JURISDICTION OVER THE RES

GULF OIL CORP. V. GILBERT

Important considerations in the application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, from the standpoint of litigants, are relative ease of access to
sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling
witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of view of
the premises if that be appropriate, and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.
Considerations of public interest in applying the doctrine include the
undesirability of piling up litigation in congested centers, the burden of jury duty
on people of a community having no relation to the litigation, the local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home, and the unnecessary injection of
problems in conflict of laws.
The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general
venue statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality, and usually
give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in
which to pursue his remedy. But the open door may admit those who seek not
simply justice, but perhaps justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff
sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most
inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.
Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts with discretion
to change the place of trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice. The federal law contains no such express
criteria to guide the district court in exercising its power. But the problem is a very
old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants,
and, both in England and in this country, the common law worked out techniques
and criteria for dealing with it.
Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will
justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to the
discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a
judicial tendency to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in
many abuses.
If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to
forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to
be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the
litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost
of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if

view would be appropriate to the action, and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. There may also be
questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will
weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the
plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or
"oppress" the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary
to his own right to pursue his remedy. But, unless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Administrative
difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers
instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.
In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the
trial in their view and reach, rather than in remote parts of the country where they
can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must
govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
TRAVELERS HEALTH ASSN. v. VIRGINIA
But where business activities reach out beyond one state and create continuing
relationships and obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort
to a fictional "consent" in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in
the latter state. And in considering what constitutes "doing business" sufficiently
to justify regulation in the state where the effects of the "business" are felt, the
narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn case cannot be deemed
controlling.
In Osborn v. Ozlin, a state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies
protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state can protect even
though the "state action may have repercussions beyond state lines" And in
Hoopeston, we accorded "great weight" to the "consequences" of the contractual
obligations in the state where the insured resided and the "degree of interest"
that state had in seeing that those obligations were faithfully carried out. And in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, this Court, after reviewing past cases,
concluded: "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Measured by the principles of the Osborn, Hoopeston and International Shoe
cases, the contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia residents, together with

that state's interest in faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify

subjecting appellants to cease and desist proceedings under 6. The Association
did not engage in mere isolated or short-lived transactions. Its insurance
certificates, systematically and widely delivered in Virginia following solicitation
based on recommendations of Virginians, create continuing obligations between
the Association and each of the many certificate holders in the state. Appellants
have caused claims for losses to be investigated and the Virginia courts were
available to them in seeking to enforce obligations created by the group of
certificates.
Moreover, if Virginia is without power to require this Association to accept service
of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only forum for injured
certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health claims are seldom so large that
Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law
suit. In addition, suits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia
where witnesses would most likely live and where claims for losses would
presumably be investigated. Such factors have been given great weight in
applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens. And prior decisions of this Court
have referred to the unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting
policyholders to seek redress only in some distant state where the insurer is
incorporated. The Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its
citizens from such injustice.
There is, of course, one method by which claimants could recover from
appellants in Virginia courts without the aid of substituted service of process:
certificate holders in Virginia could all be garnished to the extent of their
obligations to the Association. While such an indirect procedure would
undeniably be more troublesome to claimants than the plan adopted by the state
in its "Blue Sky Law," it would clearly be even more harassing to the Association
and its Virginia members. Metaphysical concepts of "implied consent" and
"presence" in a state should not be solidified into a constitutional barrier against
Virginia's simple, direct and fair plan for service of process on the Secretary of
the Commonwealth.
We hold that Virginia's subjection of this Association to the jurisdiction of that
State's Corporation Commission in a 6 proceeding is consistent with "fair play
and substantial justice," and is not offensive to the Due Process Clause.

WORLDWIDE VOLKSWAGEN v. WOODSON

A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
forum State. The defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, and the relationship between the defendant and the forum

must be such that it is reasonable to require the corporation to defend the

particular suit which is brought there. The Due Process Clause "does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations."
Here, there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that
are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners
carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales and perform no
services there, avail themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, and
solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the record show that they
regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or that they indirectly, through others,
serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. Although it is foreseeable that
automobiles sold by petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the
automobile here might cause injury in Oklahoma, "foreseeability" alone is not a
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. The
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that
a product will find its way into the forum State, but rather is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there. Nor can jurisdiction be supported on the
theory that petitioners earn substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a
state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.
A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State
and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. Due process requires that the
defendant be given adequate notice of the suit, and be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court. In the present case, it is not contended that notice was
inadequate; the only question is whether these particular petitioners were subject
to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts.
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist
"minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. The concept of
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
"reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that the defendant's contacts with
the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' The relationship between
the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable . . . to require the

corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Implicit in this
emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the
defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be
considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the
plaintiff's power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Even if the defendant
would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the
tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to
render a valid judgment.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a
total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to
any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity
whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there.
They avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law.
They solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they
regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or
that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.
In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and
whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a
single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to
suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma.
SCHMIDT v. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC.
If the principles expressed in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sections 377 and
378, are held applicable to multistate fact situations like the present, then neither
the laws of the state where the last event necessary to create tort liability took
place nor the laws of the state where the liquor dealer's violations of the liquor
statutes occurred would afford an injured party any remedy against the offending
liquor dealer for the injuries which resulted from his statutory violations. The
result would be that here both the interest of Wisconsin in affording whatever
remedies it deems proper for those injured there as the result of foreign violations
of liquor laws, and the interest of Minnesota in admonishing a liquor dealer

whose violation of its statutes was the cause of such injuries; and in providing for
the injured party a remedy therefor under the Civil Damage Act would become
ineffective.
The principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Sections 377 and 378, should
not be held applicable to fact situations such as the present to bring about the
result described and that a determination to the opposite effect would be more in
conformity with principles of equity and justice. Here all parties involved were
residents of Minnesota. Defendant was licensed under its laws and required to
operate its establishment in compliance therewith. Its violation of the Minnesota
statutes occurred here, and its wrongful conduct was complete within Minnesota
when, as a result thereof, Sorrenson became intoxicated before leaving its
establishment. The consequential harm to plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen,
accordingly should be compensated for under M.S.A. 340.95 which furnishes him
a remedy against defendant for its wrongful acts. By this construction, no greater
burden is placed upon defendant than was intended by 340.95.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino
The privilege of resorting to United States courts being available to a recognized
sovereign power not at war with the United States, and not being dependent
upon reciprocity of treatment, petitioner has access to the federal courts.
The propriety of the taking was not governed by New York law, since the sugar
itself was expropriated.
This suit is not uncognizable in American courts as being one to enforce the
"public" acts of a foreign state, since the expropriation law here involved had
been fully executed within Cuba.
The Government's uncontested assertion that the two State Department letters
expressed only the then wish of the Department to avoid commenting on the
litigation, obviates the need for this Court to pass upon the "Bernstein exception"
to the act of state doctrine, under which a court may respond to a representation
by the Executive Branch that, in particular circumstances, it does not oppose
judicial consideration of the foreign state's act.
The scope of the act of state doctrine must be determined according to federal
law.
The act of state doctrine applies and is desirable with regard to a foreign
expropriation even though the expropriation allegedly violates customary
international law.

