivocation occurs:12
et
andequallytomany{principaliter
is related
principally
(1) whenan utterance
adplura).E.g., 'dog'.
sehabet
equaliter
ina transferred
andanother
andofitself
onething
properly
(2) whenitsignifies
et
unum
etperseetaliudtransumptive
senseandlessproperly
proprie
(.significai
minus
E.g, 'runs'.
proprie).
onething,
whichofitself
manywhen
signifies
signifies
(3) whenan utterance,
.i3
term.E.g., 'sitting
(sedens)'
joinedtoanother
Now while it is severelytemptingat thispoint to attemptto discover
what nuance these authors intended in retextualizingAristotlethe differentway each did, my purpose in alluding to them is simplyto illustratethe statusof formaltreatmentson equivocation at thehalf-way
mark in the 13thcentury.While the definitionof equivocation (based
on Categories
1) is virtuallycanonical, these authors are anythingbut
9 Ibid.,p. 105.14-20.
10Introductiones
inlogicam,
pp. 87.19-88.38.
11Ibid.,p. 88. 25-34.
12Sd, pp. 331.17-333.5.
13Cf. ractatus
ofequivocaas an example
wherePeteralsouses'sitting'
, p. 104.1-4,
tionin thismode.
88

13:15:08 PM

single-mindedin how they choose to think formallyabout different

typesor modes of equivocation. What theydo agree on is that all examples of equivocation are to be thoughtof in termsof the threetypes
designated by Aristotle.
Now I findthissomewhatsurprisingforvarious reasons. First,since
diversityis at the heart of equivocation, one mightexpect a medieval,
trained to appreciate the value of categories, to look for more than
three grounds for differentmodes of equivocation. Second, all
'
'
'
language about 'primary and secondary' and 'properly and less
properly" promptone to thinkof differencesby degree (and not just
triple degree). And indeed to his credit- and his alone - Peter of
Spain did explicitlyacknowledge thatthe threefolddivision (in Aristotle also?) involves an ordered progression where (1) representsthe
greatestdegree of equivocation and (3) the weakest. Thus Peter adds
in the postscriptto his formaltreatmentof the fallacyof equivocation:
Andthusthere
arethreemodes[ofequivocation].
Andtheyareorganized
inthis
ofequivocation
is morethoroughly
mainwaybecausethenotionordefinition
tained(magis
wheremanyareequallysignified
thanwhere
oneprimarily
salvatur)
Andit is more
(perprius)and theothersecondarily
(perposterius)
[is signified].
inboththesemodesthanthethird,
maintained
sinceboththesemodes
thoroughly
arisebysignification
a diversity
ofthings
isattended
(inwhich
signified
to)where
thethirdmode[arises]byconsignification
notofthings
(in whichthediversity,
butofmodesofsignification
is paidattention
signified,
to.)14
Three insightsare remarkablein thistext. First,thatequivocation admits of degree. Second, that the differencebetween significationand
consignificationis relevantto a discussion of degrees of equivocation.
And third,thatwhile the definitionof equivocation mentionsdifferent
substances or things named by the same name, in point of fact
equivocation can also be found in cases where one termsignifiesonly
one substance so long as that one thing is signifiedin differentways
{modi).
With these threeinsightsPeter of Spain was in a positionto do what
no one up to him had done, namely, presenta treatiseon equivocation
that would draw on developments in terministlogic and would probe
the various kinds of differencesin thingsand theirmodes in order to
discover the bases fordegrees of equivocation, therebyimprovingon
Aristotle'sclassifications.Having raised the issue of degrees, surelyit
must have occurred to him at least to wonder whether there was
anythingparticularlyaccurate in thinkingof equivocation in termsof
14Tractatus
, p. 105.20-27.
89

13:15:08 PM

three modes. But as we have seen, the Tractatus,the Introductiones

in
, and the Sumule dialecticesclose without attempting any
logicam
dramatic extensionin thisregard. Perhaps theirauthorsfeltthatthree
modes were quite sufficientto alert logicians to the deception in the
fallacyof equivocation and thatfurtherdistinctionwould not servethis
end in any way commensuratewiththe labor it would take to conceive
and articulate them. Whatever the case somethinghappened in the
next decade and a halfto cause Roger Bacon to returnand take a fresh
look at the whole question of equivocation.
Between ca. 1252 and 1267 Bacon had become increasinglyconvinced that many theological problems and heresies could be avoided
if theologians were betterversed in the science of words, i.e., in the
way words signify.To meet this need and to correctother logicians
and grammarians who held semantic theoriesopposed to his own he
wrote in 1267 a treatiseDe Signisas part ofPart Three of his celebrated
Opus maius,in which one findsa very lengthydiscussion of equivocation organized withinthe structureof fivemodes.15In 1292, the year
of his death, he returned to this treatise and re-worked its central
themes in Part Two of his Compendium
studiitheologiae
, a sort of last
ditcheffortto convince his peers and fellowFranciscans of the singular
importanceof a correctphilosophyoflanguage.16 In the latterworkhe
mentionsthatAristotlehad oftenspoken on equivocation and analogy
but had never collected all his remarks into a single treatise.17The
philosopher may have done well in distinguishing the ten
15RogerBacon,DeSignis,
ed. . M. Fredborg,
in:
andJanPinborg,
LaugeNielsen,
: De signis',in: Traditio,34 (1978),
An Unedited
PartofRoger
Bacon's'Opusmaius
as Dstfollowed
identified
numbers.
Forthemostup to
93-110,henceforth
bysection
Baconand
dateandcomprehensive
ofBaconsee Stewart
C. Easton,Roger
biography
inthe
HisSearch
Bacon
: A Reconsideration
Science
fora Universal
ofRoger
oftheLifeandWork
NewYork1971).
, 1952(reprinted
ofhisOwnStated
Light
Purposes
16Fratris
studiitheologiae
, ed. HastingsRashdall,1911
RogenBaconCompendium
in the
designated
Farnborough
1966),pp. 52-59and 64-68,henceforth
(reprinted
andline.(See alsobelow,n. 19.)Rashdall's
notesas Cst, followed
bypagenumber
willbe madeinthenotesthatfollow.
andsuggestions
textis inneedofrevision
Only
of theDs,
to theeditors
are citedand I am indebted
thoseof gratersignificance
fortheir
numerous
suggestions.
(See,e.g.,thelistofsuggested
JanPinborg,
especially
Baconon'Impositio
article,
corrections,
etc.,at theendofK. M. Fredborg's
Roger
the
EndoftheTwelfth
in:English
Vocisad Significancum',
from
Century
LogicandSemantics
on Medieval
totheTimeofOckham
andBurleigh
, ActsoftheIV EuropeanSymposium
Leiden23-27April,1979,[Artistarium,
SupplemenNijmegen,
LogicandSemantics,
L. M. de Rijk,andC. H. Kneepkens,
tum,I], H. A. G. Braakhuis,
eds,Nijmegen
oftheCst.
a newedition
andtranslation
I amcurrently
1981, 187-191).
preparing
17Cst,pp.
p. 64.13-16.
90

13:15:08 PM

predicaments,but here he was lacking and Bacon feltthe need to supWhat was needed, he thought,was a listof the
ply forthe deficiency.18
principalways thingsdiffer,a more precise theoryof equivocation, an
application of his own theoryof imposition,and the resultwould be a
classificationof the proper modes of equivocation and analogy. He
but also on his Physics
would draw not just on Aristotle's Categories
,
and
Arab
sources.
,
Metaphysics
Since Bacon offersthis treatise on the degrees of equivocation in
a question arises as
studiitheologiae
both the Opusmaiusand Compendium
to which should here be adopted as the principal textforanalysis.19I
have adopted thelatterforvarious reasons. First,being his last workit
representshis final thoughts. Second, being a summary or a more
briefre-workingof the earlier material it reveals clearly what he took
to be essential to the presentationof his new classification.Third, it
sheds additional light on the way others treated the semantics of
names. And fourth,it adds a sixthmode to the fivementioned in his
Communianaturalium
and discussed in his Opus maius.
II
Treatments of equivocation in 13th century philosophical and
theologicalliteratureall presuppose that it along withunivocation and
ad placitum).20
analogy are formsof significationat pleasure {significado
18Baconwasnotbeyondexpressing
in Aristotle.
Becausethelatter
disappointment
matter
thecomposite's
topointoutclearly
thatthenameofa composite
failed
signifies
him.
and notat pleasureAverroes,
and formnaturally
saysBacon,misinterpreted
(Cst,p. 48.1-6.)
19Itshouldalsobe notedthatalongwiththeformal
found
ofequivocation
treatments
a schematic
ofthevariousmodesis also
outline
inDs 36-88andCst, pp. 64.4-68.23,
inhisCommunia
n. d., p. 51.4-15,
naturalium
found
2, Oxford
(ed. RobertSteele,Opera
in his
thatthemodesweredescribed
henceforth
citedas Cn)wherehe alsomentions
Fratris
in a partas yetundiscovered.
, presumably
Rogeri
(See Metaphysica
Metaphysics
instudio
Minorum
deviciis
contractis
Ordinis
Fratrum
, ed. RobertSteele,Opera1,
theologie
thatatleastPartTwo
evidence
n. d., pp.iii-v.)Thisalongwithother
Oxford
suggests
oftheCn(andprobably
before
theOpusmauis.
PartOne)werewritten
(See alsobelow,
n. 76) It couldalsobe pointed
outthatin theOpusmaius
(Ds 37) Baconspeaksofthe
an attempt
to
butI havenotfound
inhisworks
anywhere
manymodesofunivocation,
theseas he doesin regardtoequivocation.
distinguish
20Baconpresents
ofsignsinbothhisOpusmaius
classification
an original
(Ds 3-8)and
ofsignification
is a subclass
at pleasure
Cst(pp. 38.19-24and39.17-20).Signification
fromnaturalsignification.
For a studyof
whichin turnis distinguished
by intent
in his
Bacon'ssemiotics
and thewayin whichvocalsoundsare shownto signify
fortheclaimthatthisclassification
various
modesofsignification
is
as wellas support
45
seeThomasMaloney,TheSemiotics
Bacon)in: MediaevalStudies,
ofRoger
original
(1983),120-154.
91

13:15:08 PM

In thisvein, and as we have seen, authorstraditionallydistinguishbetween univocation and equivocation on the basis of whether a term
names one thingonly or more than one, such that a differenceis involved in the definitionsof the term. Where the differenceis absolute
one can speak ofpureequivocation; where it existswithsome degree of
similarityone can speak of analogy, the resultbeing that analogy is a
subclass of equivocation taken broadly.21While Bacon would agree
with the substance of these notions, he introduces variations which
revolve around a veryprecise understandingof the notion and consequences of impositions,and it is these that lie at the basis of what is
original in his classification of the degrees of equivocation and
analogy.
First, says Bacon, since imposition is an act of a free, rational intent, only that is named which a speaker intends. Granted, concepts
are the means by which thingsoutside the mind are known and named, when one names a thingoutside the mind it is not the concept that
is first named but the thing itself, for this is the object of the
impositor's intent.22
Second, when thingswere firstnamed the originalimpositorintended to name existing things only, and this, says Bacon, is simply a
fact.23Hence proper names of original impositionname existingin21Baconalsospeaksofa kindofanalogy
In
thatisnotequivocation.
(SeeDs 100-133.)
ofthis
Foran analysis
ofas connotation.
theCstitis spoken
(See Cst, pp.46.16-52.2.)
Bacon
see ThomasMaloney,TheSemiotics
, in:
ofRoger
typeofdoublesignification
MediaevalStudies,45 (1983),131-132.
22Cst,p 44.28-45.7.
toBaconthesevocalsoundsare
According
(See alsoDs 162-167.)
features
that
in question.Herewe canseecertain
onlynaturalsignsoftheconcepts
no directlinkhasyet
willlaterbecomeemphasized
byWilliamofOckham,though
ofBacon'stheory
seeKarin
ofimposition
Foran excellent
beendiscovered.
analysis
in: English
Vocisad Significandum',
Baconon'Impositio
Margarita
Fredborg,
Roger
, op. cit., pp. 167-191.Fredborgsuggeststhe names of
Logicand Semantics
Ps.-Albert,
andJohnofDenofAuxerre,
Lambert
Ps.-Grosseteste,
Ps.-Kilwardby,
Foran
histheory.
sources
markas possible
againstwhomBaconmayhavedeveloped
ofsignsin theOpusmaius
oftherelation
ofBacon'sgeneraltheory
(Ds) tohis
anlysis
: A Newly
Recovered
PartoftheOpus
seeJanPinborg,
BacononSigns
semantics
Roger
Mediaevalia,13(1981),403-412andThomasMaloney,The
maius,in: Miscellenea
120-154.
Bacon
Semiotics
, in: MediaevalStudies,45 (1983),
ofRoger
23Cst, pp.54.24-31and59.20-24,
at 59.23" nomen
for" nomen
reading
[non]
significai"
" inthetext. harmonize
indicate
adwithRashdall'susesquarebrackets
(To
significai
dialectices
Thisprinciple
washeldbyBaconas earlyas theSumule
(ca. 1252)
ditions.)
hesaysthatnames,ofthemselves
ofsupposition
inthelanguage
where,
theory,
(dese),
forexisting
(andinone
things
only.(Sd, p. 280.16-34.)Later,intheDe signis
supposit
how
heindicates
is evenmentioned)
ofthefewplacesinthatworkwheresupposition
other
foranything
and supposition
are related:no termmaysupposit
signification
tosignify.
thanthatforwhichitwasimposed
(Ds 50.)
92

13:15:08 PM

dividual thingsand common names the common essences of existing

individual things.
Third, since impositionis a free,purposefulact of rational intent,
one is freeto select a name that was originallyimposed forone thing
and reimpose it foranythingelse, even thingsthat do not exist.24For
example, 'man', originallythe name of the common essence of individual existingpersons, can by a second act of imposition become
the name of the concept "man," the name of its own vocal sound, the
name of a dead man or futureone, the name of a potentialman, or the
name of an indefiniteor determinateindividual man. But whenever
these second impositionsoccur the resultingname is equivocal.
Fourth,univocationand equivocation are not to be distinguishedon
the basis of whetheridentical or differentsignificatesare involved but
ratheron whetherone or more than one impositionhas occurred, i.e. ,
on whetherthe impositor'sintentvaries in even the slightestway from
that of the original impositor.25This subtle nuance in the relation of
impositionto significationwill be seen to be criticalforthe establishment of Bacon's last two modes of equivocation.26
" withMS. R.
24See, e.g., Cst,45.23-25and 61.2-11,readingat 61.5 " nonhomo
"
" withMS. R.
"
in thetextand at 61.7-8 inposicione
etequiuoce
against""ut vocamus
" andan omission
inthetext.(Fortheidentification
ofMS. R. see
against inposicione
first
for
Cst, p. 1.) Baconheldthetheory
thatnamesoforiginili
imposition,
imposed
ceasetobe signsatpleasure
ofthosethings
whenthelatter
ceasetoexthings,
existing
ist:theyfallawayfrom
OnceCaesardiedhisnameno longersignified
signification.
One canfreely
choosetoreimpose
'Caesar'forthedeadman(oranyother)
anything.
wouldbe different
butsincethesignificates
s intent)
the
(in virtueoftheimpositor'
Forthedefense
ofthisthesis
andDs
namebecomes
seeCst, pp. 59.32-64.3
equivocal.
143-153.
25Thisprinciple
ofequivocation
intheCstbutonhisdiscussion
isimplied
throughout
in theOpusmaius
(Ds 36): "... and I do notspeakofunivocation
lystatedexplicitly
when[itsignifies]
one thingnorequivocation
becausea vocalsoundsignifies
many
" WhileI
thatenableshimtoconsider
a termthat
arguethatitis thisprinciple
itis clearthatBacon
circumstances
tobe equivocalincertain
signifies
onlyonething
fortheabovequotation
condoesnothavethisin mindwhenhestatestheprinciple,
without
tinues:"... sincean utterance
) cansignify
manythings
equivocation,
(dictio
norproperly
as willbecomeclearlater.Butifitbe
andyetnotunivocally
analogically,
ifformanyequivocad.
Foritis
foronething
thevocalsoundwillbeunivocal;
imposed
foritto signify."
andanother
The addionethingfora vocalsoundtobe imposed
tolaythebasisforhis
indicate
thatthewholepassageisintended
tionalremarks
clearly
in theCst.(See above,n. 21)
calledconnotation
ofimplied
meanings
uniquetheory
tothelasttwomodesclearly
inmind,the
Had hehadthekindofequivocation
proper
ifitbe imposed
the
his
additional
remarks
reads
of
that
"But
onlyforonething
part
orqualified.
vocalsounswillbe univocal..." wouldhavehadtohavebeenomitted
26In thefirst
fourmodesBaconwillbe seentoarguethecaseforequivocation
bysaymustbe equivocal.Whilethismight
ingthata termwithtwodifferent
significates
seemtoignorethedistinction
oneshouldrecallthatthisclaimis that
justmentioned
93

13:15:08 PM

Given thisunderstandingof the notionofimpositionand itsrelation

to equivocation we are in a position to look at his classificationof the
degrees of equivocation and that typeof analogy thatis also equivocation. He begins his treatmentin the Communianaturalium
, Opus maius,
and Compendium
studiitheologiae
with a focus on intentsadmittingthe
greatest differenceand least similarityand hence his presentation
representsa movementfromthe significationhe calls "pure equivocation'' to that which borders on univocation.27
FirstMode Equivocation
tradition(followWe have already seen that authors in thesummulae
ing Aristotle) considered the term 'dog' to be a paradigm for the
'
'
'purest' form of equivocation. Bacon indicates his willingness to
break withthat approach fromthe verystart.Casting about forthings
thatrepresentthat greatestdifferencepossible he concludes thatit is to
be foundin cases where one is speaking of an entityand nonetity.Obabsoluta)here; neither
viouslythereis not absolute identity(conueniencia
is thereeven the kind of unityin diversitybroughtabout by intrinsicor
extrinsicrelations( conueniencia
relata).Hence Bacon classifiesin his first
mode ofequivocation all cases where one termis used to signifyan exin questionrepresents
a different
intent
on thepartofthe
eachoftheimpositions
in signifcates
themore
is notto surrender
speaker.Henceto focuson differences
as thebasisofequivocation.
intents
precisenotionofmultiple
27In theCn(p. 51.5-6),Opusmaius
(Ds 38), and Cst(p. 64.20-24)Baconbeginshis
withthatwhichis farthest
from
univocation.
ofthemodesofequivocation
treatment
themodeclosest
tounivocation
as
healsodescribes
intheOpusmaius
However,
(Ds
45)
' 4first
thepossibility
theoriginal
mode,"thereby
sequenceandintroducing
reversing
locinotmentiontoseekparallel
inthatwork.Asan aidtothosedesiring
ofconfusion
ofmode-numbers
inthe
thefollowing
is given,withsections
ed inthisarticle
speaking
reverse
sequenceindicated.
andunivocation
ofequivocation
Ds 36-37 Definitions
to the
Ds 38-45 The fivemodes(originalsequence);includesa reference
fourth
mode(reverse
sequence)
Ds 46
Rationalefora reverse
sequence
modes(reverse
withthirdandfourth
Ds 47-80 Problems
sequence)
Allmodes(original
Ds 81
sequence)
Ds 82-86 Modesoneto four(original
sequence)
reference
tomodes
without
Ds 87-88 Equivocation
to ampliation
and restriction
but
Ds 89-99 Equivocation
withreference
tomodes
without
reference
as a typeofanalogythatis notequivocation
Ds 100-133Connotation
as
Ds 134-142Firstmodeequivocation
(original
sequence)butnotdesignated
such
Ds 143-153Termscan fallawayfromsignification
which,whenreimposed,
becomeequivocal
94

13:15:08 PM

isting and nonexisting thing.28 Becasue the diversity here is the

'
greatesthe calls this type of equivocation 'primary{principalis
)" and
"
of
the
mode
as
first
mode."29
speaks
While it might seem quite uncontroversialto argue that equivocation is grounded in diversityand that the differencebetween what exists and does not is a differencein the extreme,the semantic implications of his position landed him squarely on the minorityside in the
heated controversy whether common and proper terms used to
or
designate thingsthat once existed but no longer exist (respreterita)
will only exist in the future(resfutura
are
to
be
considered
univocal
or
)
terms.30
Does
'Caesar'
said when the Roman emperor was
equivocal
alive and now equivocate? Bacon firstaddresses thisissue in his Sumule
dialectices
where he argues that of themselves(de se) names are only of
and suppositforpresentand existingentities,and thistheoryis clearly
at thebasis ofhis remarksthroughouthis discussion of equivocation in
the Compendium
studiitheologiae
.31In the early work Bacon argues that
names in discourse that do in fact supposit forsomethingother than
existingthingsdo so in virtueof theirconjunctionwith anotherword,
e.g., a verb of the past or futuretense,32but by the time of the Opus
maiussuch cases of ampliation and restrictionare explained exclusively
on the grounds of reimposition,one that resultsin equivocation.33
28Cst,p. 64.20-22.
" withMS. R.
"
29Cst, p. 64.22-24,
at64.24" primus
modus
againstprincipalis
" in thetext.reading
modus
30Practically
all oftheresearch
on Bacon'stheories
in Logiccenteron therolehe
See FranzPelster,Roger
Bacon'sCompendiumstudii
playedin thiscontroversy.
undderSentenzenkommentar
desRichardus
4 (1929),
theologiae'
, in: Scholastik,
Rufus
410-416and DerOxjorder
Richardus
: 'Utrum
Theologe
Rufus0. F. M. berdieFrage
Christus
in triduomortisfuerit
de TheologieAncienne
et
homo',in: Recherches
and StenEbbesen,Studies
Medievale,16 (1949),259-280;
JanPinborg
injheLogical
Attributed
toBoethius
deDacia, in: Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyen-ge
Writings
grecet
BaconandtheFoolsofHis
latin,3 (1970),especially
Ten,StenEbbesen,Roger
Chapter
Times
TheViews
onSome
Semanypp. 40-44;H. A.'G. Braakhuis,
ofWilliam
ofSherwood
ticalTopics
andTheir
Relation
Bacon
15(1977),111-142;
, in:Vivarium,
ofThose
ofRoger
StenEbbesen,TheDeadManIs Alive,
in:Synthese,
40 (1979),43-70;andK. M. Fredil
Bacon
on'Impositio
Vocisad Significandum',
andAlainde Libera,Roger
borg, Roger
Bacon
etleproblme
del'appelatio
univoca
, bothin:English
LogicandSemantics,
op.cit.,pp.
167-191
and 193-234respectively.
"
31Sd, p. 280.16-34
intheCstat59.23 nomen
and,e.g.,Cst
, p. 59.20-24,
reading
[non]
" for" nomen
' in
thetext.
significai
significai'
32See Sd,p. 280.31-33.
33Thischangeisclearly
theresult
ofaccording
moresignificance
totheimplicit
conseofimposition.
Thusbetween
theSumule
dialectices
ofca. 1252and
quencesofhistheory
theOpusmaius
of1267Bacondecidedthatthetraditional
statement
"Subjectsaresuch
as theirpredicates
mustbe understood
to be truenot
permit"(and theconverse)
95

13:15:08 PM

Bacon gives considerable attentionto justifyinghis position and in

doing so opens windows onto various real (or putative) attemptsin his
time to support a theoryof univocation in these cases. Considerably
summarized they are the following.34
(1) Names are imposed for the essences of things, and hence
whether the things exist or not is irrelevant. By implication man'
signifiesthe same thingwhethersaid of a livingor dead man.35Bacon
claims that it is factually( materialiter
) false to say that names are (first)
and
for
essences
(conveniently)appeals to such cases as the
imposed
at
naming of infants Baptism and pets, where impositionis forexisting
things. Granted the examples involve only proper names, it is clear
from the context that a broader claim is intended: all names are
originallyimposed forexistingthingsonly. Proper names of original
imposition name existing individuals; common names the common
essences withinindividuallyexistingentities.36Here where one might
expect to findsome justificationforthe extensionof the claim to common termsnone is provided in any of his writingsunless one chooses
to count the rathergeneral referenceto Genesis2:19-29 where Adam,
the firstimpositor,is said to name things.37Now this is a ratherdifofthemselves
andpredicates
relatetooneanother
becauseofthewaysubjects
(virtute
otherthanthatfor
intends
tospeakofsomething
freely
sua)butbecausethespeaker
andrestriction,
wasoriginally
which
oneofhisterms
then,occur
imposed.
Ampliation
butbecauseofa
kindofexpression
toa certain
intrinsic
notbysomekindofnecessity
mustcatch.(SeeDs. 98-99;forthe
which
thoselistening
tacitandequivocal
imposition
ForBacon'sfull
seeDs 154-161and Cst, pp. 62.24-63.12)
notionoftacitimposition
isnoparallel
textintheCst.
seeDs 89-99;there
andrestriction
ofampliation
treatment
34One shouldnotethatwhileall modesofequivocation
arementioned
in Parttwo,
in PartTwo,ChapterFour,the
modeis discussed
ChapterSix,oftheCst, thefirst
In
stated
thetwobeingexpressly
connection
between
byBacon.(See Cstip. 64.20-22.)
inthecontroverinsupport
ofhisposition
heoffers
theearlier
eightarguments
chapter
tothevarioustheories
ofhisopthesewithresponses
andfollows
sy(pp.53.12-54.21)
Sincethe
thebulkofthechapter
thelatterconstituting
(pp. 54.21-59.28).
ponents,
and
statedin thefirst
invoketheprincipal
partofthechapter
arguments
responses
whatseemstobe a rather
ofaffording
havetheadditional
comprehensive
advantage
- albeitfrom
Bacon'sview- I havechosentoexposehistheory
ofthedebate
synopsis
Theensuing
reference
tothesecondpartofthechapter.
offirst
modeequivocation
by
foundin theOpusmaius.(Cf. Ds
theories
marked(l)-(3) and (7) are notexplicitly
139-141.)
35For thetheory
and Bacon'sresponsesee Cst, pp. 54.21-55.5,readingat 55.3
" in thetext.
14
" withMS. R.
"
against monstrat
inferi
36See alsoDs 110and 115.Foran interesting
in theconstudyofBacon'sposition
: The
seeTheodore
Bacon
terms
ofuniversal
overthereference
Roger
Crowley,
troversy
oftheJohnRylands
Commentaries
inHisPhilosophical
Problem
, in: Bulletin
ofUniversals
264-275.
34 (1951-1952),
Library,
37See Opusterti
inedita
hactenus
BaconOpera
Fr.Rogeri
um, ed. J. S. Brewer,
,
quaedam
Nendeln1965),p. 101.
1859(reprinted
96

13:15:08 PM

ficulttheory to defend, and Bacon earlier acknowledged it to be a

minorityposition,38but the problem is compounded when it is coupled
with his own theoryof imposition, namely, that only that is named
which is the direct
object of the impositor'sintent.39If a person intends
to speak of a thingoutside the mind the word he imposes is not a sign
at pleasure of the concept by which the thingis known but only of the
thing. What is named is only what one intendsto name. Hence were
Bacon to provide an adequate basis for the claim that all names of
original impositionare names imposed forexistingentitieshe would
have had to indicate how he, at that time, knew what every original
impositorpreciselyintended at the time when the name was firstimposed. The failureto attemptat least some sortof defenseis especially
curious since his whole position in the controversyis predicated on it
being a factthat original impositorshad the intenthe claims, That he
is willing to apply the principle in the extreme, however, cannot be
doubted, for when, desirous of showing that the significate of
'nothing' and 'nonentity' is not a mere concept but something (intelligibleby way of privation), he does not hesitate to declare that the
in a real place outside the mind as faras an
significate"is sufficiently
imposing intellect[is concerned] and as far as impositions [is concerned].'40 Bacon also objects to the theoryin question on the basis
that, even if essences were the target of imposition, past and future
essences would be essences only in a certain sense {secundumquid).
There would then be a differencebetween an actual (present) essence
and these others and the differencewould provide the basis for
equivocal significationwhen one termis said of it and eitherof them.
(2) A name signifiesa thinghaving the being of its essence ( ressub
esseessencie
), and this being (esse) is comon to the past, present, and
future.41This theory is unacceptable, implies Bacon, because it attempts to avoid the dichotomybetween existence and nonexistence.
The thing named having this type of being either is an entityor a
nonentity;if the being is not actual, then neither is the essence to
which it relates.
(3) Things have what can be called "habitual being (essehabitale
)"
and it is this type of being that supplies communality sufficientfor
38Sd, p. 227.28-36.
39Cst, pp. 44.18-45.7.
40' ... estsufficienter
locoreali
extra
animan
adintellectum
adin, etquantum
quantum
inponentem
." (Cst,p. 45.30-32.)
posicionem
41Forthetheory
andBacon'sresponse
see Cst, p. 55.5-13.
97

