Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

1. ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in
the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose
AlmieAltiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of
San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Respondentss Contention:
a.) He is not a Filipino citizen
b.) He made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy.
c.) They contend that petitioner was a holder of
a permanent U.S. resident visa.
Petitioners Contention:
a.) He did not commit false representation in his
application for candidacy as mayor.
b.) As early as December 17, 1997, he was
already issued a Certificate of Repatriation
by the Special Committee on Naturalization,
after he filed a petition for repatriation
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
c.) Petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship
was already restored.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required
to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner
did not file one within the required period.
The provisions of law governing the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials are found in
Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which

provide as follows:
SEC. 39. Qualifications.
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines;
(b) a
registered
voter
in
the
barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of
member of the sangguniangpanlalawigan,
sangguniangpanlungsod,
or
sangguniangbayan, the district where he
intends to be elected;
(c) a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
xxx.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vicemayor of independent component cities,
component cities or municipalities must be at
least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
It is required that an elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual
citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a
foreign country or must not have acquired the right to
reside abroad.
In the present case, it has been established by clear
and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of
the United States of America. Such fact is proven by
his Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigration
Certificate of Residence.
Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation
as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17
December 1997, this did not restore to
respondent his Filipino citizenship because he
failed to register such as required by the law.
It appears from the records of this case that
respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied
with requirements of the Section 2 of Republic Act

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8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his

Filipino citizenship.
On March 22, 2004, the COMELEC in a resolution
disqualified the petitioner as candidate for Mayor.
On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and attached the following documents
to prove that he had completed all the
requirements for repatriation which thus entitled
him to run for an elective office, viz:
(1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17,
1997;
(2) Identification Certificate No. 116543
issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1,
2004;
(3) Certification from the City Civil Registration
Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of
Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of
petitioner was received by said office and
registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on
February 18, 2004;
(4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the
Special Committee on Naturalization to the
Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it
was furnishing said office with the Oath of
Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of
petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's
registration in said office as an alien, and
the issuance to him of the corresponding
Identification Card as Filipino citizen;
(5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the
Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local
Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was
sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and
Certificate of Repatriation for registration
in
their
records
and
for
petitioner's
reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship.
The COMELEC en banc however affirmed the decision
of the COMELECfirst division because petitioner

submitted
the
necessary
documents
proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only
during his motion for reconsideration, when the
COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said
evidence.
Assuming however that the new evidence of the
respondent are admitted, with more reason should
the court cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act
of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has
not yet perfected the process of repatriation.
As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has
committed false representation in his certificate of
candidacy. Such false representation constitutes
a material misrepresentation as it relates to his
qualification as a candidate.
On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside
the Resolution promulgated by the COMELEC.
The cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy
was
never
implemented.
The
petitioner however did not win the election.
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said
supervening event has rendered the instant petition
moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal
of the petition.
The petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He
claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him
from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely
affected his candidacy, since his supporters were
made to believe that his votes would not be counted.
Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions
cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship.
Since this case is capable of repetition, yet evading
review, thecourts decidedto take it.

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Issues:
(1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with
the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a
prerequisite in effecting repatriation?
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First
Division.
Held:
1.) Yes.The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration."
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on
December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation
was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only
after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the
Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner,
therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only
after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty
position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate
for an elective office apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that
the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying
to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term."
It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).

Moreover, In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court

ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to
the date of the filing of his application.
The reasons for this is simply:
1.) It was the intent of the legislative authority that the
law should apply to past events in order to benefit the
greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
enabling
them
to
enjoy
and
exercise
the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship.
2.) There is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone
3.) Neither will it result to the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right
or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
4.) It would prevent prejudice to applicants
2.) No.The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc
for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division,
considering that petitioner failed to prove before the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of
repatriation.
Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during
his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc
could no longer consider said evidence.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective
office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with
sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino
citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case.
2. BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 142840

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May 7, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents.
On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country.
On June 5, 1990, Cruz was naturalized as a U.S. citizen
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections.
He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner Bengzonfiled a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the

Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998

elections.
The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated
April 27, 2000
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RULING:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63) enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
Respondent Cruzlost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in

