RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES V Reyes

G.R. No. 178300
March 17, 2009
Facts:
Appellants were charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide
and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of death. The RTC rendered a decision
dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA,
and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby sentenced
each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH ..xxx..
On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications
the RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the
appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also
decreased the amount of civil indemnity ..xxx.. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002 convicting accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping
For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1)
perpetua;

accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

..xxx..
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was
denied. Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
The appeal challenged the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was
based solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He
maintains, however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because
they were obtained in violation of his co-appellants constitutional right to have an independent
counsel of their own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the
agents of the PAOCTF did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether
they had a lawyer of their own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the
agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his coappellants; and that Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes
also asseverates that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be
utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence,
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of
his own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession
was elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was
not assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the
purported confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the
beatings he suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty.
Rous who, according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as
evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent
counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given
freedom to choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the
custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford

to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to
him.
Issue: Whether the appellants extra-judicial confessions can be admitted as evidence. YES
Ruling:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following
requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance
of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in
the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of
the offense although not yet in custody.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information
and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is
one furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. A competent and independent
counsel is logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time
the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the
person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial
confession vis-a-vis his constitutional rights.
However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being
coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all
the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to
competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of
appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional
guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that
undue pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and
Flores.
In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that
they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROMULO TUNIACO
G.R. No. 185710
January 19, 2010

Facts:
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey
Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos
City. On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court appeals rendered judgment on January 21, 2008,
affirming the decision of the RTC with modification on civil liabilities.
One of the issues upon appeal is the admissibility of extra-judicial confession that became one of
the basis in the conviction such that it was alleged that it was obtained in violation of their
constitutional rights.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. However he did not
present evidence of compulsion, he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
his supposed intimidators, no physical evidence of violence was presented. Here, although
Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of
his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement,
conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga, a lawyer, not working with or was not
beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial
investigation. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the investigator
sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his
statement.
Issue:
Whether or not accused Alemans extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. YES
Ruling:
Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.
These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not beholden to the police,
Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation.
The appellate court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. The act of not bringing
out the issue of alleged torture to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor
who administered his oath indicates voluntariness of the confession.
It is improbable that the police fabricated Alemans confession and just forced him to sign it. The
confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known.
What is more, accused Datulaytas confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details.
Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated in it.
LENIDO LUMANOG V. PEOPLE OF THE
I.

THE FACTS

Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine
National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned
at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a
purported eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of
the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of
constitutional rights during custodial investigation.

The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the
credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their
respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to
witness closely how they committed the crime.
II.

THE ISSUES

1. Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based?
2. Was the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation valid?
3. Was the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused violated?
4. Was the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused credible?
5. Was the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness,
security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?
6. Were the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests conclusive of the innocence of the
accused-appellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the accused prevail over their positive identification in this case?

III. THE RULING

1. YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly
stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address
each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were
left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of
conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of
prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of
ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of
penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by
the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal
authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their
claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
2. NO, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation was NOT valid.
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the
right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot
afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can
only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a
valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only
the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said
counsel.
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement
before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be
acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession
is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to
questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged

his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he
understood his answers to the questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel
from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place,
verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and if said counsel
inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.
3.

No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was NOT violated.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This
protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is
a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights
nugatory.
It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases
has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under
the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained
pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so-called
radical relief to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial. In this
case, however, appellants are not entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and
convincing showing that the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
4.

YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused was credible.

In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the trial judge took
into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his elevated position from his
guardhouse, his opportunity to view frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for
him to remember their faces (when the two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and
forth in front of his guard post pointed their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later when
the four [4] armed men standing around the victims car momentarily looked at him as he was
approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his positive identification in the
courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw acting together in the fatal shooting
of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The clear view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was
verified by Judge Jose Catral Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the ocular
inspection conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court personnel, and
witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how the assailants
shot Abadilla[,] who was inside his car, the relative positions of the gunmen and lookouts, and his
opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo immediately gave his statement before the police
authorities just hours after the incident took place. Appellants make much of a few
inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his
reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have
already been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier statement in
using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing around the car and two (2)
more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him
to get down, because the latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being
ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the
credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do
not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight
than an affidavit.
5. YES, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness,
security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we reiterate that Alejos out-court-identification [of

