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1NC Drexciyans

T
A. Interpretation:
Exploration is systematic discovery of all aspects of the
ocean
National Academies 9 National Academies National Academy of

Sciences, National Academy of Engineering,Institute of Medicine, and National


Research Council 2009
Ocean Exploration Highlights of National Academies
Reports http://dels.nas.edu/resources/staticassets/osb/miscellaneous/exploration_final.pdf
What Is Ocean Exploration? As defined by the Presidents Panel on Ocean
Exploration (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2000), ocean
exploration is discovery through disciplined, diverse observations and recordings of
findings. It includes rigorous, systematic observations and documentation of
biological, chemical, physical, geological, and archeological aspects of the ocean i n
the three dimensions of space and in time.

B.Violation: The aff is not literal exploration of the Ocean


C. Standards

Limits: limits key to an equal debate, without them we cant prepare or research for
debate, making it pretty much impossible to win on the neg and controls the neg
research burden
Ground: all non-topical ground is neg ground we need for links and arguments, they
take that from us. Development is hard to judge, but subjectivity is inevitable and
its better to make a determination about what the word means than to allow an
endless proliferation of Affs.

D. T is a voter because it's necessary for good, wellprepared debating

CP
Advocacy: Ocean Exploration should be increased via an
encounter with Drexiyans
The Affirmatives use of the USFG limits the imaginary
Lisa Yaszek 13 (Race in Science Fiction: The Case of Afrofuturism, Lisa Yaszek is
Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the School of Literature, Media,
and Communication at Georgia Tech)
A lot of scholars think about Afrofuturism as
an extension of the historical recovery projects that black Atlantic intellectuals have
engaged in for well over two hundred years now. As Tony Morrison has written and spoken about eloquently,
these kinds of historic recovery projects show how African slaves and their
descendants experienced conditions of homelessness, alienation, and dislocation
that very much anticipate what Nietzsche described as the founding conditions of modernity (cf. Gilroy). And so,
you can start to see why it is that science fiction appeals to Afrodiasporic artists. If
you want think about black people as the primary subjects of modernity, those who
have the most intense engagements with it, science fiction has the grammar that
allows us to narrate those engagements . Stories about travel through time and space and stories
Let's think a little bit more about these last two goals.

about encounters with the alien other are ideal ways to bring those historical experiences to life for new audiences.
Just to jump ahead of myself here for a moment, if you think about Derrick Bell's story "The Space Traders", you can

Professor Golightly, is always engaging African American


history in his attempt make sense of an uncertain future, and that's what allows
him to realize that the United State's deal with the aliens may not end all
that well. That attempt to connect the past with the present and the future is
central to the Afrofuturist project
see how the lead character,

The state sustains collective identity through an increasing


process of oppressive power struggles the aff can never solve
Connoly in 2k2 (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @
Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference)
In several domains, the state no longer emerges as a consummate agent of efficacy, even though it expands as a
pivotal agent of power.4 A crack in the very unity of "power" has opened up. We have entered a world in which

state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly disconnected from the

ends that justify its magnification. As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state
increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punishment
and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It
launches dramatized crusades against the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users,
disloyalists, racial minor- ities, and the underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists), and the
interior other (those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within anyone). The state

becomes, first, the screen upon which much of the resentment against the adverse effects of the civilization of
productivity and private affluence is projected ; second, the vehicle through which

rhetorical reassurances about the glory and durability of that civilization are
transmitted back to the populace; and third, the instrument of campaigns against
those elements most disturbing to the collective identity . In the first instance, the welfare
apparatus of the state is singled out for criticism and reformation. In the second, the presidency is organized into a
medium of rhetorical diversion and reassurance. In the third, the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is
marshaled to constitute and stigmatize constituencies whose terms of existence might otherwise provide signs of
defeat, injury, and sacrifice engendered by the civilization of

