Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 1 of 13 PageID 153

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
DANIEL WALL-DESOUSA and SCOTT
WALL-DESOUSA,

Case No. 6:14-cv-1959-Orl-41DAB

Plaintiffs,
v.

DISPOSITIVE MOTION

DIANNE BOWMAN, Supervisor of the Brevard

County Tax Collectors Office in Indian Harbour
Beach, in her individual capacity; MAUREEN
JOHNSON, Chief, Bureau of Records, Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, in her individual capacity; CLAYTON
BOYD WALDEN, Director of Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, in his individual capacity; and JANE
DOES #1-4, several unknown Florida Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
Employees, individually,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
DEFENDANT DIANNE BOWMANS MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
COMES NOW, Defendant Dianne Bowman (Bowman), by and through her
undersigned counsel, hereby files and serves her Motion to Dismiss and Incorporated
Memorandum of Law. In support thereof, Bowman states:
I. BACKGROUND
In this case, Plaintiff Daniel Wall-DeSousa (Daniel) and Plaintiff Scott Wall-DeSousa
(Scott) (collectively Plaintiffs) allege that defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs in violation
of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs are each adult, male residents of Brevard
County, Florida. (Doc. 31 5-6.) Plaintiffs married in New York on December 6, 2013. (Id.

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 2 of 13 PageID 154

12.) Plaintiffs marriage certificate reflects their new surname, Wall-DeSousa. (Id. 13.) On
December 27, 2013, Plaintiffs visited the Social Security Administrations office in Melbourne,
Florida and changed their legal names from Daniel Antonio DeSousa to Daniel Antonio WallDeSousa and Scott Anthony Wall to Scott Anthony Wall-DeSousa. (Id. 14.) Sometime
thereafter, Daniel visited the Brevard County Tax Collectors Office in Palm Bay, Florida to
change his drivers license to reflect the change in his legal name. (Id. 18.) Daniel presented
Plaintiffs New York marriage certificate and his new social security card. (Id. 20.) The
Brevard County Tax Collectors Office issued a Florida drivers license reflecting Daniels new
surname and also changed his motor vehicle registration to reflect the change in his surname.
(Id. 21)
Scott visited the Brevard County Tax Collectors Office in Indian Harbour Beach, Florida
to change his drivers license to reflect the change in his surname. (Id. 24.) Once there, Scott
presented Plaintiffs New York marriage certificate and his new social security card. (Id. 26.)
Bowman allegedly returned Scotts marriage certificate to Scott, indicating that it could not be
used to support a name change on a Florida drivers license. (Id. 27.) Bowman also allegedly
told Scott that she would call the Brevard County Tax Collectors Office in Palm Bay to have
Daniels drivers license cancelled. (Id. 28.) 1 Bowman also allegedly called the Palm Bay
office to prevent Scott from changing his name on his drivers license there. (Id. 30.) 2 Scott
then traveled to the Brevard County Tax Collectors Office in Palm Bay. (Id. 29.) However,
Scott was apparently unable to obtain a drivers license reflecting his new name there. (See id.)
An unspecified employee of the Brevard County Tax Collector informed Scott to take his
documentation to another county to change his drivers license. (Id. 36.) This was allegedly
1

Bowman would dispute the truth of this allegation but acknowledges that well-pleaded facts are assumed to be true
at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
2
See footnote 1 above.

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 3 of 13 PageID 155

due to the fact that the Brevard County Tax Collector could not issue the license due to her
knowledge that Scott and Daniel are same-sex spouses that had entered into a marriage outside
of Florida. (Id. 37.) However, Plaintiffs marriage certificate did not clearly indicate that
Plaintiffs are same-sex spouses and employees of an agency or office authorized to issue drivers
licenses in another county would not ask if Plaintiffs are same-sex spouses. (Id.) Therefore, the
unspecified employee of the Brevard County Tax Collector advised Scott to visit another county
to have his drivers license changed. (Id.) On October 15, 2014, Scott traveled to the Orange
County Tax Collector/DHSMV office on 8110 West Colonial Drive and presented his social
security card, marriage certificate, and a bill from USAA for automobile insurance. (Id. 38,
40.) Thereafter, the office issued Scott a drivers license reflecting his new name. (Id. 41.)
On October 30, 2014, Plaintiffs spoke to news anchor Jorge Estevez from WFTV
Channel 9 on a televised broadcast about the DMVs policy. (Id. 42-43.) On November 7,
2014, Plaintiffs received a letter dated November 5, 2014 from the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) in Tallahassee that indicated that their drivers
licenses would be cancelled indefinitely as of November 25, 2014. (Id. 44.) On November 11,
2014, Plaintiffs reached back out to WFTV Channel 9, which aired a follow-up story. (Id.
45.) Scott visited the Indian Harbour Beach office against on November 24, 2014 in an attempt
to obtain a drivers license in his former surname. (Id. 49.) Bowman allegedly stated that
Scott could only be issued a temporary courtesy license valid for 90 days that would be cancelled
if he did not return with a passport reflecting his new surname within that time. (Id.) On
January 5, 2015, DHSMV issued Technical Advisory DL15-002, which directed that all offices
recognize all marriage certificates as sufficient proof for a driver license or identification card