the accused] is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near the place where Abadilla was
shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to mention that the two (2) lookouts directly
approached him and pointed their guns at them; second, no competing event took place to draw
his attention from the event; third, Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least two (2) of
the perpetrators, while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see them again,
and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence that the police
had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the suspects, except for Joel de
Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the basis of a photograph shown to him by the police
officers, insisting that he would like to see said suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo
during the trial had positively identified appellant Joel de Jesus independently of the previous
identification made at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive, straightforward
and categorical.
6. NO, the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were NOT conclusive of the innocence of
the accused-appellants.
[T]he negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no showing that the
firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in the ambushslay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug were
fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different
firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. Neither will the finding that the empty shells
and slug matched those in another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that
they could have been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the
appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in another case. To begin with, the
prosecution never claimed that the firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject
of separate charges for illegal possession of firearms, were the same firearms used in the
ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if
another weapon was in fact actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and
Lumanog cannot escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.
The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is
likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no prints had been lifted from
inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were taken from the car of Abadilla.
7. NO, the defense of alibi of the accused CANNOT prevail over their positive identification in
this case.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for
this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses.
To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such
that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the
locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two
places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception.
Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not
hold water.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused,
where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. However, none of the appellants presented clear
and convincing excuses showing the physical impossibility of their being at the crime scene
between 8:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the trial court and
CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
HO WAI PANG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight No.
068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). Among the
passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival

area, Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers and
found, all in all, 18 chocolate boxes with white crystalline substance contained in a white
transparent plastic from the baggages of the petitioner and his five co-accused. Six separate
Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused for
violation of R.A. No. 6425. After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, all the accused testified
almost identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge
about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were
provided by the travel agency.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While
conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was
indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to
warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his
constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts ratiocination
regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
ISSUE:
Did CA err in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation?
HELD:
No. Petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a competent and independent
lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was not duly informed of his rights
to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in
not excluding evidence taken during such investigation. While there is no dispute that petitioner
was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI
in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must
not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence
are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Petitioner did not make
any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. Hence, petitioners claim that the
trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves
scant consideration.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR and RODOLFO
TORRES,defendants-appellants.
Facts:
The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic review.
There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo
Anor, Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal
One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died during the pendency of the case.
From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about 7:56 o'clock in the
evening, prisoners from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in opening the door of their
dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked the inmates from dormitory 3-a, while
the latter were then getting their food rations from the delivery truck wherein the victim was
among them.
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on
November 20, 1971, all the accused executed statements admitting their participation in the
slaying of Bernardo Cutamora. Consequently, an Information for Murder was filed against them
on April 24, 1973 with the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due
to the separation from the service of a principal investigator.
Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who
died on August 15, 1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de
officio, pleaded Guilty, while the other two accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias
Rolando Amor, alias Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. The Information
was amended to correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog.
Thereafter, evidence was adduced.

At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and
Rodolfo Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their
participation in the killing of Bernardo Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that
they had signed the same under duress. Accused Federico Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted
having executed their respective confessions, while accused Rosendo Anor changed his plea of
Not Guilty to Guilty of the lesser offense of Homicide.
On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:
WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely: Tobias
Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information,
Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had
been exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of
the rain, and had been subsequently beaten up and placed in a "bartolina "
On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance
Casting doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants
could have supplied. In those statements, they called their co-accused by their nicknames, not
knowing their true names, like "Lilat" for Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The
investigators could not have concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M.,
appellants had planned to kill any prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the
"rancho"; that they are members of the Sigue-Sigue Commando Gang and their leader is accused
Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same date at around 8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin
can opened the door of their dormitory and an the accused rushed towards the place where the
inmates from Brigade 3-a were waiting for their food; that they stabbed the victim with their
"matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing of human waste on them by inmates of
Brigade 3-a.
What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all admitting their
guilt but for the lesser offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.
Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however, opposed the change of
plea because it had already finished with the presentation of its evidence.
Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confession can be admitted as evidence.
Ruling:
We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants'
confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an
extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, for no sane person would deliberately
confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. The
burden of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. Mere repudiation of
confession by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. Concrete
evidence of compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No
such evidence has been put forward. No report of such maltreatment was made to the prison
authorities nor to the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation. During crossexamination, Corpuz admitted that he was not maltreated. Ribadajo himself did not protest
when he was brought to Exequiel Santos, Administrative Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his
own words, was "like a father to me."
As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel
during custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of
confessions obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of
procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. No law gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the
1973 Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973. That Constitutional guaranty
relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive
effect.
Note:
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
I concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged extrajudicial
confession for affirmation of the judgment of conviction. I write this brief concurrence to maintain
my dissenting view in the case of Magtoto vs. Manguera (63 SCRA 4, 27) and subsequent cases
that "(T)here is no room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly
adopting the exclusionary rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against such confessions obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by

