Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. The Ethics Committee required Attys.

Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.

1. A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING
INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37
respondent law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19,
2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of CPR.
FACTS: The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya, et
al. v. Executive Secretary was promulgated. The counsel3 for Vinuya, et al.
(the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision. Counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and
Romel Regalado Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the
grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments,
Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR
THIS HONORABLE COURTS JUDGMENT TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE
LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES
EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITIONS CLAIMS. They also
claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the
plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an
article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website. Later, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.
The, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. The Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring

Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreaks website22 and on Atty. Roques blog. 23 A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA
News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Laws bulletin
board allegedly on August 10, 2010 26 and at said colleges website. Dean
Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona).
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the
brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and
suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government
of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only
had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct
attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation
of another persons work as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at
best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas
and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into
committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it
appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker.
It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in
any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part
of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow
the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers works
and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original
work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no
longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for
the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers names
and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this
case and the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the primary sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be
familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct
and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter
of diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest
Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court
actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this
article they argue that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus
cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of
its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same
article to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual
dishonesty of copying works without attribution bytransforming it into an act
of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it
deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage
suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties home States in
the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts
rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the
petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse
during the Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort
to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this
case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to
the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized

materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so

doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually
exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up
the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with
false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for
even the most basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the
Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession
before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest
standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar
because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a
democratic society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious
plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode faith
and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this
decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to
the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority
without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its
Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not
only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own
decisions, are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be
conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose
of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an
absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines.
It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence
and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the
exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of
the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral
conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme
Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine
judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the
establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate

dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the
dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an
institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court
may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by
which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions
in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and
concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of
legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27
July 2010.
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents alleged noble intentions
(b) The "correctness" of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo
committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with
the standards of academic writing
(c) Respondents belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when
others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
(d) Freedom of expression
(e) Academic freedom
ISSUE: WON respondents violated Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes.
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court
nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated
the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in
the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the
Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.
Moreover, in his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in

insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of

justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending
to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to
contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest
in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion
or interference.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court
and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in
reversing or modifying its decision.
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than
any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its
officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge.
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the
court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is
even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Hence, as a
citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen."
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. But it is a cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation.Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with

responsibility. Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary

language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes
distrust in judicial administration, or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court; or of offensive and
abusive language; or abrasive and offensive language; or of disrespectful,
offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a
letter addressed to the judge, or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalledfor remarks.
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative
complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not
excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for
one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial
to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic
freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. Their actions as
law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.
Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. Still on motive, it is also proposed that
the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective speech;
that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients
listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in
branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in
concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see
how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal

to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and
persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.
As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to
take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some
doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this
Courts consideration, why was the same published and reported in the
media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the
Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and
designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest
in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is
respondents colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew
fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were
still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts
have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the
time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of
the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement
under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics
charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of
time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its
publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics
Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents
outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the
Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action,
there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement
to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who may not
have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate
or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to
have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would
justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain
silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in
our country.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the
Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador

Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.

Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P.
Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law
professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence
the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the
administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the
charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further
ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an
officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from
these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a
professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat
of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records
of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

2. G.R. No. 78252 April 12, 1989

PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. ANGELO KING,
KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE SARINO
and DOMINGO K. LI
FACTS:
Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private
respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money
market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged
jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code.
Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private
respondents at the office address of MFC in Makati. The law firm of
Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension of time to
file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The motion was
granted giving the defendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the
expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the responsive
pleading and/or motion to dismiss. Counsel for defendants filed a motion
asking for a suspension of the action for a period of sixty (60) days on the
ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of
the case between the parties. The motion was denied. Counsel for plaintiff
filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer.
This motion was granted.
The parties submitted a compromise Agreement which was approved by the
trial court. Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment.
Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitioner
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. Counsel
for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking a
correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that he erroneously
filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact
he was the counsel for MFC only. Said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct
Compromise Agreement". The motion for clarification was denied.
The Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents filed a motion to
set aside the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution on the
ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the
corporate address of the corporation was not their address as they were no
longer connected therewith.
ISSUE: WON summons were properly served on private respondents?
HELD: No. Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as
directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally
liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by
petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be
observed in that summons must be served personally on private
respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them.