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the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance

with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, orreturnto, his original statusbefore he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
3. CO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
(G.R. Nos. 92191-92 - Ito talaga ung nakalagay sa
assignment na binigay ni Atty. A, nilagay ko na din yung kay
Balanquit vs HRET kasi ayun yung nkalagay dun sa
lawphil.net.)
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs. ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the
setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held. Among
the candidates who vied for the position of

representative in the second legislative district of

Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the
private respondent premised on the following grounds:
Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners and was, however, denied by the HRET in
its resolution. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Mr. Ong is a citizen of the PH?
YES.
HELD:
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power? The
Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given
an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions
of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds
of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it

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erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing

that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. It
has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power,
the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite
scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their
functions independent organs independent of Congress
and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as
if it had remained originally in the legislature. In passing
upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful
regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive
privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. It has been argued that under Article
VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided
political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is
nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the
Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend
on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest
grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar. Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial

administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose

Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 and was brought by
Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. As the years passed, Jose
Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao and got
married. The private respondent's father never emigrated
from this country. He filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15,
1954. On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial,
declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15,
1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his
Oath of Allegiance. Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong
Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At the
time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent
then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong,
respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina
named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986,
Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those
elections. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987,
he ran in the elections for representative in the
second district of Northern Samar. Mr. Ong was
overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as
their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the
two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV
read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the
Philippines:

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1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution;
2.
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and
4.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those
who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in
Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position
which discriminates against Filipino women. To make
the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It
must also be retroactive.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes
material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent
to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The
reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was
his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him

to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship

inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have been
an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been
a citizen since he was nine years old.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. The respondent was born in an outlying rural
town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no
racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when
the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a
license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino
and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is
nothing in the records to show that he does not
embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that
this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of
voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's
parentage. They should know him better than any member of
this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of
his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a
Filipino.
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr.
Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee
was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan
became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he
was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was
the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship
for protestee by declaring him as such."
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was
the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.

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Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never

abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up
to the present. The private respondent, in the proceedings
before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire
that gutted their house in 1961, another one was
constructed. Likewise, after the second fire which again
destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was
built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as
their family residence.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of
the private respondent's parents. The private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner
thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these
were still in the names of his parents. Even assuming that the
private respondent does not own any property in Samar, it is
held that it is not required that a person should have a house
in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough
that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or
in that of a friend or relative. To require the private
respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification.
The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere
is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should
also own property in order to be qualified to run. It has also
been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies
or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. Tprivate respondent stayed in Manila for the
purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence
in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the
animus revertendi.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of

Laoang, Northern Samar.
4. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC
FACTS
Petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of
Sorsogon.
A petition for the annulment of Frivaldo, election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen was filed.
He admitted it but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he sought American citizenship only to
protect himself against President Marcos.
He moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative
defenses but COMELEC decided to set the case for
hearing on the merits.
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
He came to this Court for petition for Certiorari.
Pending resolution of petition, a temporary order
against hearing on the merits was issued.
ISSUE: WON Frivaldo was a citizen at the time of his election
RULING: Frivaldo is declared NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES and disqualified from serving as Governor of
Sorsogon.
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution provides that
all public official and employees owe the State and the
Constitution allegiance at all times.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides that
a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency he is running.
His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not
the result of his own free and voluntary choice is
totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

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If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship

and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner
should have done in accordance with the laws of our
country.
Under CA 63, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections
in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of US. Such laws do not
concern us here. Such forfeiture did not and could not
have the effect of automatically restoring his
citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced.
Moreover, his contention that he could not have
repatriated under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee had not yet been constituted is without
merit. If it had not yet been convened, the petitioner
should have to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country.
If a person seeks to serve in the RP, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other State.
Once the status of a natural-born citizen is surrendered
and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored.

5. MAQUILING VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 195649

April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino

citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July
2008.

On the same day an Order of Approval of his

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in
his favor.5

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua),

another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao

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del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and

national elections.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a

resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is
a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USAAmerican." To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a
computer-generated travel record dated 03 December
2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US
Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on different dates using his US passport.

During the 2010 elections, Arnado garnered the

highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after the proclamation that Arnado filed his

counter-claim and alleged among other things that the
reason why he kept on using his US passport was
because even though his Philippine passport was
already released, he was not notified thereof, and thus
only used the latter when he already gained
possession of it.

