De Gruyter

Creation in the "Timaeus": The Middle Way

Author(s): Gabriela Roxana Carone
Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September
2004), pp. 211-226
Published by: De Gruyter
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Creation
intheTimaeus:
TheMiddleWay

GabrielaRoxanaCarone

inwhicha benevolent
us witha cosmology
Plato'sTimaeus
presents
god
a
as
is
as creating
to
artisan,
craftsman) introduced
(referred demiurgos:
orkosmos
outofchaos.Timaeus,a learnedastronomer
from
world-order
Southern
Italy,deliversa longspeech,whichhecallsbotha 'likelymyth'
and a 'likelyaccount'(eikoslogos).1
To whatextentfiction
(eikosmuthos)
discourseare thereintertwined
and argumentative
continuesto be a
oneofthemostcrucialexegetical
matter
ofdispute,andaffects
questions
committed
to theview
thatthisdialogueraises:Is Platoin theTimaeus
thattheuniversehas a temporal
beginning?
as thehistory
ofthedialogue'sinterpretation
Thisis a vexedquestion,
with
'literalists'
shows,
typically
answering'yes',while'non-literalists'
affirm
Whichsideis right?
On theonehand,we havethe
thecontrary.2

1 Cf.,e.g., Tim29c-e,30b and Morgan (2000: 271 ff.).All translationsare my own.

2 For a literalinterpretation
cf.Vlastos (1939: 379-99),(1964:402 ff.);Hackforth(1959:
17 ff.);T.M. Robinson(1970: 64-5),(1979: 105-8),(1993: 99 ff.);Guthrie(1978: 302-5);
Mohr (1989: 293 ff.);Berti(1997: 119-32);Vallejo (1997: 141-8);Reale (1997: 149-64);
Hankinson (1998: 111). Against,cf.Taylor (1928: 66-9,79-80); Mondolfo (1934: 70
ff.);Cornford(1937:37 ff.,176,203 ff.);Cherniss(1944:421-31);Taran (1971: 372 ff.);
Brisson(1974: 104-5),(1991:38,49 n. 21), (1992:36-7);Grube (1980: 162-3);Ostenfeld
(1982:240-2);Baltes(1996);Wright(2000: 15). In antiquitywe can countAristotle(de
Celo1 10,280a 28 ff.;MetaphXII 6, 1071b37-2a2),Plutarch(deAn Proc1014a-b)and
Atticus(apudProclusin Tim1283,27 ff.Diehl) in thefirstcamp, and Xenocrates(fr.
54 Heinze), Crantor(apudPlutarchde An Proc1012f-13b)and Proclus (In Tim1 285,
26-8;1 287,28-288,1 Diehl) in the second.

APEIRON a journal forancientphilosophyand science

211-226$12.00Academic Printing& Publishing
0003-6390/2004/3703

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212 GabrielaRoxanaCarone

thattheuniverse'hascomeintobeing,originating
from
textualassertion
since the universeis a
a principle'(gegonen,ap' archestinosarxamenos),

and all sensiblethingsaregenerated{Tim28b-c).On the

sensiblething,
otherhand,onecouldexpressqualmsabouttakingthisassertion
literally
creationas a singleeventinthepast,so thatthegenesis
oras expressing
oftheworldcouldhavea different
meaning.And,as I shallshow,other
could
servetoqualifythegegone
from
the
same
of28b7
dialogue
passages
in
orevengo againstitstemporalinterpretation
as punctualgeneration
thatthehuman
thepast.3In a laterwork,Platoconsidersthepossibility
raceneverhad a beginning,
whichwouldentailthathe at leastdid not
ruleoutthattheuniversecouldbe beginningless
(see LawsVI 781e-2a).4
Plato
himself
is
us, throughhis chosenformof
Perhaps
encouraging
a
to
think
little
harder
about
this
andinthisregardthe
writing,
question,
has occasionedmaywellrespondto
heateddiscussionthattheTimaeus
a Platonicinvitation.5
YetI thinkthatitis possible,bytakinga closelook
and see which,ifany,
at theevidence,toweighdifferent
interpretations
andmakesthetextoftheTimaeus
difficulties
entailsfewest
philosophical
thatneither
mostphilosophically
cogent.Ifitturnsout,as I shallsuggest,
ofthestandardviewshaveapproachedthematter
appropriately,
maybe
toquestionthetermsinwhichthe
we cantakethatresultas an incentive
beenposed.
debatehas generally
Thus,itis mygoal in thispaperto re-openthediscussion,notwith
its traditional
thepurposeof perpetuating
terms,but withan eye to
infavourofone
that
offered
some
crucial
arguments
typically
proposing
rest
on
a
false
or
the
other
Instead,I shall
dichotomy.
may
interpretation
defenda middleway,whichretainssomeofthemeritsbutdoes away,
I hope,withsomeofthedifficulties
ofbothoutlooks.To thefirst
group
I shallconcedethatPlatodoesmeanthattheuniverse'has
ofinterpreters

