- St. Scholasticas College vs. Toress G.R. No.

100158 June 2, 1992

Consolidated Labor Association vs Marsman Company
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17038

July 31, 1964

CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., petitioner,

vs.
MARSMAN and CO., INC., and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-17057

July 31, 1964

MARSMAN and Co., INC., petitioner,

vs.
CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES HON. JOSE S.
BAUTISTA HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, and
HON. EMILIANO C. TABIGNE, respondents.
Salvador H. Laurel and Apolonio V. Santiago for petitioner.
Jose C. Espinas and Associates for respondent Consolidated Labor Association of the
Philippines.
CIR Legal Division for respondent Judges.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
In the Court of Industrial Relations, Marsman & Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
Company, was charged with unfair labor practice committed against sixty-nine officers and
members of the Marsman & Company Employees and Laborers Association (hereinafter referred
to as MARCELA or simply as the Union). The Court (Judge Jose S. Bautista), after hearing,
found the Company guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned 69
complainants to their former positions or to similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back
wages. On motions for reconsideration filed by the Union and by the Company, respectively, the
Court en banc affirmed the decision with Judge Arsenio I. Martinez concurring in the result
Judge Baltazar M. Villanueva also concurring in the result in a special opinion; Judge Emiliano
C. Tabigne filing a separate concurring and dissenting opinion; and Judge Amando C. Bugayong
taking no part.
Both the Union and the Company appealed. The former claims that the 60 reinstated employees
should be granted backpay (G.R. No. L-17038) while the latter questions the Industrial Court's
finding of unfair labor practice (G.R. No. L-17057).
The facts, as found by the Industrial Court, are: The Company had in its employ approximately
320 persons, about 140 of whom where members of MARCELA and about 20 of the National
Labor Union. On December 23, 1953 the Industrial Court named MARCELA as the employees'
bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and conditions of employment. At that time
MARCELA was affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers, or FFW, a national labor
organization. On March 17, 1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set of proposals
for collective bargaining, which the Company answered on March 24, 1954. In spite of

negotiations held between the Company and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on
April 8, 1954 the Union, failed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor. Mediation by the
Conciliation Service of that Department proved fruitless.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at the same time placed a "round-the-clock"
picket line around the Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. The tense situation in the
strike zone prompted the Manila Police Department to send policemen thereto to preserve peace.
Meanwhile the Labor Department's Conciliation Service continued to mediate between the
representatives of the Union and of the Company.
On July 21, 1954 some 50 employees, of whom nine were members of the National Labor Union
and one a member of MARCELA, entered the Company premises under police escort in order to
return to work.
On July 30, 1954, in a conference called by Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the
Union officials and members then present were prevailed upon by Adevoso to accept the
proposals of Antonio de las Alas, Company vice-president, that they stop the strike and go back
to work, and that when they were already working the Company would discuss with them their
demands. Upon being informed to the Union's acceptance of the proposal the strikers returned to
work. The Company admitted back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9, 1954 and later on, it
also reemployed non-union employees and a majority of the strikers. However, complainants
herein were refused admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would not be
reinstated unless they ceased to be active Union members and that in any case the Company
already had enough men for its business operations.
As a result the strike and the picketing were resumed, because of which employees who had been
admitted to work since July 21, 1954 had to stay inside the Company premises, where the
Company furnished them food and quarters up to October 1954. Nevertheless some of those
employed could go in and out after office hours to visit their families.
During the strike, some of the picketers and some non-strikers were arrested within the strike
zone for having committed unlawful acts, and were duly charged therewith.
A petition for writ of injunction filed by the Company against MARCELA and its president,
Buenaventura Bacay, on the ground that the strike and picket were being maintained illegally,
was denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, which pointed out that proper criminal
complaints should have been filed against the individual strikers in the corresponding courts.
Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69 complainants even after repeated
requests, the Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines (CLAP), to which the Union
had affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated the present charge for unfair labor practice.
Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain
economic benefits set forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The strike was an economic
one,1 and the striking employees would have a tight to be reinstated if, in the interim, the
employer had not hired other permanent workers to replace them. For it is recognized that during
the pendency of an economic strike an employer may take steps to continue and protect his
business by supplying places left vacant by the strikers, and is not bound to discharge those hired
for that purpose upon election of the strikers to resume their employment.2 But the strike
changed its character from the time the Company refused to reinstate complainants because of
their union activities after it had offered to admit all the strikers and in fact did readmit the
others. It was then converted into an unfair labor practice strike.