outlawing their admission and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police
officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that the exclusionary rule bars admission of
illegally seized evidence) should be strictly enforced,' and '(T)he outlawing of an such
confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid confession be
obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution." I take exception to the statement in
the main opinion that no law gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to silence
and to counsel before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, which does not have any
retroactive effect. I maintain, as in Magtoto, that such a law was enacted as of June 15, 1954
when Republic Act 1083, authored by the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, inserted the second
paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to
counsel in any custodial investigation, thus: "In every case the person detained shall be informed
of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel. "
I had expressly joined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Fred
Ruiz Castro in Magtoto that "the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the only right
granted by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his
detention,' and that a detained person 'must make a request for him to be able to claim the right
to communicate and confer with counsel at any time.' I regard this interpretation as abhorrent
because it gravely offends against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973
Constitution that guarantee equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. ... An
accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated in the following words: 'If this detained
wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of
his choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or
legal obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel.' The absurdity so
implicit in these words strikes terror in me at the same time that it saddens me, for it not only
denies the poor and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also inflicts a
horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent
remark of the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when
Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every
custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his
right to counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning most pregnant
with meaning. "
FILOTEO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner, along with others, was charged for the crime of brigandage after having robbed a
postal delivery truck of the Bureau of Postal of documents such as treasury warrants and SSS
Medicare checks and vouchers. During the trial, an extrajudicial confession was allegedly made
by petitioner, admitting to the crime charged against him and his fellow accused. Despite this,
however, petitioner waived his right to present evidence, nor impugned such allegation. The
Sandiganbayan found petitioner and his co-conspirators guilty for the said crime and was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion temporal. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for
reconsideration the petitioner filed.
In this present petition, petitioner questioned the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, arguing that the
court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it admitted and considered against him his
alleged extrajudicial confession. He further argued that these were obtained from him through
torture, physical maltreatment, and intimidation; and thus should have been inadmissible in
compliance to the 1987 Constitution (Sec. 12, Art. III) and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Additionally, he argued that the said provision should be retroactively applied to him as the
accused in a criminal case.
ISSUES:
WON the alleged extrajudicial confession by petitioner should be inadmissible for being obtained
through torture and intimidation.
WON Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution should be applied retroactively to him.
HELD:
NO. First, petitioners claim of him going under torture was doubtful, as evidenced by the medical
tests done on him. Second, the examination of his handwriting in the documents showing his
confession proved that the same was done by him voluntarily, without being the subject of

interrogation through torture. There being said, no proof that the said confession was obtained
through torture and intimidation.
NO. First, what is being contended by petitioner is based on Article 22 of the RPC which states
that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony who is not a habitual criminal. This cannot be sustained, for the provision being
contemplated is not a penal statute, but a constitutional provision which is found in the Bill of
Rights. Second, while the requirement of a counsel in cases like this is not provided in the 1973
Constitution, the same was established in jurisprudence since 1983. However, since the
confession in question was executed in 1982, this said ruling cannot apply.
SANTOS ET AL. V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged for the complex crime of estafa through falsification after falsifying the
clearing statement issued by the central clearing office of BPI in order to withdraw the amounts
of Php 1M, Php 3M, and Php 5M. They were later convicted for the said crime, in which they filed
a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan, prompting the
petitioners to file the present petition. One of the assertions of the petitioners was that their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because of the extrajudicial confessions of petitioners
Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible due to their right to counsel, provided in Section 12 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, being violated when these were executed.
ISSUE:
WON the right to counsel, as provided in Section 12 of Article III, can be applied retroactively in
the case at bar.
HELD:
NO. As ruled in the case of Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, such right to counsel, when violated
prior to the effectivity of the (1987) Constitution cannot be applied retroactively. Additionally, the
ruling established in 1983 by the case of Morales Jr., v. Enrile, which provided that the
waiver/confession must be made with the advice of a counsel, cannot also be applied
retroactively. This is because the law provides that legal decisions form part of the legal system,
but such decisions are to be applied prospectively.

