STIA-430

Professor Heyman
May 7th, 2007

Countering The Threat Posed

By MANPADS To
Commercial Aviation

By

Jeremy White
 2

Terrorists have long been fascinated with attacking commercial airlines as they
represent symbols of what they perceive to be the opulent modernization of the western
world. However, beyond the theatrical value of downing planes, the airline industry also
accounts for a large part of the American economy. Travel and tourism are now the
largest industry in the world with US commercial airlines and their related businesses
bringing in over $150 billion in revenue last year and employing nearly 1.1 million
people.i Air travel is part of the backbone of American business with passengers in the
year 2000 taking over 600 million trips.ii Although it was short, the three-day air travel
suspension following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a significant impact upon
the airline industry as well as the US economy as whole from which it took over a year to
fully recover. While a considerable amount money has been invested to ensure the
internal security of planes, they remain incredibly vulnerable to external attacks from
shoulder fired missiles. More correctly known as MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense
systems), these missiles are widely available on the black market and are known to be in
the possession of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.
Currently, no commercial aircraft in the United States are equipped with
countermeasures to defend against MANPAD attacks. Over the forty-year history of their
use, these weapons have an alarmingly high probability of kill percentage upward of 70%
when fired at unprotected aircraft.iii It is no wonder then that while addressing the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned
that “no threat is more serious to aviation” than MANPADS.iv The probability of such an
attack is extremely high with at least 27 terrorist groups having confirmed or suspected
possession of MANPADS. There have been at least ten attacks since 1994 targeting
commercial aircraft with four planes being downed including one in which the Presidents
of Rwanda and Burundi were traveling.v With the hardening of airport security and
terrorists’ lingering obsession with high profile attacks on airplanes, the chances of a
MANPAD attack being attempted in the near future is extremely high.

MANPAD Systems
MANPADS are very popular among terrorists because they are relatively cheap,
easily portable, simple to use, and inflict large amounts of damage. In its most basic form,
 3

a MANPAD consists of a missile packaged in a tube with a seeker head, a launching

mechanism known as the “gripstock,” and a battery. Weighing between thirty and forty
pounds, they are highly mobile and can be easily concealed. The typical missile can be
assembled and launched in as little as 30 seconds at targets flying anywhere up to 15,000
feet at a range of three-to-five miles.VI Traveling at a velocity of Mach-2, the time
between launch and detonation is approximately five seconds, giving any countermeasure
an extremely short window in which to be effective. While the factory-manufactured
shelf life of these weapons tends to be around 22 years, MANPADS as old as 28 have
been used effectively in terrorist attacks.vii
There are six different classifications of MANPAD technology in existence. First
generation infrared (IR) missiles are known as tail chase weapons as they pursue the
hottest thermal signature they detect, which typically is emitted by an aircraft’s exhaust.
These models can only be fired at their target from behind and are very susceptible to
interference from simple countermeasures such as flares. The most popular first
generation MANPADS currently in use are the American Redeye, the Chinese HN-5, and
the Soviet SA-7. These are the most likely shoulder fired missiles to be found within a
terrorist organization’s arsenal. Second generation models are slightly more sophisticated
using coolants to cool the seeker head enabling it to filter out interference from most
types of flares. These missiles are also capable of attacking their target from any angle.
They come in the form of the American Stinger, the Soviet SA-14, SA-16 and the
Chinese FN-6.viii Third and fourth generation MANPADS are essentially flare-proof and
can only be defended against using sophisticated laser systems, which will be discussed
later. The British have developed a CLOS missile system that uses radio waves to target
aircraft. While extremely hard to defend against, this weapon is unlikely to be used by
terrorists due to the high level of skill necessary to operate them.ix

