The Euthyphro -- How (not) to define piety

(A dialogue about giving definitions)

1. First Definition (p. 3): Piety is doing what Im doing - prosecuting anyone
guilty of murder, even ones father. (Didnt Zeus do just the same?)
Socrates Reply (p. 4): Dont just give me one or two examples of piety, but rather
explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. I need a standard,
which I can consult to determine whether an act is pious or not. A list of examples
doesnt do that.
2. Second Definition (p. 4): Piety is that which is dear to the gods, and
impiety is that which is not dear to them.
Socrates reply (p. 6): We are told that the gods disagree with one another; what is
dear to one is hated by another. And so according to this definition, it would seem
that some acts are both pious and impious. But since piety and impiety are
opposites, it would seem that no act should be both at once. and so this definition
appears to lead to a contradiction.
Note: Socrates also notes that we are told the gods have much the same kinds of
disagreements that Euthyphro has with his family (pp. 5-6). So appealing to the
gods offers little help.
Note further: Although Socrates says a little about the difficulty determining just
what the gods might like or dislike (p. 6), this is NOT his major complaint.
3. Third Definition (p. 7): Piety is what all the gods love; impiety is what they
all hate.
Socrates reply (p. 7): Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious
because it is loved by the gods?
The point: The definition doesnt really capture the essence of piety. It isnt being
loved by the gods that makes an action pious, but something else, which serves as
the reason for the gods holding it dear (there must be some reason for the gods to
love what they do, else piety would seem arbitrary).Instead, this definition only
identifies an attribute (or effect) of piety. (p. 9)
At this point, Socrates steps in: "I will myself endeavor to show you how you might
instruct me in the nature of piety." (p. 9)
1. Identify a more extended notion of which it is a part (a genus).
2. Then specify how it is different from the other parts of that more extended
notion (supply a differentia).
At this point Socrates introduces the "Euthyphro dilemma" by asking the crucial
question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because
it is loved by the gods (10a)?" This is where he sets up his typical dialectic. This
Socratic technique, essentially an analogy or comparison in this instance, is used to
make his question clearer. He gets Euthyphro to agree that we call a carried thing
"carried" simply because it is carried, not because it possesses some inherent
characteristic or property that we could call "carried". That is, being carried is not an
essential characteristic of the thing carried; being carried is a state. Likewise with

piety: if it is defined as "what is loved by the gods," it is liked for some reason, not
just because it is liked (which would be circular in its reasoning).
4. Fourth Definition (p. 10): Piety is that part of justice which attends to the
gods.
Socrates reply: Its not clear what "attend" means in this context. Surely we dont
attend to gods in the same manner that we attend to horses, dogs, or children, for
we are not able to benefit or improve them.
5. Fifth Definition (p. 11): Piety is that part of justice concerning service or
ministration to the gods; it is learning how to please them in word and
deed.
Socrates reply: Again, this is vague. For what end is such service aimed? Surely the
gods cannot be improved or benefited by our piety.

6. Sixth Definition (p. 12): Piety is the art or science by which gods and men
do business with one another.
Socrates reply: Once again, what do the gods gain from their end of the bargain?
Nothing substantial, it would seem, beyond what they find pleasing. So this
definition seems to have traveled full circle (like Daedalus maze) back to the third
definition. (p. 13)
1. The pious = what Euthyphro is doing: prosecuting wrongdoers whoever they are.
Objection: This isn't a definition of piety; it merely points to a particular
instance of piety.
2. The pious = what is dear to the gods.
Objection: According to E the gods disagree on moral matters. Thus some
things will be dear to some gods yet not dear to other gods. Thus some things will
be both pious and not pious (an absurd conclusion which therefore refutes the
definition from which it was derived).
3. The pious = what is loved by all the gods
Objection:
If "pious" can be defined as "god-beloved" then these two terms should be
substitutable salva veritate (i.e. One term should be able to replace the other in any
sentence without affecting the truth value of that sentence).
But this isn't true. Consider the sentence P:
P = The gods love the pious because it is pious.
E and S both agree that P is true.
Now, if "pious" = "god-beloved" then the following sentence Q should
also be true:
Q = The gods love the pious because it is god-beloved
But S persuades E that Q can't be true. Why not? Because it confuses an
"affect" or "consequential feature of piety (it's being god-beloved) with its essential
nature.
4. The pious = the part of justice (i.e right conduct) that is concerned with the care
of the gods.
Objection: The concept of "care" in this definition is unclear.