13:15:08 PM

univocal predication.42Of all the theoriesrecordedby Bacon thisis the

only one to whichwe can attach the name of a proponentwhom Bacon
Richard
most probably had in mind. In a commentaryon the Sentences
of Cornwall (d. ca. 1260) clearlyemploys the notion of habitual being
to argue that 'man' can be said univocallyof Christwhile alive and in
the tomb, and Bacon, implicitlyattributingthe notion of habitual being to Richard, excoriateshim as the author of the lie that something
can be predicated univocally of an entity and nonentity.43While
secunWilliam of Sherwood's notion of habitual supposition( supposicio
dumhabitm)might suggest him as a candidate, H. A. G. Braakhuis
has cogentlyargued against this, pointingto many areas of similarity
between the two as logicians.44Bacon rejectsthe notionof habitual being as a fictionfabricatedsimplyto salvage the claim of univocation:
(a) whateverwould have thistypeof being eitheris or is not and hence
the being could not be common to an entityand a nonentity;(b) habit,
on Aristotle'sauthority,is firstact and hence related to actual being.45
(4) While it is true that (past and future)participlessignifybeing
(esse) present in the past and future respectively,names signifyin
abstraction frompresentand actual being and with a certain kind of
communality(cumcommunitate
quadam)to an entityand a nonentity.46
42Forthetheory
at 56.3"ficseeCst, pp. 55.30-56.13,
andBacon'sresponse
reading
" withMS. R.
in thetext.
tum
against"futurum"
43ForthetextofRichard'sremarks
Bacon's'Compendium
see FranzPelster,
Roger
4
desRichardus
StudiiTheologiae'undderSentenzenkommentar
, in: Scholastik,
Rufus
ofRichardsee Cst, pp. 52.30-53.5.
ForBacon'scondemnation
(1929),416,adfinem.
hasshownthat
oftheseerrors"Arthur
WhileBaconcallshim4'theauthor
Landgraf
Utrum
Christus
thecontroversy
is mucholderthanRichard.See hisDosProblem
fuerit
Pelzer
intriduo
mortis
inderFrhscholastik
homo
, Louvain1947,pp.
, in:Mlanges
August
to accountforBacon'senduring
hatredofRichardsee
109-158.Foran hypothesis
Alainde Liberasuggests
thatwhatproBacon
Easton,Roger
, pp.94-97.In thisregard
ofRichard's
but
vokedBacon'sirewasnotsomuchthetheological
theory
implications
"innovaParisian
inthe1250sfortransplanting
thewayitprepared
thesoilatOxford
de
etleproblme
Bacon
tions"ofthesecondhalfofthethirteenth
century.
(See hisRoger
inLogicin: The
AndParisTraditions
univoca
, above,. 30,andhisTheOxford
Vappellatio
Medieval
, editedbyNormanKretzman,
Anthony
Philosophy
History
ofLater
Cambridge
1982,pp. 180-183.)
Cambridge
Kenny,andJanPinborg,
44 TheViews
toThose
andTheir
Relation
onSome
Semantical
of
Topics
ofSherwood
ofWilliam
15(1977),111-142,
Vivarium,
Bacon,
esp.p. 125.
Roger
45See Aristotle
2.1. 412a20-29.
OntheSoul, probably
46For thetheory
see Cst, pp. 56.13-57.2,readingat 56.13
and Bacon'sresponse
" con"
" withMS. R.
14
licet
liadhoc inthetext;at 56.14"participium
adhuc
by
against
"
1
"
withMS. R. against
inthetext;andat56.25 similiter
jecturefor"perquantumlibe
distinction
betodrawon thetraditional
in thetext.The theory
Furnitur"
attempts
aresaidtosignify
Theformer
likeparticiples.
tweennamesandverbsorverbalforms
and237.25-26
withit.(See Sd,pp. 234.15-16
without
time;thelatter,
beingtensed,
1. 16al9-20and3. 16b6.)
OnInterpretation
Cf.Aristotle
respectively.
98

13:15:08 PM

This application of the traditionaldefinitionsof names and participles

is rejected by Bacon fortwo reasons. First, whateverwould be common to an entityand a nonentitywould have to be eitheran entityor a
nonentityand hence would thereby be prevented from being truly
common. Second, on the authorityof Priscian, names and participles
but only in how theydo
do not differin what theysignify( ressignificata)
While
Bacon
considers
the
it {modussignificant
previous theoriesto
).47
be subterfuges,cavils, and lies, he acknowledgesthatthe followingare
reasonable.
and hence abstracts
(5) A name signifieswithouttime (sine tempore)
fromconsiderationsof the past, present, and future.48
Given the Aristotelianauthorityfor the notion that names signify
withouttime (as opposed to verbs and participlesthat signifywith it),
Bacon's response interpretsthe claim to be simply a referenceto the
and not to what they
way such vocal sounds signify( modussignificandi)
signify( ressignificata
): names (of original imposition) signifythingsin
presenttime but not temporally.In consequence, he argues, the temporal status of signifcatesis relevant when attemptingto determine
whetherthe significationis equivocal or univocal.49
(6) When Aristotle says that a negative name follows from a
privativeor infinitepredicate he is grantingthat one termcan signify
univocally an entityand a nonentity.For example, the followinginferenceis valid: a man is unjust or not-just; thereforehe is notjust.50
Bacon of course grantsthe validityof the inferencebut then pointsout
that if the premiss and conclusion are switched- "A man is notjust;
47ForPrician's
remark
11. 1. 5, ed. MartinHertz,GramseeInstitutiones
grammaticae
Hildesheim
matici
latini
2, ed.Heinrich
Keil,Leipzig1855-59
(reprinted
1961),p. 550.
48Forthetheory
andBacon'sresponse
see Cst,p. 57.11-19.
49LaterBaconwillbeseentoarguethatitisprecisely
thedifferent
names
ways(modi)
andverbssignify,
itsownclass,thatconstitutes
a basisfordistinguishing
a
eachwithin
fifth
andsixth
modeofequivocation.
10)Thisdoesnotcontradict
(Seebelow,pp. 107-1
whatis saidherebecausethere,
nocontrast
is invoked
between
namesandverbsand,
in thecaseofverbs,therelevant
oftimearenotthesameas here.
considerations
50Forthetheory
and Bacon'sresponse
see Cst, pp. 57.19-58.17,
57.25
readingat
"
" homo
sitcommune
entietnon[enti'
sicud
nonsicu' in the
,
against"hecsitconsequencia
"
"
sitcommune
textand homo
enti
etnonsicud inMS. R.; at57.29" difficultatis
huius
[soluinthetextand('difficultatis
cionem
huiusmodi"
huius"inMS. R.;
]" against
"difficultates
" withMS. R.
"
"
at 57.31" terminus
at 58.1 "subiectus
against"talis in the
[ter"
"
" intext;
"
minus
in thetextand subiectum
MS. R.; 58.2 " subiectum
]" "against subiectus
" inthetextand " subiectus
" in MS.
" ideo
subiectus
talis
at
terminus
58.11
R.;
against
"
" in the
" with
" ideosi hoc
"
hoc
etequiuoce
MS. R. against
text;"at 58.13 "ente
"against
" ente
"
inthetext;at58.14 negatiuum
inthetext;andat58.16
necessarium"
against
'
"
"
" in thetext.
predicatur
[nec'quo against predicatur
quod
99

13:15:08 PM

thereforehe is unjust or not-just" - the inferenceis invalid. To make

it valid, he says, 'man' would have to be taken as a univocal termfor
an entityand a nonentity.But, he continues,thisis false,his theoryof
original impositionbeing implied as justificationforthe claim. Speaking more generallyhe adds:
Whilea negative
canbe verified
ofsomesubject
andofanother
predicate
entity
ofthe
from
thisthatitmaybe predicated
itneverfollows
nevertheless
nonentity,
and
common
toanentity
samesubject
andunivocally,
[nor]thatitbe univocally
a nonentity,
but[thatitbe predicated]
equivocally.51
'4
"
(7) The two propositions somethingis" and somethingis not"
are subcontrary propositions and this can only be the case if
'something' is taken univocally to signifyrespectivelyan entityand a
Bacon's response applies the basic principlethatnames of
nonentity.52
original imposition signifyonly existing things. The second proposition (and otherslike ' 'Something comes to be"), he says, are materially false because 'something' taken simply signifiesan entityin act.
Although no mention of the point is made, we are leftto assume that
he would deny thatthe two propositionsin question are subcontraries,
their subjects being different.
Through the preceding seven windows we get some idea of how
perplexingthe semanticsof the centralissue was at the time. Those in
the same camp withRichard of Cornwall soughtto preservethe rather
common sense notion thatnames, as opposed to verbs, somehow totally prescindfromthe implicationof timeand hence can signifythingsof
the past and futureunivocally. But when forcedto identifywhat they
considered to be the element of communalityrequired forunivocation
theyinauspiciously made proposals that, fromBacon's point of view,
were either factuallyfalse by not taking into account the intentsof
original impositorsor failedto meet the testof true communality,and
Bacon was anythingbut reluctantto point thisout. On the otherhand
Bacon's theoryrequired one to accept it as factthatnames are firstimposed only forexistingentities,taking the naming of pets and infants
at Baptism (and possibly Genesis 2:19-20) as evidence. With this
theoryin hand Bacon could then argue that 'Caesar' said of the living
and dead emperorequivocates and does so in the most radical way. It
and other terms signifyingentities and nonentities are said to
equivocate in the firstmode of equivocation.
51Cst, p. 58.14-17.
" Forthetheory
andBacon'sresponse
see Cst,pp. 58.17-59.19.
100

13:15:08 PM

SecondMode Equivocation
Pursuing the movement from pure equivocation toward univocation, Bacon next focuses on things which exhibit only a minimal
degree of communality.53Such he findsin thingssharinginternallyin
nothingabsolutely common but related in some way and he provides
various examples.
The firstis quite clear, namely, the case of the Creator and any
creature: the only thing they have in common is the relation of
dependencythatobtains between the latterand the former.Hence any
termpredicatedof both would be said to equivocate in this mode.54A
second example draws on the differencebetween substance and any of
the nine classes of accidents, but he immediatelyfallsinto the problem
ofhandling denominativetermslike ' ens9 and ' unum9thatcan function
as adjectives or substantives.55 This double use itself involves
equivocation, but it is not precisely this kind of differencethat is at
issue in this mode.56Rather it is what is predicated differently
in such
'
'
'
expressionsas "A dog is an entity' and 'Black is an entity.' In a text
that bears comment he writes:
9and4vnum
' andthelikefor
'ens
AndhereI amtaking
secondsignificates,
[their]
for
a
and
unitati
etentitati
namely,
thinghavingunity entity
(proresubtracia
),
becasuethefirstsignificate
of these[terms],whichis unityand entity,
is
common
toa substance
andan accident,
as accidents
arecomjust
[univocally]
' canbe takenin
montomanysubjects,
as 'album*
and4nigrum
toqualities
regard
themselves
orin regard
toa thing
subiectam
(rem
having[them]
).57
The problem he faces is this. In Latin lvnum9can be taken adjectivally
and be translated by 'one' as in "One horse is red." As such it
signifiesan accidental forminhering in a horse and such formsare
predicated univocally of substances or accidents since oneness is the
9 can also be taken
same no matterof what it is predicated. But 4vnum
as a neuter substantiveadjective and be translatedby 'unit' as in "A
car is a unit." The second significateof this term,then, is notjust an
accidental formbut a substance having the formof unity. Now both
substances and accidents are entitiesand units, but theyare not such
53Cst,p. 64.24-27.
54Cst, p. 64.27-32.
55Forthecomplete
at
ofthisexamplesee Cst,pp. 64.32-65.12,
discussion
reading
"
''
conueniunt"
in thetext.
65.3 *'predicamenta
conueniunt
against predicamenta
[non]
56Baconrefers
intheOpusmaius
tothisdoublekindofequivocation
andacknowledges
thatall adjectives
suchcases.(See Ds 53 and 70.)
(in Latin)provide
57Cst, p. 65.6-12.
101

13:15:08 PM

in exactlythe same way: substance has being and unityof itselfwhere

accidents only in virtue of their inherence in substance. Hence the
mode of the latter's existence and unityis different,and it is this differencethat Bacon appeals to as the basis forthe claim that termslike
' ens' and 'vnum'
(taken substantively)equivocate in the second mode
of equivocation when predicated of a substance and any of the nine
classes of accidents.
A thirdexample is the term'healthy' when predicatedof an animal
(or person) on the one hand and urine, medicine, or diet on the
other.58In the firstcase it signifiesan accidentadform(health) inhering
in a subject, but in the otherthreeit signifiesrespectivelya sign of, a
cause of, and something that preserves that form. Each of the
but thereis some communalitysince the latsignificationsis different,
ter three all relate to the former.
As a final example Bacon points to the unityand diversitythat obtains betweenmatterand form.59Among created things,he says, there
is no perfectdifferenceotherthan this,yeteven here each is relatedto
the other. Chastising those who claim that angels and (human) souls
are pure forms,he argues thattheremust be a reciprocalcommunality
between them since matteris in potencyto formand formis the act of
matter. But, since matter is not formnor formmatter,to predicate
e.g., 'substance' of both could not be done univocally. Nevertheless,
given a minimal degree of communalitybecause of their reciprocal
relations,such predicationscould not be equivocal in the firstmode.60
ThirdMode Equivocation
For his third mode of equivocation Bacon must find things that
share somethingmore in common than the relationscharacteristicof
the previous .mode,and he is satisfiedthatwholes and theirpartsalong
58Cst, p. 65.14-17.Forotherexamples
ofthistypesee Cst, p. 65.17-33.
59Cst, p. 65.33-66.19.
60In theOpusmaius
are
of
twoadditional
(Ds 45 and84 respectively)
' was types examples
'essence
from
derived
to
mentioned.
Since,
originally
grammarians,
according
(1)
'4esse
- at onetimeitsignified
of
an accident
existence,
arguetheconverse
logicians
tobe
thetermis no longerusedin thissense,werethismeaning
essence.Although
theresult
and substance
bothexistence
and "essence'usedto signify
reinstituted
mode.(2) To usethe
inthefourth
wouldbe equivocation
sequence)
(second,original
inthis
is toequivocate
s concept,
alsoforthelatter'
nameofa thing
imageorpicture
ofthesoul.
a spiritual
mode.Thesameis truewhen'health'is usedtosignify
quality
102

13:15:08 PM

'
4'
with universais and particularsfillthe bill.61Here the overlap' between thingssignifiedis considerablygreater,enough to allow him to
4
speak of 'some absolute agreement," without,however, it providing
the basis forunivocal predication. Thus Bacon argues that any term
predicatedof a composite and eitherits matteror formequivocates in
thismode. As just seen, ifone predicated 'substance' ofmatteror form
one equivocates in the second mode, forthe two have nothingin common but their mutual relations; but since matter and form are the
essential parts of a substance thereis a greatercommunalitybetween
one of the parts and the whole than that provided by the previously
describedrelations. Hence to predicate 'substance' of a composite and
its matteror formis to equivocate in a thirdmode.
While Bacon's example in the Compendiumstudii theologiaeis
restrictedto wholes and parts, in the Opusmaiushe gives an analysis of
the equivocation that arises when one predicates a termof a universal
and one of its particulars.62If 'man' is taken as the name of a species
and then reimposed to designate Socrates, the second imposition
equivocates with the first.In this vein he also rejects the theorythat
simplybecause the universal is always in a particularthe name of the
universal somehow automatically gives one to understand a particular. A new imposition, says Bacon, is required to designate the
particularand it is equivocal.63
Other examples of equivocation in this mode are presented in the
Opusmaiusbut not mentionedin the later work, at least not expressly,
as cases of equivocation. A vocal sound imposed for itself (as in
"'Man' is a vocal sound") becomes equivocal when imposed for a
vocal sound, a term,an utterance(<dictio
name, a signifying
), or a part
"
of speech, as in 'Man' is a part of speech."64 Each of the latterare
vocal sounds, but to say 'man' of any one ofthemis to say somethinga
littledifferentfromsaying it is a vocal sound.
'Chance' is equivocal when said of chance occurrences in general
and eitherthat which occurs in nature or in human affairs.65'Indic61Cst, pp. 66.23-67.9.
thattheyall
Thisandthenexttwomodeshaveitincommon
in an absolute
naturebutwithsome
instances
wherethereis an agreement
represent
See Ds 41, at thebeginning.
difference.
62Ds 47.
63Ds 50. In Ds 48 and86headdsthata termtakenwiththevariouskindsofsupposisee thereandSd,p.
in thismode.Forhisdivisions
ofsupposition
tionequivocates
269.3-36.
64Ds 85.
65Ds 41.
103

13:15:08 PM

tion' can signifya period of ten years or any one of these years.66
'Rose', taken as the name of somethingbeautiful, is equivocally the
name of a floweror a person.67'Clement' is equivocally the name of a
certain characteristicand a (proper) name of the person having that
characteristic.68Other common terms like 'good' and 'man', when
conjoined, become proper names, as 'Goodman', along with some
'
complete expressionslike Beneueniatis' the lattercommon among the
Italians, he notes.69
FourthMode Equivocation
Bacon's fourthmode presents certain problems of interpretation,
not in regard to his intent,but in diviningthe theorybehind some of
his claims. He presentsthis mode as follows:
wecanagainfindanother
absolute
thanbefore,
like
Fourthly,
agreement
greater
theequivocations
[that]lie hiddenin genus,as Aristotle
saysin theseventh
shareinsomerootnature,
, [i.e.,]wheresignificates
[book]ofthePhysics
granted
thatitwouldbedifferentiated
inaccordwithitsdifferent
beingswhenitdescends
intothem(thedifferences).
Thustheessenceofgenusofitself
isonerootcapable
if beingdifferentiated
intodifferent
species[thatwould]not [be] complete
accidental
differences
butevenbefore
becauseof[their]
[theessenceofgenus]is
understood
in them.Forexample,
thesimilar
essenceproduced
intheseedofa
horseandintheseedofa donkey
isonerootessence,
butyetithasvarious
beings
before
thisessencewouldbe leddownintothedifferences,
andthusthebeings
areessential.
Becauseofthistherootessence
ofgenusisessentially
differentiated.
66Ibid.
67Ds 48. In thisonecasea nameofan individual
ofonespecies(flower)
is reimposed
to signify
an individual
ofanother
species(man).Baconsaysthatone can do this
becausethebasis{ratio)
ofthetransference
is thebeautyfoundin bothsignificates.
withan eyetotheobjection
thathehashereconfused
with
Presumably
equivocation
he adds:' Wherefore
a namecan be transferred
more[fittingly]
toa parmetaphor
ticular
ofitsownspeciesbecausethelikeness
andidentity
inthisregard
{conveniencia)
{a
sincethereis a substantial
likeness."
partret)is considerably
stronger
{lonpe
ualidior)
68All(Latin)adjectives
aresaidtobe equivocal
inthesecondmode(seeabove,n. 56);
orsubstantively
tosignify
a quality
theycan be takeneither
adjectivally
respectively
anda subject
Thus'clement
couldbe imposed
either
for
havingthatquality.
{clemens)'
itselfor foranysubstance
clemency
havingit and,onceimposedforboth,would
theclaimthat'clement'also
equivocatein thesecondmode.In orderto justify
in thethirdmodeBacon implicitly
drawson an additional
factnot
equivocates
thatcommon
andproper
terms
differ
tohow
inregard
mentioned,
previously
namely,
takensubstantively
completely
theysignify
things.Latinadjectives
(like 'album')
a substance
a certain
in
buttheydo notdesignate
thesubstance
signify
having
quality
toallitsqualities.
Theseterms
takenasproper
namesdesignate
in
anindividual
regard
itsentirety.
Thus'clement'
namefor
fora personal
attribute
andas a proper
imposed
an individual
twothings
as partandwhole.
relatedrespectively
signifies
69See Ds 49. The equivocation
be
assertedin theseexamplesshouldpresumably
in theprevious
note.
analyzedalongthelinessuggested
104

13:15:08 PM

buta logiA naturalphilosopher

thissaysthatgenusis equivocal,
considering
cian,notconsidering
[theissue]so deeply,saysthatgenusis calledunivocal
is an essencewithout
thatdifferentiated
becausetheantecedent
rootrelation
essence.70
Three claims are easily understood. First, from the natural
philosopher's point of view a generic essence is one root variable into
different
species. (In the De Signisthe essence is considered as already
in the species and hence is spoken of as transformed[transmutata]).71
Second, the genericessence oftwo species ofthe same genus is essentiallydifferent.Here we are alerted to the factthattwo species of the same
than two individualsof the same species. And
genus are more different
in two species of the same genus has essenthe
essence
third,
generic
tially differentacts of being (esse varia); it exists in a differentway in
each species. This claim reflectsBacon's espousal of the theory of
pluralityof formsas found in a work of his early Parisian career, accordingto which generationis a process of developmentfromthe more
universalto the more particular,fromthe incompleteto the more complete, with each previous form remaining in existence and the
resultingindividual representinga unity of composition.72Similarly
each stage of developmenthas its own appropriate grade of being, the
more determinatecompletingbut not eliminatingthe previous. Each
individual, as Theodore Crowley has noted, is, in Bacon's view, a
veritable Porphyriantree.73
What Bacon has thus far said about the equivocation that lies hidden in genus seems clear enough. But what about the clain that the
even before
it is
genericessence has an act of being that is differentiated
led down among the differences?If the being of a generic essence is
differentiatedas this stage then it can only be true to say that the
70Cst,p. 67.9-21:" Quarto
videre
iterum
convenienciam
absoltam
aliammaiorem
, possumus
: ubi
ingenere
dicitseptimo
, vtlatent
, sicutAristoteles
quamprius
physicorum
equiuocaciones
inaliquanatura
esse
licet
illadescendens
iniliavarietur
secundum
communicant
radicali,
significata
variabilis
indiuersas
secundum
seestvnaradix
, nonsecundum
varia;vtessencia
species
difgeneris
similis
in
setetiam
in illas,vtessencia
accidentaliter
antequam
intelligitur
frencias
conpletas,
asiniestvnaradicalis
semine
etinsemine
essencia
essevaria
habet
, settarnen
antequam
equiproducta
hecessencia
indiffrencias
deducatur
variatur
essencialia;
, etitaessesunt
quodessencialiter
propter
hecradicalis
essencia
ForAristotle's
remark
seePhysics
7. 4. 249a22-b25.
generis."
71Ds 42.
72Questiones
altere
Aristotelis
libros
, RobertSteeleand Ferdinand
supra
prime
philosophie
fase.11,Oxford
hactenus
inedita
1932,pp. 169.11-13
Delorme,
eds.,Opera
Baconi,
Rogeri
and 170.8-16.
73For thecomment
: TheProblem
and thetheory
see Roger
Bacon
oftheSoulin His
Commentaries
naturalium
, Dublin1950,pp. 106-110.In theCommunia
Philosophical
(p.
manis saidtobe composed
andgeneralform.
ofgeneral
matter
60.8-15)universal
105

13:15:08 PM

in some way otherthan

generic essence itselfis already differentiated
will
which
constitutethe specificand next
by the formeddifferences
stage of development. Hence the essence is not just variable, but
already varied. Bacon grants this explicitlyin the locus parallelus in
the De signiswhen he says: "... the accruing differenceaccrues to the
essence of a genus transformed,adapted, and apportioned to one
It should be noted
species and to one differenceof its species
here that Bacon is not denyingthat two species of the same genus differessentiallyin virtue of their formaldifferences;such accounts for
essential differenceson the level of species. The natural philosopher
acknowledges this but distinguisheshimselffromthe logician in contending that they differin an additional way and on a higher level.
Obviously Bacon is assuming some othertheoryas the basis forhis
theoryof genus, and he gives a clue in theDe Signiswhen he notes that
matter must be proportionedto form before they togethercan constitute a composite.75 Clearly, then, Bacon leaves his readers to
recognize that he sees an analogy between his theoryof genus and his
theoryof natural matter,and the hintpromptsus to look into his Comforclarification.76
munianaturalium
we findthatBacon maintainsthatas one
In the Communianaturalium
descends fromthe most general genus of matterand the most general
genus of form,each step in the descent requires parallel additions of
differencesin the respectiveorders until the most determinatespecies
of each is reached. Any new composite along the way representsthe
case, he says, where the matterof the previous genus has been made
apt {apta) forthe receptionof a more determinateformby the prioraddition of an appropriate material difference:formis the extrinsicefficient cause of the different
) of matter;a materialdifbeings (essediversa
ference is the essential cause.77 Thus matter must be uniquely
prepared foreach formwiththe resultthatone can speak accuratelyof
74Ds 42. See also,p. 55.1-8where
withesse.
essenceissaidtocorrelate
numerically
75Ds 42.
76Cn.yp. 58.1-60.15.BothRobertSteeleandStewart
thatpartofthe
Eastonsuggest
which
butneither
theOpusmaius
before
waswritten
naturalium
Communia
part
specifies
Baconi
inedita
hactenus
orparts.(See Steele,Opera
1911,p. iiiand
, fase.3, Oxford
Rogeri
Bacon
, pp. 50, 111,and 188.)One findsin PartII oftheCommunia
Easton,Roger
intheDesignis
moredeveloped
found
a sketch
offivemodesofequivocation
,
naturalium
of
on
thistheory
draws
that
Bacon
fact
the
with
and
this,
coupled
(., p. 51.5-15)
theclaimthatatleastPart
intheDe signis
further
without
matter
supports
explanation
PartsIII andIV (ed.
draft
towhich
an earlier
naturalium
II oftheCommunia
represents
oftheOpusmaius.
Steele,Opera
3) wereaddedafterthecompletion
77Cn,p. 57.20-29.
106

13:15:08 PM

a new compositeonlyby pointingto thenew materialdifferenceas well

as to the new formaldifference.And all this comes about, he says,
when an external universal or particular agent acts upon the active
power (potentia
activa)of natural matter.78Is matter,then, to be taken
as genus? Not, says Bacon, when genus is considered as predicable,
but it is when consideredas a subject in generation,and it is thisthata
natural philosopherdoes that a logician does not.79In short,matteris
a principium
j , genus a principium
specierum.80
Bacon's
of
matter
to
the text in the Compendium
Applying
theory
studiitheologiae
we get the following:A horse and a donkey have it in
common that theyboth share the generic nature " animal,' ' and this
typeof identity( conueniencia
) is greaterthan that between a whole and
one of its partsor a universal and one of its particulars.But the identity is not perfectprecisely because during the natural generation of
each the genericnature (root essence or natural matter)is (materially)
differentiated
one way forthe horse and another way forthe donkey,
in preparationforrespectivespecific(formal)differencesyetto accrue.
Finally, since natural generationis a developmentalprocess of increasing specificityeach stage would have its own being (esse) and since
these acts are the existentialacts of essences (materially)differentiated
on the level of genus theywould be considered essential and not merely accidental.
The theoryof matter, then, as found in the Communianaturalium
stands at the basis of his claim in the Opus maiusand Compendium
studii
that
'animal'
said
of
horse
and
Both
are
theologiae
donkeyequivocates.
indeed animals, but each is an animal in a differentway and the differenceis not so great as that which characterizesthe previous mode.
FifthMode Equivocation
Given the previous type of unitywith diversityBacon thinkshe has
gone as far as he can go in findingsignificatesof an equivocal term
that are in some sense diverse, but he does not take this as a sign that
he has reached the weakest formof equivocation. His own theorythat
equivocation is to be distinguishedfromunivocationon the basis of the
numberof impositions,not significates,seems to groundhis claim that
78Questiones
Aristotelis
, RobertSteeleand Ferdinand
supraundecimum
prime
philosophie
indita
Delorme,eds., Operahactenus
RogeriBaconi,fase. 7, Oxford1926, pp.
133.36-134.17.
79Cn,p. 61.7-21.
80Questiones
altere,
op cit.,pp. 73.27-74.3.
107

13:15:08 PM

equivocation can arise in certain cases where just one term and one
significateare involved.81 Obviously the degree of differencehere
would be even less than that described in the previous mode.
Drawing on Priscian's remark that the parts of speech are
distinguishedin virtueof the way theysignifyand not what is signified
Bacon offersone typeof example of equivocation in thismode by poin*2
tingto the term 'amans' His use of a presentparticiplehere reminds
discussed
one of the example employed by the authors of the summulae
and ' sedens' and Peter of Spain's explicitstatement
earlier, llaboransy
that such, when joined with verbs of the past tense in an expression,
become instances of equivocal consignificationbecause of different
), the weakest of the threemodes of
ways of signifying( modisignificandi
is
that in Bacon's new classification
it
clear
However,
equivocation.
the kind of equivocation he himselfand Peter and William called attention to by such examples would now be firstmode equivocation:
the differencebetween a presentact and a past one is the same as that
between an entityand a nonentity,and it is the intentto reflectjust
such diversitythat constitutesfirstmode equivocation. The result is
'
'
that when Bacon applies Priscian's remarkto a term like amans his
attentionis directed to the grammatical featuresof the term itselfindependentlyof any differentintentan impositormighthave in mind
when using it in an expressionwitha verb ofthe past tense. Thus, says
'
4
Bacon, amans signifies love but, depending on the intent of the
speaker, it does this eitheras a noun or a participle.83The difference,
but in how it is done
he claims, is not in what is signified(ressignificata)
he
modus
Grammaticallyspeaking, implies, such a termis
significandi).
(
in
each
case
in virtueof a different
(grammatical) property
employed
.84 The English term 'love' would be a closely
(sub diversaproprietate)
allied example, being capable of being taken as a noun or a verb.
81See above,n. 25.
82Cst, pp. 67.25-68.1.ForPriscian's
see aboven. 47.
remark
83Whatall thisboilsdownto is thatall present
in Latinwhenusedwith
participles
verbsofthepasttensewouldbe considered
byBacontobe doublyequivocalin the
sensesjustdescribed.
84Curiously,
thesame
theterm'amo'andsaysthatitsignifies
Baconalsomentions
'
GivenBacon's
(Cst,p. 67.28-30.)
thingas amans'takenas a nounanda participle.
inthat
andeither
butitis notthesametermas 'amans'
thisis trueenough,
principles
In theparalleltextin
no basisforequivocation.
connection
oron itsownitprovides
forit
andthiswouldbe a parallelexample,
'amor1
theOpusmains
(Ds 43) hementions
inthelater
oflamoy
thenthatthemention
canbe takenas a nounanda verb.I suspect
the
ofhastein recapitulating
workis an error,eithera scribalslipor theproduct
Ds 43.
from
material
108

