ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that
respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document
against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorneyclient relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development
Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive
Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
[1]

Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa
C. Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal
became final and executory on July 15, 1992.
[2]

In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February

7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel
for complainant.
[3]

On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing
the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in
substitution of Atty. de Leon.
[4]

It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito
Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for
violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal
Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live
Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly
indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand
Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is
legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
[5]

Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any
other name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only
once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are
pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasig City; (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation
or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption; (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of
the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
one month suspension without pay; and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)
(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to
the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This
prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that,
in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged
and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he
alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding
bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise. He also
states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing
upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court
of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he
committed in good faith.
[10]

[11]

In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case
are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with
the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating
to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in

the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records
Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.
[12]

In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[13]

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed
to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted
respondents motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution
based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.
[14]

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated
that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who
have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal
and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where
these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or
desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the
rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of
trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required
by necessity and public interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person
be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of
[15]

justice. Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the
administration of justice. One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client
privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his clients secrets or confidence and not to
abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his clients secrets and confidence
outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the
clients death. It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his
rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue
is tied from ever disclosing it. With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to
his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and
enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors
essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. [22]

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1)
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.
[23]

[24]

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca, where the client and his wife
leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their
contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals
would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsellessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had
confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment
contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client
[25]

relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself,
however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his creditors. We ruled that this
indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement.
We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list
would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from
a lawyer to his client.
(2)

[26]

The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
[27]

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of

disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.
[28]

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise

agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to
the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a
client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications,
the element of confidentiality not being present.
[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

(3)
capacity.

The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional

[33]

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for
the purpose of seeking legal advice.
[34]

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and

not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.
[35]

[36]

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated

the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to
the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out
these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved
in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a
crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.
[37]

[38]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for
disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the
complaint, the Court in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP
investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report and recommendation. 2
As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:
On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B.
Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.
On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc.
was severed as shown by another agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b").
On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with
Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent
for the purpose of filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for
the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf. 3
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing the
employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of their attorney-client relationship. We
agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute
this. In fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave
misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4 However, respondent is pleading for the Court's
compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the
following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April
10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings
and his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that
he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is fully repentant; that he has severed his

attorney-client relationship with the employees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance
as counsel in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to
henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to
defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and
independent of the former case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one
of confidence and trust in the highest degree. 7 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given
attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists.
Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. 9
Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just
admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year
after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of
the Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence even after the attorneyclient relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal
profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to
his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution
be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

FERNANDO SALONGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ISIDRO T. HILDAWA, respondent.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

In an affidavit-complaint, dated 29 March 1996, Fernando Salonga, President of Sikap at Tiyaga Alabang
Vendors Association, Inc. (STAVA), of Muntinlupa City, charged Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa with gross
misconduct and/or deceit. Complainant averred that respondent lawyer was a retained counsel of STAVA for a
number of years and, in December 1993, represented the association in Civil Cases No. 2406, No. 2413 and No.
2416, for ejectment against, respectively , Linda Del Rosario, Angelita Manuel and Francisco Vega, all
stallholders at the Alabang market, before the Municipal Trial Court of Muntinlupa. The defendants deposited
the accrued rentals with the court. On 14 November 1994, respondent lawyer filed a motion to withdraw the
deposit; thus:

JOINT MOTION TO WITHDRAW DEPOSIT

Counsel for complainant, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifest:
1. That, defendants-appellants Linda del Rosario, Angelita Manuel and Francisco Vega made their deposit of
accrued rentals on their stalls up to October 15, 1994, as follows:

a. Linda del Rosario --

P24,440.60

b. Angelita Manuel --

46,436.60

c. Francisco Vega

33,666.60

Total

---

P104,543.80

2. That, plaintiff is entitled to such deposits made by the appellants in order to pay its obligation with the
cooperative which granted the concession to the transient area for the plaintiff to operate;
3. That, counsel for the appellants register no objection to such withdrawal as shown by his conformity to the
herein motion.