o Disagreement exists as to relevant standards of international law

concerning a State's responsibility toward aliens.
o The political branch can more effectively deal with expropriation than can
the Judicial Branch.
o Conflicts between the Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be
avoided were the judiciary to adjudicate with respect to the validity of
expropriations. Even if the combination alleged in this case of retaliation,
discrimination, and inadequate compensation made the expropriation here
violative of international law, a judicial determination to that effect would
still be unwise as involving potential conflict with or embarrassment to the
Executive Branch in later litigation.
A foreign country's status as a plaintiff does not make the act of state doctrine
inapplicable
The question which brought this case here, and is now found to be the
dispositive issue, is whether the so-called act of state doctrine serves to sustain
petitioner's claims in this litigation. Such claims are ultimately founded on a
decree of the Government of Cuba expropriating certain property, the right to the
proceeds of which is here in controversy. The act of state doctrine in its
traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within
its own territory.
Act of State Doctrine: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through
the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves."
"The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be
successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case
involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we
have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages
were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for its rests at last upon the
highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the
validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be re-examined and perhaps
condemned by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'"
If a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the
forum does not, by dismissing an action or by applying its own law, purport to
divest the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely declines to
adjudicate, or makes applicable its own law to parties or property before it. The
refusal of one country to enforce the penal laws of another is a typical example of

an instance when a court will not entertain a cause of action arising in another
jurisdiction. While historic notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the
wisdom or employing the act of state doctrine, they do not dictate its existence.
The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not
irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign
acts of state.
"The courts of one independent government will not sit in judgment upon the
validity of the acts of another done within its own territory, even when such
government seizes and sells the property of an American citizen within its
boundaries."
The Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.
It is suggested that, if the act of state doctrine is applicable to violations of
international law, it should only be so when the Executive Branch expressly
stipulates that it does not wish the courts to pass on the question of validity. We
should be slow to reject the representations of the Government that such a
reversal of the Bernstein principle would work serious inroads on the maximum
effectiveness of United States diplomacy. Often, the State Department will wish
to refrain from taking an official position, particularly at a moment that would be
dictated by the development of private litigation but might be inopportune
diplomatically. Adverse domestic consequences might flow from an official stand
which could be assuaged, if at all, only by revealing matters best kept secret. Of
course, a relevant consideration for the State Department would be the position
contemplated in the court to hear the case. It is highly questionable whether the
examination of validity by the judiciary should depend on an educated guess by
the Executive as to probable result, and, at any rate, should a prediction be
wrong, the Executive might be embarrassed in its dealings with other countries.
We do not now pass on the Bernstein exception, but, even if it were deemed
valid, its suggested extension is unwarranted.
It is plain that, if a recognized government sued on a contract with a United
States citizen, concededly legitimate by the locus of its making, performance,
and most significant contacts, the forum would not apply its own substantive law
of contracts. Since the act of state doctrine reflects the desirability of presuming
the relevant transaction valid, the same result follows; the forum may not apply
its local law regarding foreign expropriations.
EL-FADL v. CENTRAL BANK OF JORDAN

 The district court granted Petra Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under D.C. Code Sections 13-422, 13-334 or 13-423 (a). First, the
district court agreed that it lacked general jurisdiction over Petra Bank under D.C.
Code Sec. 13-422 because Petra Bank was not a "person domiciled in,
organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business
in, the District of Columbia." D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 13-422 (1995). Second, the
court agreed with Petra Bank that it was not subject to general jurisdiction for
"doing business" in the District of Columbia under D.C. Code Sections 13-334.5
Neither Petra Bank's maintenance of correspondent banking relationships nor its
ownership of more than 70% of the shares in PIBC sufficed for "doing business."
Third, the court agreed that it lacked specific jurisdiction over Petra Bank under
the District of Columbia long-arm statute because none of El-Fadl's claims "arose
from" Petra Bank's alleged contacts with the District. D.C.CODE ANN. Sec. 13423(a) (1995).
Doing business has been interpreted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
as requiring a "continuing corporate presence", and conducting "substantial
business" in the District. The defendants argue that El-Fadl's conclusory
statements alleging that the defendants are doing business in the District within
the meaning of Sections 13-334 are not sufficient to constitute the prima facie
showing necessary to carry the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. The
Court is inclined to agree. El-Fadl has failed to present any evidence to support
his position that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the Jordanian
defendant pursuant to D.C.Code Sections 13-334. To the contrary, the
defendants seem to establish that their presence in the District of Columbia is
very limited, and, in the case of Petra Bank, the presence of PIBC in the District
is insufficient to create personal jurisdiction over Petra Bank.
For general jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause requires that the defendant
have "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the forum.
Even though El-Fadl's present jurisdictional allegations are insufficient, he has
sufficiently demonstrated that it is possible that he could supplement them
through discovery. A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is entitled to reasonable discovery, lest the defendant defeat the
jurisdiction of a federal court by withholding information on its contacts with the
forum. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of El-Fadl's claims against Petra
Bank for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand those claims to the district court
in order to allow El-Fadl to conduct reasonable discovery on personal jurisdiction.
Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel

 As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an action under Rule 19(b). A
court with proper jurisdiction may also consider sua sponte the absence of a
required person and dismiss for failure to join.
Multiple factors must bear on the decision whether to proceed without a required
person. This decision must be based on factors varying with the different cases,
some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by
themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests.
The Republic and the Commission are required entities because without them
as parties in this interpleader action, their interests in the subject matter are not
protected.
In considering whether the Republic and the Commission would be prejudiced if
the action were to proceed in their absence, the Court of Appeals gave
insufficient weight to their sovereign status. The doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity has been recognized since early in the history of our Nation. It is
premised upon the perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,
and the common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse. The Court has
observed that the doctrine is designed to give foreign states and their
instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit,
The Republic and the Commission have a unique interest in resolving the
ownership of or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if, and how, the
assets should be used to compensate those persons who suffered grievous
injury under Marcos. There is a comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use
its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a foreign state
is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause.
Then, too, there is the more specific affront that could result to the Republic and
the Commission if property they claim is seized by the decree of a foreign court.
The analysis of the joinder issue in those cases was somewhat perfunctory, but
the holdings were clear: A case may not proceed when a required-entity
sovereign is not amenable to suit. These cases instruct us that where sovereign
immunity is asserted, and the claims of the sovereign are not frivolous, dismissal
of the action must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the interests
of the absent sovereign.
The decision to proceed in the absence of the Republic and the Commission
ignored the substantial prejudice those entities likely would incur.
The Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts did not recognize the importance
of sovereign immunity in this case and stated that the case should be thrown out
due to the sovereign immunity of the government of the Philippines. In addition,
the Supreme Court judged that the government should be considered an
indispensable party to the case under Rule 19(b). Thus, precedent describing