Using the USFG as an actor will only repeat the anti-black


structure of society

David Lyons 04 (Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery
and Jim Crow , 84 Boston University Law Review 1375-1404, 1375- 1378, 1386-1397
(December, 2004) (167 Footnotes Omitted)
The foregoing review includes an incomplete but relevant description of the federal
government's role relative to African Americans. The government's policies
supported both slavery and Jim Crow. Since 1865, the government has violated or
failed to enforce its own Constitution and legislative enactments for extended
periods. In accepting violations of its own basic law, the federal government allowed
the racial caste system to be reconfigured so that it could survive the abolition of
slavery. It thereby enabled the entrenchment of inequities for African Americans in
a new system - Jim Crow. It tolerated gross misconduct by officials, frequent public
lynchings, rape, harassment, terror, and coercion - in other words, widespread,
grievous violations of African Americans' most fundamental rights. Given the
opportunity, it has more than once declined to undertake measures
necessary to substantially rectify the long-standing inequities. Of course,
this pattern does not fully describe public policy; but it has dominated public policy
since the United States was established. The federal government has thus been
party to and partly responsible for the wrongs done to African Americans. It is the
single most important currently existing party that can truly be held accountable to
those who have suffered the wrongs of racial subjugation. The federal government
is, furthermore, an appropriate recipient of moral demands for corrective justice
because of the nature, scope, and magnitude of the inequities that remain to be
addressed.

K
The Aff has failed in their goal of providing an accurate and effective genealogy of the
Middle Passage, and modern political antagonisms. The figure of the Black in American
civil society is one of a countless series of stand-ins for the Animal, contingently reduced to
something less than humanity in order to justify violence. The very idea of the exposure to
gratuitous violence is the basic condition of the Animal in modern society and makes the
world fundamentally unethical and endless massacres inevitable
Sanbomatsu (associate professor of philosophy at Worchester Polytechnic) 11
(Jon, Introduction to Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, pg. 10-13)

This episteme to borrow Foucaults term, has subtended and conditioned the whole of
civilization from its beginning, providing the very basis of positive human culture. For
centuries, our sciences and systems of knowledge have conspired to divide sentient life,
conscious being-in-the-world, into two neat, mutually exclusive, and utterly fraudulent
halves"the human" versus "the rest"other, we end up disavowing our own humanity (itself, after
all, a form of animality) embracing a "machine civilization" based in death-fetishism. "How is it possible"
Reich wondered, "that [man] does not see the damages (psychic illnesses, biopathies, sadism, and wars)
to his health, culture, and mind that 23 are caused by this biologic renunciation?" It is striking that Reich,
Adorno, and Horkheimer, all of whom were per- sonally forced to flee Germany by Hitler, had no qualms
about comparing the human treatment of animals to the treatment of Jews and other enemies of the
24;Third Reich under fascism. After the war, Adorno famously wrote that "Auschwitz begins
wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they're only animals," a onceobscure quote that recently has been given new life by animal rights activists and sympathetic scholars.
In fact, pointed com- parisons of our treatment of other animals to the Nazis' treatment of the Jews and
others in the Holocaust are peppered throughout Adorno's work, some- times showing up in the most
unexpected places (including a study of Beethoven's music). As Mendieta observes here, Adorno drew

an explicit link between Kant's denial of any meaningful subjectivity or moral worth to
ani- mals and the catastrophes of the twentieth century, including the rise of National
Socialism. "Nothing is more abhorrent to the Kantian," he wrote, "than a reminder of man's
resemblance to animals. This taboo is always at work when the idealist berates the materialist. Animals
play for the idealist system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism?25 Indeed, is speciesism itself
not a form of fascism, perhaps even its paradig- matic or primordial form? The very word
"massacre," Semelin observes, originally meant "putting an animal to death": human

massacres of other humans have always been realized through the semiotic
transposition of the one abject subject onto the other. "Killing supposedly human animals' then
becomes entirely possible."26 Adorno made a similar point in Minima Mora- liat sixty years earlier:
"The constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks, Japanese are like animals,
monkeys for example, is the key to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided in the
moment when the gaze of a fatally-wounded animal falls on a human being," What is crucial to bear in
mind, however, as Victoria Johnson points out in her chapter here ("Ev- eryday Rituals of the Master
Race: Fascism, Stratification, and the Fluidity of Animal' Domination") the very "power of such

