EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]

GATCHALIAN

PROMOTIONS

TALENTS

POOL,

INC., complainant,

vs.

ATTY.

PRIMO

R.

NALDOZA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a Petition for
disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of
respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for
the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from
complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1]
In his Answer,[2] respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal. On the
contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to delay the
execution of the POEA Decision.[3] He also controverts complainants allegation that he asked for a cash
bond and that he issued the fake receipt.[4]
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to defend the interest of
the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant
therein on October 5, 1992, the respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had
already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent desire to collect or to
bleed his client of several thousand pesos of attorneys fees, convinced the complainant to appeal the
case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter
misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] Cash
Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S.
$2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by
the Supreme Court. The said amount was given to the respondent.

x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the Supreme
Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up
respondents misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged
Supreme court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation revealed that the
said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake
receipt. The said verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court
was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court DocketReceiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said
computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent. [5] (citations omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case[6] for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein respondent
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable
doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996,
on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed
the Motion.[7]
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, which approved
the investigating commissioners report[8] and recommendation that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his
recommendation in this manner:
x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on the receipt for the
amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his position on a mere denial that it is not his
signature. Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the
encircled signature of the respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,
however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and irregular. [As to
the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied] that he ha[d] anything to do with it
because it was the complainant who signed the Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name
appear[ed] to be the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is true
that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of the
complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he signed the said petition as counsel of the
petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who prepared the same and the notary public
before whom the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the said
petition.
The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984 was denied by the
respondent because according to him he was never given a chance to cross-examine the person who
issued the [certification] x x x. However, respondent does not deny that he is the person referred to by the
handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.
In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this Commission as his
most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People
of the Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation
with Motion to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present administrative case in

view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same facts and evidence. [9] (citations
omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his acquittal in the companion
criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner
emphasized that the criminal case for estafa [10] was completely different from the proceedings before him;
acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter. [11] He further noted that the RTC
Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein
complainant for $2,555.[12]
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. However, the
recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents Motion to Dismiss should be
denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because he has
been acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was the
very same issue litigated in this case, [13] and that his exoneration was a result a full blown trial on the
merits of this case.[14]
In a similar case, we have said:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of xxx criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an
entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. [15]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. [16] They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is necessary;[17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is
all that is required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. [19]
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. [20] Conversely, respondents acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability against the
respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this
Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the
lawyer.[21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For
this reason, it would be well to remember the Courts ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination

is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.
First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite knowing that it
had already become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on
this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had
received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conlcusion that they [had] lost the case
before the Supreme Court.[23] This, however, does not substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been
any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse,

there

has

been

no

evidence

that

respondent

knew

that

the

case

was

unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for
petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly,
this charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant the
amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this
Court. According to Gatchalian,[24] respondent explained that the amount would cover all the expenses to
be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for the
payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or paid to the complainant in
that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be garnished. [25] Corroborating Gatchalians
testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation that it would
be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case. [26]
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when he paid
P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the
charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of
another. This is an admission of misconduct. [27] In his Answer submitted to this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the allegation of the Petitioner,
on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all the cases and assignments made by the
Petitioner to me, I was made to report to him personally and to his Board of Directors the progress of the
cases both orally and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral
obligation only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorneys fee [to] which I am
entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the above-cited rules, I have the
right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services,
otherwise known as Attorneys Lien, as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of
Accounts.[28] (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondents claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorneys lien. He
demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme

Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice. [29] The
claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the
accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to
him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [30]
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to him, respondent gave
complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme Court had received the sum
of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian[31] and Deles[32] were equally clear on this
point. After respondent had presented the false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment was
made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection and Disbursement Division issued a
certification that respondent had paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the
said case[33] contain no indication at all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or that it
has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the IBPs
findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his clients
money. We agree with the IBP that it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio
Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the
Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the respondent. [34]
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble profession. As we
have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35]
[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus
reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v.
Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the
amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:
[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly
point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant,
a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.
In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the
money entrusted to him:
The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as
attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a
lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession."
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him;
he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an
official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a
member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed
to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he
could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had
been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July
1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both
in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. [1] It was after the
child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him
and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence,
this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the
case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from
the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. [2] Respondents third motion to dismiss was
noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. [3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request,
citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active
participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. [4]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees. [5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be
allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community. [7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang [8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit
on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
[9]

Respondent

and

complainant

were

sweethearts

whose

sexual

relations

were

evidently

consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse,
credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in
1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she
was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer

constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 481

February 28, 1969

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST ARTURO P. LOPEZ.

VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ assisted by her father, AGAPITO ALMIREZ complainants,
vs.
ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be disbarred upon the ground of immorality. Complainant
Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her father Agapito Almirez, charges him with having succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her, under promise of marriage, which he failed and refused to fulfill, despite a child
begotten in consequence thereof.
In his answer, respondent denied having ever had or solicited any sexual relation with the complainant,
but affirmed that they had agreed to be married as soon as he became financially stable; that he could
not carry out his part of the agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961, that complainant was
pregnant by another man; and that she filed the present charges out of spite for him, in view of his refusal
to marry her.
Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, the latter
submitted his report finding respondent guilty as charged, and then filed the corresponding complaint for
his disbarment.
In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in effect, the allegations and defenses made and set up in
his previous answer. He, moreover, averred that, while the matter was being investigated in the Office of
the Solicitor General, complainant had filed an affidavit stating that he (respondent) is not the father of
her child and a motion withdrawing her complaint.
Respondent having, moreover, expressed the wish to introduce additional evidence, the Court dated its
Legal Officer-Investigator for the reception thereof, after which the latter submitted his report concurring
in the findings of the Solicitor General, although recommending merely the suspension of respondent
herein. After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the case was set for hearing, at which a

representative of the Solicitor General and counsel for respondent appeared and were given a period to file
their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The record shows that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957 and has been engaged in
the practice of law in Manila. After meeting the complainant then about 23 years of age in Mauban,
Quezon of which their families are residents sometime in December, 1958, respondent courted her
by correspondence. Presently, they became sweethearts. Complainant having come to Manila in
November, 1960 and operated therein a store, in partnership with others, respondent used to visit her.
Although he had told the complainant, as early as May 1960, of his intent to marry her, it was understood
that the wedding would take place upon consummation of a given deal in which he expected to make a big
amount of money. From November, 1960 to April, 1961, they had carnal knowledge of each other, several
times, in various hotels in Manila, particularly the Palo Alto Hotel, the Springfield Hotel, and the
Shanghai Hotel. On December 31, 1960, complainant informed respondent that her menstruation was
overdue, whereupon he caused her to be examined by a lady physician, who found that she was in the
family way. Thereupon, he gave her some pills, to be taken three (3) times a day, for the alleged purpose of
hastening the flow of her menstruation. Then, he called her up, day and night, to inquire about her
menses and, when the same did not eventually come, he urged her to see another lady doctor, who could
perform an abortion. Complainant was averse thereto, but, respondent was so insistent that she went to
the clinic of said physician. The operation was not performed, however, for neither the latter nor
complainant were agreeable thereto. On August 22, 1961, complainant gave birth to a baby boy, Francisco
Arnold, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital in Manila.
Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their respective applications for a marriage license were filed and
their marriage license was issued on March 13, but, the wedding, scheduled for March 18, 1961, did not
take place, owing to the absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it. On April 6, 1961, complainant
learned, from her sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to the latter his unwillingness to marry her
(complainant). When, soon thereafter, complainant asked him for his reason therefor, respondent blamed
her for refusing to undergo an abortion. Thereupon, or on April 18, 1961, she filed the complaint herein.
It further appears that on September 25, 1962, while this case was pending in the Office of the Solicitor
General a motion signed by the complainant, withdrawing her complaint, was filed with said office. The
reason given was that the complaint was "a result of serious misunderstanding" and had been filed "in
the heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to proceed further on account of complainant's belief in
his innocence. This motion was, however, withdrawn by her, on November 25, 1963, for the reason that
respondent had secured her signature thereto upon the assurance that he would thereupon marry her
and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also, married another woman. In fact, respondent and one
Evelyn Orense were married in January, 1963.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have us believe that complainant had freely and voluntarily
signed her aforesaid motion to withdraw her complaint. In fact, he added, she made the affidavit, Exhibit
34, stating that he is not the father of her child. In rebuttal, complainant testified, however, that she
signed said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is now the affidavit Exhibit 34, he having convinced
her that they would be married soon thereafter.lawphi1.nt
He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony that it was complainant who asked him to take her
nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it was she who asked him, at the Bayside Nightclub, on
December 31, 1960, to marry her; that she reiterated this request in January, 1961, for fear that her
father may call her back to Mauban; that she having brought up the same subject in February, 1961,