how all governments who are absent from a court hearing because of their
sovereignty that grants them immunity from a joint case, should always be seen
as indispensible under Rule 19 (b) and the cases should be dismissed if the
claims of the sovereign are not frivolous. By allowing a case to be heard despite
sovereign immunity, the sovereignty of other states is undermined.
The court decided that the government of the Philippines and the commission
have an extreme interest in handling how the assets of Arelma should be
distributed and it is not up to the court system of another state to determine how
to do that.
Credit Suisse v. U.S.D.C.
California law requires "personal service" of a notice of levy on a deposit account
to be made at the branch or office of the financial institution at which the account
is actually carried. Because none of the Estate's assets were held in deposit
accounts located in California, the service of the notice of levy at the Banks'
California offices was ineffective. The district court should have therefore granted
the Banks' motions to vacate and quash the levies.
Second, we held that because Rule 69(a) "essentially limits a district court's
mechanism for enforcement of a money judgment to a writ of execution, the court
had no authority to order the Banks to deposit the contested funds into the court
registry." In coming to this conclusion, we noted that although the Banks had
previously been found to be "agents and representatives" of the Marcos Estate,
the significance of this finding was "outweighed by the fact that the Banks were
not parties before the court in the case in which the finding was made."
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Although once viewed as an expression of international law, resting on
considerations of international comity and expediency, the act of state doctrine is
currently viewed as a "consequence of domestic separation of powers, reflecting
`the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder' the conduct of foreign
affairs."
Under this current view, an action will be barred only if: (1) there is an "official act
of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory"; and (2) "the relief
sought or the defense interposed [in the action would require] a court in the
United States to declare invalid the foreign sovereign's official act."

 Any order from the district court compelling the Banks to transfer or otherwise
convey Estate assets would be in direct contravention of the Swiss freeze orders.
Subjecting Estate assets held by the Banks to the district court's further orders
would thus allow a United States court to question and, in fact, "declare invalid
the official act of a foreign sovereign." Issuance of the injunctive relief sought
would therefore violate the act of state doctrine.
United States courts are "bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State," including Switzerland If the MDL plaintiffs want to contest the
legality of the Swiss freeze orders, seek a declaration of the validity of the Chinn
assignment as against the Banks, or seek an injunction compelling the Banks to
turn over the assets, they should do so via the Swiss judicial system.
Pennhurst States School and Hosp. v. Halderman
The principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal
judicial power established in Art. III of the Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment
bars a suit against state officials when the State is the real, substantial party in
interest, regardless of whether the suit seeks damages or injunctive relief. The
Court in Ex parte Young, recognized an important exception to this general rule:
a suit challenging the federal constitutionality of a state official's action is not one
against the State.
In Edelman v. Jordan, this Court recognized that the need to promote the
supremacy of federal law that is the basis of Young must be accommodated to
the constitutional immunity of the States. Thus, the Court declined to extend the
Young doctrine to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively
eliminate the States' constitutional immunity. Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfilled Young's underlying purpose of
vindicating the supreme authority of federal law while at the same time
preserving to an important degree the States' constitutional immunity. But this
need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent when a plaintiff alleges
that a state official has violated state law. In such a case, the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court's grant of relief
against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or
retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. When a
federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law,
this conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh
Amendment.
The dissenters' view is that an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a
state statute would suffice to override the State's protection from injunctive relief
under the Eleventh Amendment because such conduct is ultra vires the official's

authority. This view rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and would emasculate
the Eleventh Amendment. At least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an error of
law by state officers acting in their official capacity will not suffice to override the
sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is against it. Under
the dissenters' view, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable
exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if the
relief will run against it.
The principle that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their
official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the
Eleventh Amendment applies as well to state law claims brought into federal
court under pendent jurisdiction.
While it may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state law
claims results in federal claims' being brought in state court or in bifurcation of
claims, such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation
on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
The judgment cannot be sustained on the basis of the state law obligation of
petitioner county officials, since any relief granted against these officials on the
basis of the MH/MR Act would be partial and incomplete, at best. Such an
ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to serve the purposes of
efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that
a State may consent to suit against it in federal court. The State's consent must
be unequivocally expressed. A State's constitutional interest in immunity
encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.
The general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against
the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter."
When a federal court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate
other related claims over which the court otherwise would not have jurisdiction.
The Court also has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state law claim, and that, in fact, the court usually should do
so in order to avoid federal constitutional questions (If a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the
latter). But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general
language of Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine may be

viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction contained in the

Eleventh Amendment.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as Greene v. Louisville &
Interurban R. Co., neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction
may override the Eleventh Amendment. A federal court must examine each claim
in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. We concluded above that a claim that state officials violated state
law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is
protected by the Eleventh Amendment. We now hold that this principle applies as
well to state law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

CHOICE OF LAW
UNITED AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
The appellate court erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case
at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was
to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through
petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were rewritten in
Washington, D.C. However, such fact did not change the nature of the original
contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
In the case of Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the doctrine
of lex loci contractus. According to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the
place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature
and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even
though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where
it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making and the place
of performance are the same. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place
where the airline ticket was issued, when the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline.
CADALIN v. POEA ADMINISTRATOR
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such
a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree
that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into
their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by

the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of
contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is
true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that
it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law.
In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, the American court applied the statute
of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there
was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to
give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one
of substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While
there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum
even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of
Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:

If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action

arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines
Islands.

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

 In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex

proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section
156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce
any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION vs. HON. BLAS F. OPLE

A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA argues,

since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy
in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our
Civil Code is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they
may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of
autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of
applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing
principle is that parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law
especially peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with
public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area
and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. It
is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA
in terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations.

As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister, MOLE, in effect
held that paragraph 5 of that employment contract was inconsistent with Articles
280 and 281 of the Labor Code as they existed at the time the contract of
employment was entered into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph
5.

Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement

between petitioner PIA and private respondents, we consider that those
provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3)
years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized
by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took
back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by
paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of
the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term,
at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or
even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary. Because the net
effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the
employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment
at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6
were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private

respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years, and thus to escape
completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.

We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public
interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot
be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship. Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10,
specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement of dispute;
between the contracting parties. Even a cursory scrutiny of the relevant
circumstances of this case will show the multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the
relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only
executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private
respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a
foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and
hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the
Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All
the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as
a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot
be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA
did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter;
it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of
Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the
domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi)
to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four

items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this
that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would
not alter the law, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.

ZALAMEA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code
of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside
from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. Even if the
claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable
to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which
require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be

applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the
tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case
would be Philippine law.

It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline
system of boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented
do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the
reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were
incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent
TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present
any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the
overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities
in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the
assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that
their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of
respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby
enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute
amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the
rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of
petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter
breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we
adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

Garcia v. Recio

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document

must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of
an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established
a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that
the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.

