Writ of Habeas Corpus

(8.) MANGILA vs. JUDGE PANGILINAN

FACTS:
Anita Mangila was charged with seven criminal
complaints with syndicated estafa in violation of
Art. 315 of RPC, PD 1689, and Migrant Workers
Act of 1995. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by
Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in
Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and on-line
application without authority from POEA.
Following the preliminary investigation (PI)
conducted by Judge Pangilinan of MTCC in
Puerto Princesa, a warrant of arrest was issued
against Mangila and her cohorts without bail. By
virtue of the arrest warrant, Mangila was
arrested in Manila and detained at the NBI.
Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus before
the CA to obtain her release. She argued that
Judge Pangilinan had no authority to conduct
the PI; that the PI was not yet completed when
the arrest warrant was issued; and that there
was no finding of probable cause prior to the
issuance of arrest warrant.
The CA denied Mangilas petition.
ISSUE:
(1.) What is the nature of habeas corpus?
(2.) WON the writ of habeas corpus was the
proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila
from detention.
HELD:
(1.) A petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed
by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character.
It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting
to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint. The rule applies even when
instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and
secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a
suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the
absence
of
exceptional
circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial
must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another
case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be
issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring
during the course of the trial, subject to the

caveat that constitutional safeguards of human

life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process, mere errors and
irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by
habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.
(2.) NO. It was clear that under Section 5,16
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating
judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the
power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should beultimately found
against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila
had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus to secure her release from
detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of
the preliminary investigation and the issuance of
the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the
City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given
the most direct access to the entire records of
the case, including the warrant of arrest,
following Judge Pangilinans transmittal of them
to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. The
writ of habeas corpus could not be used as
asubstitute for another available remedy.
(9.) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO
VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY
VINGSON DEMAISIP vs. JOVY CABCABAN
FACTS:
Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko), the 14 yearold daughter of Shirly Vingson, was placed in the
custody of Calvary Kids, an NGO working with
abused women and children.
This prompted Shirly Vingson to file a petition for
habeas corpus against Jovy Cabcaban and
other unnamed officials of Calvary Kids before
the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as
reason several threats against her life in that
city.
Shirly alleged that Shang Ko ran away from their
home. But Shang Ko told the social workers who
interviewed her that Shirly had been an abusive
mother to her. In fact, Shirly gave her P280.00
and instructed her to go to IloIlo City, look for a
job, and never come back to Bacolod City. When
Shang Ko reached IloIlo City, she had nowhere
to go, so she went back to Bacolod. Upon her
return, nobody, not even her siblings, would
accept her anymore.
Thats when she ended up outside a church in
Bacolod, where Bacolod police officers found
her, and endorsed her to Cabcaban, head of the
Womens and Childrens Desk.
The CA denied Shirlys petition. It said, habeas
corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining
evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as
a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of such
person.

ISSUE: Up to what extent habeas corpus is

available?
HELD:
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, but
also in cases involving the rightful custody over
a minor.12 The general rule is that parents should
have custody over their minor children. But the
State has the right to intervene where the
parents, rather than care for such children, treat
them cruelly and abusively, impairing their
growth and well-being and leaving them
emotional scars that they carry throughout their
lives unless they are liberated from such parents
and properly counseled.
Writ of Amparo
(1.) TAPUZ vs. JUDGE del ROSARIO
FACTS:
The spouses Samson filed an action for forcible
entry against the Tapuz heirs in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Aklan. The Samsons
alleged that the Tapuzes, using force and
intimidation, entered into their one-hectare
property, overwhelmed the security guards
stationed to patrol the premises and built some
structures thereon.
In turn, the Tapuzes alleged that they were the
true, actual physical prior possessor of the land
and that the tile presented by the plaintiff was
fake. After trial, the MCTC ruled in favour of the
Samsons.
The Tapuzes appealed the decision to the RTC.
Later on, the RTC would issue a writ of
demolition. On appeal to the Court of Appeals
via petition for review, and while this is pending,
the Tapuzes filed a petition for certiorari and for
the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data.
ISSUE: WON the writ of amparo may be used to
protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial in nature.
HELD:
NO. To start off with the basics, the writ
of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
When recourses in the ordinary course of law
fail because of deficient legal representation or
the use of improper remedial measures, neither
the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to
serve as a curative substitute. The writ

of amparo, particularly, should not issue when

applied for as a substitute for the appeal or
certiorari process, or when it will inordinately
interfere with these processes the situation
obtaining in the present case.