Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174908

June 17, 2013

DARMA MASLAG, Petitioner,

vs.
ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
BENGUET, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is incumbent upon x x x appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of
trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one
but themselves."1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the May 31, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365, which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag's
(petitioner) ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The Resolution disposed of the
case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
The Petition also assails the CAs September 22, 2006 Resolution5 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.6
Factual Antecedents
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for reconveyance of real property with declaration of
nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon (Monzon),
William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet. The Complaint was filed
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioners property.8 It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to pay
damages and costs of suit.9
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After going over the MTC records and the parties respective memoranda, the RTC of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, through Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato (Judge
Cabato), issued its October 22, 2003 Order,10 declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioners cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. x x x
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof,
but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the
admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. Both parties
acknowledged receipt of the October 22, 2003 Order,11 but neither presented additional evidence
before the new judge, Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr. (Judge Diaz De Rivera).12
On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a Resolution13 reversing the MTC Decision. The
fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from the Municipal Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet
is set aside. [Petitioner] is ordered to turn over the possession of the 4,415 square meter land she
presently occupies to [Monzon]. This case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
to determine whether [Maslag] is entitled to the remedies afforded by law to a builder in good
faith for the improvements she constructed thereon.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15 from the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution.
Petitioner assailed the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution for reversing the MTCs factual findings16
and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted. Her prayer before the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of La Trinidad, Benguet, appealed from be reversed in toto and

that the Honorable Court adopt the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. Further reliefs just and
equitable under the premises are prayed for.17
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They
asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC
rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners appeal. It observed that the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution (the
subject matter of the appeal before the CA) set aside an MTC Judgment; hence, the proper
remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.19
Petitioner sought reconsideration.20 She argued, for the first time, that the RTC rendered its May
4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction. She cited the earlier October 22, 2003 Order of the
RTC declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over the case.
The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its September 22, 2006 Resolution:21
A perusal of the May 4, 2004 Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter of the appeal,
clearly reveals that it took cognizance of the MTC case in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Consequently, as We have previously enunciated, the proper remedy, is a petition for
review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The
May 31, 2006 Resolution of this Court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to take cognizance of her
appeal.23
Issues
Petitioner set forth the following issues in her Petition:
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 10 OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET HELD THAT THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AS FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF LA TRINIDAD,
BENGUET WAS DECIDED BY THE LATTER WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION AND, IN
ORDERING THAT THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF

SECTION 8 OF RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF COURT, IT DECIDED THE CASE NOT ON

ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BUT ON ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WHAT WILL
BE THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10
OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET, WHEN IT DECIDED A CASE APPEALED BEFORE IT
UNDER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 8, RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS TO THE COURSE OF REMEDY THAT MAY BE AVAILED OF BY THE
PETITIONER A PETITION FOR REVIEWUNDER RULE 42 OR AN ORDINARY APPEAL
UNDER RULE 41.24
Our Ruling
In its October 22, 2003 Order, the RTC declared that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case based on the supposition that the same is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, it took cognizance of the
case and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they so desire. The parties bowed to
this ruling of the RTC and, eventually, submitted the case for its decision after they had
submitted their respective memoranda.
We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas of the RTC. Since it involves a
question of jurisdiction, we may motu proprio review and pass upon the same even at this late
stage of the proceedings.25
In her Complaint26 for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of OCT,
petitioner claimed that she and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive
possession of the disputed property since the 1940s. She averred:
7. Sometime in the year 1987, Elizabeth Monzon, the owner of the adjacent parcel of land
being occupied by plaintiff [Maslag], informed the plaintiff that the respective parcels of
land being claimed by them can now be titled. A suggestion was, thereafter made, that
those who were interested to have their lands titled, will contribute to a common fund for
the surveying and subsequent titling of the land;
8. Since plaintiff had, for so long, yearned for a title to the land she occupies, she
contributed to the amount being requested by Elizabeth Monzon;
9. A subdivision survey was made and in the survey, the respective areas of the plaintiff
and the defendants were defined and delimited all for purposes of titling. x x x
10. But alas, despite the assurance of subdivided titles, when the title was finally issued
by the Registry of Deeds, the same was only in the name of Elizabeth Monzon and
WILLIAM GESTON. The name of Darma Maslag was fraudulently, deliberately and in

bad faith omitted. Thus, the title to the property, to the extent of 18,295 square meters,
was titled solely in the name of ELIZABETH MONZON.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the property
which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzons title. Her primary relief was to
recover ownership of real property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint involves title to real
property. An action "involving title to real property," on the other hand, was defined as an action
where "the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that she owns such property or that she
has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same."27
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the
subject property.28 Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29 as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30 provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.