animal metaphors depends on a prior cultural understanding of other animals


themselves, as beings who are by nature abject, degraded, and hence worthy of
extermination." The animal, thus, rests at the intersection of race and caste systems. And nowhere is
the link between the human and nonhuman caste systems clearer than "in fascist ideology," for "no other
discourse so completely authorizes absolute violence against the weak," In our own contemporary society
too, Johnson emphasizes, we find daily life and meaning based on elaborate rituals in- tended to keep us
from acknowledging the violence we do to subordinate classes of beings, above all the animals. So
numerous in fact are the parallelssemiotic, ideological, psychological, historical, cultural, technical,

and so forthbetween the Nazis' extermination of the Jews and Roma and the routinized mass murder of
nonhuman beings, that Charles Pattersons recent book on the subject, Eternal Trehlinka: Our Treatment of
Animals and the Holocaust, despite its strengths, only manages to scratch the surface of a topic whose
true dimensions have yet to be fathomed. In the ideological mechanisms used to legitimate killing, in the
bad faith of the human beings who collude with the killing through indifference or "ignorance of the
facts," above all in the technologies of organized mur- derpractices of confinement and control, modes
of legitimation and decep- tion, methods of elimination (gassing, shooting, clubbing, burning, vivisecting, and so on)the mass killing of animals today cannot but recall the Nazi liquidation of European
Jewry and Roma. The late Jacques Derrida observed that "there are also animal genocides." he wrote with
uncharacteristic moral sobriety: [T]he annihilation of certain species is indeed in progress, but it is
occurring through the organization and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually in- terminable
survival, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every supposed
norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even
overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (lets say
Nazis) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews,
gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial in- semination, so that, being more numerous and better
fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of
genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or fire. What would it mean for us to come to
terms with the knowledge that civilization, our whole mode of development and culture, has
been premised and built upon exterminationon a history experienced as "terror without end"
(to borrow a phrase from Adorno)?To dwell with such a thought would be to throw into

almost unbearable relief the distance between our narratives of inherent human dignity
and grace and moral superiority, on one side, and the most elemental facts of our actual
social existence, on the other. We congratulate ourselves for our social prog- ressfor
democratic governance and state-protected civil and human rights (however notional or incompletely
defended)yet continue to enslave and kill millions of sensitive creatures who in many
biological, hence emotional and cognitive, particulars resemble us. To truly meditate on such a
contradiction is to comprehend our self-understanding to be not merely flawed, but to be al- most
comically delusional. Immanuel Kant dreamed of a moral order in which we would all participate as
equals in a "kingdom of ends" But it is time to ask whether morality as such is even possible
under conditions of universal bad faith and hidden slaughter, in the same way that we might
ask whether acts of private morality under National Socialism were not compromised or diminished by
the larger context in which they occurred. When atrocity becomes the very basis of society,
does society not forfeit its right to call itself moral? In \ the nineteenth century, the animal
welfare advocate EdwardMaitland warned that our destruction of the other animals lead only to
our own "debasement and degradation of character" as a species. "For the principles of
Humanity cannot be renounced with impunity; but their renunciation, if persisted in, involves inevitably
the forfeiture of Humanity itself. And to cease through such forfeiture to be man is to become
demon." What else indeed can we calla being but demon who enslaves and routinely kills thousands of
millions of other gentle beings, imprisons them in laboratories, electrocutes or poisons or radiates or
drowns them? A being who tests the capacity of empathy in other beings by forcing them to choose
between life-sustaining food and subjecting a stranger of their own species in an adjacent tank or cage to
painful electrical shocks? And what does it tell us about the vaunted moral superiority of hu- mankind
that while the rat, the octopus, the monkey will forgo food to avoid harming another, the human
researcher will persist in tormenting his captive, until he or she collapses in convulsions and dies? Do
such tests, designed to detect the presence of empathy in other species, only demonstrate the paucity of
empathy in our own? Above all, it is the existential question that haunts: Who, or rather what,

are we?
Refuse the choice of the affirmative Only an absolute refusal to move the lines of violence
can prevent the liquidation of life