Wherefore, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that plaintiff be authorized to withdraw the
corresponding amounts deposited by the defendants in the above-entitled cases.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
November 14, 1994.
MAKATI for Muntinlupa.
HILDAWA & GOMEZ
#3484 Gen. Lucban St., cor. South
Superhighway, Makati, Metro Manila
By:
(Sgd.) ISIDRO T. HILDAWA
PTR NO. 9428868 / 1-21-94 / Muntinlupa
IBP NO. 347727 / 5-06-94 / Makati
With My Conformity:
(Sgd.) Atty. PATRICIO L. BONCAYAO, JR.
2nd Flr. Cattleya Commercial
National Road, Alabang[1]
Respondent lawyer issued a receipt, dated 09 December 1994, that acknowledged his having received the
withdrawn deposit of P104,543.80. Complainant alleged that STAVA was not informed of the filing of the
motion nor did it authorize Atty. Hildawa to withdraw the amount. Despite repeated demands, respondent
lawyer refused to turn over the withdrawn sum to STAVA. To make matters even worse, added the complainant,
Atty. Hildawa appeared as counsel for Kilusang Bayan ng mga Magtitinda sa Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa
(KBMBPM), an opponent of STAVA in Civil Case No. 95-192, for Injunction with Urgent Prayer for
Restraining Order, before Branch 276 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa. Eventually, the RTC, acting
on a motion to disqualify respondent in said case, directed, in its order of 26 December 1995, the latter to
withdraw from the case and avoid committing an unethical conduct.[2]
In his answer to the complaint, Atty. Hildawa countered that complainant was fully aware of the
withdrawal of the rental in arrears deposited by the defendants in the ejectment cases and that complainant, on
several occasions, even accompanied him in following up the release of the money. He said he did not turn over
the amount withdrawn to complainant since Salonga was then on leave; instead he handed over, on 10
December 1994, the sum to Dolores Javinar, the treasurer of the association, who issued the corresponding
receipt therefor.

In his reply, Salonga disclaimed the supposed turn-over of the money to Javinar and the allegation that he
was on leave of absence.
This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In a resolution, dated 13 March 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan, found respondent guilty of violation of Canons 16 and 21 of the code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that he be suspended for one year from the practice of law. On 25 April 1998, the IBP Board
of Governors, in its Resolution NO. XIII-98-72, resolved to adopt and approve the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Soon after receiving a copy of the above-numbered resolution, respondent reverted to IBP seeking a
reconsideration of its resolution only to be thereupon informed that the case had already been forwarded to this
Court. Respondent submitted to the Court a memorandum, dated 05 August 1998, asseverating that the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner were contrary to the evidence on record. He cited the resolution of the
STAVA Board of Trustees, dated 30 October 1994, that read:

KATITIKAN NG PULONG
NG
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
NG
SIKAP AT TIYAGA ALABANG VENDORS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Ginanap noong ika-30 ng Oktubre, 1994 sa
Tanggapan nito sa Alabang
Mga Dumalo:
President

Fernando Salonga

Executive Vice-Pres.