In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real Property31 dated
November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioners Exhibit "A",32 showing that the
disputed property has an assessed value of P12,40033 only. Such assessed value of the property is
well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine, the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying
Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining which court has jurisdiction over the case and in
pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive jurisdiction.
This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing petitioners appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper appeal:
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal under Rule 41
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall
be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by
notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial
Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.1wphi1 (Emphasis supplied)
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and law.34 The
first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC exercised its original
jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The second mode is a petition
for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC
decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction
between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the
Order or Decision being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and
review the court a quos Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Besides, the
new RTC Judge who penned the May 4, 2004 Resolution, Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated
the case as an appeal despite the October 22, 2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating,
"This is an appeal from the Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad Benguet"35 and then proceeded to discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the dispositive
portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTCs findings and conclusions and remanded
residual issues for trial with the MTC. Thus, in fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a
continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. With regard to the RTCs earlier October 22,
2003 Order, the same should be disregarded for it produces no effect (other than to confuse the
parties whether the RTC was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be

overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not
within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside."37
Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the
case.38 Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a
Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule
41.
Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually did, petitioner resorts to arguing for
what the RTC should have done. She maintains that the RTC should have issued its May 4, 2004
Resolution in its original jurisdiction because it had earlier ruled that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Petitioners argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court
issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held that "any judgment,
order or resolution issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot be given any effect."39 By parity
of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be given
effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP 129
already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property,
neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the
proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is the type
of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or Resolution. Was it
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We
do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical.
Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which
already involves the merits of the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode
of appeal was improper to begin with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed May 31, 2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 83365 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199354

June 26, 2013

WILSON T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
BPI FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by Wilson Go under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the resolutions dated May 4, 20102 and October 12, 20113 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111800. The CA denied Go's petition for review for having
been filed out of time.
The Antecedent Facts
BPI Finance Corporation (BPI), operating under the name BPI Express Credit Card, has been
engaged in the business of extending credit accommodations through the use of credit cards.
Under the system, BPI agrees to extend credit accommodations to its cardholders for the
purchase of goods and services from BPIs member establishments on the condition that the
charges incurred shall be reimbursed by the cardholders to BPI upon proper billing.4
BPI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 67, Makati City, against Go. The complaint alleged that Go was among the
cardholders of BPI when he was the Executive Vice-President of Noahs Ark Merchandising and
that Go incurred credit charges amounting to P77,970.91.5
Go denied the allegations, arguing that the BPI credit card was a company account and was
issued to him because of his position as Executive Vice-President. He also stated that he had
actually requested from BPI an updated statement of account, as well as supporting documents
for purposes of accounting and verification, but BPI failed to comply.6
At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to the truth of the contents of the following:
1. Credit Card Application;
2. Letter dated February 16, 2000 which was sent to Go at his office address at Noahs
Ark Merchandising;
3. Statements of Account dated February 20, 2000, May 20, 2000, April 20, 2000 and
March 20, 2000.7
BPI also presented a witness who testified during trial that the BPI credit card belongs to Go.
However, Go insisted that he cannot be held liable since he was only acting in behalf of the
company. In his comment, he argued that the credit card application was a mere "pro forma"
document unilaterally prepared by BPI; that the letter sent to his office address would prove that