Pugliese (an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney) 13


(Joseph, State Violence and the Execution of Law, pg. 95-7)

In the pumpkin patch, the hooded detainees are compelled to embody the strange hybrid
of vegetable-animal life. They fulfill, in a grotesque fashion, Martin Heideggers euroanthropocentric vision of the hierarchy of entities that inhabit the world: man is not merely a part of the
world but is also master and servant of the world in the sense of having world. Man has world. The
hierarchy of life, after this imperial ground-clearing opening statement, follows: [1] the stone (material
object) is worldless; [2] the animal is poor in the world; [3] man is world-forming.20 In the context of
Guantnamos pumpkin patch, the masters of the world govern their militarized domain and all its
entities according to the biopolitical hierarchy of life. As masters of the world, they are indeed worldforming, as they shape and constitute the lives, deaths and realities of their subjugated subjects. In the
pumpkin patch, the detainee, that strange hybrid that has been reduced to animal-vegetable, is both
worldless (in the absolute denial through shackling, hooding, manacling and goggling of his worldforming sensorium) and, once dispatched to his cage, entirely poor in the world, as he is stripped naked
and denied the most rudimentary of things essential to a liveable existence.
Critically, the solution to this regime of violence is not to shuffle the categories of life

up or down the biopolitical hierarchy as this merely reproduces the system while
leaving intact the governing power of the biopolitical cut and its attendant violent
effects. Reflecting on the possibility of disrupting this biopolitical regime and its hierarchies of life,
Agamben writes:
in our culture man has always been the result of a simultaneous division and articulation of the animal
and the human, in which one of the two terms of the operation was what was at stake in it. To render

inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean no
longer to seek new more effective or authentic articulations, but rather to show the
central emptiness, the hiatus that within man separates man and animal, and to risk
ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension.21
Precisely because everything is always already at stake in the continued mobiliza- tion of biopolitical
caesurae, the seeking of new articulations of life that will be valorized as more authentic

will merely reproduce the machine without having eliminated its capacity for violence
as ensured by the re-articulation of the biopo- litical cut. Looking back at the biopolitical
infrastructure of the Nazi state, one can clearly see the imbrication of ecology, the regime of animal
rights, and the racio- speciesist branding of Jews as collectively exemplifying the dangers of seeking
more authentic articulations of animals and humans that are predicated on the biopolitical division and
its capacity for inversions and recalibrations while leaving the violent order of the biopolitical regime
intact. The Nazis effectively called for a more authentic relation to nature (blood and soil) that was
buttressed by animal rights (Reich Animal Protection laws) and the rights of nature (Reich Law on the
Protection of Nature).22 Animals and nature were thereby recalibrated up the speciesist scale at the
expense of Jews. Deploying the violence of racio- speciesism, the Nazis animalized Jews as rats,
vermin and other low life forms, situated them at the bottom of the biopolitical hierarchy, and then
proceeded to enact the very cruelty and exterminatory violence (cattle car transport, herding in camps
replicating stockyards and the industrialized killing procedures of animal slaughterhouses) that they had
outlawed against animals. The Nazi state also exemplifies the manner in which the regime of (animal)
rights can be perfectly accommodated within the most genocidal forms of state violence. This is so,
precisely because the prior concept of human rights is always-already founded on the human/animal
biopolitical caesura and its asymmetry of power otherwise the very categories of human and animal
rights would fail to achieve cultural intelligibility. The paternal distribution of rights to non-human
animals still pivots on this asymmetrical a priori. Even as it extends its seemingly benevolent regime of
rights and protections to animals, rights discourse, by disavowing this violent a priori, merely reproduces
the species war by other means.

