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September 2013
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Exhibit 12
Brazil Reinsurance Ceded as a Percentage of
Primary Market's Direct Premium (2008-2012)
10
80
70
50
30
20
10
3
2
(% of Direct Premium)
Segment Review
August 26, 2013
60
Global Reinsurance
Despite
0 a subpar operating climate, global reinsurers have managed to squeeze out0
2008
2011
2012*
relatively reasonable
returns 2009
on capital and 2010
compensate investors
while sustaining
Direct Premium
Ceded Reinsurance Premium
Reinsurance Premium as % of Direct Premium
organic growth in capacity. Quite an accomplishment, especially considering all the
* 2012 isobstacles
gross of reinsurance
932.2 million).
various
they commission
have and(BRL
continue
to navigate.
Source: SUSEP website (Statistics System); data reflects industry totals and financial statements available
Third-party
capital
intensifies
competition.
Over the past two-and-a-half years, catastrophes worldwide have inflicted approximately
USD
Exhibit
13190 billion in insured losses, according to Swiss Res Sigma. For global
reinsurers,
these events
wereSegment
primarily aProfit/Loss
drag on earnings,
as balance sheets remained
Brazil Local
Reinsurer
(2008-2012)
robust.
The Resseguros'
challenge of monopoly
managing ended
loss accumulation
globalacatastrophes
was eviIRB Brasil
in 2007, but itfrom
maintains
dominant
dent
in of
2011,
and since
2008 reinsurers
have margin.
faced numerous hurdles due to a weakshare
the local
reinsurance
market's profit
ened global economy: deteriorating investment returns; more volatile investments; sup2012
pressed
growth opportunities; increased client retentions and competitive pricing.
2011
Contents
Top 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Top 50 Ranking. . . . . . . . 8
Lloyds Trends. . . . . . . . 11
Brazil & Latin America . . 12
Asia/Pacific. . . . . . . . . . 17
Middle East & North Africa .20
Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . 24
Outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Now another hurdle has materialized on the horizon in the form of third-party capital.
With
excess capacity prevalent among the traditional reinsurers, pricing in the market
2010
is already very competitive.This is most evident in longer tail casualty classes, leaving
IRB
only
mar2009shorter tail specialty and property classes up for the chase. While the capital Other
kets historically have provided capacity out on the tail for property/catastrophe risk,
2008
generally
in the form of catastrophe bonds, industry loss warranties (ILWs) and other
collateralized
structures,
it now 200
appears investors,
asset managers
and bankers
are
0
100
300
400
500
600
showing more interest in the lower layers ofBRLcatastrophe
programs,
as
well
as
in
other
Millions
specialty
andwebsite
casualty
classes.
Source: SUSEP
(Statistics
System); data reflects financial statements available as of July 12, 2013.
Various reinsurance brokers have reported that as much as USD 45 billion of additional
capacity has entered the reinsurance market in recent years, representing 14% of the
current global property limit. Hedge funds, pension funds, endowments and trusts
looking for a bigger slice of the pie are lured by the relatively favorable returns, float
Exhibit 1
Global Reinsurance Shareholders Equity Plus Share Repurchases
(2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
250
Total Shareholders' Funds
Share Repurchases
Analytical Contacts
Robert DeRose
+1 (908) 439-2200 Ext. 5453
Robert.DeRose@ambest.com
Greg Reisner
+1 (908) 439-2200 Ext. 5224
Greg.Reisner@ambest.com
Editorial Management
Al Slavin
USD Billions
200
150
25.8
6.3
16.3
20.4
2009
2010
2011
29.8
4.0
100
50
0
2008
2012
2Q 2013
YTD
Copyright 2013 by A.M. Best Company, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. No part of this report or document may be distributed
in any electronic form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the A.M. Best
Company. For additional details, refer to our Terms of Use available at the A.M. Best Company website: www.ambest.com/terms.
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 1
Global Reinsurance Shareholders Equity Plus Share Repurchases
(2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
Special Report
250
USD Billions
200
150
Global Reinsurance
Share Repurchases
100
A few hedge funds have chosen to enter the reinsurance market directly by forming new
reinsurance companies, which certainly has drawn attention. However, with hedge-fund50
backed companies, not all of the capital is dedicated to providing reinsurance capacity.A
substantial portion of that capital supports investment risk. Other investors have found it
0
easier to collaborate with traditional reinsurers or collateralized facilities that already have
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2Q 2013
operational
infrastructure,
relationships and, most important,
the intellectual
YTD
Note: Excludesthe
Lloyd's
in all years and
Alterra in 2Q 2013 established
YTD.
Source: A.M. Best
data &to
research
capital
succeed at building a profitable underwriting portfolio.
Over the past year, numerous new sidecars have been formed by traditional reinsurers.Third party or managed capital is
being spun as affording additional financial
and operational flexibility.This source of
250
capital provides additional underwriting
200
capacity to better serve clients and com150
plements the traditional balance sheet and
100
risk appetite. Managed capital therefore
50
0
should allow the reinsurer greater flexibil2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
ity with capital resources throughout the
NPW
Shareholders' Equity
underwriting cycle and provides a low-risk
Source: A.M. Best data & research
source of income in the form of management fees and profit sharing.This revenue
offsets fixed operating costs that otherwise would fall to the bottom line.
(USD Billions)
Exhibit 2
Global Reinsurance Net Premium vs.
Shareholders Equity (2007-2012)
PH3
Stickiness of Some Capacity Questionable
Exhibit 3The bad news is that more capacity only makes reinsurance pricing more competitive, especially
demand for
cover
is declining.
Global Reinsurance
when
Year-to-Date
Stock
Price
ChangeThe
for stickiness
Select of this capacity also
remains
questionable.