Proliferation of MANPADS
According to the US State Department there are around twenty countries that over
the past forty years have produced around one million MANPADS.x The US Air Force
Counterproliferation Center conservatively estimates that around 6,000 of these weapons
are currently outside of the control of governments worldwide. The majority of the
 4

versions available on the black-market are low-tech first generation weapons that sell for
around $5,000 a piece.xi However, more sophisticated later generation models are known
to have sold for up to $250,000. Terrorists acquire these weapons through international
arms merchants such as Hemant Lakhani, a British citizen with Al-Qaeda connections
who was arrested in February 2003 for attempting to smuggle 50 MANPADS from
Russia into the United States.xii Three other arms dealers were similarly caught in 2005
trying to import 200 Russian SA-18 missiles into the US.xiii These examples serve as
undeniable proof that terrorists are actively and aggressively attempting to use MANPAD
technology to down aircraft on US soil.
Many sophisticated MANPADS have also ended up in terrorists’ hands as a result
of decades of US and Soviet involvement with rebel movements in their efforts to gain
the upper hand in the Cold War. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA is
known to have provided Mujahideen fighters with approximately 1,000 Stinger missiles
in the mid-1980’s. The Mujahideen used the Stingers very effectively against Soviet
helicopters and have likely recently turned the leftover munitions against US forces
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, the US government was initially hesitant to
provide the Afghani’s with such dangerous weapons out of fear that they would one day
be turned against American forces. The CIA is also known to have delivered FIM-92A
Stingers to the UNITA rebels in Angola in order to aid in their overthrow of their pro-
communist government.xiv According to a recent report issued by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense (DOD) has failed to keep
accurate records of the quantity and destination of Stinger missiles sold oversees.xv A
similar event occurred in November, 2002 when the Russian government officially
admitted that “tens of thousands” of MANPADS had been stolen from its arsenal over the
years.xvi

Past Incidents of MANPAD Attacks

A report released by the Congressional Research Service in 2003 estimates that of
the 35 recorded attacks involving MANPADS being fired on civilian aircraft, 24 planes
were downed, killing over 500 people. However, the majority of these attacks were
against non-jet engine planes and helicopters. Overall there have been five reported
 5

MANPAD attacks on civilian jet-powered aircraft of which two resulted in mass

deaths.xvii While we have yet to see widespread use of MANPADS against large civilian
aircraft, the military has seen its planes come increasingly under attack. According to
General W. Handy, Combatant Commander of US Transportation Command during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the threat to aircraft from MANPADS “is perhaps the greatest
threat we face anywhere in the world.”xviii From May 2003 to November 2003, there
were 19 attacks involving surface-to-air missiles in the vicinity of Baghdad International
Airport.xix During that time period, a Russian made SA-14 (a.k.a. Strela-3) struck a
Belgium-based DHL Airbus 300 cargo plane. While the pilots managed to avoid the other
missile that was fired, the one hit they sustained was enough to damage their left wing,
knock out the flight controls and disable all three hydraulic systems. The airplane’s crew
survived but the plane was damaged beyond repair.xx
On November 28th, 2002, Al-Qaeda attempted its first MANPAD attack on a
civilian aircraft when terrorists fired on a Boeing 757-300 owned by Israeli Arkia
Airlines. Al-Qaeda positioned two teams on each side of the runway as the Israeli airline
was taking off. Once the plane was in the air, the terrorists simultaneously fired Soviet
Strela-2M missiles at the plane carrying 261 passengers and 10 crew. Luckily, due to Al-
Qaeda’s inexperience with MANPADS at the time, the two missiles missed their target.
According to witnesses, the missiles were fired while the plane was barely 500 feet in the
air, which is well below the Strela-2M’s minimum target altitude of 800 meters.xxi 
Unfortunately, Al-Qaeda is unlikely to make this mistake again and in the future will
likely use a more close range missile such as the Stinger, which can hit targets as low as
200 meters (660 feet).xxii
In the most recent high profile attack on a commercial airliner in 2006, a
congressional delegation from the House Armed Services Committee was targeted by a
Russian SA-18 missile, one of the most sophisticated MANPADS available.
Representatives Rob Simmons, Jeb Bradley, John Spratt and Neil Abercrombie were
traveling onboard a military C-130 transport plane on a trip from Baghdad to Kuwait
when the attack occurred. Fortunately, that particular C-130 was equipped with one of the
most sophisticated countermeasures systems currently on the market and was able to
deflect the incoming missile.xxiii This event is significant in that not only did it confirm
 6

that terrorists are in possession of later generation MANPADS but that the
countermeasure systems currently used by the military are capable of defending against
high-tech missiles.