PEOPLE V. DANO
FACTS:
Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain
Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were quarreling. Demosthenes went to appellants home
to investigate. On his way, he met appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and
voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes left appellant in Wilfredos house and proceeded to
appellants residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim sprawled in the yard, near
the stairs. He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds. Demosthenes
fetched appellant from Wilfredos house and took him to the police station.
ISSUE:
WON the constitutional right to custodial investigation is violated when the appellants admission
of his crime to the Brgy. Captain was admitted.
HELD:
NO. Appellant admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police
officer nor a law enforcement agent. Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a
lawyer, is not in violation of appellants constitutional rights. The constitutional requirements on
custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted authorship of the crime. What the Constitution proscribes is
the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts.
PEOPLE V. ENDINO
FACTS:
Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis
and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him,

stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded
momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales
but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at
Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Weeks after, Gerry Galgarin was arrested. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by
the Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the police Station to be
taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing
Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. For his
part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of Dennis.
ISSUE:
WON the appellants admission was violative of the constitutional provision on custodial
investigation.
HELD:
NO. Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find
such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession
does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to
media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen
who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him as the trial court stated in its
Decision. Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H) freely admitted that he had stabbed
Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the
interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of
his statements therein.

PEOPLE V. ARONDAIN
FACTS:
Acting on a report of a robbery of a taxicab Officers found a witness, a security guard of the
nearby compound, who told them that after he heard a gunshot, he saw two male persons come
out of the taxicab and run toward the field at the back of the compound. One of them came from
the backseat of the taxicab while the other from the front seat, carrying a gun. Acting on the
lead, the police officers requested the security guard of the compound to illuminate the field. As
soon as the search light was turned on, the policemen saw accused-appellant holding a gun. One
of the officers fired a warning shot and approached accused-appellant. He asked him where his
companion was, and he pointed to him who was lying on his belly about 8 to 10 meters away.
The police officers asked why they shot the victim, and accused-appellant answered that he shot
the victim because the latter resisted his demand for money. He added that after shooting the
driver, he panicked and immediately scampered away, leaving the money bills scattered on the
floor of the taxicab.
ISSUE:
WON the confession made by the accused-appellant is admissible as part of res gestae.
HELD:
NO. The confession made by the accused-appellant admitting the crime of frustrated robbery
cannot be admitted as part of res gestae. It must be stressed that said statement, if it was at
all made by accused-appellant, was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Said
confession was given after he was arrested and without the assistance of counsel. He was not
informed of his right to remain silent or right to counsel. From time he was arrested and deprived
of his freedom, all the questions propounded on him by the police authorities for the
purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information came within the ambit of a
custodial investigation. As such, he was entitled to the rights enshrined under Article III, Section
12, of the Constitution. Failing to observe this constitutional mandate, the alleged confession of
accused-appellant cannot be admitted as evidence against him.

PEOPLE VS TABOGA
FACTS:
Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide in an Information which reads that with
intent to gain, and with violence against persons, entered the house of one Francisca Tubon, and
once inside, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, assault, attacked and stabbed Tubon,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which necessarily caused the death of said Tubon and
took away several personal properties belonging to Tubon. He was likewise indicted for Arson for
setting the victims house on fire.
After finding the burnt house and charred body of Tubon, Baranggay Captain Pagao confronted
Taboga, and the latter readily admitted that he killed Tubon and set her house on fire, causing
the whole house, including the dead body of the old woman, to be burned.
Taboga was brought to the police station for further investigation. Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio
announcer of DZNS, went to Police Station to interview the suspect. Again, Taboga admitted
killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes
charged and interposed an alibi. Accused-appellant also claimed that he was maltreated by the
policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Contaoi,
he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where
policemen were present and that the reporter acted as an agent for the prosecution. Thus, he
had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
The RTC rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
ISSUE: Whether or not confession made by the accused to a radio reporter, a private person, can
be admitted as evidence against him.
HELD:
Yes.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on
record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to
extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on.
The records also show that accused-appellant not only confessed to the radio reporter but to
several others.
Accused-appellant failed to present convincing evidence to substantiate his claim that he was
maltreated and compelled to confess. Where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers
who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of
violence, on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating the
voluntariness of the confession.
The RTC did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant's taped confession. Such
confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a
media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accusedappellant admitted to the Baranggay Captain that he clubbed and stabbed the victim even
before the police started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily asked help from the newsman.
PEOPLE VS BALOLOY
FACTS:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of 3August
1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found.
The one who caused its discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO)
himself, who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby
creek. However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with circumstantial
evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence, in this automatic review, he
seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for having been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights, and that his conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the alleged confession of the accusedappellant to witnesses luzviminda ceniza and judge celestino dicon as evidence against the
accused.
RULING:
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it
apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is
placed under investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[26In the
instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her
everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw
her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given
in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

