Historical-Based Probability Estimation For Onshore Pipelines

i
Table of Contents
A.
HISTORICAL-BASED PROBABILITY ESTIMATION FOR ONSHORE

PIPELINES.............................................................................................................. A.1
A.1
A.2
A.3
A.4
A.5
A.6
A.7
March 2003
Scope ...........................................................................................................A.1
Approach ......................................................................................................A.1
Baseline Failure Rates .................................................................................A.2
Failure Mode Factor .....................................................................................A.3
Failure Rate Models and Attribute Modification Factors...............................A.4
A.5.1 External Corrosion ............................................................................A.4
A.5.2 Internal Corrosion .............................................................................A.9
A.5.2.1 Overview...........................................................................A.9
A.5.2.2 Simplified Model ...............................................................A.9
A.5.2.3 Refined Model ................................................................A.12
A.5.2.3.1
Liquid Product Corrosion ................................A.12
A.5.2.3.2
Wet Gas Corrosion .........................................A.16
A.5.3 Equipment Impact...........................................................................A.20
A.5.3.1 Overview.........................................................................A.20
A.5.3.2 Rate of Occurrence of Equipment Impact ......................A.22
A.5.3.3 Probability of Failure Given Impact.................................A.23
A.5.3.4 Model Scale Factor.........................................................A.25
A.5.4 Geotechnical Hazards ....................................................................A.26
A.5.5 Stress Corrosion Cracking..............................................................A.28
A.5.6 Manufacturing Cracks.....................................................................A.33
A.5.7 Seismic Hazards.............................................................................A.35
A.5.7.1 Overview.........................................................................A.35
A.5.7.2 Failure Rate due to Lateral Spreading of Liquefied
Soil..................................................................................A.37
A.5.7.3 Guidance on Characterizing Soil Liquefaction
Susceptibility...................................................................A.41
A.5.8 Other Causes..................................................................................A.42
A.5.8.1 Overview.........................................................................A.42
A.5.8.2 Gas Pipelines .................................................................A.43
A.5.8.3 Liquid Pipelines ..............................................................A.43
Effective Age ..............................................................................................A.43
References .................................................................................................A.46
PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual
A.1
A. Historical-Based Probability Estimation for

Onshore Pipelines
A.1 Scope
This document describes a set of historical-based models developed to calculate the rates of
failure by small leak, large leak or rupture for a given section of an onshore pipeline. The
models are based on historical incident data and algorithms that depend on specific line
attributes. The historical-based models were developed with an emphasis on simplicity,
efficiency and minimal data requirements based on a combination of statistical analysis,
simplified models and, where necessary, engineering judgment. The failure causes addressed
by the historical-based models are: external metal loss, internal metal loss corrosion,
equipment impact, geotechnical hazards, stress corrosion cracking, manufacturing cracks
(seam weld fatigue), seismic hazards, and other (or miscellaneous) causes.
A.2 Approach
For a majority of the failure causes considered, the annual rate of failure for a section of
pipeline is calculated from a baseline historical failure rate that is subsequently adjusted to
reflect the anticipated impact on failure of specific line attributes. Baseline failure rate
estimates are obtained from statistical analysis of historic pipeline incident data. These
baseline rate estimates are converted to line-specific estimates using failure rate adjustment
factors that depend on the values of a set of key attributes. The mode of failure is taken into
account by multiplying the adjusted total failure rate estimate by a mode factor that
represents the relative likelihood of failure by small leak, large leak and rupture.
For models directly linked to a baseline historical failure rate, the annual failure rate estimate,
R fij , for each attribute-consistent section of line, as a function of failure mode i and failure
cause j, is given by
R fij = R fb j M Fij AF j
where R fb j
[A.1a]
= the baseline failure rate for failure cause j;
M Fij
= the relative probability of failure by mode i for failure cause j; and
AF j
= the failure rate modification factor for failure cause j.
For models not directly linked to a baseline historical failure rate (see Section A.3), the
annual failure rate estimate for each section of line is given by
R f ij = R f j M Fij
where R f j
March 2003
[A.1b]
= the failure rate for failure cause j.
A.2
Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines
A.3 Baseline Failure Rates

The failure rate is defined as the annual number of incidents involving loss of containment
divided by the length of pipeline in operation for the year in which incidents are reported.
The baseline failure rate, Rfb, is defined herein as the average failure rate for a reference
pipeline section associated with a particular pipeline system, operating company or industry
sector. It is intended to reflect typical conditions relating to construction, operation and
maintenance for lines where the failure cause of interest constitutes a significant integrity
threat. Note that the reference pipeline can and will be different for different failure causes
(e.g. the attributes of a line where SCC constitutes a significant failure hazard may not be
typical of pipelines where internal corrosion is a significant failure hazard).
For a given pipeline system the baseline failure rate estimates are best obtained from
operating company data if the system exposure (i.e. the total length and age of the system) is
sufficient to yield a statistically significant number of failure incidents. In the absence of
appropriate company or system specific data, an estimate of the baseline failure rates can be
obtained from historical incident and exposure data gathered and published by government
regulatory agencies, industry associations, and consultants.
A review of onshore pipeline incident data and statistical summary reports was carried out to
facilitate the development of a set of reference failure rates (and corresponding reference
pipeline attributes) that could be assumed to apply to the population of natural gas, crude oil
and petroleum product pipelines as a whole. Allowing for differences in incident reporting
requirements associated with different reporting agencies, and recognizing that in the context
of the risk estimation approach adopted herein, we are interested in rate estimates that
include small leaks, which are often not reported, the review supports the baseline failure
rates summarized in Table A.1.
Failure Cause
Failure Rate (per km yr)
External Metal Loss Corrosion
3.0 x 10-4
Internal Metal Loss Corrosion (simplified | refined)
3.0 x 10-4 | 2.5 x 10-2
Mechanical Damage
3.0 x 10-4
Geotechnical Hazards
N/A
Stress Corrosion Cracking
3.0 x 10-4
Manufacturing Cracks (seam weld fatigue)
N/A
Seismic Hazards
N/A
Other (excluding mechanical components)
2.0 x 10-4
Table A.1 Baseline Failure Rates for Onshore Pipelines
Note that baseline rates are not tabulated for failure causes involving geotechnical hazards,
seismic hazards and manufacturing cracks. This reflects the fact that these failure causes are
highly location or line specific (as opposed to being a common problem) and the associated
failure rates are therefore not adequately characterized using the adjusted baseline failure rate
approach described above. Instead, an approach to failure rate estimation that keys on
March 2003
A.3
specific attributes of the line in question is be employed for these failure causes. The specific
approach adopted for each of these excepted failure causes will be described in the sections
of the report devoted to their respective failure rate models.
A.4 Failure Mode Factor

The relative probability of failure by small leak, large leak, or rupture will depend on the
failure mechanism being considered. For example, metal loss corrosion failures are
predominantly small leaks (i.e. pin holes) whereas mechanical damage failures caused by
excavation equipment typically involve a greater percentage of large leaks and ruptures.
In PIRAMID, the distinction between the three failure modes is tied to the hole size, or more
explicitly, the equivalent circular hole diameter. Pipeline failure rate summaries that report
failure mode data by equivalent hole size (e.g. Fearnehough 1985, and EGIG 1999) typically
define the transition from small leak to large leak by an equivalent hole diameter of 20 mm,
and the transition between large leak and rupture by an equivalent diameter ranging from
80 mm (Fearnehough 1985) to the line diameter (EGIG 1999). Based on this approach to
failure mode distinction, the above references suggest relative failure mode probabilities for
gas transmission pipelines in the following ranges:
Corrosion 85 to 95% small leaks, 5 to 10% large leaks and 0 to 5% rupture

External interference 20 to 25% small leaks, 50 to 55% large leaks and 20 to 25% rupture
Ground movement 10 to 20% small leaks, 35 to 45% large leaks and 35 to 45% rupture
Construction/Material Defects 55 to 70% small leaks, 25 to 35% large leaks and 5 to 10% rupture
Other causes/unknown 70 to 90% small leaks, 5 to 15% large leaks and 5 to 15% rupture
Note that stress corrosion cracking is not specific addressed in these summary reports,
however, anecdotal information on the North American experience suggests that most
failures are large leaks or ruptures.
The earthquake loss estimation methodology developed by the US Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA 1999) assumes that damage due to seismically induced
permanent ground movement will consist of 20% leaks and 80% breaks.
Representative failure mode splits based on the above information, assuming that the
behaviour of gas and liquid product pipelines at failure is comparable, are summarized in
Table A.2.
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A.4
Failure Cause
Failure Mode
Small Leak
Large Leak
Rupture
External and Internal Corrosion
85 %
10 %
5%
Equipment Impact
25 %
50 %
25 %
Geotechnical Hazards
20 %
40 %
40 %
Stress Corrosion Cracking
0%
50 %
50 %
Manufacturing Cracks (seam weld fatigue)
60 %
30 %
10 %
Seismic Hazards
0%
20 %
80 %
Other Causes
80 %
10 %
10 %
Table A.2 Reference Failure Mode Splits for Onshore Pipelines
A.5 Failure Rate Models and Attribute Modification Factors

The algorithms that define the failure rate modification factor, AF, for models that depend on
baseline historical failure rates, and the algorithms that define the failure rate, Rf, for models
that do not depend on baseline historical failure rates, are described in the following sections.
A.5.1 External Corrosion
Pipeline failure associated with external metal loss corrosion is typically the result of a loss
of pipe protection at locations where the surrounding soil environment supports a corrosion
reaction. The factors that affect the susceptibility of a line to external corrosion include: the
type and condition of the coating system; the level of cathodic protection; and the corrosivity
of the surrounding soil medium. Also, the operating temperature of the pipeline affects the
corrosivity of the environment and the general condition of the coating system because high
temperatures promote coating decay and accelerate chemical reactions. Because external
corrosion is a time dependent mechanism, the extent of corrosion damage and its propensity
to cause line failure will be significantly influenced by the duration of exposure (i.e. the line
age) and the thickness of the pipe wall that must be penetrated by a growing corrosion
feature. The specific line attributes used in this model are listed in Table A.3.
March 2003
Attribute Name
Benefit Period of Hydrotest - External
Corrosion
Units
A.5
Attribute Description
Metric (Imperial)
The length of time over which a hydrostatic pressure

years
test event is assumed to provide a reduction in the

failure rate due to external corrosion.
Benefit Period of Inspection - External

Corrosion
The length of time over which an inspection and

years
maintenance event is assumed to provide a reduction

in the failure rate due to external corrosion.
An indication of whether electrical shorting at cased
Casing Short
Choice
locations is contributing to a lack of effective cathodic

protection at exposed locations on the pipe wall.
A characterization of the adequacy and uniformity of
Cathodic Protection Level
Choice
the voltage potential generated by the cathodic

protection system.
Coating Condition
Choice
Coating Type
Choice
Date of External Coating Rehabilitation
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Installation
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Last Hydrotest
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Last Inspection - External

