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The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to
individual remedies for the violations of his rights.
II.
IV.
V.
I.
Concept
A.
Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency
is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation
commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any
department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau x x x ."
Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the
decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack
of capacity to sue.
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it
by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body
charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation examples
are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term agency includes
any department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority or bureau.
B.
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detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power
to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
D.
Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de
Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in
Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution
No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon
Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was
issued .
Issues :
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR
[Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development
Office]; and
(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional right
to security of tenure.
Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPERA
and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations of Divisions,
each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and
Office comprises groups of positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or
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Reasons for creation of administrative agencies Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of
grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.
Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction
and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency
must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the
perimeters of its own competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which
is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no
merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a postaudit basis. x x x (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity
directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity."
(Italics supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that
private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.
E.
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4.
F.
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime of
libel together with Eduard OBrian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the
complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor and
a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have
appealed to this court.
During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking
that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the
Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and an exception was also
taken to this ruling.
Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of
the United States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins
of government are for the time being.
1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by
and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and
the territories which are a part-of the United States with reference to the
Constitution of the United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris,
under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the
status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not
extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles
of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the
Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the
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II.
Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation
of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power
in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties,
the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional
offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become
ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly
within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office
and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
B.
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Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the
cage of the Supreme Court.
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil
College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives,
organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC
into what is now the PUP.
Held:
No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution not in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to
replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure
and organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the
creation of a new one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the
PUP as the new name of the institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to
create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school
without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
C.
Reorganization, defined
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate
and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of
Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed
under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or
less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By
virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which
authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register
of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of
the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was
denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained
unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending
decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a
Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice
notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum
of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal
to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification
requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid
Executive Order.
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Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and
new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus
clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NILTDRA. The additional
qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.
III.
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to
the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the marcoses
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill
of Rights, to wit:
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to
wit:
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of
presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not
define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the
President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what
is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
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the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grantamnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee
foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Secs. 14-23]. (more than the sum of the powers enumerated)
B.
Power of control, defined power of the president to nullify,
modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a subordinate.
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Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the
banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and void.
Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.
Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl
fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over from
him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The Presidents
power of control means that if a cabinet secretary or a head of a bureau or agency
can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power
not only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another
set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.
C.
Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego
doctrine;
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Power of supervision
Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143
Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende
filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to
the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action
and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in
obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by
the provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial,
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against
the petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative
case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the
respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.
Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and, offices
under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department
is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the
provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed
as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction,
and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order
the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10,
article VII, of the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
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they can work with other departments and conduct checks and balances
regarding the actions of each.
1.
No function is capable of exact definition. Description
is only a generalization concerning its principal but not all of its
characteristics;
2.
The Constitution allocated to the several departments
specific powers which in their nature did not ordinarily pertain
to them.
3.
Practical necessity of exercising powers incidental to
those that are express or are appropriate to it, even if such
incidental powers should fall within the category of functions
pertaining to another department.
II.
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - what has been delegated cannot
be delegated.
A.
General rule
US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws
must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
B.
C.
Blending of powers though each department has their own
duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative
B.
Purpose of doctrine
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public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise
vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section
5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve
and periodically review and adjust reasonable fares, rates and other related
charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386
Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the memoranda no. 92-009
issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which, among others, to authorize provincial bus
and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares
without application there for with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval
thereof by said agency and other matters.
Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?
Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid. Legislature
delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and
cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended which
authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also provided that judgment
on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed
by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment made by the Director on the Rule
vesting hearing officers authority to hear their cases was illegal and void because
under the law, it is the Director who should personally hear the cases of
petitioners.
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Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.
Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative agency
to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and
orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and
provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been
withheld. There is no provision under the general law and RA 165 and 166 which
prohibits such authority insofar as the designation of hearing examiners is
concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director
suggests that the aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious
discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion
will still be exercised by him since that the parties will still be able to adduce
evidence. Due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the
actual taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the decision.
III.
B.
Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab operators
under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.
Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers
granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled principle of
law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the
authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which
it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of
the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.
Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case against
herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works and Communications for
the reason that latter were encroaching a part of the river with their fishpond. The
petitioner countered that they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries.
The secretary of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct hearings on
the same and eventually ordered the same be removed. Petitioners went to the
Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the secretary and obtain an
injunction which were ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower courts
decision.
Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation and
order the removal of the encroachment made on the river.
Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or
provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of
dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal
waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered
removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided x x x.
The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued in 1948 while
the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific
authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or
impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause
inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence.
Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear
public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as
early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this
Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v.
Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno,
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Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which provided for
the procedure of removal and suspension of policemen. Petitioner herein contends
that the Civil Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others,
that charges against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by
the city or municipal council.
Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409
so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction
to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in
competitive service.
Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not inconsistent
with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against
policemen and the power of the City Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic
Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified service.
Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal, suspension or
separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be passed upon or
reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's
"final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension" of classified
service employees presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another
official to originally or initially decide the removal, separation or suspension which
the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.
Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government
agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to
render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the
payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a
written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail
the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers
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E.
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the
respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof.
AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational
Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before the
DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the
said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental
agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS
from implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate
of the said school. The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the
requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was dismissed,
undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition before the
RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of the
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Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines,
not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for
Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even
if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent
to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute
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F.
Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and
powers
Article 5 Civil Code
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not
chaos and total disruption of the operations of the government.
Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or discretionary in nature
and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from
ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that
prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.
G.
1.
Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school
(navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case against
the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the
non-suability of the state.
Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
2.
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by
Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the
amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests
and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the total
amount collectible as informers reward.
Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the
task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes has
after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due
or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of
Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or
ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot
be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any
Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office by
virtue of their official capacity.
2.
Estoppel inapplicable
Presumption of regularity
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Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance of concerned
teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been bought to the
latters attention. As a result of the said action, the DECS secretary dismissed from
the service one of the private respondents and the other nine were suspended.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decision
had became moot.
Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won the
CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies do?
Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it
is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with powers
said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws
affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of
which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good knowledge and
grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation. The
consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of
justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless
there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial.
IV.
Investigatory Powers
A.
Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political
rights.
The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is
that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as regard
claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not
judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.
The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate.
Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate?
Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate depending on
the law granting such power.
Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without quasilegislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies are
formed for the sole purpose of investigation only (fact finding, etc.)
19 | P a g e
the Constitution. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any
act or omission which xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient may be
yielded, it is difficult to equally concede however, that the constitution and the
Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon it veto or provisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the
Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to
confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment
or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of whether to accept or reject
a bid and award contract vested by law in a government agency, which involves the
exercise of discretion, the Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the
award and granting it to another bidder.
20 | P a g e
Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the
regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by Secretary
Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was ordered dismissed
from the government service. Respondent did not appeal the judgement .
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action
but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to dismiss.
Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the
hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded
these rights.
C.
Right to counsel in administrative investigations a counsel
may or may not assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)
D.
21 | P a g e
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that
preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in
connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency
all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of
the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision
was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct.
Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through
its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to
investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the
president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR
abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another
memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from office as a result of the
investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and
he cannot be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since
petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the
president.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have
the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner?
Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a
presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes
under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the principle
that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the
Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which created a
committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant
to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not
absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor
the security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause enumerated by
law.
E.
Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of
any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.
Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code
22 | P a g e
Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
fishing in fresh water.
Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing electro
fishing.
Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in Infanta,
Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil Service Commission
as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of
81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. After
an investigation, Remolonas name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged
fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he did it because he
wanted them to be together.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The lawmaking
body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act
constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of PD 704.
Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend
an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it
must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred
by law.
1.
Ordinance power of the President/Delegation to the
President
-
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and Atty.
Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSS
found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was
The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive
orders, proclamations, etc.)
Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution
23 | P a g e
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
issued as general or special orders.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and
banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null and
void.
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Issue
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed
thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or
pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without
requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the
performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies
functions.
24 | P a g e
2.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law.
(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by the
majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.
Held:
Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply
deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of its
cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as
the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be
filed with SC, are brought to CA.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief
executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial
to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
3.
Delegation to LGUs
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an
25 | P a g e
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The
Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by twothirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even
without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds
the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the
Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the
same with its comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay
concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the
effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision
called for is effected.
(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails
to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof,
the same shall be deemed approved.
B.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is
beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall
advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30)
days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang
Barangay shall furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of
the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy
projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every
law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of
the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
26 | P a g e
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for
sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate,
petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has
no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law,
thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter
prevails. Petition is dismissed.