a literalreadingofthe
3 In addition,Phaedrus
245cff.couldbe seento contradict
ofsoulintheTimaeus
creation
(34b10ff.),giventhatintheformer
dialoguesoulis
saidtobe ungenerated.
4 'Everyman shouldcomprehend
thiswell: thatthegeneration
of humans(ton
atallnorwilliteverhaveany
either
hashadnobeginning
(arche)
anthrpn
genesis)
or
end,butithas alwaysbeenand assuredlywillbe (all' enteaeikaiestaipantos);
else,thelengthoftimethatwouldhavepassedsinceitbeganis incalculable'.
- whichneedn'tbe 'disturbing',
5 Thissituation
paceDillon(1989:72)- mightbe
and Xenocrates
that
his
direct
such
as Aristotle
the
fact
disciples,
suggested
by
aboutthematter.
cf.above,n. 2 - wereindisagreement

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Creationin theTimaeus 213

comeintobeing'in a literalsense;however,thisneed notbe read,as

literalists
have usuallydone,to mean thattheDemiurgecreatedthe
I shallsuggest
universeas a singleandisolatedeventinthepast.Rather,
thattheTimaeusprovidesstrongevidencefora view of creationas a
someoftheintuitions
oftheliteralist
process,whichreconciles
perpetual
in thisregard,even thoughit does grantto the
and thenon-literalist
thatthesequentialorderofprecosmosand cosmosprenon-literalist
sentedin themythshouldnotbe takenas a temporalone.HereI shall
and show why,in
engagewithVlastos'argumentsto the contrary,
I shallsuggestthattheTimaeus
does
essence,I findthemflawed.Finally,
indeedencourageus to searchfora deepermeaningunderlying
creationaltalk(as non-literalists
claim),and thatsuch a meaningcan be
in
an
terms
of
underanalysed
emphaticassertionofcosmicteleology,
stoodnotjustas a resultbutas a processaccordingtowhichgeneration
takesplace.Letus thenproceedto reviewsomeof
oforderconstantly
thathavebeenprovidedforand againsta literal
theclassicalarguments
intheTimaeus.
of
creation
interpretation
1

Gegoneat Tim 28b7

We should startby lookingat what is usuallyknownas Timaeus'

ornot,one
'proemium',
giventhatmuchturnson whatstatus,mythical
that
to
the
lines
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
gives
Demiurgeis the
Creatoroftheuniverse.Thespecificargument
forthegeneration
ofthe
in thefollowing
universeis presented
form:(i) theuniverseis tangible
andvisibleand possessesbody:itis thussensible;(ii) all sensiblethings
are in processofbecomingand generated(gignomena
kaigenneta);
(iii)
thiscosmoshas comeintobeing{gegone,
therefore,
28b7-c2).This,for
an 'unadornedlogicalargument'
constitutes
andT.M.RobinHackforth,
sonwrites:'Whatever
Platomayhavemeant,he certainly
speaksofthe
of
the
world
as
it
in
took
time.'6
Literalists
often
beginning
though
place
insistthatthisargument
is presentedbeforethestartofanymythical
account(thewordmuthos
beingintroduced
onlylater,at 29d2),so that
itwouldbe unsoundtotakeitfiguratively.7

6 Hackforth(1959: 19); Robinson(1995: 64-5).Cf. Vlastos (1964: 403-4).

7 Cf.Hackforth(1959: 17 ff.),Vlastos (1964:402-3),T.M. Robinson(1979: 105 ff.),Prior

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214 GabrielaRoxanaCatone

suchas Cornford,
Contrastthiswithnon-literalists
who arguesthat
is ambiguous,and can mean
theword 'becoming'(genesis,
gignesthai)
at sometime;or (b) beingin processof
either(a) comingintoexistence
'it
In
latter
is
truethatin suchbecomingsomething
the
sense,
change.
old passingaway;buttheprocess
newis alwaysappearing,something
withoutbeginningor
itselfcan be conceivedas goingon perpetually,
toCornford,
best
fits
the
use
o
atTim28b7-c2,
end'.According
(b)
genesis
sincethe whole argumentis introducedin the contextof a twofold
ofentities,
where'thatwhichis always,andhasnogenesis'is
distinction
to 'thatwhichalwaysbecomes(togignomenon
contrasted
aei)and never
'theapplication
ofthepremisstothevisible
is' (27d6-8al).ForCornford,
worldmustmeanthattheworldbelongstothelowerlevelofexistence
in turnfollowsancientinterpreters
in underas described'.Cornford
'it
into
in
the
has
come
terms
ofthe
being'(gegone)
standing expression
possessionof 'a derivativeand dependentexistencewhichis notselfsufficing'.8
advisesus to takethegegoneat 28b6as
Thus,thislineofargument
as processofchange,side
the
more
to
generalconceptofgenesis
pointing
where
the
world
itself
is connected
withthe
with
those
side
passages
by
realmofbecoming(genesiskaitopantoe,29d7-el; genesiskaikosmos,
29e4)