Corrosion
system.
The type of external coating applied to the pipeline.
The date when the external coating system was
replaced or otherwise rehabilitated.
The date when the pipeline was installed.
The date when the most recent hydrostatic pressure
test was performed.
The date when the most recent inspection and
YYYY/MM/DD
maintenance event having an effect on internal

corrosion was performed.
Effectiveness of Inspection - External

Corrosion
A characterization of the integrity of the external coating
The reduction in the failure rate due to external

%
corrosion resulting from the most recent inspection and

maintenance event.
An indication of whether or not stray electrical currents
Electrical Interference
Choice
are undermining the effectiveness of cathodic

protection at exposed locations on the pipe wall.
The average temperature of the product being
Product Temperature
C (F)
transported through the line. (Note that pipe body

temperature is assumed to be equal to the product
temperature.)
A characterization of the degree to which the soil
Soil Corrosivity
Choice
conditions surrounding the pipe provide an environment

that is conducive to the development of metal loss
corrosion in unprotected areas of pipe.
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
The nominal wall thickness of the line pipe.
Table A.3 Line Attributes Required by External Corrosion Model
The failure rate modification factor developed to reflect the impact of these factors on the
baseline external corrosion failure rate is
March 2003
A.6
*
2.28
AF = K EC ec (T + 17.8) FSC FCP FCF
t
where KEC
*
ec
t
T
FSC
FCP
FCF
[A.2]
= external corrosion model scaling factor;

= effective line age for external corrosion (see Section A.6);
= wall thickness;
= operating temperature (assumed equal to product temperature);
= soil corrosivity factor;
= cathodic protection factor; and
= coating factor.
The core relationship involving the line age wall thickness t and operating temperature T
was developed from a multiple linear regression analysis of failure rate data on hydrocarbon
liquid pipelines operating in California published by the California State Fire Marshall
(CSFM 1993). It should be noted that the actual relationship derived from the California
pipeline incident data involved line diameter rather than wall thickness. The diameter term
was translated into a wall thickness term (which, in the context of corrosion failure, is
considered to be the more relevant parameter) by assuming that on average wall thickness is
directly proportional to line diameter.
The soil corrosivity factor FSC is an index that scales the rate modification factor over a range
that reflects the impact of variations in soil corrosivity on the corrosion failure rate. The
index multipliers associated with each value of the soil corrosivity attribute are given in
Table A.4.
Soil
Corrosivity
Resistivity
Very low
> 10,000
Low
5000 - 10,000
Moderate
(ohm cm)
Soil Drainage and Texture
FSC
excessively drained - coarse texture
0.33
well drained - moderately coarse texture, or

poorly drained - coarse texture
0.67
2000 - 5000
well drained - moderately fine texture, or

poorly drained - moderately coarse texture, or
very poorly drained with high steady water table
1.0
High
1000 - 2000
well drained - fine texture, or

poorly drained - moderately fine texture, or
very poorly drained with fluctuating water table
2.3
Very high
< 1000
poorly drained - fine texture, or

mucks, peats with fluctuating water table
3.3
Table A.4 Soil Corrosivity Factor
The order of magnitude range was established based on the results of corrosion metal loss
tests conducted on steel pipe samples buried in soils of various resistivities as reported by
Crews (1976). The corrosivity categories and corresponding resistivity ranges (with
March 2003
A.7
descriptions of characteristic soil drainage and texture) were adapted from those developed
by Miller et al. (1981) as a basis for ranking the underground corrosion potential based on
soil surveys.
The cathodic protection factor FCP is an index that scales the rate modification factor over a
range that reflects the impact of varying degrees of cathodic protection system effectiveness
on corrosion failure rate. The index multipliers associated with each value of the cathodic
protection level attribute are given in Table A.5.
Cathodic Protection Level
Characterization
FCP
Consistently within range
adequate voltage, uniform level
0.5
Isolated excursions
adequate average voltage, some variability
1.0
Extensive excursions
inadequate voltage and/or high variability
2.0
None
5.0
Table A.5 Cathodic Protection Factor
The order of magnitude range was established primarily based on failure rate data reported
by the CSFM (1993) that indicates a failure rate approximately five times higher for
unprotected pipe. The multipliers 0.5 and 2.0 were introduced based on judgement to reflect
the fact that the five fold reduction in failure rate is an average value which therefore applies
to pipelines having average cathodic protection levels and that some allowance should be
made for above and below average conditions.
Note that the impact of two additional line attributes, the presence of casing shorts and
electrical interference, are tied to the cathodic protection factor. The assumption implicit in
the model is that if there is a casing short, then the cathodic protection factor will be set equal
to the no protection state (FCP = 5.0) and if there is electrical interference, then the cathodic
protection factor will be downgraded by one category.
The coating factor FCF is an index that scales the rate modification factor to reflect the impact
of different coating types and their condition on corrosion failure rate. The index multipliers
associated with each combination of coating type and coating condition are given in
Table A.6.
March 2003
A.8
Coating Type
FCF
Completely
sound
Isolated
damage
Extensive
damage
Not applicable
(no coating)
Fusion bonded epoxy
0.25
0.5
1.0
1.0
Extruded polyethylene
0.25
0.5
1.0
1.0
Coal tar
0.5
1.0
2.0
2.0
Wax and vinyl tape
1.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
Asphalt
1.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
Polyethylene tape
1.0
4.0
8.0
8.0
Bare (no coating)
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
Coating
Condition
Table A.6 Coating Factor
The coating related index multipliers in Table A.6 were adapted from a study by
Kiefner et al. (1990) wherein factors are cited based on the perceived track record of
generic coating types.
The model scale factor KEC serves to adjust the failure rate modification factor to a value of
unity for the external corrosion reference section defined as the line section associated with
the reference value of all line attributes that influence the external metal loss failure rate
estimate. The intention is that the baseline failure rate for external corrosion should apply
directly to the reference section (hence the need for a corresponding attribute modification
factor of 1).
The expression for KEC is obtained by first rearranging Equation [A.2] and setting AF = 1.0 to
give
K EC =
2.28
(T + 17.8) FSC FCP FCF
t
*
ec
[A.3]
The value of the model scale factor is calculated using Equation [A.3] by substituting the
values of all parameters that are associated with the reference section. The reference section
parameter values should be developed in conjunction with the baseline failure rate estimate
(see Section A.3) on a pipeline system, operating company or industry basis, depending on
the intended application of the model.
Based on a review of incident data summaries in the public domain the following attribute
values are considered to be representative of the external corrosion reference section:
March 2003
Age
Coating type
Coating condition
Cathodic protection level
Product (operating) temperature
Soil corrosivity
Wall thickness
A.9
= 38 years;
= Coal tar;
= Isolated damage;
= Isolated excursions;
= 25 C;
= Moderate; and
= 5.82 mm.
The corresponding model scale factor is KEC = 2.92 x 10-5.

A.5.2 Internal Corrosion
A.5.2.1 Overview
Pipeline failure associated with internal metal loss corrosion is primarily influenced by the
corrosivity of the transported product and the product flow conditions. Like external
corrosion, internal corrosion is a time dependent mechanism. The extent of corrosion
damage and its propensity to cause line failure will therefore be significantly influenced by
the duration of exposure (i.e. the line age) and the thickness of the pipe wall that must be
penetrated by a growing corrosion feature.
Two models are available for estimating internal corrosion failure rates; a so-called
simplified model in which the product corrosivity is defined directly by a single line
attribute; and a refined model in which the product corrosivity, as represented by the metal
loss rate, is calculated from a set of line attributes that reflect specific characteristics of the
product and product flow regime. Use of the simplified model places the responsibility on
the user to accurately characterize product corrosivity whereas use of the refined model
requires significantly more pipeline-specific information.
Note that the refined model is intended to address CO2 corrosion of either liquid multiphase
flow, using a corrosion rate model developed by Gopal and Jepson (1996); or wet gas flow,
based on a model by de Waard et al. (1991). The refined model does reflect the impact of
H2S content on corrosion rates but it does not address other internal corrosion mechanisms
(e.g. microbial induced corrosion or MIC) because their characteristics can be extremely linespecific and they fall beyond the scope of this model. Note also that neither model accounts
for the effects of internal pipe coatings or liners.
A.5.2.2 Simplified Model
The specific line attributes used in the simplified internal metal loss corrosion model are
listed in Table A.7.
March 2003
A.10
Attribute Name
Benefit Period of Hydrotest - Internal
Corrosion
Units
Metric (Imperial)

years

failure rate due to internal corrosion.
Benefit Period of Inspection - Internal

Corrosion

years

in the failure rate due to internal corrosion.
YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Last Inspection - Internal

Corrosion

test was performed.
YYYY/MM/DD

Effectiveness of Inspection - Internal

Corrosion
The reduction in the failure rate due to internal

%

maintenance event.
Product Corrosivity
Choice
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
A characterization of the corrosivity of the product

mixture.
Table A.7 Line Attributes Required by Internal Corrosion Model (simplified method)
baseline internal metal loss failure rate is
*
AF = K IC ic
t
where KIC
ic*
t
FPC
FPC
[A.4]
= internal corrosion model scaling factor;

= effective line age for internal corrosion (see Section A.6);
= wall thickness; and
= product corrosivity factor.
The core relationship involving line age and wall thickness t was inferred from the model
developed for external corrosion which suggests that the failure rate is directly proportional
to line age and inversely proportional to wall thickness. Note that the line operating
temperature term in the external corrosion model was dropped because the effect of
temperature on the failure rate is to be covered under the broadly defined measure of product
corrosivity.
The product corrosivity factor FPC is an index that scales the rate modification factor over a
range that reflects the impact of variations in product corrosivity on corrosion failure rate.
The index multipliers associated with each value of the product corrosivity attribute are given
are given in Table A.8.
March 2003
Product Corrosivity
Grow Rate
A.11
Index
(mm/yr)
Very low
< 0.02
0.04
Low
0.02 to < 0.1
0.2
Moderate
0.1 to < 0.5
1.0
High
0.5 to < 2.5
5.0
Extreme
2.5
25.0
Table A.8 Product Corrosivity Factor
The index range was established based on the simple assumption that if the corrosion growth
rate is essentially constant, and failure rate has been shown to be inversely proportional to
wall thickness, then it follows that the failure rate will be directly proportional to pit depth
growth rate. The index multipliers are therefore directly proportional to the assumed growth
rates for each product category. The corrosion growth rate ranges associated with each
product category are consistent with values that are generally accepted in the process piping
industry.
The model scale factor KIC serves to adjust the failure rate modification factor to a value of
unity for the internal corrosion reference section defined as the line section associated with
the reference value of all line attributes that influence the internal metal loss failure rate
estimate. The intention is that the baseline failure rate for internal corrosion should apply
directly to the reference segment (hence the need for a corresponding attribute modification
factor of 1). The expression for KIC is obtained by first rearranging Equation [A.4] and
setting AF = 1.0 to give
K IC =
1

FPC
t
[A.5]
*
ic
values are considered to be representative of the internal corrosion reference section:
Age
Product corrosivity
Wall thickness
March 2003
= 38 years;
= Moderate; and
= 5.82 mm.
A.12
The corresponding model scale factor is KIC = 1.53 x 10-1.