JESALVA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the victim Leticia
Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo,12 Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at
Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about
10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner.
With the exception of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While
Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer and
[F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who flagged down a
tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was usually petitioner who drove them
home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin
at his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticias house.
While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until
the next day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of
barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner and Leticia boarded
the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th
Street instead of towards 7th Street where Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1
Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in
St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team
approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle
to check what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood
seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however,
petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town
proper which is directly opposite his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters holding office at the
Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV Pangpang. While he was walking
from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on
the highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so
he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a tricycle
being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, "What
is that?" Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger
home first and just come back to check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was bleeding that he even
got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at
Hazelwood such that when De Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then
proceeded to the police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area but to no avail. On
their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel

Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this
point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted he left the woman in
Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the next day.
However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last person seen with the victim, a
search for him was conducted. He "surrendered" at one (1) oclock in the afternoon accompanied
by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first cousin.13
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia disclosed to her that
petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner that they should just remain as
friends because she was already married, and that she loved her handsome husband.14
Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while
conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, 15 together with other police officers, Senior Police
Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his
vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town
proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding
SPO1 Mendozas calls.16 Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together
with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he
voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his
vehicle.17 At about 1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other
police officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified as the
place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.18
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for leave of court to
file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its
Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC, Branch 51, denied in its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On
August 11, 1994, the defense filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994
and Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the case; hence, the
case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of
the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of
evidence of the defense.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN
NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE
WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM
UNDER HIS CUSTODY
HELD:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. The rule begins to operate at
once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and
direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all
elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal
Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia
jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did
not, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not
applicable in the instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be convicted of the crime
of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial
evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that
petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances
point to petitioner as the culprit.
SEBASTIAN V. GARCHITORENA

FACTS: On April 22, 1993, the marking of the documents to be testified on by the lone
prosecution witness, Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan of the Commission on Audit, who conducted the
audit examination, took place before the Deputy Clerk of Court of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The marking of the exhibits was with the conformity of all of the accused and
their respective counsel.
Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution rested its case5 and
formally offered its evidence on July 6, 1993. Among those offered as evidence were the sworn
statements made by all the accused, including that of petitioner, and previously marked as
exhibits "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", and "U-1" for the prosecution. Said exhibits were offered as part of
the testimony of Auditor Rugayan.
On August 19, 1993, all the accused (including petitioner) filed their "Joint Objections to Formal
Offer of Evidence" on the principal ground that the sworn statements were "hearsay" evidence.
The Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution dated August 24, 1993, admitted said evidence,
thus:
Acting upon the "FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated July 5, 1993, of the Prosecution and
considering the "JOINT OBJECTIONS TO FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated August 19, 1993, of
accused, the Court RESOLVES the same as follows:
Exhibits A, B, and C are admitted, they being certified true copies of official documents; Exhibits
D up to U and U-1 inclusive of submarkings are admitted as part of the testimony of Lilibeth
Rugayan as examining auditor under the State Auditing Code (P.D. No. 1445).
Dissatisfied, the three accused, on September 13, 1993, jointly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the respondent court in its Resolution dated
September 27, 1993. It ruled that:
Considering that under the Order of this Court dated April 22, 1993 (p. 85) the exhibits "offcourt" was admitted by the accused through counsel, among which were exhibits "A", "B" and
"C", the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused Pada, Torres and Sebastian with regard
to the admission of said exhibits dated September 10, 1993 is denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in evidence
"as part of the testimony of the prosecution witness".
HELD: The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigation because such
inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers.
Petitioner argues that the said issue should be resolved in the negative on the ground that the
subject sworn statements are hearsay evidence. Petitioner contends that he and his co-accused
were never presented as witnesses, thus, they were not given the opportunity to identify and
authenticate their respective sworn statements and that Auditor Rugayan had no personal
knowledge of the contents thereof.
We disagree.
As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Thus, the rule explicitly provides that a
witness can testify only on those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perceptions. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in
the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement
In the present case, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and co-accused were
offered not to prove the truth or falsity of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such
written statements were actually made and executed. As stated in the Resolution dated August

24, 1993 of the respondent court, Exhibits "D" up to "U" and "U-1" were admitted only as part of
the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as Examining Auditor. Title II, Chapter I, Section 55 of P.D.
1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code provides that "the auditor shall obtain
through inspections, observation, inquiries, confirmation and other techniques, sufficient
competent evidential matter to afford himself a reasonable basis for his opinions, judgments,
conclusions and recommendations".
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be
invoked only when a person is under "custodial investigation" or is "in custody investigation."
Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing postage stamps at the
Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted by a Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal
Service Officer, is not a custodial investigation. It is merely an administrative investigation.
While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v. Exevea that the right to
counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.

