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1 History
The CDM is one of the exibility mechanisms that is
dened in the Kyoto Protocol. The exibility mechanisms are designed to allow Annex B countries to meet
their emission reduction commitments with reduced impact on their economies (IPCC, 2007).[1] The exibility
mechanisms were introduced to the Kyoto Protocol by the
US government. Developing countries were highly skeptical and ercely opposed to the exibility mechanisms
(Carbon Trust, 2009, p. 6).[3] However, in the international negotiations over the follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol, it has been agreed that the mechanisms will continue.
Framework Convention). The CDM is one of the Protocols project-based mechanisms, in that the CDM is
designed to promote projects that reduce emissions. The
CDM is based on the idea of emission reduction production (Toth et al., 2001, p. 660).[9] These reductions
are produced and then subtracted against a hypothetical baseline of emissions. The emissions baseline are
the emissions that are predicted to occur in the absence
of a particular CDM project. CDM projects are credited against this baseline, in the sense that developing
countries gain credit for producing these emission cuts.
From the viewpoint of bringing about a global reduction in emissions, emissions from developing countries
are projected to increase substantially over this century
(Goldemberg et al., 1996, p. 29).[10] Infrastructure decisions made in developing countries could therefore have a
very large inuence on future eorts to limit total global
emissions (Fisher et al., 2007).[12] The CDM is designed
to start o developing countries on a path towards less
pollution, with industrialised (Annex B) countries paying
for these reductions.
There were two main concerns about the CDM (Carbon
Trust, 2009, pp. 1415). One was over the additionality
of emission reductions produced by the CDM (see the
section on additionality). The other was whether it would
allow rich, northern countries, and in particular, companies, to impose projects that were contrary to the development interests of host countries. To alleviate this concern, the CDM requires host countries to conrm that
CDM projects contribute to their own sustainable development. International rules also prohibit credits for
some kind of activities, notably from nuclear power and
avoided deforestation.
3.1 Outline
An industrialised country that wishes to get credits from
a CDM project must obtain the consent of the developing country hosting the project that the project will contribute to sustainable development. Then, using methodologies approved by the CDM Executive Board (EB),
the applicant (the industrialised country) must make the
case that the carbon project would not have happened
anyway (establishing additionality), and must establish a
baseline estimating the future emissions in absence of
the registered project. The case is then validated by a
third party agency, called a Designated Operational Entity (DOE), to ensure the project results in real, measurable, and long-term emission reductions. The EB then decides whether or not to register (approve) the project. If a
project is registered and implemented, the EB issues credits, called Certied Emission Reductions (CERs, commonly known as carbon credits, where each unit is equivalent to the reduction of one metric tonne of CO2 e, e.g.
CO2 or its equivalent), to project participants based on
the monitored dierence between the baseline and the
actual emissions, veried by the DOE.
3.2 Additionality
To avoid giving credits to projects that would have happened anyway (freeriders), rules have been specied to
ensure additionality of the proposed project, that is, to ensure the project reduces emissions more than would have
occurred in the absence of the intervention created by the
CDM.[13] At present, the CDM Executive Board deems a
project additional if its proponents can document that realistic alternative scenarios to the proposed project would
be more economically attractive or that the project faces
barriers that CDM helps it overcome. Current Guidance
from the EB is available at the UNFCCC website.[14]
To prevent industrialised countries from making unlimited use of CDM, the framework has a provision that use
of CDM be supplemental to domestic actions to reduce
emissions. This wording has led to a wide range of interpretations - the Netherlands for example aims to achieve
half of its required emission reductions (from a BAU
baseline) by CDM. It treats Dutch companies purchases
of European Emissions Trading Scheme allowances from
companies in other countries as part of its domestic ac3.3
tions.
Baseline
4.1
3
Boost transfers of clean, less polluting technologies
to developing countries.