A.5.2.3 Refined Model
A.5.2.3.1 Liquid Product Corrosion
The specific line attributes used in the refined internal metal loss corrosion model for liquid
multiphase flow are
Attribute Name
Corrosion
Corrosion
Units
Metric (Imperial)
years

years

YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD

test was performed.
YYYY/MM/DD

mm (in)
The nominal outside diameter of the line pipe.

Corrosion
Diameter
Corrosion
Inhibitor Effectiveness
Liquid Flow Characterization
Liquid Fraction Water-Cut
Operating Pressure Gradient

maintenance event.
The reduction in the rate of internal corrosion

attributable to the use of inhibitors in the product
mixture.
Choice
A characterization of the liquid phase flow (areas of

liquid separation or stagnation) in the product mixture.
Ratio
The ratio of water volume to total liquid volume for the

product mixture.
kPa/km (psi/mi)
The pressure gradient driving the product mixture

through the pipeline.
Partial Pressure CO2
kPa (psi)
The concentration of dissolved CO2 in the product

mixture, expressed as a partial pressure calculated
based on mole fraction.
Partial Pressure H2S
kPa (psi)
The average concentration of dissolved H2S in the

product mixture, expressed as a partial pressure
calculated based on mole fraction.
Product Temperature
C (F)

temperature.)
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
Table A.9 Line Attributes Required by the Liquid Product Internal Corrosion Model (refined method)
March 2003
A.13
The liquid product failure rate modification factor developed to reflect the impact of key
factors on the baseline internal metal loss failure rate is
ic*
AF = K ICL
t
where KICL
*
ic
t
V0
Foil
FH2S
Finhibit
Vo Foil FH 2 S Finhibit
[A.6]
= liquid product internal corrosion model scale factor;

= wall thickness;
= basic corrosion rate;
= liquid hydrocarbon factor;
= hydrogen sulfide factor; and
= inhibitor factor.
The basic corrosion rate is calculated using an empirically derived model for full pipe flow
developed by Gopal and Jepson (1996). This model estimates the corrosion rate as a function
of total wall shear stress, CO2 partial pressure, and temperature. It is given by
Vo = 416649 (T + 273.15) e
5041
(T + 273.15 )
pCO2
1000
0.83
w0.1
[A.7a]
where T
= product temperature (C);
pCO2 = carbon dioxide partial pressure (kPa); and
w
= wall shear stress (N/m2).
The wall shear stress is given by
w =
D
Pslope
4000
[A.7b]
where Pslope = operating pressure gradient = P/L (kPa/km); and

D
= diameter (mm).
This basic corrosion rate model is only applicable to pipelines under full pipe flow
conditions. In general, corrosion rates for slug flow conditions are much higher than those
for full pipe flow. It has been suggested (Gopal and Jepson 1996) that this is caused by the
stripping of poorly adhered layers of corrosion products due to a combination of high wall
shear stress and turbulence under slug flow conditions.
The liquid hydrocarbon factor, Foil, is intended to account for the potential protection
afforded to the pipe surface by the liquid hydrocarbon phase. The index multiplier associated
with relevant line attributes is given in Table A.10. The model underlying this factor
assumes that internal corrosion can only occur when the interior pipe surface is wetted. It
further assumes that the water phase can wet the pipe surface if the water cut is greater than
March 2003
A.14
or equal to 0.3, or if flow conditions allow the water to separate from the liquid hydrocarbon.
Note that separation is considered likely for flow velocities less than 1.0 m/s but it can also
occur in bent or non-horizontal pipe at higher flow velocities.
Foil
No separation/stagnation
Separation/stagnation
Water cut < 0.3
0.0
1.0
Water cut >= 0.3
1.0
1.0
Table A.10 Liquid Hydrocarbon Protection Factor
The hydrogen sulfide factor, FH2S, is an index that adjusts the failure rate modification factor
to acknowledge the potential two-fold increase in corrosion rate caused by the presence of
hydrogen sulfide (Videm 1995). The factor indices are shown in Table A.11.
H2S Partial Pressure (pH2S)
FH2S
pH2S 0.056 kPa
1.0
pH2S > 0.056 kPa
2.0
Table A.11 Hydrogen Sulfide Factor
The inhibitor factor, Finhib, scales the failure rate based on the assumed effectiveness of the
inhibitor used in the pipeline. Inhibitor effectiveness is defined in terms of the expected
reduction in metal loss corrosion rate. The factor is given by
Finhib = 1.0
E
100
[A.8]
where E is the inhibitor effectiveness (in percent).

The model scale factor KICL serves to adjust the failure rate modification factor to a value of
unity for the internal corrosion reference section defined as the line section associated with
the reference value of all line attributes that influence the internal metal loss failure rate
estimate. The intention is that the baseline failure rate for internal corrosion should apply
directly to the reference segment (hence the need for a corresponding attribute modification
factor of 1). The expression for KICL is obtained by rearranging Equation [A.6] and setting
AF = 1.0 to give
t
1.0
K ICL = *
ic Vo Foil FH 2 S Finhibit
[A.9]
March 2003
A.15
Based on three case studies by Jones et al. (1998) and a review of other literature the
following attribute values are used to define the liquid product reference section:
Age
Diameter
Operating Pressure Gradient
Partial Pressure - C02
Partial Pressure - H2S
Product Temperature
Wall Thickness
= 14 years;
= 610 mm,
= 0 % (No Inhibitor)
= No separation/stagnation
= 0.33 (ratio)
= 42.84 kPa/km
= 114.2 kPa
= 0.0 kPa
= 23. 9 C
= 11.91 mm
The corresponding model scale factor is KICL = 0.8165.
March 2003
A.16
A.5.2.3.2 Wet Gas Corrosion
The specific line attributes used in the refined internal metal loss corrosion model for wet-gas
flow are
Attribute Name
Corrosion
Corrosion
Units
Metric (Imperial)
years

years

g/(m s)
(1E-6lb/(ft s))
The rate of condensation of the transported water

vapour.
YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD

test was performed.
YYYY/MM/DD

Condensation Rate

Corrosion
Corrosion

maintenance event.
The reduction in the rate of internal corrosion

attributable to the use of inhibitors in the product
mixture.
Choice
A characterization of the liquid phase flow (areas of

liquid separation or stagnation) in the product mixture.
Ratio
The ratio of water volume to total liquid volume for the

product mixture.
Partial Pressure CO2
kPa (psi)
The concentration of dissolved CO2 in the product

mixture, expressed as a partial pressure calculated
based on mole fraction.
Partial Pressure H2S
kPa (psi)
The average concentration of dissolved H2S in the

product mixture, expressed as a partial pressure
calculated based on mole fraction.
pH
pH
Pressure Profile
kPa (psi)
The acidity of the product water-cut.

The anticipated maximum operating pressure in the
pipeline defined at the start and end of the line and at
selected reference points along the length of the line.
(Note that the location of intermediate points should be
chosen to adequately characterize the pressure profile
given that the program uses linear interpolation to infer
the line pressure at all locations between specified
reference points. Note also that the specified pressure
should reflect an upper bound pressure profile
associated with likely worst case operating conditions
including, for example, periodic line pack or shut in.)
Product Temperature
C (F)

temperature.)
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
Table A.12 Line Attributes Required by the Wet-Gas Internal Corrosion Model (refined method)
March 2003
A.17
The wet-gas failure rate modification factor developed to reflect the impact of key factors on
the baseline internal metal loss failure rate is
ic*
AF = K ICG
t
where KICG
*
ic
t
V0
FH2S
Fscale
FpH
Foil
Fcond
Finhibit
Vo FH 2 S Fscale F pH Foil Fcond Finhibit
[A.10]
= wet-gas internal corrosion model scale factor;

= wall thickness;
= basic corrosion rate;
= hydrogen sulfide factor;
= protective film factor;
= pH factor;
= liquid hydrocarbon factor;
=.condensation factor; and
= inhibitor factor.
The basic corrosion rate prediction and adjustment factors, with the exception of FH2S and
Finhibit, are based on a model developed by deWaard et al. (1991). This model has been
updated in recent years; however, the basic equations have not changed. The 1991 version
has been used because it is completely in the public domain and later versions of the model
reported in the literature do not include empirically derived constants. The basic corrosion
rate is given by
log(Vo ) = 5.8
where: T
fCO2
1710
+ 0.67 log( fCO2 100.0)
T + 273.15
[A.11a]
= product temperature (C); and

= carbon dioxide fugacity (kPa).
Note that carbon dioxide fugacity is to calculate the basic corrosion rate instead of the CO2
partial pressure because fugacity accounts for both the total pressure of CO2 in the system
and the activity of CO2 in the presence of other gases. Fugacity is given by
fCO2 = pCO2 a
[A.11b]
where: pCO2 = carbon dioxide partial (kPa); and

a
= fugacity coefficient.
The fugacity coefficient is based on results reported by deWaard for the fugacity of a binary
gas system consisting of CO2 and CH4, as calculated using methods described by
Lammers (1973).
March 2003
A.18
The protective film factor, Fscale, is used to adjust the basic corrosion rate (and failure rate
modification factor) to account for the formation of a protective film at higher temperatures.
The corrosion product film changes texture with temperature and at temperatures below
approximately 60 C the film is easily removed by flowing liquids. With increased
temperature the protective film is more protective and more resistant to erosion.
The protective film factor is given by the following
1 .0
1 .0
and
log( Fscale ) = 2400
T + 273.15 Tscale + 273.15

Fscale 1.0
[A.12a]
[A.12b]
where T is the product temperature and Tscale is the scaling temperature given by
Tscale =
2400
273.15
6.7 + 0.6 log( fCO2 )
[A.12c]
The presence of H2S is assumed to interfere with the formation of a stable protective scale
(Srinvasan 1999); so in situations where the H2S partial pressure is greater than zero the
protective film factor Fscale is set to 1.0.
The pH factor, FpH, is given by
log( F pH ) = 0.32( pH sat pH act )
for pHsat > pHact;
[A.13a]
FpH = 1.0
for pHsat = pHact;
[A.13b]
for pHsat < pHact;
[A.13c]
log( F pH ) = 0.13( pH act pH sat )
1.6
where pHsat is the pH at FeCO3 or Fe3CO4 saturation; and pHact is the measured pH of the
water phase. Note that pH level will depend on the source of new water and the time and
distance required for Fe++ to reach saturation.
The value of pHsat for different product temperatures and CO2 concentrations is given by
1307
pH sat = min1.36 +
0.17 log( fCO2 ), 5.4 0.66 log( fCO2 )
T + 273
[A.14]
The model does not allow for the combined effects of Fscale and FpH since the corrosion rate
is governed by local conditions on the scale covered steel surface rather than by the bulk
water pH. FpH is therefore set to 1.0 when the Fscale is less than 1.0.
March 2003
A.19
The condensation factor, Fcond, accounts for the decrease in corrosion rate that occurs in the
presence of condensing water. It is given by
Fcond = 0.4rcond
[A.15a]
Fcond <= 1.0
[A.15b]
where rcond is the water vapour condensation rate (g/m2s).