The
traditional
market
has
long
prided
itself on enduring, deep
Reinsurers (2013)
(% Change)
Ar
As ch
pe
Am n
lin
Be
rk
Al
sh
lie
ire
d
Ha Axi
th s
aw
a
En Ca y
du tli
ra n
Ge nce
Gr ner
Ha een ali
nn lig
ov ht
Ko er R
re e
an
M Re
ap
M fre
M aid
on en
tp
el
M ier
M S&
un A
i D
Pa ch R
rtn e
e
Pl r Re
at
inu
m
Ev Q
er BE
es
tR
Re
e
nn
ais RG
an A
ce
R
SC e
To Swi OR
kio ss
M Re
ar
in
Va e
W
lid
hit
us
e
Al Mou X
leg n L
ha tain
ny s
Co
rp
.
out of markets as opportunities arise and are careful not to overstay their welcome.
That strategy has its place in the markets, and the key differences need to be understood. Many market observers would expect that over time the vast majority of hedge
fund participants will move in and out of the reinsurance sector, while a minority of
hedge
funds may make a longer term commitment.
Source: A.M. Best
research
2
(USD Billions
(USD Billions)
200
150
100
50
0
Global Reinsurance
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
NPW
Shareholders' Equity
reinsurers perspective, this just might be the wave of the future
where
capital
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011 Source:
2012
A.M. Best data & research
management includes managing third-party capital.The jury is still out on this, but tradiNPW
Shareholders' Equity
tional reinsurers that dont
have
a long history of managing third-party capital are wading
Source: A.M. Best data & research
into the water.This suggests that management teams believe third-party capital likely could
linger in the reinsurance sector for some time, and that they understand a basic tenet the
best money managers attract the most capital.PH3
This subtle variation paints a different mind3
set than the disposable reinsurers established Exhibit
after Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita and Wilma in
PH3
Global Reinsurance Year-to-Date Stock Price Change for
Exhibit 3
Reinsurers (2013)
Global Reinsurance Year-to-Date Stock
Price
Select
Prices
as Change
of Aug. 5,for
2013
YTD % Price Change
Avg Reinsurers % Change
65
Reinsurers (2013)
58.6
60
57.5
55
S&P 500
YTD % Price Change
Avg Reinsurers % Change
50
58.6
57.5
45
40
35
32.5
32.3 33.9
30
27.9
26.7
36.8
24.4
23.3
23.1
22.9
25
20.4
32.5
32.3 33.9
18.5
20
27.9
15.6
14.7 12.2
26.7
26.3
15
24.4
23.3
23.1
22.9
22.8
10.3
21.9
8.8
20.4
20.4
10
18.5
6.6
15.9
15.6
14.7 5 12.2
19.7
1.6
13.5
10.3
0
8.8
6.6
5.8
-5
-3.0 -0.4
1.6
1.6
(% Change)
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
Ar
As ch
pe
Am n
lin
Be
rk
Al
sh
lie
ire
d
Ha Axi
th s
aw
a
En Ca y
du tli
ra n
Ge nce
Gr ner
Ha een ali
nn lig
ov ht
Ko er R
re e
an
M Re
ap
M fre
M aid
on en
tp
el
M ier
M S&
un A
i D
Ar
Pa ch R
rtn e
As ch
er
pe
Pl Re
at
Am n
inu
lin
Be m
Al
Ev rksQ
l
i
er hBirE
ed
es e
t R H Ax
Re
a
e
nn
th is
aw
ais RG
a
A
an
ce End Ca y
Re u tlin
ra
SC
n
To Swi OR Ge ce
kio ss G ne
M ReH reen rali
ar an li
in n g
Va e ove ht
W
lid K r R
hit
us ore e
e
an
Al Mou X
leg n L M Re
a
ha tain
ny s M pfre
Co M aid
rp on en
. tp
el
M ie
M S& r
un A
i D
Pa ch R
rtn e
e
Pl r Re
at
inu
m
Ev Q
er BE
es
tR
Re
e
nn
ais RG
an A
ce
(% Change)
-3.0 -0.4
USD Billions
Cat Bonds
Sidecars
8
A year
10 ago,A.M. Best stated that overall,
the (re)insurance market seems to be
6
8
functioning
in solid though unspectacular
fashion,
a statement that is still valid today.
4
6
Can a transition to easier days with hand2
4 pay take place without it first getsome
ting worse? It will continue to take a great
0
2
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
deal of discipline.Traditional reinsurance
companies
may be able to emerge from
0
Source: A.M. Best research
2007
2010by 2011
2012
2013
this soft2006
market
in a 2008
strong2009
position
YTD
sharing
the
brunt
of
any
future
losses
with
Source: A.M. Best research
third-party capital, a vast majority of which then quickly exits.That will be the trial by fire.
Until the staying power of recent third-party capital is tested by the wrath of a major loss,
reinsurers will jockey for position to make sure they have a horse in that race.
USD Billions
Special
250
200
Report 150
100
50
From0a
2012
2013
YTD
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Given the greater pricing pressure that abundant capacity has placed on some of the
most attractive margin business, A.M. Best can only contemplate the near-term effect
to be thinner underwriting profits.That, combined with lackluster investment yields,
makes achieving a reasonable return on equity a challenging proposition.There is the
hope that fee income and profit share on managed capital may help close the gap. It
is argued that while pricing is under pressure, perhaps the traditional reinsurers have
commanded too much rate on line.This new capacity may cut off the peaks and bring
greater stability to pricing for the foreseeable future.Time will tell.
While the January and April renewal period seemed to progress in orderly fashion, June
and July renewals in Florida and southern states gave way to the pressure of excess
capacity and stagnant demand. U.S. property catastrophe pricing is reported to be off
by as much as 20%.This class and region has been the bread and butter for the traditional reinsurance sector since the hard market peaked in 2006, and it remains a leading
opportunity relative to other classes and regions in the world. Historical results demonstrate that global reinsurers have done a commendable job in cycle management since
9/11. It now seems this endeavor will become even more challenging.