According to Burniaux et al. (2009, p. 37), the costsaving potential of a well-functioning crediting mechanism appears to be very large. Compared to baseline
costs (i.e., costs where emission reductions only take
place in Annex I countries), if the cap on oset use was
set at 20%, one estimate suggests mitigation costs could
be halved. This cost saving, however, should be viewed
as an upper bound: it assumes no transaction costs and
no uncertainty on the delivery of emission savings. Annex I countries who stand to gain most from crediting include Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In this eco3.4 Methodologies
nomic model, non-Annex I countries enjoy a slight income gain from exploiting low cost emission reductions.
Any proposed CDM project has to use an approved base- Actual transaction cost in the CDM are rather high, which
line and monitoring methodology to be validated, ap- is problematic for smaller projects.[20] This issue is adproved and registered. Baseline Methodology will set dressed by the Program of Activities (PoA) modality.
steps to determine the baseline within certain applicability conditions whilst monitoring methodology will set
specic steps to determine monitoring parameters, qual- 4.1 Diculties with the CDM
ity assurance, equipment to be used, in order to obtain
data to calculate the emission reductions. Those approved Carbon leakage
methodologies are all coded:[15]
In theory, leakage may be reduced by crediting mechanisms (Burniaux et al., 2009, p. 38). In practice, the
AM - Approved Methodology
amount of leakage partly depends on the denition of
ACM - Approved Consolidated Methodology
the baseline against which credits are granted. The curAMS - Approved Methodology for Small Scale Projects rent CDM approach already incorporates some leakage.
Thus, reductions in leakage due to the CDM may, in fact,
ARAM - Aforestation and Reforestation Approved
be small or even non-existent.
Methodologies
Additionality, transaction costs and bottlenecks
All baseline methodologies approved by Executive Board
are publicly available along with relevant guidance on the In order to maintain the environmental eectiveness of
UNFCCC CDM website.[16] If a DOE determines that the Kyoto Protocol, emission savings from the CDM must
a proposed project activity intends to use a new base- be additional (World Bank, 2010, p. 265).[21] Without
line methodology, it shall, prior to the submission for additionality, the CDM amounts to an income transfer
registration of this project activity, forward the proposed to non-Annex I countries (Burniaux et al., 2009, p. 40).
methodology to the EB for review, i.e. consideration and Additionality is, however, dicult to prove, and is the
subject of vigorous debate.[13]
approval, if appropriate.[17]
Burniaux et al. (2009) commented on the large transaction costs of establishing additionality. Assessing ad4 Economics
ditionality has created delays (bottlenecks) in approving
CDM projects. According to World Bank (2010), there
According to Burniaux et al., 2009, p. 37, crediting are signicant constraints to the continued growth of the
mechanisms like the CDM could play three important CDM to support mitigation in developing countries.
roles in climate change mitigation :[18]
Incentives
The CDM rewards emissions reductions, but does not pe Improve the cost-eectiveness of GHG mitigation nalize emission increases (Burniaux et al., 2009, p. 41).
policies in developed countries
It therefore comes close to being an emissions reduction
Help to reduce leakage (carbon leakage) of subsidy. This can create a perverse incentive for rms to
emissions from developed to developing countries. raise their emissions in the short-term, with the aim of
Leakage is where mitigation actions in one coun- getting credits for reducing emissions in the long-term.
try or economic sector result in another countrys
or sectors emissions increasing, e.g., through relocation of polluting industries from Annex I to nonAnnex I countries (Barker et al., 2007).[19]
Another diculty is that the CDM might reduce the incentive for non-Annex I countries to cap their emissions.
This is because most developing countries benet more
from a well-functioning crediting mechanism than from a
4
world emissions trading scheme (ETS), where their emissions are capped. This is true except in cases where the
allocation of emissions rights (i.e., the amount of emissions that each country is allowed to emit) in the ETS is
particularly favourable to developing countries.
Local resistance
While the C in CDM stands for Clean, most projects
might be better dened with the B from Big, from large
hydropower to HFC or waste to energy and clean coal
projects (which all together make the majority of credits
generated through CDM). The argument in favor of the
CDM is that it brings development to the South. However, in all continents the mainly Big Development it
stands for is resisted by local people in those countries. A
global coalition of researchers published a large report on
African civil society resistance to CDM projects all over
the continent.[22] In New Delhi, India, a grassroots movement of wastepickers is resisting another CDM project[23]
on what the makers call 'the waste war' in Delhi. In
Panama, a CDM project is blocking peace talks between
the Panamanian government and the indigenous NgbeBugl people.[24] Civil society groups and researchers in
both North and South have complained for years that
most CDM projects benet big industries, while doing
harm to excluded people. As local protests against CDM
projects are arising on every continent, the notion that
CDM 'brings development to the South' is contested.