The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such
personal service of summons was effected. The office address of the
corporation as indicated in the complaint does not appear to be the office
address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the
corporation then. Personal service of summons should have been made on
them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected
substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant
Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as
above stated private respondents were no longer connected. Such
substituted service is not valid. There was no compliance with the
requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and
a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to.
As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.
It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC
and private respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a
responsive pleading, and a suspension of the proceedings pending a
possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise
Agreement in behalf of MFC and private respondents which was submitted
to the court on the basis of which a compromise judgment was rendered;
that said judgment was partially complied with but upon default in the
payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by
the trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the
court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise
Agreement in behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which
hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf
of the defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of
the aforementioned pleadings and the Compromise Agreement would
constitute a waiver of the defect in the service of summons. However, the
lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the
resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of
said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of the
private respondents.
Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of
the private respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in
so far as they are concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment
is also null and void as to private respondents. The ruling of the lower court
that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from
judgment were filed beyond the reglementary period is untenable. An action
to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 8
Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the
performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He

represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the

private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the
Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only after the writ of execution
of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he perked up by
saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by the
private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the
Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal
requirement of the practicing lawyer. To say one thing today and another
tomorrow is a transgression of this imperative. Counsel should be made to
account before his peers.

3. G.R. No. 118584 October 24, 1995

AURELIA S. GOMEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
Branch 15, Ozamis City; COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: This Court required attorneys for petitioner to show cause "why
they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for impeding the execution of the
judgment in Criminal case and for misusing the rules of procedure to defeat
the ends of justice in violation of Rule 10.03, Canon 10 and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
CA finds the accused Aurelia Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Libel. Her motion to reconsider the decision of the CA having been
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari. This petition was, however, denied for non-compliance with
Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.
Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this Court, reinstated
the petition but denied it nonetheless "for being factual and for failure of the
petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment."
The instant petition is to annul and set aside this Court's final resolution. The
attorneys for the petitioner know, or ought to know, that the special civil
action for certiorari will not lie against a final judgment of this Court. Even
granting for the sake of argument that it could, this petition must fail for
being filed one (1) year, four (4) months, and nineteen (19) days after the
entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 or long after the jurisprudentially
established "reasonable time" prescribed for the remedy under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. As this Court sees it, the instant petition is a clever ploy
to further delay the execution of the judgment.
In their Explanation, with the above show-cause order, attorneys for
petitioner, namely: Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza,
II, and Antonio A. Ligon, averred among others that Atty. Pactolin refused to
surrender the records of the aforementioned case, so that accusedpetitioner experienced extreme difficulties in filing the instant petition. And
consequently, accused-petitioner stands helpless in determining the material
dates of receipt of all orders, judgments, and other processes of the trial
court, Court of Appeals, and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were
addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin. Hence, it could not be stated that herein
counsel misrepresented on the procedural antecedents in this case. Rather,
when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking the equity
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such that procedural rules be set aside
to serve the ends of justice, as the liberty of a person is at stake.
ISSUE: WON attorneys for petitioner were guilty for violating the CPR?

HELD: Yes. The filing of the instant petition was nothing but a scheme to
frustrate and further delay the execution of the judgment. Neither could a
claim of denial of due process save the day for petitioner as the judgment of
the trial court was affirmed only after due proceedings by the Court of
Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost liberality to
petitioner who failed to file her Brief. Said judgment was ultimately sustained
by us in the resolution which had long become final, with the entry of
judgment made on 8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no depth of honest belief
as to the innocence of the accused could alter the final verdict. Petitioner's
counsel, if they are so minded, can only seek to relieve their client from the
effects of the judgment from another forum, e.g., they may consider
executive clemency.
Counsel's gambit is condemnable for it clearly disregards a lawyer's duty to
maintain absolute candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court (Canon 10,
CPR). In no uncertain terms, this Court can neither condone nor tolerate
attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would
have a bearing on its initial action.
Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being
essential to the effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived
of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any
scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end
to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite
date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and law
should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to
be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights; and the exertion of their
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be
withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15 ), they
should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice (Canon 12). They should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12).

As a final point, we wish to state that the apology contained in the

Explanation is misplaced. Counsel ought to know that they were not
required to show cause for the inconvenience the filing of the petition
caused this Court. The apology insinuates, rather smartly, that we required
them to show cause out of our whims or caprice, which, of course, is
baseless.
WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO, FERNANDO C. COJUANGCO,
VIGOR D. MENDOZA, II, and ANTONIO A. LIGON are hereby
CENSURED and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

4. A.C. NO. 10050

December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINA
ESPEJO, Respondent.
FACTS: Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio.
Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and
wanted to borrow P250,000 from Victoria. To secure the payment of the
loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check
covering the loan amount and agreed interest. Victoria deposited the said
check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds.
Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victorias repeated demands.
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon
City Prosecutors Office which she personally received and continued to
ignore Victorias demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary
investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation.
5

Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of
two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000.). However, to
Victorias chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency
of funds.Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty.
Espejo. Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer.
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) recommended the suspension of Atty.
Espejo from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for a period of
five (5) years. The CBD reasoned: The failure of a lawyer to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled
hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves
disciplinary sanction. Moreover, respondent[s] acts of issuing checks with
insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with
her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary
investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges
against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct
that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Espejo is guilty of gross misconduct?
HELD: Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The prompt payment of financial
obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo
obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity

and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment. A lawyer may be

disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.
While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be
justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to
show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer.
Further, the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what
Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a lawyers low regard for her
commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. We have held
that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless
attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the
public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to
her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should
hold in high esteem.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant
refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office and the
IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A LAWYER
SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years,
as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. We,
however, cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to
return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the

determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no

material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may to choose me
against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in
these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue
of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.
22

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross

misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for two (2) years affective immediately.

5. G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M.
TIONGCO, petitioners, vs. HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC,
Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and LORENA
AGUIRRE, respondents.
FACTS:
This Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the
petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively
for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
considering:. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court
did not read the petition as borne out by the following statement:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the
petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has "failed
to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .which, as earlier
noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his use of
intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified by his characterization
of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to
fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one
"you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with
"perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who
were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his
charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused with that confusion
which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up
amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His
Honor, Respondent Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not
owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor was already
either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; in one scale of the balance, a
311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers
from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brandnew car, impeccable attire, and dignified "mien"; and his charge that the
respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a scheme
to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property
for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, by
describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and
"blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and
blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the
undersigned also called him a "robber", a "rotten manipulator" and "abetter"
of graft and shady deals; On the other hand, if the undersigned called
anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed
particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word;
Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore
stands in dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully

expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme

Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the
undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt with
administratively or otherwise.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND
UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
ISSUE: WON Atty. Tiongson is guilty of violating the CPR?
HELD: Yes.
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and
phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and
entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily
demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco
and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by
the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently
show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty.
Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the
respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and
eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation
of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as
follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under
Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under
the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of
their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of
speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation.
Freedom
is
not
freedom from responsibility,
but

freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353354 [1988]), it was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration justice. There is no antimony between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions
for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re:Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55
SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of
19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs.
Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295
[1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks
(Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in
making the false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly
the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the
respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from
anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate
could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby
he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to
be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does
not accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]).
When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when
he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition which this Court
failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with
seething sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from
turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance
with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE"

(Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can extenuate his

liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional
Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

6. .R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO S.
SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION
OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
FACTS:
Union of Filipro Employees, and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets
they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC
building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the SC
building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed
provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the
place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and
sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and
took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by
Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions
where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the
Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might
be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same
constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with. Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the
union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described
acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. Atty. Espinas
further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the
Court and that the SC has always remained steadfast in its role as the
guardian of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON picketers were guilty for direct contempt?
HELD: No.
"Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by
an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every
citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity
of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse
parties and the citizenry at large.

The individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in
her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that
even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the
Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through
the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within
the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such
efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The
duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily
upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his
attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a
reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of
the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper
attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a
continuing educational program for their members

7. A.C. No. MTJ-94-894 June 2, 1995

ATTY. FELIXBERTO N. BOQUIREN, complainant, vs. JUDGE
EMPERATRIZ DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ; CLERK OF COURT MELINDA D.
GATDULA; and ATTY. SATURNINO V. BACTAD, respondents.
FACTS: This administrative complaint stemmed from a Civil Case entitled
Alex Boquiren, et. al. vs. Mariano Gutierrez, for ejectment and damages,
where complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren was the plaintiff's counsel.
Atty. Saturnino V. Bactad, the defendant's counsel and the incumbent vicegovernor of the province, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty.
Melinda D. Gatdula, the judge and clerk of court respectively of the MTC,
San Antonio, Zambales where the aforementioned civil case was docketed.
Judge Cruz dismissed the ejectment suit due to plaintiff's lack of cause of
action which complainant, Atty. Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the RTC
of Iba, Zambales. Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious
nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of duty and ignorance of the law relative
to the disposition of civil case no. 111.
On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by
the complainant with false representation and employing scheme to defeat
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure the latter
alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and false representation that a motion to
dismiss is an allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary
Proceedings.
The Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of an
administrative case at the proper time, it appearing that the case is on
appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales where relief
is available". Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for its reconsideration. The Court
dismissed the complaint for not having been verified and for its failure to
show prima facie case against respondent Atty. Gatdula. In reaction thereto,
complainant Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty.
Boquiren in his Motions for Reconsideration describing the Court's
Resolutions as: "highly questionable"; "based on insufficient or incorrect
reasons"; "a classic arbituarily concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics"; "pregnant with aptness to mislead, deceptive
or delusive quality"; "patently erroneous"; "a BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY
OF JUSTICE" "classic carelessness, inefficiency, if not lack of industry on
the part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the 3rd Div.
and/or to the adjudication officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating
Tribunal's and/or its staff's BRAZEN MOCKERY OF JUSTICE with their
gross violation of the PUBLIC INTEREST POLICY of the State" [Emphasis
in the original]

Issue: WON Atty Boquiren violated Canon 11 of the CPR?