Exhibit 5
Global Reinsurance US/Bermuda, European Big Four & Lloyds Trend
Summary (2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
(USD Billions)
2008
NPW (Non-Life only)
Net Earned Premiums (Non-Life only)
Net Investment Income
Realized Investment Gains / (Losses)
Total Revenue
Net Income
2009
2010
2011
2012
3.4
24.1
20.3
4.9
24.9
10.7
15.5
Shareholders' Equity
141.5
184.3
193.9
194.3
218.4
174.3
186.5
Loss Ratio
Expense Ratio
Combined Ratio
65.2%
29.8%
95.0%
58.9%
30.6%
89.5%
63.8% 76.1%
31.6% 31.3%
95.4% 107.4%
60.7%
31.3%
92.0%
59.2%
30.1%
89.3%
64.9%
30.9%
95.9%
-7.6%
-3.9%
-4.9%
-6.3%
-6.1%
-4.5%
-5.8%
22.2%
72.8%
24.2%
65.3%
19.2%
76.2%
19.5%
87.9%
19.0%
72.9%
19.6%
69.6%
20.7%
75.1%
2.1%
1.9%
14.6%
11.7%
10.6%
8.9%
2.5%
2.2%
12.1%
12.5%
12.0%
20.8%
8.3%
7.1%
84%
357%
405%
66%
297%
332%
66%
293%
327%
71%
298%
327%
67%
264%
293%
68%
299%
325%
70%
298%
332%
Non-Life Gross Pr
Global Reinsurance
5.1
4.3
er
es
Re
Ko
re
a
Ev
S.
E
wa
at
ha
er
ov
Be
rk
s
hir
eH
nn
Ha
SC
OR
Re
's
yd
Llo
Re
ss
Sw
i
M
un
ich
Re
tough lessons learned in the late 1990s. Many reinsurers were badly burned by the
severe financial and operational ramifications of adverse loss-reserve development that
0
resulted from poorly underwritten and priced casualty business written during that
period.The bleeding that emerged from that time continued into the first half of the
next decade and strained some balance sheets, so much so that some reinsurers could
not participate fully in the subsequent hard casualty cycle that began in 2001. For those
reinsurers that were able to leverage capacity in the following years, the opportunity
A.M.form
Best data
research
was enormous and continues to pay dividendsSource:
in the
of &favorable
reserve runoff.
Over the past five years, favorable reserve development has cumulatively contributed
approximately $37 billion to the bottom
line for the segment and added approxiExhibit 6
mately four points to the average annual
Global Reinsurance Return on Equity
return on equity (ROE). It would be foolUS/Bermuda, Lloyd's & European Big Four
ish to believe this benefit will continue
(2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
indefinitely, but the roller-coaster ride of
US & Bermuda Market
European "Big Four"
30
the past serves as a powerful reminder
Five-Year Average
Lloyd's
that reinsurers must continue to care25
fully chart their course.
20
(%)
Germany
10%
Flagstone,
4.2
rR
Pa
rtn
e
6.1
aR
e
9.7
Ch
in
10.2
10
tR
e
(USD Billions)
Special Report
15
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
needed expertise to profitably manage these operations and investments.These steps are
necessary to assure the bottom line does not suffer as a consequence.
As previously discussed, reinsurers feeling the competitive pressure from capital market
participants increasingly have sought to partner with this capacity rather than fight it.
Using this lower cost capacity has enabled reinsurers to better control market share, if
not retain or gain it. Sourcing profitable risk is the main value-added quality that traditional reinsurance companies provide to third-party capital.These days, sourcing risk is
just as hard, if not harder, than sourcing capital.The added revenues from management
fees and profit sharing from these ventures, while not a fortune, enhance reinsurers
earnings and solidify the overall client relationship by affording additional capacity at
pricing that otherwise would not be obtainable.
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 7
Top 50 Global Reinsurance Groups
2013
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Company
Munich Reinsurance Co.2
Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 2
Lloyds 3,4
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 5
SCOR S.E.
Reinsurance Group of America Inc.
China Reinsurance (Group) Corp.
Korean Reinsurance Co. 6
PartnerRe Ltd.
Everest Re Group Ltd.
Transatlantic Reinsurance Co.
London Reinsurance Group Inc.
Assicurazioni Generali SpA
General Insurance Corporation of India 6
XL Group plc
QBE Insurance Group Ltd.
MAPFRE RE, Compania de Reaseguros, S.A. 7
The Toa Reinsurance Co., Ltd. 6,8
Odyssey Re Holdings Corp.
R+V Versicherung AG 9
Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. 6,8
Catlin Group Ltd.
Axis Capital Holdings Limited
Caisse Centrale de Reassurance
MS&AD Insurance Group Holdings, Inc. 6,8,10
Amlin plc
RenaissanceRe Holdings Ltd.
IRB - Brasil Resseguros S.A.
Arch Capital Group Ltd.
Deutsche Rueckversicherung AG
Aspen Insurance Holdings Ltd.
White Mountains Insurance Group, Ltd.
Validus Holdings, Ltd.
Endurance Specialty Holdings, Ltd.
ACE Ltd.
American Agricultural Insurance Co.11
Alterra Capital Holdings Ltd.
Pacific LifeCorp
Maiden Holdings, Ltd.
ACR Capital Holdings Pte, Ltd. 6
Allied World Assurance Co. Holdings, AG
Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd.
African Reinsurance Corp.
NKSJ Holdings, Inc. 6,8
Milli Reasurans Turk Anonim Sirketi 12
Platinum Underwriters Holdings Ltd.
Wilton Re Holdings Ltd.
W.R. Berkley Corp.
Central Reinsurance Corp.