Market deation
Most of the demand for CERs from the CDM comes from
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme which is
the largest carbon market. In July 2012, the market price
for CERs fell to new record low of 2.67 euros a tonne.
This represented a change in price of about 70 percent
in a year. Analysts attributed the low CER price to lower
prices paid for European Union emissions allowances, the
over supply of EU emissions allowances and the slowing
European economy.[25]
In September 2012, The Economist described the CDM
as a complete disaster in the making and in need of
a radical overhaul. This was because carbon prices, including prices for CERS, had collapsed, from $20 a tonne
in August 2008 to below $5 in response to the Eurozone debt crisis reducing industrial activity and the overallocation of emission allowances under the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme.[26] The Guardian reported that the CDM has essentially collapsed, due to
the prolonged downward trend in the price of CERs,
which had been traded for as much as $20 (12.50) a
tonne before the global nancial crisis to less than $3.
With such low CER prices, potential projects were not
commercially viable.[27] In October 2012, CER prices fell
to a new low of 1.36 euros a metric tonne on the London ICE Futures Europe exchange.[28] In October 2012
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon calculated that the oversupply of units from the Clean Development Mechanism
and Joint Implementation would be 1,400 million units
5 FINANCIAL ISSUES
for the period up to 2020 and Point Carbon predicted
that Certied Emission Reduction (CER) prices would
to drop from 2 to 50 cents.[29] On 12 December 2012
CER prices reached another record low of 31 cents.[30]
Bloomberg reported that Certied Emission Reduction
prices had declined by 92 percent to 39 each cents in the
2012 year.[31]
5 Financial issues
With costs of emission reduction typically much lower
in developing countries than in industrialised countries,
industrialised countries can comply with their emission
reduction targets at much lower cost by receiving credits
for emissions reduced in developing countries as long as
administration costs are low.
The IPCC has projected GDP losses for OECD Europe with full use of CDM and Joint Implementation
to between 0.13% and 0.81% of GDP versus 0.31% to
1.50%[32] with only domestic action.
While there would always be some cheap domestic emission reductions available in Europe, the cost of switching from coal to gas could be in the order of 40-50 per
tonne CO2 equivalent. Certied Emission Reductions
from CDM projects were in 2006 traded on a forward
basis for between 5 and 20 per tonne CO2 equivalent. The price depends on the distribution of risk between seller and buyer. The seller could get a very good
price if it agrees to bear the risk that the projects baseline and monitoring methodology is rejected; that the
host country rejects the project; that the CDM Executive Board rejects the project; that the project for some
reason produces fewer credits than planned; or that the
buyer doesn't get CERs at the agreed time if the international transaction log (the technical infrastructure ensuring international transfer of carbon credits) is not in
place by then. The seller can usually only take these risks
if the counterparty is deemed very reliable, as rated by
international rating agencies.
6.1
Transportation
5.2
Adaptation nance
CDM projects
6.1 Transportation
R. of Korea 9.1%
Brazil 7.2%
Mexico 1.6%
Chile 1.0%
Argentina 0.9%
Others 5.4%
China 59.9%
Data: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Issuance/CERsIssuedByHostPartyPieChart.html
Since 2000, the CDM has allowed crediting of projectbased emission reductions in developing countries (Gupta
et al., 2007).[33] By 1 January 2005, projects submitted
to the CDM amounted to less than 100 MtCO2 e of projected savings by 2012 (Carbon Trust, 2009, p. 18-19).[3]
The EU ETS started in January 2005, and the following
month saw the Kyoto Protocol enter into force. The EU
ETS allowed rms to comply with their commitments by
buying oset credits, and thus created a perceived value
to projects. The Kyoto Protocol set the CDM on a rm
legal footing.