 A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Under Section
50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the
time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate
court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under
Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment
is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity.
Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in
which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country
in which the judgment is relied on. Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the
defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the
formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law
of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private
respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian
procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as
to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed
service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is
invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of
Malaya must stand.
The lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and
procedure. Considering that under the procedural rules of the High Court of
Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment
every fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be
accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the
judgment of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

LOUCKS et al. v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK

The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. A statute penal in
that sense is one that awards a penalty to the state, or to a public officer in its
behalf, or to a member of the public, suing in the interest of the whole community
to redress a public wrong.
A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be sued upon in
another unless public policy forbids. That is the generally accepted rule in the
United States. It is not the rule in every jurisdiction where the common law
prevails.
A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to an obligation, which, if
transitory, follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found. No law can exist as such except the law of the land; but it is a principle of
every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected.
Our own scheme of legislation may be different. We may even have no
legislation on the subject. That is not enough to show that public policy forbids us
to enforce the foreign right. A right of action is property. If a foreign statute
gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for
refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so
provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal
with it otherwise at home. Similarity of legislation has indeed this importance; its
presence shows beyond question that the foreign statute does not offend the
local policy. But its absence does not prove the contrary. It is not to be exalted
into an indispensable condition. The misleading word comity has been
responsible for much of the trouble has been fertile in suggesting a discretion
unregulated by general principles.
The sovereign in its discretion may refuse its aid to the foreign right. From this it
has been an easy step to the conclusion that a like freedom of choice has been
confided to the courts. But that, of course, is a false view. The courts are not free
to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the
individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless
help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
This test applied, there is nothing in the Massachusetts statute that outrages the
public policy of New York. We have a statute which gives a civil remedy where
death is caused in our own state. We have though it so important that we have
now imbedded it in the Constitution. The fundamental policy is that there shall be
some atonement for the wrong. Through the defendant's negligence, a resident
of New York has been killed in Massachusetts. He has left a widow and children,
who are also residents. The law of Massachusetts gives them a recompense for
his death. It cannot be that public policy forbids our courts to help in collecting

what belongs to them. We cannot give them the same judgment that our law
would give if the wrong had been done here. Very likely we cannot give them as
much. But that is no reason for refusing to give them what we can. We shall not
make things better by sending them to another state, where the defendant may
not be found, and where suit may be impossible. Nor is there anything to shock
our sense of justice in the possibility of a punitive recovery. The penalty is not
extravagant. It conveys no hint of arbitrary confiscation. It varies between
moderate limits according to the defendants guilt.
We have no public policy that prohibits exemplary damages or civil penalties. We
give them for many wrongs. To exclude all penal actions would be to wipe out the
distinction between the penalties of public justice and the remedies of private law.
Finally, there are no difficulties of procedure that stand in the way. We have a
statute authroizing the triers of the facts, when statutory penalties are sued for, to
fit the award to the offense. The case is not one where special remedies
established by the foreign law are incapable of adequate enforcement except in
the home tribunals.
We hold, then, that public policy does not prohibit the assumption of jurisdiction
by our courts and that this being so, mere differences of remedy do not count.
For many years the courts have been feeling their way in the enforcement of
these statutes. A civil remedy for another's death was something strange and
new, and it did not find at once the fitting niche, the proper category, in the legal
scheme. We need not be surprised if some of the things said, as distinguished
from those decided, must be rejected today. We must apply the same rules that
are applicable to other torts; and the tendency of those rules to-day is toward a
larger comity, if we must cling to the traditional term.
The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall
be everywhere maintained. At least, that is so among the states of the Union.
There is a growing conviction that only exceptional circumstances should lead
one of the states to refuse to enforce a right acquired in another. The evidences
of this tendency are many. One typical instance will suffice. For many years
Massachusetts closed her courts to actions of this order based on foreign
statutes. She has opened them now, and overruled her earlier decisions. The test
of similarity has been abandoned there. If it has ever been accepted here, we
think it should be abandoned now.
Hilton v. Guyot
A citizen and resident of this country who has his principal place of business here
but has an agent in a foreign country and is accustomed to purchase and store
large quantities of goods there, and, in a suit brought against him by a citizen and
in a court of that country, appears and defends with the sole object of preventing
his property within the jurisdiction, but not in the custody of that court, from being

taken in satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered against him there
cannot, in an action brought against him in this country upon such a judgment,
impeach it for want of jurisdiction of his person.
The admission at the trial in a court of a foreign country, according to its law and
practice, of testimony not under oath and without opportunity of crossexamination, and of documents with which the defendant had no connection and
which by our law would not be admissible against him, is not of itself a sufficient
ground for impeaching the judgment of that court in an action brought upon it in
this country.
When an action is brought in a court of this country by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens to recover a sum of money adjudged by a
court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign
judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs
and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the
course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record,
the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged,
and the judgment is conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court unless
some special ground is shown for impeaching it, as by showing that it was
affected by fraud or prejudice or that, by the principles of international law and by
the comity of our own country, it is not entitled to full credit and credit.
A judgment for a sum of money, rendered by a court of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, in a suit brought by one of its citizens
against one of ours, is prima facie evidence only, and not conclusive of the merits
of the claim in an action brought here upon the judgment if by the law of the
foreign country, as in France, judgments of our own courts are not recognized as
conclusive.
No law has any effect beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which
its authority is derived. The extent to which one nation shall be allowed to
operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon the comity of
nations. Comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation, nor of mere courtesy
and good will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. The comity thus extended to
other nations is no impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the
nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or
prejudicial to its interests. But it contributes so largely to promote justice between
individuals, and to produce a friendly intercourse between the sovereignty to
which they belong, that courts of justice have continually acted upon it, as a part
of the voluntary law of nations. It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of
the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided

by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are
ascertained and guided.
PHIL. ALUMINUM WHEELS v. FASGI
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established
a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that
trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.
PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not
necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for
enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary. Rule 39, Section 50 provides:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment
is as follows:

In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive

upon the title to the thing;
In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or
conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court
were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished
copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented
thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then being
litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the
judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners
action is barred by the principle of res judicata. Petitioners in fact questioned the
jurisdiction of the U.S. court over their persons, but their claim was brushed aside
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
A foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in the jurisdiction
where affirmative relief is being sought. Hence, in the interest of justice, the
complaint should be considered as a petition for the recognition of the
Hongkong judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order
that the defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence of lack of
jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if applicable.
Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company
We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, against such independent determinations by the federal courts
extends to the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by
the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's
state courts. Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly
disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts
sitting side by side.
Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state
upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal
system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution,
the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for

the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent

'general law' of conflict of laws.
Subject only to review by this Court on any federal question that may arise,
Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the
law of the forum or some other law. This Court's views are not the decisive factor
in determining the applicable conflicts rule. And the proper function of the
Delaware federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to
be.
Klaxon Doctrine is a principle of conflict of laws which say that a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state
where the court sits. The standard was set in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (U.S. 1941) where the Supreme Court extended the Erie
principle to conflicts questions, and required federal diversity courts to administer
the conflicts law of the states in which they were sitting (forum states). Erie
principle is the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) which held that there was no federal general common law,
and that except in matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied by the federal courts in diversity cases was the
law of the state. Therefore this doctrine is also known as Erie/Klaxon doctrine.
WILLIAM B. BORTHWICK vs. HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME
It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties, and rejection thereof may be justified,
among others, by "evidence of a want of jurisdiction" of the issuing authority,
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The opportunity to negate the foreign court's competence by proving the nonexistence of said jurisdictional facts established in the original action, was again
afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, where enforcement
of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the summons of the
domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was
declared in default. And in the default judgment subsequently promulgated, the
Court a quo decreed enforcement of the judgment affirming among others the
jurisdictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted
business therein.
In the light of these antecedents, it is plain that what Borthwick seeks in essence
is one more opportunity, a third, to challenge the jurisdiction of the Hawaii Court
and the merits of the cause of action which that Court had adjudged to have
been established against him. This he may obtain only if he succeed in showing
that the declaration of his default was incorrect. He has unfortunately not been
able to do that; hence, the verdict must go against him.

KOSTER v. AUTOMARK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED

Whether a court may, under American law, assert jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant-company depends upon whether the company "purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State." This means
that the company must pass a threshold of minimum contacts with the forum
state so that it is fair to subject it to the jurisdiction of that state's courts.
Automark's only contacts with the Netherlands were eight letters, and possibly a
telegram and a transatlantic telephone call all preliminary to the meeting in Italy.
In Lakeside, 597 F.2d at 604, the court notes that such contacts cannot be held
to satisfy jurisdictional requirements, otherwise "use of the interstate telephone
and mail service to communicate with (an out-of-state) plaintiff, if constituting
contacts supporting jurisdiction, would give jurisdiction to any state into which
communications were directed." Such a result would make virtually every
business subject to suit in any state with which it happened to communicate in
some manner. That clearly would not satisfy the demands of due process.
The best interests of the international and state systems" of commerce should be
considered when making determinations about minimum contacts in individual
cases. This consideration weighs in favor of Automark, since it "is based on the
proposition that '(a) state should not improperly impinge upon the interests of
other states by trying in its courts a case with which it has no adequate
relationship. The Netherlands lacks an adequate relationship to defendant's
presence and conduct to justify trial of the case in that country. The interests of
international business are better served by protecting potential international
purchasers from being unreasonably called to defend suits commenced in
foreign courts which lack jurisdiction according to our recognized standards of
due process.
Where the nature of a defendant's business contact in the forum state does not
involve activities dangerous to persons and property, the propriety of vesting
personal jurisdiction in that state must be considered in light of its relationship
with the defendant other than that at issue in the lawsuit.
MARGARET QUERUBIN vs. SILVESTRE QUERUBIN
The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a court of
another state between the same parties on the same cause of action, on the
merits of the case is conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the merits
only. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the
question by the court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the
rights of the parties."
As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final and not
subject to modification, is entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution and must be enforced in this state. If, however,

a part of the Minnesota decree in not final, but is subject to modification by the
court which rendered it, then neither the United States Constitution nor the
principle of comity compels the courts of this state to enforce that part of the
decree; for no court other than the one granting the original decree could
undertake to administer relief without bringing about a conflict of authority.
A judgment rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction in one state, is
conclusive on the merits in the courts of every other state, when made the basis
of an action and the merits cannot be reinvestigated. Our own Supreme But
before such a judgment rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in the
courts of another state, as conclusive on the merits, it must be a final judgment
and not merely an interlocutory decree.
A consideration of all the facts and circumstances leads to the conclusion that
comity does not require the courts of this state, regardless of the well-being of
the child, to lend their aid to the enforcement of the Iowa decree by returning
Winifred to the custody of her grandmother. A child is not a chattel to which title
and the right of possession may be secured by the decree of any court. If the
decree had been rendered by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, it would
not have conclusively established the right to the custody of the child. In a
contest between rival claimants, this court would have been free, notwithstanding
the decree, to award the custody solely with an eye to the child's welfare.
"Comity cannot be considered in a case like this, when the future welfare of the
child is the vital question in the case. The good of the child is superior to all other
considerations. It is the polar star to guide to the conclusion in all cases of
infants, whether the question is raised upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court
of chancery."
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEAL
The evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner PISC under the procedural law applicable in
that forum. Copies of the Summons and Complaint 16 in 83 Civil 290 (EW) which
were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court, were
stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, P.I.S.C., Manila." indicating that service thereof
had been made upon and acknowledged by the PISC office in Manila on, and
that PISC had actual notice of such Complaint and Summons. Moreover, copies
of said Summons and Complaint had likewise been served upon Prentice-Hall
Corporation System, Inc. (New York), petitioner PISCS agent, expressly
designated by it in the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement with respondent
Interpool. "For the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of
New York, USA with respect to any claim or controversy arising out of or relating
to directly or indirectly, this Lease."

 The record also shows that petitioner PISC, without, however, assailing the
jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court over the person of petitioner, had filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which Motion was denied. All of the foregoing
matters, which were stated specifically in the U.S. District Courts disputed
Default Judgment, 19 have not been disproven or otherwise overcome by
petitioners, whose bare and unsubstantiated allegations cannot prevail over clear
and convincing evidence of record to the contrary.
That foreign judgment which had become final and executory, no appeal
having been taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner PISC is thus
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties [i.e., PISC and Interpool]
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." We note, further, that
there has been in this case no showing by petitioners that the Default Judgment
rendered by the U.S. District Court in 83 Civil 290 (EW), was vitiated by "want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." In other
words, the Default Judgment imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of U.S.
$94,456.28 in favor of respondent Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this
jurisdiction.
Petitioners argument of lack or absence of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, on
the alleged ground of non-service of notice or summons does not persuade.
Even assuming that none of the ten (10) petitioner herein had been served with
notice or summons below, the record shows, however, that they did in fact file
with the Regional Trial Court Motion for Extension of Time to file Answer as well
as Motion for Bill of Particulars both addressing respondent Interpools. In those
pleadings, petitioners not only manifested their intention to controvert the
allegations in the Complaint, but they neither questioned nor assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either over the case filed against them or over their
individual persons, as defendants therein. There was here, in effect, voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court by petitioners, who are thereby
estopped from asserting otherwise before this Court.