13:15:08 PM

A second typeofexample is provided in the Opusmaiusthoughomit.85 Since essence pertains to the

studiitheologiae
ted in the Compendium
substance
stands to accident as matter to
of
a
and
substance
thing
form,Esence' can signifymatter. But since 'essence' can also signify
quiddityand thisderivesfromform,'essence' can also signifyform.In
both cases, however, what is signifiedis substantiallythe same: differenceintrudesonlyin the way it is signified,but it is enough to cause
equivocation in this mode.
SixthMode Equivocation
A sixthmode of equivocation, as previouslymentioned,is foundonand in it Bacon discusses material
studiitheologiae
ly in the Compendium
not yet presentedin the Communianaturalium
, but included in the fifth
and finalmode in the Opusmaius.86The mode presupposes an inflected
language like Latin where nouns and adjectives are declined and verbs
conjugated. In these instances the stem of the term remains the same
while suffixesare added to determine(among other things) cases and
tenses respectively.According to a grammatical theoryof the time,
while the parts of speech differamong themselves substantially,the
same term appearing in differentcases or tenses is said to differonly
accidentally.87Drawing on thistheoryand Priscian's remarkmentioned in discussing the previous mode, Bacon argues that such terms
signifythe same thingas theyare declined or conjugated, but do this
in slightlydifferent
ways. Once again differenceenter the picture not
modes
by reason of a significatebut in virtueof(accidentally) different
of signification.Ordinarily the great varietyof suffixesin Latin sufficesto preventambiguity,but thereare instanceswhere the same suffix designates more than one grammatical case and even fails to
discriminatea noun froma verb, and it is to these thatBacon points in
his final mode of equivocation: one term signifyingone thingbut doing so in accidentallydifferentways.
To explicate his point Bacon makes referenceto a syllogismthat
evidentlywas used in elementarytextbookson Logic to illustratehow
ambiguitycan be introducedinto an argumentthroughuse of a term
85Ds 44.
y
'
"
86Csty
. Quodpate
at68.1 " nomen
, quod
predicatur*
against nomen
p. 68.1-14,reading
is stillsomecorruption
inthetext.)Cf.Cn,
there
inthetext.(Evenwiththissuggestion
p. 51.13-15andDs 44.
87Cst, p. 68.8-12.
109

13:15:08 PM

thatis equivocal because of case. The syllogismreads: "Quicumquesunt

"88
; istiasinisuntepiscopi
; ergoistiasinisuntsacerdotes.
episcopisuntsacerdotes
'
4
For the minor to be true episcopiwould have to be taken to be in the
genitivesingular (' 'These donkeysbelong to a bishop") althoughit is
clearly in the nominative plural in the major (' 'Whoever are bishops
are priests"). The equivocal term(which serves as Bacon's sole examis
studiitheologiae)
ple of sixth mode equivocation in the Compendium
'
then ' episcopi
which, having the same stem and case ending in the two
cases mentioned signifiesone thing(a bishop) but in different
ways.89
In the Opus maiushe mentions the additional examples of ' ovum9 and
' cornu* the former
;
equivocates in the nominative and accusative
in
all cases.90 One term,one significate,but more
the
latter
singular;
than one way of signifyingbecause of differentimpositionsreflecting
differentintentson the part of the impositor.
Having arrived at this point Bacon is content that he has now
presented the kind of equivocation that is closest to univocation:
mode
itis impossible
In regard
thatanother
tothemodesofequivocation
proper
theleastdifference
be foundbeyond[these]becausethesixthmoderepresents
isnot
Andthus,whenthere
cannot
bea lesserdifference,
there
thatcanbefound.
Andthisistrueoftheproper
an equivocation
modesofequivocabeyond
[them].
tion.91
Bacon concludes his treatmentof equivocation with two brief additional remarks. First, metaphor ( vox transitiue
posita) is not a proper
mode of equivocation. (The claim seems to serve as absolution forany
furtherdiscussion of equivocation.)92Second, all the modes previously
described are also modes of analogy except the first.Analogy, he says,
involves proportionor comparison between significates,and it is this
that is lacking in the firstmode.93
88Cst,p. 68.5-7.
89Bacondoesnotidentify
to
terminthesyllogism,
theequivocal
beingcontent
simply
that
whohadpaidattention
tohistextbooks
wouldrecognize
saythatanyschoolboy
becauseofcase(equiuocacio
penes
casus)wasatissuehere.(Cst,p. 68.7-8.)
equivocation
in hisSumule
dialectices
mentions
However,
'episcopi'as the
(p. 332.3-7)he explicitly
ofSherwood
inlogicam.
inhisIntroductions
as doesWilliam
(MartinGrabmann,
culprit
reswood,Sitzungsberichte
vonShy
der
in logicam
des Wilhelm
ed., Die Introductions
Phil.-hist.Abteilung,
Akademieder Wissenschaften,
1937,
Bayerischen
Jahrgang
tothe
Rashdallerrsinpointing
Heft10,Mnchen1937,p. 88.12-15.)ThusHastings
term'asini1.
(See Cst, p. 19.)
90Ds 43.
" inthetext.
" vnum
91Cst, p. 68.14-19,
at68.18"verum"
withMS. R. against
reading
92Cst, p. 68.19-23.
93Cst, p. 68.24-32.
110

13:15:08 PM

The above suffices,I think, to give evidence that when Bacon

returnedto the notion of equivocation afterfirstaddressing it in his
Sumuledialectices
his reflectionshad sharpened and he was ready to
break with the tradition of the summulaein a very interestingand
originalway. But why did he do it? What value did he see it it? While
it is not often that one can find data in medieval (philosophical)
literatureto answer such questions, I believe we are in a far better
position than usual in this case. Prescinding from the psycho-social
considerationsthatenabled Bacon to be able and willingto buck tradition on more than one occasion and to eschew the comfortof holding
majorityviews on some of the major issues of his time, I think the
answerlies in his more general and thenstilluncommon interestin the
philosophyof language itself.It is safe to say that therewas no one in
his timewho wrotemore about and campaigned more forthe studyof
language. The authors of the summulaewere interestedin language,
but only to the degree it impacted a complete discussion of syllogism
(includingthefallacies). Others like Robert Grossetesteare well known
for the promotion of translationsand there were several memorable
philologists(though Bacon thoughtpoorlyof them) in the period. But
none of these demonstratedthe comprehensiveinterestBacon had in
the philosophyoflanguage itself.94It was also he who (partially)broke
with traditionin developing a division of signs that had no parallel in
ancient or medieval literature and he used this new schema to
elucidate the polymodal significationof words.95In short,Bacon took
the Pseudo-Boethian call fora cognitio
terminorum
integra
very seriously
and this,in part, accounts forhis relentlessattackson theologiansand
peers who failed to appreciate its usefulnessforall sciences.96Part III
of the Opus maiusis elequent testimonyto the importance he gave to
the study of language, and so are scattered remarks troughouthis
otherworksfromthe early 1250s. Given theirpurposes, the authorsof
94According
to S. A. HirschBacon "far surpassed"his contemporaries
"in his
in: A. G.
BaconandPhilogy
speculations
uponthenatureoflanguage."See hisRoger
BaconEssaysContributed
ontheOccasion
Writers
Little,ed., Roger
byVarious
oftheCommemoration
NewYork1972),pp.
, 1914(reprinted
oftheSeventh
Centenary
ofHis Birth
103-104.
95See ThomasS. Maloney,TheSemiotics
Bacon
, in: MediaevalStudies,45
ofRoger
(1983),120-154.
96ForthephraseseePs.-Boethius
De disciplina
scholarium
, ed. Olga Weijers,LeidenKln1976,p. 97.4-6;forBacon'smention
ofitsee Cst, p. 38.5.
Ill

13:15:08 PM

the summulaeas such give no comparable attentionto language and

saw no good reason for strayingfar fromAristotle's three modes of
equivocation. But the later Bacon did, precisely because he was no
longer interestedin syllogismbut ratherthe complexitiesof linguistic
signification. Now equivocation is an important and fascinating
featureof language and it admits of varyingdegrees. To know this in
the 13thcenturywas to know somethingabout language thatwas not
widely scrutinized (if known at all), and Bacon was determinedto
change this. He once said that to ponder the intricaciesof connotation
was a thingof wondrous usefulnessand beauty.971 suspecthis delight
in tracing modes of equivocation was no less estheticallypleasing.
Louisville, Ky
ofLouisville
University
97Ds 103.

112

13:15:08 PM

Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
PetrusBerchoriusRedivivus -

Les Sermonsde Bersuire

MARIJKEVAN DER BIJL

Depuis la dernire publication de Joseph Engels se rapportant

Bersuire1,il s'est coul bien du temps. Il semble donc utile de rappeler d'abord les principauxpoints de sa biographie2,avant d'aborder le
problme spcifique de ses sermons.
N vers 1300 Saint-Pierre-du-Chemin(Vende), Bersuire a fait
professiondans l'ordre de S. Franois pour passer, une date indtermine, celui de S. Benot. Le faitest attestdans une bulle de Jean
XXII, date du 3 aot 1332, confrant Bersuire le prieur de La
Fosse-de-Tign (dpendance de l'abbaye de Saint-Florent de
'
minorum
quodtuolimde ordine
fratrum
quemexpresse
Saumur): nonobstante
sanciiBenedicti
de licentiatuisuperioris
ad ordinem
qui tuneerat
fixeras
professus
tetranstulisti.
. 3. La bulle nous apprend en outre que Bersuire appartenaitjusqu' cette date un monastre bndictin de San Salvador
au diocse de Tuy (Espagne). Par une faute de copie, le nom de la
localit o se trouvaitce monastre, a t omis, de sorte que, jusqu'
prsent, on a vainement cherch l'identifier4.La solution du problme avait t pourtantfourniepar Dom Ursmer Berlire dans une
notice,parue en 1902, qui semble avoir entirementchapp l'attention des biographes de Bersuire5. Elle contientle texte d'une supplique, date du 24 aot 1343, que Bersuireavait adresse Clment VI,
parce qu'il s'tait mis douter de la validit de la dispense que lui
avait confreJean XXII relativement son changementde religion.
1 Lescommentaires
auXVIesiecle
12(1974),pp. 3-13.
d'Ovide
, dans:Vivarium,
2 La biographie
est
la pluscomplte,
avecdes notesbibliographiques
importantes,
1362), avec
Bersuire
deSaintEloideParis( 1290?Pierre
cellede CharlesSamaran,
, Prieur
de la France39 (1962),
littraire
la collaboration
deJacquesMonfrin,
dans:Histoire
2 (1964),pp. 114. r. parJ. Engels,dans:Vivarium,
pp. 259-450.Sigle:Samaran.
124.
3 Bullep.p. A. Thomas,dans:Romania11(1882),pp. 184-185;"nunc"au lieude
"tune"chezThomasestunecoquille.
4 Samaran
, p. 278.
5 Revuebndictine
19(1902),pp. 317-320.
113

13:15:17 PM

C'est que, jeune Franciscain, il avait jet une fois son frocaux orties
pour vagabonder assez longtempsdans le monde, dsertiondontJean
XXII n'avait pas t averti:
Verumquiaidemreligiosus,
dumindictoordinefratrum
minorum
exiiuvenis
sterai
ordinem
fuerat
etdimisso
habituregulri
, semeldictum
egressus
aliquamdiuperseculum
ad ordinem
tarnen
revertens
fuerit
divagatus
persuossuperiores
ad gradumpristinum
dubitattamenidemreligiosus
restitutus,
quod quia de
dictaprecedenti
nonfuitfactamentio
adhuc
apostasiain predicta
dispensatione
occasione
eiusdemaliquanotainfamie
existt...
innodatus
Cette rvlationexplique le silence que Bersuire,dans ses ouvrages, a
gard sur son pass franciscain6.C'est seulementla craintede perdre
ses bnficesqui, des annes plus tard, l'a pouss avouer sa dfaillance.
La supplique fait connatre aussi dans quelles circonstancesBersuire s'est faitBndictin. Ayant obtenu de son suprieurle consentement de quitterl'ordre des Franciscains, il avait rencontr Avignon
le frreJean, abb du monastrede San Salvador de la Torre, au diocse de Tuy {monasteriiSanciiSaluatorisde Turre, Tudensisdicesis
), qui
l'avait accueilli comme membre de sa congrgation.Enfin, par l'acte
du 3 aot 1332, Jean XXII avait ratifison passage aux Bndictins.
Torre, un village appartenant aujourd'hui la commune de Viana
do Castelo, en Portugal, est situe sur la Lima, 40 kilomtresenviron au sud de Tuy7. C'est ce mme monastreque futtransfren
1353, du moins pour la forme,l' ex-dominicainJean de Thermis, qui
sous Clment VI avait t charg de composer un travail sur la
rformedu calendrier8.D'aprs les suppliques de deux autres moines
de La Torre, adresses galement Clment VI, l'abbaye tait
l'poque dans un tristetat: elle tait ruine par les guerres,de sorte
que les moines n'avaient pas de quoi vivre et il n'y avait plus
d'observance9.
6 Samaran
numrant
, p. 263,n. 6, se trompe
cependant
quandil ditque Bersuire,
a omisles
lesprincipaux
ordres
dansarticle
ABYSSUSde sonRepertorium
mendiants,
"
& quamendicantes...
Franciscains:
sunt
quatuor
quatuor
Equietiam
rufi
quadrigae
religiones
distincta.
.. , Cologne,1730-1731,
III,
drigasuntMinores..'1
(Operaomniain 6 tomos
p. 32 L).
7 Le monastre
San Salvadorde la Torreestmentionn
parAntonio
LinageConde
enla Peninsula
Iberica
dans: Los orgenes
delmonacato
benedictino
, Leon, 1973,t. III:
" Monasticon
, p. 431,n 1552.D'aprsunenoticede 1068,le monastre
Hispanum"
etconfesetrdifi
auraittfond
parOrdoo,"frater
parle "duxPaioBermudes"
sor''
8 U. Berlire,
25 (1908),pp. 240-241.
Revuebndictine
9 U. Berlire,
19(1902),pp. 319-320.
Revuebndictine
114

13:15:17 PM

On ne sait pas en quelle anne Bersuire a faitla rencontrede l'abb

Jean. Dom Berliresuppose que c'tait aprs qu'il avait pass au service du cardinaliPierre des Prs, c'est--dire aprs 132810,mais cela
n'est pas sr. Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'est pas probable que Bersuire ait
vcu longtemps La Torre - suppos qu'il y soitjamais all - puisque dans la supplique prciteil dit avoir conu des doutes sur la personne de l'abb Jean. Celui-ci tait-ilun vrai abb et si oui, avait-ille
pouvoir de nommer des religieux hors du monastre et sans conseil?
...quiaetiamidemreligiosus
nescit
deprefato
abbatequieummona( = Bersuire)
utrum
verusabbasexisteret
velutrum
creandi
monachos
extramonastechavit,
riumetsineconventu
notorie
etpubliceincuriapro
haberet,
potestatem
quamvis
abbatese gereret...
Bersuire a rsid longtemps Avignon. Sur l'ordre du Cardinal il
s'y appliquait composer des instrumentsde travail l'usage des prmorale
dicateurs: le Reductorium
, une sorted'encyclopdie moralise en
16 livres, dont YOvidiusmoralizatus
est le quinzime11,et le Repertorium
morale
un
recueil
de
,
dveloppementsprfabriqusde tous les mots de
la Bible, rangs par ordre alphabtique.
On ne sait pas au juste quand Bersuire a quitt la rsidence papale.
En tout cas, il est certainqu'en 1350 il a suivi des cours de thologie
l'Universit de Paris et qu'il y futimpliqu, vers la finde cetteanne,
dans un procs d'hrsie, intent contre lui par son suprieur du
moment,l'abb de Notre Dame de Coulombs. Bersuire s'en tira avec
honneur, grce aux influencesexerces en sa faveurpar l'Universit,
Innocent VI et le nouveau roi, Jean le Bon12. Aprs cette aventure,
Bersuire trouva un nouveau protecteuren la personne du roi, qui le
chargea de traduireen franaisles Dcadesde Tite-Live.
En 1353, encore avant l'achvement de cette traduction,Bersuire
changea la chambrerie de Notre Dame de Coulombs, dignit qu'il
avait revtuedepuis 134913,contrele prieurde Saint-Eloi de Paris14.
10Dans le prologue
de sonRepertorium
morale
en premire
ditionen 1340,
, termin
Bersuire
dclare
du cardinal
12ans:"cujussumego
qu'ilestle familier
depuis
familiaris
"
domesticus
duodecim
annis
nutritus
, III, p. 1,infine).PourPierredes
apudipsum
{d.cite
Prs,voirSamaran
, pp. 265-266.
11Cf.J. Engels,L'dition
del'Ovidius
moralizatus
deBersuire
9
, dans:Vivarium,
critique
(1971),pp. 19-24.L'ditionestprvuepourla finde cetteanne.
12Voirpourcettepisode,Samaran
, pp. 281-286.
13Bullep.p. G. Mollat,dans:Revue
bndictine
22 (1905),pp. 271-272.
14Le contrat
futratifi
VI, le 8 avril1354;bullep.p.A. Thod'change
parInnocent
mas,art.cit.,p. 187.Pourla querelle
voirSamaran
juridiqueentrelesdeuxparties,
pp. 292-295.
115

13:15:17 PM

Cette fonctionexigeait la rsidence et, jusqu' sa morten 1362, Bersuire a d mener de frontses tches de prieur et d'crivain.
Il serait intressant de savoir si la prdication faisait partie des
devoirs de Bersuire en qualit de prieur de Saint-Eloi. Tritenheim,
dans dition princeps de sa biographie d'crivains ecclsiastiques,
affirmeque Bersuire tait un grand prdicateur(in declamandis
sermonibus ad populumexcellentis
ingenti)et lui attribue un recueil de sermons
divers (sermones
varios)en 2 livres15.Il est suivi en cela par d'autres biotels
graphes,
que Philippe de Bergame, qui cependant omet le ad populum (<declamator
verbidivini valde insignis)16,Gesner17, Fabricius18 et
Ziegelbauer19.
Ce recueil n'a jamais t retrouv.De plus, l'item manque dans le
canon de ses ouvrages, tabli par Bersuire dans le prologue de sa traduction de Tite-Live et dans la Collationprofine operis(une sorte de
morale
, date de 135920),et
postface la seconde dition du Repertorium
" de son
il manque aussi dans l'numration des "opera solemnia
pitaphe21.
Que pourtantTritenheimne se soit pas tromp,cela a t dmontr
par Engels dans son article sur les Pseudo-Bersuires22.Examinant
l'ouvrage d'un Bndictin espagnol, Michael Ximenez Barranco, qui
s'tait propos de prouver que Bersuire tait l'auteur d'un commentaire sur les Psaumes23, l'attention d'Engels futattirepar 3 citations
15Johannes
siveliber
Trithemius,
ecclesiasticorum,
Ble,1494,f.91v.
Catalogus
scriptorum
16JacobusPhilippusBergamensis
chronicarum
, Venise,
(1434-1520),Supplementum
la chronique
un autrePhilippe
de Bergame,
1513,f.254.Samaran
, p. 421,attribue
de Bersuire;
erreurrectifie
, dans:
parJ. Engels,LesPseudo-Bersuires
contemporain
3 (1965),pp. 128-129.
Vivarium,
17Conradus
Bibliotheca
universalis
omnium
Gesnerus,
, siveCatalogus
scriptorum
locupletissimus...jZurich,1545,f.545v(ne mentionne
que le recueilde sermons).
18Johannes
Albertus
Bibliotheca
latinamediae
etinfimae
aetatis
Fabricius,
, Hambourg,
de Bergame).
1736,V, p. 728(reproduit
Philippe
19Magnoaldus
ordinis
Historia
reiliterariae
S. Benedirti...,
etc.,
Ziegelbauer,
Augsbourg
"
eteleganter
".
etdocte
1754,III, p. 185: sermones
plures
compositi
20Vivarium,
citsci-dessus,
3 (1965),pp. 158-159.Outreles3 ouvrages
Bersuire
s'y
morale
etd'uneCosmographia
seuMundi
dclarel'auteur
d'unBreviarium
, ouvrages
mappa
du prologue
du Tite-Live,
dans:Samaran
, pp. 359-360.
perdus.Cf.la transcription
21Transcription
Lesantiquitez
etsingularitez
deParis,
, histoires
d'aprsGillesCorrozet,
de France
villecapitale
du Royaume
, pp. 300-301;
, Paris,1550,f. 35, dans: Samaran
surPierre
Bersuire
2 (1964),p. 65.
, dans:Vivarium,
Engels,Notice
bibliographique
22Vivarium,
3 (1965),pp. 147-148.
23Incognitus
Monach.
siveDissertato
, inquaPetrm
Berchorium,
comparativa
persecognitus.
in Psalmos
nomine
Benedictinum
verum
Auctorem
Expositionis
vulgatae
propugnai
Incogniti
Ximenez
Barranco...
R.A.P.M.F.Michael
, Madrid,1720,p. 16; pp. 65-66.
116

13:15:17 PM

morale
du Repertorium
, o Bersuirerenvoiele lecteurpour de plus riches

des
sermons,dont il cite incipit. Voici ces renvois,
dveloppements
avec leur contexte immdiat, cits d'aprs l'dition de 173124:
LAETITIA,LAETUS (IV, p. 455A): Nota,quodlaetitiaidemestquodgauCumergode istisomnibus
exultatio
&jubilatio.
dium,jucunditas,
supraad suffiest
modicum
hincest,quodde laetitiaquoadpraesens
sittractatum,
cientiam
&insermone
Lattare
steriLaetare
Hierusalem:
cuminsermone,
maxime
dicendum,
- Cf.infine(p. 456): Sed accipedide ea sittractatum.
lis, satis& sufficienter
Hierusalem
Laetare
, & poneeas hic...
stinciones,
quae suntin sermone:
MARIA(V, p. 29 F): Videsivisinsermone,
Quaeestista, ubimultade laudibus
VirVideetiamsupradeAdventu,
ubidevirginitate
invenies:
gloriosae
Virginis
multainvenire.
poteris
ginis,& filliconceptione
Haeccine
reddis
Domino
CHRISTI PASSIO (III, p. 296,infine):Videinsermone
,
& insipiens?
Ponehictotumquod ibi,quia sub alia formaponitur
stulte,
popule
& sole.Et si vispulchra
Itemvidesuprade sanguine,
seriespassionis.
originalia
hic
< ubi> multaposui,quapropter
videinsermone
dictoHaeccine
depassione,
paucadixi.
L'emploi de la premire personne dans le dernier passage montre,
sans qu'on puisse en douter, que Bersuire renvoie des sermonscrits
par lui-mme. D'ailleurs, quand il lui arrivede renvoyer un sermon
d'un autre auteur, il ne manque jamais de le nommer. Cela se voit,
par exemple, dans l'article HIERUSALEM25, o Bersuire commence
par numrerles 4 sens que peut avoir ce nom, en se rfrantau serin Sermon LaetareHierusalemd'Innocent III (SicutenimdicitInnocentius
.
Puis
Hierusalem.
272
dicitur
Laetare
moneQuadragsima*
, quae
A),
.)26.
(p.
aprs un courtdveloppementde chaque membre de cettedistinction,
il renvoiele lecteursoit d'autres articles("tituli") du Repertorium
, soit
des sermons,dans lesquels il avait dj traitde ces sens, mais sparment:
Hierusalem
multa& mirabilia
De istaigitur
dici,sedquia
possent
quadruplici
estde eisdem,idcirco
dictum
locisparticulatim
supersedeo
quoadpraepluribus
sens.
de Hierusalem
Videigitur
ADDUCERE, iniliaauctorisuperiori
supraintitulo
inHierusalem
tate:Elevavit
mespiritus
, Ezec. 8.
, & adduxit21
24Voirci-dessus,
le Repertorium
dansla sriede mss.contenant
n. 6. Mmesrenvois
Haeccine
selitdansle ms.
au sermon
Le renvoi
Paris,B.N. lat.16788-16790.
complet,
X, non la fin,maisau dbutde l'article
16790,sousla lettre
(f.453ra).
25Ed. cite
, IV, pp. 271-275.
26Migne,PL 217,393-398;cf.J. B. Schneyer,
des
derlateinischen
Sermones
Repertorium
t.4, p.
i. W., 1969-1980,
Mittelalters
, 9 tomesparus,Mnster
frdieZeitvon1150-1350
43,n 18.T 22.
27Ms. 16789,f. 119va]induxitd,
1731.
117

13:15:17 PM

i.e. Ecclesia,videsuprain tituloCUSTODIRE,

veroinferiori,
De Hierusalem
muros
Hierusadivisa:Super
tuos
velintituloCONSTITUERE, inillaauctoritate
Laetare
Hierusalem.
custodes
lemconstitui
, Esa. 62 & in sermone28:
videinservelbonapersona,
i.e. de bonaconscientia,
De Hierusalem
interiori,
divisa:Illa
B. Virginis,
inillaauctoritate
De assumptione
tualeaena.
mone:Mater
nostra.
Gal. 4, in sermone:
estHierusalem
, libera
est,quaeestmater
Quae
quaesursum
hominis
inFilium
Videbunt
Itemin sermone:
estHierusalem.
sursum
, inillaauctorilumen
tuum
Hierusalem.
tate:Venit
de passagio,
videbenein sermone
& terrestri,
veroexteriori
De Hierusalem
qui
coruestrum.
ascendat
saeculi
& Hierusalem
Recordamini
super
prioris
incipit:
& ideoaestimavi
fitmentio,
aliislocisde Hierusalem
In istisenim& pluribus
meminime
ampliusdicere,ex quo in totlocisde Hierusalem
superfluum
dixisse...29.
nous fontdj connatrel'incipit scriptuCes 4 articlesdu Repertorium
raire de 8 sermonscomposs par Bersuire: 1) LaetareHierusalem;2) Laetaresterilis
; 3) Quae estista; 4) HaeccinereddisDomino; 5) Matertua leaena;
Filiumhominis
estHierusalem
sursum
; 8) Recordamini
; 7) Videbunt
6) Quae
priorissaeculi. Sans doute, en dpouillant les 4 volumes que comporte
l'ouvrage dans l'dition de Cologne, on en trouverad'autres. Mais ces
ont d avoir leur disposition
sermons,que les usagers du Repertorium
renvois
les
qu'ils y rencontraient,soient fonctionnels,o
pour que
sont-ils?
La solution du problme propose par Engels, savoir qu' "il ne
s'agit de rien autre chose que de lemmes particulirementdvelopps
30, si
du Repertorium"
attrayantequ'elle soit, ne tientpas debout. Ces
articlesou lemmes, mme les plus structurs,sontdes dveloppements
d'un seul vocable, entre lesquels le prdicateur est invit faire son
choix. Il y manque le thme,le prothmeavec l'exhortation la prire
initiale et la division du thme. On a vu, d'ailleurs, que dans ses ren'
et
vois Bersuire distingue nettemententre les 'tituli" du Repertorium
ses sermons.
Le problme est donc rest entier. Toutefois, un seul sermon de
Bersuire a t retrouv. Il a t conserv dans le Repertorium
, o BerVIDERE

l'article
en
suire l'a insr, quelque peu abrg,
appendice
(VI, pp. 201 b 209 b). Dans l'dition il est prcd de la mentionsuiAuctorfaci'
vante: " Sermo
, de quo per Dictionariumsaepe mentionem
l'introduction
originale:
remplaant
de
etmateriam
semelpraedicaui
Et notaquodquiaistumsermonem
sequentem
duxi31.
ideoipsumhicponereetinserere
VIDERE ibisatisaccumulaui,
dignum

28Ms. 16789,f. 119valinfra

d. 1731.
' 'Sedsi visistam
29Bersuire
materiam
dilatare
nanmoins:
continue
, die...".
30Vivarium,
9 (1971),p. 24.
31Ms. 16790,f.384 .
118

13:15:17 PM

Le thme du sermon, qui est construitentirementd'aprs les pr, a t choisi dans TEptre de S. Paul aux
ceptes des artespraedicandP2
5:
Videte
, le prothme dans le
quomodocauteambuletis
Ephsiens, 5,
lumen.Il a comme incipitnon
psautier, 35, 10: In luminetuovidebimus
ad
visionem
nonsolumestnecessaria
charissimi,
Quia
scripturaire:
corporalem
et
se
termine
sur
une
citation
de S. Augustin:
,
objectipraesentatio...

erit
desideriorum
sinefastidioamanostrorum,
'Ipse finis
qui sinefinevidebitur,
933.
laudabitur*
Christus
bitur,sinefatigatione
, & . ExpliQuodnobisconcdt
34
cat sermo .
La leon du prothme, savoir que pour discernerentrele bien et le
mal, la visiomoralis
, qui est le sujet principaldu sermon,on a besoin de
la lumiredivine, est dveloppe au moyen de 4 arguments,emprunts 1) aux faitsde la nature ( naturaliter
): les oiseaux commenant leur
chant au lever du soleil; 2) aux figuresde la Bible {figur
aliter
): les lande
feu
en
de
l'effusion
du

la
littrature
gues
signe
Saint-Esprit; 3)
profane ( exemplariter
): la fable des arbres du soleil et de la lune; 4)
Evangile (scripturaliter):
la gurison du sourd-muet. Reprenant
donne
de
la
fable,le prothmese terminepar une exhorl'explication
tation la prire: ilIgiturcharissimi
ad
, pro istoluminecoelestiimpetrando,
nostraduo lumina,Solem& lunam}i.e. Christum
& Mariam recurramus.
.." .
La divisiondu thme, en 3 parties, est nonce dans un schma rim:
inaspectumentali
VIDETE,
sapientiaesplendorcm:
Habcamus
decorem: QUOMODOCAUTE,
ergoinaffectumoralimoderantiae
inprofectu
reali diligentiae
vigorem: AMBULETIS.
De cettetripartition,
le premiermembreest dvelopp longuement(13
col.) au moyen d'une subdivision en 8 parties de l'autorit confirma& videde loco,in quo nunces,
tive, Gen. 13, 14: Leva oculostuosin directum,
ad aquilonem& meridiem,
ad orientem
& occidentem.
ET SIC DICO, QUOD TU DEBES VIDERE:
est
LEVA OCULOS TUOS,
DEUM,
qui
" " superior:
interior
: IN DIRECTUM,
TEIPSUM,
'
" " exterior:
ET VIDE,
PROXIMUM,
" " inferior:
DE LOCO, INQUO NUNC ES,
MUNDUM,
" " sterilior:
AD AQUILONEM,
EGENUM,
" " deterior:
AD MERIDIEM,
IMPIUM,
" " felicior
: AD ORIENTEM,
PARADISUM,
FINEMSEU TERMINM, " " asperior:
AD OCCIDENTEM.
32Cf.Th.-M. Charland,
Artes
Contribution
l'histoire
dela rhtorique
aumoyen
praedicandi.
La prdication
1936,pp. 109-226;
ge,Paris-Ottawa,
J. Longre,
mdivale,
Paris,1983,
pp. 195-202.
33Civ.DeiXXII, 30, 33-35
(CCL 48).
34Sauferreur,
le sermon
n'estpas mentionn
parSchneyer,
op.cit.
119