5. The pious = saying and doing what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and
sacrifice.
Objection: Since the gods derive no benefit from what we do, when E says
that prayer and sacrifice are pleasing to the gods he's really only repeating the idea
that the pious is what is loved by the gods (definition 3).
15c-15d. Socrates remains in ironic character, humbly petitioning Euthyphro ("do
not think me unworthy") to continue his instruction. But we now see the point: "If
you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety, you would never have ventured to
prosecute your old father for murder..." Since it is now obvious that Euthyphro does
not have "clear knowledge of piety and impiety," it should be obvious to anyone,
even Euthyphro, that he indeed should never have prosecuted his father. Socrates
remains in character as Euthyphro's student, but he is here clearly laying out the
conclusions that Euthyphro should draw. All Euthyphro needs to do is admit his own
ignorance and then connect the dots. But Socrates will not simply tell him what to
do.
The dialogue is set near the king-archon's court, where the two men encounter each
other. They are both there for preliminary hearings before possible trials (2a).
Euthyphro has come to lay manslaughter charges against his father, as his father
had allowed one of his workers to die exposed to the elements without proper care
and attention (3e4d). This worker had killed a slave belonging to the family estate
on the island of Naxos; while Euthyphro's father waited to hear from the expounders
of religious law (exegetes cf. Laws 759d) about how to proceed, the worker died
bound and gagged in a ditch. Socrates expresses his astonishment at the
confidence of a man able to take his own father to court on such a serious charge,
even when Athenian Law allows only relatives of the deceased to sue for murder
(Dem. 43 57). Euthyphro misses the astonishment, and merely confirms his
overconfidence in his own judgment of religious/ethical matters. In an example of
"Socratic irony," Socrates states that Euthyphro obviously has a clear understanding
of what is pious ( to hosion) and impious ( to anosion).[2] Since
Socrates himself is facing a charge of impiety, he expresses the hope to learn from
Euthyphro, all the better to defend himself in his own trial.
Euthyphro claims that what lies behind the charge brought against Socrates by
Meletus and the other accusers is Socrates's claim that he is subjected to a daimon
or divine sign which warns him of various courses of action (3b). Even more
suspicious from the viewpoint of many Athenians, Socrates expresses skeptical
views on the main stories about the Greek gods, which the two men briefly discuss
before plunging into the main argument. Socrates expresses reservations about
such accounts which show up the gods' cruelty and inconsistency. He mentions the
castration of the early sky god, Uranus, by his son Cronus, saying he finds such
stories very difficult to accept (6a6c).
Euthyphro, after claiming to be able to tell even more amazing such stories, spends
little time or effort defending the conventional view of the gods. Instead, he is led
straight to the real task at hand, as Socrates forces him to confront his ignorance,
ever pressing him for a definition of 'piety'. Yet, with every definition Euthyphro
proposes, Socrates very quickly finds a fatal flaw (6d ff.).

At the end of the dialogue, Euthyphro is forced to admit that each definition has
been a failure, but rather than correct it, he makes the excuse that it is time for him
to go, and Socrates ends the dialogue with a classic example of Socratic irony: since
Euthyphro has been unable to come up with a definition that will stand on its own
two feet, Euthyphro has failed to teach Socrates anything at all about piety, and so
he has received no aid for his own defense at his own trial (15c ff.).