Calculating the condensation rate for a line segment can be a complicated process that is
highly dependant on the specific cooling process and the product flow rate, however, typical
conditions in wet gas transport pipelines are such that the condensation rate is usually far
below 0.25 g/m2 s. Work by de Waard et al. (1991) suggests that a condensation factor based
on an assumed condensation rate of 0.25 g/m2 s will provide a reasonable if somewhat
conservative estimate of the corrosion rate in the absence of line specific data.
The liquid hydrocarbon factor, Foil, is intended to account for the potential protection of the
pipe surface provided by liquid hydrocarbon product in the flow stream. It is assumed that
internal corrosion can only occur when the interior pipe surface is wetted. The values of
Foil are given in Table A.10.
The H2S factor, FH2S, is an index that adjusts the failure rate modification factor to account
for the potential increase in corrosion rate caused by the presence of hydrogen sulfide
(Videm 1995). The values of FH2S are given in Table A.11.
The inhibitor factor, Finhib, scales the failure rate based on the assumed effectiveness of the
inhibitor used in the pipeline. Inhibitor effectiveness is defined in terms of the expected
reduction in metal loss corrosion rate. The factor is given by
Finhib = 1.0
E
100
[A.16]
where E is the inhibitor effectiveness (in percent).

The expression for the model scale factor KICG is obtained by rearranging Equation [A.10]
and setting AF = 1.0 to give
t
K ICG = *
ic
1.0
Vo FH 2 S Fscale F pH Foil Fcond Finhibit
[A.17]
March 2003
A.20
Based on a three case studies by Jones et al. (1998) and a review of other literature the
following attribute values are used for the wet-gas refined internal corrosion reference
section:
Age
Condensation Rate
Partial Pressure - C02
Partial Pressure - H2S
pH
Pressure
Product Temperature
Wall Thickness
= 14 years;
= 0.25 g/m2s;
= 0 %;
= No separation/stagnation;
= 0.33 (ratio);
= 62.05 kPa;
= 0.0 (no H2S);
= 5.5 pH;
= 6205.3 kPa;
= 23. 9 C; and
= 11.91 mm.
The corresponding model scale factor is KICG = 2.9950.

A.5.3 Equipment Impact
A.5.3.1 Overview
Mechanical damage incidents are typically caused by construction or excavation equipment

working in the area of the pipeline. The potential for line failure due to damage inflicted by
this type of equipment depends on both the likelihood of equipment impact and the
subsequent likelihood of pipe failure given impact. The factors that affect the susceptibility
of a line to equipment impact include: 1) the level of construction/excavation activity on or
near the right-of-way, and 2) the degree to which line burial depth, right-of-way condition
and signage, one-call systems, and line patrols reduce the potential for impact given activity.
The potential for line failure given interference will depend on the type of equipment
involved in the incident (i.e. the level of force applied and the configuration of the indentor)
and the resistance of the pipe to a puncture-type failure, which is largely dependent on the
thickness of the pipe wall and the strength of the material. The specific line attributes used in
this model are listed in Table A.13.
March 2003
Attribute Name
Units
A.21
Metric (Imperial)
A category describing the relative frequency of

occurrence of excavation activity on the right-of-way
Activity Zone
Choice
and an indication of the likely nature of the activity (with

shallow excavations being associated with
undeveloped areas and deep excavations being
associated with developed or developing areas).
An indication of whether or not permanent above
Alignment Markers - Above Ground
Choice
ground markers (such as fencing or concrete curbs)

exist to provide an obvious indication of the location of
the pipeline alignment.
An indication of whether or not buried markers (such as
Alignment Markers - Buried
Choice
coloured tape) exist to provide an indication of the

location of the pipeline alignment after the start of
excavation activity.
An indication of the placement of explicit signage that
Alignment Markers - Explicit Signage
Choice
describes and locates the pipeline and provides a

telephone number for dig notification.
Crossings / Special Terrain

Depth of Burial
Choice
m (ft)
Diameter
mm (in)
Dig Notification Requirement
Choice
A characterization of the type of crossing or special

terrain feature encountered by the pipeline.
The depth of top of the pipeline below ground surface.
The legislative requirements pertaining to the need for
parties planning excavation activities to use a one-call
system.
Dig Notification Response
Choice
The action taken by the operator in response to a dig

notification.
An indication of whether or not buried physical
Mechanical Protection
Choice
protection (such as concrete slabs or steel plates)

exists to effectively prevent direct contact between the
pipe body and any excavation equipment.
One-call System Type
Choice
Public Awareness Level
Choice
The type of one-call system in place.

An assessment of the relative level of public awareness
regarding the presence of, and hazards posed by,
buried pipelines.
An assessment of the degree to which the overall
Right-of-way Indication
Choice
condition of the right-of-way provides an indication of

the existence of a buried pipeline in the immediate
area.
Surveillance Interval
Choice
The time interval between right-of-way patrols.
Surveillance Method
Choice
The method employed to patrol the right-of-way.
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
Yield Strength (SMYS)
MPa (ksi)
Specified minimum yield strength of the line pipe. (e.g.

5XL60 should be reported as 60 ksi or 414 MPa)
Table A.13 Line Attributes Required by Equipment Impact Model
March 2003
A.22
The failure rate modification factor developed to reflect the influence of these factors on the
baseline equipment impact failure rate is
AF = K MD RHIT PF |H
[A.18]
where RHIT is the rate of occurrence of equipment impact events, PF|H is the probability of
failure given impact, and KMD is the model scaling factor.
A.5.3.2 Rate of Occurrence of Equipment Impact
The rate of occurrence of equipment impact events is estimated using an algorithm developed
using so-called fault tree analysis techniques. The algorithm takes the form
R HIT = rB1 f ( p B 2 , p B 3, ... p B15 )
[A.19]
where rB1 is the rate of excavation-related activity on the alignment (in events per unit length
per year) and pBi is the probability of occurrence of basic event Bi, where each basic event is
defined as the possible outcome of actions that can be shown to depend on physical
characteristics of the pipeline and its right-of-way, and various operating and preventative
maintenance practices employed by the operator. The basic events that are assumed to
contribute to the potential for a line hit, and the line attributes that are assumed to influence
each basic event probability are:
Equipment activity on the alignment (activity zone and crossings);

Parties fail to use one-call before moving onto right-of-way (public awareness level, dig
notification requirement and one-call system type);
Right-of-way indicators not recognized (public awareness level and right-of-way
indication);
Parties ignore right-of-way indications (public awareness level and one-call system
type);
One-call system fails to notify operator (one-call system type);
Explicit signage not seen (public awareness level and alignment markers-explicit
signage);
Parties ignore explicit signage (public awareness level);
No patrol during period of activity (surveillance interval);
Patrol personnel fail to detect activity (surveillance method);
Operator fails to ensure correct location of alignment (dig notification response);
Above ground markers fail to convey alignment location (alignment markers above
ground);
Buried markers fail to convey alignment location (alignment markers buried);
Accidental activity of located alignment (dig notification response);
Excavation depth exceeds burial depth (land use and depth of burial); and
Mechanical protection fails to protect pipe (mechanical protection).
March 2003
A.23
The hit frequency algorithm outlined above is common to both the historical-based and the
reliability-based probability estimation models that have been developed for equipment
impact. See Appendix D, Section D.2.1 for a detailed description of the hit frequency model.
A.5.3.3 Probability of Failure Given Impact
Given a mechanical interference event, the probability of failure, PF|H, is equal to the
probability that the load, L, will exceed the pipe wall resistance, R, at the location of impact.
This can be written as
PF | H = P(L > R ) = P(R L < 0)
[A.20]
If, as a first order approximation, the uncertainty associated with both the applied load and
the pipe resistance are characterized by assuming that both parameters are normally
distributed then a solution to Equation [A.20] is given by

PF |H = P( R L < 0) = L2 R 2
L +R
where L
L
R
R
[A.21]
= the mean value of the applied load;

= the standard deviation of the applied load;
= the mean value of the pipe resistance;
= the standard deviation of the pipe resistance;
and is the standard normal distribution function.

The magnitude of the applied load is a function of the weight of the construction/excavation
equipment impacting the pipeline. Based on an estimate of the weight distribution of
excavators operating in North America obtained by C-FER from industry, and assuming that
the impact force in kN is equal to 5.63 times the excavator weight in tonnes
(Spiekhout 1995), the applied load can be characterized by the following
L = 164 kN,
[A.22a]
L = 73.8 kN
[A.22b]
The pipe body resistance (i.e. the indentor load to cause failure) can be estimated using a
semi-empirical model developed by Driver and Playdon (1997) from full-scale tests on line
pipe reported in the literature. The model takes the form
D
R p = 1.17 0.0029 (L + w)t u

t
March 2003
[A.23]
A.24
where D
t
L
w
= pipe diameter (mm);

= pipe wall thickness (mm);
= indentor length (mm);
= indentor width (mm); and
= pipe body ultimate tensile strength (MPa).
Driver and Playdon suggest that a representative indentor has a length of 70 mm and a width
of 5 mm, which corresponds to the geometry of an individual tooth on the bucket of a typical
excavator.
From an analysis of line pipe material property data reported by Fleet Technology Limited
(1996), a relationship between the pipe body tensile strength and the yield strength S is given
by
u = 4.832 S 0.7786
[A.24]
Substituting this expression for the tensile strength in Equation [A.23] gives the following
expression for the indentor load causing failure in terms of the material yield strength
D
R p = 4.83 1.17 0.0029 (L + w)t S 0.7786

t
[A.25]
Uncertainty in estimating puncture resistance is taken into accounted by incorporating two

model uncertainty factors in the final expression for the pipe body resistance, R, which is
given by
R = C1 R P + C2
[A.26]
where C1 and C2 are the multiplicative and additive components of the model error,
respectively. Regression analysis of test-to-predicted ratios by Driver and Playdon using
Equation [A.23] reportedly found that C1 is best approximated by a constant with a value of
1.00 and C2 is best approximated by a normally distributed variable with mean value of 0.883
kN and a standard deviation of 26.7 kN.
These model error characterizations have been adopted for pipe resistance estimation using
Equation [A.23], because the additional uncertainty associated with estimating the tensile
strength of the material from its yield strength, using Equation [A.25], is small enough in
comparison to the overall level of model uncertainty to be ignored.
Based on this puncture model, and representative assumptions about the variability in pipe
yield strength it can be shown that the pipe resistance is characterized by
R = 4.83 1.17 0.0029
March 2003
D
0.7786
+ C2
(L + w ) t S
t
[A.27a]
A.25
R = 4.83 1.17 0.0029 (L + w)t (0.7786) S(0.77861) S2 + C2 2