The Company disputes the Industrial Court's findings that (1) it offered to reinstate all the
strikers; (2) the complainants made a timely acceptance of the offer; and (3) the Company's
refusal to reinstate complainants was for the purpose of discouraging union activities.
Substantial evidence supports the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Complainants Teodoro Bacalzo, Raymundo Mostoles-Cruz, Mariano Bautista, and Godofredo
Garcia testified thus: They were all present at the July 30, 1954 conference called by then Labor
Secretary Eleuterio Adevoso in order to settle the differences between the Company and the
Union. It was during this conference that Antonio de las Alas, then the Company's vice-president,
offered to take back all the strikers if they would only stop the strike and as further inducement
promised that the Union's demands would be discussed when the strikers were already working.
Adevoso convinced the Union officers and members who were present to accept De las Alas'
proposal.
The lower court's reasons, we think, amply answer the Company's contention that De las Alas
could not, by his offer, have bound the Company because it was Velilla, and not he, who had the
authority to deal with the strikers:
The denial of respondent that Antonio de las Alas was not authorized by the Company but
Amando L. Velilla to deal with the union with respect to the strike is not worthy of belief. First,
because then De las Alas was an executive Vice-President while Velilla was only the Secretary of
the Company; second, while respondent wants to impress this Court that Velilla's authority to
deal with the strikers was virtue of the Board resolution, such document was not presented in
Court and third not even De las Alas was presented to make the denial.
The Company claims that the complainants applied for readmission only on June 7, 1955, more
than a year after the offer, when the CLAP, in their behalf, wrote the Company asking for their
reinstatement. Prior to said letter, however, complainants had, by various means, sought
readmission. After De las Alas' invitation to return to work was accepted by the Union officers
and members, they informed all the other strikers accordingly. Thereupon the strikers terminated
the strike and presented themselves for work at the Company's premises. Eighty one of the
strikers were allowed to come back. But the Company's security guards, upon instructions of the
Company officials, barred the entrance when complainants attempted to enter, and informed
them that they had to write individual letters of application. So complainants complied with this
requirement. It appears that the applications were scrutinized by a committee of employees
composed of Salvador Bantique assistant accountant of the mines division; Mariano Lee,
purchasing agent; Juan de Vera, paymaster; and Regina Cruz, accountant. Then the applications
were further screened by a personnel committee composed of Jan H. Marsman, Antonio de las
Alas, Charles G. Herdman and Amando Velilla. None of the sixty-nine applications met with
favorable action by either committee.
In addition to writing formal letters of application a number of complainants phoned while others
personally approached their respective chiefs of department in the Company. Some also went to
see Salvador Bantique, chairman of the screening committee, and expressed their desire to work.
Bantique, however, upon learning that the strikers, among them Eulogio Labrador, were still
active union members, informed them that they should first disaffiliate from the union in order to
be reinstated. Furthermore, Amando Velilla, when approached by a group of complainants, told
the latter that they had been away for a long time; that the Company had enough employees and
did not need additional help; that some of those whom he had invited to return refused; and that
by that time (August, 1954) it was already too late for them to wish to return.
The Company alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its policy of retrenchment, not labor
discrimination, which prevented it from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by
the fact that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also hired new employees and even
increased the salaries of its personnel by almost 50%. We are convinced that it was not business
exigency but a desire to discourage union activities which prompted the Company to deny
readmittance to complainants. This is an indubitable case of unfair labor practice.