13:15:17 PM

La vritcontenue dans chacune de ces parties est "prouve" par une

varit d'arguments, parmi lesquels des exemplaemprunts la
mythologie35et l'histoire36de l'antiquit, et confirmepar de nouvelles autorits,le plus souvent scripturaires.
Du dveloppement des 2 autres membres de la tripartition,QUOMODO CAUTE et AMBULETIS, le Repertorium
parat n'avoir conserv qu'une rdaction abrge37.Cela n'est pas tonnant,puisque la
seule intentionde Bersuire, en insrant le sermon dans son Repertorium, tait de fournir de la matire supplmentaire l'article
VIDERE.
Ensuite, aprs la rptitiondes 3 parties de la division principaleet
du thme lui-mme, une transition est effectueau moyen d'un
enchanementd'autorits de la visiomoralis la cause finale,la visiobeatifica,aprs quoi le sermon se terminepar l'invocation du Christ.
Sans doute, Bersuire a prononc ce sermon, qui est d'un caractre
rudit,devant un auditoirede clercs. Etait-ce pendant la priode qu'il
tait prieur de Saint-Eloi?
A moins qu'on ne dpiste la recueil de sermonslui-mme ou qu'on
ne dcouvre encore quelque indicationutile dans l'uvre conserve,il
ne semble pas possible de le savoir. Mme si l'on et russi classer
les manuscritset les imprimsdes 2 ditions que Bersuire a donnes
du Repertorium
, la premireen 1340, la seconde en 135938,et qu'on et
constat qu'il s'agissait d'une addition de la seconde, cela ne nous
avancerait pas beaucoup. Car, d'aprs la Collatioprofineoperis
39,Bersuire a commenc la rvision du Repertorium
lorsqu'il tait prieur de
Clisson, c'est--dire entre 134240 et 134941, bien avant qu'il ne ft
nomm au prieur de Saint-Eloi.
Trans 14
InstituutvoorLaat Latijn
Utrecht
35Fablesde Polyphemus,
de Narcissus
etde Calavecuneinterprtation
spirituelle,
listo.
" nosce
36Description
et
de Delphesetde l'inscription:
du temple
teipsumAlexander
Callisthenes.
373/4col.; Bersuire
l'article
le lecteur
{d.
QUOMODO du Repertorium
y renvoie
totam
XVI: Super
morale
cite
, V, pp. 399-401)et,pourAMBULETIS, Reductorium
Bibliam
, I, pp. 157-159
, xxiii,1 ad Ezech.1, 5-9(d.cite
b).
38Cf.Samaran
etditions.
On connat
unequinzainede mss.
, pp. 434-450:Manuscrits
la premire
mss.partiels,
et 12 ditions
ctde nombreux
imprimes,
complets,
de 1731 Cologne.
la dernire
tantde 1489 Nuremberg,
39Vivarium,
3 (1965),pp. 155-156.
40Bullep.p. A. Thomas,art.cit
de ClissontaitunedpenLa Trinit
, pp. 186-187.
'
au diocsede Nantes.
dancede l'abbayeSaint-Jouin-de-Marnes
41Cf.ci-dessus,
n. 13.
120

13:15:17 PM

Vivarium
XXII,2 (1984)
Prolegomenato a Studyof
ExtrinsicDenomination
in the Workof Francis Suarez, S.J.
JOHN P. DOYLE
Introduction
At the beginningof the CritiqueofPureReason, Immanuel Kant compares himselfwithCopernicus. As that man had invertedthe order of
heaven and earth, so Kant would invert the order between things
known and knowers. Where previous philosophershad regarded concepts and our knowing apparatus itselfas diaphanous media through
which thingsin themselvesare clearly seen, Kant would regard them
as in fact constitutiveof things, precisely as those thingscome to be
known.1
But whatever Kant may have thought about the 4'dogmatic"
metaphysicsof precedinggenerations,the idea thatthe knoweraffects
what he knows was indeed a common one among earlier Scholastics.
Even in the moderate realisttraditionof St. Thomas, it was axiomatic
- in effect
that: cognitasunt in cognoscente
secundummodumcognoscentis2
that human subjects somehowenter into the constitutionof objects
which theyknow.3And, of course, this idea was much more dominant
in the medieval traditionsof conceptualism and nominalism.4
While Francis Suarez, S.J. (1548-1617) is not ordinarilyclassified
as a conceptualistor a nominalist, his philosophywas in major ways
influencedby thesemedieval traditions.5Since moreover,Suarez truly
1 Cf. I. Kant,Critique
tothe2ndedition
, Preface
ofPureReason
(B, xvi).
2 Cf.Summa
, II-II, q. 1, a. 2; De Ventate
, q. 1, a. 2.
Theologiae
3 Forsomeoftheramifications
ofthis,seeJ. P. Doyle,IpsumEsseas God-Surrogate
:
ThePointofConvergence
in: The Modern
ofFaithandReason
forSt. Thomas
Aquinas,
L (1973),293-296.Butforsharpcriticism
ofa Thomistic
a
"intellectual
Schoolman,
andTruth
inAquinas,
in:MediaevalStudies,
32(1970),
", seeJ. OwensJudgment
priori
138-158.
4 In linewiththis,I believeno mistake
is madewhenmodern
Scholastic
manualists
locatetheKantiantheoretical
itself
underthetitleofConceptualismus
; cf.
philosophy
, 2nded. (BuenosAires,1939),I, p. 218.
e.g. C. Boyer,S.J.,Cursus
Philosophicus
5 Forthechargeofnominalism
leveledat Suarez,cf.L. Mahieu,Franois
Suarez.
La
etlesrapports
a avecsathologie
, Paris1921, 288,499,500,501, 504,505
philosophie
qu'elle
and522;alsoj. Marchal,
dedpart
delaMtaphysique,
Paris1923-26-27,
S.J.,Lepoint
Vol. I, 185.Forreply,cf.P. Descoqs,S.J., Thomisme
etSuarzisme,
in: Archives
de
121

13:15:24 PM

was "the main channel by which scholasticismcame to be known by

modern classical philosophers",6 this influencemightbe expected to
have had its own importanteffects.The present essay will not trace
these effects,but will concentrateinstead on somethingwhich is prima
faciecharacteristicof all formsof nominalism and which in Suarez*s
doctrine may show some influence of later medieval nominalismdenomination
, which, etymologically,amounts to naming
viz., extrinsic
from
outside
themselves.
This concentrationwill be restricted
things
with
to a selection of topics from Suarez' s Disputationes
metaphysicae1
only an occasional excursus into other of his works. To some extent,
" of
this will explain the " Prolegomena
my title.
More to explain: about extrinsicdenominationitself,my firsthope
was that a close examination of Suarez' s text could reveal rules
governingits use, rules which, systematicallylaid out, mightin ways
adumbrate the Kantian a priori.What I found was that Suarez does
observe some conventions,ifnot actual rules, with regard to extrinsic
denomination. I have, however, been unable to find that these conventionsin any explicitway anticipate Kant. If anything,.I may have
discovered the opposite. On its face, extrinsicdenomination ought to
be a mere matterof naming. Yet, as we shall see, Suarez regardsit as
somehow a featureof thingsthemselves.And this,to be sure, presupposes an ability to know such things.
But aside from this, I did have a second hope that extrinsic
denomination would prove a kind of Ariadne's thread, to followfor
understanding in the labyrinthof Suarez's own philosophy. Within
space available, I expect to show that thishope has been in some part
realized.
denomination
I. Somedescription
and examplesofextrinsic
forSuarez
Leaving aside, for the moment, any question of things in
themselves,let me provisionallydescribe extrinsicdenomination as a
Eximio
delDoctor
IV (1926),82-192;J. M. Alejandro,
y
S.J.,La gnoseologia
Philosophie,
isa listofcitations
wherethere
nominalista
la acusacin
by
, Comillas1948,esp.375-376,
Fora mediating
successors.
SuarezofOckhamandhisnominalist
view,seeJ.GomezXV
in:Pensamiento,
desryessencia
deSurez,
dela composicin
S.J.,Sentido
Cafferena,
(1959),esp. 148-149.
6 A. Maurer,C.S.B., Medieval
, NewYork1962,356; fora similar
judgPhilosophy
moderne
etlaphilosophie
, in:Revuede Mtaphysique
Mora,Suarez
ment,seeJ. Ferrater
etde Morale,68 (1963),esp.63.
7 Salamanca,1597.I willusethetextpublished
inVolumes25 and26 oftheBerton
References
tootherofhisworks
ofSuarez'sOpera.
edition
(Paris:Vives,1856-1866)
thisedition.
willalsobe from
122

13:15:24 PM

designationof something,not fromanythinginherentitself,but from

some disposition,coordination,or relationshipwhich it has toward or
with somethingelse.8 A common enough example is furnishedby the
designationof a column as "right" or "left" in relation to an animal
changingits position.9Other examples are given by objects designated
"visible" or "seen", "audible" or "heard", "knowable" or
"known", in relationto powers and acts of a percipientor a knower.10
For Suarez, one whole category, i.e., habitus
, is constitutedby extrinsicdenomination,as when, forinstance, a man is "clothed" from
a relation to his garments.11Other categories seem to involve such
denominations. Thus, a thingis called "bounded", "contained", or
"located", from a containing surface.12Something is said to be in
time froma referenceto the motion of somethingelse, especially the
8 All threeofthesewords,"disposition",
or "relationship",
"coordination",
may
cf.note55,below.
translate
thewordhabitudo
Suarezusesindifferent
contexts;
, which
9 "Hujusmodi
dicitur
dextravelsinistra
estdenominado,
animali;..."
qua columna
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.54,sec.2, no. 9 (Vol. 26,p. 1020);ibid.,disp.47,sec. 1,no.4
used
sec.15,no.6 (p. 841);ibid.,no.29(p. 847)Forthesameexample
(p. 782);ibid,
Theol.
seeSt. Thomas,Summa
I, d. 8, p.
I, 13,a. 7; andDunsScotus,Lectura
earlier,
1, q. 4 (ed. Vatican:Vol. XVII, p. 49, n. 135).
10Cf. "... itemilia quae redundet
ex potentia
ut sic,ut essevisiblevelaudibile."
verbi
., disp.54,sec.2, no. 9 (Vol. 26,p. 1020);"Idemestde visione,
Disp.Metaphys
..." ibid.
, disp.16,sec.1,no.24(Vol.
objecti
quodvisumdenominai;
respectu
gratia,
obetrepraesentatus
ilioactudicitur
25,p. 574);"... homoautemcognitus
conceptus
a conceptu
formali
..."
extrinsecam
conceptus
quidemperdenominationem
jectivus,
ibid.
tdisp.2, sec.1, no. 1 (p. 65); also:ibid.,disp.23,sec.8, no.8 (p. 880);disp.25,
sec.1,nos.31 and32(p. 908);disp.47,sec. 14,no. 5, textinnote50,below.Letus
on thesidebothoftheknower
noteherethedifference
between
actualandpotential,
forSuarezthere
relation
andwhatisknown.
In every
is a transcendental
instance,
(cf.
notes126and127,below)onthesideoftheknower
., disp.47,nos.
(cf.Disp.Metaphys
ofreasononthesideoftheknown
2 and18Vol. 26,pp. 799and804),anda relation
ortheknowable
nuanceis introduced
by"beings
(cf.e.g. note194,below).A further
ofreason",whosewholeesseis cognosci
withthese,
(cf.note170,below).Contrasted
whichis
realpossiblebeingshavean intrinsic
to be known,an aptitude
aptitude
reducible
Actualreal
to thedouble-negative
ofnon-contradiction.
reality
ultimately
andthe
Forsomeofthis,seeJ. P. Doyle,Suarez
beingshavethis,plusactualexistence.
in:TheModernSchoolman,
XLV (1967),29-48;alsocf.note49,
Reality
ofthePossibles
below.
11Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.53,sec.1,no. 3 (Vol. 26,p. 1012);ibid.,disp.16,sec.1,
no. 24 (Vol. 25,p. 574);disp.54,sec. 1, no. 9 (Vol. 26,p. 1020).In thetextabove,
"is 'clothed'
than"is saidtobe 'clothed'", highlights
thefactthathabitus
isa
", rather
classofthings
andnotjusta classofterms.
12Cf. ibid.,disp.16, sec.l, no. 24 (Vol. 25, p. 574); disp.18, sec. 5, no. 7 (pp.
disp.51,sec.2, no.9 (Vol. 26,pp.981-982).Letmenoteherethat,without
625-626);
whatI believetobe Suarez's ultimate
inthetextaboveI could
doctrine,
contradicting
havewritten
"r'bounded',etc.", insteadof"is called'bounded'".
123

13:15:24 PM

A becoming or a simplefieriis said to be

motionof theprimmmobile.13
an action by an extrinsicdenomination of an agent.14(In this last example, let us note the distinctionbetween "said to be" and "by an extrinsicdenominaiion" . This is in the textand it is intendedby Suarez.
It should, at very least, put us on guard against accepting the provisional descriptionjust above as the last word on the subject.)
extrinsicdenomination can easily be
Examples of at least apparently
Suarez'
s
text.
from
Dispensing with excessive quotation
multiplied
and
for
now
marks,
simply footnotingsome of theirnuances, let me
list: up and down,15 under16 (and over), before and after,17
simultaneous18(and non simultaneous), near and far,19similar20(and
13Cf.ibid.,disp.5, sec.9, no.5 (Vol. 25,pp. 198-199);
disp.40,sec.9, no. 10(Vol.
26,p. 586);disp.50,sec.9, no.3 (p. 951);no. 4 (p. 952).Again,aboveI couldhave
insuch
inherent
of"is saidtobeintime".Theambiguity
"is intime''instead
written
on theone hand,
showshoweasyit is foranyoneto waverbetween,
expressions
as a matter
as a feature
ofthings
denomination
extrinsic
and,ontheother,
regarding
ofmerenaming.
14"... de actione,de qua dicitur,
extrinsecus
ut actioest,esseformam
actionem,
sed talem
et ideo ut sic non requirere
inhaerentiam,
denominantem,
propriam
informaet quasi extrinsecae
habitudinem,
quae ad iliummodumdenominationis
tionissufficiat."
Ibid.,disp.37,sec.2, no. 14(Voi. 26,p. 497);disp.48,sec.4, nos.
a teractioetpassionondistinguuntur
12-18(pp.891-893);alsocf.:"... increaturis
interse (realiter
etconsequenter,
minoproducto
quia fieri
ipsiusterloquimur),
et sievocatur
in quemtendit
unumad terminm,
habetrespectum,
miniduplicem
etsicvocatur
a quo egreditur
aliumad principium,
actio,
passio,seufieripassivum,
..." Suarez,De SS. Trinitatis
VI, . 2, . 1 (Vol. 1, p. 676). On the
Mysterio
transcendeninvolved
here,cf."Actioutactio,etpassioutpassio,dicunt
"respects"
sinequibusnequeesse,neque
actuexistens,
talesrespectus
ad realeagens,velpatiens
., disp.47,sec.4, no. 5 (Voi. 26,p. 800). fnotes
possent."Disp.Metaphys
intelligi
100,101,126,128,159and 185,below.
15Disp. Metaphys
., disp. 51, sec. 4, no. 31 (Voi. 26, p. 998). Whileextrinsic
citedin
inthisandinsomeofthetexts
mentioned
denomination
maynotbe explicitly
involvewillshowat leastan implicit
notes,a briefglanceat thecontexts
following
ment.
16Disp.Metaphys
., disp.13,sec.9, no. 13(Vol. 25,p. 433).In Suarez'stextan examdenominaby(extrinsic)
pleis givenofa basewhichis saidtobe "under"a column
or anysubjectis
tionand whichis thenusedto explainthewayin whichmatter
extrinofchangetoa merely
"under"a change.Theresult
appearstobe a reduction
toa subject.Yet,Suarezdoesnotwantthis;cf.e.g. ibid.,
ofa form
sicjuxtaposition
hereis in linewithhisposition
disp.15, sec. 7, no. 3, (p. 522). His unwillingness
themostcommonkindofchange,whichis localmotion;cf.note109,
regarding
below.
17Ibid., disp.39, sec.2, no. 43 (Vol. 25, p. 523).
18Ibid.
19Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.10,sec. 3, no. 11 (Vol. 25, p. 350); ibid.,no. 18 (p. 352);
deAngelis
IV, .
disp.47,sec. 1,no. 12(Vol. 26,p. 784);butalsocf.Suarez,Tractatus
anddistance
nearness
15,. 5 (Vol. 2, p. 485),wherehehastrouble
understanding
in universum
"Et in verumfatear,
denominations:
as "purely"extrinsic
intelligere
124

13:15:24 PM

dissimilar),same and other,21measuring,measured and measurable22

(commensurable and incommensurable), equal and unequal,23 more
and less24(bigger and smaller), etc.
Again, order seems to involve extrinsic denomination. This is,
especially, numerical order.25But it is also the order in a house,26an
army, a city, a republic, or a nation.27
sit pureexnon valeo,quomodohaec denominatio
et distantiae
propinquitatis,
in realiquidintrinsecum,
itautnonsupponit
trnseca,
20Cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec. 1,no. 12(Voi. 26,p. 784).Butalsoseeibid.,no.
15(p. 785)andibid.,sec.4, no. 19(textinnote149,below),whereSuarezremarks
notethat
that*'similar"is notsimply
an extrinsic
denomination.
On "dissimilar",
ofdissimilitude;
cf.ibid
Suarezsaysthatthereis no realrelation
., sec. 11,no. 3 (p.
of"similar",itwouldseemthat"dissimilar"
whatever
isa purely
826).Accordingly,
extrinsic
denomination.
21Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.3, sec. 2, nos. 12 and 14 (Vol. 25, pp. 110-111).
22Ibid.,disp.40,sec.3, nos.8-11(Vol. 26,pp.540-541);
sec.7,no.7 (p. 575);sec.9,
nos.6-7(p. 585).
23Ibid.,disp.47,sec.1,no. 12(Vol. 26,p. 784);butalsoseeibid.
, no. 15(p. 785)and
ibid.,sec.4, no. 19 (p. 804).
24Ibid., nos. 12(p. 784)and 15 (p. 785).
25Cf.ibid.,disp.41,sec.1,no.2 (Vol. 26,p. 588),wheresuchan orderissaidtobe,
" solum
ifanything,
rationis".
26Cf. "... multavidentur
esseunumtantum
utdomus,etartificialia.
peraccidens,
... Haec autemomniavidentur
tantum
peraccidensesseunum,veldenominatione
potiusquamre." Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.4, sec.3, no. 1 (Vol. 25, p. 126).Thereare
ramifications
from
thisrecognition
thattheaccidental
unityofpartsandwholeinarofextrinsic
denomination.
tifacts
isa matter
Considera(as opposedtonatural
things)
forexample,
tionsofthissortshouldhavea roletoplayin laterquestions,
between
mechanists
andvitalists.
whatoccurstomeis thatmechanism
mayhave
Immediately,
a built-in
to nominalism.
affinity
27Cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.39,nos,6-7(Vol.26,p. 512);ibid.,no.37(p. 521).There
inall ofthisagainaboutartifacts
in no. 6) and
arequestions
("house" is mentioned
about"moral"denominations
Alsosome
{ibid.,andcf.below,notes37,51,201-204).
allowance
benecessary
fortheelement
ina nation(populas
ofconsanguinity
, no.
might
ramifications
note26,
here,andintheimmediately
preceding
37). Therearefurther
forthemuchdebatedScholastic
theunityofa scientific
habit.It
question
regarding
somekindofintrinsic
wouldseemthatan "organic"unity
wouldinvolve
denominationbetween
oramongthepartswhichmakeup thewhole.Failingthat,as wouldbe
a science,inwhichthepassage
thecasedejureineverybasically
nominalisti
system,
from
within
a singleproposition,
oramongpropositions
oneparttoanother
(whether
themselves
inan inference)
wouldbepurely
a matter
ofextrinsic
would
denomination,
havenomoreunity
thanthatfound
ina deadbody.Forsomeone
sucha posiholding
a S. Paulo,OrdinisCistercianis,
Summa
tion,cf.Eustachius
quadripartita,
philosophiae
1649- original
are
dated;"Parisiis,1609"),forwhomsciences
(Cantabrigiae,
preface
"one" inthewayan army,
a republic
ora crowdormenareone(cf.ibid.,Logica
, III,
, I, q. 9 [p.
q. 5 [p. 138]),andwhothenusesthesamesimileofan army(in Physica
the"unity"ofa deadbody.ForfacetsofSuarez'sdoctrine
on the
257])todescribe
ofa scientific
Suarez
in: Condelafilosofia,
habit,cf.J. F. Yela Utrilla,
unity
y la unidad
International
defilosofia,
4-10Octubre,
1948.Actas,Madrid1949,Vol.
Barcelona,
gresso
delafilosofa
metafsica
enFrancisco
1, 159-196;also:J. R. Sepich,Naturaleza
primera
125

13:15:24 PM

A whole area is opened up by the predication of certain terms of

God. For instance, He is called Creator,28Agent29(Cause, Mover) or
Lord30with referenceto His creatures. Or His attributes,ideas, and
actions are multiplied from the multiplicityof His creatures.31The
withregard
tomedieval
Surez
nominalism,
, ibid.,Vol. 3, 493-504.Forthequestion
cf.A. Maurer,C.S.B., Ockham'
s Conception
, in: Mediaeval
oftheUnity
ofa Science
Studies,20 (1958),98-112.
28Cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
., disp.47,sec.15,
disp.39,sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 512);ibid
no. 26 (p. 846).
29Cf.Ibid,ydisp.48, sec.4, no. 9 (Vol. 26,p. 891).It shouldbe notedherethatthe
or evenmainly,a matter
Suareziannaturaltheology
is notmerely,
of extrinsic
a common
denomination.
Instead,fromthestartit presupposes
conceptofbeing,
andGod.The famous
Suarezian"analogyofinwhichis intrinsic
tobothcreatures
onthe
trinsic
attribution"
follows
uponthisconcept;on this,seeJ. P. DoyleSuarez
XLVI (1969),219-249and 323-341.
yin: The ModernSchoolman,
Analogy
ofBeing
theissueofacSuarezcanhaveitso,without
Thefurther
iswhether
begging
question
onthis,seeidem
cesstoGodbywayofdemonstration;
, TheSuarezian
Proof
forGod'sExinthe
A Symposium
toHonor
istence
, in:History
Professor
James
Making:
ofEssays
ofPhilosophy
D.C. 1982,105-117.
D. Collins
, ed L. J.Thro,S.T. Washington,
30Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.30,sec.5, no. 5 (Vol. 26,p. 87); ibid.y
disp.47,sec.15,
similes
no.26(p. 846).Alsocf."... hocmodosalvatur
multae
denominationes
absque
sicenimdicitur
Deuscreator
fiatinredenominata;
additione
aliqua,quae intrinsece
velsinistra;
veldominus
siccolumna
dicitur
dextra
sicpariesdicitur
extempore;
visus,
thislasttextispartoftheconfiretc." ibid.y
disp.47,sec. 1,no.4 (p. 782).Although
isthe
Suarezwouldprobably
mation
ofa "difficulty",
agreewithit.Whatis striking
and
extrinsic
between
theparadigm
denomination
ofthecolumn
equationitcontains
certain
ofGod.
designations
31Suarez,De DivinaSubstantia
I, . 13,nos.2, 3, 5, and7 (Vol. 1, pp. 38-40);ibid.y
, disp.7, sec. 1,nos.4 and5 (Vol.
III, c. 5, nos. 15-18(pp. 213-214);Disp.Metaphys.
thatthe
25, p. 251); ibid.y
disp.30, sec. 6, no. 13 (Vol. 26, p. 93). Let us remark
to
heremaynotbe entirely
extrinsic.
rationis
ratiocinatae
distinctiones
For,in addition
of
ofcreatures,
a basisinthemultiplicity
theyalsohavea basisintheeminence
having
... essedebetveleminentia
God;cf."Undefundamentum,
ipsiusrei,quamsicmens
... velcertehabitudo
penesquas
aliquaad resaliasvereetinredistinctas,
distinguit,
seu concipitur."
talisdistinctio
Ibid.y
disp.7, sec. 1, no. 4 (Vol. 25,p.
excogitatur,
notethatsomeoftheseare
rationis
, letus further
251). On thepointofdistinctiones
raentia
as theyfallbetween
denominated
inasmuch
themselves
such,
onlyextrinsically
anddarkness,
tionis.
Forexample,
blindness
exist,
although
theydo notas suchreally
ofreason;cf."Possuntautemin"exseyiandnotfrom
arestilldistinct
anyoperation
realiter
diciproprie
duoentiarationis,
terdum
distingui,
quae nonpossunt
distingui
et
ratione
distingui
proprie
equeetiamdicipossunt
quiaentiarealianonsunt;tarnen
sed ex se vere
rationis,
intrinsece,
quia eo modoquo sunt,nonjam ex fictione
etiamfictis
enessepotest
Namcumdistinctio
negatiosit,communis
distinguuntur.
de distinctione
tibus,etitapotiusestilladistinctio
quasirealis,sicutsupradicebamus
interrelationem
similisenimintelligitur
et caecitatem;
intertenebras
specieiad inetinequinaad sua;ita
innaturahumanaad sua individua,
dividua,quae concipitur
realiter
essent
interse,quod,si realesessent,
illaeduaerelationes
enimcomparantur
no. 7
realiter
distinctos."
et terminos
habentenimfundamenta
ibid.y
distinguendae;
as therelahereinasmuch
ad infinitum
letus notea kindofregressus
(p. 252). Finally,
denominations
founded
tionsofspecies,
whicharethemselves
(seetexts
uponextrinsic
126

13:15:24 PM

other side of the coin is that those same creatures are "possible",
Suarez tells us, by extrinsicdenomination fromthe power of God.32
Other examples come fromeconomic, social, and morad realities.
Money, forinstance, becomes the price of a thing,or somethingelse
becomes collateral (pignus
), by extrinsicdenomination.33All contracts
between buyers and sellers, or even those between husbands and
wives, inasmuch as theyproceed fromthe will of the contractingparties, are constituted and are binding by extrinsic denomination.34
Again, the mutual designationsof master and slave, teacher (and student), king (and subject), as well as jurisdiction(ownership) and servitude themselves, reduce to extrinsic denominations.35 Likewise,
fame and honor are ultimatelymatters of extrinsicdenomination.36
And human acts, especially acts commanded in other powers by the
will, are free,moral, good, bad, prohibited,or prescribedby extrinsic
denomination.37
Signs especially arbitrary(ad placitum)signs- speech itself(which,
ofcourse, entails the order thatis syntax),and, in the area of theology,
sacraments,seem all to be mattersof extrinsicdenomination.38Second
intentionsfollowingthe threeoperations of conception,judgment and
inference(e.g. universal, species, genus, subject, predicate, proposition, antecedent, consequent, etc.), have the status of rational relations proximatelyfounded upon extrinsicdenominations.39
whichis onlyextoinnote39,below)aresaidtobe distinct
referred
bya distinction
denominated
"rationis".
trinsically
32Cf.e.g. "... perdenominationem
extrinsecam
a potentia
Dei, ..." Disp.Metaphys.,
a
denominationem
disp.31, sec. 2, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 230); "... perextrinsecam
potentia
agente..." ibid.,disp.43,prol.(p. 633).Alsocf.below,notes128,143,158,
163,164,165,166,174,193,and 194.
33Disp.Metaphys
St.
., disp.30, sec. 5, no. 5 (Vol. 26, p. 87). Suarezacknowledges
De Trinitate
It shouldbe noted,
V, c. 16,as thesourceoftheseexamples.
Augustine,
thatSt. Augustine
doesnotspeakof"extrinsic
denomination"
as such.
however,
34Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54,sec.6, no. 6 (Vol. 26,p. 1040),textinnote192,below.
35Ibid.; alsodisp.39,sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 512);andSuarez,De bonitate
etmalitia
humanorum
actuum
, disp.1, c. 2, no. 19(Vol. 4, p. 285),textin note187,below.
36Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54, sec.4, no. 1 (Vol. 26, p. 1028);ibid.,no. 8 (p. 1030).
37Ibid., disp.19,sec.
5, no.3 (Vol. 25,pp. 711-712);
ibid.,no. 17(p. 716);ibid.,disp.
39,sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 512);disp.54, sec.2, no. 17(p. 1023);andSuarez,De
, . 15,no. 4 (Vol. 5, p. 145).
Legibus,
38Disp.Metaphys
., disp.41,sec.3, nos.1-2(Vol.26,pp.595-596);ibid.,disp.54,sec.
denomination
withrespect
tosacraments,
cf.notes
6, no.6 (p. 1040).Butonextrinsic
54 and208,below.
39Ibid.,disp.6, sec.6, no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 228);sec.7, no.4 (p. 230);disp.54,sec.6,
nos.8-9(Vol. 26,pp. 1040-1041).
Letus note,however,
thatforSuarezsacraments
cannotbe reducedtomerely
extrinsic
on this,cf.notes54 and208,
denominations;
below.
127