Net
$36,167
25,344
16,231
11,371
15,059
11,286
7,907
6,471
3,390
4,567
4,081
3,456
3,268
2,979
2,534
2,209
1,675
1,953
1,821
1,916
1,972
1,579
1,614
1,815
1,719
N/A
1,278
1,103
792
1,227
819
1,157
948
1,009
1,087
1,025
284
727
882
765
389
748
616
586
501
518
565
502
477
462
Gross
$22,539
19,468
10,201
15,770
9,668
6,146
4,184
5,113
3,910
4,311
3,577
43
958
2,758
2,008
2,265
1,890
2,155
2,044
1,981
1,966
1,860
1,830
1,645
1,700
1,592
1,552
1,301
1,282
1,221
1,228
1,179
1,154
1,119
1,070
955
899
864
765
760
735
618
608
565
570
509
344
Net
$22,038
15,117
9,060
11,358
9,668
5,558
4,090
3,390
3,768
4,081
3,456
43
958
2,520
1,885
1,675
1,850
1,821
1,916
1,955
1,579
1,614
1,815
1,595
N/A
1,278
1,103
745
1,227
772
1,157
948
1,009
1,087
1,025
284
727
765
389
748
616
562
557
508
565
477
316
Total
Shareholders
Funds
$36,248
34,026
8,909
31,204
191,588
6,358
6,910
7,026
1,275
6,934
6,734
4,331
715
29,830
5,012
11,856
11,417
1,280
2,157
3,679
2,527
35,196
3,512
5,780
2,330
28,740
2,411
3,507
1,140
5,169
273
3,488
4,258
4,455
2,711
27,531
440
2,840
9,497
1,015
699
3,326
1,629
609
19,857
548
1,895
1,540
4,336
477
Ratios1
Loss
61.2%
53.1
70.7
56.0
N/A
65.4
N/A
58.6
79.7
58.5
65.9
70.6
N/A
62.3
82.1
58.4
67.1
67.3
80.4
57.0
74.1
N/A
63.5
61.5
52.5
N/A
59.6
30.4
67.2
50.9
72.0
56.1
58.4
55.5
62.8
55.2
86.3
57.8
N/A
73.4
73.2
69.0
46.5
60.2
N/A
77.2
32.4
N/A
60.5
81.1
Expense Combined
30.0%
91.2%
30.0
83.1
25.4
96.0
34.9
91.0
N/A
99.9
29.0
94.3
N/A
N/A
41.7
100.4
18.1
97.9
29.3
87.8
27.9
93.8
20.3
90.9
N/A
N/A
23.7
86.0
22.7
104.8
28.6
86.9
32.1
99.2
29.6
97.0
27.6
108.0
27.6
84.6
24.5
98.6
N/A
N/A
19.9
83.4
27.9
89.4
12.0
64.5
N/A
N/A
27.3
86.9
27.4
57.8
44.8
112.0
29.3
80.2
28.6
100.6
29.3
85.4
31.9
90.3
23.1
78.6
32.0
94.8
22.3
77.4
13.1
99.4
33.7
91.5
N/A
N/A
29.1
102.5
29.4
102.7
26.1
95.1
34.5
81.0
32.0
92.2
N/A
N/A
30.0
107.2
30.1
62.5
N/A
N/A
40.0
100.5
26.2
107.3
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 8
Global Reinsurance Market Top 15 Ranked on
Non-Life
Exhibit
6 Gross Premium Written (2012)
Global Reinsurance Return on Equity 120%
25
22.5
108.0
104.8
US/Bermuda,
Lloyd's
& European
Big Four
99.9
100.4
99.2
97.9
96.0
94.3
93.8
100%
91.2
19.5
90.9
87.8
91.0
(2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
20
84.6
15
25
Non-Life
Gross Premium
10.2
6.1
5.1
4.3
60%
40%
15
10
4.2
3.9
3.6
2.8
2.3
2.2
20%
2.0
2009
2010
2011
yR
e
se
ys
Od
GI
of
To
aR
e
QB
E
Ind
ia
sR
e
Tr
an
rtn
e
2008
2012
2Q 2013 YTD
Be
rk
rR
e
Re
-5
Pa
ina
Ch
er
es
tR
e
Re
an
OR
re
S.
E
.
Ko
Ev
ire
0%
sh
SC
Ha
th
a
er
ov
nn
Ha
wa
Re
's
yd
Llo
Re
iss
Sw
un
ich
Re
20
9.7
(%)
10
30
15.8
Combined Ratio
(USD Billions)
83.1
(%)
Exhibit 9
Global Reinsurance Total Shareholders' Funds
by Region* (2012)
Other
Markets
10%
Germany
10%
Switzerland
13%
Bermuda Market
10%
15
Other
Looking
forward, the overall market
Germany
Markets
environment remains challenging,
and companies for the most part are realistic
10%
10%
about the returns they can achieve in theExhibit
current 10
market. Pricing is not expected
to
improve
for
the
Jan.
1
renewal,
absent
any
major
event. Management
teams
Switzerland
Global Reinsurance
Gross Premium
Written
Bermuda Market
10%
13%
by Region* (2012)
Americas*
Other
1%
Switzerland
Pa
rt
Ch
er
Ev
Ko
r
SC
O
Ha
nn
Be
o
rk
sh
ire
Ha
t
Sw
M
un
Special Report
* Americas includes the United States, Canada and Latin America, and
gross premium of National Indemnity & General Re Corp. (subsidiaries
of Berkshire Hathaway).
Source: A.M. Best data & research
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 10
Global Reinsurance Non-Life Gross Premium
Written by Region (2012)
London
13%
Switzerland
14%
Other Markets
9%
Asia-Pacific
14%
Bermuda
Market
14%
Americas
12%
Germany
24%
Note: Region determined by the domicile of ultimate parent.
*Americas includes the United States, Canada and Latin America. Americas
also includes GPW of National Indemnity & General Re Corp. (subsidiaries of
Berkshire Hathaway).
Source: A.M. Best data & research
Exhibit 17
Global Reinsurance Premium Cession Rates in
Select Regions (2002-2011)
60
GCC
50
40
Far East
30
Indian Subcontinent
Levant
20
Developed
10
CIS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Exhibit 11
Brazil Reinsurance Local Reinsurer Market Share (2008-2012)
Admitted and occasional reinsurers have gained a larger share
of ceded
10
premium since Brazil's reinsurance market opened in 2008.