Tirso Sapar

VP Internal

Domingo Silava

VP Security

Leonardo Gumapos

Auditor

Undo Cipriano

Hindi Dumalo:
VP External
Treasurer

Aser Arevalo
Dolores Javinar

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Unang tinalakay sa pagpupulong and kaayusan ng samahan at mga dapat tupdin ng mga kasapi
bilang kanilang tungkulin sa samahan at sa lugar na kanilang pinagtitindahan. Ang kalinisan ay
pinagtutuunan ng pansin.
Bagamat on-leave ang pangulo natin, sa kahalagahan ng pinaguusapan siya ay narito sa
pagpupulong.
Tinalakay ang hindi pagbabayad ng Market Fee at gamit electrical ng 11 dating miyembro ng
STAVA na tuwirang nagbabayad ngayon sa kooperatiba. Dahil dito ay nawawalan ng P450.00
hanggang P500.00 ang samahan sang-ayon sa taya ng pangulo.
Dahil dito, binigyan ng karapatan ang abogado ng samahan na isaayos ang dapat na hakbanging
legal upang malikom ang salapi para sa STAVA upang makatugon ito sa bayarin sa KBMBMP at sa
iba pang pagkakagastusan sa hinaharap na okasyon.
Mayroong pag-uusap upang wakasan ang usapin na idinulog ng STAVA laban sa Kooperatiba
sapagkat sa diwa ng magandang pagkakaunawaan at mabuting samahan, nais ng ipagkaloob ng
Kooperatiba ang hinihingi ng STAVA na lagyan ng hangganan ang lugar na ang mga miembro ng
STAVA ang siya lamang magtitinda sa halagang itatakda ng bawat panig.
Dito tumindig si Ester Dalde at ipinabatid sa kapulungan na siya ay kinausap ng Gen. Manager ng
Kooperatiba at tinatanong kung maari daw ay huwag ng paalisin ang labing-isang (11) tumiwalag
sa STAVA.
Tinalakay ng pamunuan ang bagay na ito at ang lahat ay nagkakaisa sa kanilang paninindigan na
dapat lamang palayasin ang lahat ng taksil at anay ng samahan upang maiwasan ang hindi
pagkakaunawaan at tuloy maging aral na din sa iba pa.
Isinunod na tinalakay ang mga balimbing o nagdadalawang mukha at inatasan na bumuo ng
kommitte tungkol dito upang mabatid kung sino-sino ang mga ito at malapatan ng kaukulang lunas.
Sa ano mang Compromise Agreement na gagawin, hindi dapat pumayag na manatili pa ang mga
taksil sa STAVA at ang kooperatiba ang siyang magbibigay sa kanila ng lugar sa alin mang parte ng
palengke ngunit hindi sa Transient Area.

Ang pagpupulong ay itinindig sa ganap na ika-2:00 ng hapon.

(Sgd.)
Fernando Salonga
President
(Sgd.)
Domingo Silava
VP Internal

(Sgd.)
Tirso Sapar
Executive Vice-President
(Sgd.)
Leonardo Gumapos
VP Security

(Sgd.)
Undo Cipriano
Auditor[3]
Respondent likewise sought to make the clarification that his services as counsel of STAVA were already
terminated in February 1995, long before he appeared as counsel for KBMBPM in December 1995.
After a close review of the records, the Court is inclined to partially grant the motion for reconsideration
submitted by respondent.
The basis of the Investigating Commissioner for finding respondent lawyer to have violated Canon 16[4] was
the supposed admission of Atty. Hildawa that he withdrew the amount of P104,543.80 for STAVA. This fact,
however, was never denied by Atty. Hildawa. It would appear that the real focus should have been then on the
issue of whether or not the withdrawal of the deposit by respondent had the clients authority. Apparently, he
did have that authority under the resolution, dated 30 October 1994, of the Board of Trustees of STAVA. The
resolution, in part was to the following effect:

Dahil dito, binigyan ng karapatan ang abogado ng samahan na isaayos ang dapat na
hakbanging legal upang malikom ang salapi para sa STAVA upang makatugon ito sa bayarin
sa KBMBPM at sa iba pang pagkakagastusan sa hinaharap na okasyon. [5]
One of the signatories of the resolution was complainant Fernando Salonga himself. Atty. Hildawa did not
keep the money but turned it over on 10 December 1994, or just one day after receiving it (on 09 December
1994), to Dolores Javinar, the STAVA treasurer, who issued a corresponding receipt therefor. What the
treasurer or STAVA might have done thereafter with the funds was no concern of respondent counsel.
The Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner, however, that respondent lawyer has transgressed
Canon 21 which requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-

client relation ceases, a mandate that he has placed in possible jeopardy by agreeing to appear as counsel for a
party his client has previously contended with in a case similarly involving said parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court ABSOLVES Atty. Isidro T. Hildawa from the charge of having violated his
obligation to hold in trust the funds of his client but REPRIMANDS him for having placed at risk his obligation
of preserving the confidentiality relationship with a previous client, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[A.C. No. 5280. March 30, 2004]