13:15:24 PM

I have mentioned the order which is in numbers. But also numbers

themselves,which are collectionsof units, come to be permodumunius
only by extrinsic denomination from the mind's conception.40
Arithmetic,the science which considersthe properties(e.g. odd, even,
finite)and associations (e.g. as equal, unequal, addable, subtractable,
multipliable, divisible, etc.) of numbers, is based upon the same
denomination.41
denomination
to Suarez
II. Somereasons
according
forand sourcesofextrinsic
On occasion, Suarez comes close to reducing extrinsicdenomination to the ways in whichpeople talk.42Such would seem to be the case
in every instance of an analogy of proportionality,which for him
always involves an element of metaphor.43Naturally, also, wherever
we would have ad placitumsigns we would be dealing with extrinsic
denominations rooted in people's conventions.44But contrariwise,
Suarez can and does sharply distinguish"real" extrinsicdenomination froma mere impositionof names.45
40Ibid., disp.41, sec. 1, no. 16(Vol. 26, p. 591).
41Ibid., nos. 17-20(pp. 592-593).
42Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys.,
hespeaksof
disp.3, sec.2, no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 110),where
as
inthetranscendental
oftruth
andgoodness
thedenominations
involved
properties
"tumin rebus,turnin usuhominum".
reasonandutility
havingsufficient
43Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.28,sec.3, no.4 (Vol. 26,pp. 13-14).On theinvolvement
cf.ibid.,no. 11(p. 16);ibid.,disp.32,sec.2, no.
ofmetaphor
ineverysuchanalogy,
13(p. 323);disp.39,sec.3, no. 1 (p. 523);no. 12(p. 527);ibid.,disp.8, sec.7, nos.
21 and22
25, pp. 302-303).
44Cf.e.g.(Vol.
usumhominum
"... signaad placitum,
instituuntur,
quaead communem
etdisputastabiliimponuntur, Suarez,Commentarti
communi
legeac consuetudine
intertiam
Partem
D. Thomae:
tiones
De Sacramentis,
Q. 60, art.3, disp.1, sec. 3, no. 7
tantum
eximpositione,
significant
atqueadeo
(Vol. 21,p. 21); "... signaad placitum
..." ibid.,Q. 63,art.4, disp.11,sec.2, no. 2 (p.
extrinsecam,
perdenominationem
to in note38, above,andcf.note47,below.
194).Alsosee thetextsreferred
45Cf. "... sed nuncnonagimusde impositione
hocenimmodoetiam
nominum,
estopusranominis
ad impositionem
denominatio
denominativi,
intrinseca,
quantum
in quibustalia,
aut habitudinibus,
tionis;sed agimusde ipsarumrerumunionibus
sedindenominatione
nominafundantur,
denominativa
quaenonsuntoperarationis,
extrnseca
autaliquidsimile;indenominatione
estrealisuniovelidentitas,
intrinseca
ut
realisuniusreiad aliam,exqua provenit
esthabitudo
quaeex rebusipsissumitur,
habitudinis.
alterius
denominetur
illares,ad quamesthabitudo,
permodumtermini
tamrelationem
autemcomprehendimus
Sub habitudine
quam
praedicamentalem
transcendentalem."
disp.54,sec.2, no. 10(Voi.26,p. 1020).To this
Disp.Metaphys.,
inpassing
letus remark
notes.Meanwhile,
insubsequent
textwewillreturn
pregnant
ofnamesseemsall thereis when"being"is saidofan ensrathata mereimposition
cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
tionis-,
disp.4, sec.8, no.4 (Vol. 25,p. 138);ibid.,disp.54,sec.1,
deAnima,
no. 9 (Vol. 26,p. 1017);Suarez,Tractatus
IV, . 2, no. 4 (Vol. 3, p. 714).
128

13:15:24 PM

As noted in the last section,thingsmay be denominatedextrinsically inasmuch as they are the objects of knowing powers or their activities.46The most salient case of this is when thingsare designated
known or conceived, thatis to say " objective concepts", fromthe formal concepts to which they are related as objected.47Other instances
are provided by sense powers. Thus, things may be extrinsically
denominatedseen or visible, heard or audible, fromsightand hearing,
whose objects they are.48 In these and other cases of extrinsic
denomination, thingsdesignated are in no way affectedintrinsically.
They are in themselvesthe same before and after.49
is
wherethere
., disp.45,sec.4, no.9 (Vol. 26 pp. 750-751),
Also,seeDisp.Metaphys
an interesting
relation
ofextrinsic
and
denomination
to thereality
(?) ofprimary
exhere,at timesSuarezdoesnotso sharply
Finally
distinguish
secondary
qualities.
trinsic
denomination
from
an imposition
ofnames;cf.e.g. De Legibus,
I, . 2, no. 2,
textin note58,below.
46Cf. in note10,above.
47Cf.esp.Disp.Metaphys
treat., disp.2, sec. 1,no. 1 (Vol. 25,pp.64-65).Forfuller
andtheobjective
mentofthedistinction
theformal
seeJ. P. Doyle,
between
concept,
Suarez
ontheAnalogy
ofBeing
(citedinnote29,above),esp.pp. 224-228.A cluetothe
in theuse ofsignsmaybe detected
whenformal
conroleofextrinsic
denomination
"... non
arecalled"things
concepts
ceptsarecalled"signs"andobjective
signified";
de signisipsis,sedde resignificata,
de conceptibus
sedde
tractamus
formalibus
..." Disp.Metaphys
., disp.29, sec.3, no. 34 (Voi. 26,p. 59).
objectivis
48Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.3, sec.1, no. 7 (Voi. 25,p. 105);ibid.,disp.16,sec.
1,no. 24(p. 574);disp.54,sec.2, no.9 (Voi. 26,p. 1020);anddisp.47,sec. 14,no.
5, textin note50 below.
49Cf."... resutcognita,
velutrepraesentata,
etrepraesenquandoverecognoscitur
illudquodin se habet;quodsolum
tatur,nonhabetaliudesseobjectivum,
praeter
a cognidicitur
actuesseobjectum
talicognitioni
extrinsecam
perdenominationem
tionequae terminatur
ad ipsum,sicutresvisa in esseobjectivo
visus,si
respectu
seu in actuprimo,nihilaliuddicitpraeter
sumatur
in aptitudine,
ipsumessecoloratumautlucidum,
utactuvisa,nihiladdit
quodinse reshabet.Si autemsumatur
nisidenominationem
a visione;..." Disp.Metaphys
extrinsecam
., disp.8, sec.1,no.4
like"known"or"seen",whilethey
(Voi. 25,p. 276).Noteherethatdenominations
tothethings
or
areextrinsic
denominated,
presuppose
aptitudes
(e.g. "knowability"
tobe so denominated.
inthosethings
areultimately
not
Theseaptitudes
"visibility")
ofthosethings.
A fewpointsonthis:(1)
different
from
thebeing(actualorpotential)
Prima
or nottheaptitudes
or
as to whether
of"knowability"
faciethereis question
are reallydifferent
fromthe "similarity"
which,in the instanceof
"visibility"
a totally
"similar"things,
denomination
extrinsic
prevents
(cf.note20, above).For
whichis invarying
foruniversal
can
suchsimilarity,
thefoundation
degrees
concepts,
itself
beeither
actualormerely
., disp.6, sec.2, no.
aptitudinal
(cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
14(Vol. 25, pp. 210-211).(2) The aptitudes
in question
herearenotdifultimately
ferent
from
realessences,
as theyare"apt" to
whichare,in fact,realonlyinasmuch
back
., disp.2, sec.4, no.3 (Vol. 25,p. 88). (3) Referring
exist;cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
ofa scientonote27,above- whileSuarezis ambivalent
oftheunity
onthequestion
tific
sometenuous
denomination
habit,he doesavoidtotalextrinsic
bymaintaining
intheobject(i.e. thescibile)
itself:
cf."Cumergoestsermode objecto
scibili,
aptitude
129

13:15:24 PM

Things may be extrinsicallydenominated also inasmuch as theyare

actual or possible objects of the will or of sense appetition. So things
may be extrinsically denominated loved or lovable, desired or
desirable, delightfulor delectable.50 Additional examples may be
gleaned fromthe listingin the last section. A point to mark in thisconnection is that certain denominations, e.g., "moral", may be extrinbetween the
sically applied in an analogical order ofpriusand posterius
internalacts of the will itselfand what it commands in otherpowers or
other things.51
But, prior to all subjective operations of knowledge or appetition,
very important sources for extrinsic denomination lie in things
themselves.According to Suarez, things can be extrinsically
denominated fromotherthingsfora varietyof reasons. They may be
the (natural) signs (or effects)of those things, they may be their
causes, or theymay be theiroccasions.52On such bases, termswhich
are analogous by what Suarez calls an extrinsicanalogy of attribution
are said of the secondary analogates by extrinsicdenomination.53
Ultimately, I believe, Suarez's sourcing extrinsicdenomination in
things themselves reflectshis Catholic theology of grace and the
a sciennonsignificai
illudessescibile
denominationem
utsic,danteunitatem
scientiae,
ut subunamscientiam
caderepossit;quae quidem
tia,sedaptitudinem
proximam,
exparteejussupponitur."
., disp.44,sec. 11,no.64(Vol.26,
Disp.Metaphys
aptitudo
haveno realbeing,theyhaveno
p. 714).(4) Since"beingsofreason"{entia
rationis)
Neither
in
suchaptitude.
do theyhaveanyknowability
or anytranscendental
truth
Cf. "... licetentiarationis,
eo modoquo cognoscuntur,
themselves.
dicipossint
habereconformitatem,
tarnen,quia, ex se non habentintelligibilitatem,
neque
veritatem
habent,
disp.8, sec.7,no.36(Vol.25,p. 307).
quaeestpassioentis."Ibid,
FortheAristotelian
As weshallseebelow,"beingsofreason"canhavelogicaltruth.
Paris
Leproblme
del'tre
chez
onthislastpoint(4),cf.P. Aubenque,
Aristote,
background
1962,esp. 110.
50Cf."si verositde scibili
talia
autdescitoetamatoformaliter
etappetibili,
quatenus
a potentia
velactu,..."
denominationem
sunt,utrumque
completur
perextrinsecam
., disp.47,sec.14,no.5 (Vol. 26,p. 838).Alsosee:ibid.,disp.10,sec.
Disp.Metaphys
1,no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 332);ibid.,sec.2, no. 15(p. 340);ibid.,disp.54,sec.2, no. 17
(Vol. 26, p. 1023).
51Cf.Suarez,De bonitate
humanorum
actuum
etmalitia
, disp.1, c. 2, n. 20,textinnote
Incf.Disp.Metaphys.,
character
ofpriorandposterior,
187,below.On theanalogical
dexlocup.V, c. 11 (Vol. 25, p. xxii).
52Cf."Secundocenseo,rescognitas
cognitionis
perextrinsecam
posseab hacventate
etquodhabet
diciveras,... nam,sicutsanumdicitur,
ac denominationem
analogiam
verumdicipotestet
et quod causatet significat
illam,ita in praesente
sanitatem,
illamsignificans,
et resipsa,
et vocalispropositio
judiciumhabenshancveritatem,
illam."Disp.Metaphys.,
causat,velfundat
disp.8, sec.8, no. 10(Vol.25,p.
quatenus
310); alsocf.ibid.,disp.9, sec. 1, no. 19(p. 319).
53Ibid.,disp.28, sec. 3, no. 4 (Vol. 26, p. 14); no. 14 (pp. 17-18);no. 22 (p. 21);
ibid.,disp.32, sec.2, no. 14(p. 323);nos. 16 and 19(p. 324).
130

13:15:24 PM

sacraments.54But its importance now forus is that it runs counter to

what at firstseems to be the main mark of extrinsicdenomination,
viz., its dependence upon the perceptions and/or the purposes of a
namer. It was my own pre-judgment that extrinsic denomination
would always have this character for Suarez, and it was with this in
mind that I originallyset out to look forrules governingits use which
mightanticipate the Kantian a priori.But, as I have said, for Suarez
extrinsicdenominationis notjust an impositionof names. Neitheris it
always rooted in the complexion of a knower. Instead, an important
attributeof what he terms "real" extrinsicdenomination is that it is
rooted in things themselves, in their coordinations, dispositions, or
relations( habitudines
theirconnections( con),55theirunions (uniones),56
nexiones
),57 their causalities ( causalitates
),58 their conditions
54Cf.e.g. SuarezonGrace:"... ostensum
estautemhancgratiam
nonconsistere
in
sedinaliquaintrinseca
denominatone
animae."De Gratia
extrnseca,
, lib.
perfectione
"Nihilominus
Veritas
Catholicaest,
6, cap. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 9, p. 9); onJustification:
hominemconstitui
verejustumcoramDeo per gratiamilli infusameique in4
haerentem."
Ibid.,lib. 7, cap. 7, no. 4 (p. 131);on theEucharist:
'Deinde,ilium
adesseibi,quodanteconsecrationem
nonerat,etnonestdenominatio
in
extrnseca
nisitantum
nonessetChristus,
Christi;
ipsocorpore
quia,cumanteconsecrationem
nonpotest,ut denuofiatrealiter
in celo,intelligi
praesensterrae,et propinquus
illisnonmutatis,
denominarebus,a quibusanteadistabat,
persolamextrinsecam
" Commentarii
Christi.
etDisputationem,
absquealiquonovomodorealiinipsocorpore
intertiam
D . Thomas:
tiones
Partem
De Eucharistia
, Q. 75, art.1, disp.47, sec. 7 no. 2
"character"
onthesoulbyBaptism,
Con(Voi. 22,p. 44); ontheintrinsic
imprinted
firmation
andHolyOrders:"Dicendumveroest,haectriasacramenta,
baptismum,
etOrdinem,
inanimacharacterem."
Ibid.: DeSacramento
confirmationem,
,
imprimere
ofDurandus
). 63,art.4, disp.11,sec.1 (Vol. 21,p. 190)andontheopinion
saying
thatthischaracter
is onlya relation
ofreasonor an extrinsic
denomination:
"Nunc
verononpotesthaecopinioab errorein fidevindicari,
definitiones
Concil.
propter
Florent,
et Trident.,quae docent,characterem
esse spitituale
signumanimaeimIbid.,sec.2, no. 1 (p. 193).Alsocf.note209,below.
pressum."
55Passim
; cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.37,sec.2, n. 14,textinnote14,above;ibid.,
disp.54,sec.2, nos.9-11(Vol.26,p. 1020),textpartially
giveninnote45,above.For
a context
inwhich
habitudo
is conceived
as a relatio
secundum
esse
, seeibid.,disp.6, no.8
or
(Vol. 25, p. 277). Noticethatsuch a relationcan be eithertranscendental
predicamental;
againlookat thetextin note45.
56Disp.Metaphys.,
of
disp.54,sec.2, no. 10,textaboveinnote45.On some
meanings
"union",cf.ibid.,disp.15,sec.6, no. 10(Vol. 25,p. 521).Notethatwhilea union
sucha denomination
doesnotgiverise
denomination,
maybethebasisofan extrinsic
toa union;see ibid.,disp.16,sec. 1, no. 24 (p. 574).
57Suarez,De bon.etmal.hum.act.,disp.2, c. 2, no. 17
(Vol. 4, p. 296); forconnexio
matter
andform
between
ofanopinion
whichSuarezrejects),
cf.Disp.
(inthecontext
Metaphys.,
disp.15,sec. 7, no. 9 (Vol. 25, p. 528).
58Cf. e.g. Disp.Metaphys.,
disp. 13, sec. 9, nos. 7-9(Vol. 25, pp. 430-431).For
tothe
"causality"withan "orderofnature"following
uponit,in contradistinction
"orderofreason"whichfollows
from
our"inadequate
cf.ibid.,disp.15,
concepts",
sec. 7, no. 5 (p. 523); cf. "... aliudestloquide ordine,seu derivatione,
quoad
131

13:15:24 PM

,59 their inclinations ( inclinationes

(conditiones)
),60 their capacities
,61theircoexistences( coexistentiae
{capacitates)
),62theiragreements(convenientiae),63their concomitances (-concomitantiae
),64 their similarities
similitudines
etc.
Let
us
note
while
all
of these are in some
that,
(
),65
sense realities, theydo not belong to the same category. Thus, some
appear to be qualities, othersto be relations(or perhaps, ifa real relation includes a subject, a term and a foundation,66they may be the
aliudquoaddenominationem,
seunominis
..." Suarez,
causalitatem,
impositionem;
De Legibus
"...
, I, . 2, no. 2, (Vol. 5, p. 4); cf.note190,below.Also,consider:
causalitas
dicitrelationem
velhabitudinem
etideopostulare
transcendentalem,
potest
consortium
resautem,a qua estcausalitas,
essemagisabsoluta,
etnon
alterius;
potest
actusedaptitudine
tantum
societatem
alterius
postulare/'
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.15,
sec. 7, no. 11(Vol. 25,p. 528).ForSuarezon thegeneral
character
ofcausality,
see
ofa realorderofthings
inthe
ibid.,disp.12,sec.2, no. 13(p. 387).Forhimspeaking
cf.ibid.,disp.47, sec. 1, no. 14 (Vol. 26,p. 785).On "commensuratio"
as
universe,
realfollowing
inthings
cf.ibid.,disp.40,sec.3,
themselves,
something
uponcausality
no. 10(p. 541).
59Disp. Metaphys.,
disp.10,sec. 1, no. 20 (Vol 25, p. 335).
60Ibid., no. 12(p. 332).
61Ibid..
62Ibid.yalso:disp.6, sec.1,no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 204);disp.47,sec.4, no. 19(Vol.26,
p. 804).
63Ibid.,disp.10,sec. 1, no. 12(Vol. 25, p. 332);disp.6, sec. 1, no. 12(p. 204).
64Ibid.,disp.8, sec.2, nos.9, 10,and12(Vol. 25,pp. 279-280).Alsoibid.,disp.15,
"
.
sec. 7, no. 3 (p. 522),where" concomitantia
appearstobe equatedwith"habitudo"
Thislastwillbe notedagainat 166and 173,below.
65Cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.6, sec.1,no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 204);disp.47,sec.4, no. 19
of"similar",cf.notes20 and49,aboveand
(Vol. 26,p. 804).On thedenomination
149,below.
66PaulusDezza, S .J.hassummarized
a longstanding
within
theSuarecontroversy
"... athiauctores
induasclassesdividuntur:
zianschoolas follows:
(a) aliiidentifcant
sitmeraconditio
itautterminus
ad hocut
relationem
cum(subjecto
et) fundamento
connotatores
deturrelatio
realis.Ita SUAREZ,PESCH, FRICK etc.quivocantur
quia
relationem
identifcant
cum(subjectoet) fundamento
terminm;
proutconnotai
ita
ut
teralii
fundamento
et
termino
etiam
identifcant
relationem
cum
subjecto
(b)
Ita Nominales,URRABURU, SCHIFFINI,
relationis.
minussit constitutivum
Romae1948,333,J.J. Urraburu,
etc.". Metaphysica
Generalis,
S.J.,hadsummed
up
"Tertiavero
as follows:
his side'sview,forwhichhe claimsSuarez's adherence,
cumfundamento
sententia
relationem
extremo,
proutinutroque
adequateidentificai
v.g. similitudinis
inPetroetPaulo
itautrelatio,
etnonsolumin subjecto,
reperitur,
in albedineutriusque.Et haec est comexistenssecundumalbedinemconsistt
nostrorum
munissima
auctorum
sententia
apud LudovicumLossada,quam puto
ad connotatorum
etiamtenereDoctorem
Eximium,
partes
quidquiddicantnonnuli,
hisintertrahere
volentes."Ontologia,
Vallisoleti
iliuminvitem
1891,997.To support
makesreference
ofthe"Outstanding
Doctor"Suarez'sdoctrine,
Urraburu
pretation
10
and
also
to
to:Disp.Metaphys.,
sec.
nos.
and
14,
7, sec.2, no. 3.
47,
8,
disp.
disp.
an unambiguous
oftheintercontains
noneofthesethree
However,
proof
paragraphs
to support
hisviewofSuarez.But,I believe,
Dezza givesno references
pretation.
somebasisforitcanbe gleanedfrom:
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec.2, no.3 (Vol.26,
intheSuarezian
p. 786);ibid.,no. 22(p. 792);ibid.,no. 23 (p. 793).On bothparties
132

13:15:24 PM

foundationsof real relations). At least one, depending on how it is

viewed, appears to be eitheran action or a passion.67And some are examples of that elusive entity, the Suarezian "mode", which is
distributedthroughoutthe categories.68
Even the very act of the intellectitselfis a thing{forma
) with a real
or
relation
habitudo
toward
another
which
is its obdisposition
(
)
thing
This
is
not
the
Rather
mind
ject.69
disposition
mind-dependent.
somehow depends upon it and presupposes it in its operations.70The
same can be said in the case of the will and its act. When the intellect
knows that somethingis loved, the "being known" (essecognitum)
involved in this is not all that is there. For in actual realitylove tends
toward and terminatesin a thing- and this is what it is forthat thing
to be loved.71
A notable corollaryof all this is that Suarez, faced with the traditional choice between ens reale and ens rationis
, locates extrinsic
denomination reductivelysub latitudineentisrealis.72This reduction,
which decisivelycasts the die in favorof extrinsicdenomination being
a featureof thingsratherthan an affairof mere naming, sharplyconschool,as wellas JohnofSt. Thomas,vis vistheearlierThomistic
school,cf.A.
La doctrine
dela relation
chezSaintThomas
, Paris1952,253-254.
Krempel,
67Cf.e.g. "... eademestcausalitas
a qua et effectus
denominatur
causari,etcausa
"
causare.
., disp.13,sec.9, no.9 (Vol. 25,p. 431);"...causatioipsaut
Disp.Metaphys
sicduplicem
illamhabitudinem
essentialiter
ad causamutad principium,
et
includit,
ad efectum
utad terminm,
etideoutrumque
alterum
denominat,
causans,alterum
causatum."Ibid.,no. 5, (p. 429). Also,cf.note185,below.
' and
68For4'condition'
"causality"as modes,cf.e.g. ibid.,disp.16,sec. 1, no. 23
fora relation,
cf.ibid.,disp.
(Vol. 25,p. 573).Notethatactionis botha "condition"
47,sec.12,no.8 (Vol. 26,p. 833),anda real"mode",cf.disp.48,sec.4, nos.7 and
13(pp.890-891).
Also,passionisa mode;cf.e.g.ibid.,disp.49,sec.1,no.3 (p. 898).
On theSuarezian"modes",as theyaredistributed
thecategories,
cf.J. I.
through
La teora
delosmodos
enSuarez
Alcorta,
, Madrid1949,esp.229-313.
69Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.54, sec. 2, no. 11(Vol. 26, 1020).
70Ibid.,nos. 10-11.
of intelligence
On the "intentional"
character
to
according
La gnoseologia
213-216.In thisconnection,
Suarez,seeJ. Alejandro,
..., esp. 192-195,
letus notethetendential
ofanyrelation,
character
thetranscendental
relaincluding
tioninvolved
in knowledge;
cf.e.g. "Et ratiouniversalis
et
est,quia cumrespectus
habitudo
sitvelutitendentia
quaedamad aliud,..." Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec.4,
no. 4 (Vol. 26, p. 800).
71Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54, sec.2, no. 13(Vol. 26, p. 1021).
72Cf."Quocirca,si praecise
indenominatione
sistamus
extrnseca
a forproveniente
ma reali,etab aliquaejushabitudine
nonficta,sedvera,etinreipsaexistente,
non
existimo
ad ens rationis,
sed comprehendi
sub latitudinem
entisrealis,
pertinere
saltem
exparteformae
denominantis."
Ibid., no. 14.Atother
Suarez
times,
however,
canregard
extrinsic
denomination
as something
unreal;cf.e.g. ibid.,disp.47,sec.4,
no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 799).
133

13:15:24 PM

trasts with the doctrine of his order-brother,Gabriel Vasquez

(1549-1604), for whom it is contradictoryto speak of an extrinsic
denomination as being in things, prior to the activityof a knower or
namer.73Suarez's view also stands in contrastto that later expressed
by the Dominican, John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), who just as
.74But, for
decisively regards extrinsicdenomination as an ens rationis
Suarez himself,the option taken here will enable extrinsicdenomination both to functionad modumpassionis75 in things and to provide a
,76including relations of reason.77
(real) foundationforentiarationis
in connection
withthe
denomination
III. Suarez's use ofextrinsic
and
properties categories
ofbeing
1. The Transcendental
Properties
of Truthand Goodness
It may be too much to say that in his metaphysicsSuarez tries to
can
metaphysicae
spell realityfromthe top down. Still, the Disputationes
it
with
a
common
inasmuch
as
that
concept of
begins
impression
give
its main
its
and
being and proceeds to spell out its properties, causes,
divisions.78That concept itself,specificallythe common objective con),79 is in fact an extrinsic
cept of being as a noun ( ens ut nomen
73Cf. "Secundoexistimo,
non esse realemaliquam
anteintellectus
operationem
cum sit
ab aliqua re, aut formaextrnseca.
denominationem
Quia denominatio
et resquae absolutain se est,si relate
nominis
io, estetiamopusrationis,
appellai
nomina
enima nobis
denominatur:
relateearnconcipiente
ab intellectu
denominatur,
concedere
ut
de
rebus
id
sunt,
quare
concipimus,
significemus:
quod
imposita
conrealemantequemcumque
denominationem
intellectum,
aliquamextrinsecam
exestalicujusintellectionis
inobjecto:namsiestdenominatio,
tradictionem
implicat
'
inprimam
SanciiThomae,
acdisputationum
disp.115,cap.
partem
pressionCommentariorum
2, no. 2 (ed. Lugduni1631),Tom. II, p. 32.
74LogicaII, P., Q. II, Art.I, ed. Reiser(Taurini,1930),Tom.I, pp.288-289,
some
of
textinnote132,below.Fora contemporary
view,presented
againsta background
Extrinsic
DenominaD.
cf.
and
of
St.
Thomas,
Beach,
Analogous
Naming,
J.
Cajetan John
XLII (1965), 198-213,esp.
, in: The ModernSchoolman,
tion,andtheRealOrder
205-206.
75Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.3, sec. 1, no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 107);ibid.,disp.54,sec.4,
ofthis,cf.ibid.,disp.8, sec. 7, nos.
no. 9 (Vol. 26, p. 1030).Forsometempering
21-22(Vol. 25, pp. 302-303);alsoibid.,disp.10,sec. 3, nos.5 (p. 348).
76Cf. "... haec est propriaratiovel fundamentum
entiumrationis,..." Disp.
no.
1
sec.
3, sec. 1,no. 10(p. 106);
ibid.,
25,
1,
2,
disp.
(Vol. p. 65);
Metaphys.,
disp.
disp.54, sec. 1, no. 6 (Vol. 26,p. 1016).
77Disp.Metaphys.,
ibid.,sec.6 (pp. 1039ff.).
disp.54,sec.4, no. 9 (pp. 1030-1031);
78Fora summary
oftheDisputationes
ofthegroundplan
, cf.
Metaphysicae
presentation
ontheAnalogy
ofBeing..., 222-223.
J. P. Doyle,Suarez
79Forthedistinction
andbeingas a noun,cf.ibid.,pp.
between
beingas a participle
225,228-231.
134

13:15:24 PM

denomination.80My concern here, however, is one step beyond, with

the first synthetic moments in the progression of Suarezian
metaphysicalscience. More precisely,my focus is on the distinction,
whichthe AristotelianSuarez requires forscientificdiscursus,between
being and its propertiesof truthand goodness.81
Obviously, forprogresssome distinctionis necessary. But ifthe propertiesof being are really other than being, theywould appear to be
non-being. They would add nothing to being and they would be
unable to functionfor a scientificdiscursus in metaphysics. In that
event, metaphysicswould become at best a perfectlynugatoryconcentration on being as such.82 To avoid this, Suarez has distinguished
threeproperties,each tenuouslyand yetsomehow understandablydifferentfrombeing. These threeare: unity,constitutedby the negation
of division, and two others, truthand goodness, arising in extrinsic
denominations, respectivelyof intellectand appetite.83I am leaving
unity aside, to consider firsttruthand then goodness.
Truth as a transcendentalpropertyof being, Suarez tells us, does
not consistinjust an extrinsicdenomination. His own words here defy
paraphrase:
"We do notassertthat(such)denomination
aloneis theproperty,
butrather
beconceived
undersucha characteristic
Fromthisithaping(entitas
) itself
{ratio).
thisattribute
oftruth
no newperfection
orrealcharacter
will
pensthatthrough
beexplicated
inbeingitself,
butthecharacter
ofbeingitself
willonlybe morefultocognition,
... And,becausethisrelalyexpressed
byrelation
(perhabitudinem)
tionhappens
somehow
tobeingitself
as suchandis insomeway,atleastaccordto it (although
it is alwaysconjoined
withit), truth
ingto reason,posterior
80Disp.Metaphys
., disp.2, sec. 2, no. 8 (Vol. 25, p. 72); ibid..sec.4, no. 3 (p. 88).
81Cf.ibid,
ofmetaphysical
ydisp.3, sec. 1,no. 1 (Vol. 25,p. 103).Forthediscursus
science
toa non-discursive
offirst
alsocf.ibid.,disp.
subsequent
knowledge
principles,
1, sec.5, no. 30 (pp. 45-46).
82"... aliasnullomodo
dicipossent
seuattributa,
dicere
proprietates
essetque
nugatio
ensesseunumautbonum;oportet
ergoutde formali
ens;
significent
aliquidpraeter
..." Disp.Metaphys
cf.P.
., disp.3, sec.1,no. 11(Vol.25,p. 106).Forthesamepoint,
Fonseca,S.J.,InMetaphys.
Arist.y
IV, c. 2, q. 6 (ed. Coloniae,1615),Vol. 1,col.790;
andearlier,
St. Thomas:De Veritate
Theol.
. I, q. 11,a. 1, ob. 1.
, q. 1, art.1; Summa
83"... passiones
entisdebent
adderealiquid
aliquidadderesupraens,etnonpossunt
velpositivm
seuperdenominationem
reale;ergovelnegativum,
positivm
rationis,
autconvenientiam
ad aliquidextrinsecum.
Priorimodoconstituitur
passiounius,...
Posteriori
modoconstituuntur
duaealiaepassiones,
unaperrespectum
seuconvenientiamad intellectum;
alia perhabitudinem
et convenientiam
ad appetitum
et volunet nullaealiaesuntuniversales,
et respiciunt
omne
tatem;namhae duaefacultates,
enssubdiversa
ratione."Disp.Metaphys
., disp.3, sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 25,p. 109);ibid.,
sec. 1, no. 11(p. 106).
135