(BRL Billions)
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
11
Exhibit 17
Global Reinsurance Premium Cession Rates in
Special Report
Select Regions (2002-2011)
Global Reinsurance
60
GCC
50
Abundant
40
10
Brazils
to catastrophe
such2009
as hurricanes
or earthquakes, leaves
2002 limited
2003 exposure
2004
2005
2006
2007risks,
2008
2010
2011
it well positioned
as
a
diversity
play
relative
to
other
emerging
markets
in Latin AmerGCC (Bahrain, KSA, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE)
Levant (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey)
Indian
Subcontinent
(India,
Pakistan)
CIS
(Kazakhstan,
Russia,
Ukraine)
ica. Perhaps more important, the countrys need to build out infrastructure before hostEast (Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam)
Developed (France, Germany, UK)
ing theFar
2014
FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic
Games remains a catalyst in the overall
Source:
Best's Statement File Global
economy. Low insurance penetration, vast offshore oil reserves and a growing middle
class also factor into long-term growth forecasts for insurers and reinsurers.
Exhibit 11
Brazil Reinsurance Local Reinsurer Market Share (2008-2012)
Admitted and occasional reinsurers have gained a larger share of ceded
premium since Brazil's reinsurance market opened in 2008.
(BRL Billions)
6
Local Reinsurers
4
3
2
1
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: SUSEP website (Statistics System); data reflects industry totals and financial statements available
from SUSEP as of July 12, 2013. Individual breakout of admitted and occassional figures not available.
(% of Direct Premium)
Pricing
Exhibitaround
12 Julys renewal season was flat to down 5%, with insurers able to
secure
additional
capacity
on aas
treaty
basis underofterms unavailable a year ago. This
Brazil Reinsurance
Ceded
a Percentage
reflects the growth in their own portfolios. It is not yet clear whether an imbalance
Primary Market's Direct Premium (2008-2012)
exists between this years reinsurance premium prices and the amount of coverage
10
80
being purchased, which in some cases may be excessive for underlying risk. The
9
70
existence
of coinsurance arrangements also has generated potential accumulation
8
risks60for reinsurers placing treaty-based cover under this scenario, should a signifi7
cant50event coincide across separate treaties within a single reinsurers portfolio.
6
While
5
40 reinsurers would prefer facultative coverage, demand for this is driven downward30 by abundant capacity for treaty business.
4
20
These
developments outline the growth trajectory of Brazils reinsurance market 2since
10 opened five years ago, ending the monopoly held by IRB Brasil Resseguros1 S.A.
it first
0
2008
Direct Premium
2009
2010
12
Ceded Reinsurance Premium
0
2011
2012*
Reinsurance Premium as % of Direct Premium
Special Report
Exhibit
Exhibit 11
11
Global Reinsurance
Brazil
Brazil Reinsurance
Reinsurance Local
Local Reinsurer
Reinsurer Market
Market Share
Share (2008-2012)
(2008-2012)
Admitted
and
occasional
reinsurers
have
larger
Admitted
and
occasional
reinsurers
have gained
gained aa
larger share
share
of
ceded in 2010 with
since
1939.
The
road to an
open reinsurance
market
tookof
a ceded
detour
premium
since
Brazil's
reinsurance
market
opened
in
2008.
premium
since
Brazil's
reinsurance
market
opened
in
2008.
legislation
that required 40% of reinsurance premium be ceded to locally based
(BRL
(BRLBillions)
Billions)
reinsurers. Insurers also are prohibited from ceding more than 20% of premium to off66
shore
reinsurance affiliates, but a key exception involves the surety business, a line that
factors heavily
into Brazils build
out.
Local
Admitted
&&Occassional
LocalReinsurers
Reinsurers
Admitted
Occassional
55
There are now 14 local reinsurers approved to operate in Brazil, with the balance of
3
the3 reinsurance market composed of admitted and occasional reinsurers, and the latter
primarily
serving in a retrocession role.There is a market expectation that merger and
22
acquisition activity will tick upward in this admitted and occasional segment, which
11
includes
more than 100 registered companies and 15 to 20 Lloyds syndicates. Smaller
companies
contending with administrative costs and competitive pricing may be forced
00
2008
2010
2011
2012
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
to find local partners or2009
exit the market. Local
players seeking cheaper
capital also may
Source:
SUSEP
website
(Statistics
System);
data
reflects
industry
totals
and
financial
statements
available
Source:
SUSEP
website
(Statistics
System);
data
reflects
industry
totals
and
financial
statements
available
benefit
by pairing
with
aIndividual
foreign
reinsurer
thatandhas
a less figures
formidable
market presence.
from
breakout
occassional
not
fromSUSEP
SUSEPas
asof
ofJuly
July12,
12,2013.
2013.Individual
breakoutof
ofadmitted
admittedand
occassionalfigures
notavailable.
available.
Exhibit
Exhibit 12
12
Brazil
Brazil Reinsurance
Reinsurance Ceded
Ceded as
as aa Percentage
Percentage of
of
Primary
Primary Market's
Market's Direct
Direct Premium
Premium (2008-2012)
(2008-2012)
10
10
99
80
80
88
77
60
60
50
50
66
55
40
40
44
33
30
30
20
20
22
11
10
10
00
2008
2008
Direct
DirectPremium
Premium
2009
2010
2009
2010
Ceded
CededReinsurance
ReinsurancePremium
Premium
(%of
ofDirect
DirectPremium)
Premium)
(%
Premium(BRL
(BRLBillions)
Billions)
Premium
70
70
00
2011
2012*
2011
2012*
Reinsurance
ReinsurancePremium
Premiumas
as%
%ofofDirect
DirectPremium
Premium
**2012
2012isisgross
grossof
ofreinsurance
reinsurancecommission
commission(BRL
(BRL932.2
932.2million).
million).
Source:
Source:SUSEP
SUSEPwebsite
website(Statistics
(StatisticsSystem);
System);data
datareflects
reflectsindustry
industrytotals
totalsand
andfinancial
financialstatements
statementsavailable
available
from
SUSEP
as
of
July
12,
2013.
from SUSEP as of July 12, 2013.
Exhibit
Exhibit 13
13
Brazil
Brazil Local
Local Reinsurer
Reinsurer Segment
Segment Profit/Loss
Profit/Loss (2008-2012)
(2008-2012)
IRB
IRB Brasil
Brasil Resseguros'
Resseguros' monopoly
monopoly ended
ended in
in 2007,
2007, but
but itit maintains
maintains aa dominant
dominant
share
share of
of the
the local
local reinsurance
reinsurance market's
market's profit
profit margin.
margin.