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

The arbitration clause is to be respected and enforced by federal courts in accord
with the explicit provisions of the United States Arbitration Act that an arbitration
agreement, such as is here involved, "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Since uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract, such as
the one in question here, with substantial contacts in two or more countries, each
with its own substantive laws and conflict of laws rules, a contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum for litigating disputes and the law to be applied is

an almost indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness and

predictability essential to any international business transaction. Such a provision
obviates the danger that a contract dispute might be submitted to a forum hostile
to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.
In the context of an international contract, the advantages that a security buyer
might possess in having a wide choice of American courts and venue in which to
litigate his claims of violations of the securities laws, become chimerical, since an
opposing party may by speedy resort to foreign court block or hinder access to
the American court of the buyer's choice.
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized
kind of forum selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit, but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute, and the invalidation of the
arbitration clause in this case would not only allow respondent to repudiate its
solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal service of

summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant. To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.

It is a general rule that processes of the court cannot lawfully be served outside
the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court from which it issues and this is
regardless of the residence or citizenship of the party thus served. There must be
actual service within the proper territorial limits on defendant or someone
authorized to accept service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a resident or
not in the forum where the action is filed, must be served with summons within
that forum.

It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila or beyond the
territorial boundaries of Japan was null and did not confer jurisdiction upon the
Tokyo District Court over the person of SHARP; hence, its decision was void.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which
it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of
the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in

personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the
same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be

assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,

fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court,
whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of

overcoming the presumption of its validity.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the
judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service
of process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It
may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may
be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy
thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that
Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity
of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.

Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may
be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar
with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on
the government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the

designation is exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the
court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Where the corporation has no such
agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b)
the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign
corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of
process is so made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail
a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.

The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so as to

sustain a money judgment, must be based upon personal service within the state
which renders the judgment. The process of a court, has no extraterritorial effect,
and no jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant by serving him
beyond the boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment of a court of a foreign
country against a resident of this country having no property in such foreign
country based on process served here, any effect here against either the
defendant personally or his property situated here. Process issuing from the
courts of one state or country cannot run into another, and although a
nonresident defendant may have been personally served with such process in
the state or country of his domicile, it will not give such jurisdiction as to authorize
a personal judgment against him.

In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid resulting in the failure of the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants in an action in
personam was the service of summons through publication against nonappearing resident defendants. It was claimed that the latter concealed
themselves to avoid personal service of summons upon them. In Dial, the
defendants were foreign corporations which were not, domiciled and licensed to
engage in business in the Philippines and which did not have officers or agents,
places of business, or properties here. On the other hand, in the instant case,
SHARP was doing business in Japan and was maintaining four branches therein.

Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the past. In that

case, a divided Supreme Court of Iowa declared that the principle that there can
be no jurisdiction in a court of a territory to render a personal judgment against
anyone upon service made outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of
residents and non-residents. The principle was put at rest by the United States
Supreme Court when it ruled in the 1940 case of Milliken vs. Meyer that domicile
in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the
state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate
substituted service or personal service without the state. This principle is
embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which allows service of
summons on residents temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the
country.
INTERNET CASES

PANAVISION INTERNATIONAL v. DENNIS TOEPPEN

Personal jurisdiction may be founded on either general jurisdiction or specific
jurisdiction. General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum
state or his activities there are "substantial"or "continuous and systematic." The
district court correctly concluded that it did not have general jurisdiction over
Toeppen. Toeppen is domiciled in Illinois and his activities in California are not
substantial or continuous and systematic.

 We apply a three-part test to determine if a district court may exercise specific

jurisdiction: The non-resident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails
himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws; the claim must be one which arises out of or
results from the defendant's forum-related activities; and exercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that a non-resident defendant will
not be haled into court based upon "random, fortuitous or attenuated" contacts
with the forum state. This requirement is satisfied if the defendant "has taken
deliberate action" toward the forum state. It is not required that a defendant be
physically present or have physical contacts with the forum, so long as his efforts
are "purposefully directed" toward forum residents.
In each case where personal jurisdiction was exercised, there had been
"something more" to "indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit
electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state.
The Effects Doctrine. In tort cases, jurisdiction may attach if the defendants
conduct is aimed at or has an effect in the forum state. Personal jurisdiction can
be based upon: (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3)
causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered--and which the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered--in the forum state.
The second requirement for specific, personal jurisdiction is that the claim
asserted in the litigation arises out of the defendants forum related activities. We
must determine if the plaintiff Panavision would not have been injured "but for"
the defendant Toeppen's conduct directed toward Panavision in California. This
requirement is satisfied. Toeppen's registration of Panavisions trademarks as his
own domain names on the Internet had the effect of injuring Panavision in
California. But for Toeppen's conduct, this injury would not have occurred.
Panavision's claims arise out of Toeppen's California-related activities.
Even if the first two requirements are met, in order to satisfy the Due Process
Clause, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable. For jurisdiction
to be reasonable, it must comport with "fair play and substantial justice.
Where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence
of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.
Toeppen purposefully directed his activities at Panavision in California. This
placed the burden on him to "present a compelling case that the presence of
some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."
In

addressing the question of reasonableness, we consider seven factors: (1) the

extent of a defendant's purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in
defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the
most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the
forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the
existence of an alternative forum.
Even if there is sufficient `interjection' into the state to satisfy the purposeful
availment prong, the degree of interjection is a factor to be weighed in assessing
the overall reasonableness of jurisdiction under the reasonableness prong. Here,
the degree of interjection was substantial.
We conclude that Toeppen's registration of Panavisions trademarks as his
domain names on the Internet diluted those marks within the meaning of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and the California Anti-dilution statute. Toeppen
engaged in a scheme to register Panavisions trademarks as his domain names
on the Internet and then to extort money from Panavision by trading on the value
of those names. Toeppen's actions were aimed at Panavision in California and
the brunt of the harm was felt in California. The district court properly exercised
personal jurisdiction over Toeppen. We also affirm the district court's summary
judgment in favor of Panavision under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and
the California Anti-dilution statute, Toeppen made commercial use of
Panavision's trademarks and his conduct diluted those marks.

MARITZ, INC. vs. CYBERGOLD, INC.

Whether the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant requires a
two-part inquiry. The Court first examines whether personal jurisdiction exists
under Missouri's long-arm statute.
Missouri's long-arm statute allows the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents
to the extent permissible under the due process clause. Any person or firm,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, or any corporation, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this section,
thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts: (1) The transaction of
any business within this state and (2) The commission of a tortious act within
this state.
Based on these decisions, the Court concludes that Missouri's long-arm statute
reaches the defendants, even assuming CyberGold's allegedly infringing
activities were wholly outside of Missouri, because the allegedly infringing