so
and wherewe aretoldthat,'as being(ousia)is tobecoming(genesis),
If
would
truth
to
belief
is
(atheia)
(pistis)'(29c3). so,genesis
pertainto
withit,at leastinthesensethatthe
theworld,orindeedbe coextensive
sensibleworld is in a processof constantchangein some or other
respect.9

cf.Cornford
(1937:37 ff.);Taran(1971:
(1985:95) and Berti(1997:119-32).Against,
andtheeikoslogosintheTimaeus
382ff.).Forstudiesonthenatureoftheproemium
cf.Runia(1997:101-18);Donini(1988:5-52).
8 See Cornford
(1937:24-6);alsoCherniss(1944:422),Taran(1971:384).On whether
thecontroversial
'always'(aei)at 28al shouldbe keptin a readingofthetext,cf.
Cornford
(1969),(1973);T.M.Robin(1959:18-19);Whittaker
(1937:25-6);Hackforth
son(1979:105);Dillon(1989:60-63).
intheTimaeus
should
theidea thatthe'becoming'
9 M. Frede(1988)has challenged
be understood
as changeatleastinsomesense,bycontending
that,ifthereis some
thereis anotherone in whichit isn't
is becoming,
respectin whichsomething
do nothaveanykindofbeingwhatsoi.e.,is,butobjectsofexperience
becoming,
contrast
between
ever,sincethiswouldgo against'theclearand straightforward
by Platoat Tim27d6-8al(40). His argument,
beingand becoming'established

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Creationin theTimaeus 215

havebeenposed,
Now,tojudgebythewaythesetwointerpretations
And literalists
have tradiit would seem thattheyare irreconcilable.
with
to
the
at
'no
28b4-c2,
that,
argument
complained
regard
tionally
infiltrates
this
of
or
sequence
proposilanguage
metaphorical figurative
tions':10
thetextdoesseemtoconcludethattheworld'hascomeintobeand notjustthatitis a thingthatbecomes,orgignomenon.
ing'(gegone),
Yet,I suggest,thereis no needto takeone side ortheother.Instead,
Let
a viamediais possiblebetweenthesetwoopposinginterpretations.
at28b7 as literally
us readilyconcedethatitis possibletoreadthegegone
standing
meaning'has comeintobeing',and notjustas metaphorically
for'itbecomes'.But'hascomeintobeing'doesnotexcludethepossibilis a perpetualprocessinsteadofan isolatedeventat
itythatgeneration
oftime.Infact,
means'hascomeintobeing'
thebeginning
gegone
literally
This
sometimes
mistranslate.11
than'cameintobeing',as literalists
rather

at28a3-4by
sincePlatoimmediately
thecontrast
is unconvincing,
qualifies
though,
is' (togignomenon
... ontds
on).As
oudepote
sayingthat'whatbecomes... neverreally
a matter
offact,Fredeconcedesthispointon p. 39: Tlato maybe readyto admit
... canhave"being"inan ordinary
thatordinary
senseofthe
objectsofexperience
verb"tobe",buthe herewouldbe denyingthattheycouldbe said tobe in some
senseof"tobe" '; thoughhisargument
thenoverlooks
thisprovision.
philosophical
Platois notdenying
tosensibleparticulars,
sincehe doesindeed
beingorexistence
attribute
'existence'
he
(ousia)or'being'(einai)tothemintheTimaeus:
specifically,
at35al-3and'scattered
existence'
existence'
(ousiagignomene)
speaksof'generated
at37a5;seealso52d3forattribution
ofeinaitogenesis.
Whatsensibles
(ousiaskedasie)
don'thaveis realbeinginthesenseoftheconstantly
certainly
unchanging
beingof
theForms(cf.29b6,37e-8a),and thesetermsseemsufficient
to accountforthe
and ousiain thiscontext.
contrast
betweengenesis
Forfurther
discussionon being
andbecoming
cf.Code (1988),Bolton(1975),Nehamas(1975),Irwin(1977),Jordan
(1983:48-66),Prior(1985:89-93);on thephilosophical
meaningofbeingcf.Vlastos
inPlatoas onethatincludesalsothepredicative
(1965),Kahn(1981).Forthecontrast
andveridical
of'tobe',seemy(1998:117-8)withfurther
references
there.
meanings
I think
thispointcanbe maintained
as a generalunderstanding
of'becoming'
inthe
whichis independent
ofthefurther
Timaeus,
should,pace
questionwhether
gegone
be readinthespecific
senseof'hascomeintobeing'rather
thanas merely
Cornford,
fora processofbecoming
as such.
standing
10 Cf.Vlastos(1964:403)quotingHackforth
(1959:19).
11 See here,e.g.,T.M.Robinson(1995:65).

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216 GabrielaRoxanaCorone

tobe stillongoing,
opensup roomfortakingtheprocessofgeneration
orindeedperpetual,12
as suggestedinturnby Tim38cl-3:
Whereas
themodel(paradeigma)
inalleternity,
exists
theformer
[=the
universeor ouranos at 38b6] continuously
forall timehas comeintobeing
{dia teloustonhapantachronon
gegonds),existsand will exist.