The strike was illegal of purpose, the Company insists, first, because it was staged for a trifling
reason; and second, the union demands, which had precipitated the strikes, were already covered
by an Industrial Court judgment, for the alteration, modification or setting aside of which a
certain procedure has to be followed.
The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that settlement of their demands was
at an impasse and that further negotiations would only come to naught. It stopped the strike upon
the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed the strike (or it started a new strike) as a
protest against the discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for going on
a strike.
It is true that on August 14, 1952 the Industrial Court promulgated a decision in CIR Case No.
571-V, Marsman and Company Employees and Labors Association (MARCELA-FFW) v.
Marsman and Company, Inc. However, except for the demand for general salary increases, the
demands in said labor case were different from the demands which the Union made before it
went on strike. For this reason, it did not have to ask modification of the aforementioned
judgment. It had only to give the proper strike notice, as in fact it did.
The Company further argues that since the methods used by the strikers were illegal, it had the
right to refuse them readmission. Of the 69 complainants, nine, namely Alejandro Mojar, Manuel
Mazo, Esteban Borja, Cecilio Walo, Eugenio Valenzuela, Elias Matic, Marcos Buccat, Malisimo
Vargas and Ricardo Antonio, were charged with and convicted of various crimes like coercion,
malicious mischief, physical injuries, breach of the peace, light threats, and damage to property,
all committed during the period from September 4, 1954 to October 12, 1954. Admittedly, the
Company could not have condoned these acts which were committed after it had offered to
reinstate the strikers. Nevertheless, as the lower court reasoned out, it does not appear that the
aforementioned individual acts were authorized or even impliedly sanctioned by the Union.
Hence, the other strikers who were innocent of and did not participate in the illegal acts should
not be punished by being deprived of their right of reinstatement. It is only those who had been
found guilty who should be penalized by the loss of the right.3
We now come to the question of backpay. In an economic strike, the strikers are not entitled to
backpay, since the employer should get the equivalent day's work for what he pays his
employees. During the time that the strike was an economic one, complainants had no right to
back pay. The Industrial Court could not have made a finding of unfair labor practice with
respect to such time, as none had so far been committed. This being an unfair labor practice case,
it cannot, therefore, order reinstatement much less back pay for that period.4
On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding of unfair labor practice, it still has the
discretion to determine whether or not to grant back pay. Such discretion was not abused when it
denied back wages to complainants, considering the climate of violence which attended the strike
and picket that the complainants conducted. While the complainants ordered reinstated did not
actively take part in the acts of violence, their minatory attitude towards the Company may be
gathered from the fact that from the very first day of the strike policemen had to patrol the strike
zone in order to preserve peace.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the
employer which he is not required by law to grant.

2Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, 754-755.

3PECO v. C.I.R., L-7156, May 31, 1955.
4Malaya Workers Union (PAFLU) v. C.I.R., L-17880-81, April 23, 1963.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 100158

June 2, 1992

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKANAFTEU, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking union members terminated
for abandonment of work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be reinstated.
On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and private
respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU
(UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A
deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826.
On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the
COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5
November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, instead of
returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order
questioning inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.
On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees enjoining
them to return to work not later than 8:00 o'clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same
time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the UNION presented a
list of (6) demands to the COLLEGE in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most
important of these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking
employees. But these were flatly rejected.

Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his returnto-work order and sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12
November 1990, the UNION received the Order.
Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held conciliation meetings
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its
demands to three (3), viz.: that striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and
conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against them; and,
that CBA negotiations be continued. However, these efforts proved futile as the COLLEGE
remained steadfast in its position that any return-to-work offer should be unconditional.
On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the UNION
continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that "appropriate steps under
the said circumstances" may be undertaken by him. 1
On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the striking
employees, which were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and
members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the COLLEGE.
On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers
and several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed
as NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order before respondent
SECRETARY, citing "selective acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It also
sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.
Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their respective position papers. The
COLLEGE prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who
defied his return-to-work order.
On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia, directed
the reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or
otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION like
private respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in
asserting its existence". 2 Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for
the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and, correspondingly,
sustained their termination.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE
questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking UNION members, and private
respondent UNION, the dismissal of its officers.
On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both motions. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his assailed Orders insofar as
they directed the reinstatement of the striking workers previously terminated.
Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on
termination disputes, maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter
pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thus
Art. 217.
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise
provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties
for decision without extension, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or

non-agricultural: . . . 2. Termination disputes . . . 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article

264 of this Code, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs . . .
In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment 3 where We held:
The labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary
measures against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the
Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike but not the company's right to take action
against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts.
Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico 4 and
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 5 workers who refuse to obey a return-towork order are not entitled to be paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the positions they
have abandoned of their refusal to return thereto as ordered.
Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed
officers considering that the act of the UNION in continuing with its picket was never
characterized as a "brazen disregard of successive legal orders", which was readily apparent in
Union Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra, nor was it a willful refusal to return
to work, which was the basis of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra. The failure of UNION
officers and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders was not because
they wanted to defy said orders; rather, they held the view that academic institutions were not
industries indispensable to the national interest. When respondent SECRETARY denied their
motion for reconsideration, however, the UNION intimated that efforts were immediately
initiated to fashion out a reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, if
failed.
The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, was already settled in International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment. 6 Therein, We ruled that:
. . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this
authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all
questions and include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including
cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of the Labor Code did contemplate
of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is readily evident from its
opening proviso reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . .
Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the
Secretary of Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving unfair
labor practice. 7
At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment, supra, which was cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real.
To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in
the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is,
however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never
submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he

restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal
strike.
Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely
incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor disputed itself,
or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v. Secretary or
Labor and Employment, supra, and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is
tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply.
The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases,
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred
to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.
In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990, asked the
"Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise
prayed in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking
employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the termination of its officers and
members before respondent SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work
orders. There is no dispute then that the issue on the legality of the termination of striking
employees was properly submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.
Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide
workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the
arbitration and litigation process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to
our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation.
Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For, labor laws are
meant to promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of
Labor ). 8 After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor.
We now come to the more pivotal question of whether striking union members, terminated for
abandonment of work after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order, should be
reinstated.
We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a returnto-work order:
1.

Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code

Art. 263.
Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715;
emphasis supplied).
2.

Article 264, same Labor Code

Art. 264.
Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a
strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this
Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration
or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout
. . . (emphasis supplied).
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike . . . (emphasis supplied).
3.
Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31
August 1990)
Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an
illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain
or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from the locking-out
employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to
criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied).
Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the
return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of
jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic
institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and
that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to
work.
This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if
a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall
immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is
immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration
(University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC). 9 It must be strictly complied with even during the
pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the
exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must
therefore be immediately complied with.
The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing
Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 10 thus
To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for
reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the
deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and
hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.

Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor
disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of Business
Administration v. Noriel 11 where We ruled thus:
There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national
interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or
less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and
will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important, it is not
amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual and
emotional well-being of the country's youth.
Respondent UNION's failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5
November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides
that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal. act. Any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently,
"be declared to have lost his employment status."
Section 6 Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides the penalties for
defying a certification order of the Secretary of Labor or a return-to-work order of the
Commission, also reiterates the same penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance with the
aforesaid orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under pain of loss of employment
status." Under the Labor Code, assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.
Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and
defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers
have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be
validly replaced.
We recently reiterated this stance in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, 12 wherein we cited
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra, thus
A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or
certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended . . . The union officers and members, as a
result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.
Despite knowledge of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, records of the case reveal that
private respondent UNION opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990
but also that of 9 November 1990.
While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9 November 1990 initiatives were
immediately undertaken to fashion out a return-to-work agreement with management, still, the
unrebutted evidence remains that the striking union officers and members tried to return to work
only eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in failure, or twenty (20) days after
they received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.
The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC), 13 cannot be extended to the striking union officers and
members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two returnto-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of teachers, who are supposed to
be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride

displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action
against some union officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated
9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to
work on 12 November 1990 presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the
same terms and conditions or prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same. The
COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who chose to
disregard the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the
interests of its students who form part of the youth of the land.
Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v.
Tuico, supra, and Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle, Philippines, Inc., supra, cannot be made
applicable to them because in the latter two cases, workers defied the return-to-work orders for
more than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said, did not last more
than a month.
Again, this line of argument must be rejected. It is clear from the provisions above quoted that
from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his
job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just
simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations while
retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v.
Tuico, supra). Suffice it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the workers were
terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only nine (9) days. It is indeed
inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to
stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they
report back to work. This is absurd.
In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the
reinstatement of striking union members who refused to report back to work after he issued two
(2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. The Order
in question is, certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and
the Resolution 31 May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are
SET ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union members terminated by
petitioner, and the temporary restraining order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, p. 44.

Ibid., p. 34.

G.R. No 88210, 23 January 1991, 193 SCRA 223.

Nos. L-75271-73, 27 June 1988; 162 SCRA 676.

G.R. Nos. 88710-12, 19 December 1990; 192 SCRA 397.

G.R. Nos. 92981-83, 9 January 1992.

Meycauayan College v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81144, 7 May 1990; 185 SCRA 50.

G.R. No. 78909, 30 June 1989; 174 SCRA 632.

G.R. No. 89920, 18 October 1990; 190 SCRA 759.

10

38 SCRA 372 (1971).

11

G.R. No. 80648, 15 August 1988, 164 SCRA 402.

12

No. L-49983, 20 April 1992.

13

G.R. Nos. 86917-18, 25 January 1991; 193 SCRA 365.