The COMELEC First Division granted the petition for

disqualification and annulled the proclamation as the
winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte on the gound that although Arnado
appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his
US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his

Affidavit of Renunciation and ordered the order of

succession
under
Section
44
of
the
Local
Administratice Code teke effect.

Hence, Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration

before the COMELEC En Banc.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling),

another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before
the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration
together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended
Motion for Reconsideration.

Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly

disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that
the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number
of lawful votes,

The COMELEC En Banc ruling

As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En
Banc cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention
in
proceedings
for
disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered.
The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados
Motion for Reconsideration, proclaiming that Amado
was qualified for the position notwithstanding the

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fact that he used his US passport several times

after he took his Oath of Allegiance.

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not intervention

disqualification case.

is allowed

in

2.

Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after

renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones
qualifications to run for public office.

3.

Whether or not the rule on succession in the Local

Government Code is applicable to this case.

HELD 1:
Yes. Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when there has not yet
been any proclamation of the winner.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon

motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may

during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in
the case. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that
the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against
Arnado will attain finality.

HELD 2:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position. Rommel Arnado took all the necessary
steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office. By renouncing his
foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under
the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not
operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen
performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself

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subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after

renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US
passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. While the act
of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and
loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for public office.
The act of using a foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to
Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed
on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position. By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification
under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position.
Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any
of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.
Besides, Arnados subsequent
use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that
after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing
his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport.
By using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, he has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation
he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies
to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the
public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections.

HELD 3:
Yes. Since, legally speaking, Arnado
a candidate from the very beginning,
obtained the highest number of votes
qualified candidates, it follows that he
winner in the election held.

was disqualified as
Maquiling having
from among the
is but the lawful

6. MERCADO VS MANZANO

6ERNESTO S. MERCADO petitioner

EDUARDO
BARRIOS
MANZANO
and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS respondent

the

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The proclamation of private respondent was
suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who
alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual

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Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

citizenship are disqualified from running for any

elective position.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion remained pending even
until after the election held on May 11, 1998. The
board of canvassers were ordered by the COMELEC to
suspend the proclamation of the winner for vice mayor.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the
case for disqualification. The motion was not
resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC
en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and
declared private respondent qualified to run for vice
mayor. On the evening of August 31, 1998, private
respondent was proclaimed as vice mayor.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to
set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and
to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of vice mayor of Makati City.

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring
this suit considering that he was not an original party
in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril
nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.
2. Whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

HELD:
1. Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has
neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate

for the vice-mayoralty post. The flaw in this argument

is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
there had already been a proclamation of the results of
the election for the vice mayoralty contest, on the
basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there
had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting
private respondent from the race at the time he sought
to intervene. Under Section 6, R.A. 6646 (Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987), intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
2. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states,
a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand,
refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition. Article IV, Section 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the

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other country of which they are also citizens and

thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
The record shows that private respondent was born in
San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States
follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that,
at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship
under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and
that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years
old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. There is no merit in petitioners contention
that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute
renunciation
of
his
American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners
contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent
reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

7. REPUBLIC VS LIM

FACTS:

Respondent filed a petition for correction of entries in

her certificate of live birth before the Regional Trial
Court.

She petitioned for the following corrections:

1. Her surname, being misspelled,
changed from "Yo" to "Yu";

should

be

2. Her father's name should be Yu Dio To instead of

Yo Diu To; and
3. Her parents never got married (her father was
previously married in China). In effect, her
status should be changed from legitimate to
illegitimate and her citizenship from Chinese to
Filipino.

Petition was granted by the lower court; CA affirmed

the same. Republic appealed via petition for certiorari
on the following assignment of errors in the decision of
the CA: 1. Respondent never demonstrated any
compliance with the legal requirements for election of
citizenships enshrined in Article IV, Section 1 (3) of the
Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 625.

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Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

2. Respondent should not be allowed to use her

father's surname as she is an illegitimate child.

ISSUE:
WON CA was correct in upholding the decision of the
lower court.
HELD:
1. Yes, the CA was correct in finding for the
respondent. The constitutional and statutory requirements
apply only to legitimate child. By being an illegitimate child of
her Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a
Filipino citizen upon birth and need not elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
2. CA did not allow the use of the father's surname; it
merely granted the petition for correction in the entries of the
father's surname. Furthermore, Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act 142 allows a person to use the name by which he has
been known since childhood. The respondent is now 47 years
old. Changing her surname would just create confusion. It
was not also shown that her relatives in China would be
prejudiced by her use of such surname. While judicial
authority is required for a change of name or surname, there
is no such requirement for the continued use of surname
which a person had already been using since childhood.