it was a company account; and that although the statements of account were not disputed, he
alleged that he did not receive any demand letter from BPI.8
Go failed to present any evidence during the hearing. As a result, the MeTC declared that he had
waived his right to present evidence. For this reason, the court deemed the case submitted for
decision.9
On April 23, 2008, the MeTC rendered a decision10 whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court RENDERS judgment holding the defendant Wilson T. Go liable to pay
plaintiff BPI Card Finance Corporation the following amounts:
1. P77,970.91 plus interest of 1% per month and penalty of 1% per month to be computed
from May 23, 2000 until full payment;
2. 10% of the total amount due as attorneys fees; and
3. Cost of suit.11
The MeTC ruled that nothing in the credit card application states that the credit card was for the
account of the company. The statement of account was addressed to Noahs Ark Merchandising
simply because Go requested it. By preponderance of evidence, the MeTC found that BPI proved
the existence of Gos debt.12
Go appealed the MeTC decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In a decision dated
September 4, 2009, the RTC fully affirmed the MeTC decision. Go filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an order dated November 16, 2009. Gos counsel
received the denial of the motion for reconsideration on November 26, 2009.13
On December 10, 2009, Go filed before the CA a motion for extension of time for thirty (30)
days, or up to January 10, 2009, within which to appeal. However, since January 10, 2010 was a
Sunday, Go instead filed his petition for review on January 11, 2010.
On May 20, 2010, four months after the motion for extension of time was filed, the CA issued
the disputed May 4, 2010 resolution, denying the petition for review:
Petitioners motion for extension of thirty (30) days is PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner is
granted "an additional period of 15 days only within which to file the petition for review."
Considering that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the granted extension, the same is
hereby DENIED ADMISSION.14

Go filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA also denied in a Resolution dated October
12, 2011. The CA explained that while the motion for extension of time was granted, only a
period of fifteen (15) days was given, not the requested thirty (30) days. Hence, the last period to
file the petition for review should have been on December 25, 2009, not on January 10, 2010 as
Go had assumed. Since Go filed his petition for review after December 25, 2009, his filing was
out of time.
The Petition
Go now questions the CA rulings before us. He posits that it was only on May 20, 2010, or four
months after he filed his motion for extension of time, when he became aware that he had only
been given an extension of 15 days. He also claims that he was denied due process on mere
technicality, without resolving the petition based on the merits or the evidence presented.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. [emphasis, italics and underscore ours]
The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days. While
a further extension of fifteen (15) days may be requested, a specific request must be made with
specifically cited reason for the request. The CA may grant the request only at its discretion and,
by jurisprudence, only on the basis of reasons it finds meritorious.
Under the requirements, it is clear that only fifteen (15) days may initially be requested, not the
thirty (30) days Go requested. The petitioner cannot also assume that his motion has been
granted if the CA did not immediately act. In fact, faced with the failure to act, the conclusion is

that no favorable action had taken place and the motion had been denied. It is thus immaterial
that the resolution granting the extension of time was only issued four months later, although
such late action is a response we cannot approve of. In any case, the late response cannot be used
as an excuse to delay the filing of its pleading as a party cannot make any assumption on how his
motion would be resolved. Precisely, a motion is submitted to the court for resolution and we
cannot allow any assumption that it would be granted.
The right to appeal is a statutory right, not a natural nor a constitutional right. The party who
intends to appeal must comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; otherwise, the
right of appeal may be lost or squandered.15 Contrary to Gos assertion, his appeal was not denied
on a mere technicality. "The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect that appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory."16
In Lacsamana v. IAC,17 the Court laid down the now established policy on extensions of time in
order to prevent the abuse of this recourse. The Court said:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days
for filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the
reglementary period of appeal.18 (italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours)
We similarly ruled in Video gram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals 19 where we said that the
appellant "knew or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above rule, his motion for
extension of time of thirty (30) days could be granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply
was no basis for assuming that the requested 3 0-day extension would be granted." As we
heretofore stressed, an extension of time to appeal is generally allowed only for fifteen (15) days.
Go cannot simply demand for a longer period, without citing the reason therefor, for the court's
consideration and application of discretion.
Additionally, this Court rules only on questions of law in petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is likewise bound by findings of fact of the lower
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, particularly where all three tribunals below
have been unanimous in their factual findings. Thus, even on the merits, there is more than
enough reason to deny the present petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner Wilson T. Go.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186475