In order to short-circuit this machine, a deconstructive move is needed, a move that refuses
to participate in the mere overturning of the binarized hierarchy, for example: animal > human, and that

effectively displaces the hierarchy by disclosing the conceptual aporias that drive it. The challenge

is
to proceed to inhabit the hiatus, to run the risk of living the emptiness of an atopical
locus that is neither animal nor human. This non-foundational locus is the space that
Agamben designates as the open, marked by the reciprocal suspension of the two
terms [human/animal], something for which we perhaps have no name and which is
neither animal nor [hu]man [and that] settles in between nature and humanity. Critically,
the reciprocal suspension articulates the play between the two terms, their immediate constellation in a
non-coincidence.23 In naming their constellation in a non-coincidence, Agamben enunciates the
possibility of a Levinasian ethics that refuses the anthropocentric assimilation of the Other/animal/nature
into the imperialism of the Same/human. The urgent necessity of instigating the move to render
inoperative this anthropocentric regime is not incidental to the violent biopolitical operations of the state.
On the contrary, state violence is viru- lently animated by the logic of the biopolitical caesura and its
anthropological machine which produce[s] the human through the suspension and capture of the
inhuman.24 The anthropocentrism that drives this biopolitical regime ensures that

whatever is designated as non-human-animal life continues to be branded not only as


expendable and as legitimately enslaveable but as the quintessential unsavable figure of
life.25 The aporetic force that drives this regime is exposed with perverse irony in one of the entries of
the al-Qahtani interrogation log, which documents an interrogator reading to the detainee in the course of
his torture session two quotes from the book What Makes a Terrorist and Why?: The second quote
pointed out that the terrorist must dehumanize their victims and avoid thinking in terms of guilt or
innocence. In the context of the post-9/11 US gulags, this biopolitical regime of state

terror is what guarantees the production of captive life that can be tortured with
impunity and that, moreover, enables its categoriza- tion as unsavable. Once captive life is
thus designated, it can be liquidated without compunction without having to think in terms
of guilt or innocence.

The Aff papers over the ongoing war on the non-human animal
any cessation of violence under the current logic is only a
momentary deferment. Anthropocentrism is radically evil and
must be rejected it is connected to every form of oppression
Bell (PhD candidate in social philosophy at Binghamton) 11
(Aaron, The Dialectic of Anthropocentrism in Critical Theory and Animal Liberation, pg. 1712)
To return, now, to the anthropocentric gaze, we find that it too looks out upon the
world and, like the radically evil individual, sees nothing but its own reflection.

The rest of nature is reduced to "the chaotic stuff of mere


classification,"33 to be organized by the subject of logos in order to attain actu- ality
and meaning. Like the radically evil subject, a sort of megalomania mo- tivates the
anthropocentric subject, which understands itself as the sole point of reference in an
otherwise meaningless universe. Furthermore, as Derrida notes, the anthropocentric
subject, like the radically evil individual and its indeterminate freedom, is
defined by an emptiness or lack; and "from within the pit of that lack, an eminent
lack, a quite different lack from that he assigns to the animal, man installs or claims in a
single stroke his property . . . and his 34 superiority over what is called animal life."
However, unlike the radical evil of the individual in Hegel's account, anthropocentrism is
culturally sanc- tioned, hence persists through time as an institutionally stabilized
phenome- non. The many practical limitations that finally render (individual) radical evil
self-subverting have been either defused or omitted by the formal struc- ture that
anthropocentrism has evolved into over the history of Western civi- lization. Perhaps it is
the historical scale of anthropocentrism that has allowed it to thrive while individual

radical evil necessarily fails. A grandiose narrative scaled down to the life of an
individual quickly becomes problematic; when inflated to the size of a society or
civilization, however, it becomes a thing of truly awesome power, taking on the
appearance of a "second nature." On the individual level, the deep irrationality and
impractical nature of radical evil's egoism come to the fore almost immediately,
whereas on a cultural level this sort of species-narrative has been able to persist and
develop in a way that obscures and leaves latent these issues. As Goebbels remarked,
the bigger the lie, the more it will be believed (a matter he knew something about). By
comparing Hegel's conception of radical evil to humanist anthropocen- trism I have tried
to show the way in which violent irrationality is implicit in the grandiose narrative and
the logic of ontological exclusion of Western an- thropocentrism. But I want to push this
claim further stillto suggest that humanist anthropocentrism is not simply
analogous to Hegel's conception of radical evil, it is evil. The logic of exclusion

