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Telan vs CA
Facts:

Petitioner is retired government official from Isabela.

In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his residence to the other side of the national highway
on a lot owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for P50.00 a month. 3

He set up business as it was near the Shrine of Our Lady of Guibang. Private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and virginia
Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot.
On March 27, 1984, petitioners received a notice to vacate from DBP. A letter was also received from the respondents as they executed a
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Roberto Telan was able to secure a title and filed a complaint as accion publiciana. Petitioner hired the services of Atty. Antonio Paguiran.
On October 27 1988 The RTC decided in favour of Roberto. As the petitioners wanted to appeal, they hired Ernesto Palma who
represented himself as a lawyer. Petitioners paid lawyers fees.
On Deccember 28, 1989 the CA issued a resolution that the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and dismissed for failure to file
an appeal brief. They only came to know about it on May 1990 and Palma was nowhere to be found.

Issue: Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of
due process.
Ruling: We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law because they lost their to appeal when deprived
of the right to counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitutional provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be deprived of life, or property, without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, 19 specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property
is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial
of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to
be heard by himself and counsel. 20
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law applies
not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in which he and
his family live and in which he has established a modest means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much form ordinary citizens whose only compelle
intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property
rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be
exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can
impart. 21

Philippine Lawyers association vs Agrava

Facts:

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover
patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
Respondent maintain that patent cases does not ordinarly involes practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge.
. that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the
Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Issue: Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
Ruling: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the
first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and
training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public
order or morals, or to public health or welfare. . All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They
call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from
his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of
the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent
Office. No costs.
Khan vs Simbillo
Facts:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta a staff member of the Supreme Court, called the said number and pretended to be an interested party. Mrs.
Simbillo claimed that his husband can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, they charge 48,000.
The advertisements were published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star.
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. [3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that
the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by
the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising
IBP suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.

Issue: WON the advertisement made by respondent was not valid.

Ruling: It is not valid. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15] The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
While he admits the act his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no
intention to violate the rules. He advertised again in the buy and sell magazine. What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
[20]
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication
in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.

In re Cunanan
Facts:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as
the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of
the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this
court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per
cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been
discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower

than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Issue: WON RA 972 is constitutional.

Ruling: By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands
of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below
50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with
the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found
that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean
that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the
legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at
law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice
Facts:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of
public respondents that:
o

The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not
trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable;
(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are
estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or
modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Issue: WON the court looses its jurisdiction of the case after it becomes final and executory.

Ruling: NO. First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at
bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments
can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to
begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the
metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become
final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the
judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5
Grande vs De Silva
Facts:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff
versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to
complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as
settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him that the
same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not
sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating
as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason: "Account Closed." On June 19,
1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value of the check. 1
he instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Marikina,
Respondent refused to accept the complaint. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Issue: WON the respondent is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility..

Ruling: Yes. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a
violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.8 Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such
malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition
precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.9
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment, 10because it is important that
members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.11 Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the
profession, whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to
comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The
duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Royong vs Oblena
Facts:

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena,
a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein.
On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:

The complainant testified that she was raped by the respondent, She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by
the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent;
The respondent denied that he raped the complainant, but admitted that he had
illicit relations w/ the complainant. They had their
first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18.

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once
but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than
of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....

The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of
good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first
Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."

But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived
an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage
still subsists.

After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by
having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal
liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer
in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also
recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Issue: The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
Ruling: Yes. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But
it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the
profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party
be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a
scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and
unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not
disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for
admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of
himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral
character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for
license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the
standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as
merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52

Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Cordon vs Balicanta
Facts:

On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta. After respondents comment to the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on
March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation,
When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left
by the said decedent. All in all, complainant and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who
helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.
Sometime in early 1981, respondent enticed the complainant to organize a corporation turing their 19 parcels of land to a business disctrict.
Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General
Manager and Treasurer. The respondent also made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement.
In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the
amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her
daughter contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial
Center (BCC, for brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as sawali, coco lumber and
bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan secured.
Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had been demolished and that her mother,
herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa shack in a place called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie
was able to locate her mother. Rosemarie later learned that respondent took complainant away from her house on the pretext that said
ancestral home was going to be remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to Tion Suy Ong,
using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of 1992.
Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as their lawyer and repeated
their demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles that respondent transferred to the
corporation. They also threatened him with legal action in a letter dated August 3, 1985.
On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution4 dismissing for lack of merit the complaint for disbarment against Attys.
Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan. And in Adm. Case No. 2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for 5 years "for commission of acts of misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a
lawyer to gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon and caused serious damage to the
complainant."5

Issue: WON respondent should be disbarred from the Bar.

Ruling: Yes. After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the
legal profession. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit
properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.
Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he thought could exculpate him were the very same
documents that revealed his immoral and shameless ways. These documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who knew
the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and opportunism
beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.11 If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 12 Thus, the requirement of good
moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 13 Lawyers
are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.14 Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing
if it is wrong.15 This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all." 16
Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondents offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere
suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead, his wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal
and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.