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221
27 | P a g e
C.
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasilegislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
25
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
28 | P a g e
of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
D.
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of
the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No.
372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees
with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its
present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be
for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution
and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the
Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to
the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is
not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supranormal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court
has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a
covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the
people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the
people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the
economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for
they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of
liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court
be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the
onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may
appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.
1.
Completeness test the law must be complete in all
its items and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
29 | P a g e
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for
sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate,
petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has
no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law,
thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter
prevails. Petition is dismissed.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
30 | P a g e
Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted.
Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject expressed in
the title of the law.
Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied, nor it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other
statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are pertinent to that
subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is pertinent to
the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied.
Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other
statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to
the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in
the same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.
Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers Corporation. Its
board of directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to the
control of the government enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA
51 for approval, the resolution was disapproved on recommendation by auditor
general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited
by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/
Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is unconstitutional being an
undue delegation of legislative power to executive.
Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a standard is
established by the statute there is no undue delegation. RA 51 is authorizes the
president to make reforms and changes in the government controlled corporation
31 | P a g e
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power. The
court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
the court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
3.
Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient
legislative standards
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held:
Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of
powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by the
President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner was
affected to the said order with the contention that the said order is an invalid
delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The Solicitor General
contended that the said law is a proper delegation of legislative power to the
President of the Republic.
1.
power which is not directly or exclusively a
legislative one and has no relation whatsoever to
personal or property rights;
2.
power to regulate a mere matter of
privilege
E.
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license
pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
32 | P a g e
"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal
of a rule.
An ordinance to be valid:
Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University asked
the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per diems claimed
under the National Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel
including petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law
or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not
agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside by authorized agency
of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
33 | P a g e
Supplementary/detailed legislation
1.
2.
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the
decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources,
which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their
mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment
between two mining claims.
Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private
respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the
law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as
the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise,
mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2)
should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have
abandoned their mining claim.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners had
filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of
Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres.
Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural
Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue
rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking power.
Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for
their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the
Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it
does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the
coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to
implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend
the provisions of the statute
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
must be reasonable
34 | P a g e
which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other
remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets
of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is
now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure
the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which are deemed
not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation,
or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special
holidays, pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As such they are deemed
not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered i the computation of the
13th month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find any 'earnings and other
remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay. Then
the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane,
i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of
its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote
out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or
any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission,
as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring
vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive
at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the
NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or
any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
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Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from
the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Issue: WON the amendments are valid
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992
election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time petitioner
Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for disqualification and
suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and assume office;
petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the
same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT subject to
any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after
January 1, 1992.
Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an employer
should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the
benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the
Fund coverage.
Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667
3.
Requirement of reasonableness
a.
Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose
sought to be accomplished;
b.
Supported by good reasons;
c.
Free from constitutional infirmities or
charge of arbitrariness
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only
to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not
be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into
effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any handouts, review
material or any tip from school or any review center during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.
Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.
Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance
of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation
to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held
invalid.
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H.
Interpretative legislation
1.
Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing
and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying with the
provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of
Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
2.
2.
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the
payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-protest
is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset will not
operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired
pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is
hereby denied.
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J.
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of commissioner in
dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of express provision in
Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to condone penalties.
Petitioners contention that they had under the impression that international
organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask for
condonation, which was denied by commissioner.
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of
Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on
illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering the
carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the quarantines against the
same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant interposed a defense
that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime.
ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under SSC to
condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.
RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC precisely
enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said powers may it
shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by implication the authority
to condone penalties imposed by the act.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do not
fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said finding does
not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of
the revised penal code.
3.
2.
K.
Rate-fixing power
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside
an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner
for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the reservation to make
further reduction later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power and a denial or procedural, as well as
substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is allegedly under the
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L.
Publication requirement
Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out
the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall
be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by
law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)
days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them.
Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the
preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in
effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center
may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be
unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule
shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the
bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule
and new copies thereof may be obtained.
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40 | P a g e
VI.
Adjudicatory Powers
a.
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making power.
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasilegislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
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Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
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Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type
of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.
Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to
a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
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Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration
case to resolve the following issue:
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law
relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the
"(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715
is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
c.
Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature as such are
devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of existence.
through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such
bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the
government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special
privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on
Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to carry on certain government
functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of
Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank
of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is performing some business service for the public,
like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National
Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
office, office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking under the police power to regulate
private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange
Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for
Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social
policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor,
the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and
Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or
to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper
reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of
the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No.
1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the
Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and
decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to
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45 | P a g e
subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare
the same unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not
a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them
of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious dayswhen they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the
review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be
terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.
Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the
powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No.
223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all
legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
d.
e.
power
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P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National
Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions
under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified
by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently
to the pressing problems of the modem world.
f.
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to
47 | P a g e
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the
election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge
his duties as such member.
48 | P a g e
Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such
qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected
sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be
understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under the
circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who
buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have since been
transferred to the HLRB.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein provided
that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against
project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or
body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of
reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the
HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
"to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the
merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in
by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by
law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and
the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions,
or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.
49 | P a g e
one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa
Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share of
the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary
was Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
g.
VII.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at
any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his
deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a
form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection
with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for any
investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this
Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference.
That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his
administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a
confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received
by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court for her
claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning such death
benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or
conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant, which was,
obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
remotely related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the request
and using his official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any
yardstick, improper.
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned
"subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of
redress.
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition in
the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private
respondents witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as
regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena
on the ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to discover evidence
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Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be
classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30,
Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come
under its jurisdiction.
When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power
to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power
to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the,
administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited
to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power
by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid.
VIII.
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless
said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as
is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative code. The refusal to
comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is neither contempt nor a
penalized offense.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
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Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store
situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam,
Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial
Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above
employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in
the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had
been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and
had interfered with their right to organize under the law.
of all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of
well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this
means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face
to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not
beyond reasonable doubt.
This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be
contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the
law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
X.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the
management and her co employees so much so that several criminal charges were
filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the
corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in
court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary
courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition
of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of
the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal
and should be nullified.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations
in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees
to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that
"the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling
and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations)
and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not
be bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself
I. Jurisdiction
A.
Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an
appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability
should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said
petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and
Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that
the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his liability
as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not section 2
of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among those cases in
which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the
offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that the
marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish the
criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving
offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction,
abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished
in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser
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II.
Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by
respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara
won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memberelect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
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before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of
the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and selfserving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due
process.
Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.
Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be
the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely
intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to
the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
B.
C.
Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment
of publics respondents. The arbitrations decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public
respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRCs decision on the
ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the
principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the
rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1)
there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings
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for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and
directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace
the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of
the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The
stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons
to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed
indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A
justiciable controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive
jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another
who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can bring the controversy and can
cause an exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or
any of those who are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates
of stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having
initiated, would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000 fine
on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This time, it is
the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its
instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in
interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers
in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency
(FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the
decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates of
stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.
E.
F.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon
applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing),
certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding
cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel legal and
regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties
G.
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A.
Substantive and procedural due process, defined
DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is designed to secure justice as a
living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance
must prevail over form.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
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committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said
treaties. The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Petitioner refused because it is not included in the procedure of
the RP-US Treaty.
Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process
clause in the Constitution?
Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
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Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative
of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he
was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial
payment of the consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms,
thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the real
defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility under the
judgment falls on him.
"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4
Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law'
contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32).'
(Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not be amiss to
mention here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is designed to
secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to
formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none the
less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321322: 'A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by
a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should he no vested rights in technicalities.
B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case and
submit evidence
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself
The evidence must be substantial
The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing
The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involves and reason for the decision rendered
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In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the
enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain
duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R.
No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on the
basis of an ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the
basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine the
cause or motive of such a lay off
Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the
respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot be
established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when conducted at
the request of the interested.
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D.
E.
Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the
enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain
duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.
Essential elements of due process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for the court to determine whether the applicable rules of
law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence
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RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of
Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the
Radio Control Board from proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending application. The
complaint alleged that the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO without previous
hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in support of its
opposition was without due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present case.
Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only necessary in those
cases where the statute so requires. A cursory reading of the Radio Control Law
(Act No. 3846, as amended) shows that, unlike in other proceedings or instances
specified in section 3, paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no, hearing is required in
the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of any
application for the installation, establishment, or operation of a radio station
(paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a hearing is required, RCA must be
considered to have waived its right thereto, its counsel having addressed a letter to
the Radio Control Board saying that "little would be gained by arguing the matter
both before yourselves and before the Public Service Commission."
Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it
mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a
valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal
Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
is filed.5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unIess the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in
the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does
not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade
the jurisdiction of the court.
F.
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Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San,
surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the
building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The
permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer,
notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing
Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated
structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary
surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the notifications remained unheeded
by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial
process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset building.
Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not
of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized
to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was
no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent
public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in
abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its
property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for
prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined
by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing
and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
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2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
3.
Where the twin rights have previously been offered
but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it denied them
opportunity to refute the charges against them
Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from,
the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being
a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
As held in Nera v. Garcia:
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Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself
before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date
of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board
into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the
Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without
cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy
away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always
of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence
to this constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an
opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than
this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and
their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fairtreatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal
in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could
proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this
view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus The
rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the
respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the
hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived
of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support
he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard
G.
Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letterpetition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan, Ilocos,
Sur", charging the following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light
Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and also report that the electric
meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they
register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.
The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in
excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in
the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that
reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates
for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of
May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a "copy of
the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then
expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to
petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to
ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates. That
petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the
order complained of is based, that such order had been issued without notice and
hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that, having
been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of
the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.
Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service commission
are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions
applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to
action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings,
that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand, legislative and rule-making
in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are,
on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES,
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H.
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures the
defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from claiming
denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due process have
been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and he is still denied due
process, where the decision against him has nothing to support itself, one of the
cardinal requirements of due process being that the decision or ruling of an
administrative body must be supported by substantial evidence.
absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Any defect may be cured by
the filing of motion of reconsideration.
i.
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IV.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek relief
in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though
the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its jurisdiction. The
court will not determine a controversy:
1.
2.
3.
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Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of Petitioner
Vicente Villaflor complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.
ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case?
RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality of Factual
Findings of the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary
Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the Jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in
this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual
qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with
the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior
judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope
Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a
leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons landholdings at Poblacion Norte,
Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay private respondent a
certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated
demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective
rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him
back rentals and damages.
Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out
of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the
complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the Revised Rules of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
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decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents argue that actions
for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15
days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision
becomes final and executory, pursuant to 51 of R.A. No. 6657.
Issue: Which contention is meritorious?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
D.
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not apply. It
does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which
was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a
logging road without authority.
From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private
respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway, through
their security force, to prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs for the
Japanese vessel. Private respondent claim that they were the only authorized
timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court, which
was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding that the issue is
within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have heard the case
before filing t case in court.
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V.
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the
remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
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Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate
administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered
prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent of
the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter to the
Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted the present
action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior officers any
opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking judicial
intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before resorting to
the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the present case
where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the superior officers of
appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon him to compel
him to yield and give up the position in question. The decision appealed from is
reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.
The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was ordered to dismiss
the case filed by Pontejos.
The exceptions under the Doctrine of Exahaustion of Administrative Remedies
mentioned in this case are the following;
1) where the question is purely legal,
(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the
matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
B.
It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance
with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is
ground for a motion to dismiss. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
ground for motion to dismiss or is a defense which may be raised in the answer.
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga, the engineer of that city,
to authorize de los Santos to construct a residential house on the land described in
the petition. It is alleged the respondent without any lawful cause refused to grant
said permit; and that in view of this refusal, petitioner suffered damages.
In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied the
allegations of the petition and interposed the following affirmative defenses: that
after a fire which occurred in Lamitan that raged down a major portion of the
market site therein, the city government approved the purchase of an additional
area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot claimed by the petitioner
was included in the area; that by virtue thereof, expropriation proceedings had
been instituted thereon, hence, the denial of the permit applied for by petitioner.
The city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: that
mandamus will not lie since the issuance of the permit applied for was a
discretionary and not a ministerial duty on the part of the city engineer to which
the trial court agreed.
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Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the court.
Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as the
record shows, the land in question is already the subject matter of expropriation
proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution approved by the City
Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Basilan.
Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him. Petitioner should have first brought the matter to the Director of
Public Works who, under the law, exercise supervision and control over city
engineers of chartered cities (see Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not
satisfied with the Director's decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import Control
Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate remedy by an
appeal to the President. Certiorari or mandamus against administrative officers
should not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief. Thus,
the petition is denied.
D.