13:15:24 PM

whichexpresses
thenatureofbeingthrough
thisrelation,
is calledan at(verum),
tribute
orproperty
ofit."84
What must be noticed here is that even though it alone is not constitutiveof the property,nevertheless,an extrinsicdenomination of
the intellectis somehow involved in truth,and it is preciselythiswhich
supplies the distinctionof truthfrombeing as such.85
much the same can be said of the propertyof
Servataproportione,
is
There
the added nuance that in goodness a double exgoodness.86
trinsicdenomination is involved, since beings, in order to be good,
must be true.87But, like truth,the propertyof goodness does not consist in extrinsic denomination alone. Primarily, what goodness
signifies is the intrinsic perfectionof being,88 and what it further
denominates is a certain " suitability'' (convenientia)
or "appetibility"
or
either
for
itself
to
another.90
the
identificationof
(iappetibilitas
),89
By
and
in
the
of
is
secured:
being
goodness re,
reality goodness
by the connotation of suitabilityor appetibilitythe distinctionof goodness and
being in rationedis preserved.92
84"... nonasserimus
solamdenominationem
esseproprietatem,
sedipsamentitatem
subtaliratione
nullanovaperfectio
aut
conceptum.
Quo fitutperhocveriattributum
realisratioinipsoenteexplicetur,
sedsolumdeclaretur
ratioentisper
amplius
ipsamet
ad cognitionem,
... Et,quiahaechabitudo
habitudinem
accidit
quodammodo
ipsienti
utsic,etestaliquomodosaltem
secundum
rationem
illa(quamvissemper
sit
posterior
cumilioconjuncta),
ideoverum,
declarat
naturam
entis,
quodperhanchabitudinem
seuproprietas
attributum
., disp.8, sec.7, no. 36 (Vol.
ejusdicitur."Disp.Metaphys
cf.St. Thomas,De Veritate
25, p. 307). Fora verysimilar
doctrine,
, q. 1, a. 8.
85Disp.Metaphys.
, disp.3, sec. 1, n. 11 (p. 106); ibid.,sec. 2, nos. 3 and 7 (pp.
as a property
ofbeingforSuarez,seeHansSeigfried,
On truth
Wahrheit
und
108-109).
beiSuarez
, Bonn1967,esp. 118-127andp. 130.It maybe notedherethat
Metaphysik
a viewthatwouldmaketranscendental
Suarezrejects
truth
consist
in,orevenformally
a relation
ofreason:"... passioentisrealisnonpotest
inpraedicta
consistere
include,
includere."
relatione,
., disp.8, sec. 7, no. 11
nequeillamformaliter
Disp.Metaphys
(Vol. 25, p. 298).
86Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.10,sec. 1,no. 14(Vol. 25,p. 333);ibid.,no. 20(p. 335).
87Ibid.,disp.3, sec.2, n. 9 (pp.109-110);
ibid.,no. 14(p. Ill); alsodisp.8, prol.(p.
274).
88Ibid.,disp.10,sec.3, no. 10(pp. 349-350).
89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91Thisdistinction
is rational,
witha foundation
in reality
ratiocinatae
);
(i.e. rationis
disp.10,sec. 1, no. 12 (Vol. 25, p. 332). As such,itis enoughto
Disp.Metaphys.,
will(among
thepriority
ofbeingoveritsproperty
ofgoodness,
which
priority
ground
otherthings)permitmathematical
sciencesto prescind
fromgoodness(and from
and to focusuponbeingas quantified;
cf.
demonstrations
finalcausality)
through
seemsallthatis
ibid.,sec.3, nos.19-23(pp.352-353).Alsonotethatsucha distinction
cf.ibid.,disp.
fora (scientific)
inference
a priori
from
oneproperty
toanother;
required
47, sec. 5, no. 3 (Vol. 26, p. 894).
136

13:15:24 PM

2. The Categories
ofBeing
Tracing its ancestryback to the Liber de sexprincipiistraditionally
ascribed to Gilbert de la Porree (d. 1154), 93 a common opinion in
Suarez' s day was that the last six categories (actio,passio, quando, ubi,
situs, habitus)are nothingmore than extrinsicdenominations.94Suarez
himself, in a number of places, has flatlycontradicted this view.95
Against it, his main argument is that accidents are real beings with
their own intrinsicentity;but it would be impossible forthem to be
such simplyby extrinsicdenomination, because (despite any location
it mighthave under ens reale
) this denomination posits nothingin the
denominated.96
thing
92Cf. Elisabeth
dessittlich
DieMetaphysik
Guten
beiFranzSuarez
Gemmeke,
, Freiburg
hasmuchofvalueon extrinsic
in
denomination
andgoodness
1965,154.Gemmeke
andpp. 171-177.On the
Suarez;see esp. pp. 29-32,p. 89, note145,pp. 151-157,
within
thecontext
of
general
pointbeingmadeinthetextabove,cf.Suarez,speaking
thedistinction
between
theDivineEssenceanditsattributes:
"De transcendentibus
...
entitatem
includunt
velconnotationem
seu expraeter
negationem
aliquamrationis
rationecujus concipiuntur
vero
entitatem.
trinsecam,
tanquamextra
Quidquid
realisineisest,essentiale
estentireali.'' DeDivinaSubstantia
, I, . 11,no.
perfectionis
7 (Vol. 1, p. 35).
93CriticaleditionbyA. Heysse,Liberdesexprincipiis.
in
Gilberto
Porretano
ascriptus,
ettextus
i. W. 1929(revised
character
ofthe
, Munster
Opuscula
1953).On theincorrect
cf.L. Minio-Paluello,
SexPrincipiorum
terza
, in: StudiMedievali,
ascription,
Magister
to Gilbert
in thiscontext,
see Disp.
serie,VI (1965),123-155.ForSuarezreferring
., disp.51, sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 973).
Metaphys
94Cf. Disp.Metaphys
., disp.52, sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26, p. 1007),whereSuarezattributes
thisopinion
toFonseca,"5 Metaphys.
c. 15,qu. 7". Cf.Commentariorum
Petri
Fonsecae
InMetaphysicorum
Aristotelis
Libros
, TomiQuatuor
.,
(Coloniae,1615),5 Metaphys
c. 15,q. 7, sec.3 (Vol. 2, col.868); alsoibid.,. 7, q. 2, sec. 3 (cols.435-436).
95Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.52,sec. 1,no. 2 (Vol. 26,p. 1007);ibid.,disp.39,sec.2,
nos.13-14(p. 513);ibid.,disp.51,sec.1,no.25(p. 979),andno.4 (p. 973)wherehe
also attributes
thisviewto St. Thomas:"Unde favethuicsententiae
D. Thomas,
docetomniaultimapraedicamenta
esseextrinsece
quatenusin 2 Metaph.generatim
1 part.,quaest.110,art.3, ait:
Etspecialiter
denominantia,
quodnonnulli
sequuntur.
nonestinpotentia
Mobile
secundum
locum
inquantum
ad aliquidintrinsecum,
sed
hujusmodi,
solum
adaliquid
adlocum.
Idemferehabetquaest.6, de Potent.,
art.
extrinsecum,
scilicet,
dicit:Aliquando
denominatur
abeo,quodestextra
3, et2 cont.Gent.,c. 13,expresse
aliquid
uta locodicitur
essealiquid
alicubi
localemacquiratur
et
; ergocumpermotum
ipsum,
amittatur
D. Thomas,formam
ipsumUbi, apertesentit
ipsiusUbi, esselocumextrinsecum."
as constitutive
On extrinsic
denomination
ofthelastsixcategories,
cf.A.
de la relation
..., esp. c. 20, pp. 426-452.Couplingsucha
Krempel,La doctrine
denomination
withan identification
ofquantity
(based,he says,on modern
physics)
and quality,Krempelhimself
willreducethenumberof realcategories
to three:
andrelation;
substance,
ibid.,pp. 84-85.
quality,
96Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys.,
toa
disp.32,sec. 14(Vol. 26,p. 323).Forwhatamounts
brief
onthispointbya present-day
cf.J. Owens,AnElementary
Christian
Thomist,
reply
Milwaukee
1963,191-192.
Metaphysics,
137

13:15:24 PM

As remarkedabove in Section I, he does allow an exceptionto this.

In the case of habitus
, we are dealing witha purelyextrinsicdenomination. The factof " being clothed", forinstance, does not inhere in nor
does it posit anythingin the man who is clothed. It is, instead, a merely extrinsicdenomination coming to him fromthe contiguityof his
garment.97An extension of this, with ramificationsinto art and
aethetics, is that such designations as "gilded" (ideauratum
), "whitare
extrinsic
denominaand
"adorned"
ornatura
ened" ( dealbatum
(
)
),
98
tions in this same categoryof habitus.
The categoryofpassion is notjust an extrinsicdenomination. Quite
the contrary,passion for Suarez is an accidental formwhich intrinsically affectsthe patients.99Looked at in anotherway, the same reality is termed (or, perhaps, simply "is") action as extrinsically
it
which
does
not
inhere, but toward which
denominatingan agent in
it has a real relation.100This is a transcendentalrelationwhose termis
in the agent which is extrinsicallydenominated.101Inthisway, action
97Cf. "Nihilominus
esse mereexdicendumest, formam
hujuspraedicamenti
nonaliterinformat,
velaliquidsimile,
adjacendo,
quam
trinsecam,
quae
putavestem,
"
denominando.
et extrinsece
., disp.53, sec. 1, no. 3 (Vol. 26, p.
Disp.Metaphys
1012).
98Ibid., sec. 2, nos.3-4(pp. 1013-1014).
99Ibid.,disp.49, sec. 1, no. 8 (Vol. 26,p. 899).
100Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.37,sec.2, no. 14,textinnote14,above:alsoseeibid.,
inthe
actioninheres
disp.48, sec.4, nos. 12-18(pp. 891-893).Notethatimmanent
immaVI, . 6, no.23(Vol.2, p. 663).Accordingly,
agent;cf.e.g. Suarez,DeAngelis
ofaction;Disp.Metaphys
nentactionis notin thecategory
., disp.48, sec.4, no. 12
immanent
actionandimmanent
between
distinction
(Vol. 26, p. 891). Fora further
XXXVIII
inSuarez
, in:TheNewScholasticism,
act,cf.J. PatoutBurns,S.J.,Action
(1964),453-472,esp. 462-466.
101"Dico secundo;actio ut actio dicit intrinsece
et essentialiter
respectum
ad agens,seu ad principium
transcendentalem
agendi.... Item,cumactiout actio
ad agens.
sinerespectu
ab agente,
velprocessionem
dicitegressum
concipinonpotest
realiortaexipsis
actioutactiodenominai
Praeterea,
agensactutale,denominatione
ad ipsumagens,... quia aliasnonessetilla
realemunionem
rebus,et nonpropter
realemachabitudinem
sed intrinseca;
extrnseca
denominatio
ergosaltempropter
. , disp.48,sec.1,no. 17(Voi. 26,p. 872);ibid.,disp.
ad agens."Disp.Metaphys
tionis
thatwhilea transcenden47,sec.4, no.5 (p. 800),textinnote14,above.Notefurther
doesnotneeda realterm(cf.Disp.Metaphys
talrelation
., disp.47,sec.8, no. 12[p.
case theagentwouldbe realand actual.In othercases,there
818]),in thepresent
forterminating
wouldbe onlya realaptitude
., disp.47,sec.
(cf.e.g. Disp.Metaphys
tobe made
distinction
16,no. 7 [p. 849];alsoseenote143,below).Thereisa further
thevery
orbetter,
as terminating,
andthetermprecisely
thetermitself
herebetween
thetermination
initsownright,
Whiletheterm,
itself.
termination
maybea realthing
denomination
as suchis constituted
., disp.31,sec.
(cf.Disp.Metaphys
byan extrinsic
2, no. 7 [Vol.26,p. 231];ibid.,disp.47,sec.16,no.2 [p. 847];no.7 [p. 849];no. 17
termination
Suarezcanregard
however,
[p. 852];no. 25 [p. 854]).In somecontexts,
138

13:15:24 PM

is real, and distinctfrompassion (which isfieriitself102)

by a distinction
rationis
ratiocinatae
, which distinctionsufficesforreal categories.103The
parallel withbeing and its propertiesof truthand goodness is evident.
The categories of when ( quando) and where (ubi) are for Suarez
similar inasmuch as both may be looked at either intrinsicallyor extrinsically.Intrinsicquando, which is properlythe categoryand which
is only rationallydistinctfromexistence,is not an extrinsicdenomination. For any one thing, in isolation fromall other things,would be
trulyand properlysaid to endure as long as it remained in its own existence.104Extrinsic quandoy which is an extrinsic denomination, is
presentwhen the durationof one thingis measured by thatof another,
e.g. when the time of sublunar thingsis measured by the motion and
time of the heavens.105The differencehere permitsa change of extrinsic duration,which would be only a matterof extrinsicdenomination,
withoutany real intrinsicsuccession in the thingdenominated as having endured through the change.106 (Conceivably, had he known
about such 20th centuryitems as "the twin paradox' ' or frozenembryos, Suarez could have offeredsome answers to problems they
raise.)
Intrinsicubi, which Suarez identifieswith the categoryof ubi, is in
everybody a certainproper intrinsic"mode" ofbeing, really(exnatura
rei) distinctfromthe substance and otheraccidents of thatbody.107By
thismode of being each body is presenthere or there,where it is said
to be.108That such presence is not a mere extrinsicdenomination is
clear, he tells us, because a body which is now here and then thereis
by that really and intrinsicallychanged.109Also, the firstcontaining
as a "mode"; cf.e.g. Disp.Metaphys
., disp.7, sec. 1, no. 19 (Vol. 25, p. 256)and
ibid.,disp.32,sec. 1, no. 18(Vol. 26,p. 318),wherea pointis saidtobe theintrinsic
termofa lineandalsoa mode.
102Cf.Suarez,DeSS. Trinit.
, VI, c. 2, no. 1 (Vol. 1,p. 676),textinnote14,
Mysterio
above.
103Disp.
., disp.49, sec. 1, no. 8 (Voi. 26, p. 899).
104Ibid.,Metaphys
disp.50, sec. 1, no. 5 (pp. 914-915);sec. 6, no. 11 (p. 943).
105Cf.Ibid., disp.5, sec.9, no.9
ibid
., disp.40,sec.9, no. 10
(Vol. 25,pp. 198-199;
(Vol. 26,p. 586).
106Ibid.,disp.50, sec.5, no. 9 (Vol. 26, p. 932).
107Ibid.,disp.51, sec. 1, no. 14 (Vol. 26, p. 976).
108Ibid.,On ubication
as a mode,seeJ. Alcorta,
La teora
delosmodos
..., 295-313.
109Disp.Metaphys.
, disp.51, sec.1, no. 15(Vol.26,p. 976).NotethatforSuarezlocal
motion
canneversimply
inextrinsic
consist
denomination;
ibid.,disp.18,sec.7, no.
41(Vol.25,p. 644);DeAngelis
here
IV, . 15,no.5 (Vol. 2, p. 485).Suarez'sposition
contrasts
withthatofSt.Thomas,forwhomlocalmotion
as suchdoesnotintrinsically
La doctrine
dela
it;seethetextsgivenbyA. Krempel,
changea bodywhichundergoes
139

13:15:24 PM

surface, from which primarilyan extrinsicdenomination would be

taken, can be changed and stillthe body contained can remain here or
there,whereit is. As examples, he points to a tree or a rock in a river,
which keep their places even though the surfaces around them
change.110Again, while recognizing a natural order of bodies in the
universe,111he remarksthat the outermostcelestialisphere is in place,
by its own intrinsicmode of being, even though it is not bounded by
any extrinsicsurface.112And, finally,he uses "the absolute power of
God" to performsuch thoughtexperimentsas (1) successivelyremoving outer spheres, to leave each followinginner sphere still whereit
was, or (2) moving a body locallyin a vacuum.113
Extrinsicplace, while it may be an inheringaccident in some other
subject (whose surface it is), with respect to the body which it surrounds is not a true accident, forit does not trulyaffector change that
body. Instead, it only denominates it extrinsically.For this reason,
Suarez believes, extrinsicplace and intrinsicubi do not belong in the
same category.114Indeed, extrinsicplace, he tells us, may be in no
category or it may be for differentreasons reduced into three
115
categories: quantity, relation, and habitus.
4
'
The categoryof 'position' (situs)is not an extrinsicdenomination.
Sittingor standing, forexample, are not denominationsfroma chair,
the surrounding air, or the ground. Rather, they are true internal
dispositions in the one who sits or stands.116Even in a vacuum,
relation
, editio
..., 236-237,429-440,andthosegivenbyP. Hoenen,S.J.,Cosmologia
altera,Romae 1936,73-74.Also cf. the textswhichSuarezhas citedin Disp.
here
., disp.51,sec.1,no.4, quotedinnote95,above.St.Thomas'sposition
Metaphys
For
relative.
withmodernviewsof motionas essentially
seemsmorecompatible
Motion
classicalmodernviewson motion,cf. M. Jammer,
, in: TheEncyclopedia
of
NewYork1972,Vol. V, esp.398-399;andalso,A. Koyre,
edition,
, reprint
Philosophy
forHenryMore's
World
totheInfinite
Universe
From
theClosed
, NewYork1959,142-145,
viewofmotion,
a criticism
whichrestsona basisnotunlikethe
criticism
ofDescartes'
ofSuarez.
position
110Disp.Metaphys
., disp.51, sec. 1, no. 15(Vol. 26, p. 976).
111Ibid., no. 18 (p. 977).
112Ibid., no. 21 (p. 978).
113Ibid..
114Ibid.,sec.2, no. 9 (pp. 981-982).
115Ibid., no. 10(p. 982).
4
116Disp.Metaphys.
ydisp.52,sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26,p. 1007).On this,cf. 'In Aristoofthe
means'at (or to) thecircumference
tle'scosmological
( 7wcvr)va)
system
oftheuniverse',
whichis occupied
xtco'at (orto)thecentre
universe',
bytheearth.
definitions
ofve*)
andxocxo)
headoptsdifferent
tolivingthings
Butwithregard
(1. 3),
oftheparts(xot
whichdependonthefunctions
; theupperpartofananimalis
epyot)
therootofa
he hastodescribe
thatat whichitabsorbsfoods,and on thatprinciple
140

13:15:24 PM

withoutany relation whatever to an external sustainingbody, a man

with the necessary internaldisposition of his own bodily parts would
trulybe said to be standing. At the same time, Suarez does have a problem showing how such a man could not equally be said to be lying
down. Moreover, he is aware that in everydayusage {in communi
usu)
thereare two denominations about this category. Of these, one is intrinsicin the way just described and is constitutiveof the category.
The other is extrinsic,outside the category,coming fromsuch things
as the sustainingchair or ground.117
Outside the 6 categoriesof Gilbert de la Porree, and yet deeply entwinedwithextrinsicdenomination,is the categoryof relation. Firstto
be said on this is that back beyond the Middle Ages the authorityof
Aristotlehimselfis ambivalent. In his Categories
, under relationAristotle includes thingswhich seem to belong to othercategories.118Much
the same is truein his Metaphysics
.119Again, in both places, he includes
many of the itemslisted above in Section I as apparent
examples of extrinsicdenomination.120The importof this is heightenedinasmuch as
Aristotledoes not use an equivalent of the English substantive "rela-

oftheuniverse
tothecentre
thanthe
plantas itsupperpart,inspiteofitsbeingnearer
: DeAnima,
ed. andcomm.(London,1961),
restoftheplant."SirDavidRoss,Aristotle
cf.Disp.
p. 229(at416a2-5).ForSuarezontherealorderofthepartsoftheuniverse,
., disp.47,sec.1, no. 14(Vol. 26,p. 785);andibid.,disp.51,sec. 1,no. 15
Metaphys
- calldenomination
ofextrinsic
(p. 977).Threemorepoints:(1) Eventheparadigm
- ultimately
"left"or"right"
hasa foundation
intherealsituation
of
ingthecolumn
theright
andleftsideofa manoran animal;ibid.,sec.5, no. 29 (p. 847);onthissee
St.Thomas,InPhysic.
Ill, 1.5(ed. Leon.,n. 15)andibid.V, 1.3(ed. Leon.,n. 8). (2)
hereis questionable
Aristotle's
as intheCategories
inasmuch
, c. 7; 6b 12,he
authority
of relation;cf. Suarez,Disp.
to the category
appearsto reduceposition(0<xi)
Metaphys.,
disp.52,sec.1,no.3 (Vol. 26,p. 1007)andno. 5 (p. 1008),wherehesays
ownopinion.(3) On theuniverse
thatthisis notreallyAristotle's
itself
as animated,
andthisgiving
De CeloII, 2, 285a29-32.
risetoabsolute
cf.Aristote,
directions,
117Disp.Metaphys.,
NotethatSuarez
disp.52,sec.1,no. 11(Vol.26,pp. 1009-1010).
fromintrinsic
situsas an intrinsic
rationis
mode,distinct
regards
placebya distinctio
similar
tothatbetween
actionandpassion;ibid.,no. 9 (p. 1009).
(ratiocinatae)
ne Qf "e<rci
tgjvrcp
ti otovet,
oxatx toioctoc
oiOeai,
0at."
aaOrjai,
7)|),
. 7,6b2-3.ForSuarez's recognition
toAristotle's
ofthedifficulty
attached
Categories,
textandalsoforhisinterpretation,
cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec. 1,nos.5-7(Vol.
26,pp. 783-784)andibid.,sec.4, nos. 17-19(pp. 800-801).
119Cf. "... oovi ioiTpixfj
tcv
Ttti yvo
Boxet
elvat
ti."
aTfj
^ lm<rrr'[Lr'
7tp
7ip
V., c. 15,1021b5-6;cf.Suares,Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47, sec. 1,nos.5 and6 (Vol.
26,p. 783);ibid.,sec.4, nos,17-18(pp. 801-802).
120Forexamples:
intheCategories
hementions:
double,similar,
smaller,
larger,
equal,
he mentions:
double,measurable,
unequal,master,and slave;in theMetaphysics
as among" 7tp
ti."
knowable,
perceptible,
equal,and similar
141

13:15:24 PM

tion", but instead employs the adjectival phrase rcpti, which emphasizes the extrinsiccharacter of a relation.121
Next to be said is that Suarez, followingSt. Thomas Aquinas,122
refuses to reduce relation to a merely extrinsic denomination.123
Neither will he contrariwisereduce extrinsicdenomination to a relation.124Again, an extrinsicdenomination cannot be the foundationof
a real categorical relation.125At the same time, every real relation,
transcendental126as well as categorical, involves an extrinsic
denomination of its term.127 Conversely, every real extrinsic
denomination involves a real relation, either categorical or
and real extrinsicdenominationsare foundedupon
transcendental,128
121On partofwhatis involved
relahere,cf.Cajetan:"... ly "relatio"significai
tionem
utconceptam
et nonutexercitam,
secunpropter
quodad aliudnondicitur
"
4
*
dumilludnomen,.... Lyvero relativumsignificat
relationem
utexercendam
magis
tiamenimquandamimportt
ad referendum.
quamut exercitam;
poten
Ly autem
'
"ad aliquid' relationem
utexercitam:
ipsamsignificai
importt
siquidem
respectum
ut terminatur
ad aliud,quodest,ut sic liceatloqui,relationis
tuncsiexercitium,
exercitio
cumad aliudrespicere
quidemrelatioinveroet proprio
ponitur
ponitur."
Commentaria
inPraedicamenta
Aristotelis
, ed. M.-H. Laurent,O.P. (Romae1939),p.
111.
122Cf.e.g. Cont.Gent.
ofcategories
inthe
II, . 13.AlsonoteSt. Thomas'grouping
courseofcommenting
onthetextofAristotle:
InPhys.
Ill, lect.5 (ed. Leon.n. 15)and
InMetaphys.
V, lect.9 (ed. Cathalan. 892).
123Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47, sec. 11,no. 8 (p. 833);cf.ibid.,sec.2, no. 22 (p. 792)
andibid,
ysec. 1, no. 11(p. 784).
124Cf. "... si essetdenominado
ut sicnonessetrespectiva,
extrnseca,
quia potius
essetveluti
formae
extrinsecae
ad subjectum
denominatum,
applicatio
quamhabitudo
ad terminm
extrinsecum."
ibid.,disp.47, sec. 2, no. 11 (p. 789).Thisis
subjecti
foundconfirming
an argument
infavor
ofa modaldistinction
a realrelation
between
anditssubjectas wellas itsfoundation.
Suarezdisagrees
withthemodaldistinction
buthedoesseemtoacceptthevalidity
ofthepointmadeinitsconfirmation.
doctrine,
125Cf.e.g. "... ratiomensurae
relanonestperse aptaad fundandam
quantitativae
denominatio
..." Disp.Metaphys
tionemrealem,cumsolumsitextrnseca
rationis,
.,
denomination
of"measure"here,
disp.47,sec. 10,no. 15(p. 825).On theextrinsic
cf.notes193and 195,below.
126ForSuarezontranscendental
thecategory
as distinct
from
thosewithin
relations,
ofrelation,
cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47,sec.3, nos.10-13andsec.4, nos.1-21(Vol.
VI, . 6, no. 24 (Vol. 2, pp. 663-664).
26, pp. 797-805);also:De Angelis
127Cf. "... relatio
suaessentia
sinealiacausalitate,
solumquiaex intrnseca
respicit
remvisamsinevera
iliumdenominat
Sicutvisiodenominat
terminantem.
terminm,
undesicutnon
sedex eo solum,quodestcumtaliintrnseca
causalitate,
habitudine;
ita nonpriusnaturaest quam
priusnaturaest quam habeatillamhabitudinem,
denominei
visum."Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47, sec. 16,no. 25 (Vol. 26, p.
objectum
to in notes101and 126,above.
854); alsosee thetextsreferred
128Cf. Disp.Metaphys
disp.54, sec. 2, no. 10,textin note45, above.Alsosee the
nowabout
texts,
question
e.g.,onactioninnotes14and 101above.Thereis another
from
as possible
thepowerofGod(cf.note32,
theextrinsic
denomination
ofcreatures
142

13:15:24 PM

such relations.129In contrast,while an extrinsicdenomination is not

the same thingas a relationof reason, various relations of reason, includingmathematical and second intentionsin Logic, can be founded
upon such a denomination.130Of this more will be said in the following section.