Transaction costs and CDM process requirements: These are geared more towards the most advanced developing countries, and do not work well
for the projects most often found in LDCs.
Barriers
8.1.2 Types
World Bank (n.d., p. 12) described a number of barri- Additionality is a much contested. There are many rival
ers to the use of the CDM in least developed countries interpretations of additionality:
(LDCs).[44] LDCs have experienced lower participation
in the CDM to date. Four CDM decisions were high1. What is often labelled environmental additionality
lighted as having a disproportionate negative impact on
has that a project is additional if the emissions from
LDCs:
the project are lower than the baseline. It generally looks at what would have happened without the
Suppressed demand: Baseline calculations for
project.
LDCs are low, meaning that projects cannot generate sucient carbon nance to have an impact.
2. Another interpretation, sometimes termed project
additionality, the project must not have happened
Treatment of projects that replace nonwithout the CDM.
renewable biomass: A decision taken led to
essentially a halving in the emission reduction
potential of these projects. This has particularly A number of terms for dierent kinds of additionality
aected Sub-Saharan Africa and projects in poor have been discussed, leading to some confusion, particucommunities, where rewood, often from non- larly over the terms 'nancial additionality' and 'investrenewable sources, is frequently used as a fuel for ment additionality' which are sometimes used as synonyms. 'Investment additionality', however, was a concooking and heating.
cept discussed and ultimately rejected during negotia Treatment of forestry projects and exclusion of tion of the Marrakech Accords. Investment additionality
agriculture under the CDM: These sectors are carried the idea that any project that surpasses a certain
more important for LDCs than for middle-income risk-adjusted protability threshold would automatically
countries. Credits from forestry projects are penal- be deemed non-additional.[45] 'Financial additionality' is
ized under the CDM, leading to depressed demand often dened as an economically non-viable project becoming viable as a direct result of CDM revenues.
and price.
8.2
Concerns
Many investors argue that the environmental additionality interpretation would make the CDM simpler. Environmental NGOs have argued that this interpretation
would open the CDM to free-riders, permitting developed countries to emit more CO, while failing to produce emission reductions in the CDM host countries.[46]
Gillenwater (2011) evaluated the various denitions of
additionality used within the CDM community and provided a synthesis denition that rejects the notion of there
being dierent types of additionality.[13][47][48]
7
8.2.1 Overall eciency
Pioneering research has suggested that an average of approximately 30% of the money spent on the open market buying CDM credits goes directly to project operating and capital expenditure costs.[52][53] Other signicant
costs include the brokers premium (about 30%, understood to represent the risk of a project not delivering)
and the project shareholders dividend (another 30%).
The researchers noted that the sample of projects studied
was small, the range of gures was wide and that their
methodology of estimating values slightly overstated the
average brokers premium.
8.1.3
Views on additionality
isnt governed according to the rules of good gover- 8.2.4 Reasons for including avoided deforestation
nance. Solving this problem might require a genuine
projects in the CDM
democratization in the election of the EB-members and
thus a shift in thinking from government to governance.
In practice this would mean that all the stakeholders Combating global warming has broadly two components:
decreasing the release of greenhouse gases and sequestershould get a voice in who can have a seat in the EB.
ing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Greenhouse
Another important factor in the dysfunctionality of the gas emitters, such as coal-red power plants, are known as
EB is the lack of time, sta and nancial resources it has sources, and places where carbon and other greenhouse
to fully evaluate a project proposal.[55] Moreover, the ver- gases, such as methane, can be sequestered, i.e. kept out
ication of a project is often outsourced to companies that of the atmosphere, are known as sinks.
also deliver services (such as accounting or consultancy)
to enterprises setting up these same projects. In this way, The worlds forests, particularly rain forests, are importhe veriers have serious incentives to deliver a positive tant carbon sinks, both because of their uptake of CO2
report to the EB.[54][55][60][64] This indicates that imple- through photosynthesis and because of the amount of carmentation is the place where the shoe pinches, as usually bon stored in their woody biomass and the soil. When
happens in environmental issues (mostly due to a lack of rain forests are logged and burned, not only do we lose
the forests capacity to take up CO2 from the atmosphere,
funds).[65]
but also the carbon stored in that biomass and soil is reFinally, it should be noted though that there have been leased into the atmosphere through release of roots from
indications in recent years that the EB is becoming more the soil and the burning of the woody plant matter.
strict in its decisions, due to the huge criticism and the
An emerging proposal, Reduced Emissions from Avoided
board getting more experience.[63]
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), would allow
rain forest preservation to qualify for CDM project status. REDD has gained support through recent meetings
of the COP, and will be examined at Copenhagen.