activities have produced an effect in Missouri as they have allegedly caused

Maritz economic injury.
Sufficient contacts exist when the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there, and when the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. In assessing the defendant's "reasonable
anticipation," there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits of its laws.
The Eighth Circuit has set forth a five-part test for measuring minimum contacts:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state;
(2) the quantity of those contacts:
(3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts;
(4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents;
(5) the convenience of the parties.
Because the internet is an entirely new means of information exchange,
analogies to cases involving the use of mail and telephone are less than
satisfactory in determining whether defendant has "purposefully availed" itself to
this forum. Unlike use of the mail, the internet, with its electronic mail, is a
tremendously more efficient, quicker, and vast means of reaching a global
audience. By simply setting up, and posting information at, a website in the form
of an advertisement or solicitation, one has done everything necessary to reach
the global internet audience.
Defendant clearly has not actually commenced its service of sending
advertisements over the internet to internet users on its mailing list. However,
defendant does, maintain a website from which it sends out information regarding
its upcoming services. The information is an advertisement of its services and
solicits names and addresses of internet users who are potential users on its
mailing list. Defendant is using the internet to develop an indispensable part of its
advertising service--its mailing list. Thus, because of these activities, the Court
concludes that the "uses in commerce" test has been satisfied.
COMPUSERVE, INC. v. PATTERSON
The confluence of the "increasing nationalization of commerce" and "modern
transportation and communication," and the resulting relaxation of the limits that
the Due Process Clause imposes on courts' jurisdiction. Simply stated, there is
less perceived need today for the federal constitution to protect defendants from
"inconvenient litigation," because all but the most remote forums are easily
accessible for the pursuit of both business and litigation. The Court has also,

however, reminded us that the due process rights of a defendant should be the
courts' primary concern where personal jurisdiction is at issue.
The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of these
historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment and
knowledge - that is, people like Patterson - to operate an international business
cheaply, and from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled
to the protection of the Due Process Clause, which mandates that potential
defendants be able "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where the conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."
Thus, this case presents a situation where we must reconsider the scope of our
jurisdictional reach.
To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant, federal courts
apply the law of the forum state, subject to the limits of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The defendant must be amenable to suit under
the forum state's long-arm statute and the due process requirements of the
Constitution must be met."
The Ohio long-arm statute allows an Ohio court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents of Ohio on claims arising from, inter alia, the nonresident's
transacting any business in Ohio.. It is settled Ohio law, moreover, that the
"transacting business" clause of that statute was meant to extend to the federal
constitutional limits of due process, and that as a result Ohio personal jurisdiction
cases require an examination of those limits.
Further, personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific in nature,
depending on the nature of the contacts in a given case. In the instant case,
because CompuServe bases its action on Patterson's act of sending his
computer software to Ohio for sale on its service, CompuServe seeks to
establish such specific personal jurisdiction over Patterson.
As always in this context, the crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether,
given the facts of the case, the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with
the forum state that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." This court has repeatedly
employed three criteria to make this determination:
o First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to
make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

 Patterson has knowingly made an effort - and, in fact, purposefully contracted - to

market a product in other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe operating, in
effect, as his distribution center. Thus, it is reasonable to subject Patterson to suit
in Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network service he chose to
employ.
The "purposeful availment" requirement is satisfied when the defendant's
contacts with the forum state "proximately result from actions by the defendant
himself that create a `substantial connection' with the forum State," and when the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he "should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Courts require purposeful
availment to insure that "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts do not
cause a defendant to be haled into a jurisdiction. This requirement does not,
however, mean that a defendant must be physically present in the forum state.
As the Burger King Corp. Court stated, "So long as a commercial actor's efforts
are `purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat
personal jurisdiction there."
Physical presence of an agent is not necessary for the transaction of business in
a state. The soliciting of insurance by mail, the transmission of radio broadcasts
into a state, and the sending of magazines and newspapers into a state to be
sold there by independent contractors are all accomplished without the physical
presence of an agent; yet all have been held to constitute the transaction of
business in a state.
In the instant case, the record demonstrates that Patterson not only purposefully
availed himself of CompuServe's Ohio-based services to market his software, but
that he also "originated and maintained" contacts with Ohio when he believed
that CompuServe's competing product unlawfully infringed on his own software.
Patterson repeatedly sent both electronic and regular mail messages to
CompuServe about his claim, and he posted a message on one of
CompuServe's electronic forums, which outlined his case against CompuServe
for anyone who wished to read it.
The cause of action in the instant case concerns allegations of trademark or
trade name infringement and unfair competition. Patterson's contacts with Ohio
are certainly related to the operative facts of that controversy. He placed his
software on CompuServe's Ohio-based system. He used that system to advertise
his software and sell it. The proceeds of those sales flowed to him through Ohio.
According to CompuServe's allegations, Patterson has marketed his product
exclusively on their system.

Yahoo! Inc., a Delaware Corporation v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et

L'antisemitisme
The only bases for personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF in the district court
are the actions they have taken in connection with their French suit against
Yahoo!. Those actions are sending a cease and desist letter to Yahoo! at its
headquarters in Santa Clara, California; serving process on Yahoo! in Santa
Clara to commence the French suit; obtaining two interim orders from the French
court; and serving the two orders on Yahoo! in Santa Clara.
Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal
jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court
sits. Because California's long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with
federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and
federal due process are the same.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, ), the Supreme Court held that a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process
only if he or she has "certain minimum contacts" with the relevant forum "such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" Unless a defendant's contacts with a forum are so
substantial, continuous, and systematic that the defendant can be deemed to be
"present" in that forum for all purposes, a forum may exercise only "specific"
jurisdiction; that is, jurisdiction based on the relationship between the defendant's
forum contacts and the plaintiff's claim. The parties agree that only specific
jurisdiction is at issue in this case.
In this circuit, we analyze specific jurisdiction according to a three-prong test:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or
consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or
perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws;
(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's
forum-related activities; and
(3) The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial
justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
We have typically treated "purposeful availment" somewhat differently in tort and
contract cases. In tort cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant
"purposefully directs his activities" at the forum state, applying an "effects" test
that focuses on the forum in which the defendant's actions were felt, whether or
not the actions themselves occurred within the forum. By contrast, in contract
cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant "purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities" or "consummates a transaction" in the forum,

focusing on activities such as delivering goods or executing a contract. However,

this case is neither a tort nor a contract case. Rather, it is a case in which Yahoo!
argues, based on the First Amendment, that the French court's interim orders are
unenforceable by an American court.
In this circuit, we construe Calder to impose three requirements: "the defendant
allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in
the forum state."
In any personal jurisdiction case we must evaluate all of a defendant's contacts
with the forum state, whether or not those contacts involve wrongful activity by
the defendant.
A single forum state contact can support jurisdiction if "the cause of action arises
out of that particular purposeful contact of the defendant with the forum state."
The case before us is the classic polar case for specific jurisdiction described
in International Shoe, in which there are very few contacts but in which those few
contacts are directly related to the suit. All of the contacts with the forum state in
this case are either the interim orders themselves or contacts directly related to
those orders.
Ripeness doctrine is "`drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and
from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.'"
The existence of Article III subject matter jurisdiction is, like personal jurisdiction,
a close question, but we agree with the district court that the effect of the French
court's orders on Yahoo! is sufficient to create a case or controversy within the
meaning of Article III.
In determining whether a case satisfies prudential requirements for ripeness, we
consider two factors: "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision," and "the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration."
Insofar as the issue is whether the French court's orders are enforceable in
California, it is clear that California law governs. However, it is less clear whose
law governs when enforceability in other states is at issue. This is a potentially
difficult choice-of-law question, but we do not need to answer it in order to decide
ripeness. First, the central issue is enforceability in California. Therefore, if the
suit is unripe under California law, we should not decide the case, irrespective of
whether it might be ripe under the law of some other state. To do otherwise would
be to allow the tail to wag the dog. Second, in any event, the law of virtually all
other states appears to be similar, or even identical, to California law. We may
thus safely proceed with our ripeness analysis based on the California law of
enforceability.
The general principle of enforceability under the Third Restatement is the same
as under California's Uniform Act. That is, an American court will not enforce a
judgment if "the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the
judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the
State where recognition is sought.