t
where S
S
C2
C2
= mean value of pipe yield strength

= standard deviation of pipe yield strength
= mean value of C2
= standard deviation of C2
[A.27b]
= 1.1 S;
= 0.07 S;
= 0.883 kN; and
= 26.7 kN.
The probability of line failure given impact can therefore be estimated from Equation [A.21]
using Equation [A.22] for the load parameters and Equation [A.27] for the resistance
parameters.
A.5.3.4 Model Scale Factor
The model scale factor KMD serves to adjust the failure rate modification factor to a value of
unity for the equipment impact reference section defined as the line section associated with
the reference value of all line attributes that influence the equipment impact failure rate
estimate. The intention is that the baseline failure rate for equipment impact should apply
directly to the reference section (hence the need for a corresponding attribute modification
factor of 1). The expression for KMD is obtained by first rearranging Equation [A.18] and
setting AF = 1.0 to give
K MD =
1
RHIT PF |H
[A.28]
The value of the equipment impact model scale factor is calculated using Equations [A.19],
[A.21], and [A.28] by substituting the values of all parameters that are associated with the
reference section. The reference section parameter values should be developed in
conjunction with the baseline failure rate estimate (see Section A.3) on a pipeline system,
operating company or industry basis, depending on the intended application of the model.
values are considered to be representative of the equipment impact reference section:
Activity zone
Alignment marker above ground
Alignment marker buried
Alignment marker explicit signage
Depth of burial
Diameter
Dig notification requirement
Dig notification response
March 2003
= Zone 3 (high-undeveloped);
= No;
= No;
= At selected strategic locations;
= 0.9 m;
= 305 mm;
= Not required (voluntary);
= Locate and mark with no site supervision;
A.26
Mechanical protection
One-call system type
Public awareness level
Right-of-way indication
Surveillance interval
Surveillance method
Wall thickness
Yield strength
= None;
= Unified system;
= Average;
= Continuous but limited indication;
= Bi-weekly;
= Aerial;
= 5.82 mm; and
= 289 Mpa.
The corresponding model scale factor is KMD= 776.7.

A.5.4 Geotechnical Hazards
Pipeline failure can occur as a result of geotechnical hazards involving progressive ground
movement (e.g. subsidence, frost heave, thaw settlement, and slope movement), seismic
activity, and river scour. The potential for line failure depends on both the likelihood of
occurrence of the hazardous event and the severity of the event in terms of its potential to
cause pipe failure. The specific line attributes used in this model are listed in Table A.14.
Attribute Name
Failure Potential given Geotechnical
Event
Geotechnical Hazard Occurrence Rate
Units
probability
events / km yr
(events / mi yr)
The probability of pipeline failure given the occurrence
of the prescribed geotechnical loading event.
The frequency of occurrence of a geotechnical loading
event generating significant outside force on the pipe
body (e.g. ground movement, river scour).
The annual rate of change in the frequency of
Geotechnical Hazard Occurrence Rate
events / km yr
Change
(events / mi yr)
occurrence of the prescribed geotechnical loading

event (Note that an occurrence rate change of zero
implies that the occurrence rate remains constant over
time).
The type of pipe joint (i.e. weld vs. mechanical
Girth Weld Type
Choice
connection) and a relative indication of joint quality

(with respect to tensile strength and ductility) for welded
joints.
Table A.14 Line Attributes Required by Geotechnical Hazard Model
Failures due to ground movement events are highly location and pipeline specific and
therefore, probability estimation based on historical incident rates adjusted by selected line
attributes is not considered appropriate. An alternative approach based entirely on location
specific information is employed. Specifically, pipeline failure associated with geotechnical
hazards will be addressed by directly specifying estimates of both the probability of
geotechnical loading event occurrence, and the probability of line failure given event
occurrence.
March 2003
A.27
The failure rate is given by

*
R f = RMV
PF |M FJNT
*
where RMV
RMV
R MV
PF|M
FJNT
[A.29a]
= effective annual frequency of event occurrence (see Section A.6)

[A.29b]
= R MV + R MV ( + ) ;
= fixed component of the annual frequency of event occurrence;
= variable component of the annual frequency of event occurrence;
= time since the date of pipe installation (line age);
= future time increment;
= probability of pipe failure given event occurrence; and
= pipe joint factor
Note that for consistency with other failure cause models the frequency of geotechnical event
occurrence must be defined per unit length of pipe. Specifically, if a geotechnical event is
estimated to have an occurrence frequency of x (events per yr), and the effective length of
pipe potentially involved in the geotechnical event is s (km), then the event occurrence
frequency must be entered as x/s (events per km yr).
The frequency of occurrence of a significant geotechnical event is user defined, however, the
fixed component occurrence rate estimates shown in Table A.15 are provided for guidance.
Subjective characterization
Events per yr
RMV (events per km yr)
Negligible to very low
0.00001
0.000001/s
Low
0.0001
0.00001/s
Moderate
0.001
0.0001/s
High
0.01
0.001/s
Very high
0.1
0.01/s
Note: s = effective length (in km) of the section of pipe potentially involved in the geotechnical event
Table A.15 Geotechnical Hazard Occurrence Rate Suggested Values
The probability of pipeline failure given event occurrence is also user defined. The estimates
shown in Table A.16 are provided for guidance.
Subjective Characterization
PF|M
Low
0.01
Moderate
0.1
High
1.0
Table A.16 Failure Potential Given Event Suggested Values
March 2003
A.28
The pipe joint factor FJNT is an index that modifies the estimate of the probability of failure
given event occurrence to reflect the impact of weld quality on failure when the expected
failure mode is tensile rupture. The index multipliers associated with each joint type are
given in Table A.17.
Girth Weld Type
FJNT
High quality weld
0.5
Average quality weld
1.0
Poor quality weld
2.0
Mechanical joint
5.0
Table A.17 Pipe Joint Factor for Geotechnical Hazards
The index multipliers associated with each girth weld type were established subjectively
based on judgement to reflect the perceived effect on failure probability of variations in the
strength and ductility of different joint types.
Note that if the geotechnical hazard occurrence rate is specified as a negative number, then it
is assumed that failure will involve compression-induced buckling (typically away from the
joints) in which case the joint factor is not relevant and it is therefore set to 1.0 in the failure
rate calculation.
A.5.5 Stress Corrosion Cracking
Pipeline failure associated with stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is the result of a loss of pipe
protection at locations where the physical and operating conditions of the pipe and
surrounding soil environment supports this form of environmentally induced cracking. The
factors that affect the susceptibility of a line to SCC include: the presence of a soil and
groundwater environment conducive to the formation of SCC in areas where coating damage
and has occurred and cathodic protection is ineffective; a susceptible pipe body material; and
an operating pressure that generates tensile stresses sufficient to promote significant crack
growth. The specific line attributes used in this model are listed in Table A.18.
March 2003
Attribute Name
Units
A.29
Metric (Imperial)

Benefit Period of Hydrotest - SCC Cracks
years

failure rate due to stress corrosion cracking.
Benefit Period of Inspection - SCC

Cracks

years

in the failure rate due to stress corrosion cracking.
Date of External Coating Rehabilitation
YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Last Inspection - SCC Cracks
YYYY/MM/DD
The date when the external coating system was

replaced or otherwise rehabilitated.
test was performed.
maintenance event having an effect on SCC was
performed.
Diameter
mm (in)

The reduction in the failure rate due to SCC resulting
Effectiveness of Inspection - SCC Cracks
from the most recent inspection and maintenance

event.
The anticipated maximum operating pressure in the
pipeline defined at the start and end of the line and at
selected reference points along the length of the line.
(Note that the location of intermediate points should be
chosen to adequately characterize the pressure profile
Pressure Profile
kPa (psi)
given that the program uses linear interpolation to infer

the line pressure at all locations between specified
reference points. Note also that the specified pressure
should reflect an upper bound pressure profile
associated with likely worst case operating conditions
including, for example, periodic line pack or shut in.)
A characterization of the degree to which the soil
SCC Potential of Environment
Choice
conditions surrounding the pipe provide an environment

that is conducive to the development of stress corrosion
cracking in susceptible pipe.
A characterization of the susceptibility of the pipe body
SCC Susceptibility of Pipe
Choice
(i.e. metallurgy and surface condition) to the formation

of stress corrosion cracking.
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
MPa (ksi)

Specified minimum yield strength of the line pipe. (e.g.
5XL60 should be reported as 60 ksi or 414 MPa)
Table A.18 Line Attributes Required by Stress Corrosion Cracking Model
baseline SCC failure rate is
March 2003
A.30
*
AF = K SCC scc
t
where KSCC
*
scc
t
FSCC
FPS
FTH
FSCC FPS FTH
[A.30]
= SCC model scaling factor;

= effective line age for SCC (see Section A.6)
= wall thickness;
= SCC potential factor;
= pipe susceptibility factor; and
= threshold stress factor.
The core relationship involving line age and wall thickness t was inferred from the model
developed for external corrosion which suggests that the failure rate is directly proportional
to line age and inversely proportional to wall thickness. Note that the line operating
temperature term in the external corrosion model was dropped because the effect of
temperature on the failure rate is implicitly covered under the broadly defined SCC potential
factor.
The SCC potential factor, FSCC, is an index that scales the rate modification factor over a
range that is intended to reflect the combined impact on the failure rate of soil environment
(i.e. soil type, drainage, topography, groundwater chemistry and pH, and temperature),
coating type and condition, and cathodic protection system effectiveness. The index
multipliers associated with each condition state are given in Table A.19.
SCC Potential of Environment
FSCC
No potential
0.0
Very low potential
0.1
Low potential
0.3
Moderate potential
1.0
High potential
3.0
Very high potential
10.0
Table A.19 SCC Potential Factor
The SCC potential categories and associated indices were established so that if the soil
environment and/or the coating system is assumed to have no potential for the development
to SCC, then the SCC failure rate will be set to zero; whereas if the environment is deemed to
have a moderate potential for SCC damage then the failure rate will be equal to the baseline
rate, provided that the pipe material is susceptible and the stress level is sufficiently high.
Environments with a very high SCC potential are assumed to have failure rates one order of
magnitude higher than the reference rate.
March 2003
A.31
Note that the all encompassing nature of the adopted SCC potential categories, and the order
of magnitude variations in associated indices, have been chosen to provide a way to integrate
company-specific SCC susceptibility ranking schemes into the PIRAMID model. It is
recognized that the SCC mechanism is extremely complex and dependent upon a number of
factors not explicitly addressed in the model. It is intended that operators will match their
own site susceptibility categories to the most appropriate SCC potential categories in the
PIRAMID model.
The pipe susceptibility factor, FPS, is an index that is intended to acknowledge that the
microstructure and/or surface treatment of the pipe body material may render it unsusceptible
to the formation of SCC. The index multipliers associated with each condition state are
given in Table A.20.
SCC Susceptibility of Pipe
FPS
Not susceptible
0.0
Unlikely to be susceptible
0.1
Likely to be susceptible
0.5
Proven to be susceptible
1.0
Table A.20 Pipe Susceptibility Factor
Intermediate susceptibility categories are provided to acknowledge that the materials

susceptibility to SCC may not be known with certainty.
The threshold stress factor, FTH, is intended to account for the impact of tensile stress on the
potential for the formation and growth of significant SCC. The tensile stress level is defined
in terms of a stress ratio given by
Stress Ratio =
pD
2t S
where p
D
t
S
= operating pressure (calculated from pressure profile);

