1

(1) U.S. vs. Dorr (2 Phil 332)

F: The defendants were convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of
writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon Sec. 8 of
Act No. 292 of the Commission which punishes any person who shall "utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the U.S. Government or the
Insular Government of the Phil. Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the
people against the unlawful authorities x x x". The alleged libel was published as an editorial in
the issue of the "Manila Freedom". The article mentioned about the "foolish work that the Civil
Commission is doing all over the Islands" referring to the appointment by the latter of natives
which were referred to as "insurgents" and "rogues" to important Government positions.
ISSUE: Whether the publication constitutes an offense under Sec. 8 of ACT. No. 292
HELD: NO. The term "government" as employed in ACT No. 292 of the U.S. Philippine
Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished from
the concrete organism of the Government. The article in question contains no attack upon the
governmental system of the U.S., and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as
respects
both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon
the governmental system by which the authority of the U.S. is enforced in these isla nds. The
form of Goverment by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the
character of the men who are instructed with the administration of the government that the
writer is seeking to bring into disrepute. Adapted.

(2) Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

Spanish Code of Commerce Provision Disqualifying Judges from Engaging in Commerce is Part
of Spanish Political Law Abrogated by Change of Sovereignty
F: The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Art.
14 of
the Code of Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, fr om engaging in commerce,
either in person or in proxy or in the financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he associated himself w/ the Traders Mftg.
& Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and pres., said corp. having been organized to
engage in business.

HELD: Although this provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce w/c is part of the
commercial laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices
and judges. Political law has been defined as that branch of public law w/c deals w/ the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations
of the state w/ the inhabitants of its territory. Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of
certain public officers and employees w/ respect to engaging in business; hence, political in
essence.
xxx Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the
Republic of the Phils., Art. 14 of the said Code must be deemed to have been
abrogated bec. where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether
compatible or not w/ those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless
they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no enabling
or
affirmative act. Consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding
effect
and cannot apply to respondent Judge. VV.
Positivist theory: There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws on
which the right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa v Polyblank) Sociological theory: If the
State is amenable to suits, all its time would be spent defending itself from suits and
this would prevent it from performing its other functions.
(3) Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83 (1973.)
F: On 7/3/61, a decision was rendered in SP in favor of resps. P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, et. al. and
against
petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of 1.7 M, subject of SP. On
6/24/69, resp. Judge issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, QC as well as Manila to execute the said decision. A
corresponding alias writ of execution was then issued. On the strength of said writ, the
sheriff served notices of garnishment w/ several banks, specially on the 'monies due the AFP
in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the writ;' the Phil. Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment. Hence, this original action for certiorari and
prohibition w/ the SC.
HELD: It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its govt is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is

readily understandable why it must be so. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not bec. of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on w/c the right depends.
(J. Holmes, Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 US 349.) Sociological jurisprudence supplies
an answer not dissimilar. [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions
are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted.The State may not be sued without its consent. A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds
cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. This is based on considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the d iversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law. RAM.
(4) Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424
F: Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Sur against the
Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the land authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land in Tinambac, Camarines Sur. He alleged that the lot in question should
be excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation program of the government under
Proc. No. 90, since it's his private property being covered by a possessory information title
in the name of his predecessor-in- interest. (Proc. No. 90 reserves for settlement purposes,
under the administration of the NARRA, now the Land Authority, a tract of land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur.) Feliciano prayed that he be declared
the rightful owner of the property in question.A motion to dismiss, principally on the ground
that the RP cannot be sued without its onsent and hence the action cannot prosper, was filed
by 86 settlers (as intervenors) of the land in question. The CFI granted the motion to dismiss,
which was then reversed by the IAC on appeal. Hence this petition by the RP.
ISSUES: 1. WON the doctrine of non-suability of the state can be invoked in this case.
(YES) The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the RP as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person
who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an
action in rem, but an action in personam. By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the
complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by

implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no
such showing of consent in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the
existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should
have been dismissed. The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit
when the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings."
2. WON the consent of the RP may be read from Proc. No. 90 itself.
(NO)The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proc. no. 90
cannot be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of
immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be
construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent
of the State to be sued must manate from statutory authority. Waiver of State Immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body. Adapted.
(5) Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Adm., 32 SCRA 466 (1970)
F: Gaudencio Begosa, plaintiff-appellee, was an "enlisted men of the Phil. Commonwealth
Army, inducted in the service of the USAFFE" having taken "active participation in the battle of
Bataan" as well as the "liberation drive against the enemy" thereafter became "permanently
incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in line of duty xxx." Pltff. filed his claim
for disability pension as far back as 3/4/55; but it was erroneously disapproved on 6/21/55, bec.
his dishonorable discharge from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said
disapproval, and that on reconsideration asked for by him on 11/1/57, w/c he continued to
follow up, the Board of Administrators, Phil. Veterans Admin., finally approved his claim
on 9/2/64, at the rate of P30/mo. Judge Soriano noted that: "had it not been for the said
error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so the latter was valid
and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on 3/4/55, hence to make the same effective
only as of the date of its approval on 9/2/64 -- according to def's stand-- would be greatly unfair
and prejudicial to pltff. The appeal assigns as one error what it considers to be the failing of the
LC in not holding that the complaint in this case is in effect a suit against the State w/c has not
given its consent thereto. HELD: It does not admit of doubt that if the suit were in fact against
the State, the LC should have dismissed the complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while
ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the def. may in reality be the govt. As a
result, it is equally well -settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on
the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of prop., the public official
proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability
may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted bec. of his failure to comply w/ the duty imposed by statute

appropriating public funds for the benefit of pltff. or petitioner. Such is the present case.xxx
However, where the judgement in such a case would result not only in the recovery
of possession of the prop. in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liab.
of the Govt, then the suit should be regarded as one against the govt itself, and
consequently, it
cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except w/ the consent of said Govt.
RAM.
(6) Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Adm (PVA), 51 SCRA 340 (1973)
F: Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area
Command
(a duly recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained
an honorable discharge from the service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical
disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Phil.
Veterans Bd granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47; that in 3/50, the
said Bd. discontinued payment of monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar
pension from the US Govt, thru the US Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered
in the US in the Far East during the war, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life
pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the said Bd. twice, demanding the continued
payment of his monthly pension but his demands went unheeded. And petition for mandamus
was filed w/ CFI-Cebu w/c rendered judgment upholding Del Mar's claim. The PVA argues that
the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try the civil case bec. it involves a money claim against
PVA- a mere agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical
personality of its own- and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt w/c is
immune from suit w/o its consent.
HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Govt from suit w/o its consent
holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in
the disbursements of funds or loss of prop. Needless to say, in such actions, w/c, in effect,
constitute suits against the Govt, the court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the
rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action
against a functionary who fails to comply w/ his statutory duty to release the amount
claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said
claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the
exception. RAM.
(7) Shauf v CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)
Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official
is

being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

F: By reason of her non-selection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf filed an equal opportunity
complaint against officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex. She then filed a complaint for damages with the RTC.
Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as officers of the US Armed Forces performing
official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them, they are immune from suit.
Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory
acts performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the US Govt.
which would require its consent. According to respondents, the complaint is barred by the
immunity of the US since the acts sued upon are governmental activities of the US.
HELD:
1. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable
to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded
as against
the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
3. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual
capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A
public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the officers are liable for damages. Adapted
(8) Republic v. Purissima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977)
Suability of the State. The Need for a Statute Giving Consent

F: The Rice & Corn Administration (RCA) entered into a contract w/ the Yellow Ball Freight
Lines in w/c they agreed that in the event of breach, action may be filed w/ the c ourts of Mla.
In 1972, Yellow filed a money claim against RCA. The case was assigned to resp. Judge., who
denied a motion to dismiss filed by RCA relying on the stipulation in the contract of the parties.
HELD: The RCA is part of the govt, being in fact an office under the Office of the Pres. and
therefore cannot be sued w/o the consent of the State. The consent to be effective.... must
come from the tate, acting thru a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for def. RCA
agreed to had no binding orce in the govt. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.
In Republic v Feliciano, 148 SCRa 424, the SC held that the Proclamation of the
President of the Philippines (recognizing private rights to the land) cannot be the
source of consent, since the Proclamation is not a legislative act. VV.
(9) Sayson v. Singson, 54 SCRA 282 (1973)
F: In 1/67, the Office of the District Engr. requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D
-8 Bulldozer. A public bidding for the said items was conducted wherein the awards committee
accepted the winning bid of P43,530 given by Singkier Motor Service owned by resp.
Singson. Said award was approved by the Sec. of Public Works and Comm. who then directed
the immediate delivery of the parts. In due course, the voucher w/c covered the transaction
reached the hands of petitioner Highway Auditor Sayson who then made inquiries about the
reasonableness of the price. After finding the price reasonable (as was evidenced by the
indorsements of the Div. Engr. and the Comm. of Public Highways, the approval of the Sec. of
PW & C, and the verification of the representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination),
petitioner approved and effected payment of the voucher and withheld the 20% equivalent
of P8,706 in order to submit the documents covering the transaction to the Supervising Auditor
for review. After making a canvass, the General Auditing Office determined the transaction
to be overpriced by at least P40,000. Malversation charges were failed against the district
engr. and civil engr. involved. A mandamus suit was filed by the resp. w/c sought to compel
petitioner government auditors to approve the payment of the voucher covering the
balance. The LC decided in favor of resp. Singson. Hence this appeal by certiorari.
HELD: It is apparent that resp. Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the Govt, for
the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of
Public Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not the
remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State ***, but an ordinary action for
specific performance***. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the
Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, w/c cannot prosper
or be entertained by the Court except w/ the consent of the State***. In other words,
the resp. should have filed his claim w/ the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of CA