The Potential Economic Impact of a MANPAD Attack

In 2005, the RAND Corporation published a detailed analysis of the economic
impact to the United States of a successful attack against a commercial airliner by a
MANPAD. The author’s of the study divided economic loss into three categories:
“immediate tangible losses from the attack, losses to travelers and airlines due to a shut
down of air travel, and losses to travelers and airlines due to a decline in demand for air
travel.”xxiv Using the recorded losses suffered by the airline industry during and after the
three-day suspension of air travel following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,gave RAND the
basis for its economic projections.
Due to their large size and lack of maneuverability during take off and landing, it
is more than likely that a commercial aircraft would be damaged beyond the point of
repair if struck by a MANPAD. Depending on the model, the average large passenger
plane costs between $200 and $250 million dollars each and carry approximately 300
passengers per flight. While there is no generally accepted dollar amount that can be
assigned to the value of a human life, the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund made
an average death claim payment of around $2.1 million to the victim’s families based
upon calculated lifetime earning potential.xxv In the event that similar payments were
given to the families of those who died in a 300-person plane, the total would come to
$630 million. Combined with the additional loss of the plane, the total immediate
economic loss of a MANPAD attack on a fully loaded passenger plane would come to
approximately $880 million. Furthermore, insurance rates for airliners would likely
skyrocket immediately following the downing of a plane by a shoulder fired missile.
In the event of a successful MANPAD attack on a commercial airline, air traffic is
likely to remain suspended until the government can reasonably assure the American
people that it has taken measures to prevent additional airplanes from being targeted in
the future. Based upon data collected from the days immediately following the 9/11
attacks, RAND estimated that the combined consumer and producer losses from a one-
 7

day suspension of air travel would be approximately $500 million. The net loss to the US
economy gets exponentially higher the longer the airline shutdown continues with
estimated losses of $3.4 billion for a one week suspension of air travel and $14 billion for
one month suspension.xxvi
If the American people’s reaction to a future attack on the airline industry mirrors
their behavior following 9/11, we can expect that a shutdown of one day will likely
reduce the number of people flying by 10% over the following two weeks. RAND
predicted that a one week suspension would likely lead to a decrease in air travel by 15%
for the subsequent six month period following the attack. A month long shut down is
predicted to reduce the airlines’ business by nearly 25% over an 18-month period.xxvii
9/11 taught us that despite additional security measures being put in place to counter the
threat, the memory of the attack still lingered in the public’s mind causing air travel to
decline by 8% over the following year and resulting in 14% of airline workers losing
their jobs.xxviii RAND estimates that if the government were made fully aware of the
potential damage that a MANPAD attack could have on the America economy that it
would be more willing to pay $12 billion to avoid an incident that would negatively
impact the airline industry for over 6 months and $50 billion to avoid an attack that
would reduce air travel for over a year and a half.xxix

Countermeasure Systems
There are essentially three main categories of countermeasures to MANPADS:
flares, laser jammers, and high-energy lasers (HELs). The first two of these
countermeasures act to confuse the seeker heads on missiles in order to cause them to
miss their target. These systems are currently deployed on a limited number of military
aircraft. Various countermeasure systems employing high-energy lasers are currently
under development, but none have yet to be deployed in the field. These sophisticated
systems hope to surpass other countermeasures by actually destroying missiles in flight.