2012
2012
2011
2011
2010
2010
IRB
IRB
Other
Other
2009
2009
2008
2008
00
100
100
200
200
300
300
BRL
BRLMillions
Millions
400
400
500
500
Source:
Source:SUSEP
SUSEPwebsite
website(Statistics
(StatisticsSystem);
System);data
datareflects
reflectsfinancial
financialstatements
statementsavailable
availableas
asof
ofJuly
July12,
12,2013.
2013.
13
600
600
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Local reinsurers have maintained a steady market position with 59% of the BRL 5.53
billion in reinsurance premium generated in 2012 (see Exhibit 11), according to data
from Superintendencia de Seguros Privados (SUSEP). In 2011, local reinsurers held a
57% share of the BRL 5.52 billion in reinsurance premium. As an aside, reinsurance commissions totaled BRL 932 million in 2012 (a comparable figure for 2011 was unavailable), according to SUSEP. It should be noted that some reporting and accounting anomalies may exist within publicly available SUSEP data.
The level of reinsurance premium as a percentage of the primary markets direct premium has hovered at just under 9% since 2008, according to an A.M. Best review of
company financial statements filed with SUSEP.This level of reinsurance penetration
held steady as direct market premium climbed from BRL 42.9 billion in 2008 to BRL
73.2 billion in 2012, a cumulative increase of 70% (see Exhibit 12).This illustrates how,
despite a modest percentage of ceded reinsurance premium, the overall premium volume in Brazils insurance market remains attractive.
J. Malucelli
XL
Austral
AIG
Swiss Re*
Alterra*
Terra Re*
Total
172.8
89.9
82.8
16.2
6.4
4.9
0.1
2,976.2
4.1
7.1
700.9
1,852.4
n/a
n/a
n/a
10.3
5.8
3.0
2.8
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.0
143.2
68.4
83.2
8.5
1.6
3.9
0.1
2,673.5
579.4
1.2
778.1
2,144.7
n/a
n/a
n/a
44.0
82.9
76.1
100.4
52.1
24.7
79.0
67.2
89.8
12.7
80.6
91.6
45.3
n/a
n/a
n/a
68.8
Note: 2012 financial statements on file with SUSEP for Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty
Resseguros Brasil and Zurich Resseguradora Brasil S.A. reflect no earned income. BTG
Pactual received SUSEP authorization on Feb. 26, 2013.
* 2011 financial statements unavailable through SUSEP website.
Source: SUSEP website (Statistics System); data reflects financial statements available as
of July 12, 2013.
IRB has continued with its transition into a competitive market environment and has cleared necessary regulatory hurdles
to privatize. This move coincides with IRBs plan to expand beyond Brazils borders and
provide an international reinsurance platform for multinational insurers operating within
Brazil.This has required IRB to dedicate a team to catastrophe assessment and to license
catastrophe modeling software, an operational aspect that required less emphasis given the
less volatile catastrophe exposures in a Brazil-focused portfolio. In June 2012, IRB acquired
a 4.8% stake in Africa Re.A.M. Best understands the relationship between IRB Brasil-Re and
Africa Re to be strategic, owing to the reciprocal arrangement between the two entities to
support development in their corresponding markets.
14
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 15
Latin America A.M. Best-Rated Reinsurance Companies
Ratings as of Aug. 16, 2013.
Domicile
Brazil
Brazil
Mexico
Panama
Panama
Source:
Company
IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A.
Terra Brasis Resseguros
Reaseguradora Patria, S.A.B.
Barents Re Reinsurance Co. Inc.
QBE del Istmo Reinsurance Co. Inc.
AMB #
085590
092722
086054
091083
078448
15
Bests
Financial
Strength
Rating (FSR)
AB++
AAA-
Rating
Effective Date
Dec. 19, 2012
May 9, 2013
July 31, 2013
Sept. 27, 2012
Jan. 10, 2013
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
16
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 16
Asia/Pacific A.M. Best-Rated Reinsurance Companies
Ratings as of Aug. 16, 2013.
Domicile
Australia
Australia
China
China
China
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
India
Japan
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Company
General Reinsurance Australia Ltd.
General Reinsurance Life Australia Ltd.
China Life Reinsurance Co. Ltd
China Reinsurance (Group) Corp.
China P&C Re
Peak Reinsurance Company Ltd.
Taiping Reinsurance Company Limited
General Insurance Corp. of India
The Toa Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
ACR ReTakaful Berhad
Asia Capital Reinsurance Malaysia Sdn
Labuan Reinsurance (L) Ltd.
Malaysian Reinsurance Berhad
National Reinsurance Corp. of Philippines
Asia Capital Reinsurance Group Pte. Ltd.
Samsung Reinsurance Pte Ltd
SCOR Reinsurance Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
Singapore Reinsurance Corp. Ltd.
Korean Reinsurance Co.
Central Reinsurance Corp.
Asian Reinsurance Corp.
PVI Reinsurance Company
AMB #
086052
086652
090957
090955
088692
091406
085029
086041
085179
090060
090756
086913
078303
086771
078461
091577
088684
085224
085225
086496
085568
091541
Bests
Financial
Strength
Rating (FSR)
A++
A++
A
A
A
AAAA+
AAAAB++
AA
A
AA
A
B- u
B+
17
Rating
Effective Date
June 11, 2013
June 11, 2013
Sept. 12, 2012
Sept. 12, 2012
Sept. 12, 2012
Dec. 28, 2012
Oct. 18, 2012
Feb. 21, 2013
May 30, 2013
Dec. 20, 2012
Dec. 20, 2012
Dec. 12, 2012
Dec. 13, 2012
April 18, 2013
Dec. 20, 2012
Nov. 15, 2012
May 2, 2012
Nov. 21, 2012
Feb. 28, 2013
July 30, 2013
June 13, 2013
April 11, 2013
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
For instance, Japans Toa Re took a series of capital replenishment actions, including issuance of 30 billion yen (US$302 million) in subordinated notes in March 2012,
reducing risk exposures in its investment assets and underwriting portfolio. Korean Re
enhanced its capital position with a disposal of its treasury stocks worth around 134
billion won (US$120.3 million), together with reduction of underwriting risks during its
2011 fiscal year.