Oncemore,then,theuse oftheperfect
tense(as opposedto theaorist)
- as muchas at28b7(gegone)
- plustheadverbial
hereat38cl (gegoris)
all
for time',seemto indicatethatthecoming
expression
'continuously
intobeing of the world did not occur 'once upon a time',but is a
continuous
process.
In addition,thereare someotherpassageswherecreationby god is
depictednot merelyas havingtakenplace in the past,but also as
inthepresent,
thatwouldagainsupporttheviewof
occurring
something
creation
as a perpetualprocess.Thuse.g.,inthemiddleofthedescription
ofthecreation
oftime,we findtheuse ofthewords'makes'(poiei,
37d6)
and 'contrives'(nichanatai,
37e3)- in a passagewhere,interestingly,
Plato is talkingspecifically
about tense(37e4 ff.),so thatone would
carefulaboutthetenseshe is using.
expecthimtobe particularly

Re-assessingalternatives

I contend,has theadvantageofexempting
us from
My interpretation,
to
text:
solutions
the
we
do
not
need,
problems
posedby
overimaginative
themeaningofgegoneat 28b7, and to this
as Cornford
does,to stretch
extentwe do not need to side withthetraditional
non-literalist.
But
withVlastos(and withancientliteralneither
do we need topostulate,
takenplace
ists),a precosmictimein whichchaoswouldhaveliterally
beforecreationby theDemiurge.Otherproblemstoo besetthetradibutI shallfirst
focusontheintriguing
tionalliteralinterpretation,
briefly
andwhyVlastos'valiantattempt
atmaking
issueoftimeintheTimaeus,
withitultimately
fails.
hisliteralviewcompatible

12 Thisviewwas suggested
byProclus(In TimI 282,27-30;288,14-17;290,23-291,1;
III 51,7-10Diehl)andI believethetextsupportsit.Cf.my(1991:51 ff.).

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Creationin theTimaeus 217

in theTimaeus
with
as generated
Timeis presented
by god together
and as relatedtomeasurement.
to
theorderly
universe,
According Tim
whichmoveswithnumber';
37d6-7(cf.38a),timeis an 'imageofeternity
monthsandyearsdidnotexistbefore
we arealso toldthat'days,nights,
at thesame timeas it
theheavencameintobeing,butwerecontrived
and therewas framed'(37el-3;cf.38b6).Thatis,thenotionofnumber,
of'time'.In
forethatoforder,is includedin theverycharacterization
withthekosmos
as an orderedwhole- as
addition,timeis coexistent
suggestedbyitscomingintobeing'at thesametime'as theuniverseso thatwithoutorderthereis no time.Butifthisis so,thereseemstobe
theuniversefroma temporally
noroomfora Demiurgecreating
previous
stateofchaos.13
is to postulatea secondkindof
Now, one way outofthisdifficulty
to at Tim37c-8c,as cosmictime
time(apartfromthe one referred
order,andmarkedbythecelestialclock).Thisavenuehasbeen
implying
exploredby Vlastosamongothers,who callsthissecondkindoftime
itas an irreversible
succestime',andcharacterizes
temporal
'precosmic
sionofpastand future
whichcannotbe measured.14
We mustnote,however,thatthetextseemsprimafacieto ruleout
thispossibility,
forwe aretoldthatevenpastand future
arecreatedby
in
sees
but replies
the Demiurge(37e4).Vlastos, fact,
thisdifficulty,
fromsilence,claimingthatPlatoatleastdoesnot
mainlywitharguments
ofa secondkindoftime.Whatis problematic
about
denytheexistence
Vlastos'accountis notso muchitslackoftextualevidence(whichmight
be requiredforsucha largeclaim)butitsmisreading
ofportionsoftext.
For even past and futureare describedas 'generatedkindsof time'
eid,37e4).Vlastoswould liketo takepastand future
(chronou
gegonota
as 'attributes'
oftime- as a rendering
ofchronou
eidat37e4gegonota
whichcould therefore,
as 'attributes',
have existedindependently
of

13 Thispointhasbeenstressed
often:
Cherniss
cf.,amongothers,
(1944:426-7n.361-2),
Taran(1971:378-80),
Brisson(1991:49).Comparetheargument
inProclus(In Tim
III 49,20-50,7 Diehl).
14 Cf.Vlastos(1964:410-1).Fora 'precosmictime'understood
as durationcf.also
(1959:22).Formorerecentdefencesof
Skemp(1942:111),followedbyHackforth
thesameview,cf.Mohr(1985:65) and Vallejo(1997:147).In antiquity,
Proclus
andcriticizes
a theory
ofa 'twofold
time'insupportofa literalviewofthe
reports
chaos(InTim1286,20 ff.Diehl).
precosmic