Flares:
Flares are the most basic type of MANPAD countermeasure. The different types
of flares are broken down into three categories based on their level of sophistication:
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conventional, advanced, and covert. Conventional flares were originally designed to

counter first and some second generation infrared (IR) missiles. After being deployed,
these flares are designed to produce a stronger IR signature than the targeted aircraft so
that the seeker head on the MANPAD will choose to lock onto the flare rather than the
plane.xxx The flares are deployed automatically after an onboard optical or radar sensor
detects an incoming projectile. Although effective against some older MANPADS, most
second and third generation shoulder fired missiles can distinguish between flares and
planes due to their flight pattern, spectral properties and heat intensity. More advanced
flares attempt to counter the missile’s power of discrimination by employing a cocktail of
flares, which all burn at different temperatures emitting a variety of light wavelengths.
The version of these flares considered best suited for use at commercial airports are
known as covert flares due to their low probability of starting ground fires and their lack
of apparent visibility.xxxi
Although flares have proven to be an effective countermeasure in the past, the
weapon systems being employed by terrorists today are becoming increasingly more
sophisticated. For example, even the most advanced flares are completely useless against
laser beam riders that target a laser spot fixed on an aircraft by a human operator. They
are similarly ineffective against radio frequency command-guided missiles, such as the
British Blowpipe.xxxii While flares are a relatively cheap countermeasure that is currently
available for deployment, they are not a cost effective choice as terrorists could easily
render them ineffective by simply purchasing more advanced MANPADS.

Laser Jammers:
Newly available for deployment, laser jammers have proven effective against both
first and second generation MANPADS. Formally known as directed infrared
countermeasures (DIRCM), laser jammers work by overloading the signal emitted by a
missile’s seeker head and then replaces that signal with a modulated one that diverts the
missile off course and away from its target.xxxiii These systems are mounted on a
moveable turret located on the hull of the aircraft. After a missile launch is detected by
the plane’s onboard tracking system, optical sensors are used to direct the laser mounted
turret so that it may quickly make contact with the missile’s seeker head. Some of the
 9

more advanced systems are “threat adaptive” meaning that they can identify the type of
incoming missile and reprogram the codes contained within their laser beams to
specifically target that model missile. Laser jamming systems are now deployed on
approximately 300 military aircraft flying in hazardous airspace, such as Baghdad.
Northrop Grumman and BAE systems are currently the top developers of DIRCM
technology in the United States.xxxiv
Laser jammers are however not without their downsides. Just like with flares,
DIRCM systems are ineffective against laser beam riders, radio frequency guided
missiles and focal plane imaging IR seekers.xxxv There is also a potential for false alarms,
which can be triggered by a few natural and manmade sources such as “high-intensity
lamps, aircraft afterburners, corona discharges, and lightening.”xxxvi While not very
likely, there is also a slight chance that the system could fire its laser at other objects
besides MANPADS and possibly blind people on the ground. However, it is important to
note that while there is a potential risk of blindness that the US Air Force has not
experienced any eye safety malfunctions with the laser jamming systems currently in
use.xxxvii The high cost of installing and maintaining these systems on board all
commercial aircraft is another potential downside that will be addressed later in detail.

High-Energy Lasers:
High-Energy lasers (HELs) are ground-based systems that seek to destroy all
incoming artillery ranging from shells to missiles. Northrop Grumman’s Hornet system is
the first HEL system to be designed to protect commercial airports. The system has
essentially three components: a radar system to establish vectors currently occupied by
friendly aircraft, an infrared search and track system (IRST), and a megawatt-class
deuterium fluoride chemical laser weapon.”xxxviii Northrop Grumman claims that its
Hornet system has the capability to defend a designated area from up to three missiles at
once at a range of up to five kilometers. In order to cover the area of a large airport such
as Reagan National, up to three of these systems would be required.xxxix Perhaps the
greatest advantage of employing high-energy lasers to defend airports is that once the
system is properly developed, it will be capable of countering every current and future
model of MANPAD. However, the best estimates claim that the start of HEL production
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is at least two to three years away.xl