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 4 of 13 PageID 156

change. (Id. 51.) On January 13, 2015, Plaintiffs obtained drivers licenses reflecting their
new surname from the Palm Bay office of the Brevard County Tax Collector. (Id. 52.)
On January 23, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, naming Bowman,
Maureen Johnson (Johnson), Clayton Boyd Walden (Walden), and Jane Does #1-4 as
defendants, all in their individual capacities. Through their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs
assert a single claim against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged First Amendment
retaliation. As relief, Plaintiffs seek actual and compensatory damages, punitive damages, and an
award of attorneys fees and costs. Bowman now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Legal Standard
Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure come in two forms: facial attacks and factual attacks. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d
1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks on the complaint require the court merely
examine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and
the allegations in the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion. Id. at 1529.
Factual attacks on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and
affidavits, are considered. Id. (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511
(5th Cir. 1980)). When a partys attack on subject matter jurisdiction is factual, no presumption
of truth attaches to the plaintiffs allegations and a court is free to weigh evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction. Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412-13).
4

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 5 of 13 PageID 157

2. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Constitutional Standing

The allegations in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint are insufficient to establish
constitutional standing for Plaintiffs to assert 1983 claims based upon First Amendment
retaliation against Bowman. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to cases and controversies. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992). [T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III. Id. at 560. The irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements. Id. First, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in factan
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct of which a plaintiff complains. Id. That is, the injury has to
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. Id. Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at
561. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Id.
Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's
case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation. Id. Finally, a Court should dismiss a claim over which it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. See Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim under 1983 should be dismissed as to
Bowman because Plaintiffs provide a factual account of the events that gave rise to this case, but
they fail to explain how Bowmanor any defendantretaliated against them in violation of
their First Amendment rights. In constitutional standing terms, Plaintiffs fail to allege that their

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 6 of 13 PageID 158

purported injury in fact is fairly traceable to Bowmans conduct. See Enders v. Fla., 535 F.
Appx 799, 801-03 (11th Cir. 2013) (plaintiffs claims should be dismissed for failure to allege
an injury that was traceable to the defendants conduct); Swann v. Secretary, 668 F.3d 1285,
1288 (11th Cir. 2012); DiMaio v. Democratic Natl Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir.
2008). Bowman therefore is left to surmise that the basis for Plaintiffs First Amendment
retaliation claims is the cancellation of their drivers licenses issued in their new surname after
they spoke with WFTV Channel 9 on October 30, 2014. Plaintiffs allege that after speaking with
WFTV Channel 9, their drivers licenses were cancelled indefinitely by DHSMV as of
November 25, 2014. Notably, Plaintiffs do not allege that Bowman cancelled their drivers
licenses. Therefore, the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs are not fairly traceable to any conduct of
Bowman. Accordingly, Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed as to
Bowman for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Enders, 535 F. Appx at 801-03.
B. Legal Adequacy of Allegations
1. Legal Standard
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Evaluation of a complaint requires a two-step inquiry:
[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. The court,
however, is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion presented as a factual allegation in the
complaint. Id.

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 7 of 13 PageID 159

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id. at 678. [D]etailed factual allegations are not required, but [t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
2. Plaintiffs Allegations are Insufficient to State a Claim for First
Amendment Retaliation
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish first, that his
speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendants retaliatory conduct
adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the
retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250
(11th Cir. 2005). In showing that protected speech is adversely affected, a private citizen must
meet an objective standard: A plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendants allegedly
retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First
Amendment rights. Id. at 1254. To prove causation, a plaintiff must prove that his speech was
the but-for cause of the allegedly retaliatory action, . . . which may be accomplished with proof
of: (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the
allegedly retaliatory act, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal
link. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 08-CIV-80134, F. Supp. 2d , 2014 WL
4101514, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2014). (citing Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir.
2009), Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007), and HuntGolliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1997)).
In Count I, Plaintiffs flatly allege that their speech was constitutionally protected.
(Doc. 31 54.) However, Plaintiffs impermissibly fail state facts that might explain what speech
was purportedly constitutionally protected. Additionally, Plaintiffs flatly allege that Defendants
7