327*** w/c prescribe the conditions under w/c money claim against the government may be
filed. xxx It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, in the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there
was no ruling of the Auditor Gen. Even had there been such , the court to w/c the matter should
have been elevated is this Tribunal; the LC could not legally act on the matter. Adapted.
(10)
Merritt v Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311
F: Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine
General Hospital. It was driven by a driver employed by the hospital. In order for Merritt
to sue the Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was then filed
before the CFI of Manila which fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance
driver and determined the amount of damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed
from the decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in rendering
the amount against the government.
ISSUE: Did the defendant in enacting Act No. 2457 simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
HELD: By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not
thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend
its iability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting iability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. Act No. 2457 authorizes E. Merritt to bring suit for the
purpose of fixing the responsibility for the collision and determining the amount of
damages, if any, to which E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. The
government did not assume any liability under the Act. The Government of the Philippine
Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as
special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of A1903, OCC (par. 6, Art. 2180, NCC). A
special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in
representation of the state and executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply
to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions w/c are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and w/c are regulated by law and the regulations. The responsibility of the State is limited to
that w/c it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or

commission to perform some act or charged w/ some definite purpose w/c gives rise to the
claim, and not were the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged
w/ some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the
manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent. Adapted

(11)
United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
State Immunity from Suits Extends to contracts Relating to Sovereign Functions.
F: In 5/72, the US advertised for bid projects involving the repair of wharves and certain works
on the
shorelines at its naval base in Subic, Zambales. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. (EG & Co.)
submitted proposals in connection w/ w/c it received 2 telegrams from the US govt asking
it to confirm its price proposals and the name of its bonding co. However, in 6/82, EG & Co.
was informed that its proposals had been rejected and the projects had been awarded to 3rd
parties. EG & Co. brought suit in the CFI to compelthe US govt to allow it to perform the work
on the projects. It also asked for a writ of prel. inj. to restrain the US govt from entering into
contract w/ 3rd parties for work on the projects. The US govt moved to dismiss the complaint,
but its motion was denied. Hence the petition for review.
HELD: It has been necessary to distinguish bet. sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis.) The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii. However, the resp. Judge held that by entering
into a contract for the repair of wharves or shorelines the State did not act in its governmental
capacity. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. The rule does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base w/c is devoted
to the defense of both the US and the Phils., indisputably a function of the govt of the highest
order; they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to, commercial or business purpose. VV.
(12)
Malong v PNR, 138 SCRA 63 (1985)
PNR not Immune from Suit
F: The petitioners sued the Philippine National Railway (PNR) for damages for the death of
their son
who fell from an overloaded PNR train on 10/30/77. However, the trial court dismissed the
suit on the ground that, under its charter as amended by PD 741, the PNR had been
made a government instrumentality, and that as such it is immune from suit.