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and
file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent
the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent
prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to
his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from
him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after
reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out
later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title,
respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for Falsification of Public Documents.[1] The
letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of
title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have
filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a
resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T.
UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G.
Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F.
Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as
follows:
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001
ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan,
Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter
in favor of the former; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122,
in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy
executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely,
Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said
children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and
in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries,
thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified
documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award
No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named children. Some of these Falsified documents are
purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996,
without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales
was already dead ;
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned,
still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB
Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No.
33122knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the
same was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by
the said check which was encashed by him;
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to
refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the
said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned. [2]
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and
grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent
unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondents
request for additional compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation and social
standing.[3]
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000, [4] respondent filed his
Comment narrating his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property
situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the
latter acquired by purchase from his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales,
Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of
TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he
gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the
same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to
complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed
of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT
No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the
property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT

No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to
protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165
the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to prepare a petition for lost
title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for
transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To
these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title
ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office
informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for
expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where
he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without
leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct
infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he
is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to
file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant
was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no
longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the lettercomplaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the
Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2,
2003 before the IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There
was no showing that respondent received the notice for that days hearing and so the
hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.[8]
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty.
Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost
interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the
case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and
recommendation, portions of which read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the
Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact
of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to
the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Respondent cannot
argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint
on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent
had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty
to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in
effect perpetual for it outlasts the lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of Professional
Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve
the clients confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules
of Professional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client,
use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M.
Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no
longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid
letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason
of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver
vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that any person may bring to this Courts attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for
a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer
and member of the Bar.[10]
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors
the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:

of

the

Integrated

Bar

of

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule

21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. [11]
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of
complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed
against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. [12]
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.[13] While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court, [14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances
enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records
reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by
respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property

which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title
which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children,
thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new
title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses
therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for,
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the
present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained
by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his
service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the property
that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed
filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a)
When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
b)

When required by law;

c)
When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavitcomplaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained
by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally
owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can
equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that
is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any
lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary
interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed
against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
REBECCA J. PALM,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 8242

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR.,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
October 2, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm
(complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in
the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted
with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).
The Antecedent Facts
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of
computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as
Comtechs retained corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From
September to October 2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate
matters, including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1
October 2003, respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow
participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board of
Directors who were outside the Philippines.
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became
uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a
former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer
agreement with respondent effective November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for
Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the
Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to
order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven

and Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet
been amended to allow teleconferencing.
On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or
account for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she
was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply,
signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written
demands, Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors
Office. In the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared
as Soledads counsel.
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint[1] for disbarment against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In his Answer,[2] respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on
process and procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about
the legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February 2003, Soledad
engaged his services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to
October 2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter
concerning the operations of the corporation. Respondent further alleged that he had no access
to any record of Comtech.
Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant
met with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board
members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings.
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy
during the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to
observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he objected to the participation
of Steven and Deanna Palm because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended
to allow the participation of board members by teleconferencing.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in
the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he
became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or
connected with the limited procedural queries he handled with Comtech.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006, [3] the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of Comtech as his
former client.
The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtechs retained
counsel from February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the course of the
meetings for the intended amendments of Comtechs corporate by-laws, respondent obtained
knowledge about the intended amendment to allow members of the Board of Directors who
were outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The
IBP-CBD noted that respondent knew that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to
allow the teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected to
the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through teleconferencing on the ground that the
corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a privileged information he
obtained while he was Comtechs retained counsel.
The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech,
respondent represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-CBD ruled
that the fact that respondent represented Soledad after the termination of his professional
relationship with Comtech was not an excuse.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that
herein respondent be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.[4]