= diameter;
= wall thickness; and
= specified minimum yield strength.
[A.31]
The index multipliers associated with each adopted condition state are given in Table A.21.
March 2003
A.32
Stress Ratio
FTH
SR < 0.6
0.0
0.6 SR < 0.65
0.1
0.65 SR < 0.7
0.5
SR 0.7
1.0
Table A.21 Threshold Stress Factor
The threshold stress condition states and associated indices were selected based on the
assumption that the threshold stress for the initiation of significant SCC is a hoop stress level
of between 60 and 70 % of the pipe body yield strength. For hoop stress levels below 60 %
of yield, the threshold index multiplier is set to 0.0, implying that SCC failure is essentially
not possible. The uncertainty associated with the threshold stress level is reflected by index
multipliers ranging between 0.1 and 0.5 for stress levels in the transition range.
The model scale factor KSCC serves to adjust the failure rate modification factor to a value of
unity for the SCC reference section defined as the line section associated with the reference
value of all line attributes that influence the SCC failure rate estimate. The intention is that
the baseline failure rate for SCC should apply directly to the reference section (hence the
need for a corresponding attribute modification factor of 1).
The expression for KSCC is obtained by first rearranging Equation [A.30] and setting AF = 1.0
to give
K SCC =
*
scc
[A.32]
FSCC FPS FTH
values are considered to be representative of the SCC reference section:
Age
Diameter
Pressure
SCC susceptibility of environment
SCC susceptibility of pipe
Wall thickness
March 2003
= 20 years;
= 914 mm;
= 6895 kPa;
= Moderate;
= Proven to be susceptible;
= 9.14 mm; and
= 448 MPa.
A.33
The corresponding model scale factor is KEC = 4.57 x 10-1.

A.5.6 Manufacturing Cracks
Pipeline failure associated with manufacturing cracks is currently restricted to the

consideration of seam weld fatigue only. Seam weld fatigue tends to occur in susceptible
seam welds (i.e. seams with significant starter defects) that are also undergoing significant
stress fluctuations due to line pressure variations and/or external loads. The factors that are
thought to affect the susceptibility of a pipeline to seam weld fatigue are primarily seam weld
type, the effective stress range and number of stress cycles. The specific line attributes used
in this model are listed in Table A.22.
Attribute Name
Benefit Period of Hydrotest - Fatigue
Cracks
Units
Metric (Imperial)

years

failure rate due to seam weld fatigue.
Benefit Period of Inspection - Fatigue

Cracks

years

in the failure rate due to seam weld fatigue.
YYYY/MM/DD
YYYY/MM/DD
Date of Last Inspection - Fatigue Cracks
YYYY/MM/DD

test was performed.
maintenance event having an effect on seam weld
fatigue was performed.
Diameter
mm (in)
Effectiveness of Inspection - Fatigue

Cracks

The reduction in the failure rate due to seam weld
fatigue resulting from the most recent inspection and

maintenance event.
The effective number of pressure cycles experienced
by the pipeline on an annual basis. (Note that complex
Pressure Cycles
cycles/year
pressure vs. time loading histories should be

characterized by a representative single value Pressure
Range and an associated annual number of Pressure
Cycles.)
The effective pressure range associated with cyclic
fluctuations in line pressure during routine operation.
Pressure Range
kPa (psi)
(Note that complex pressure vs. time loading histories

should be characterized by a representative single
value Pressure Range and an associated annual
number of Pressure Cycles.)
Seam Weld Type
Choice
Wall Thickness
mm (in)
A characterization of seam weld quality with respect to

fatigue resistance.
Table A.22 Line Attributes Required by Manufacturing Cracks Model
March 2003
A.34
The fatigue life of a weldment, NR, is typically expressed using a relationship of the form
log(N R ) = b m log(Sr )
[A.36]
where b and m are random variables that can be estimated from regression analysis of fatigue
test results, and Sr is the stress range perpendicular to the weldment axis. For longitudinal
seam welds, the stress range is given by
Sr =
where pr
D
t
pr D
2t
[A.37]
= pressure range;
= diameter; and
= wall thickness.
Adopting the parameter and model uncertainty characterizations developed in the Superb
project (Superb 1996) and the fatigue curve transformation model described by Albrecht
(1983), Equations [A.35], [A.36] and [A.37] can be combined and recast into the following
expression for the probability of failure for a single weld
PSWF
log ( N L ) b m log( S r )
=
2
2
2
m
1
1
2
2
2
b +
cov S r +
cov +
cov 2N L
log(
10
)
log(
10
)
log(
10
)
[A.38]
where ulog( N L ) log(N L ) ;

cov N L = coefficient of variation on the load cycles = 0.18;
p D
ulog( S r ) log(S r ) = log r ;
2t
cov S r = coefficient of variation on the stress range = 0.10; and
cov
= cov on the stress history approximation model = 0.30.
The mean value of the number of applied load cycles is given by

*
N L = n L mc
where nL
*
mc
March 2003
[A.39]
= average annual number of pressure cycles per year; and

= effective line age for seam weld fatigue (see Section A.5.8)
A.35
The probability of fatigue failure for a given seam weld can therefore be estimated from
Equation [A.38] using the pressure cycle estimate given by Equation [A.39] if fatigue curve
parameters appropriate for the type and quality of weld are available.
Based on generally accepted probabilistic characterizations of fatigue life for standard
categories of structural welds (DnV 1984) the fatigue resistance parameters given in
Table A.23 are considered representative for the various categories of seam weld quality.
Seam Weld Type
Weld Classification / Description
None
(seamless)
B (plain steel, as rolled)
15.3697
0.1821
4.0
High quality weld

(with NDT)
C (transverse butt weld w/o NDT)
14.0342
0.2041
3.5
Good quality weld

(without NDT)
D (transverse butt weld w/o NDT)
12.6007
0.2095
3.0
12.09
0.2279
3.0
11.5662
0.1846
3.0
Suspect weld
Poor quality weld
F2 (one-sided butt weld w/o backing)

W (partial penetration weld)
Table A.23 Fatigue Resistance Parameters
Finally, to account for the fact that the model developed above considers only a single
weldment, a multiplier is required to convert the probability of failure per seam weld into a
probability of failure per unit line length (see Equation [A.33]). Assuming that the seam on
each pipe joint constitutes a distinct weldment, and assuming further an average joint length
of approximately 10 m, this implies that there are on the order of 100 distinct weldments per
kilometre of pipeline, hence
N SW = 100
[A.40]
A.5.7 Seismic Hazards

A.5.7.1 Overview
Pipeline failure associated with seismic hazards is currently restricted to the consideration of
failures caused by ground movement resulting from the lateral spreading of soil liquefied
during a seismic event or ground movement directly associated with fault displacement.
Seismic wave propagation, and seismically induced landslides and subsidence, are not
addressed because historical data suggests that these damage mechanisms are typically much
less likely to cause line failure than lateral spreading and fault displacement.
March 2003
A.36
Failures due to lateral spreading are associated with sections of pipeline that pass through
seismically active areas where the soils have the potential to liquefy and thereby become
unstable during significant seismic events. The model developed to quantify the
susceptibility of a pipeline to failure by lateral spreading takes into account the intensity and
duration of ground movement during a significant seismic event, the susceptibility of the
surrounding soil to liquefaction during that event, the slope of the ground, and the overall
ductility of the pipeline as reflected by girth weld type. The specific line attributes used in
the model are listed in Table A.24.
Failures due to fault movement are associated with sections of pipeline that intersect active
fault planes. It is assumed that companies operating pipelines that intersect active faults will
undertake detailed site-specific analyses of the potential for line failure. The seismic hazard
model, as currently implemented, facilitates the incorporation of the results obtained from
this type of detailed off-line hazard analysis in the overall seismic hazard risk estimate by
allowing the user to directly specify the expected annual failure rate due to fault movement
(see Table A.24).
Attribute Name
Units
Metric (Imperial)
Earthquake Moment Magnitude
A measure of the total energy released during an

earthquake.
Girth Weld Type
Choice
The type of pipe joint (i.e. weld vs. mechanical

connection) and a relative indication of joint
quality (with respect to tensile strength and
ductility) for welded joints.
Groundwater Depth
Choice
The depth of the water table below ground

surface.
Peak Ground Acceleration

Event 1/2/3
Seismic Hazard Failure Rate due to
Fault Movement
fraction of gravity
failures / km yr
(failures / mi yr)
The maximum acceleration at ground surface

during prescribed earthquake event 1/2/3
The expected rate of line failure due to fault
rupture in the immediate vicinity of the fault.
Soil Liquefaction Susceptibility
Choice
A characterization of the relative likelihood that

the soil will liquefy during an earthquake.
Surface Topography
Choice
A characterization of the slope of the terrain

surrounding the pipeline right-of-way.
Table A.24 Alphabetical Listing of Line Attributes Required by Seismic Hazard Model
Failures due to seismically induced ground movement are considered highly location specific
and involve events with long return periods. Probability estimation based on historical
incident data (typically reflecting less than 30 years of system exposure) is therefore not
considered appropriate. An alternative approach based on location specific soil and pipe
information and probabilistic seismic hazard data is therefore employed.
The adopted model for lateral spreading consists of four components: 1) an estimate of the
peak ground acceleration (PGA) and moment magnitude associated with the extreme seismic
March 2003
A.37
event expected to occur within a prescribed time period; 2) an estimate of the probability of
soil liquefaction given the extreme event; 3) an estimate of the extent of ground movement
given soil liquefaction; and 4) an estimate of the probability of pipe failure given ground
movement.
With this model a failure rate is obtained using a first-order approximation method that
requires an estimate of the mean value of the PGA associated with the most severe event
expected to occur within the so-called reference time period. The adopted reference time
period for seismic hazard analysis is 500 years. This time frame was chosen to ensure that
major seismic events with credible return periods are reflected in the analysis.
The estimate of the mean value of the PGA associated with the extreme event occurring
within a 500 year period is obtained from linear regression analysis of site-specific PGA
estimates associated with two or three representative seismic events (i.e. events with
representative return periods). The analysis assumes that PGA is lognormally distributed (a
common assumption for probabilistic seismic hazard analysis) and involves a least-squares
fitting procedure when three events are involved. (Note that typical return periods to be
considered in an analysis would include for example 475, 975, and 2475 years; which
correspond to events with exceedance probabilities of 10%, 5% and 2% in 50 years
respectively.)
Estimates of both the soil liquefaction potential and the extent of ground movement, given
the prescribed PGA and earthquake moment magnitude, are based on algorithms adapted
from HAZUS, the natural hazard loss estimation methodology developed in the United States
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 1999). The estimate of pipe
response given ground movement is based on empirical relationships summarized by
ORourke and Liu (1999) and extended by C-FER.
A.5.7.2 Failure Rate due to Lateral Spreading of Liquefied Soil
The average annual failure rate due to lateral spreading of soil liquefied during a seismic
event is approximated by
Rf = Rf500 / 500
(per km yr)
[A.41]
where Rf500 is the probability of pipe failure per unit line length for the expected extreme
seismic event occurring within the adopted 500 year reference period. In accordance with
the HAZUS methodology the failure rate for the expected extreme event is given by
Rf500 = 7.82 uPG5000.56 PLIQ FJNT
where PLIQ
uPG
FJNT
March 2003
(per km)
[A.42]
= the probability of liquefaction associated the expected extreme event;