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 8 of 13 PageID 160

engaged in retaliatory conduct that adversely effected Plaintiffs protected speech. (Id. 55.)
However, Plaintiffs do state facts to explain what retaliatory conduct Bowman (or any defendant)
engaged in. Also, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants retaliatory conduct caused the adverse
effect on Plaintiffs speech. (Id. 56.) Again, Plaintiffs do not state facts to explain the adverse
effect that Plaintiffs claim to have suffered, nor do Plaintiffs allege facts to causally link any
purported adverse effect with Bowmans conduct. In general, Bowman is left to guess as to what
constitutional speech Plaintiffs engaged in, how Plaintiffs were purportedly retaliated against,
and what adverse effect they suffered. Count I of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint amounts
to nothing more than an impermissible threadbare recital of the elements of a First Amendment
retaliation claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Moreover,
Plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible . . . .
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The pleading standard set through Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, as explained in Twowbly and Iqbal, demands more in order to put Bowman
on fair notice of Plaintiffs claims. See id.
As stated above, Bowman surmises that Plaintiffs base their First Amendment retaliation
claim on the cancellation of their drivers licenses after they spoke with WFTV Channel 9 on
October 30, 2014. However, Plaintiffs claims would fail on this basis for an obvious lack of
causation.

That is, Plaintiffs do not allege that Bowman cancelled their drivers licenses.

Instead, Plaintiffs allege that DHSMV cancelled their licenses. Therefore, if in fact Plaintiffs
seek to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim against Bowman based upon the cancellation
of their licenses, Plaintiffs cannot do so, and their claims should be dismissed.
3. Bowman is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 9 of 13 PageID 161

The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs 1983 claims against Bowman because she is
entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dalrymple v.
Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003)).

The immunity protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1354 (quoting
Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., 400 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Once a public official has established that he or she was acting within the scope of his or
her discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful act occurred, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. To
overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy a two prong test; he must show that: (1)
the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). A court may begin the qualified
immunity analysis with either prong, at its own discretion. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). Because qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, but also from
suit, it is important for a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early
in the lawsuit as possible. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. Therefore, a court may grant a motion to
dismiss based on qualified immunity. See Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182
(11th Cir. 1997).
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Hope

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 10 of 13 PageID 162

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987));
Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must show that in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness was apparent. Bates, 518 F.3d at 1248. Thus, the
salient question for the clearly established analysis is whether the state of the law at the time
the official acted gave him or her fair warning that his or her conduct was unconstitutional. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has identified three ways in
which the law can give an official fair and clear notice that his or her conduct is
unconstitutional. Id. First, the constitutional provision in question may be specific enough to
establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and circumstances. Id. If not, then a
broad principle found in the case law can establish clearly the law applicable to a specific set of
facts facing a government official. Id. When a district court within the Eleventh Circuit looks to
case law, only case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals can provide fair and clear notice. Id. at 1248 n.17; McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231,
1237 (11th Cir. 2007). Third, a court may look to case law that is tied to the facts of the instant
case. Bates, 518 F.3d at 1248.
In this case, it appears undisputed that Bowman was acting within her discretionary
authority as a supervisor of the Brevard County Tax Collectors Office in Indian Harbour Beach.
Bowman allegedly refused to issue Scott a drivers license reflecting his new name pursuant to
section 741.212(2), Florida Statutes (2014), which prohibited Bowman from recognizing
Plaintiffs New York marriage certificate as a record in support of a change of name on Scotts
drivers license. 3 Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to establish that qualified immunity
does not apply. Plaintiffs will not be able to do so.

Section 741.212(2), Florida Statutes (2014) provides: The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may
not give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any state, territory, possession, or tribe of the

10

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 11 of 13 PageID 163

Putting aside the causation issues and lack of adequately pleaded facts in Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint and assuming that Plaintiffs charge Bowman with retaliating against them
for unspecified protected speech based on her (1) non-acceptance of Plaintiffs New York
marriage certificate in support of a name change on Scotts drivers license and (2) cancellation
of Plaintiffs drivers licenses, Bowman did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Even if
the Court were to hold otherwise, it was not clearly established during or before October 2014 4
that such conduct would amount to a constitutional violation.
Bowman did not violate either plaintiffs right because it is clear that defendants
obligation to abide by section 741.212(2), Florida Statutes (2014), was the cause of the action
that Plaintiffs claim was retaliatory.