10

HELD: The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or
noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of
the objects for w/c the entity is organized." When the govt enters into a commercial
transaction it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corp. In this
case, the state divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, w/c is no
different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Co.
(13)
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 284 (1978)
Consent to be Sued Presumed where Allowance of Immunity Would be Inequitable
F: Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the revocation of a deed of
donation
w/c he and his wife had made to the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claimed that the donee failed
to comply w/ the condition of the donation that the donee should install a lighting and water
system on the prop. and build an office building w/ parking lot thereon not later than 12/7/74.
The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity.
HELD: Ordinarily, a suit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair
for the govt, as donee, w/c is alleged to have violated the condition under w/c it received
gratuitously certain prop., to invoke its immunity. Since it would be against equity and justice to
allow such a defense in this case, consent to be sued could be presumed. VV.
(14)
Commissioner of Public Highways v Burgos, 96 SCRA 831 (1980)
F: Priv. respondent Victoria Amigable was the owner of a parcel of land in Cebu City;
sometime in
1924 the Government took this land for road-right-of-way purpose. In 1959, she filed in the
CFI of Cebu a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession plus damages. This
complaint was dismissed on the grounds of estoppel and the statute of limitations and
also on the ground of non-suability of the Government. The SC on appeal reversed the CFI
and remanded the case for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid
Amigable, directing that to determine just compensation for the land, the basis should
be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. Respondent judge, however did not
heed the directive but instead took into account supervening inflation of the currency
and adjusted the value in accordance with the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate. His
basis was Article 1250 of the Civil Code. The Sol-Gen appealed the decision.
HELD: Art. 1250 applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not
apply where the obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking of
private
property by the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise
to

11

a contractual obligation. The value of the property at the time the govt took possession of the
land in question, not the increased value resulting from the passage of time, w/c invariably
brings
unearned increment to real estate, represents the value to be paid as just compensation for
the
prop. taken. Adapted.
(15)
SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II
Justice Cruz 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner:
SandersSpecial Services Director of NAVSTA (Naval Station)
MoreauCommanding Officer of the Subic Naval Base
Respondents:
Rossi and WyerAmerican Citizen employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA
Events:
Private Respondents employment had been converted from permanent full-time to part-time
Respondents filed protest and a recommendation report was made by the hearing officer
stipulating the reinstatement of both respondents plus back wages. Report on hearing
contained the observation that Special Services Management practices an autocratic form
of supervision. Sanders disagreed with recommendation report with the later containing
statements that:Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors Mr. Rossi and
Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to bedifficult employees to
supervise. Grievants placed the records in public places where other not involved in the case
could hear. Moreau sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the
private respondents employment status and requesting concurrence therewith.
Filling of Case:
Respondents filed a case in Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for
damagesagainst petitioners; plaintiffs claimed that letters contained libelous
imputations. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that acts complained of
were performed bythem in their discharge of official uties; consequently, court has no
jurisdiction over themunder the doctrine of state immunity Petitioners motion was denied on
ground that petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and
not personal torts. An order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filling
of a P10,000 bondon plaintiffs, against properties of Moreau, who allegedly was then about to
leave thePhilippines. Moreau was declared in default. Petitioners Motion to lift the default order was
dismissed on ground that Moreaus failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of
some understanding.
Motion for reconsideration of the denial motion was also dismissed.

12

ISSUES:
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Preliminary Injunction was thereafter filed before this
court.
W/N petitioners were performing their official duties when they did acts for which they have
been sued for damages by the private respondent.
RULING:
Petition was granted. Challenged Orders were set aside. Respondent Court is directed to dismiss
the case. Court held that he acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders wrote the letter as a reply
from Moreau for more information regarding the case of theprivate respondents. Even without
such request, he has the rights in reacting to the hearing officers criticism. Moreaus letter is
clearly official in nature as the Commanding Chief of the Naval Baseanswerable to the naval
personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Court concludes that
petitioners acted behalf of the government, within the scope of their authority making the
action a suit against the government without its consent.
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II
FACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station.
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised
that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent parttime.
They
instituted
grievance
proceedings
to
the
rules
and
regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for
reinstatement of their permanent full-time status. However, in a letter addressed to
petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter
contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants
were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
where others not involved in the case could hear." Before the start of the grievance
hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel

13

explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent
filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights. However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them
under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground
that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of
the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because
they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it
is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts. It is
stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in
his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public
officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere
invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an
act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These
well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where
the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present
case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that
government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus
making the action a suit against that government without its consent
(16)
Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons
by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with
Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then
connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an
informer belonging to the military intelligence community).

14

Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets.
Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the
expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card
showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to
the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and
further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for
which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made
arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin
trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a
motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine
court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous
assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of
the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with
diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement
complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or
by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect
already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time
to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations
which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the
scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a
victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally
liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in
his official capacity.

15

Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons
by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with
Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then
connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an
informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets.
Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the
expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card
showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to
the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and
further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for
which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made
arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin
trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a
motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine
court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous
assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of
the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with
diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement
complained in a Diplomatic Note.
Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or
by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect
already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time
to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

16

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations
which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the
scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a
victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally
liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in
his official capacity.