June 26, 2013

POSEIDON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
TITO R. TAMALA, FELIPE S. SAURIN, JR., ARTEMIO A. BO-OC and JOEL S.
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the September 30, 2008
Decision2 and the February 11, 20093 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 98783. These CA rulings set aside the December 29, 2006 and February 12, 2007
Resolutions4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 049479-06.
The NLRC, in turn, affirmed in toto the May 2006 Decision5 of the labor arbiter (LA) dismissing
the complaint for illegal termination of employment filed by respondents Tito R. Tamala, Felipe
S. Saurin, Jr., Artemio A. Bo-oc and Joel S. Fernandez against petitioner Poseidon International
Maritime Services, Inc. (Poseidon), and its principal, Van Doorn Fishing Pty, Ltd. (Van Doorn).
The Factual Antecedents
In 2004, Poseidon hired the respondents, in behalf of Van Doorn, to man the fishing vessels of
Van Doorn and those of its partners Dinko Tuna Farmers Pty. Ltd. (Dinko) and Snappertuna
Cv. Lda. (Snappertuna) - at the coastal and offshore area of Cape Verde Islands. The respondents
contracting dates, positions, vessel assignments, duration of the contract, basic monthly salaries,
guaranteed overtime pay and vacation leave pay, as reflected in their approved contracts,6 are
summarized below:
Artemio A.
Bo-oc

Joel S.
Fernandez

Felipe S.
Saurin, Jr.

Tito R.
Tamala

Date
Contracted

June 1, 2004

June 24, 2004

July 19, 20047

October 20,
2004

Position

Third Engineer

Chief Mate

Third Engineer

Ordinary
Seaman

Vessel
Assignment

M/V "Lukoran
DVA"

M/V "Lukoran
DVA"

M/V "Lukoran
Cetriri"

M/V
"Lukoran
DVA"

Contract
Duration

Twelve (12)
months

Twelve (12)
months

Twelve (12)
months

Twelve (12)
months

Basic

Monthly
Salary

US$800.00

US$1,120.00

US$800.00

US$280.00

Guaranteed
Overtime
Pay

US$240.00/mo

US$336.00/mo

US$240.00/mo

US$84.00/mo

Vacation
Leave Pay

US$66.66

US$93.33

US$66.66

US$23.33

The fishing operations for which the respondents were hired started on September 17, 2004. On
November 20, 2004, the operations abruptly stopped and did not resume. On May 25, 2005,
before the respondents disembarked from the vessels, Goran Ekstrom of Snappertuna (the
respondents immediate employer on board the fishing vessels) and the respondents executed an
agreement (May 25, 2005 agreement) regarding the respondents salaries.8 The agreement
provided that the respondents would get the full or 100% of their unpaid salaries for the
unexpired portion of their pre-terminated contract in accordance with Philippine laws. The
respective amounts the respondents would receive per the May 25, 2005 agreement are:
Artemio A. Bo-oc

US$6,047.99

Joel S. Fernandez

US$7,767.90

Felipe S. Saurin, Jr.

US$6,647.99

Tito R. Tamala

US$7,047.99

On May 26, 2005, however, Poseidon and Van Doorn, with Goran of Snappertuna and Dinko
Lukin of Dinko, entered into another agreement (letter of acceptance) reducing the previously
agreed amount to 50% of the respondents unpaid salaries (settlement pay) for the unexpired
portion of their contract.9 On May 28, 2005, the respondents arrived in Manila. On June 10,
2005, the respondents received the settlement pay under their letter of acceptance. The
respondents then signed a waiver and quitclaim10 and the corresponding cash vouchers.11
On November 16, 2005, the respondents filed a complaint12 before the Labor Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC, National Capital Region for illegal termination of employment with prayer for the
payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts; and for non-payment of
salaries, overtime pay and vacation leave pay.13 The respondents also prayed for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The respondents anchored their claim on their May 25, 2005 agreement with Goran, and
contended that their subsequent execution of the waiver and quitclaim in favor of Poseidon and
Van Doorn should not be given weight nor allowed to serve as a bar to their claim. The
respondents alleged that their dire need for cash for their starving families compelled and unduly
influenced their decision to sign their respective waivers and quitclaims. In addition, the
complicated language employed in the document rendered it highly suspect.