Retaliatory motive was not the but-for cause of the

allegedly retaliatory action. At the time of the events that gave rise to this case, neither the
Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court had construed the First Amendment in the manner that
Plaintiffs now suggest through their First Amended Complaint.

Additionally, neither the

Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court had declared section 741.212, Florida Statutes,
unconstitutional. 5 Instead, the vast majority of First Amendment retaliation cases arise in the
context of public employment or prisons. See Griffin-Nolan v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., No.
504CV1453FJSGJD, 2005 WL 1460424, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2005). This case arises
outside of either familiar context. Instead, this case arises out of the extremely unusual context
in which a state law that had not been ruled unconstitutional by either the Eleventh Circuit or the
United States or of any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location respecting either
a marriage or relationship not recognized under subsection (1) or a claim arising from such a marriage or
relationship.
4
Plaintiffs do not specify the date that Bowman refused to issue Scott a drivers license. However, based on the
chronology of events described in their First Amended Complaint, this occurred sometime after December 27, 2013
and before October 15, 2014.
5
Judge Hinkle had declared section 741.212, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional prior to that date in Brenner v. Scott,
999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2014). However, the decisions of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida do not clearly establish the law. Bates, 518 F.3d at 1248 n.17; McClish, 483 F.3d at
1237. Additionally, Judge Hinkle stayed enforcement of his Order in Brenner through January 5, 2015.

11

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 12 of 13 PageID 164

Supreme Courtsection 741.212(2), Florida Statutesprohibited any state official from

accepting an out-of-state marriage certificate for a same-sex marriage as documentation in
support of a name change on an individuals Florida drivers license.

Neither the First

Amendment itself, any broad principle of law, nor any binding case law would put a reasonable
official on fair and clear notice before or during October 2014 that refusing to accept an out-ofstate marriage certificate for a same-sex marriage as documentation in support of a name change
on an individuals Florida drivers license, cancelling an individuals license that was issued
based an out-of-state marriage certificate for a same-sex marriage as documentation supporting a
name change, or both, would violate an individuals First Amendment rights. Instead, prior to
Brenner, the only federal case to consider the constitutionality of section 741.212, Florida
Statutes, was Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (M.D. Fla. 2005), in which this
Court held that section 741.212, Florida Statutes, survived a constitutional challenge. 6 Finally,
no case law existed that is tied to the facts of the instant case such that it might have provided
fair and clear notice to Bowman prior to the events that gave rise to this case. Therefore,
Bowman is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For each of these reasons, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint should be dismissed as to
Bowman.

Additionally, in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682-83 (U.S. 2013), the United States Supreme Court
explicitly declined to decide the constitutionality of the provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
that allows states to decline to recognize same-sex marriages entered into lawfully in other states and nations that
allow for same-sex marriage, as that issue was not before the Court. Further, the Supreme Court will take up the
related issue (no longer directly raised in this case) of whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to
recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed
out of state as an issue of first impression during its upcoming term. See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, S.
Ct. , 2015 WL 213646, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (granting certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit).

12

Case 6:14-cv-01959-CEM-DAB Document 35 Filed 02/05/15 Page 13 of 13 PageID 165

WHEREFORE, Defendant Dianne Bowman requests that the Court enter an Order
dismissing Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as to Defendant Dianne Bowman.
Respectfully submitted on this 5th day of February, 2015 by:
/s/ Frank Mari
Michael J. Roper, Esquire
Florida Bar No.: 0473227
mroper@bellroperlaw.com
Frank M. Mari, Esquire
Florida Bar No.: 93243
fmari@bellroperlaw.com
Bell & Roper, P.A.
2707 E. Jefferson Street
Orlando, FL 32803
(407) 897-5150
(407) 897-3332 (fax)
Secondary: phermosa@bellroperlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Dianne Bowman
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of February, 2015, the undersigned filed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court via the Courts CM/ECF system,
which will send an electronic notice to:
Wm. J. Sheppard
Elizabeth L. White
Matthew R. Kachergus
Bryan E. DeMaggio
Sheppard, White, Kachergus & DeMaggio, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

/s/ Frank Mari

Frank M. Mari, Esquire

13