Held: Yes. It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at
seriously undermining the integrity of this Court. Complainant seems to have
forgotten his duty, as a lawyer and as an officer of the court, to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers (Canon 11, Code
of Professional Responsibility).
ACCORDINGLY, finding the motions for reconsideration without merit
the same are hereby DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Felixberto N.
Boquiren, however, is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be cited for
contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

8. A.C. No. 9116

March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA,
JR., Complainants, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
FACTS: Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity
in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in
Quezon City. Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for
damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag before the RTC of
Quezon City for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and
denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged
that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance which
prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the
public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or
community street. The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and
Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the
counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC ruled
in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law
firm, appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that
the original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even
before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The
CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the
six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not
meritorious.
8

Complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of

the Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent
before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the CPR,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18
thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his
duties as an officer of the court.
12

Respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law

firm represented the homeowners association, the case was actually
handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of
the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and
signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of
the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed
on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and
spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at
no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the
Association. Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant
Figueras in the election for President of the homeowners association in
1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying
their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other
delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of
Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land

Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the

present disbarment case against him and concluded that the disbarment
case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no
personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients;
hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of
the IBP-CBD.
Considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule
18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.
Issue: WON the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for
violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held: Yes.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have
no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his
clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him. The
procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the
real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment
cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers
misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome." Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered
injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of
proof of the charges.
17

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of

protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his
duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to
unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:
Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
20

The Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client as
amounting to inexcusable negligence. An attorney is bound to protect his
clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. A failure to
file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his
1

part. The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty
owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to
aid in the speedy administration of justice.
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be
disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in
grave cases, disbarment. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of
suspension for 1 month from the practice of law to be more commensurate
with the extent of respondents violation.
22

23

24

25

Thus, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for

violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt
with more severely.

9. A.C. No. 217

November 27, 1968
NIEVES RILLAS VDA. DE BARRERA, complainant, vs. CASIANO U.
LAPUT, respondent.
FACTS: Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of
respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon the ground that, being her counsel, as
administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Macario Barrera, he (Laput)
had misappropriated several sums of money held by him in trust for said
estate and tried to appropriate two (2) parcels of land belonging to the
same, as well as threatened her, in a fit of anger, with a gun, into signing
several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.
In his answer, respondent admitted his former relationship with Mrs. Barrera
as attorney and client and, apart from denying the main allegations of her
complaint, averred that the filing thereof was "part of a scheme to beat off"
his claim for attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct?
HELD: Yes. Mrs. Barrera was not inclined to cause the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Macario Barrera to be closed; that, upon the
other hand, respondent wanted to put an end to said proceedings since
there was nothing else to be done therein so that he could collect his fees
for services rendered to Mrs. Barrera as administratrix of said estate; that
he, therefore, prepared a petition for the declaration of Mrs. Barrera as the
universal heir of her deceased husband, for the delivery to her of the residue
of his estate and the termination of the proceedings; that he, moreover,
caused to be prepared a notice "for the rendition of the final, accounting and
partition" of said estate; that his purpose in preparing said petition was to
induce her to virtually agree and promise to submit her final accounts by
signing this notice; that respondent presented said petition and notice to
Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955, for her signature; that she, however,
refused to do so and suggested that the papers be left with her so that she
could have them read by somebody else; that, annoyed or angered by this
open manifestation of distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by
putting his revolver on his lap; and that, although he did not point the firearm
at her, its display attained the intended effect of intimidating Mrs. Barrera,
who, accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and the notice
aforementioned.
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, they become more so
when we consider that they were performed by a man dealing with a woman
72 years of age. The offense in this case is compounded by the
circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court,
the offender should have set the example as man of peace and a champion
of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very

person whom the offender was pledged to defend and protect his own
client.
There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance in favor of
respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently considered himself insulted by
Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated because she clearly indicated her lack of
confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read
the papers to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless.
Still, it cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on his lap was to
intimidate his client.