A.M. No.

MTJ-14-1842
February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will
solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. 1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead notarized
affidavits of cohabitation2 and issued them to the contracting parties. 3 He notarized these affidavits on the
day of the parties marriage.4 These "package marriages" are allegedly common in Bacolod City. 5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All
affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties marriages. 6 The affidavits contained the
following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON.
Judge7

REMEGIO

V.

ROJO

For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly
violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. 8 Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to
act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and
duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official functions and
duties as solemnizing officer. 9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo
notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not
require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple and
elementary to ignore."10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.11 He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the father of
Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false statements in her
affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay Frialyns case. 12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. 13 The Guidelines on the

Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary 14 does not prohibit judges from notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. 15 Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate
Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a
notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit. 17 The parties
identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized. 19 He pleaded "not to make him [complainant
Tupals] doormat, punching bag and chopping block" 20 since other judges also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined P9,000.00
and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected
with municipal trial court judges official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,21 a judges duty is to personally examine the allegations in the
affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. 22 Nothing in the Guidelines authorizes
judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended a fine of P1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized.23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of
the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may
do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances
only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990
provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the
function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court
hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected
only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries public ex officio,
undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of
conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code
of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the
risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law
(Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).

They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts
territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when notarizing
documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have neither
lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the
competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ,
June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the
lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. 24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of
his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and
examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and
formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. 26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of
the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. 27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge
must personally examine the marriage license presented.28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. 29 Instead, the parties must
present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the
parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal
impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally
ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. 32 Article 34
of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of
cohabitation. In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer
shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b)
personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together as
husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal impediments to marry each other;
and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the
person who notarizes the contracting parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will
solemnize the parties marriage.

As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether
the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The
Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judges official function and duty to
solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he
cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements before performing the marriage
ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized,
he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false
allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty to
solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not connected with his official function and duty
to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary
does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be prohibited
from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojos argument will render the solemnizing officers duties to examine the affidavit of
cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with redundant. As
discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family
Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that
"the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the
"solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private
documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges." 34 Since a
marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public
document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he notarizes a public document. He did not
violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity."35 The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose," remains a private
document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As
discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judges official duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and private
lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business." 36 He cited Borre v. Judge Moya 37 where this court
found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued
that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not compete with private law practitioners or
regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."38 Thus, he did not violate Circular No. 1-90.

In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that "[judges]
should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing
business."39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing
business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he
violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiones v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 40 this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of
candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., 41 this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification
page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The documents
involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court
found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official function
and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are
lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the municipality or
circuit of the judges court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90. 42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized
does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary. 43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not
personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent
evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the
signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the
signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed
and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to
him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They personally
appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed them on their

qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation need not present their
competent pieces of evidence of identity.44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits. To
personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with them. 45 Interviewing the
contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v. Judge
How46where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations x x x"47were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good faith in
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres] only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x."48 Good faith "does not apply where the issues are so
simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error." 49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts
territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries
public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the signatory to
present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo
violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity, 50 "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." 51 If the law involved
is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity." 52 Violating basic legal principles and procedure nine times
is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a
serious charge:53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or controlled corporations;54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months;55 or
c. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for gross
ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges practice of notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law.1wphi1 They should act
with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in this
case will be dealt with strictly.

WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5,
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6)
MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199310

February 19, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision2 dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
90503. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application 4 with the RTC for
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square
meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order5 finding the respondents application for registration
sufficient in form and substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The scheduled
initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002. 6 The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette, April 1, 2002 issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-1633 7 and in the March 21, 2002 issue of
Peoples Balita,8 a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was
likewise posted in a conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig, Metro Manila.9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA,
which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondents application for
registration.10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition11 to the respondents application for registration, asserting
that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On
the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its
Opposition,12 alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondents application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the respondents corporate secretary; Ronnie
Inocencio, an employee of the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957;
and Engineer Mariano Flotildes (Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to conduct a
topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and
Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr. Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.

Essentially, the testimonies of the respondents witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said
parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from
Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were
originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of
crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; 13 (2)
survey plans of the subject properties; 14 (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; 15 (4) Geodetic
Engineers Certificate;16 (5) tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; 17 and (6) certifications
dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno), Senior Forest Management Specialist
of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondents application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850 19 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding
the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which
was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of
Coast in April 1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That
upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed
that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that
Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges
from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, 20 which granted the respondents application for
registration of title to the subject properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming the title of the applicant Remman
Enterprises Incorporated over a parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769
respectively and ordering their registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of Remman
Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.21

The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are
very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna
Lake. The RTC pointed out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50 m is
hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial
survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted
on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the
elevations of the subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise
faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties,
pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5 meters, oppositors witness merely
compared their elevation to the elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots. Also, the elevation of the
said portion of the lake dike that was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79 meters
and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower than the said [benchmark] or reference
point, said witness suddenly jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDAs witness was based on hearsay as said witness admitted that it was DPWH
or the FF Cruz who determined the elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the subject lots and that he has no personal
knowledge as to how the DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark] or reference
point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79 meters from the information he got from FF Cruz. 22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined
that the same could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water
when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not
those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out that
the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry
and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that
the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, 23 affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16,
2007. The CA found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
as claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant registration of the subject lands in its
name. Appellees witness Engr. Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the subject
lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation
of its highest portion is 15 meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the lowest
portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15 meters. Said

elevations are higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph 11,
Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies merely on the Topographic Map dated
March 2, 1966, prepared by Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels of land
are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake. The said data was gathered through aerial
photography over the area of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on the due
execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr.
Ramon Magalonga, that the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the same can be
considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay considering his admission that his findings were based
merely on the evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x. 24 (Citations omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR,
attesting that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the respondent was able to prove,
through the testimonies of its witnesses, that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated May
16, 2007, which granted the application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the respondents application
registration since the subject properties do not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject properties are below
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of
bed of Laguna Lake.

for
the
the
the

That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of
fact by the lower courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing policy of this
Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally
deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual findings of
the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. 25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean
that they already form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent
upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are
indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While deference is due to the lower
courts finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m
and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the
Court nevertheless finds that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to
the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not

shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration,
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable."26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152927, which provides that:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public
land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073.28 Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications 30 issued
by Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain "under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3,
1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 31 the Court
clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land
is alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true
copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do
so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.32 (Emphasis ours)
In Republic v. Roche,33 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or
disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said
that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. 34 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration
are thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as
alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a
true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the application for registration in spite of the
failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of
the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent
points out that its application for registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted by
the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to
present a copy of the original classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy, the respondent claims, would not
warrant the denial of its application for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the
Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it
is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is
elementary that the interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was
originally passed, since this Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. 35 "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage
of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one." 36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in subsequent cases notwithstanding that
the applications for registration were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida,37 the application for registration of the subject properties therein was filed on
October 22, 2004 and was granted by the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v.
Jaralve,38 the application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on October 22, 1996 and
was granted by the trial court on November 15, 2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the
applications for registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the promulgation of T.A.N.

Properties, this Court applied the pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified that the
subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who supposedly possessed and cultivated the same
since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn,
sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of
the subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest cultivated the subject
properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of
the subject properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of crops that
are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly
planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed
planted crops on the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have
been possessed and occupied by them in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops
in the subject properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession
and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years."40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent
were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of

ownership."41 That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year. Likewise, no improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax declarations. This fact
belies the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony,
have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain and that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945, or earlier, the respondent's
application for registration should be denied.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the Decision
dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N11465 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Remman Enterprises, Inc. in
Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.