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218 GabrielaRoxanaCorone

butrather
But'eidos'cannotmean'attribute',
means'kind'
cosmictime.15
withthe
oftime.Andsincewe aretoldthattimewas generated
together
itwouldfollowthatanykindoftimewas generated
universe,
together
withtheuniverse.In addition,Platoexplicitly
linkspastand futureto
themeasurability
oftimewhenhe saysat 38a7-8thattheyare'kindsof
time... whichcirclesaccordingto number'.Thissuggeststhatsimple
durationis insufficient
fortime,whichinsteadrequiresorderlysequence.
Letus also thinka littleaboutthetraitofgoodnessthatdefinesthe
Demiurge,and his desireto makethingsgood as faras possible(29ewiththethought
thatthe
30a). Suchtraitsseemhoweverincompatible
have
remained
for
no
should
inactive,
apparently
good reaDemiurge
chaosoccurred.
son,whiletheprecosmic
seemto supportthissuggesDialoguesbeforeand aftertheTimaeus
we
read
tion.In theRepublic
that,
(II 380d-lc)
beingperfect,
god cannot
in
a context
note
that
this
is
said
for
the
worse.
We
must
changeexcept
ofgod as such(cf.
wheregeneralclaimsarebeingmadeaboutthenature
379a-bon theneedtorepresent
god 'as he reallyis'),and that,a fortiori,
- whosetraditional
theseclaimswouldapplynotonlytotheOlympians
in thatdialogue- , buttoanykindofgod
accountsarebeingcriticized
in theformofmyth.LawsX (900cff.)in turnsuggeststhat
represented
fortheworldisdefinitory
orlazysincehisconcern
cannot
be
inactive
god
of his goodness,and he does not lack the power to exerciseit. The
in addition,emphasizesthepointthatenvyis absentfromthe
Timaeus,
tobe good so faras
divinenature,and insteadgod wishedeverything
It
thatgod's essential
would
then
seem
Phaedrus
cf.
247a).
possible(29e,
- suchas benevolenceand providence- would have to be
features
displayed,and theancientsalreadyfoundthispointalluded
constantly
that'god remainedinhissame
in
Timaeus
thesuggestion
the
to
through
reasons
we
accustomedmanner'(42e5-6).16
Thus, can see philosophical

15 Cf.Vlastos(1964:410-12).
claimthat
16 Cf.Cherniss
(1944:425);Taran(1971:380-1).Vallejo's(1997:147)contrary
withhis
withanyactionthatis coherent
ofgod is compatible
'theimmutability
foritcouldbe
nature'(suchas creationfromchaos)is simplyquestion-begging,
withgod's
argued(andtheLawsdoesargue:see X 900c8-lc6)thatitis notcoherent
goodnessnottocarefortheworldwhenhecoulddo so (as wouldbe thecaseifone
a pre-cosmic
state).
postulates

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Creationin theTimaeus 219

fordoubtingtheliteraldescription
ofa godwhichsuddenlyinitiates
his
cosmicordering.
in the Timaeusthe universeitselfand the heavenly
Furthermore,
bodies are called 'gods',17and theWorld-Soulis called 'divine'(36e),
stated.
Thistraitis recurrently
boththesetermsindicating
immortality.18
Not onlydo we hearthatboththeuniverse,itssoul and theheavenly
in theTimaeus(cf.33a2,36e4,40b5,42e7,43a4-5,
bodiesare immortal
thesame thought.19
Can this,
69c6),but also otherdialoguesconfirm
however,be squaredwithotherpassages in the Timaeusapparently
- as literalists
claim- thatall thoseentitiesdid have a
suggesting
as onceandonlyoncegenerated
bygod (31b,34a-b,
punctualbeginning,
On
the
face
of
there
would
to
be
no
it,
41d)?
problem,sincethe
appear
traditional
Greekgods wereconceivedas beingbornand not dying.
Forthetext
However,thepictureintheTimaeus
appearstobe different.
in
and corruption
hand
hand
indicatesthatgeneration
(gignomenon
go
kaiapollumenon,
assertionthat'every28a3,whichrecallstheRepublic
VIII 546a2).Ifso, a beliefinthe
undergoescorruption',
thinggenerated
the
world
seems
to
of
immortality
presupposea beliefthatit was not
generated.
Butdoesn'tthetextafterall concedetheuniverseis actuallydissolvable, thoughit will not be dissolvedby god's will? (41a7-b6)This
concession,
however,doesnotalterthepointjustmade.Fortheclaimat
thatis generatedis actuallydissolved,notjust
28a was thateverything
'dissolvable'.
So, eventhedenialat 41a-bthattheuniversewill
merely
be dissolved- muchas one mayconcedeitis 'dissolvable'- appears
to demandthatit has notcomeintobeing,ifnon-dissolution
implies
non-generation.

17 Cf. 34b8,40c-d,68e3-4,92c7.
18 Cf.,e.g.,Mugnier(1930) and my (1991: 117-34).
19 Cf.,e.g., Phaedrus245c-6a,Laws XII 967d6-7.The heavenlybodies are called 'gods'
at R VI 508a4, Laws VII 821b-c,X 899a-b; forthe universeas god see also Laws VII
821a2.