In their position paper,14 Poseidon and Van Doorn argued that the respondents had no cause of
action to collect the remaining 50% of their unpaid wages. To Poseidon and Van Doorn, the
respondents voluntary and knowing agreement to the settlement pay, which they confirmed
when they signed the waivers and quitclaims, now effectively bars their claim. Poseidon and Van
Doorn submitted before the LA the signed letter of acceptance, the waiver and quitclaim, and the
cash vouchers to support their stance.
In a Decision15 dated May 2006, the LA dismissed the respondents complaint for lack of merit,
declaring as valid and binding their waivers and quitclaims. The LA explained that while
quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon and do not bar them from
recovering the full measure of what is legally due, excepted from this rule are the waivers
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the employees, such as the waivers assailed by the
respondents. Citing jurisprudence, the LA added that the courts should respect, as the law
between the parties, those legitimate waivers and quitclaims that represent voluntary and
reasonable settlement of employees claims. In the respondents case, this pronouncement holds
more weight, as they understood fully well the contents of their waivers and knew the
consequences of their acts.
The LA did not give probative weight to the May 25, 2005 agreement considering that the
entities which contracted the respondents services - Poseidon and Van Doorn did not actively
participate. Moreover, the LA noted that the respondents signed letter of acceptance superseded
this agreement. The LA likewise considered the respondents belated filing of the complaint as a
mere afterthought.
Finally, the LA dismissed the issue of illegal dismissal, noting that the respondents already
abandoned this issue in their pleadings. The respondents appealed16 the LAs decision before the
NLRC.
The Ruling of the NLRC
By Resolution17 dated December 29, 2006, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs decision. As the
LA did, the NLRC ruled that the respondents knowing and voluntary acquiescence to the
settlement and their acceptance of the payments made bind them and effectively bar their claims.
The NLRC also regarded the amounts the respondents received as settlement pay to be
reasonable; despite the cessation of the fishing operations, the respondents were still paid their
full wages from December 2004 to January 2005 and 50% of their wages from February 2005
until their repatriation in May 2005.
On February 12, 2007, the NLRC denied18 the respondents motion for reconsideration,19
prompting them to file with the CA a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the CA
In its September 30, 2008 Decision,21 the CA granted the respondents petition and ordered
Poseidon and Van Doorn to pay the respondents the amounts tabulated below, representing the

difference between the amounts they were entitled to receive under the May 25, 2005 agreement
and the amounts that they received as settlement pay:
Artemio A. Bo-oc

US$3,705.00

Joel S. Fernandez

US$4,633.57

Felipe S. Saurin, Jr.

US$4,008.62

Tito R. Tamala

US$4,454.20

In setting aside the NLRCs ruling, the CA considered the waivers and quitclaims invalid and
highly suspicious. The CA noted that the respondents in fact questioned in their pleadings the
letters due execution. In contrast with the NLRC, the CA observed that the respondents were
coerced and unduly influenced into accepting the 50% settlement pay and into signing the
waivers and quitclaims because of their financial distress. The CA moreover considered the
amounts stated in the May 25, 2005 agreement with Goran to be more reasonable and in keeping
with Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.
The CA also pointed out with emphasis that the pre-termination of the respondents employment
contract was simply the result of Van Doorns decision to stop its operations.
Finally, the CA did not consider the respondents complaint as a mere afterthought; the
respondents are precisely given under the Labor Code a three-year prescriptive period to allow
them to institute such actions.
Poseidon filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for Reconsideration22 in the
CAs February 11, 2009 Resolution.23
The Petition
Poseidons petition argues that the labor tribunals findings are not only binding but are fully
supported by evidence. Poseidon contends that the CAs application of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 to justify the amounts it awarded to the respondents is misplaced, as the respondents never
raised the issue of illegal dismissal before the NLRC and the CA. It claims that the respondents,
in assailing the NLRC ruling before the CA, mainly questioned the validity of the waivers and
quitclaims they signed and their binding effect on them. While the respondents raised the issue of
illegal dismissal before the LA, they eventually abandoned it in their pleadings a matter the LA
even pointed out in her May 2006 Decision.
Poseidon further argues that the NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction nor gravely abuse its
discretion in deciding the case in its favor, pointing out that the respondents raised issues
pertaining to mere errors of judgment before the CA. Thus, as matters stood, these issues did not
call for the grant of a writ of certiorari as this prerogative writ is limited to the correction of
errors of jurisdiction committed through grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment.