Suarezseemstoadmita transcendental
relation
on the
above).Evenhere,at times,
"
ex parte
partofGod (cf.e.g.: Respondeo,... nonpossetolliillampossibilitatem
a Deo positiva
ac subindesciencraturarum,
quintollatur
omnipotentiae,
perfectio
tiae,et totiusdiviniesse." De Trinitate,
IX, . 6, no. 20 [Vol. 1, p. 740]andDisp.
atother
Suarez
., disp.30,sec.16,no.42 [Vol.26,p. 1971).Generally
times,
Metaphys
is moreorthodox,
all transcendental
relations
denying
(and,ofcourse,allcategorical)
inGod(cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47,sec.4, no.4 [Vol.26,p. 800]).Suarez'sambivalence
onthishasbeennotedbyDiegode Alarcon,
"Ex quibus
S.J.(1585-1634):
nonnulli
docentomnipotentiam
Auctoribus
divinamrealiter
referri
perrelationem
ad quamlibet
transcendentalem
adeoutqualibet
minima
etiam
creaturam;
deficiente,
... etaliquandoitasensit
P. Suarez:namlib.9 de Trinitate,
c. 6,
ipseDeusdeficieret
n. 20,fatetur
deficiente
alicuiuscreaturae
necessario
defecturam
in Deo
possibilitate
ettotius
essedivini:oppositum
tamenvidetur
perfectionem
omnipotentiae,
positivam
in Metaphys.
docuisse
d. 30, sec. 15,n. 26 etlocissupracitatis,
ubicummultis
aliis
docetnullamessein Deo relationem
realemintrinsecam
ad creaturas."Prima
Pars
Scholasticae
(Lugduni,1633),Tract.II, disp.2, cap. 2 (p. 96a),as citedby
Theologicae
N. J. Wells,Sttarez
Truths
ontheEternal
LVIII
, PartII, in: The ModernSchoolman,
ofSuarezhavingchanged
his
(1981),171,n. 120.Prof.Wellshasraisedthequestion
mindonthispoint.Butforanother
cf.Disp.Metaphys.
resolution,
, disp.47,sec.3, no.
8 (Vol. 26,p. 796),wherethedivineomnipotence
is saidtobe relative
secundum
dici,
itorexplainitotherwise:
becausewecannot
conceive
"Sic enimdivinam
omnipotenesserelativum
tiamdicimus
secundum
necexdici,... quia illamnonconcipimus,
nisinonconcomitantia
ad quodestin potentia,
et permodum
alterius,
plicamus,
habentis
habitudinem
ad illud.";also: "Ut in exemplo
Dei, propositode potentia
babiliusestnonincludere
etiamtranscendentalem,
etiamsi
relativa
secunrespectum
dumdiciappelletur.
nonestidemquodrelatio
dicitantum,
Igiturrelatiosecundum
..." ibid.,no.9 (p. 797).ForSuarezbriefly
transcendentalis;
uponthesubtouching
sistent
relations
thePersons
whichconstitute
oftheTrinity,
cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.
47, sec.4, no. 21 (Vol. 26, p. 805).
129Ibid.:alsocf.ibid..disp.47,sec. 1, no. 12(Vol. 26,p. 784)andno. 14(p. 785).
130Cf.e.g. "... sicenimnaturam
esseabstractam,
seuuniversaliter
non
conceptam,
additnaturae,nisiessequoddamconveniens
illiperextrinsecam
denominationem,
Sicutessevisumvelessecognitum
nonestaliquod
quodesseobjectivam
appellatur.
esse reale additumrebus,nec formaliter
in relationerationis,sed in
consistit
denominatione
ab actuvidendivelcognoscendi,
proveniente
superquampotestintellectus
fabricare
..." Disp.Metaphys
relationem
rationis,
., disp.6, sec. 6, no. 10
denomination
(Vol. 25, p. 228).On occasion,Suarezseemsto saythatan extrinsic
can be a foundation
foronlya relation
ofreason;cf. "Ab ilioautemesse,quod
inDeo habent,
creaturae
sedhaecsolumestdenominatio
denominantur
excognitae,
trnseca
inillis,solumque
essepotest
fundamentum
alicuiusrelationis
rationis."
Ibid.,
thepossible
of
disp.30,sec. 15,no. 27(Vol. 26,p. 178).Notice,however,
ambiguity
the"solumque"
, as wellas ofour"only",here.
143

13:15:24 PM

and otheritemsobserved
in Suarez's use of
IV. Someconventions
extrinsic
denomination
The following catalog of conventions and items observed in
Suarez' s use of extrinsic denomination is not as complete or as
systematicas I would like it. Certainly, it is not finad.Nevertheless,I
thinkit does provide insightsinto Suarez's philosophy. Moreover, in
view of Suarez's place in history,such insights should help also in
understanding other medieval and post-medieval philosophies.131
Therefore,withoutadded comment here, let me say that forSuarez:
1. Every extrinsicdenomination involves: (a) a thingdenominated
), (b) a form denominating {formadenominans),() a
{res denominata
union, disposition, coordination or relation {habitudo)between the
thing denominated and the form denominating, and (d) the actual
denominationitself.Examples are: of(a) a wall or a man, of(b) the act
of seeing (visto)or a garment,of (c) the relationof seeing to the wall or
the placing of the garment around the man, and of (d) seen or
clothed.132
131Mr. DarylWennemann,
hasbrought
at St. LouisUniversity,
a graduate
student
after
Suarezhave
a number
ofplacesinwhichmodern
tomyattention
philosophers
de
Meditationes
cf.:(1) Descartes:
denomination.
Forsomeofthese,
extrinsic
mentioned
continens
, VI, (ed. A.T., t. VII, p. 85); (2) Spinoza:Appendix
cogitata
philosophiae
prima
Vol. I, p. 246);ibid.,parsII, cap.2 (p. 252);
, parsI, cap.6 (ed. Gebhardt,
metaphysica
demonstrata
Ethica
ordine
, parsII, def.4 (Vol. II, p. 85); ibid.
, parsII, prop,
geometrico
Def. xlviii,explic.(p. 203); Korte
xliii,scholium
(p. 124); ibid.,parsIII, Affect.
endeszefs
Welstand
vanGod,deMensch
, Deel I, cap. 2 (ed. VlotenetLand:
Verhandeling
Emendatone
tatus
deIntellectus
(VlotenetLand;Vol. 1,
Hagae,1914;Vol. 4, p. 14); Trac
Vol. IV, pp. 506and513);
(ed. Gerhardt,
pp. 21 and31); (3) Leibniz:De ipsanatura
essais
sur
realia
abimaginariis
Demodo
(Vol.VII, p. 321);Nouveaux
distinguendi
phaenomena
l'entendement
, II, c. 25,n. 5 (Vol.V, p. 211);ibid.,. 27,. 3 (p. 214);ibid.,IV, . 6, .
deadinventorum
4 (pp. 381-383);Primae
veritates
pp. 519-521);Specimen
(ed. Couturat,
and
Vol.VII, p. 311).In someofthese,
naturae
arcanum
mirandis
(ed. Gerhardt,
generalis
denominations
areanyabsolutely
extrinsic
other,
places,Leibnizhasdeniedthatthere
The
alsocf.FranzBrentano
inthings.
(1838-1917),
Comingup intothe20thcentury,
andN. Guterman,
TheHague1981,25-26,
tr.R. M. Chisholm
oftheCategories,
Theory
94-95,103,153-155,156-159,171,and 174.
132Cf. e.g. "... omniailia reveraita suntin re, sicutcognoscuntur,
scilicetres
denominaet illa qualiscunque
unio complens
formadenominans,
denominata,
tionem,
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.54,sec.2,no. 14(Vol.
quaepotiusestrealishabitudo."
esthomo,verbigratia,
estvestisipsa:subjectum
26,p. 1021);"Formaigitur
qui inindumenti
iliomodo,
seuadjacentia
duitur;uniohicnonestalia,nisicircumpositio
conseutegumentum
estad ornamentm,
subjecti
quodvestitur;
qui accommodatus
indutum."
velincomplexe,
autemest totum
cretum
Ibid.,disp.
hoc,homovestitus,
53, sec. 1, no. 3 (p. 1012);also,cf.ibid.,disp.16,sec. 1, no. 24,(Vol. 25,p. 574).
videtur,
quodindenominatione
JohnofSt.Thomas:"Sedverius
Compareandcontrast
seu apet adiacentia
istaconcurrunt
duo,scilicet
ipsa formaut ratiodenominans,
144

13:15:24 PM

because it posits nothingin the

2 . A denominationis called extrinsic
denominated.133
thing
3. Extrinsic denomination is not a perfection in things
denominated.134
4. No one (nemo)is trulychanged by extrinsicdenomination.135
5. Nothing can exist by extrinsicdenomination.136
6. Nothing can be a real essence (as opposed to a mere ensrationis)
by extrinsicdenomination.137
7. An extrinsicdenomination (e.g. extrinsic time, place, habitus
,
It
the
same
holds
a
be
noted
that
is
not
of
action.138
may
principle
etc.)
true fora predicamental relation.139
8. An end or goal does not move by the extrinsicdenomination it
has precisely in being known. Rather it moves as a thing so
denominated.140
manifestum
ad ipsamformam,
Etquantum
utconditio.
eiusad denominatum
plicatio
estessealiquidreale,sicutvisio,qua pariesdenominatur
visus,realisformaestin
nonestaliquidreale,
tameneius,uttangit
denominatum,
oculo;applicatio
subjectum
estquidrationis,
ponit.Omneautemnonrealeapprehensum
quianihilinipsopariete
exestdenominado
informa
denominata
etsicexparteapplicationis
aliquidrationis
trnseca."
, II P., Q. II, Art.I (ed. Reiser),Vol. 1, p. 289.Here,lookagainat
Logica
from
thesentence
., disp.54,sec.2, no. 14,quotedinnote72,above.
Disp.Metaphys
and habitudo
in
whichSuarezallowsbetween
thedistinction
Alsoconsider
applicatio
ydisp.47, sec.2, no. 11,textin note124,above.
Disp.Metaphys.
133"... talisdenominatio
ideo enimextrnseca
nihilponitin re denominata;
ap, disp.54, sec. 2, no. 9 (Vol. 26, p. 1020);"... quae
pellator;..." Disp.Metaphys.
nihilponit,..." ibid.,disp.31, sec.2, no. 7 (p. 231);
in redenominata
denominatio
denominatio
nihilreiponitinredenominata."
"... solaextrnseca
Ibid.,disp.32,sec.
2, no. 14(p. 323).
134"... si estextrnseca,
reidenominatae;
nullumesserealeconfer
ergo realem
..." ibid.,disp.46, sec.6 no. 11 (Vol. 26, p. 659).
perfectionem;
"
135"... quia persolamdenominationem
nemoveremutator,
extrinsecam
ibid.,
disp.51,sec.3, no. 13(p. 985).
136"Nec enimresessepotest
vel
existens
denominationem,
peraliquamextrinsecam
constitueret
ensactureale,etextra
alioquiquomodoexistentia
aliquodensrationis;
nihil?"ibid.,disp.31, sec. 1, no. 2 (Vol. 26,p. 225);also,cf.Suarez,Opusculum
II,
lib. 1, c. 7, no. 13(Vol. 11,p. 321).
137"... est enimapertarepugnantia
quod aliquidsit ens realeper extrinsecam
..." Disp.Metaphys.,
denominationem;
disp.32, sec.2, no. 14(Vol. 26,p. 323);cf.
Vasquez,as citedin note73,above.
138Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.18,sec. 5, no. 7 (Vol. 25,pp. 625-626).
139Ibid.,disp.47, sec.4, no. 14(Vol. 26, p. 803).
i4Qf < efinedrebamus,nonmovere
essecognitum
ad appetendum
secundum
..." ibid.,disp.25, sec. 1, no. 32 (Vol. 25, p. 908).
quoadipsumessecognoscitur,
between
thisand the
thesame,thereis somesimilarity
Whiletheyare notexactly
terminons
andan objectum
movens
an objectum
inknowledge
between
distinction
,
(cf.ibid.
in relation
to
disp.31, sec. 2, no. 7 [Vol. 26, p. 231]). On thelatterdistinction
inOldBottles:
A Rqoinder
seeN. J. Wells,NewWine
Suarez'sdoctrine
ofthepossibles,
LIII (1979),522.
toJ. C. Doigin: The NewScholasticism,
145

13:15:24 PM

9. Since the means participatesgoodness and appetibilityfromthe

end by extrinsicdenomination, it participates final causality in the
same way, with the entailmentthat only the end itselfexercises true
final causality.141
10. While the extrinsicdenominationof " being known'' is a condition required forexemplar causality, such a denominationcannot constitutean exemplar cause.142
11. Extrinsic denomination as such does not presuppose any real
being ( essereale)to receive it.143
141Cf. "... sicutmedium
nonaccipitaliquamintrinsecam
a fine,qua fiat
bonitatem
sedsolumperextrinsecam
denominationem
etquasiinformationem
appetibile,
accipit
ab ilio convenientiam
et appetibilitatem
ita ad summum
objectivam,
persimilem
denominationem
extrinsecam
retarnen
causalitatem
vera,
finalem;
potest
participare
totailla causalitasprovenit
ab ipso fine,ejusquebonitate;et ideo saepedixiin
denominationem
solumfinemexercere
proprieet per intrinsecam
superioribus,
causalitatem
finalem."
., disp.23,sec.6, no. 15(Voi. 25,p. 872).For
Disp.Metaphys
seealsoibid.,disp.37,sec.2, no. 14,textinnote14,above.
this"quasi-information",
Itshouldbenotedherethata goodorbadsubjective
end(finis
willnotmakea
operantis)
meansobjectively
exfineextrnseco
etperaccidens,
goodorbad: "Ultimodicendum,
nullambonitatem,
velmalitiam
in
resultare
qui soletdicifinisoperantis,
objectivam
ad talemfinem."De bon.etmal.hum.
act., disp.2,
medio,seuobjecto,
quodordinatur
sec. 3, no. 23 (Vol. 4, p. 305).
142Cf. "... essecognitum,
utsic,quatenus
dicitur
de objectodirecte
cumsit
cognito,
sola extrnseca
non potestesse propriaratioconstituens
denominatio,
ipsumexesseinilioformale
necpotest
causandi."Disp.Metaphys
., disp.25,
emplar,
principium
sec.1,no.31(Vol. 25,p. 908);"... sedhaecestconditio
..." ibid.,no.32.
necessaria;
Letus notethatforSuareztheexemplar
causeis identified
withtheformal
concept
whichis "alwaysa trueandpositive
(ibid.,nos. 26-27[pp. 906-907]),
thingandin
ina mind"(ibid.,disp.2, sec. 1, no. 1 [p. 651).
a qualityinhering
creatures
143"... nequeetiamsupponit,
, disp.31,
perseloquendo,
aliquodrealeesse,..." ibid.
sec.2, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 231).Butagainstthis,cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47,sec. 16,
no. 7 (Vol. 26, p. 849),whereSuarezappearstosaythatan extrinsic
denomination
at leastan aptitude
in thething
cf.alsoibid.,sec.
tobe so denominated;
presupposes
wherehe speaksofthescibile
as extrin13,no. 6 (p. 836),andibid.,sec. 15,no. 13,
" and
ilabipsamet
scientia
reali
is "in
sicallydenominated
saysthatthisdenomination
rebus
. Also,cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
ipsis,etnonesseperintellectum
conficta"
disp.44,sec. 11,
no.64(textinnote27,above),where"aptitude"enableshimtoavoida totally
extrinsicdenomination
inthecaseofthescibile.
verosupponitur
in
Again,cf."Necessario
termino
ob quamestterminativus
aliquaratioetquasicausaformalis,
(utsicdicam)
..." ibid.,
relationis,
relationem;
quia nonomneenspotestterminare
quamcumque
disp.47,sec. 16,no.2 (Vol. 26,p. 847).Thevalueofthislasttextliesinthefactthat
itoffers
somehintoftheroleof"aptitude"insetting
torealextrinsic
limits
denominations.Alongparallellines,see: "... tumin rebus,..." ibid.,disp.3, sec. 2, no. 12
ininfinitum:
(Vol. 25,p. 110);and"... nequeinhocpotest
procedi
ergonecessarium
estsistere
inaliquoactuquiperse bonussit."De bon.etmal.hum.
act.,disp.4, sec.1,
no.8 (Vol. 4, p. 318).Butalsoon"aptitude",inapparent
tomuchofthis,
opposition
consider:
"... iliamensurabilitas
(ut sicdicam)solumestaptitudo
quaedam,utrei
nulliusautemreiessentia
conmedium;
magnitudo
cognosci
possitperextrinsecum
sistit
inaptitudine
utcognoscatur;
talisentis,scilicet,
ergonequeessentia
quantitatis
146

13:15:24 PM

12. Many extrinsicdenominations can be attributedto privations

and negations as well as to real beings.144
13. An extrinsicdenominationcan be lost or varied withoutthe loss
of any formin the thingdenominated.145
14. A ' 'quasi-adequate' ' sign of an extrinsicdenominationis thatit
may be posited or taken away without any change in the thing
denominated.146
15. A variation of predicates, even though theymay be contradictory, if it is by {per) extrinsic denomination, does not entail any
mutabilityor imperfectionin the thing denominated.147Despite any
contraryappearance, thisis not to reduce extrinsicdenominationto a
mere matterof predication. As should now be evident, Suarez' s view
is more realisticthan that.
16. That which extrinsically denominates something is always
{semper)itselfintrinsicallyin somethingelse.148Actually, as shall be
seen below at # 37, Suarez does not ' 4always' ' follow this rule. But
here, the other side of the coin is that some denominations such as
consistere
inaptitudine
utcognoscatur
et
extrinsecum,
permedium
praesertim
potest
., disp.40, sec. 3, no. 11 (Vol. 26, p. 541).On
quasiperaccidens."Disp.Metaphys
inthisnote,seealsonotes10,27,32,49, 101, 128,and
various
madeorimplied
points
140,aboveand 158,163,165,174,193,and 194,below.
144Cf.Disp.Metaphys
toDuran., disp.54,sec.2, no.6 (Vol. 26,p. 1019);attributed
withwhich
Suarezagrees.Support
forsucha judgment
canbe
dus,thisis an opinion
theobjective
takenfrom
ofprivations
concepts
(cf.ibid.,disp.2, sec.1,no. 1 [Vol.25,
intheir
truths
regard
p. 65])as wellas from
(cf.e.g. ibid.,disp.31,sec. 1,no. 1 [Vol.
26,p. 2251).
145Ibid.,disp.10,sec.2, no.28(Vol. 25,p. 344);disp.47,sec.1,no. 15(Vol. 26,p.
act.,disp.1,sec.2, no.21(Vol.
785);ibid.,sec.2, no. 11(p. 789);De bon.etmal.hum.
4, p. 285).
146"... illudestquasiadequatum
extrinsecae
denominationis,
scilicet,
signum
quod
et tollatur
sinemutatione
ut patetin denominatione
ponatur,
subjectidenominati,
velnoncreantis,
etc."DeAngelis,
visi,velnonvisi,creantis,
VI, c. 6, no. 22 (Voi. 2,
p. 663);cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.10,sec. 2, no. 28 (Voi. 25,p. 344).
147"... variatio
etiampercontradictoria,
si sitperdenominationem
praedicatorum,
noninferi
mutabilitatem
inresicdenominata,
necimperfectionem,
..."
extrinsecam,
De Angelis,
IV, . 13,no. 9 (Vol. 2, p. 480).
148"Est igitur
aliamdenominai,
advertendum,
semperearnrem,quae extrinsecus
esseintrinsece
inaliquaalia re,namvelestsubstantia
aliqua,etiliaestinse; velest
entitas
autmodusaccidentalis,
et sicnecesseestesseintrinsece
in aliquosubjecto,
a
quo sustentetur."
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.16,sec.2, no. 2 (Voi. 25,p. 575);cf.ibid.,
on
disp.37,sec.2, no. 2 (Vol. 26,p. 494);disp.48,sec.4, nos.13-18(pp. 891-892),
thesubject
ofaction
; disp.51,sec.2, no. 9 (p. 982),whereextrinsic
placeis saidtobe
an accident
in thesurrounding
body;and disp.54, sec. 4, no. 8 (p. 1030),where
honoris saidtobe in theonehonoring
andfameis saidtobe intheclearknowledge
withpraiseoftheone wholooksuponthe"famous"person.On honorin theone
cf.Aristotle,
Eth.Nic.I, . 5; 1095b24-25.
honoring,
147

13:15:24 PM

"

similar", "equal", "father", etc. are not as extrinsicas, they may

firstappear, since theyare not taken simplyfromformswhich exist in
other things. For example, somethingis similar to another thingnot
merelyfromsome formexistingin thatother,but primarilyfromsome
formin itself.149
17. A form which extrinsicallydenominates something, while it
must itselfbe intrinsicallyin somethingelse, need not be in thatas giving it the same denomination it gives to the firstthing. For example,
the act of vision, which extrinsicallydenominatessomethingas seen, is
itselfintrinsicallyin the facultyof sight,which it denominates as seeing. Or action is intrinsicallyin the patient,but it does not denominate
the patient as acting.150
18. In the constitution of a property of being (i.e. truth or
goodness), thereis an intrinsicdenominationof being and then a connotation of intellector appetite.151It is true that in his zeal to oppose
the earlier doctrineof Cajetan152(and perhaps also thatof his contemporary,Vasquez,)153 Suarez at times appears to deny the presence of
an extrinsicdenominationhere.154But paradox largelyvanishes when
149"Neque etiamtalesdenominationes
rebus
suntextrinsecae,
id estab extrinsecis
alteriperquodinalteriest,sedper
similis
namresnondicitur
autformis
desumptae,
id quodin se habet,..." Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47, sec. 4, no. 19(Vol. 26, p. 804).
150"... forma
... non
debetpriusinaliquointrinsece
denominane
extrinsece
reperiri:
alicuitribuit,
esttamennecesseuteamdemdenominationem,
prius
quamextrinsece
clarumestin visionequae
detintrinsece
alteri,sed potestdarealiam.Exemplum
in potentia,
esttamenintrinsece
visumextrinsece:
denominat
quamnon
objectum
in
esseinhaerenter
constat
et in actionetranseunte
denominai
visam,secvidentem:
act.,disp.1,sec.
agentis:..." Debon.,etmal.hum.
passo,cuinondatdenominationem
2, no. 21 (Vol. 4, p. 285).
151Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.8, sec.7,nos.24-25(Vol.25,p. 303);ibid.,sec.8, no. 11
(p. 311);ibid.,disp.10,sec.3, no. 3 (p. 347).
152Cf. "Quoniamresomnesdicuntur
utin
intrinsece
etextrinsece,
bonaeduplicter,
itaquod
tantum
extrnseca
est:veraeautemdicuntur
denominatione,
qu. vi dictum
intellectus
seuadimpletive
sedimitative
nullaestin rebusformaliter
Veritas;
respectu
Si enimnullusessetintellecnostri
intellectus
etcausaliter
divini,
speculativi.
respectu
utin Qu. deVer.,
tus,nullaresvera,nullussensusverusdiciposset,nisiaequivoce,
nullamedicina,
si nonessetsanitasanimalis,
quemadmodum,
qu. 1, art.4 dicitur:
Partem
, I, q. 16,a. 6, no.6 (ed. Leon.Sti.
nullaquedietasanadicipotest."InPrimam
Thomae),Vol. 4, 214b.
153Cf. "Caeterisomnibus
videtur
opinioquaedocet,nonsolumveritatem
praestare
ac proinde
eassecunillisconvenire:
sedequeprimarie
nonesseinrebusformaliter,
dicitur
sicutmedicina
verasappellari,
ab intellectu
derivata
darie,etdenominatione
in
disputationum
sana ab animalissanitatequamefficere
potest."Commentariorum
Tomus
Thomae.
Sancti
Primam
Partem
I, disp.77,c. 4 (Lugduni1631),p. 298;ibid.,. 5,
p. 299.
154Cf.e.g. "... nonintercedit
denominado."
inpraesenti
Disp.Metaphys.,
hujusmodi
butthatSuarez
disp.8, sec.8, no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 311).Thereis neveranyquestion
148

13:15:24 PM

we see him use "connotation" as for all purposes synonymouswith

extrinsicdenomination.155The situationhere is partlythe same as and
"
partlydifferentfromthat of similar" and "equal" mentioned in #
16, just above. In both situations,thereis primarilyan intrinsicform
and secondarilya connotation of somethingoutside.156However, in
the case of "similar" and "equal", Suarez has denied the presence of
a double denomination, taken fromtwo absolute forms,one intrinsic
and the other extrinsic.157
19. That which extrinsically denominates {formadenominans)is
related itself to what it denominates (res denominata
), rather than
relatingwhat it denominates. For example, Suarez tells us that action
is itselfrelated to an agent ratherthan relatingthat agent.158In passing, let us remark that in this example the reality is fieri(cf. 4 35,
below).
20. That which extrinsicallydenominates (e.g. action) as such does
not require a proper inherence (in the agent), but it does require a
relationship(habitudo),which sufficesforthat denomination and fora
' 159
4
quasi-extrinsicinformation
11
real extrinsic denominations" among things
21. There are
themselvesprior to any vital act of ours.160
alone
denomination
ofbeingtoan extrinsic
wouldnotreducea property
; cf.e.g. ibid.,
sec. 7, no. 21 (p. 302).
155Cf. "Res connotata
autemnonestaliquidrei,sedest
extrnseca
est;connotatio
autdenominandi
nostro."Ibid.,disp.48,
denominatio
sumptaex modoconcipiendi
sec. 1,no. 13(Vol. 26,p. 871);cf.ibid.,disp.8, sec.2, no. 9 (Vol. 25,p. 279).But
hancveritatem
of"connote"to "include":e.g. "Dico ultimo,
alsonotetheaffinity
transcendentalem
nonessemeramdenominationem
extrinsecam,
quamvisincludit
alterius
rei,..." ibid.,sec.7,no.34(p. 306);
conjunctionem
aliquomodoseuconnotet
of
onoccasion,
cf.ibid.,disp.47,sec.2, no. 23(Vol. 26,p. 793;andtheequivalence,
seuconnotationem."
": "... secundum
rationem
and" ratio
"connotation"
Ibid.,no.
36,(p. 307).
156Cf.e.g. Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.8, sec.8, no. 11(Vol. 25, p. 311); ibid.,disp.10,
sec.3, no. 18(p. 352).
157Cf. "... cumdicitur
denominatio
ex coexistentia
plurium
respectiva
consurgere
illamdenominaabsolutorum
nonesse intelligendum,
absqueulla realiadditione,
tionem
formis
unaintrinseca,
etalteraexabsolutis,
aeque simulsumiexpluribus
trnseca."
Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.47, sec.2, no. 25 (Vol. 26, p. 793).
158"... quia quodextrinsece
ad ipsumquoddenominat,
denominai,
potiusrefertur
ad agens,quamipsumrefert,
quamrefert
ipsum;atqueita actiopotiusrefertur
sitoccasiovelconditio
utinagenteresultet
relatio."Disp.Metaphys.,
quamvis
disp.47,
sec. 12,no. 8 (Vol. 26,p. 833).Againthere
comestomindtheproblem
raisedabove
in note128,abouttranscendental
in God.
relations
159Disp.Metaphys
., disp.37,sec.2, no. 14,textinnote14,above;ibid.,disp.23,sec.
6, no. 15,textinnote140,above;cf.ibid.,disp.16,sec. 1, no. 24 (Vol. 25,p. 574).
160Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54, sec. 2, nos.9-14(Vol. 26, pp. 1020-1021),
partial
textinnote45, above.
149

13:15:24 PM

22. Such real extrinsicdenominations should be classified as real

entisrealis)ratherthan as beings of reason ( entiarabeings ( sublatitudine
tionis).161
23. In a real extrinsic denomination there is a real relation
habitudo
) that
) of one thing to another, fromwhich it results{proventi
(
the thingto which this relation is directedis denominated as the term
Put
of the relation of the other{permodumtermini
alteriushabitudinis).162
anotherway, an extrinsicdenominationarises froma relationbetween
a thingdenominating,which is the subject of thatrelation,and a thing
denominated, which is its term.163
24. The real relationin a real extrinsicdenominationmay be either
predicamental or transcendental.164
25. Real extrinsicdenominationsare founded upon such real relations.165
26. The presence of the relation{habitudo)is necessaryforan extrinsic denomination. For counterexample,take away theconcomitanceof
its object, and knowledge, even though it remains the same, can no
longer be denominated as true.166By the way, it should be noted that
161Cf.note72,above.Alsocf."... respondetur
denominationem
hujusmodi
proprie
intellectus
sedestinrebusipsis,..." De
nonesseensrationis,
infctione
quodconsistit
bon.etmal.hum.act.,disp.1, sec.2, no. 19(Vol. 4, p. 285).
162Disp.Metaphys.,
disp.54, sec.2, no. 10,textinnote45, above.
163Cf. "... denominado
oritur
exaliquahabitudine
formae
denominantis
extrnseca
ad rem
inordine
ad remdenominatam:
essevaldediversa
haecautemhabitudo
potest
De bon.etmal.hum.
act.,disp.1,sec.
extrinsecam,
quamsitinordinead subjectum."
2, no. 21 (Vol. 4, p. 285).Againseenote128,above.
164Disp.Metaphys
., disp.54, sec.2, no. 10,textgiveninnote45, above.
165Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47, sec. 1, no. 12 (Vol. 26,p. 784),whereSuarezhas
simile
mentioned
, andfilius.As has
remotum,
, propinquum,
pater
aequale,
majus,minus,
exaboutthepurely
beennotedabove(at 19,20,49, 54,and 149),thereis question
seenote120,above.
ofatleastsomeofthese.Fora parallel
trinsic
character
question,
is a setofrealrelations
Also,letus noteherethattheorderofbodiesin theuniverse
realexcanbe founded
., disp.47,sec.1,no. 14[p. 785]),onwhich
(cf.Disp.Metaphys
letitbe notedthat
trinsic
denominations
(cf.e.g. notes105and114,above).Finally,
in thingswhichare
real relations
seemto presuppose
themselves
"ordinability"
whicharetheir
cf.ibid.,disp.47,sec.16,
notinthosethings
terms;
related,
although
in
encountered
no. 22 (Vol. 26,pp. 853-854).Thislastseemstodeepenthedifficulty
note128,above.
166"... mutato
ibialiquid
ettarnen
nonmutatur
ventascognitionis,
mutatur
objecto,
concomitantia
intrinsecum
., disp.8, sec.
actui,sedtollitur
objecti;..." Disp.Metaphys
and habitudo
, cf.Disp.
2, no. 9 (Voi. 25, p. 279). For an equationofconcomitantia
of
., disp.15,sec.7,no.3 (Vol. 25,p. 522).Butalsonotethatsucha removal
Metaphys
cf.
isextrinsic;
thatthedenomination
a concomitant
objectdoesnotofitself
guarantee
dicitur
intrinseca
claraest,quiadenominatio
"Secundaitemconsequentia
quaeab inin fundamento
nititur
trinsecaformasumitur.Ultimaveroconsequentia
saepe
amittipotest,et acquiride novo,conservando
repetito,
quod haec denominatio
150

13:15:24 PM

truthhere is not transcendentaltruth,the propertyofbeing. Rather, it

is truthin the mind or in propositions.This is partlya matterofintrinsic denomination, inasmuch as it properlydenominates the act of the
mind, and partlya matterof extrinsicdenomination, inasmuch as it
connotes an object.167More exactly,it is truthin abstract,as opposed
to intuitive,knowledgeand in vocal propositions.168
As such, it is common to propositionsabout both real beings and beings of reason.169If
anything,preciselyas mental or propositionalit mightseem more absolute regarding beings of reason inasmuch as these, depending as
theydo upon the mind's operation,170cannot change apart fromthat
operation. Suarez has touched this last reasoning only in an oblique
way.171He would seem to reject it on the basis of a distinction,in this
contextof truth,between a real relation,which would require the real
estin
a qua sumitur,
intrinseca
etrespectiva,
omnem
formam
absoltam:
ergoforma
saltemmodalidistinctione."
formis
re aliquomododistincta
ab omnibus
absolutis,
ofan
Ibid.ydisp.47,sec.2, no. 11 (Vol.26,p. 522).Thislasttextoccursinthecontext
its
foundation.
a
real
relation
and
between
a
modal
distinction
argument
supporting
of
character
butheaccepts
theconfirming
withthemodaldistinction,
Suarezdisagrees
theargument.
167Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.8, sec.2, no. 14(Vol. 25,p. 281);alsocf.J. Urraburu:
stareincomplexu
veritatem
opiniodicentium
(logicam)
"Quartademumestaliorum
inobliquo
actusinrecto
itauthocnomineVeritas
actusetobjecti,
,
, objectum
importetur
inveriesse partimintrinsecam,
denominationem
partimextrinsecam;
proindeque
actumipsum;extrinsecam
trinsecam,
quemobjectum,
proutimportt
proutinvolvit
tr.5, disp.2, c. 1, n. 3). Idemqueest,quodaliidiadmodum
scribit
Lossada(Logic.,
Hanctenent
in ipsaentitate
actusproutconnotai
consistere
cuntveritatem
objectum.
EximiusDoctorSuarez(DM 8, 2, nn. 5 sq.), Arriaga(Logic
., d. 14,s. 1), Rhodes
., lib. 1,d. 3, q. 2, s. 1,para.2), Semery,
Mayr,Lossada,aliique."Logica
(Phil,perip
ofSuarezhere.
s interpretation
1890),408. I agreewithUrraburu'
(Vallesoleti
168Disp.Metaphys
in
., disp.8, sec.2, no. 10(Vol. 25,p. 280).On intuitive
cognition
A KeytotheSignificance
cf.S. Day,. F.M., Intuitive
laterScholasticism,
ofthe
Cognition.
N.Y. 1947.
Later
Scholastics
, St. Bonaventure:
169"... haec denominado
sic enimverumesse
verietiamnonentibusconvenit;
nonesseequum."Disp.Metaphys
ethominem
etchymeram
sseensfictum,
.,
dicimus,
non
propositionis
disp.8, sec.8, no. 10 (Voi. 25, pp. 310-311);"... esseinveritate
..."
et fictitiis
sedetiamin entibusrationis
solumhabetlocumin essentiis
realibus,
ibid.,disp.31, sec.2, no. 11(Voi. 26, p. 232).Cf. note49, above.
170"... nonhabentaliudessequamcogitari."
., disp.54,sec.1,no. 7
Disp.Metaphys
(Voi. 26, p. 1017);cf.ibid.,disp.3, sec. 1, no. 7 (Vol. 25, p. 105);ibid.,no. 10(p.
106);disp.8, sec.7, no. 11 (p. 298).
171
an
is absoluteor relative,
ofall cognition
thetruth
On thequestionofwhether
etex
thatitisabsolute
runs:"Secundo,quia nonpendet,
perse loquendo,
argument
nisiquandotaleessejudicatur;
ab aliquotermino
realietexistente,
quod
necessitate,
in hocautem
debetessein omnibus;
estperaccidens:namVeritas
ejusdemrationis
realisabsquerelatione
estVeritas
estensfictum,
reali;ergoidemest
judicio:chymera
..." Disp.Metaphys
in omnibus,
., disp.8, sec.2, no. 2 (Voi. 25, p. 277).
151