When applied
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the
agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does not apply in the exercise
of its rule-making power or legislative power.
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The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City.
the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a
condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same
question by a court of justice.
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circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while the administration grapples with the
complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." To
sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
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"final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all
permanent officials and employees in the competetive or classified service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officials
and employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central
Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor,
coupled with the fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the noncompetetive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the
Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said
remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto
proceedings it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the
proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public
interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily
as practicable."
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
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Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of Republic Act
No. 2056, is it required that appeal to the President should precede recourse to the
courts. The silence of the statute, to be sure, does not mean that the President may
not review the action of the Secretary. His power to do so is implicit in his
constitutional power of control of all the executive departments (Section 10, Works
and Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). This, however, does not
resolve the issue, which is not whether petitioner could have appealed to the
President but whether he should have done so before seeking judicial relief. The
answer depends, in turn, upon whether an appeal to the President would have
been sufficiently effective, adequate and expeditious, a negative finding in this
respect being the basis on which the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for
by petitioner, may be issued. The absence of an express provision in Republic Act
No. 2056 for an appeal to the President from the decision of the Secretary,
considered together with the peremptory character of the periods therein
prescribed, shows that such an appeal-assuming that it may be taken in view of the
President's constitutional power of executive control-would not affect the
inexorable requirement that those periods be observe& the only exception being in
favor of Works and Communications the Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid
reason for his failure or delay to terminate and decide a case or effect the removal
of the illegal construction such as, for Instance, an injunction issued by a court. We
are of the opinion that an appeal to the President from the order of respondent
Secretary would not have been expeditious enough for petitioner's purposes and
hence the latter did not have to resort to it before seeking judicial relief. In any
event, we believe the facts of this case place it within the rule enunciated in
Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil., 237, as follows: "Such failure (to appeal
from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President) cannot preclude the plaintiffs from taking court action in view of the
theory that the Secretary of a Department is merely an alter-ego of the President;
the assumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the
President, unless the same is disapproved by the latter."
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Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission,
Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The case was docketed therein
as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein petitioners denied that Rodito
Nasayao was employed in the company as plant manager with a fixed monthly
salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the undertaking agreed upon by the parties
was a joint venture, a sort of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the
machinery in good working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts
from end-users for the installation of marble products, in which the company
would not interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an
amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would
realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no
profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount. The
case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the herein
respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the
proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity
to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from
farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In due time, or on
29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the complainant, ordering
the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00, within 10
days from notice. Upon receipt of the decision, the herein petitioners appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely
abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the case notwithstanding
petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is
not supported by evidence. On 18 March 1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is
final, appealable, and immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the motions, the
respondent Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and
immediately executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to comply with the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents from
enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the petitioner
failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is tenable.
Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as contended. In the recent
case of John Clement Consultants, Inc. versus National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no law provides for an appeal from
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public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the
management and operation of the facility, and that the stallholders should
thenceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market
Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the doctrine
of exhaustion of admin remedies.
Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that
this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then
to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could
be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is
purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal,
arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter
shown, is correct.
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The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed for,
but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act on
the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of a certificate
of title without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The reason for
this short-circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by Quintos. His
gives no reason for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, there is
none. The order of dismissal, therefore, certainly cannot be considered as being in
derogation of the due process guarantee. The judicial forum sought by Quintos was
in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept of primary jurisdiction. In the
traditional language of administrative law, the stage of ripeness for judicial review
had not been reached. Quintos ignored factors not predetermined by formula but
by seasoned balancing for and against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had
been said so far would seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower courts
insistence of the fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies
is more than justified.
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672
COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO. Specifically, the change
sought is in the civil status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner wants to
be described in the certificate of title as married to her rather than as a widower.
The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January 1933 to
the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent, describing
himself as "married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the original certificate
over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower."
Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that his description as a
"widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the couple
opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933, the
oppositors nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in
1942 to live with another man. Later, they said, she had adulterous relations with
still a second man by whom she begot eleven children. According to these
oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in
1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered conjugal
and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
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also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid
in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper
resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high
school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a
barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in
question. The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized
by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay
Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it
involves the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its
technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein
petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein
petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to
the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With this
instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.
Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his
former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the
circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is
rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the
petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing
power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot
be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in
their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against
the officials of this government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer, who claims that
poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court set aside the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of
the petition.
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