deployed in the ontological distinction of human and animal and the


radical evil of anthropocentrism have been the implements of
unimaginable violence. The express, intentional purpose of
anthropocentrism has been not only a "war of the species" but a war on
empathy. As Derrida claims, the conflict "accelerating, intensifying, no longer
knowing where it is going, for about two centuries, at an incalculable rate and level"
35 is "being waged .. . [by] those who violate not only animal life but. . .
compassion" itself. This radical evil is not content with the rationalized destruction of
the lives of animals in infernal industrial farmsit works to eradicate pity for all
that is other. Of all the things that Adorno meant when he said, "Auschwitz begins
wherever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they're only
animals," perhaps this destruction of pity was what he meant to warn against most.
The use of the same train cars designed to transport cows, the same crematorium ovens
originally designed to burn animal bodies, the same elec- trified barbed wire enclosures
used to intern animals before slaughter, makes the denial of the material similarities
between the two events absurd, but the 37 affinity between the two events is much
more fundamental. The denial of the significance of the others suffering

because she is "only an animal" is inextricably linked to indifference


because she is "only" a woman, a black, a Jew, and so on. The "bare life"
of the camps is the everyday existence of every factory farmed animal in
the world. But the horror of the violence against animals is a kind of
impossible genocide, a perpetual violence: [T]he annihilation of certain species
is indeed in process, but it is occurring through the organization and exploitation of an
artificial, infernal, virtually in- terminable survival.... As if, for example, instead of
throwing people into ovens and gas chambers (lets say Nazi) doctors and geneticists
had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and
homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being continually more
numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the
same hell, that of the imposition of genetic experimentation, or extermination by gas or
by fire. In the same abattoirs.

Our alt solves the aff- only looking at the Drexiyans in the
context of speciesism allows us to truly understand slavery
Roberts (Department of Philosophy at Suffolk County Community College) 8
(Mark, The Mark of the Beast: animality and human oppression, pg. 66-7)
These atrocities have, as one may sense, distinct comparisons to the ship- ping of
livestocka point made by Marjorie Spiegel. Her overall statement is quite simple:

Slaves were treated like animals, both on their passage to the


Americas and during the full course of their enforced visit. Her "dreaded

com- parison" with regard to human slaves and animals is most effective when she
contrasts the shipping of livestock and that of slaves. Livestocksteers, cattle, pigs,
and so onis shipped great distances from auction, to feeding yards, to another
auction, and finally to the slaughterhouse.Typically, livestock may travel as much as
2,000 miles, in cramped and abysmal conditions.The animals gener- ally lose a
great deal of body weightas much as 9 percentand are subject to what is
commonly called "shipping fever," of which hundreds of thousands die 16 annually.
better. Their living conditions were, as noted earlier, similarly deplorable. The tight
packing, stress, and lack of nutritious food caused considerable weaken- ing and
weight loss during the crossings. Most slaves were fattened up again before the
auctions in what were usually referred to as slave-yards, which is, of 17 course,
precisely what happens to feed cattle. With no incentive to properly feed the cattle
on the way to slaughter, the process of fattening is restricted to the feedlots
attached to the slaughter facilities. Moreover, many slaves in transit The "livestock"
cramped into the Atlantic slavers did not fare much died, like todays livestock, of
contagious diseases exacerbated by poor nutrition, unsanitary conditions, and,
perhaps above all, dire overcrowding.
Factory farming is another point of comparison between animal and hu- man
exploitation: "The horrors of the Middle Passage, with its cramped con- ditions, pools
of excrement and urine, acceptable' mortality-rates, seemingly interminable length
of duration, and finally insanity leading to violence and cannibalism, have been
projected into modernity in the form of factory farming."18 The factory farm carries
on the paradigm of manipulation for profit so obvious in the cramming of slaves into
slave ships. Sows, for example, are chained or clamped into narrow farrowing stalls,
for months or years on end, so as to save caloric energy expenditure. Chickens and
pigs are stacked in tiers three, four, or five high; the pigs' tails are cut off so as to
prevent stress-induced 19 tail biting.were transported economically to the New
World. Virtually every narrative description of slave-ship conditions