they signed the necessary applications late in February, 1961, and got the corresponding marriage
license sometime later, although the wedding, scheduled for March 18, had to be postponed indefinitely
because of the absence of the officer, who was to solemnize it; that after a drinking spree in Manila, in the
evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it would be unwise for him to drive his car home to Quezon City, in view of
which he decided to spend the night at the Shanghai Hotel; that while there, he remembered having an
appointment with complainant, whom he, accordingly, called by telephone to apologize to her and
informed her of his condition and whereabouts; that soon later, complainant arrived unexpectedly at the
hotel and asked permission to sleep with him there, stating that she had quarreled with her sister-in-law;
that after switching off the light and undressing herself, complainant started massaging his head, for he
had a slight headache; that as complainant kissed him, he noticed that she was pregnant and told her so;
that after saying that she merely had a stomach ache, complainant eventually confessed that another
man had abused her; that angered by this revelation, respondent dressed up and prepared to step out,
but, before he left the hotel, she asked his forgiveness and promised to behave thereafter; that she went to
his office, the next day, but he refused to talk to her; that as she insisted upon talking with him privately,
they went to an ice cream parlor where she begged him to marry her and save her honor, suggesting that
their marriage would be in name only and that they need not live together, if he did not want to; that
complainant even said that her father 1 would give P5,000 if he married her, but he rejected the offer and
volunteered to prosecute the man responsible for her condition, if she would identify him; and that, when
respondent still refused to marry her, complainant threatened to bring disbarment proceedings against
him.
Upon a review of the record, we agree with the solicitor, who first investigated this case, and the Legal
Officer-Investigator, before whom additional evidence were introduced, that respondent's version is
unworthy of credence. Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to the effect that he had never
solicited or had carnal relations with the complainant, his very testimony shows that they had met in a
hotel room under conditions attesting to a condition of intimacy clearly revealing past extra-marital
relations between them. Then, too, respondent's promise to marry complainant has been, not only
admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their applications for a marriage license and the marriage
license actually secured by them.
The breach of such promise on his part is thus patent. What is more, when her pregnancy was confirmed
by a physician, respondent firstly persuaded the complainant to take some pills for the avowed purpose of
hastening the flow of her "menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to have an abortion, to which she did
not agree. Worse still, when this case was pending in the office of the Solicitor General, respondent
prevailed upon her to sign a motion withdrawing her complaint, under the false allegation that he is
innocent of the charges preferred against him, as well as to sign a blank sheet of paper which now
appears to be her aforementioned affidavit Exhibit 34 under promise to thereupon marry her, without
the slightest intention to keep it, because, instead he married another woman soon later.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is hereby found guilty of gross immoral conduct rendering him
unfit to continue a member of the Bar, 2 for which reason he is hereby barred from the practice of law, and
his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so ordered.
EN BANC

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,

Complainant,

Adm. Case No. 2474

Present:

versus

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
*CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, and
**
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. LEO J. PALMA,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

September 15, 2004

X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court
not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. [1]

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his
oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.

The facts are undisputed:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s.

Complainant was a client of Angara

Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his
cases. Owing to his growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal
counsel.

Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became intimate.

He traveled

and dined with them abroad.[2] He frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old
daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption

Convent.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family, respondent married Lisa in
Hongkong.

It was only the next

day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is legal.

Complainant was

shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a married man and has three children. Upon
investigation,

complainant

found

that

respondent

courted

Lisa

during

their

tutoring

sessions. Immediately, complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to
Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent
requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong
Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate
his marriage with Lisa; and

(c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three

children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.