HEL systems present many of the same dangers as laser jammers. There is always
the possibility that the targeting system may malfunction and accidentally blind a
passenger onboard a plane or perhaps someone on the ground. However, systems such as
the Hornet present a much greater risk as a technical malfunction could lead to the
accidental destruction of a civilian aircraft. Since the time between launch and detonation
of a MANPAD is only a few seconds, it is not possible for these systems to have a human
failsafe component. It is thus absolutely necessary for the HEL and laser jamming
systems to be completely automated, increasing the chances of friendly fire. Another
concern with both these systems involves whether or not the technology involved can be
safety shared and exported to other countries. Sensor processing algorithms, laser jam
codes, and HEL systems are considered classified technology, which could be dangerous
in the wrong hands.xli It will fall to policymakers to decide whether protecting American
aircraft abroad is worth the price of sharing this sensitive technology.

Estimated Costs of Countermeasures

According to the aforementioned RAND study, there are 6,800 unprotected
commercial aircraft currently operating over the United States.xlii It has been suggested
that in order to guarantee the safety of these planes that America must follow the Israeli
example and begin to equip all commercial aircraft with some form of laser jamming
system. RAND estimates that the cost of a total fleet installation would come to $11.2
billion over four years.xliii The cumulative average unit production cost (AUPC) is
estimated to be $1.3 million. In addition to the cost of installation, RAND further predicts
that the added operating and support cost per airplane would be $300,000 a year, which
would ultimately cost the airline industry a total of $2.1 billion a year in addition to the
upkeep on the planes themselves. Airlines would also likely have to spend around
$45,000 more a year per aircraft on fuel, as the laser jamming systems are predicted to
increase a plane’s drag by 0.4%.xliv Maintenance on these complex countermeasure
systems would also be likely to lead to an increase in late departures. According to
RAND, the revenue loss for each hour of delayed departure is $10,000, which with the
estimated repair time of 30 minutes for short haul flights would likely lead to a net loss of
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$400 million across the airline industry over the course of a year.xlv

Cheaper Countermeasure Alternatives

Since neither the airline industry nor the Federal government appears willing to
foot the bill for retrofitting all US commercial aircraft with laser jamming systems, a
more cost effective countermeasure is required. Instead of installing countermeasures on
each individual aircraft, it would be much cheaper for airports to install systems that
protect all planes in their vicinity. As aircraft are only vulnerable to MANPAD attacks in
the 10 to 15 minute period during takeoff and landing, they only logically need to have
active countermeasures in place when they are in the vicinity of an airport. There are two
different systems currently under development that could perform this function at a
relatively minor cost.
Raytheon’s Vigilant Eagle is a ground based airfield defense system that uses
microwave energy to counter surface-to-air missiles. According to Raytheon, “Vigilant
Eagle uses a simple technique of illuminating the missile body with electromagnetic
energy tailored to divert the missile thus providing a dome of protection around airports,
protecting all aircraft during the most critical phases of flight.”xlvi The system is
comprised of three interconnected primary components: “a distributed missile detect and
track subsystem (MDT), a command and control system, and the Active Electronically
Scanned Array (AESA), which consists of a billboard-size array of highly efficient
antennas linked to solid-state amplifiers that provide the beam that diverts the
missile.”xlvii Vigilant Eagle has a much lower false alarm rate than other systems as each
missile detection is confirmed by two other sensors in an overlapping grid. The command
and control system is also capable of instantly pinpointing the location of a missile launch
and can quickly communicate this information to law enforcement officials as a result of
its interoperability with civilian communication systems.xlviii
According to Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle has proven itself to be both safe and
effective in the field. The electromagnetic fields transmitted by Vigilant Eagle are
reported to be well within Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards for
human exposure and do not interfere with aircrafts’ electronic systems.xlix The multiple
sensors used to detect the presence of a missile further decrease the chances that the
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system will accidentally fire at a friendly target. In addition to its proven field
effectiveness and superior safety, Vigilant Eagle is considerably cheaper to install and
maintain than many other countermeasure systems. The US Air Force estimates that if
Vigilant Eagle were installed at 53 of the nation’s busiest airports that it would be capable
of protecting 84% of aircraft in the United States. Raytheon estimated that each system
would cost $25 million to install, which would come to $1.325 billion for their initial
installation.l According to RAND, this is only slightly more than the immediate costs
($880 million) associated with the downing of one large aircraft.li
The other system under consideration is known as Project Chloe, named after a
character on the popular television thriller, 24. The Chloe system is composed of a
combination of proven technologies incorporating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
retrofitted with Northrop Grumman’s Guardian anti-missile system. The Guardian system
is currently in its third phase of testing for use on commercial aircraft. The Nemesis
system upon which Guardian is based is currently operationally deployed on U.S. Air
Force and Special Operation Forces aircraft.lii Guardian is a laser jamming system that is
comprised of an external pod attached to the underbelly of an aircraft that scans in all
directions for incoming missiles. Once an incoming missile is detected, the system’s
turret quickly fires a laser at the munitions guidance system, forcing it off course.liii The
Chloe system would have the advantage of being able to protect an area much larger than
that of a ground-based system. The idea behind using UAV’s as a MANPAD
countermeasure involves them patrolling the airfield from an altitude of 60,000 to 65,000
feet, which will allow them to protect aircraft during all stages of landing and takeoff,
while remaining well above the flight deck of commercial aircraft.liv According to the
DHS Undersecretary for Science & Technology, Jay Cohen, a higher powered laser will
likely be needed for the UAV mounted systems than what was envisioned for use by
commercial aircraft because of the high altitude at which they operate.lv
According to project manager, Kerry Wilson, testing of UAV’s for missile defense
is slated to begin late this summer and finish in the early fall. If the Chloe system proves
successful, it would represent the most cost-effective countermeasure. The UAV platform
that will be used has yet to be determined, but the choice is between General Atomics
Predator B drone and Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The cost of equipping a UAV
 13