= the ground displacement associated with the expected extreme event; and
= a pipeline joint factor reflecting the relative fragility of various joint types.
A.38
The probability of ground liquefaction for a given event is assumed to be a function of the
groundwater level, the liquefaction susceptibility of the soil deposit, and peak ground
acceleration and moment magnitude of the earthquake. The liquefaction probability is given
by
PLIQ =
where aPG
a1, a2
Pml
KW
KM
M
(a1a PG a2 )Pml
0 (a1 aPG a2) 1.0
K M KW
[A.43]
= the mean value of the PGA associated with the most severe event
expected to occur in 500 years (from regression analysis of 2 or 3 events);
= acceleration coefficients (see Table A.25);
= a proportion factor (see Table A.26);
= a groundwater depth correction factor (see Table A.27);
= a moment magnitude correction factor
= 0.0027 M3 0.0267 M2 0.2055 M + 2.9188; and
= a representative estimate of the moment magnitude of the most severe
earthquake expected to occur in 500 years.
Soil Liquefaction
Susceptibility
Acceleration Coefficients
a1
a2
Very high
9.09
0.82
High
7.67
0.92
Moderate
6.67
1.00
Low
5.57
1.18
Very low
4.16
1.08
None
N/A
N/A
Table A.25 HAZUS Acceleration Coefficients
Soil Liquefaction
Susceptibility
Pml
Very high
0.25
High
0.20
Moderate
0.10
Low
0.05
Very low
0.02
None
0.00
Table A.26 HAZUS Proportion Factor
March 2003
Groundwater Depth
Kw
Shallow (< 5 m)
1.1
Intermediate (5 to 10 m)
1.4
Deep (> 10 m)
1.7
A.39
Table A.27 Groundwater Correction Factor
The proportion factor, Pml, reflects the effects soil variations within a geologic map unit,
which tend to reduce the likelihood of liquefaction. The groundwater correction factor, KW,
reflects the effect of groundwater depth on the likelihood of soil liquefaction and as
implemented, constitutes a three-step approximation to the continuous function given in
HAZUS.
The extent of ground displacement associated with lateral spreading of liquefied soil is
assumed to be a function of the liquefaction susceptibility of the soil deposit, the surface
topography (i.e. ground slope), and the PGA and magnitude of the earthquake. The expected
permanent displacement is given by
uPG = ( b1 aPG /aPGT b2) K KS
0.0 m ( b1 aPG /aPGT b2) K 2.55 m
[A.44]
where aPGT = the threshold acceleration necessary to induce liquefaction (see Table A.28);
b1, b2 = displacement coefficients (see Table A.29);
K
= a displacement correction factor
= 0.0086 M3 0.0914 M2 + 0.4698 M 0.9835; and
= a ground slope correction factor (see Table A.30).
KS
Soil Liquefaction
Susceptibility
aPGT
Very high
0.09g
High
0.12g
Moderate
0.15g
Low
0.21g
Very low
0.26g
None
N/A
g = acceleration due to gravity

Table A.28 HAZUS Acceleration Thresholds for Liquefaction
March 2003
A.40
Normalized aPG Range
b1
b2
aPG/aPGT 1
1 < aPG/aPGT 2
0.31
0.31
2 < aPG/aPGT 3
0.46
0.61
aPG/aPGT > 3
1.78
4.57
Table A.29 HAZUS Displacement Coefficients
Surface Topography
KS
Flat (slope < 5%)
1.0
Rolling (slope 5% to 50%)
2.0
Steep (slope > 50%)
3.5
Table A.30 Slope Factor
The empirical relationship given in HAZUS for estimating the permanent ground
displacement was derived using historical data from relatively flat areas where ground slopes
were typically in the range of 0.5 to 5%. To acknowledge the potential for increased soil
displacement in areas with steeper slopes, a slope factor, KS, has been introduced. The
factors adopted for the rolling and steep topography categories are consistent with the
displacement multipliers obtained from empirical ground displacement models developed by
Hamada et al. (1986) and Barlett and Youd (1992), assuming that flat, rolling and steep
terrain are associated with representative slopes of 3%, 20%, and 80%, respectively.
A failure rate obtained using Equation [A.42] with a joint factor, FJNT, equal to 1.0 is
intended to represent the performance of cast iron pipes with mechanical or filet welded
joints. Data from past earthquakes, as summarized by ORourke and Liu (1999), suggests
that failure rates for steel pipelines with full penetration acetylene and arc welded joints are,
respectively, about 1/2 and 1/8 of the rates associated with cast iron pipes. For relatively new
pipelines with arc welded joints constructed using emerging technologies and customized
quality assurance procedures intended to achieve high joint ductility, the failure rate is herein
assumed to be 1% of that of cast iron pipes. Joint factors consistent with these assumptions
are summarized in Table A.31.
March 2003
Girth Weld Type
Typical Example
FJNT
High quality weld
Full penetration arc weld in joints designed to

provide significant post-yield ductility
0.01
Average quality weld
Full penetration arc weld in joints designed to

minimum code requirements
0.13
Poor quality weld
Full penetration acetylene welded joint
0.5
Mechanical joint
Mechanical coupler or
fillet welded bell and spigot joint
1.0
A.41
Table A.31 Joint Factor
The basis for the implied behaviour of high quality, ductile girth welds is an empirical model
developed by C-FER that assumes that pipeline fragility, expressed as the log of the failure
rate, is inversely proportional to the nominal tensile strain capacity of the girth weld. This
relationship can be shown to hold for the joint factor indices adopted for mechanical
connections, poor quality welds and average quality welds, if the nominal tensile strain limits
for each category are assumed to by 0.125%, 0.25% and 0.5%, respectively. The joint factor
for high quality welds was obtained by extrapolation, assuming a nominal tensile strain limit
of 1%.
A.5.7.3 Guidance on Characterizing Soil Liquefaction Susceptibility
The seismic hazard model, as implemented, requires a characterization of soil liquefaction

susceptibility in terms of six relative susceptibility categories (see Tables A.25, A.26 and
A.28). The adopted susceptibility categories are consistent with the notation used by others
working in the area of seismic hazard analysis and for selected geographical regions (e.g.
California and south western British Columbia) soil liquefaction susceptibility maps
employing these categories have been developed and are publicly available. In areas where
liquefaction susceptibility is not known in terms of the adopted categories, the classification
system shown in Table A.32, which is based on formation age, depositional environment and
material type, can be used to characterize liquefaction susceptibility. This categorization
approach was developed by Youd and Perkins (1978) and has been adopted by HAZUS.
Note that areas characterized as rock or rock-like, and other areas that are assumed to present
no liquefaction hazard, are assigned a liquefaction susceptibility of none.
March 2003
A.42
Type of Deposit
Distribution
of
Cohesionless
Sediments
in Deposits
(less than
500 yrs)
Locally variable
Locally variable
Widespread
Widespread
Widespread
Variable
Variable
Widespread
Widespread
Variable
Variable
Rare
Widespread
Rare
Locally variable
Liquefaction Susceptibility of Saturated

Cohesionless Sediments (by age of deposit)
Modern
Holocene Pleistocene Pre-Pleistocene

(11,000 to
(500 to 11,000
(over 2 million yrs)
yrs)
2 million yrs)
Very high
High
Moderate
N/A
High
High
High
Low
High
High
Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
Moderate
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate
High
Low
Low
High
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
Low
Very low
Low
Low
Low
Very low
Low
High
Very low
Very low
N/A
Very low
Low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
N/A
Very low
Very low
N/A
Very low
Very low
Widespread
Locally variable
Widespread
Widespread
Locally variable
Locally variable
Very high
High
Moderate
High
High
High
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Low
Very low
Low
Low
Low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Very low
Variable very
Variable
High
Low
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Continental Deposits
River channel
Flood plain
Alluvial fan and plain
Marine terraces and plains
Delta and fan-delta
Lacustrine and playa
Colluvium
Talus
Dunes
Loess
Glacial till
Tuff
Tephra
Residual soils
Sebkha
Coastal Zone
Delta
Estuarine
Beach (high wave energy)
Beach (low wave energy)
Lagoonal
Fore shore
Artificial
Uncompacted fill
Compacted fill
Table A.32 Liquefaction Susceptibility of Sedimentary Deposits
A.5.8 Other Causes

A.5.8.1 Overview
The other causes category is included to reflect the background failure rate associated with
causes that are not typically addressed by maintenance programs intended to maintain the
integrity of aging pipelines. Failures in this category are not the result of a single failure
mechanism and, therefore, they cannot be estimated from any single physical model. Instead
historical failure rate data was analysed to identify relationships between the failure rate and
key line attributes.
March 2003
A.43
A.5.8.2 Gas Pipelines
Based on analysis of AGA incident data for gas pipelines in the United States (Battelle 1995)
it was found that the failure rate is inversely proportional to pipe diameter. No other trends
were apparent. The failure rate modification factor for failure by other causes on gas lines is
therefore given by
AF =
where KOT
D
KOT
D
[A.45]
= other causes model scaling factor, and

= diameter.
The expression for KOT is obtained by setting AF = 1.0 in Equation [A.45] and rearranging to
give
KOT = D
[A.46]
Based on the AGA data, a pipe diameter of 229 mm is considered representative and the
corresponding model scale factor is therefore KOT = 2.29 x 102.
A.5.8.3 Liquid Pipelines
No discernable relationship was established between the other causes failure rate and any
key line attributes. It is therefore assumed to be constant, which implies that the failure rate
modification factor for failure by other causes on liquid lines is given by
AF = 1.0
[A.47]
A.6 Effective Age