Finally, Poseidon maintains that it did not illegally dismiss the respondents. Highlighting the
CAs observation and the respondents own admission in their various pleadings, Poseidon
reiterates that it simply ceased its fishing operations as a business decision in the exercise of its
management prerogative.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents point out in their comment24 that the petition raises questions of fact, which are
not proper for a Rule 45 petition. They likewise point out that the petition did not specifically set
forth the grounds as required under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On the merits, and relying on
the CA ruling, the respondents argue that Poseidon dismissed them without a valid cause and
without the observance of due process.
The Issues
At the core of this case are the validity of the respondents waivers and quitclaims and the issue
of whether these should bar their claim for unpaid salaries. At the completely legal end is the
question of whether Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 applies to the respondents claim.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to partly GRANT the petition.
Preliminary considerations
The settled rule is that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the review of
questions of law,25 i.e., to legal errors that the CA may have committed in its decision,26 in
contrast with the review for jurisdictional errors that we undertake in original certiorari actions
under Rule 65.27 In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, we examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct.28
In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review
on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it.29
Viewed in this light, we do not re-examine the factual findings of the NLRC and the CA, nor do
we substitute our own judgment for theirs,30 as their findings of fact are generally conclusive on
this Court. We cannot touch on factual questions "except in the course of determining whether
the CA correctly ruled in determining whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering and appreciating the factual [issues before it]."31
On the Merits of the Case
The core issue decided by the tribunals below is the validity of the respondents waivers and
quitclaims. The CA set aside the NLRC ruling for grave abuse of discretion; the CA essentially
found the waivers and quitclaims unreasonable and involuntarily executed, and could not have

superseded the May 25, 2005 agreement. In doing so, and in giving weight to the May 25, 2005
agreement, the CA found justification under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
The respondents are not entitled to
the unpaid portion of their salaries
under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
The application of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 presumes a finding of illegal dismissal. The
pertinent portion of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 reads:
SEC. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. x x x
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract. [emphasis and italics ours]
A plain reading of this provision readily shows that it applies only to cases of illegal dismissal or
dismissal without any just, authorized or valid cause and finds no application in cases where the
overseas Filipino worker was not illegally dismissed.32 We found the occasion to apply this rule
in International Management Services v. Logarta,33 where we held that Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 applies only to an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker or a worker dismissed from
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause.34
Whether the respondents in the present case were illegally dismissed is a question we resolve in
the negative for three reasons.
First, the respondents references to illegal dismissal in their several pleadings were mere cursory
declarations rather than a definitive demand for redress. The LAs May 2006 Decision clearly
enunciated this point when she dismissed the respondents claim of illegal dismissal "as
complainants themselves have lost interest to pursue the same."35
Second, the respondents, in their motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC, positively
argued that the fishing operations for which they were hired ceased as a result of the business
decision of Van Doorn and of its partners;36 thus, negating by omission any claim for illegal
dismissal.
Third, the CA, in its assailed decision, likewise made the very same inference that the fishing
operations ceased as a result of a business decision of Van Doorn and of its partners. In other
words, the manner of dismissal was not a contested issue; the records clearly showed that the
respondents employment was terminated because Van Doorn and its partners simply decided to
stop their fishing operations in the exercise of their management prerogative, which prerogative
even our labor laws recognize.
We confirm in this regard that, by law and subject to the States corollary right to review its
determination,37 management has the right to regulate the business and control its every aspect.38