with a Guardian laser system will be about $1 million per unit. While the Global Hawk is
capable of flying at higher altitudes (60,000 feet), they carry an expensive price tag
starting at $20.3 million. The Predator B is comparatively cheaper at $9 million each. If
the Predator B can be modified to fly above its current maximum altitude of 50,000 feet,
it is likely to be chosen as the favored platform.lvi If the Chloe system were selected to
protect the same 53 busiest airports that Northrop Grumman recommended its Vigilant
Eagle be used in, then the total cost of installation would come to $1.06 billion. This
calculation assumes that the Guardian is attached to a Predator B and that each airport
purchases two UAV’s to be used one at time. The cost of installing the Chloe system
would thus be $265 million less than Vigilant Eagle.

Consequence Mitigation
In the event that terrorists do successfully perpetrate a MANPAD attack against a
US aircraft, the government’s main priority should be restoring the public’s confidence in
the security of air travel. As was demonstrated earlier, the airline industry is an integral
part of the US economy representing billions of dollars in annual revenue and employing
over a million people. The US government must act as it did after the 9/11 attacks and be
seen taking visible steps to improve airport security. While external countermeasures
such as Chloe and Vigilant Eagle are capable of providing the necessary protection
against MANPADS, they are not visible enough to the public. Passengers need to be able
to see the heightened level of security as they do now during TSA screenings. This paper
thus recommends that in the immediate aftermath of a MANPAD attack that the US
government begin installing Guardian laser jammers on the hulls of all commercial
aircraft. Since the mass installation of these systems would likely take an extensive
amount of time to complete, aircraft waiting to be retrofitted should be provided with
decoy systems. This will be a necessary measure in order to offset the negative economic
ramifications of a long-term air travel shut down. It does not necessarily matter if it is
publicly known that some of the systems are decoys as their presence is still likely to
have a deterring effect as terrorists will not be able to spot which aircraft are vulnerable.
They will then likely try to find a different weakness in our security to exploit.
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Conclusion & Recommendations