 In sum, it is extremely unlikely that any penalty, if assessed, could ever be

enforced against Yahoo! in the United States. Further, First Amendment harm
may not exist at all, given the possibility that Yahoo! has now "in large measure"
complied with the French court's orders through its voluntary actions, unrelated to
the orders. Alternatively, if Yahoo! has not "in large measure" complied with the
orders, its violation lies in the fact that it has insufficiently restricted access to
anti-semitic materials by Internet users located in France. There is some
possibility that in further restricting access to these French users, Yahoo! might
have to restrict access by American users. But this possibility is, at this point,
highly speculative. This level of harm is not sufficient to overcome the factual
uncertainty bearing on the legal question presented and thereby to render this
suit ripe.
A foreign party can use a foreign court decree to censor free speech here in the
United States on any range of subjects it finds objectionable; religion, democracy,
gender equality; in the name of enforcing its own country's laws. The good
intentions of even sympathetic foreign parties such as LICRA and UEJF in this
case are not the standard.
In sum, the uncertainties Yahoo! faces are not reasons to delay adjudication.
Rather, they provide a compelling basis for a federal court to hear Yahoo!'s First
Amendment challenge at this time, as the district court did.
The experts also emphasized, "the measures to be taken depend upon the
particular case in point. They cannot be generalised to all sites and services on
the Internet.
INSET SYSTEMS, INC. v. INSTRUCTION SET, INC.
The Connecticut long-arm statute, C.G.S. Sec. 33-411(c)(2) states that "Every
foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state
on any cause of action arising (2) out of any business solicited in this state if the
corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers
relating thereto were accepted within or without the state". The court concludes
that advertising via the Internet is solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to
satisfy subsection (c)(2) of the Connecticut long-arm statute, C.G.S. Sec. 33-411,
thereby conferring Connecticut's long-arm jurisdiction upon ISI.
Due Process limitations require that a nonresident corporate defendant have
'minimum contacts' with the forum state such that it would reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there. Further, maintenance of the suit in the forum state
cannot offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The essence of the minimum contacts test is "that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. This

due process inquiry rests upon the totality of the circumstances rather than any
mechanical criteria.
In the present case, Instruction has directed its advertising activities via the
Internet and its toll-free number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to
all states. The Internet as well as toll-free numbers are designed to communicate
with people and their businesses in every state. Advertisement on the Internet
can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further,
once posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the
advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user. ISI has therefore,
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut.
The court concludes that since ISI purposefully directed its advertising activities
toward this state on a continuing basis since March, 1995, it could reasonably
anticipate the possibility of being hailed into court here.
"The minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial
justice' may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has
the requisite minimum contacts with the forum. However, where minimum
contacts have been established the defendant 'must present a compelling case
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable." The factors to be considered are "the relative burdens on the
plaintiff and defendant of litigating the suit in this or another forum, the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, and the interstate judicial system's
interest in efficient resolution of controversies."
In the present case, the distance between Connecticut and Massachusetts is
minimal. Further, since the present action also concerns issues of Connecticut
common and statutory law, Connecticut has an interest in adjudicating the
dispute. This being the case, adjudication in Connecticut would dispose of this
matter efficiently. Therefore, the court concludes that its finding of minimum
contacts in this case comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
BENSUSAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION v. RICHARD B. KING,
The mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infringing
product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or
otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York. Here, there is simply
no allegation or proof that any infringing goods were shipped into New York or
that any other infringing activity was directed at New York or caused by King
occur here.
Substantial "revenue" is required from interstate commerce, not mere
participation in it. King has submitted an affidavit stating that 99% of his
patronage and revenue is derived from local residents of Columbia, Missouri
(primarily students from the University of Missouri) and that most of the few out-

of-state customers have either an existing or a prior connection to the area, such
as graduates of the University of Missouri.
Allegations of foreseeability which are based solely on the fact that King knew
that Bensusan's club is located in New York, is insufficient to satisfy the
requirement that a defendant "expects or should reasonably expect the act to
have consequences in the state." That prong of the statute requires that a
defendant make "a discernable effort to serve, directly or indirectly, a market in
the forum state."
Finally, Bensusan's conclusory allegation of a loss in New York is nothing more
that an allegation of an "indirect financial loss resulting from the fact that the
injured person resides or is domiciled in New York," which is not the allegation of
a "significant economic injury" required by section 302(a)(3).
Bensusan's primary argument in support of both statutory bases for personal
jurisdiction is that, because defendant's Web site is accessible in New York,
defendant could have foreseen that the site was able to be viewed in New York
and taken steps to restrict access to his site only to users in a certain geographic
region, presumably Missouri. Regardless of the technical feasibility of such a
procedure, mere foreseeability of an in-site consequence and a failure to avert
that consequence is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, even if jurisdiction were proper under New York's arm statute,
asserting personal jurisdiction over King in this forum would violate the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Due process requires "that the
non-resident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the
forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The following factors are relevant to this determination: "(1) whether the
defendant purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state; (2)
whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there; and (3) whether
the defendant carries on a continuous and systematic part of its general business
within for forum state."
There are no allegations that King actively sought to encourage New Yorkers to
access his site, or that he conducted any business-- let alone a continuous and
systematic part of its business-- in New York. There is in fact no suggestion that
King has any presence of any kind in New York other than the Web site that can
be accessed worldwide. Bensusan's argument that King should have foreseen
that users could access the site in New York and be confused as to the
relationship of the two Blue Note clubs is insufficient to satisfy due process.

 Although CompuServe v. Patterson, a recent decision of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, reached a different result, it was based on vastly
different facts. In that case, the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction proper in
Ohio over an Internet user from Texas who subscribed to a network service
based in Ohio. The user, however, specifically targeted Ohio by subscribing to
the service and entering into a separate agreement with the service to sell his
software over the Internet. Furthermore, he advertised his software through the
service and repeatedly sent his software to the service in Ohio. This led that
court to conclude that the Internet user "reached out" from Texas to Ohio and
"originated and maintained" contacts with Ohio. This action, on the other hand,
contains no allegations that King in any way directed any contact to, or had any
contact with, New York or intended to avail itself of any New York's benefits.