REMOLINA V CSC
FACTS:
Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in
Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of
Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%. Mr.
America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee of
8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was
eventually revealed that Nery Remolons name did not appear in the passing and failing
examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a
certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.Estelito Remolona in his written statement of
facts said that he met a certain Atty.Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain
eligibility for a fee of 3,000pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy
when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked
for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988,America was
able to receive 6 checks at 2,600 pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona. Remolona admitted
that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no knowledge thereof. On
recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses
guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion
For Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process as the extra-judicial admission allegedly
signed by him was in blank form and that he was not assisted by counsel.
HELD:
NO. Right to Counsel is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial
investigation when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken in custody. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. The
exclusionary rule under Paragraph 2, Section 12 applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation.
ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 159734, NOVEMBER 29, 2006
Facts:

Petitoners were hired by Western Marketing, a chain of appliance stores, as sales persons.
Benitez and Robel were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever,
respectively.


An incident ensued later wherein the petitioners and the other accused were involved
wherein the daily cash collection report of the company did not reflect any remittance of
payments from the transactions covered by the alleged missing invoices.

It was later found out that the goods covered thereby in the invoices were missing.
Concluding that the transactions under the said invoices were made but no payment was
remitted to Western, branch accountant Camilo reported the matter to Aurora Borja, the branch
assistant manager.

Benitez soon approached Camilo and requested him not to report the matter to the
management, he cautioning that many would be involved.

Later, in a subsequent meeting with the branch manager Lily Ong, accused-petitioner
Orellana admitted having brought home some appliances while Benitez gave a handwritten
statement.

The other accused as well executed statements relating themselves to the incidents.

On complaint of Western Marketing Corporation, petitioners Astudillo and Orellana were

collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with a certain Robel and Benitez, under an
information dated September 9, 1996.

Additionally, petitioners, Benitez and a certain Javier were individually charged also with
Qualified Theft in four separate informations all dated September 9, 1996.

During arraignment, petitioners, with assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty.

Thereafter, the RTC found the accused-herein petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Qualified Theft.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment with modification as to the penalties
imposed.
Issue: W/N the employees extra-judicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an
administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against them.
Held:
The petitioners argue that their extra-judicial statements were taken without the assistance of
counsel, they are inadmissible as evidence, following Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.

It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners
failed to file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, this Court
answers the issue in the affirmative.
The rights above specified (Miranda rights), to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or
"in-custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial
interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his
privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be
absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc)
which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations.
People v. Tin Lan Uy, Jr. is similarly instructive:
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by accusedappellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. Thus we held in
one case (People v. Ayson, [supra]) that admissions made during the course of an administrative
investigation by Philippine Airlines do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective
mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions made to
a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not part of the
investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a personal confidante and not in his official
capacity.
The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that petitioners were not under custodial
investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written
incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence.
ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE VS CA AND PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 102786, AUGUST 14, 1998
Facts:

In various incidents, electrical engineers of MERALCO who were assigned to inspect six
electric meters installed in Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) discovered
that these electric meters were missing. These engineers suspected that employees of

CAPASSCO must have damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that to
conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters.

Later it was discovered that several crewmembers of MERALCO were removing the electric
meters. Patrolman Edgar Enopia ascertained the identities of the men, one of whom turned out
to be petitioner de la Torre.

These men were later brought to a police lineup.

Petitioner de la Torre was pointed to be the leader of the group which took down the
electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises.

As such, de la Torre was charged with Qualified Theft. The RTC found de la Torre guilty of
Qualified Theft.

De la Torre appealed to the CA, contending first that his constitutional rights were violated
during the custodial investigation of the case.

CA however denied reconsideration.

Issue: W/N de la Torres rights under custodial interrogation or investigation were violated.
Dela Torres contention: he was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at the NPD
headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO service truck number 522 were presented in
a police line-up. He further invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same sec. 12 that "any
confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him."
Held:
In Gamboa v. Cruz, this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf,
and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and
in the presence of counsel." However, this applies only from the moment the investigating
officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any
information from the accused. A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest
because it is conducted before that stage is reached.
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO
truck number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was
picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the electric meters from the
CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no
questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the complainant.
There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial
interrogation were violated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDUARDO PAVILLARE
G.R. NO. 129970, APRIL 5, 2000
Facts:
On March 10, 1996 the accused appellant Pavillare was apprehended in connection with the
kidnapping of an Indian national Accused-appellants were thereafter charged and convicted of
kidnapping for ransom for abducting the Indian national. Pavillare contends that the
identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the
appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel, and that the money given to
them was not ransom money but was given in exchange for their dropping of the charges of rape
against private complainant.
Issue: W/N Pavillares rights under custodial interrogation or investigation were violated.
Held:
Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel." Thus the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional mandate is
inadmissible in evidence. The prohibition however, does not extend to a person in a police lineup because that stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation.
It has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to
elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police
line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it

involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory in nature. It has
also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line-up does not preclude the
admissibility of an in-court identification. The identification made by the private complainant in
the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although
the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel.
We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and credence to the identification in
open court of the accused-appellant by the private complainant and his cousin as one of the
kidnappers. Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember
their faces.
PEOPLE VS. CASIMIRO
FACTS: In a buy bust operation, after arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the
Narcom Office, where the policemen wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it
to the evidence custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and arrest report, affidavits,
and a request for the laboratory examination of the confiscated marijuana. They also prepared a
"receipt of property seized," Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant was properly informed of the charges against him. (No)

RULING: The receipt could not be considered evidence against accused- appellant because it was
signed by him without the assistance of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered by the suspect to a
poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect,
accused-appellant admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an offense
under the law. Having been made without the assistance of counsel, it cannot be accepted as
proof that marijuana was seized from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.
In People v. Obrero, this Court held that an uncounseled statement is presumed by the
Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded
by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs the
guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda rights while he was being
arrested outside the grocery:
Also, the recitation of the Miranda rights to the accused was incomplete and was made without
any effort to find out if he understood it. It did not include a statement that, if accused-appellant
could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to him.. It was merely ceremonial and
inadequate in transmitting meaningful information to the suspect. SC ruled that signing of the
receipt without a lawyer, the accused-appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. The
police investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he
was willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was
waiving his right to remain silent at all.
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if accused- appellant could not
afford counsel, one would be assigned to him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any
effort to find out if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in transmitting
meaningful information to the suspect. We cannot say that, in signing the receipt without a
lawyer, accused- appellant acted willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police
investigators did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say whether he was
willing to answer their questions even without the assistance of counsel or whether he was
waiving his right to remain silent at all.
PEOPLE VS. SAYABOC
FACTS: Witnesses of the shooting of the deceased Galam identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP
Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death. SPO4
Cagungao was called on the very same day to the Provincial Command Headquarters in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc Before taking the statement of
Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Sayaboc told him that he wanted to

have a counsel of his own choice however sSayaboc could not name one. The police officers
brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After
Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo
remained silent the entire time. Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty.
Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confessionin
Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje
for the sum of P100,000. Accused argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be
admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel
during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is inadmissible.
RULING:
Sayabocs extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right (waiver of rights) is missing. The right
to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights
especially in this case where the suspect only has an educational attainment of Grade IV.
Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are unable to
rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show
through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo
remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
PEOPLE VS BAGNATE
Facts: Appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation and was
informed by the latter in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel,
that whatever he says may be used against or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or
molested. His rights were reiterated by Atty. Brotamonte in the absence of the policemen.
Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. Appellant signed his typed
confession. The next day, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the MTC of
Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently
examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as the authenticity of the
signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant the consequences of
his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them. Judge
Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign it again and appellant answered in the
affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession
again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte after which appellant affixed his signature. There were
no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the
crimes were committed by him.
Issue: Whether or not appellants confession was executed in violation of his constitutional rights
thus inadmissible.
Held: The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the Constitution.
An extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the
assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation
must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start to be admissible evidence. The
presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra- judicial confession, and
the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing full protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused. The assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than
perfunctory. His testimony during cross-examination leaves no room for doubt that he adequately
assisted appellant during the investigation. Appellant signed the confession with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him
before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the MTC of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the consequences of his
confession.