8.2.3
The rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol excluded forest conservation as well as avoided deforestation from the CDM for a variety of political, practical
and ethical reasons.[66] However, carbon emissions from
deforestation represent 18-25% of all emissions,[67] and
will account for more carbon emissions in the next ve
years than all emissions from all aircraft since the Wright
Brothers until at least 2025.[68] This means that there have
been growing calls for the inclusion of forests in CDM
schemes for the second commitment period from a variety of sectors, under the leadership of the Coalition
for Rainforest Nations, and brought together under the
Forests Now Declaration, which has been signed by over
300 NGOs, business leaders, and policy makers. There is
so far no international agreement about whether projects
avoiding deforestation or conserving forests should be initiated through separate policies and measures or stimulated through the carbon market. One major concern
is the enormous monitoring eort needed in order to
make sure projects are indeed leading to increased carbon storage. There is also local opposition. For example, May 2, 2008, at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), Indigenous leaders
from around the world protested against the Clean Energy
Mechanisms, especially against Reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation.
8.2
8.2.6
Concerns
CERs from hydropower projects are not listed on European carbon exchanges, because dierent member states
Some CERs are produced from CDM projects at interpret these limitations dierently.
refrigerant-producing factories in non-Annex I countries
that generate the powerful greenhouse gas HFC 23 as a
by-product. These projects dominated the CDMs early 8.2.8 Other concerns
growth, and are expected to generate 20% of all credited emission reductions by 2012 (Carbon Trust, 2009, Renewable energy
p. 60).[3] Paying for facilities to destroy HFC-23 can cost In the initial phase of the CDM, policy makers and NGOs
only 0.2-0.5 /tCO2 . Industrialized countries were, how- were concerned about the lack of renewable energy CDM
ever, paying around 20 /tCO2 for reductions that cost projects. As the new CDM projects are now predomibelow 1 /tCO2 . This provoked strong criticism.
nantly renewables and energy eciency projects, this is
The scale of prots generated by HFC-23 projects threatened distortions in competitiveness with plants in industrialized countries that had already cleaned up their
emissions (p. 60). In an attempt to address concerns
over HFC-23 projects, the CDM Executive Board made
changes in how these projects are credited. According to
the Carbon Trust (2009, p. 60), these changes eectively
ensure that:
8.2.7
Hydropower
8.2.9 Suggestions
In response to concerns of unsustainable projects or spurious credits, the World Wide Fund for Nature and other
NGOs devised a Gold Standard methodology to certify projects that uses much stricter criteria than required,
such as allowing only renewable energy projects.[74]
For example, a South African brick kiln was faced with a
business decision; replace its depleted energy supply with
coal from a new mine, or build a dicult but cleaner
natural gas pipeline to another country. They chose to
build the pipeline with SASOL. SASOL claimed the difference in GHG emissions as a CDM credit, comparing emissions from the pipeline to the contemplated coal
mine. During its approval process, the validators noted
that changing the supply from coal to gas met the CDMs
'additionality' criteria and was the least cost-eective
10
10
8.3
Successes
REFERENCES
See also
Certied Emission Reduction
Obtaining ownership of land by productive use
Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance
China Carbon Forum (CCF)
Veried Carbon Standard
Additionality
10
References
cial Dimensions of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (J.P. Bruce et
al. Eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.,
and New York, N.Y., U.S.A. doi:10.2277/0521568544.
ISBN 978-0-521-56854-8.
11
[36] CERs issued by host party total = 1,004,633,719. UNFCCC. 2012-09-14. Archived from the original on 201209-16.