entails some combination of chains, leg irons, stacking, handcuffs,


cramped spaces, and penlike enclosures.
To be sure, this egregious abuse and exploitation of humans has spawned numerous
and often disparate explanations and entreaties, including ones from such eminent
figures as Marx, Bentham, and Mill. Most explanations of slavery, however, fail to
fully account for the staggering disregard for human life in the initial
stages of American slavery. Even given the incentive to deliver as many whole
slaves as possible, there were still certain conditions created by humans for other
humans that made torture, pain, disease, suffering, and in many cases the loss of
life inevitable and, worse, acceptable. These conditions and acts, I suggest , can be

fully understood only by considering the devaluation of the


appropriated African slave to sheer animality. The aforementioned
Aristotelian reduction of the slave to human property, and the
subsequent equating of humans and domesticated animals, figure
significantly in this notion. If the slave were naturally subordinate, like the
animal fated to serve its master, then whatever improved his or her
use-value would be seen as productive and nec- essary, regardless of
the treatment any individual slave received. After all, as is the case with
the domestic animal, the best results are not always achieved by kindness. As
absolute subordinates, the African slaves could be treated in any way
necessary to provide the best practical results, with economic

interests (i.e., bringing in live rather than dead slaves) being the only mitigating

concern.To ship cattle, pigs, chickens, or any other domestic animals in comfortable,
spa- cious conditions, or to keep them in individual, well-ventilated pens would be
patently absurd, as there is in this view absolutely no moral obligation to do so, All
of these were, of course, the principal positions in which slaves and it would be
economically impracticalwhat Aristotle, in his day, would probably have termed
"unnatural."

Case Answers
Considering the ocean as its OWN space improves the
historiography of slavery and anti-slavery
McDaniel 11

W. Caleb McDaniel is an Assistant Professor of History at Rice University. He received


his PhD from Johns Hopkins University in 2006 and is currently completing a book
manuscript on Garrisonian abolitionism and the Atlantic world. Atlantic Studies:
Global Currents Volume 8, Issue 2, 2011 Special Issue: Abolitionist Places Saltwater
anti-slavery: American abolitionists on the Atlantic Ocean in the Age of Steam
Saltwater anti-slavery: American abolitionists on the Atlantic Ocean in the Age of
Steam View full textDownload full text Full access DOI:
10.1080/14788810.2011.562349 W. Caleb McDaniel* pages 141-163
Saltwater anti-slavery, or, more specifically, the ocean crossings of nineteenthcentury American abolitionists, has often been placed on the margins of scholarship
oriented primarily towards the history that happened on land. What happens, I have
asked in this essay, when we move abolitionists at sea from the margins to the
center of analysis? My answer has been that setting aside assumptions about
the ocean's marginality helps bring to the fore other often marginalized
aspects of abolitionist activism and experience, especially what might be
called the emplacement of anti-slavery politics and individual abolitionist selffashioning. Historians of abolitionism have long been attuned to the relationship
between anti-slavery activism and geography, broadly defined. As historians have
turned to focus on transatlantic abolitionism, they have paid increasing attention to
how abolitionists used locations beyond the boundaries of the nation to place
their movement within hemispheric, international, and global contexts. The
abolitionists frequent crossings of the Atlantic and their movement across the
boundaries of the nation state are crucial to this larger and ongoing re-imagining of
the geographical borders of American abolitionism.44 Yet, a close look at the actual
experience of abolitionists engaged in political confrontations and personal
transformation on the ocean itself on board a Cunard steamship, for instance
also argues for the importance of attending to the relationship between abolitionist
politics and space or place on a smaller, human scale. The architecture of a
nineteenth-century passenger ship, and the particular combinations of capital
investment, state power, and customer demand that made the ship what it was,
presented to saltwater abolitionists a matrix of dangers and protections which was
different from the political opportunity structures that confronted them on either
shore of the Atlantic Ocean. Likewise, the ocean provided unique opportunities for
personal contemplation different from those available on land. These realizations
argue for paying renewed attention to the other material places the buildings, the
groves, the river steamboats in which abolitionist activity took place on land. Such
explorations of physical place, when incorporated within ongoing studies of the
regional, national, hemispheric, and global geographies of anti-slavery politics, can
provide the basis for a fuller account of the differences place made in
the history of abolitionism..45 Other conclusions might be, and should be,
gleaned from greater attention to saltwater anti-slavery. But from the evidence
presented in this essay, this much should be clear: notwithstanding the
abolitionists own panegyrics to the steam travel and their own imagery of the
Atlantic as a connecting bridge between Europe and the United States, the ocean