NB: additional discussion on rules of changing entries

in the live birth.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to
be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. In
Republic v. Valencia, it was held that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is
one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals in the
case at bar, it is taken that the Republics failure to cite this
error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that
the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial.

8. REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA

PETITION DENIED. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo had earned majority of the votes as public
servant ( Governor) in Sorsogon.

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There was a conspicuous doubt whether the respondent

Frivaldo acquired Filipino citizenship before he ran as
governor in the said city.
Respondent judge Dela Rosa set the petition for hearing and
directed the publication of order in official gazette for 3
consecutive weeks and last said publication which would be
6 months before its hearing, it was held months after the
respondent Frivaldo filed a petition for Naturalization.
There was a motion to set hearing ahead of schedule it was
granted by the court and manifested the public office
running intention for filing certificate candidacy.
The respondent brought all his requirements and 6 days
later respondent judge assailed his decision in RTC allowing
respondent Frivaldo to reacquire Filipino citizenship by virtue
of his rights and privileges of being a natural born Filipino
citizen; However, Quiterio alleged that there was
jurisdictional defect about granting naturalization process.
Several days after the proclamation of the court, Election
was done and Frivaldo was declared winner in the casting of
votes.
Republic petitioner filed the petition with COMELEC to annul
proclamation of private respondents winning state they
alleged that respondent Frivaldo didnt reacquire his
citizenship and had pending political status as of the
moment.
COMELEC had issued enbanc resolution which was
dismissed because there was a late filing of the said
resolution, meanwhile petition for mandamus under Rule 65
of Sec 5(2) Article VIII of the constitution, regarded the
revise or modification on appeal or certiorari in GR No.
105735 and was filed with prayer for temporary restraining
order.
There was a failure to reacquire due to time that lapse and
the failure to publicize the naturalization of the respondent
in the official gazette inorder to become a Filipino citizen
again. The Revised Naturalization law is a procedural law
that must be followed.

ISSUE:

Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

WON respondent Frivaldo shall claim the qualification as
newly elected Governor in Sorsogon by properly reacquiring his
Natural citizenship.
HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Private respondent is

declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified
from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the
Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was
marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition
was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a
publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the
petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the
last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take
his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4)
petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the twoyear waiting period.

9. TECSON VS COMELEC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
FACTS:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan

Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President of the Republic of

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Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

the Philippines under

the
KoalisyonngNagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the forthcoming national elections.
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing
himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, filed, a
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions
- first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

COMELECs decision:
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04003 for lack of merit. The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this
Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R.

No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining

order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution
that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUE: WOR pursuant to Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the basic issue on the case.
HELD: NO. Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution provides -"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in
view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and
Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into,
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. [5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
who would have received either the second or third highest

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Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

number of votes could file an election protest. This rule

again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before
it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
ISSUE :WOR FPJ is a Filipino citizen?
History of Citizenship
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during
the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish
subjects. In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Not all citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decree.
In the year 1898 Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United
States. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December
1898 between Spain and the United States. ]Under Article IX
of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States.
Native inhabitants they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be
citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands"
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the
United States on the Philippines.
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was
one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant
was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an

inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April

1899.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States
made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902
providing for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of Philippines islands not covered by the
foregoing provisions.
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he
initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for
the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912.
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as
of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since
that date, not a citizen of some other country.
>>While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.

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Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines

and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
>>Meanwhile under the 1973 Constitution its states that Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirtyfive.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
>>And at present, the Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution
now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
HELD:
YES. Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without

having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their

Philippine citizenship.
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to
be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution which treats jus sanguinis or blood relationship
as the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou
would
have
benefited
from
the
en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634, dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
G. R. No. 161824, dismissed for failure to show grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission
on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

Macapintal . Zorilla . Pasa . Nipal . Maban . Tamondong . Calvo . Mayor . Bercenio

Citizenship Constitutional Law 2

Macapintal . Zorilla . Pasa . Nipal . Maban . Tamondong . Calvo . Mayor . Bercenio