13:15:24 PM

existenseof an object, and a simple concomitance,whichwould not.172

But I confessthat I do not completelyfathomthis distinction.173
27. An actual real extrinsicdenomination requires the co-existence
of both the thingdenominated and the thingdenominating.This does
not seem to be the case when the denomination is aptitudinal.174
28. A new real extrinsicdenomination does not arise between two
created thingswithouta real mutation in at least one of them.175
29. In order to constitutea category, a thing denominatingmust
fulfillthreeconditions: (a) even thoughit is not a forminhering(in the
resdenominata
), it must in some way act like a form"to perfector actuate" that which it denominates, (b) its denomination as such must
be distinct from other categories, i.e. not included in any other
category,and (c) its denomination must not be a quasi-composite or
aggregate of formsfromother categories.176
172"Ad secundum,
concedoveritatem
ut si nunquamconsistere
formaliter
in relationereali,negotarnen
indesequinonincludere
concomi
tantiam
cuicognitio
objecti,
conformetur.
Necrefert
Veritas
nonsemper
obquodhujusmodi
cognitionis
requirat
realemexistentiam
inconceptu
jectumactuexistens,
quianondicimus
objectiincludi
sed solumquod ita se habeat,sicutpercognitionem
seu
veritatis,
repraesentatur
seuquodhabeattaleesse,qualecognoscitur.
estexjudicatur,
Quodessenonsemper
sedqualesufficit
ad veritatem
.." ibid.,no. 16(p. 282).
istentiae,
enunciationis,
173Thedifficulty
increases
whenweseeSuarezequating
concomitantia
andhabitudo;
cf.
., disp.15,sec.7, no.3 (Vol. 25,p. 522).Cf.alsoJohnofSt.Thomas,
Disp.Metaphys
whorejects
Suarez's doctrine
thatlogicaltruth
isnota relation
tobutonlyan extrinsic
connotation
ofan object,Cursus
In qq. 16-18
, Primae
Partis,
theologicus.
disp.22,art.2,
nos. 20, 24 and 25; esp.: "... nonpotestconnotado
alicuiusexintelligi
respectu
trinseci
sinealiquarelatione,
sivereali,siverationis."
no. 25 (p. 610). ForSuarez's
oflogicaltruth
as addinga rational
cf.Disp.Metaphys
rejection
relation,
., disp.8, sec.
2, no. 8 (Vol. 25, p. 279).
174Cf. "... in denominationibus
extrinsecis
ex rebusipsis,quomododicitur
sumptis
Deus creator
ex tempore,
velpariesvisus,etc.;haecautemdonominatio
interdum
sumitur
utactualis,
etrequirit
coexistentiam
utinexemplis
extremi,
utriusque
positis;
interdum
veroutaptitudinalis,
sicutdicitur
etc."Disp.Metaphys
., disp.
pariesvisibilis,
thedifference
between
theDivine
3, sec.1,no. 7 (Vol. 25,p. 105).Withthis,compare
"scienceofsimpleintelligence",
Godknowsmerely
andthe
whereby
possible
things,
"scienceofvision",whereby
He knowsthings
as actually
ibid.,disp.31,sec.
existing;
2, no. 7 (Vol. 26, p. 231).
175"Item,novadenominatio
realisinter
duasrescreatas
noninsurgit
sinerealimutationein alteraeorum."De Angelis,
II, . 15,no. 6 (Vol. 2, p. 485).
176"... advertendum
denominaest,praedicamentum
illud,quodperextrinsecam
tionem
trespotissimum
conditiones
expartereidenominantis.
constituitur,
requirere
habeattamenaliquaJem
modumformae,
id
Prima,ut,licetnonsitforma
inhaerens,
velactuantis
id quoddenominat;
... Secunda,utilladenominatio
est,perficientis
per
se sitdistincta
a caeteris
itautinnulloeorumintrinsece
generibus
praedicamentorum
... Tertia,quodtalisdenominatio
nonsitquasicomposita
velaggregata
ex
includatur,
formis
..." Disp. Metaphys.,
plurium
praedicamentorum,
disp.39,sec.2, no.34(Voi.
26,p. 520).
152

13:15:24 PM

30. Inherence is not of the nature of an accident which only extrin177

sically denominates.
31 . Whatever accrues to somethingonly by extrinsicdenomination
may be called an accident only in an analogical way.178The analogy
here is what Suarez calls ' 'analogy of proportionality".179
This, as we
have seen,180always involves an element of methaphor.
32. Different extrinsic denominations do not fragment reality.
Specificallyhere, inadequate objective concepts do not introducereal
distinctionsinto thingsthemselves.181
At the same time, such concepts
a
rational
order
into
introduce
may
things.182
33. A thing can be at once extrinsicallydenominated in two apparentlycontradictoryways, e.g. a single thingcan be good as fitting
to one other thing and bad as not fittingto somethingelse.183
34. We may at times resolve apparent contradictionsin thingsby
reflectionon the factthatcertain denominationsare extrinsic.184
Note
the similaritybetween this and #15 above.
177"... propria
exnonestde ratione
eorumaccidentium,
inhaerentia
quae tantum
'
denominanti
trinsecus
ibid.,disp.37, sec.2, no. 8 (p. 494).
178"... hincsumitur
nimirum
omniailia, quae per solamexregulageneralis,
vocariaccidenalicuiaccidere
tantum
denominationem
trinsecam
dicuntur,
analogice
tia,..." ibid.,disp.39, sec. 3, no. 12 (p. 527); alsosee: disp.51, sec. 2, no. 9 (pp.
981-982).
179"... probabile
..." ibid.,disp.
mihiesthicintervenire
analogiam
proporionalitatis;
etproportionalitatem
39,sec.3, no. 12(p. 527)."... solumperquamdamanalogiam
et praedicationem
rationem
accidentis."
ibid.,disp.51, sec. 2, no. 9 (p.
participai
982).
180Cf.note43, above.
181Cf. "... ex hocquodaliqua,utobjectamenti,ratione
nonpotest
distinguantur,
inreinterea colligi;..." Disp.Metaphys.,
aliquadistinctio
disp.6, sec.9, no. 11(Vol.
, 1.IV, . 4, nos.17-19(Vol. 1,pp.627-628).
25,p. 239);alsocf.DeSS. Trinit.
Myst.
182Qf "Interquas,prouta nobisratione
perinadequatos
conceptus,
distinguuntur
..." Disp.Metaphys.,
ordinis
disp.31,sec. 14,
quamdametiamrationem
intelligimus,
no. 10(Vol. 26,p. 311).
183"... uteademres,retinens
eamdem
sitbonauni,etmalaalten;...
perfectionem,
ibid.,disp.10,sec.1,no. 12(Vol. 25,p. 332);alsosee:disp.42,sec.5,no.6 (Vol.26,
p. 624).
184Cf."Hae tamendenominationes
..." ibid.,disp.45,
noninferunt
contradictorias,
here(pp.750-751)
isoffurther
insec.4, no.9 (Vol.26,p. 751).Thewholeparagraph
from
a mereimterest
a realdenomination
fortworeasons:
distinguishes
(1) itsharply
ofnames(cf.note45,above),and(2) it,ineffect,
linksthiswithourpercepposition
tionofprimary
andsecondary
On themainpointofthisnote,alsosee:De
qualities.
1.IV, c. 4, nos.17-19(Vol. 1,pp.627-628),
andibid.,. 3, esp.no.7
SS. Trinit.
myst.,
where
hedeniestheapplicability
toGodoftheprinciple
ofcomparative
(pp.623-624),
"
inter
sunteadem
unitertio
se". On thislastpoint,his
, sunteadem
identity:Quaecumque
otherwise
faithful
disciple,P. Descoqs,has partedcompanywithhim:Institutiones
. I (Paris1935),471-472.Butforanother
his
Metaphysicae
generalis
discipledefending
cf.Alejandro,
La gnoseologia
master,
..., 150-178.
153

13:15:24 PM

35. One thingmay be regardedin two different

ways- one intrinsic
and the other extrinsic. For example, the one fierimay be called (or
simply"be") passion as it intrinsicallyaffectsa subject and action as it
extrinsicallydenominates an agent.185
36. Some extrinsicdenominations are necessarilyprior to others.
For example, the denominationof truthis priorto thatof goodness.186
37. There can be among extrinsic denominations an analogical
order of prior and posterior.For example, color is seen firstand then
throughit this colored substance is seen: or the internalact of the will
is moralin the firstinstance and through it external acts and things
themselvesare moral.187Referringback to # 16, let us say that, in the
case of color, "seen" in the firstinstance would not be intrinsicto
anything and yet it denominates substance in the second instance.
That is, substance is said to be seen because color is seen.
38. In a real series,what is second (or beyond) is denominatedfrom
what is first,but what is firstneed not be denominatedsuch fromwhat
is second. That is to say, it may be firstsimplybecause thereis nothing
before it.188
185"Dicendum
etpassionem
inrenonessemodosexnaturarei
ergocenseo,actionem
formae
ab agente,quatenus
et emanationem
sedeamdemdependentiam
distinctos,
veroagensipsumdenominat
vocaripassionem,
intrinsece
afficit,
quatenus
subjectum
..." Disp.Metaphys.,
actuagens,vocariactionem;
disp.49,sec. 1,no. 8 (Vol. 26,p.
onthis,
., 1.VI, . 2, no. 1 (Vol. 1,p. 676).Fora variation
myst
899);cf.DeSS. Trinit.
see Disp.Metaphys
., disp.13, sec. 9, no. 9 (textin note67, above),wherebyone
is saidtobe caused.
thecauseis saidtocauseandtheeffect
causality
186See textsmentioned
Theol.
innote87, above.Also,cf.St. Thomas,Summa
, I, q.
ofother
to
denominations
, q. 21, a. 3. Foran orderofreduction
16,a 4 andDe Ventate
reducitur
truthand goodness,cf. "Denique juxta hunc modum,ad veritatem
ratiointegri,
et perfecti
reducitur
denominatio
, et
; ad bonum
significabilis
intelligibilis,
denominatio
., disp.3, sec.2, no. 14
, etsimiles;..." Disp.Metaphys
amabilis,
appetibilis
outtomanyquestions.
thatthisramifies
(Vol. 25,p. 111).Bynowitshouldbeevident
187Cf. "... caloret substantia
extrinsece
dicuntur
cui inhaeret
visa,et nihilominus
verononnisiperaccidenset
calordicitur
visus,substantia
proprie simpliciter
visibilis
essequidanalogm
secundum
perse,et
respectu
quid:etsicessevisumpotest
tale:et
sitintrinsece
utprimm
ettuncnonestnecessarium
analogatum
peraccidens,
in proportione
ratioestclara,quiaanalogiafundatur
quadam,seuproportionalitate:
ad formam
intrinsece
interdum
haecautemsicutsumitur
denominantem,
perordinem
denominantem
ita potestsumiin ordinead formam
extrinsece,
quando forma
Sic ergoin
in denominando.
seu ordinem
habetaliquamvariationem,
denominans
vel
velexternis,
actibusinternis,
analogiceconveniat
quamvisessemorale
praesenti,
denominationem
omnibus
aliisrebus:nihilominus
convenire,
potest
perextrinsecam
..."
externis:
actibusinternis,
perquoscommunicatur
quae primo perse convenit
act., disp.1, sec.2, no.20(Vol. 4, p. 285).NotethattheVivesediDe bon.etmal.hum.
sentence
ofcolor
whenitgivescalor
inerror
tionis obviously
, inthefirst
twice,instead
quotedhere.
188Cf. "... metaphysice
loquendc,haec videtursatiset usitataacceptioprimae
154

13:15:24 PM

39. The constitution,the order and the propertiesof numbers as

such all arise by extrinsicdenomination fromthe conceptions of the
mind.189
40. In a purely numerical order, there is no more reason forone
ratherthan another to be first.It is all a matter of merely extrinsic
denomination. 190
41. While an extrinsicdenomination is not simply the same as a
relationof reason, extrinsicdenominationsmay be the foundationfor
various relationsof reason, including second intentionsin Logic.191
42. Some relations of reason are in both their extremes founded
upon an extrinsicdenomination. Examples would be arbitrarysigns,
whereboth in the sign and in the thingas signifiedthereis an extrinsic
denomination. Much the same can be said of the relations of master
and servant,husband and wife,buyer and seller, all of which arise by
voluntary contracts.192Also quantitative measurements involve exsubstantiae.
Estenimilia,quaeitapersesubsistit,
utnullasitprior
insubvelsubstat,
sistendo
velsubstando;
... Underatioprimaesubstantiae
vere proprie
Deo
potest
attribu
inaliquosensu..." Disp.Metaphys
., disp.33,sec.2, no. 16(Vol. 26,p. 344).
Onceagain,consider
theproblem
innote128,above.
189Cf.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.41, sec. 1, nos. 17-20(Vol. 26, pp. 592-593).The text
butfora portion
hereis toolongtoreproduce,
ofitcf.note190,immediately
following.
190Cf."... si ternarium
hominum
secundum
se consideres,
innulloeorumestprima
auttertia;
nullaenimratiotalisordinis
inter
eosassignari;
ille
unitas,secunda,
potest
..." ibid.,no. 2 (p. 588);alsocf.:"At vero
ergoordo,si quisest,solumestrationis;
constat
unitates
secundum
senonhabereordinem
realeminter
se,nealicujusnumeri
velprimam;
turaliquo
uthaecsuman
que in eis aliquamesseultimam
ergooportet
modoinordinead conceptionem
nostram."
subIbid.,no. 17(p. 592).Fora similar
inthemeasurement
ofcontinuous
concf."... inpropria
jectivity
quantity,
quantitate
tinuamensuram
ut mensuram
accomodationem,
semperesse perhumanum
quia
nullaestmajorratioquodhaecresmensuret
si resipsae
illam,quame converso,
secundum
se spectentur."
Ibid.,disp.40, sec. 3, no. 8, (p. 540). Notethatfora
"true"orderofpriorandposterior
cf."Quocircasi
somecausality
seemsrequired;
interAngelosnonestordocausalitatis
in illuminationibus,
quas a Deo recipiunt,
autposterions
nullusverusordoprioris
inveniri
VI, . 11,no. 8
potest."De Angelis,
disp.40,sec.3, no. 10(Vol. 26,p. 541);and
(Vol. 2, p. 702);alsocf.Disp.Metaphys.,
see note58,above.
191Cf.e.g.Disp.Metaphys
., disp.6, sec.6, no. 10(Vol. 25,p. 228);ibid.,sec.7, no.4
(p. 230);ibid.,disp.40,sec.3, no. 10(Vol. 26,p. 541);disp.54,sec.6, nos.6-9(pp.
Attimes,
ofreasonand
Suarezcomesclosetoequating
relations
however,
1040-1041).
cf.e.g. "Hoc igiturgenusrelationis
saltemmagis
extrinsic
videtur
denominations;
autdenominationes
relationes
etmodosloquendi
continere
ortos
rationis,
extrnsecas,
ex comparationibus
variisnostriintellectus
interresdiversas,
quamveraset reales
habitudines."
Ibid.,disp.47, sec. 10,no. 8 (Vol. 26, p. 823).
192Cf."Undead hocgenusspectant
relationes
exomnes,quae inutroque
imprimis
tremo
fundantur
tantum
indenominatone
utestrelatio
extrnseca,
signiad placitum,
sivetalesignumsitvox,ut
quae tamin signo,quamin signatoestrelatiorationis,
155

13:15:24 PM

trinsic denominations on both the side of the measure and what is

measured.193
43. Some relationsare non-reciprocalinasmuch as theyare rational
and founded upon an extrinsicdenomination, on only one side. Such,
forexample, would be relationslike those of a thingseen to someone
seeing, of somethingvisible to vision itself,or of somethingknowable
to knowledge. Other examples are furnishedby the rational relations
of God to creatures.194
44. Extrinsicdenomination is not a sufficientfoundationfora real
relation.195
45. Only extrinsicdenominations, or relations of reason founded
upon them, may be de novoattributedto God, fortheyalone posit no
change in Him.196
46. Extrinsicdenominations may provide a foundationforrational
distinctions.197
Cum enimhaec impositio
ad
nomen,aut verbum,sivesit res ut sacramentam.
nihilreiponatinsignonisidenominationem
extrinsecam,
nequeetiam
significandum
in signato,
nonpotestfundare
relationem
realem,utomnedocent.Deindeejusdem
namillaenonfundantur
nisiin
suntmodirelationes
dominiet serviinterhomines,
a volntate;
etsimiles
suntaliaemultae,
ut
denominatione
quadamextrnseca
sumpta
etvoluntatibus
utintermaritum
omneillaequae oriuntur
ex contractibus
humanis,
exvolntate
contraheninratione
inter
ementem
etvendentem
etuxorem
' ' conjugum,
of
di; etsicde aliis. Ibid.,disp.54,sec.6, no. 6 (Voi. 26,p. 1040).On thecriticism
DutchCalvinisttheologian,
Suarezhereby the17thcentury
JacobRevius(Suarez
sivesyllabus
Disputationem
repurgatus:
Metaphysicarum
[LugduniBatavorum
1643]),cf.J.
nmeroextraordinario
F. Yela Utrilla,El entederaznenSuarez
, in: Pensamiento,
271-303,esp. 298-299.
(1948),
193Cf.Disp.Metaphys.,
some
disp.40,sec.3, nos.8, 9, and10(Vol.26,pp.540-541),
textin note190,above.
194Cf. "Rursusad aliudmembrum
omnesrelationes
non
pertinent
hujusgeneris
visiad videntem,
aut
rationis
sunt,utsuntrelatio
mutuae,
quatenusinunoextremo
etc. ... Et hueetiamrevocari
ad visum,aut scibilisad scientiam,
visibilis
possunt
in
nametiamillaepossent
dicifundari
omnesrelationes
Dei ad creaturas
existentes,
se nonestcapacitas,
denominatione
extrnseca,
quiainipsoDeo secundum
atqueadeo
ad talesrelationes."
necfundamentam
Ibid.,disp.54,sec.6, no. 7 (Vol. 26,p. 1040).
On this,alsocf.ibid.,disp.47, sec. 15,no. 13(pp. 842-843).
195Disp.Metaphys
., disp.47, sec. 10,no. 15,textin note125,above;alsocf.ibid.,
disp.30, sec. 15,no. 27 (Vol. 26,p. 178).
196"... solumenimdenominationes
velrelationes
extrinsecae,
rationis,
quae in eis
..."
mutationem
ineo ponunt;
de novoattribu
Deo, quianullum
fundantur,
possunt
et a
Ibid.,disp.30, sec. 7, no. 32 (p. 105);alsocf.:"Sic enimDeus creareincipit,
etresintempore
movet
actione
etiamtemporali
etsuccessiva,
creando
desistit,
absque
vel
veldiminutionis
inhisactionibus
variatione
suaeaeternitatis,
quia haecsuccessio
autpropria
denominationibus
externis
noninferi
varietatem
in aliquoactuinterno,
perfectione
ipsiusDei, ..." ibid.,disp.50, sec.3, no. 7 (p. 924).
197Cf."... etsicsemper
estdistinctio
.. . quiasolumconvenit
rationis,
perdenomina156

13:15:24 PM

47. An extrinsic denomination cannot be a foundation for a real

distinction.198
48. Extrinsic denominations may be the foundationsforbeings of
,199
reason ( entiarationis)
49. At times, a being of reason may be the foundationof an extrinsic denomination. For example, something may be denominated
"bad" fromevil, which is a privation.200An example even furtherout
on this line is the extrinsic denomination of an exterior omission
as "bad" from
(which Suarez refersto as a "quasi pure privation,,2()1)
the privation which is the evil itselfof an interioract of the will.202
entis
That such extrinsicdenominations are to be located sub latitudine
realishardly seems likely.
50. Extrinsic denominations may become entiarationiswhen they
are thought of as something actually existing in things
denominated.203At times it takes subtletyto square this with much
that we have seen above.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have been able only to scratchthe surface. By now,
however, it should be evident that extrinsic denomination is in
Suarez' s thoughtan ambiguous item. At times, it seems close to, ifnot
synonymous with, a mere naming from the outside. But at other,
more frequent,and more importanttimes, it is definitelyregardedas a
featureof things themselves.204In any event, it is an item with many
velsubordinatur
diversis
tionemextrinsecam,
concepquatenuseademresobjicitur,
tibus."Ibid.,disp.7, sec. 1, no. 21 (Vol. 25, p. 258).
198Cf.e.g. ... namestapertarepugnantia
a
etnaturam
dicere,
distingui
suppositum
nihiladderenaturae,quodsitintrinsecum
ipsisupparterei,et tarnen
suppositum
connotatum."
., disp.34,sec.4,
posito,sedtantum
aliquidextrinsece
Disp.Metaphys
no. 4 (Vol. 26, p. 367).
199Ct. ibid.,disp.54,sec.4, no.8 (p. 1030).Alsoseetexts
tomnotes7band
referred
191,above.
200Cf. "... quodin se malumdicitur,
a solaprivatione
denominan
potest;... Disp.
., disp.11,sec. 1, no. 8 (Vol. 25,p. 358);cf.ibid.,nos.9-10(pp. 358-359).
Metaphys
201Cf. ... cumhocpeccatum
... De Vitus
etpeccatis,
sitquasipuraprivatio,
disp.3,
sec. 5, no. 2 (Vol. 4, p. 549).
202Ibid.,sec. 4, nos.4-10(pp. 547-548).
203Cf. .. . namessepraeceptum,
ut
estextrnseca,
denommatio
quaesiapprehendatur
..." Disp.Metaphys
eritensrationis;
in ipsarepraecepta,
., disp.54,
aliquidexistens
sec. 2, no. 17 (Vol. 26, p. 1023).
24vvhatSuarezis angling
ota 17thcenmtheremarks
toward
is,I believe,
expressed
Suarezon important
whowas influenced
writer,
pointsof
by
turyDutchCalvinist
externa
nonestnudavox,sedaliquidquodpervocem
cf.' 'Denominado
metaphysics;
157

13:15:24 PM

facetsand many roles to play. Among these, some that I have treated
remain open to much deeper and more detailed discussion. Others,
which I have barely touched, offerthe prospect of almost virgin territoryforhistorians of philosophy.
For random examples, I think of sign theory,language, and communication, including a consideration of teaching, along the lines of
St. Augustine's linguisticconcern in his De Magistro.I furtherthinkof
morality,moving out especially fromPlato's question of whetherthe
pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is (intrinsically)holy, or
holy (extrinsically)because it is beloved,by the gods.205In a similar
vein, theory of art comes to mind with its ancient question: Is the
beautiful in things themselves, or is it merely in the eye of the
beholder? Moving back into theoreticalareas, I thinkonce more of the
status of "the possibles" as extrinsicallydenominated fromthe power
of God.206 Not entirelyunconnected with this are problems regarding
the foundation and character of mathematics, as well as of "intermediate sciences' ' such as astronomy, music and optics. In ways
that I have alluded to in notes above, there are questions here, in a
periodjust priorto Newton and Leibniz, about the absolute or relative
characters of time and space, as well as of local motion itself.
In the area of metaphysicsundergirdingtheology,I thinkof knowing and naming God in termsderived fromcreatures, as well as of the
very designation of the "supernatural" itself,involving an extrinsic
denomination fromthe natural. In line with this last, I am intrigued
(especially recallingtheAd MajoremDei Gloriammottoof theJesuits) by
connectionsbetween extrinsicdenomination and the extrinsicgloryof

nonestresipsa,quae ad subjecsignificatili-.
Quodveropervocemillamsignificatur,
autquicquidilludsit,quodinter
remillametsubjectum
tumrefertur,
sedordopotius,
intercedit.
SicdicitArist.ex&tv,
quodbauddubie
quodad decimam
Categ.pertinet,
externa
denominatio
est,nonesseeumqui vestemhabet, vestemillam,sed
Illudveroquemadmodum
nonestomnino
xaltooe'xovro
ttjvlafjTa.
eafjTO,
[
nihil,itaquoquenonestveraresautEns reale,sedmediumquippiaminterEns et
LibriDuo.OpusPosthumum
nihil."Franconis
Institutionum
Metaphysicarum.
Burgersdici,
textcf.
1640),Lib. I, . 4, th. 7 (pp. 28-29).ForAristotle's
(LugduniBatavorum
V, . 20, 1022b7-8.
Metaphysics
205" atovcmatovlaTivcptelTat
oaiovaTiv;
tmotg)vecov,
r oti cpieTai
ofPlato'squeswhenhe writes
9E-10A.A. Koyreis scarcely
Euthyphro
exagerrating
whichbecamelaterthecruxofthe
tion:"This,bytheway,is a verydifficult
problem
NewYork1960,
Plato
medieval
Christian
, tr.L. Rosenfield,
philosophy."
Discovering
58, n. 6a.
206Cf. esp.notes32, 128,and 143,above.
158

13:15:24 PM

God as the end of man and, indeed, as the end of all creation.207Then
I think of sacraments, questions of effectsproceeding ex opereoperato
,
the Real Presence of Christ in the Euch)rist, or the realityof the marriage bond. Not far offare issues of the realityof rightsand duties,
contracts between buyers and sellers, and ownership itself. But
perhaps what most interestsme here goes beyond Suarez, into the
17thcenturyProtestantphilosophyand theologyinfluencedby him.208
It goes, for example, to the role of extrinsic denomination in
4
understandingjustification as a cloaking over" with the merits of
Christ, or in understandingvarious denials of the Real Presence. Of
course, Suarez himselfrejecteddoctrineslike these: but he did see how
they involved extrinsic denomination.209The thing to notice is that
such doctrines, with their involvement made explicit after Suarez,
represent more and more a denial of the Ding an sich, in a theology
which has a bi-lateral relationshipwith philosophy.
In fact,all of the issues which I have mentionedhere, and numerous
others besides, have been treated in differentdegrees by Suarez and
his 17th century successors, both Catholic and Protestant. Most of
that treatment,however, is almost virgin territoryfor present day
historians. Like some great philosophical Indies, it now lies in wait for
207Cf. "... quodenimDeus sitid cujusgratiaresfit,nonestaliquidintrinsecum
in
Dei a rebusipsisdesumpta."
extrnseca
rebus,nequeinDeo ipso,sedestdenominatio
., disp.23,sec.4, no. 3 (Vol. 25,p. 859);alsocf.Suarez,Deoratione
, I,
Disp.Metaphys
. 14,nos.5 and6 (Vol. 14,pp. 56-57),esp.no. 6, wherehemakesa distinction
betweentheextrinsic
gloryofGod and thatoftheSaints:"Respondeodifferentiam
Dei etSanctorum;
quiaDeo ex
quamdamconsideran
posseinterextrinsecam
gloriam
nihilintrnseca
aut
accrescit,
gloriaextrnseca
nequeutilitas
aliqua,neccommoditas,
AtveroSanctis,etiamChristi
denominatio.
sedsolaextrnseca
humanitati,
voluptas,
velsaltem
extrnseca
nascitur
ex gloriaetclaritate
semper
aliquaintrinseca
perfectio,
Thismayprompt
another
lookat note148,above.
actalegaudiumaccidentale."
208On this,cf.esp. M. Wundt,Diedeutsche
des17.Jahrhunderts
, TbSchulmetaphysik
enla
La proyeccin
sobre
deunagranmetafisica
, o Surez
Europa
ingen1939,andJ. Iriarte,
delosdiasdelbarocco
, in: Razny Fe 138(1948),229-265.
filosofia
209Cf. e.g. "Primusenimerrorcavendusesthaereticorum
dicentium
nostraopera
in se, sed constitui
nonhaberemeritum
formaliter
in esse meritorio
permeritum
ChristiUlisapplicatum,
mediantefide.Sicutenimdicunthominem
fierijustum
denominatione
tantumextrnseca
perapplicationem
justitiaeChristi... sic dicere
meritum
nonessein ipsisintrinsece,
sed esseipsum
operumnostrorum
potuerunt
meritum
Christi
..." Demerito
, . 19,no. 2 (Vol. 10,p. 116);cf.alsoibid.,esp.nos.5,
Degratia,
lib.6, c. 1,no. 1(Vol.9, p. 2); ibid.,lib.7,c. 7 (pp.
12,14,16(pp. 117-123);
In Primam
cf.D. Banez(1528-1604),
Partem,
observation,
qu.
130-144).Fora similar
est
observanda
6, art.4 (ed. Urbano,Madrid1934),p. 194:"Doctrinahujusarticuli
sedsolum
homines
essebonosnonbonitate
contraLutheranos,
inhaerente,
quivolunt
Cf. alsonote54, above.
bonitate
etjustitiaChristi
extrnseca."
159

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its Columbus. And when that man comes, he may well discover in its
vast expanse much more than a prevenience of Kant's Copernican
revolution.
Saint Louis, Missouri
SaintLouis University

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