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220 GabrielaRoxanaGavone

Creationand theDemiurge

Now, Tim41a-b does, however,seem to be revealingin a different

Forithelpsus see thattheexistence,
as muchas theimmortality,
respect.
oftheuniverse,
is notnecessary,
ordeiure,butdejado contingent
upon
theexistence
ofa superiorcause.20
Thisformofthinking
alreadypaves
thewayforanunderstanding
ofwhyPlatomayhavechosentheimagery
of creation.To talkaboutcreationis, at a deeperlevel,to talkabout

principles.
explanatory

In thisregard,thechoiceofa mediumwhichrepresents
eventsin a
fulfil
an
order
still
It
has
oftenbeen
sequential
may
important
goal.
that
had
observed
cosmogonists
priorto Plato
depictedtheworldas
createdby aimlessand randomforces;so Platowantsto meetthemon
theirown groundand show,conversely,
thattheuniverseis theresult
This
is
the
ofa teleological
same
he followsin thehaws,
plan.21
strategy
ofbirthofsouloverbody(X892a-c)but
wherehe claimsthesuperiority
atall;rather,
whereno precosmic
chaosis mentioned
motion
disorderly
is thereprovedtobe a hypothesis:
howtheworldwouldbe z/itwerenot
as itis,by intelligence
(cf.X 898b-c).One couldthinkofthe
governed,
in
Timaeus
as havingsimilarcounterfactual
value:
precosmicchaos the
althoughitis notlikelythatitcouldhaveexistedintime,itstillhelpsus
see howtheworldwouldbe iftheprinciples
positedbythematerialists
if
and itstendency
to
were
absent
from
the
universe
i.e.,
god
prevailed,

thattheuniversedependson?Attheveryleast,itis
20 Whatis thishigherprinciple
thattheForms
theForms(cf.50c7-d4).
Alongsimilarlines,we readinthePhaedrus
theos
on
arethosethings'bybeingin relation
towhichgod is divine'(proshoisper
theios
cf.247d),andthetraditional
estin,
249c5-6,
imageofthegods'beingnurtured
- isreplacedbythemetaphor
- a keytotheirimmortality
onnectarandambrosia
ofthegods'beingnurtured
on theForms(247c-e),whichagainindicatesthatthe
andimmortality.
Itisoutside
foundation
ofthegods'divinity
Formsaretheultimate
theDemiurgeshouldbe
thescopeofthispapertodelveintothequestionwhether
he
takento standfora principle
otherthantheForms,and,in thatcase,whether
eventhoughI shall
shouldbe takenas a nousseparateorimmanent
totheuniverse,
in theformofa deusexmachina.
One
rejecttheviewthathe is a personalcreator
shouldalsonotethattheDemiurgeembodiesan intelligence
which,as such,seems
and subordinate
itsproperobject(cf.Tim
inferior
to theForms,whichconstitute
51b-e).Fora discussionofthisissuesee my(forthcoming),
Chapter2.
21 Cf.,e.g.,Cornford
totheAtomists.
(1937:31),withspecialreference

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Creationin theTimaeus 221

wereleftunchecked.22
Andwe seematleastlicensednottotake
disorder
theorderofthenarration
as necessarily
therealsequence
representing
of eventsby Timaeus'remarkthat'as faras the soul is concerned,
todescribeitafterthebody,thegod didnot
althoughwe areattempting
it to be younger,
thatthe
sincehe would nothave permitted
contrive
oldershouldbe governedby theyounger;but,sincewe verymuch
in whatis casualand random,we also tendto speakin the
participate
same fashion'(34blO-c4).Indeed,as was alreadysuggestedin antiqthesequentialpresentation
ofeventsin themyth(suchas, first,
uity,23
ofdisorder,
theprevalence
second,thatofgod's design)canbe takento
and in isolationtwo factors,
calledin theTimaeus
depictdynamically
in
in
and
which
fact
coexist
the
cosmos
as a 'combination'
nous,
necessity
inwhichnousrulesovernecessity
(cf.48a).
(sustasis)
Ifthisis so,whataboutthe'CreatorGod' (potetes,
28c3)?Itseemsthat
notso muchinthesenseofa god
theDemiurgeshouldbe called'creator'
createdtheworld'once upon a time',but,
who anthropomorphically
insofar
as
he
is
the
efficient
causewhichis perpetually
rather,
generating
and inthatwaysustaining
theorderoftheuniverse.24
(Thus,we aretold