was not empty space or simply a space binding opposite shores and nation states
together. For abolitionists, as for other seafarers, human experience and historical
action continued in the passages between ports. Consequently, as historians of
American abolitionism continue to look beyond the boundaries of the nation to
understand the history of slavery and anti-slavery, they may find that the
oceans themselves, and not just the lands beyond them, are profitable
places to visit.

Focussing on the sea as a METAPHOR trades off with


MATERIALIST analysis of the ocean
Blum 10

Associate professor of English, Penn State University, Ph.D., University of


Pennsylvania, 2002 B.A., Princeton University, 1995 (magna cum laude)
Blum, Hester. "The Prospect of Oceanic Studies." PMLA 125.3 (2010): 670-677.
THE SEA IS NOT A METAPHOR. FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE HAS ITS PLACE IN
ANALYSES OF THE MARITIME WORLD, CERTAINLY, BUT OCEANIC studies could be
more invested in the uses, and problems, of what is literal in the face of the seas
abyss of representation. The appeal that figures of oscillation and circulation have
had is easy to understand, since the sea, in William Boelhowers formulation,
leaves no traces, and has no place names, towns or dwelling places; it cannot be
possessed. Boelhowers description of the Atlantic world is representative of
characterizations of the ocean in recent critical work: it is fundamentally a space
of dispersion, conjunction, distribution, contingency, heterogeneity, and of
intersecting and stratified lines and imagesin short, a field of strategic
possibilities in which the Oceanic order holds all together in a common but highly
fluid space (92-93). The ready availabilityand undeniable utilityof fluidity as an
oceanic figure means that the actual sea has often been rendered immaterial in
transnational work, however usefully such work formulates the ethos of
transnationalism and oceanic studies alike. In this essay I advocate a practice of
oceanic studies that is attentive to the material conditions and praxis of the
maritime world, one that draws from the epistemological structures provided by the
lives and writings of those for whom the sea was simultaneously workplace, home,
passage, penitentiary, and promise. This would allow for a galvanization of the
erasure, elision, and fluidity at work in the metaphorics of the sea that would better
enable us to see and to study the work of oceanic literature. The sea is
geographically central to the hemispheric or transnational turn in American studies
and to Atlantic and Pacific studies.1 Hemispheric American studies has sought to
challenge traditional definitions of the United States as a self-contained political and
cultural entity, working against notions of American exceptionalism by observing
the transnational dimensions of cultural and political formulations and exchanges in
the United States. Often complementary with hemispheric methodologies, Atlanticand Pacific-based scholarship has tended to venture the relative irrelevance of state
affiliations in the maritime world. The material conditions of maritime transit, trade,
and labor would seem to be logical focuses of study in fields that take oceanic
spaces as fundamental unit[s] of analysis, to adapt Paul Gilroys description of the
black Atlantic (15). Yet recent work in transnational studies has been dominated by

attention to questions of empire, exchange, translation, and


cosmopolitanism-critical frames not unique to the sea.