What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an accused

without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given
competent and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the
services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing
and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by
violence or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that
mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed.
PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985
FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat
him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste.
The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him
and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating
officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will,
he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the
law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect
or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not
permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only
about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not
assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
SANTOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 7152368
Facts: All the accused appropriated among themselves the proceeds of amounted to
9,000,000,000 to their own personal use and benefit which was illegally taken from Central Bank
of the Philippines or Bank of the Philippine Islands. In 1985, accused are found guilty as coprincipals in the three separate complex crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are
inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said confessions were
executed.
Held: Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the rights of an accused during
custodial investigation. It reads: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
First paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states: (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The 1973 Constitution does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to
counsel, which is found in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to
counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of said Constitution. Waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation
without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. The prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue. Valentino and petitioner Estacio failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the
use of force or intimidation on their persons to obtain he confession.
PEOPLE VS MENDOZA
Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial confessions; Waiver; If the accused fails to object during
the trial to the presentation of his confession which was taken during the trial to the presentation
of his confession which was taken during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel, he is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla was charged with robbery with homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information against the accused-appellant charged:
That on or about July 7, 1994 in Iloilo City, said accused, armed with a knife, cosspiring and
confederating with Marco Aguirre who is still at large, working together and heping on another,
with deliberate intent and with violence employed upon the person of Hernandez Abatay, that is
by stabbing him with the said knife, with which the accused was armed at the time, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally take and carry away with intent to gain 1 Seiko Divers
wristwatch valued at P300.00 and cash of P15.00 owned by Hernandez Abatay and as
consequence of the stab wounds suffered by Hernandez Abatay at the hands of the accused, the
said Hernandez Abatay died a few days thereafter.
Accused-appellant contends that the confession he made to PO3 Daniel Tan at the St. Pauls
Hospital that he and Marco Aguirre had robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was
given without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in custody.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence is inadmissible because the confession was made without he
assistance of counsel.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section
12(1) and (3) of the constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was
made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation
during the trial with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility. No error was, therefore, incurred by the trial court in admitting evidence of the
confession.

PEOPLE VS GONZALES
Searches and Seizures: The right to be secure from an unreasonable search may be waived
either expressly or impliedly.
Facts:

Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph Bernaldez with
robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which
alleged:
That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Davao Oriental, the accused, by
means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal, and carry away Seiko divers watch
valued at P1000.00, one Sanyo cassette recorder valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to
P2,725.00 with a total value of P4,325.00, belong to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs, represented by his widow, Carolita Suraltain the aforestated sum; and on the
occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed hand gun and a knife, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said
firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, therefy inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.
Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he and his
co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to secure
the services of counsel, in violation of Section 2 and 12, Art., III of the Constitution. Hence, their
admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in evidence against them.
Accused appellant Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant when the
latter conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the
robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and wristwatch are inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial are inadmissible in law
because accused-appellants were not informed of their Miranda rights and therewas an absence
of a search warrant.
Ruling:
As regards to the Miranda rights issue:
The Supreme Court held that the contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was picked
up at around 8 am near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Gonzales had a
handgun tucked in his waistline and was wearing a wristwatch. According to inspector Malintad,
Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily surrendered the
stolen goods to him.
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their
admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and had begun to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter
were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way. Hence, the
admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sec. 2(1) and
(3), Art. III of the Constitution.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Gonzales told him that one of his
companions was Romeo Bernaldez. On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was
in the Municipal Jail at the Police Station of Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects,
he asked them who killed the victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it
was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his coappellant Gonzales. For the constitutional provision of custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
As regards to the absence of search warrant:

The contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant

Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of
accused-appellant Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were
given to him. What thus happened was a consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the
constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from
an unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art III, sec 3(2)) in the
Constitution does not apply.

PEOPLE V. JARA, 144 SCRA 516

The presumption is against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. A curt Opo is
insufficient to constitute a waiver. *Jara, Vergara, and Bernadas were all sentenced to death for
robbery with homicide. Jara was also sentenced to death in the companion case of parricide.
They robbed and killed Amparo Bantigue and Luisa Jara using a hammer and a pair of scissors
while both were sound asleep in the bedroom they shared. The accused took with them a piggy
bank and a Buddha bank. The victims were found the next morning by their employees. The
accused gave extra-judicial confessions without the assistance of counsel.*The presumption is
against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel. The stereotyped advice found in practically
all extrajudicial confession to which police investigators type together with a curt Opo is
insufficient to constitute a waiverits tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of the right is missing.
F:
Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of
Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found
guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband
of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and
Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The
confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five
policemen and after two weeks of detention.
HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained
giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently,
the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly
and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was
not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is
missing in this case.
PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO (G.R. NO. 139179)
Facts:
On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin
Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor
Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to
them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house,
Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo
explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings
being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the
bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told
by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan.
Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of
rice he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living
room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed
Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo,

immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and
falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help
him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the
neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the
creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo successively stabbed
Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing the
victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila
and Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they
just followed whatever Tolentino told them.
On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused
Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to
each other as the one who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and
the latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.
However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final and executory on
his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole
responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accusedappellant Jonathan Fabros.
The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the
person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also
ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling.
The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested
his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused.8 Thus,
the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for
the murder.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an accessory?
Decision:
Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an
accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in
its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of
three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
(2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when
the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an
accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime
and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.
Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the
crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the
discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.
In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he
refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that
appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately
explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not
incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim
if to do so would put the former's life in peril.
The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.