All time dependent failure mechanisms (i.e. corrosion and cracking mechanisms) involve
defects that grow larger with time. As the defect population grows the expected annual rate
of failure is assumed to increase. The historical-based models associated with time
dependent failure (with the exception of the model for manufacturing cracks) all assume that
the annual failure rate increases linearly with line age. To account for the beneficial effects
of integrity maintenance actions that are intended to find and eliminate defects before they
reach a critical size (i.e. before they grow large enough to cause failure), a maintenance
factor has been developed that transforms the actual age of the pipeline into a so-called
effective age. This factor is based on a conceptual model that relates the annual failure rate
to a hypothetical defect population (see Figure A.1).
To achieve a linear increase in the annual rate of failure over time, the model hypothesizes a
defect size distribution with a triangular shape that grows with time at a constant rate. The
effect of an integrity maintenance action (such as in-line inspection or hydrostatic pressure
testing) on this defect population is idealized by assuming that a fixed proportion of all
March 2003
A.44
No. defects
reaching
critical size
Defect density
Failure rate
defects larger than certain size tmax will be found and eliminated by the action. The effect on
the defect population of an action having this effect is shown in Figure A.2a and the implied
effect on the annual failure rate is as shown in Figure A.2b. This model yields a failure rate
reduction that is directly related to the proportion of defects eliminated and the duration of
the benefit period (i.e. the time over which the failure rate is assumed to be reduced) is
directly related to the difference between the critical defect size tcr and the maximum size of
defects that are allowed to remain.
Rf ()
Line age
Time
Grow with time
Size to
cause
failure
tcr
Defect size
a) Relationship between failure rate and time.
b) Assumed defect size distribution and

growth model.
Failure rate
Defect density
Figure A.1 Conceptual Model for Failure Due to Time-dependant Mechanisms
Grow with time
B =
tcr t max
growth rate
R f ( )
Defect size
tmax
tcr
a) Effect of maintenance on defect population
Line age
b) Effect of maintenance on failure rate
Figure A.2 Idealized Model for the Effect of Integrity Maintenance on Failure Rate
March 2003
A.45
In reality the benefits of an integrity maintenance action would be expected to diminish with
time rather than terminate abruptly at the end of so-called benefit period. To acknowledge
this, the failure rate adjustment model as implemented is as shown in Figure A.3.
b
Failure rate
R f ( + )
Line age
Figure A.3 Adopted Model for the Effect of Integrity Maintenance on Failure Rate
The adopted model assesses the effect of integrity maintenance action on failure rate over
time as follows
R f ( + ) = R *f ( + )
[A.48]
where is a maintenance factor given by
and
( l + )2
= 1
1
100
R *f
= failure rate without integrity maintenance,
l
b
= initial effectiveness of integrity maintenance action (as a percentage);

= time since the date of pipe installation (line age);
= time since integrity maintenance was last performed;
= benefit period for last integrity maintenance action; and
= future time increment.
b2
1.0
[A.49]
As noted above, the failure rates associated with time dependent damage mechanisms are all
assumed to be directly proportional to line age, therefore, the maintenance factor can be used
to establish an effective age * that takes the following form
i* = i ( + )
March 2003
[A.50]
A.46
where i*
= the effective line age for failure cause i,

= the maintenance factor for failure cause i.
For external and internal corrosion, manufacturing cracks and SCC, it is assumed that both
in-line inspection and hydrostatic testing can be effective for finding and eliminating defects.
Note that hydrotesting is treated as special case in that the adopted model assumes that after
pressure testing the failure rate for the affected causes is reduced to zero (i.e. the initial
effectiveness of this integrity maintenance action is 100%).
In addition for external corrosion and SCC the effect of external coating system rehabilitation
(i.e. coating replacement) is addressed using the effective age model described above by
assuming the line age in Equation [A.50] is measured from the date of coating rehabilitation
rather than the date of pipe installation.
Geotechnical hazards are treated as a special case in that this hazard type can be treated as
either time dependent or time independent, depending on the nature of the specific hazard
being considered. The general expression for the effective annual frequency of hazard
*
, given in Equation [A.29b] incorporates a fixed component of the annual
occurrence, RMV
frequency of event occurrence, RMV , and a variable component, RMV , that reflects the
annual rate of change in the frequency of event occurrence. If the geotechnical hazard is to
be treated as time independent, the effective frequency of event occurrence is fixed and the
rate of change in event occurrence frequency should be set to zero. If the hazard is to be
treated as time dependent, the effective event occurrence frequency will increase with time
and the fixed and variable components of the annual frequency can be specified such that the
desired frequency of hazard occurrence in any given year is obtained.
A.7 References
Albrecht, P. 1983. S-N Fatigue Reliability Analysis of Highway Bridges. Probabilistic Fracture
Mechanics and Fatigue Methods: Applications for Structural Design and Maintenance.
ASTM STP 798, J. M. Bloom and J. C. Ekvall, Eds. American Society for Testing and
Materials, pp. 184 - 204.
Bartlett, S. F. and Youd, T. L. 1992. Empirical Analysis of Horizontal Ground Displacement
Generated by Liquefaction-induced Lateral Spreading. Technical Report NCEER-920021, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, Buffalo, New
York.
Battelle 1995. An Analysis of DOT Reportable Incidents On Gas Transmission and Gathering
Pipelines For June 1984 Through 1992. American Gas Association, NG-18 Report
No. 213.
Crews, D. L. 1976. Interpretation of Pitting Corrosion Data from Statistical Prediction Interval
calculations. Galvanic and Pitting Corrosion - Field and Laboratory Studies. ASTM
STP 576, American Society for Testing and Materials, pp. 217 - 230.
March 2003
A.47
CSA Z662-94. 1994. Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems - Oil and Gas Industry Systems. Canadian
Standards Association, Ontario, September.
CSFM 1993. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Risk Assessment. Prepared for the California State
Fire Marshal by EDM Services, Inc., Simi Valley, CA.
de Waard, D., Lotz, U. and Milliams, D.E. 1991. Predictive Model for CO2 Corrosion
Engineering in Wet Natural Gas Pipelines, The Journal of Science and Engineering
Corrosion, National Association of Corrosion Engineers, pg. 976-985.
DnV 1984. Fatigue Strength Analysis of Mobil Offshore Structures, Det Norske Veritas.
Driver R.G. and Playdon D.K. 1997. Limit States Design of Pipelines for Accidental Outside
Force. Report to the National Energy Board, May.
EGIG 1999. 4th EGIG Report 1970 to 1998 - Gas Pipeline Incidents, European Gas Pipeline
Incident Data Group.
Fearnehough, G. D. 1985. The Control of Risk in Gas Transmission Pipeline. Institute of
Chemical Engineers, Symposium Series No. 93, pp. 25 - 44.
FEMA 1999. HAZUS 99 Technical Manual. developed by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Washington, D.C., through a cooperative agreement with the National Institute
of Building Sciences, Washington, D.C.
Fleet 1996. Pipeline Limit States Design Material Property Partial Safety factor Selection
review. Submitted to the National Energy Board by Fleet Technology Limited, March.
Gopal, M. and Jepson, P. 1996. Modeling of Corrosion in High Pressure Horizontal Multiphase
Flow Pipelines, Fluids Engineering Division Conference, ASME, pg. 689-694.
Hamada, M., Yasuda, S., Isoyama, R., and Emoto, K. 1986. Study on Liquefaction Induced
Permanent Ground Displacements, Association for the Development of Earthquake
Prediction, Japan.
Jones, D.G, Dawson, S.J. and Clyne, A.J. 1998. Reliability of Internally Corroded Pipelines,
Corrosion 98, National Assoication of Corrosion Engineers, Paper 80.
Kiefner, J. F., Vieth, P. H., Orban, J. E. and Feder, P. I. 1990. Methods for Prioritizing Pipeline
Maintenance and Rehabilitation. American Gas Association.
Lammers, J. 1973. Shell B.V. Internal Report, Amsterdam.
McCormick, M. J. 1981. Reliability and Risk Analysis. Academic Press, Inc., New York.
March 2003
A.48
Miller, F. P., Foss, J. E. and Wolf, D. C. 1981. Soil Surveys: Their Synthesis, Confidence
Limits, and Utilization for Corrosion Assessment of Soil. Underground Corrosion,
ASTM STP 741, Edward Escalante, Ed. American Society for Testing and Materials,
pp. 3 - 23.
ORourke, M. J. and Liu, X. 1999. Response of Buried Pipelines Subject to Earthquake Effects.
The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, Buffalo, New York.
Spiekhout, J. 1995. A New Design Philosophy for Gas Transmission Pipelines - Designing for
Gouge-Resistance and Puncture-Resistance.
Srinivasan, S. and Kane, R.D. 1996. Prediction of Corrosion of CO2/H2S Production
Environments, Corrosion 96, National Association of Corrosion Engineers, Paper 11.
Srinivasan, S. and Kane, R.D. 1999. Corrosion Prediction Models Need to Include Field, Lab
Data, Pipe Line and Gas Industry, Vol. 82 No. 6, pg. 39-47.
Superb 1996. Reliability Based Design Handbook: Offshore Pipelines. The Superb Project
Team: Sintef, Snamprogetti, and Det Norske Veritas, December.
Videm, K., and Kvarekval, J. 1995. Corrosion of Carbon Steels in Carbon Dioxide-Saturated
Solutions Containing Small Amounts of Hydrogen Sulfide, The Journal of Science and
Engineering Corrosion, National Association of Corrosion Engineers. Vol. 51, No. 4.
Youd, T. L. and Perkins, D. M. 1978. Mapping of Liquefaction Induced Ground Failure
Potential. Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, American Society of Civil
Engineers, Vol. 104, No. 4, pp. 433-446.
March 2003

Historical-Based Probability Estimation For Onshore Pipelines

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HISTORICAL-BASED PROBABILITY ESTIMATION FOR ONSHORE

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

A. Historical-Based Probability Estimation for

= the baseline failure rate for failure cause j;

= the relative probability of failure by mode i for failure cause j; and

= the failure rate modification factor for failure cause j.

= the failure rate for failure cause j.

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines

A.3 Baseline Failure Rates

Failure Rate (per km yr)

External Metal Loss Corrosion

Internal Metal Loss Corrosion (simplified | refined)

3.0 x 10-4 | 2.5 x 10-2

Stress Corrosion Cracking

Manufacturing Cracks (seam weld fatigue)

Other (excluding mechanical components)

Table A.1 Baseline Failure Rates for Onshore Pipelines

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines

A.4 Failure Mode Factor

Corrosion 85 to 95% small leaks, 5 to 10% large leaks and 0 to 5% rupture

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines

External and Internal Corrosion

Stress Corrosion Cracking

Manufacturing Cracks (seam weld fatigue)

Table A.2 Reference Failure Mode Splits for Onshore Pipelines

A.5 Failure Rate Models and Attribute Modification Factors

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines

The length of time over which a hydrostatic pressure

test event is assumed to provide a reduction in the

Benefit Period of Inspection - External

The length of time over which an inspection and

maintenance event is assumed to provide a reduction

locations is contributing to a lack of effective cathodic

Cathodic Protection Level

the voltage potential generated by the cathodic

Date of External Coating Rehabilitation

Date of Last Hydrotest

Date of Last Inspection - External

maintenance event having an effect on internal

Effectiveness of Inspection - External

A characterization of the integrity of the external coating

The reduction in the failure rate due to external

corrosion resulting from the most recent inspection and

are undermining the effectiveness of cathodic

transported through the line. (Note that pipe body

conditions surrounding the pipe provide an environment

The nominal wall thickness of the line pipe.

Table A.3 Line Attributes Required by External Corrosion Model

PIRAMID Technical Reference Manual

Historical-Based Probability Estimation for Onshore Pipelines

= external corrosion model scaling factor;

Soil Drainage and Texture

excessively drained - coarse texture

well drained - moderately coarse texture, or

well drained - moderately fine texture, or

well drained - fine texture, or

poorly drained - fine texture, or

Table A.4 Soil Corrosivity Factor