Malaysias Labuan Re restored its financial position through issuance of US$55 million
subordinated bonds and revisions of underwriting guidelines, risk control and further risk retrocession. For new capital investment, Canadas Fairfax Financial Holdings
acquired around 25% of Thai Re for US$70 million in January 2012. Japans leading trading company, Marubeni Corp., invested about a 22% stake in Singapore-based ACR Capital Holdings to become one of its major shareholders in May 2012.
Companies became quite proactive in anticipation of a hardening market. Credit awareness in the market has also increased substantially over the years and those reinsurers
worked quickly to avoid a downgrade in credit quality.
However, with additional reinsurance capital, the hardening of the market was less than
many would have expected, except in catastrophe business.
Capital deployment into the reinsurance industry has grown, with a recent influx of
capital estimated in the double-digit range.
Asias increased capacity has come from both newly established regional writers and
regional expansion from existing global reinsurers. Bermuda reinsurers and Lloyds have
also become notable additions to the Singapore market over the past two years.
In the past, a clear softening would be visible after a benign catastrophe year, such as
2012 in Asia with additional capacity, but companies are more underwriting focused,
and the extent of softening is mild. Asia players have been quite disciplined for terms
and conditions, which differs from previous cycles of strong capital influx. Current
conditions could be explained by low investment return, along with the expectation of
a continuing low-yield environment, which has made companies more underwritingfocused.This will reduce the volatility of operating performance, although there would
not be a steep increase in profitability as the companies could expect.
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
on its buyer, South Koreas Hanwha General Insurance. Hanwha Insurance recorded
a sharp increase in credit risk associated with reinsurance recoverables due to the
downward rating of Best Re on Dec. 18, 2012.
Global reinsurers see Asia as a diversification play given their peak exposures in the
United States, Europe and Japan, along with Australia as an additional increasingly aggregated peak zone.
The 2011 catastrophes highlighted the need of reinsurers to quantify exposures in a
region that lacks the full suite of vendor catastrophe models and where data transparency can often be lacking.
Natural disasters are a challenging factor for Asia-Pacific writers and have affected a
large population in Asia but the corresponding insurance impact remains comparatively
low.The industry is in need of products that improve penetration levels on a widespread basis across emerging Asia.
19
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Germany
27%
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
ness ceded has gradually decreased in the past few years.A.M. Bests analysis of 130 companies based in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries ofGermany
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
24%
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) shows that in 2002 more than 60% of direct
premiums written were ceded (see Exhibit 17). However, in 2011, cession rates for compaNote: Region determined by the domicile of ultimate parent.
nies in this data set were less than*Americas
40% ofincludes
risks. the United States, Canada and Latin America. Americas
also includes GPW of National Indemnity & General Re Corp. (subsidiaries of
Berkshire Hathaway).
change
in Best
the data
markets
mix of business, with health care
Source: A.M.
& research
40
Far East
30
Indian Subcontinent
Levant
20
Developed
10
CIS
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
21
2008
2009
2010
2011
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
cession levels are approximately double those of the 111 companies that comprised the data
set for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine
and the 1,191 entities analysed in the developed markets of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom.
The MENA market largely utilizes proportional reinsurance, although there has been
a gradual shift toward nonproportional cover in recent years. Within the region there
is extensive use of bouquet treaties, whereby most non-life lines are placed together
under the same treaty to service group multirisk accounts.This makes pricing the treaty
for the whole portfolio more critical, factoring in both under- and overperforming
lines. In most cases, health care is placed separately. Historically, MENA insurers have
benefited from reinsurance rates that have been among the lowest in emerging markets. While reinsurance prices have been under pressure in recent years, it is likely that
prices are starting to increase in the short term. For rates to materially increase there
would need to be a major shock to the reinsurance market.This could be triggered by a
major catastrophe in the region, or a series of large losses on high-value risks, such as in
energy and infrastructure risks.
Medical business has historically been written on a proportional basis. However, the
level of competition in medical has contributed to losses among many insurers and
reinsurers.The latter may have suffered more in some instances because of the outwards commission structures attached to these treaties. As a result, reinsurers are dictating terms more aggressively as they threaten to remove capacity, move from treaties
to excess-of-loss cover, reduce commissions or shift to sliding-scale commissions.The
dominance of medical in the region makes it important for the markets to have reinsurers continued support.
In the medium term, MENA insurers are under pressure to maintain greater focus on technical profitability, given depressed investment returns.There is pressure from reinsurers to
increase rates, enforce stricter terms or reduce commission levels, which will further encourage companies to concentrate more on gross rather than net profitability. Furthermore, insurers are taking active steps to improve profitability, with increased retentions as one measure.
They are also performing back-testing (sometimes with the assistance of third parties) on their
reinsurance utilization to see the overall benefits of reinsurance coverage, aiming to leverage
their positions to negotiate improved terms and conditions.
Retakaful Trends
Retakaful operators represent an important sector of the MENA reinsurance market,
although these tend to be young companies finding it difficult to establish themselves
and create a balance between market franchise and profitability. Rather than distinguish
themselves through targeting new, untapped market segments, Retakaful operators tend to
compete directly with their conventional counterparts. Given that some existing conventional
reinsurers benefit from strong reputations and economies of scale, Retakaful operators find it difficult to establish profitable operations. Moreover, pressure from shareholders to service capital
can lead to the pursuit of premium income through pricing practices.
Retrocession should ideally be placed with Retakaful companies, but in reality, a lot of the risk
is ceded to conventional reinsurers, as Retakaful operators have insufficient capacity to support
large and volatile commercial risks or lack the ratings required by the ultimate insureds.
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
(FSRs).The highest rating achieved at present is an FSR of A (see Exhibit 18). In all but two
instances, the outlook for the FSR and Issuer Credit Rating (ICR) is stable.