[37] UN-aided project in Himachal to cut down carbon emissions. Times of India (Jun 26 2011)
[38] "CDM:Project Activities. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
[39] Rosenthal, Elizabeth; Lehren, Andrew W (August 8,
2012). Incentive to Slow Climate Change Drives Output of Harmful Gases. The New York Times. Retrieved
September 18, 2012.
[40] Carbon markets: The smoking greenhouse gun. The
Economist. 2 September 2010. Retrieved 24 January
2013. According to Sandbag, an outt that monitors carbon markets, 59% of the CERs used as osets in the
EU cap-and-trade scheme in 2009 came from HFC-23
projects
[41] Rosenthal, Elizabeth; Lehren, Andrew W (August 8,
2012). Subsidies for a Global Warming Gas - Graphic.
The New York Times. Retrieved September 19, 2012.
[42] Hedegaard, Connie (January 21, 2011). Emissions trading: Commission welcomes vote to ban certain industrial
gas credits. European Commission. Retrieved September 18, 2012.
[43] Regulations restricting the use of HFC-23 and N2O
CERs in the NZ ETS. Ministry for the Environment.
22 February 2012. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
[29] Oversupply in Carbon Credit Market could hit 1,400 million credits by 2020 (Press release). Thomson Reuters
Point Carbon. 10 October 2012. Retrieved 29 November
2012.
[44] World Bank (n.d.). The World Banks 10 years of experience in carbon nance: Insights from working with carbon
markets for development & global greenhouse gas mitigation (brochure)". Carbon nance on the World Bank
website. Retrieved 2010-04-20.
[45] VROM (Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spacial Planning and the Environment
[46] Failed Mechanism: Hundreds of Hydros Expose Serious Flaws in the CDM; International Rivers; December
2, 2007
[47] Gillenwater, M. What Is Additionality? Part 2: A framework for a more precise denitions and standardized approaches. Retrieved 10 December 2014.
[48] Gillenwater, M. What Is Additionality? Part 3: Implications for stacking and unbundling,. Retrieved 10 December 2014.
[49] Schneider, L. (5 November 2007). Is the CDM fullling
its environmental and sustainable development objectives?
An evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement.
WWF website. Retrieved 2010-04-20.
[50] Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality
(Version 03), UNFCCC CDM EB, EB 29
[51] Mller, B. (March 2009). Additionality in the Clean
Development Mechanism: Why and What?". Dr. Benito Mllers web page on the Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies website. Retrieved 2010-04-20.
12
12
EXTERNAL LINKS
[69] Fogarty, David (Jul 12, 2011). Carbon credits for India coal power plant stoke criticism. Reuters. Retrieved
September 18, 2012. ...ve high-eciency coal power
plants have been registered under the CDM -- four in India and one in China -- meaning they are all eligible to
earn CERs that they can sell.
[70] Against Own Technical Advice, UN decides to subsidize,
remove safeguards, for dirty coal power plants (Press release). CDM-WATCH. 13 September 2012. Retrieved
10 October 2012.
[71] Brazils Jirau hydro project worlds largest CDMregistered renewable plant. Hydro World. 6 May 2013.
Retrieved 30 Dec 2014.
[72] World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market,
2010
[73] http://www.wsrw.org/a105x2329
[74] CDM Gold Standard
[75] CDM Project 0177 Lawley Fuel Switch Project UNFCCC
[76] Carbon trade watch
11 Further reading
Boyd, E. et al (October 2007). The Clean Development Mechanism: An assessment of current
practice and future approaches for policy. Tyndall
Centre for Climate Change Research. Retrieved
September 18, 2012.
Hepburn, C. (November 2007). Carbon Trading:
A Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms. Annual
Review of Environment and Resources 32: 375393.
doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.32.053006.141203.
Retrieved May 20, 2009.
The ultimate climate change FAQ (July 26, 2011).
What is the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM)?". The Guardian. Retrieved September 20,
2012.
12 External links
Home page of United Nations website on Clean Development Mechanisms
Capacity development for the CDM
Spreadsheet of Hydro Projects in the CDM Project
Pipeline, International Rivers
13
UN Clean Development Mechanism prole on
database of market governance mechanisms
14
13
13
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