In Resolution No. XVII-2006-583[5] passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification by suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[6]
In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that
respondents motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a rehash of his
previous arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only one year.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors First
Division. The IBP Board of Governors denied respondents motion for reconsideration but
reduced his suspension from two years to one year.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[7] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court
We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Violation of the Confidentiality
of Lawyer-Client Relationship
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent
obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board
members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through
teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer.
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a
stockholders meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical
presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders meeting because a member may
vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or by-laws. [8] Hence,
there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they
could just have sent their proxies to the meeting.
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws
may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by the board of directors or
trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding
capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation. [9] It means the
stockholders are aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be
delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a
delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new

by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.
[10]
The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.[11] The client must intend the communication to be confidential. [12] Since the
proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have
been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the
stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence
within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Representing Interest in Conflict

With the Interest of a Former Client

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a
former client, in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,[13] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of
interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use
against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.[14] The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[15]
We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by
Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech
against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that
respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still

Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination
of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. [16] The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters
that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyerclient relationship has terminated.[17]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
CLARITA J. SAMALA,
Complainant,

ADM. CASE NO. 5439

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
_______________________
x----------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a complaint[1] dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant)
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a)
serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading
the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange
for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001,
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[2]
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a
series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda [3] and the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E.

Reyes
prepared
the
Report
and
[4]
Recommendation dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15
and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension
for six months.
In a minute Resolution[5] passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty
of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality
and as to the recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez for nonpayment of
rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel
for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga[6] by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.[7]
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch
75, Marikina City, entitled Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamanteand her
husband for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants
in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch
272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000,
[8]
Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz[9] warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of
being counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City,
entitled Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of MarikinaCity,
respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages
and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former
client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that
in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not
for Bustamante and Bayuga[10] albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf

of the tenants.[11] Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 986804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband, because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the
property[12] and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment.[13] But, while
claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already
severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.[14] Thus, the
filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. [15] He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic
interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. [16] It
springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[17]
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[18]
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorneys duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the clients confidence as well as from the
injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications
of his client.[19]
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him
but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. [20] The bare attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from
the clients adversary either in the same case [21] or in a different but related action.[22] A lawyer
is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.[23]

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez[24] that the termination of the relation of attorney and
client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed
cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. [25] Consequently, a lawyer
should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation.[26]
In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed
by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband, is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyerclient relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,[27] citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,[28] we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an
unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to
the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them
would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [29]

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which states that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.[30]

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents representation of Valdez and Alba
against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a
clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this
Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon
being warned by the court,[31] but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of
representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to
refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict
of interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of
the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[32]

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75
for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite
the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2,
1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and
presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property.[33] During
the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the
said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba;
so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. [34] Respondent
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when
the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for
rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27,
2000,[35] before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that
he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was
revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and
2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was
already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the
latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It
matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in
the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002[36] dismissing the complaint
for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new
one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,[37] we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon
his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court
and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. [38] He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. [39] The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to
display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense
of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.[40] As such, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate.[41]
On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c)
I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave
coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for
trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as
his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.[42]

Respondent
filed
I.S.
Nos.
00-4439[43] and
01-036162[44] both
entitled
Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights
against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306[45] for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 004318[46] against Alvin Valencia[47] for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing
the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the
other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that
the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his
client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to
defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children
by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,[48] while his first wife was still alive. He
also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years
of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.[49] Respondent further
admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by
complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship[50]and
does not consider the latter as his second family.[51] He reasoned that he was not staying
with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another inMarikina.[52]

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable
on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He
even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship
with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider
them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the
commissioner that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and
in Marikina, where Lagmay lives.[53] It is of no moment that respondent eventually
married Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not
live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.[54] Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a
lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community.
[55]
That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that
this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon
receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and
let it be entered in respondents personal records.
SO ORDERED.