22 Thus,at Tim53a8-b4,
whereitis said thatthecondition
'without
planormeasure'
kai
'whenever
ametms)
(hotan
(alogds
belongstothings
godisabsentfrom
something'
we cantakethehotanas conditional.
Cf.LSJad loc.Thispassage,in
apitinostheos),
is mostusefulforshowingthatgod'sconstant
addition,
presenceintheuniverseis
as I pointedoutinmy(1991:52,
requiredifthelatteris tocontinue
beingorderly,
59-60).
andProclus(mentioned
inn. 2 above).
23 See,e.g.,Xenocrates
24 Thecausallyefficient
character
ofthisgod,as principle
oforderlymotionin the
is emphasizedbyhisbeingcalleda 'creator'(potetes,
universe,
28c3)and 'principle
ofbecoming
andorder'(geneses
kaikosmou
... arche,
as a cause
29e4),andpresented
of thegeneration
of all things(Tim28a,c), withan emphasison itsfunction
of
Thus,
(cf.,e.g.,53bl,69c)orbringing
(29e-30a).
ordering
goodnesstoa stateofaffairs
we havegoodreasontobelievethattheDemiurgebelongstotheorderofwhatthe
Timaeuscalls'primary'
or'divine'causes(46c-e,68e-9a),i.e.,those'causeswhich,
areartisans(dmiourgo)
offairand good effects'
(metanovi),
byusingintelligence
from'secondary'
or'necessary
causes',
(46e).Thesecausesareinturndistinguished
which'occurby otherthingsbeingmovedand in turnmovingotherthingsby
totheorderofthebodily(cf.46c-d,48a-b).Thelatter
(46el-2),andpertain
necessity'
becomes'errant'(cf.pianamene
aitia,48a) withoutnous,in whichcase theycanbe
characterized
as those'causeswhich,if/whendeprivedofintelligence,
ineachcase
46e5-6.The primaryfunction
of nous,
effects',
producerandomand disorderly
inturning
consists
thosesamecausesintoco-causesorauxiliaries
however,
(insofar

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222 GabrielaRoxanaCatone

is absentrandomand
at 46e5-6thatin each case whereintelligence
seemsto
effects
occur.)Thatis,theDemiurgein theTimaeus
disorderly
ofgenerating
order(cf.29e4)as a cause(aition,
havenotonlythefunction
is perpetual,
thatofkeepingthecosmos
28c2)butalso,ifthisgeneration
that
ingoodorder.Thisinturncorresponds
tothefunction
o governing
themythallotstohim(cf.48a2,41a-2e,71d);a governance
which,despite
in thepast,mustalso be understoodas presentif
itsusual description
the world is to continuebeing orderly,as we read thateverything
whenevergod is
behaveswithoutplanand measure(alogdskaiarneiros)
in
a context
where
tinos
absentfromsomething
theos,
(hotan
53a8-b4),
api
if
and
fair
allude
to
the
the
world
is
must
So,
(as
Demiurge.25
good
god
is takenforgrantedat 29a5,92c),i.e.,orderly(cf.87c4-5),itis implied
thatgod mustbe constantly
presentinittosustainit.
Let us recall,however,thatthe artisanalmetaphor,suggestinga
and developing
definite
stepsoftheworkstarting
productand different
theteleologiintime,hasproveda mostusefulwayforPlatotohighlight
oftheworld,likeanygoodproductofart,whichismade
calarrangement
notat randombutwitha definite
purpose(cf.Grg503e-4a)seekingto
In thisrespect,
itis interesting
a chainofmeans.26
fulfil
an endthrough
whiletakingcreationintheTimaeus
tonotethatevenAristotle,
literally
Plato in favourof the view thatthe universeis
and thuscriticizing
morethanonce,however,resortedto theartisanalmetaphor
eternal,27
- 28to
- whichhe elsewhereseemedto have criticized
as nonsensical

as thatis possible),and thisis mythically

bythepersuasionthatnous
represented
actionofnousworksby
exertsuponnecessity
(48a).Inotherwords,theteleological
whichprovidethemeans
relyingon whatwe maycall mechanicalconditions,
seebelow,n. 26.
without
whichan endcannotbe fulfilled:
theprecosmic
saidthat[he]gaveshapeto(dieschematizato)
25 Sinceitis subsequently
andnumbers
traceswithforms
(b4-5).
interact
and teleology,
26 I analysethewayinwhichmeansand ends,ormechanism
2.
in
intheTimaeus'
(forthcoming),
Chapter
my
cosmological
picture
27 De Celo110,279bl2-80all,280a28ff.
whichhe
in whichhe upbraidsPlatofortheuse ofmetaphors
28 Thus,in a context
Aristotle
asks'what[note:not"who"]is it
callsmere'emptywords'(kenologein),

thatworks lookingto the Forms?' (tigar estitoergazomenon

prostas ideasapoblepon,

19,991al9-23).Thewholepassagerunsas follows:'Noraretheotherthings
Metaph
fromFormsin anyoftheusualwaysofspeaking.And to say thattheFormsare

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Creationin theTimaeus 223

inthecosmos.29
Thisshowsthat
arrangement
emphasizetheteleological
bothPlato and Aristotlewould agree on the usefulnessof artisanal
in thecontext
ofdiscussingnaturalteleology,
muchas their
metaphors
in
It
thisteleologiaccounts
differ
substantial
is,
then,
respects.
respective
thatthedialogueinvitesus
oftheworldintheTimaeus
cal arrangement
froman intelligent
toturnourattention
to,andwhichitstalkofcreation
The
is
however, notan inertprodhelpsemphasize. universe,
principle
buta livingbeingitself(30d,32d,92c),whoselife
uctofcraftsmanship,
is constantly
270a3-5),and whoseorderis
beingrenewed(cf.Politicus
ruleoveritsnecessary
tendencies
theresultofconstant
(Tim
intelligent
48a,53a7-b4).As a matteroffact,theremaybe morethanone layerto
thisteleological
picture:for,justas theDemiurgeimposesorderupon
disorder,so does Timaeus(albeitwithmoredifficulty)
tryto impose
orderupon randommodesofspeaking(cf.34b-c).30
(Afterall,thebest
formofdiscourseis inthePhaedrus
(264c)describedas a zdion- likethe
universein the Timaeus- and in the Philebus(64c) a completeor
is describedas a kosmos).
To seetheworldbeing
argument
accomplished
out
of
chaos
is
to
see
Timaeus'discoursein
createdbya benevolent
god