Most reinsurers in the MENA countries are now underwriting business outside of the region.
While the markets continue to expand, reinsurers will find opportunities to grow but need to
ensure underwriting is adequately controlled.
MENA insurers operating in countries that have suffered from regional political and economic
instability have seen their top lines affected. However, many A.M. Best-rated Middle Eastern reinsurers have shown resilience in their operating performances due to their diversified portfolios
and flexible business continuity plans. Reinsurers have felt obliged to support affected markets
during the turbulent period however, after the initial unrest, policy wording has materially tightened in the region, driven by the international reinsurance markets desire to alleviate uncertainty or conflict arising from strike, riot and civil commotion (SRCC) definitions.
Furthermore, in relation to the uncertainty of natural catastrophes across the world and the
increased frequency of regional catastrophe events, focus has increased on introducing event
limits in the region.This should provide further protection to reinsurers in the event of a major
adverse loss scenario.These issues over the past few years have highlighted the need for greater
transparency in policy wording and conditions offered in MENA markets.
MENA markets allow reinsurers to diversify into relatively less catastrophe-prone territories.While insurers seek to increase their retention levels, reinsurers will continue to play
an important role in the market. As the complexity of the market develops, the presence
of reinsurers and proximity to clients in the region will remain important.
Exhibit 18
Middle East & North Africa A.M. Best-Rated Reinsurance Companies
Ratings as of Aug. 16, 2013.
Domicile
Algeria
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Kuwait
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Qatar
Tunisia
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Source:
Company
Compagnie Centrale de Reassurance
ACR ReTakaful MEA B.S.C. (c)
Arab Insurance Group (B.S.C.)
Trust International Insurance & Reinsurance Co. B.S.C. (c) Trust Re
Al Fajer Retakaful Insurance Co. K.S.C. (Closed)
Kuwait Reinsurance Co. K.S.C. (Closed)
Arab Reinsurance Co. S.A.L.
Societe Centrale de Reassurance
Q-Re LLC
Societe Tunisienne de Reassurance
Milli Reasurans Turk Anonim Sirketi
Gulf Reinsurance Ltd.
Bests Statement File Global; Ratings as of Aug. 16, 2013.
23
AMB #
090777
090059
085013
086326
088954
085585
089190
084052
092611
083349
085454
088930
Bests
Financial
Strength
Rating
(FSR)
B+
AB++
AB++
AB+
B++
A
B+
B+
A-
Bests
FSR &
ICR
Outlook
Stable
Stable
Stable
Stable
Stable
Stable
Stable
Negative
Stable
Stable
Negative
Stable
Rating
Effective Date
July 18, 2013
Dec. 20, 2012
Dec. 18, 2012
Aug. 30, 2012
July 10, 2013
April 25, 2013
Dec. 11, 2012
July 10, 2013
Nov. 26, 2012
July 10, 2013
April 5, 2013
Aug. 2, 2013
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Exhibit 19
Global Reinsurance U.S. & Bermuda Market Trend Summary
(2008-2Q 2013 YTD)
(USD Billions)
2008
$51.6
52.1
7.6
(6.0)
55.9
2009
$50.3
51.1
8.2
0.8
63.1
2010
$52.6
52.4
8.1
2.2
65.7
2011
$55.0
54.4
7.6
(0.1)
64.6
2012
$56.7
55.5
7.1
2.2
68.6
2Q YTD
2013*
$31.1
26.3
3.1
0.2
33.3
5yr Avg
$53.2
53.1
7.7
(0.2)
63.6
Net Income
(0.5)
12.4
11.2
0.9
10.1
5.7
6.8
67.6
88.4
95.1
93.7
101.7
96.5
89.3
Loss Ratio
Expense Ratio
Combined Ratio
64.2%
29.4%
93.6%
56.1%
29.7%
85.8%
61.8%
30.9%
92.7%
77.3%
30.0%
107.3%
63.4%
29.8%
93.1%
56.1%
30.6%
86.7%
64.7%
30.0%
94.7%
-7.3%
-6.1%
-6.2%
-6.0%
-5.8%
-6.3%
-6.3%
14.6%
79.0%
16.0%
69.8%
15.4%
77.3%
14.0%
93.3%
12.7%
80.4%
11.8%
74.9%
14.5%
80.1%
-0.7%
-0.9%
16.0%
19.7%
11.9%
17.1%
1.0%
1.5%
10.6%
14.8%
11.8%
34.6%
7.7%
10.8%
76%
57%
55%
59%
56%
64%
60%
168%
215%
134%
167%
128%
158%
138%
169%
130%
158%
134%
160%
138%
171%
24
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Although this legislative issue warrants ongoing surveillance, A.M. Best does not believe
the matter will lead to any ratings revisions over the near term. Depending on the final
outcome, companies likely will continue to seek operating alternatives to ensure tax
and capital efficiency if and when the tax benefits for foreign companies are eliminated.
Some companies already have reacted, while others will continue to take steps that
mitigate the impact of any potential tax exposure.
The current administration has tried but failed to eliminate this tax benefit in
previous budget proposals. The opposition on this issue has the support of many
members of Congress, particularly from states that have considerable exposure to
natural catastrophes. Their concern is the possibility that a tax increase could lead
to increased costs for (re)insurance coverage or possibly a decrease in allocated (re)
insurance capacity for less profitable risks. Accordingly, any resolution of this issue
still could be years away.
Over the past several years, there have been various initiatives to increase insurance
capacity for catastrophe-prone states, the most recent being the relaxation of collateral
requirements in some states for foreign (re)insurers operating within those jurisdictions.The proposed elimination of the existing tax benefits would be in direct opposition to such initiatives.
25
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
26
Special Report
Global Reinsurance
Contributors
Special Report
Chairman & President Arthur Snyder III
Executive Vice President Larry G. Mayewski
Executive Vice President Paul C. Tinnirello
Senior Vice Presidents Manfred Nowacki, Matthew Mosher,
Rita L. Tedesco, Karen B. Heine
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SR-2013-046