On

August

24,

1982,

complainant

filed

with

the

Court

of

First

nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P.

In the

Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for declaration of

Decision[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint [5] for disbarment, imputing to
respondent the following acts:
a.
In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage of his tutoring sessions with
Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence,
education, age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the
latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her scruples
and apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a
married man with three (3) children;

b.
Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and determination and
even pursued her in her travels abroad under false pretenses that he was traveling on
official business for complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and
assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment
whatsoever to his marrying;

c.
With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation
that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage,
respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without
complying with the requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria
Luisas parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of age,
respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June 22, 1982
by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor.
x x x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss [6] on the ground of lack of cause of action.

He contended

that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his
lawyers

oath. There

is

no

allegation

that

he

acted

with

wanton

recklessness,

lack of skill or ignorance of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of
grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and
good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to marry the
woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili conducted the investigation.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued in G.R. No. 64538 [8] a
Resolution[9] (a) setting aside the CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P
declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio; and (b) remanding the case to
the CFI for proper proceeding and determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of
this case.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings[10] on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial
question to the disbarment proceeding. It was denied.

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining
Order.[11] In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the
investigation of the disbarment proceedings.[12]

Thereafter,

the

case

was

Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.

referred

to

the

Integrated

Bar

of

the

On October 19, 1998, Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo

issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending and as
a practical measure to ease the backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within
ten (10) days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting this case or supervening events have transpired which render this case
moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and
terminated.[13]
In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his continuing interest in
prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against respondent.

On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing on the ground that he
needed more time to locate vital documents in support of his defense.

The scheduled hearing of

December 4, 2001 was reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to
appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution. [15]

Respondent again

failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered submitted for resolution. [16]

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted a Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer.

She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three

(3) years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent
committed the following acts which warrant his disbarment:

a)

Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by complainant;

b)

His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or

prohibition to his contracting a second marriage;

c)

The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross

misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath
as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong representing

himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition
no different from term spinster with respect to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully
well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the
trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was
allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and it is recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and Recommendation, but it
reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year suspension.

Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in
the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life.

This is because a lawyer may not divide his

personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. [17] Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good
name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part
of the proper authorities.[18]

Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his ability.

In fact, the

complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.

While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good lawyer, [19] however, professional
competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar.

Good moral character is always

an indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage
with Elizabeth Hermosisima.

The Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that

he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City.

On the other hand,

the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents
subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents
second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and
family friend.[22]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[23]

His act of contracting a second marriage is

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality.

Thus, we have somehow come up with

a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.[24] Measured against this definition, respondents act is manifestly
immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young
woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:

1)

In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted

to legal remedies to sever them.

There, we ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent

undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing
of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole.

As such, there can be no other fate that awaits

respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26] respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession, warranting respondents disbarment.

(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive,
their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

Thus, lacking the good moral character

required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and

integrity, which at all times is expected of members of the bar.

He is, therefore, disbarred from the

practice of law.

(5)

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported him and spent for his

law education, and thereafter cohabited with another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

For this, respondent was

disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and child and resumed
cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal
relations with a former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting
disbarment.

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. It was
respondents closeness to the complainants family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made
possible his intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal
affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter.

Like the proverbial thief in the

night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong.

He

did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant
that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married her, he
cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the
sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity.[31]

How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he

was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done
was to walk away.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student
of
[32]

Assumption

Convent

and

was

under

psychological

treatment

for

emotional

immaturity.

Naturally, she was an easy prey.

Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been
determined by the court with finality, the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment
proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the
instant disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,[33] a disbarment case is sui generis for it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him,[34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, [35] then
the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches. [36]

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is
that they shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on
the lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility ranked the
above responsibility first in the enumeration.

They knew then that more than anybody else, it is the

lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law.

As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath which every lawyer in the
country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his
offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country with copies of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CAG.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in
said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule
65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned
by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to
the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R.
s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.