It is clear to everyone working in the security field that terrorists armed with
MANPADS represent one of the greatest threats to US national security. Since 9/11, the
security within airports, while not perfect, has become a major deterrence to terrorists
attempting to attack aircraft internally. Having a propensity for soft targets, terrorists have
now focused their attention to attacking planes from the outside where they can do an
equal amount of damage as any shoe bomber. Whatever countermeasure the government
chooses to invest in needs to be implemented as soon as possible. Attacks on aircraft
employing MANPADS are on the rise; especially in Iraq where more and more terrorists
are becoming skilled operators of shoulder fired missiles. In addition to relying on
technology to defend the homeland, efforts to locate and destroy the many thousands of
MANPADS being exchanged on the international black market must be doubled.
Additionally, the US government and its allies must develop a better system for
safeguarding the tens of thousands of dangerous weapons in their arsenals in order to
prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.
While effective countermeasures are rather expensive, if policymakers were to
look at the economic data pertaining to the consequences of a successful MANPAD
attack in the United States, they would clearly see that the cost of doing nothing far
outweighs a small investment in better security. The necessary technology currently
exists to counter the MANPAD threat, which can now be done in a cost effective manner.
It is the conclusion of this paper that the Chloe system employing UAV’s equipped with
the Guardian laser jammer is the best choice for defending America’s airports. The
technology involved in Project Chloe has already been developed and proven effective in
the field. UAV’s can also cover a much larger area than ground-based systems, which will
be especially important for bigger airports such as JFK or Reagan. Although the Vigilant
Eagle system is likely to have fewer false alarms due to its multiple independent sensors,
the Chloe system is simply more cost effective. Just as the 9/11 commission
recommended, we must start to make better use of our imaginations when it comes to
homeland security. Taking proactive steps now to protect commercial aviation will likely
save us from potential economic disaster and could possibly deter terrorists from
attempting MANPAD attacks in the future.
 15

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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, 2003
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Joel, Lingel, Sherrill, Ochmanek, David, Shirly, Chad, RAND Corporation, “Protecting
Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” 2005
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Counterproliferation Center, Air University, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama)
16
i
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.1
ii
Ibid.
iii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.3
iv
Matt Schroeder, “MANPADS Proliferation,” p.1
v
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.4
vi
Ibid., p.11
vii
Ibid., p.11-12
viii
Ibid., p.13
ix
Ibid., p.14
x
US State Department, “The MANPADS Menace: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air
Defense Systems,” http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/53558.htm
xi
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.11
xii
Ibid., p.9
xiii
Ibid., p.30
xiv
Ibid., p.19
xv
GAO, “Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense,” May 13th,
2004
xvi
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.19
xvii
C. Bolkom, B. Elias, and A. Feickert, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Homeland Security:
Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, 2003
xviii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5
xix
Ibid., p.6
xx
Ibid.
xxi
Ibid., p.5-6
xxii
Raytheon, Directory of US Military Rockets and Missiles: FIM-92 Stinger, http://www.designation-
systems.net/dusrm/m-92.html
xxiii
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5
xxiv
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7
xxv
Ibid.
xxvi
Ibid., p.9
xxvii
Ibid.
xxviii
Ibid.
xxix
Ibid.
xxx
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.40
xxxi
Ibid., p.41
xxxii
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.18
xxxiii
Ibid., p.19
xxxiv
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.42
xxxv
Ibid.
xxxvi
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.20
xxxvii
Ibid., p.19
xxxviii
Ibid., p.21
xxxix
Ibid.
xl
Ibid., p.22
xli
Ibid.
xlii
Ibid., p.23
xliii
Ibid., p.25
xliv
Ibid., p.26
xlv
Ibid., p.27
xlvi
Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1
xlvii
GlobalSecurity.org, “Raytheon to Demonstrate Aircraft Protection System Under DHS Contract, October 23rd, 2006
xlviii
Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1
xlix
Ibid., p.1-2
l
James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.49-50
li
RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7
lii
Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April
20th, 2007
liii
Ibid.
liv
Ibid.
lv
Sharon Weinberger, “Drones vs. Missiles,” in Wired Magazine, March 7th, 2007
lvi
Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April
20th, 2007