inthemis touse emptywordsand

andthattheotherthings
paradigms
participate
Forwhatis thatthingwhichworkslookingtotheForms?'
utterpoeticmetaphors.
is quitesimilartothatin theTimaeus
and blepein
Thisvocabulary
(cf.apergazesthai
oftheDemiurgeat 28a and 28c-9a),so thatAristotle's
reference
mustbe to the
failsto takeas a personalentity,
and
Demiurge,whichhe, however,evidently
witha toneofcomplaint
surrounds
as doingnoexplanatory
work.Cf.Guthrie
(1978:
255-6,n. 3); (1981:246-7).
invain',thatnature'aspirestothe
29 Thus,hetellsus that'godandnaturedo nothing
theuniverse,
thatnaturehas 'devised'one'shands
best',thatgod 'has perfected'
fora certain
cf.,e.g.,deCelo14,271a33,
purpose,andcallsnatureitself
'demiurgic':
PA 687a6ff.,645a9.(CompareheretheTimaeus'
GC II 10,336b27-32,
reference
to
or 'demiurgic'
causesas belonging
toan 'intelligent
nature',46d-e).That
primary
thelanguageismetaphorical,
seemssuggested
though,
bypassagessuchas deCelo
II 9,291a24,talking
abouthowitis 'as if (hsper)
naturehadprovidence
orpronoia.
Fordiscussionoftheseand likepassagessee,e.g.,Mansion(1946:261ff.);Preus
(1975:246-7);Guthrie
(1981:106-9);Kahn(1985);Balme(1972:93-6);Lennox(1987:
accountin generaltriesto stay
276-9),(1997:171-3).Clearly,however,Aristotle's
theuniverse
intheformof
awayfromthenotionofan intelligent
entity
pervading
a Platonic
initsattempt
cosmicsoul,andisdistinctive
toexplainteleology
byappeal
tonatureas an internal
ofmotionin thingsand as a conceptinprinciple
principle
fromsoulorevena designing
distinct
mind.
30 See hereOsborne(1996).

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224 GabrielaRoxanaCarone

themaking;whattheresultshowsus, however,is thattheuniverseas

such is less subjectto randomnessand chaos thanhumanways of
speakingmay suggest,and insteadprovidesa paradigmforanyone
discourseorintheiractions)tocreatea kostnos.31
wishing(through
4

Conclusion

a readingwhichallowsfortheclaimthat
In thispaperI havepresented
theuniverse'hascomeintobeing'atTim28b7tobe readina literalsense
and others).
sensedefendedbyCornford
thanthemetaphorical
(rather
as a claim
thatthisclaimneednotbe understood
I haveshown,however,
oftheuniversefroma temporally
aboutthegeneration
previouschaotic
that
state.In fact,thisreadingseems precludedgiven,particularly,
as I hope
timecannotbe sustained,
fora pre-cosmic
Vlastos'arguments
evidencein favour
tohavedemonstrated.
Instead,theTimaeus
presents
one
which
itselfis a continual
oftheviewthatcreation
process, through
universecanbe seenas havingcomeintobeing'forall time'
theorderly
it is no wonderthat,preciselyin the contextof
(38c); accordingly,
activities
shouldbeportrayed
the
time, Demiurge'screational
describing
in the presentratherthanin the past tense (37d-e),in a way that
than
cosmicorderrather
roleas oneofsustaining
theformer's
highlights
rather
of
the
tense
even
the
use
it
once
(indeed,
perfect
merely
generating
allowsthattheprocessof
thantheaoristat28b7is suggestive,
iorgegone
as one of
creationis stillwithus). Sucha rolecan inturnbe interpreted
in
in
and
this
the
the
rule
of
universe,
regardcreateleology
securing
and
tionalimages,emphasizing
planning design,provequiteuseful.To
thisextentnon-literalists
mayhavebeenrighttoinsistthatwe oughtto
eventhoughI
thecreationstory,
lookfora deepermeaningunderlying
been
not
as
has
often
does
that
this
conclusion
have
shown
entail,
hopeto
at
into
as
come
universe
talk
of
the
that
assumed,
being' 28b7
'having
shouldnotbe giventheliteralweightthatitdeserves.
ofPhilosophy
Department
ofColorado
University
CO
Boulder, 80309-0232
U.S.A.
caroneObuffmail.colorado.edu

natureoftheuniversefroman ethicalpointofview,cf.my
31 On theparadigmatic
(forthcoming),
Chapter3.

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Creationin theTimaeus 225

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