Included in this management right is the freedom to close or cease its operations for any reason,
as long as it is done in good faith and the employer faithfully complies with the substantive and
procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence.39 Article 283 of our Labor Code
provides:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the [Department of Labor
and Employment] at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x x x In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered as one (1) whole year. [Italics, underscores and emphases ours]
This provision applies in the present case as under the contract the employer and the workers
signed and submitted to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), the Philippine
labor law expressly applies.
This legal reality is reiterated under Section 18-B, paragraph 2,40 in relation with Section 2341 of
the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) (which is deemed written into every
overseas employment contract) which recognizes the validity of the cessation of the business
operations as a valid ground for the termination of an overseas employment. This recognition is
subject to compliance with the following requisites:
1. The decision to close or cease operations must be bona fide in character;
2. Service of written notice on the affected employees and on the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) at least one (1) month prior to the effectivity of the
termination; and
3. Payment to the affected employees of termination or separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher.42
We are sufficiently convinced, based on the records, that Van Doorns termination of the
respondents employment arising from the cessation of its fishing operations complied with the
above requisites and is thus valid.
We observe that the records of the case do not show that Van Doorn ever intended to defeat the
respondents rights under our labor laws when it undertook its decision to close its fishing
operations on November 20, 2004. From this date until six months after, the undertaking was at a
complete halt. That Van Doorn and its partners might have suffered losses during the six-month
period is not entirely remote. Yet, Van Doorn did not immediately repatriate the respondents or

hire another group of seafarers to replace the respondents in a move to resume its fishing
operations. Quite the opposite, the respondents, although they were no longer rendering any
service or doing any work, still received their full salary for November 2004 up to January 2005.
In fact, from February 2005 until they were repatriated to the Philippines in May 2005, the
respondents still received wages, albeit half of their respective basic monthly salary rate. Had
Van Doorn intended to stop its fishing operations simply to terminate the respondents
employment, it would have immediately repatriated the respondents to the Philippines soon after,
in order that it may hire other seafarers to replace them a possibility that did not take place.
Considering therefore the absence of any indication that Van Doorn stopped its fishing operations
to circumvent the protected rights of the respondents, our courts have no basis to question the
reason that might have impelled Van Doorn to reach its closure decision.43
In sum, since Poseidon ceased its fishing operations in the valid exercise of its management
prerogative, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 finds no application. Consequently, we find that the CA
erroneously imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in not applying Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042 and in awarding the respondents the unpaid portion of their full salaries.
The waivers and quitclaims signed by
the respondents are valid and
binding
We cannot support the CAs act of giving greater evidentiary weight to the May 25, 2005
agreement over the respondents waivers and quitclaims; not only do we find the latter
documents to be reasonable and duly executed, we also find that they superseded the May 25,
2005 agreement.
Generally, this Court looks with disfavor at quitclaims executed by employees for being contrary
to public policy.44 Where the person making the waiver, however, has done so voluntarily, with a
full understanding of its terms and with the payment of credible and reasonable consideration,
we have no option but to recognize the transaction to be valid and binding.45
We find the requisites for the validity of the respondents quitclaim present in this case. We base
this conclusion on the following observations:
First, the respondents acknowledged in their various pleadings, as well as in the very document
denominated as "waiver and quitclaim," that they voluntarily signed the document after receiving
the agreed settlement pay.
Second, the settlement pay is reasonable under the circumstances, especially when contrasted
with the amounts to which they were respectively entitled to receive as termination pay pursuant
to Section 23 of the POEA-SEC and Article 283 of the Labor Code. The comparison of these
amounts is tabulated below:
1wphi1
Settlement Pay

Termination Pay

Joel S. Fernandez

US$3134.33

US$1120.00

Artemio A. Bo-oc

US$2342.37

US$800.00

Felipe S. Saurin, Jr.

US$2639.37

US$800.00

Tito R. Tamala

US$2593.79

US$280.00

Thus, the respondents undeniably received more than what they were entitled to receive under
the law as a result of the cessation of the fishing operations.
Third, the contents of the waiver and quitclaim are clear, unequivocal and uncomplicated so that
the respondents could fully understand the import of what they were signing and of its
consequences.46 Nothing in the records shows that what they received was different from what
they signed for.
Fourth, the respondents are mature and intelligent individuals, with college degrees, and are far
from the naive and unlettered individuals they portrayed themselves to be.1wphi1
Fifth, while the respondents contend that they were coerced and unduly influenced in their
decision to accept the settlement pay and to sign the waivers and quitclaims, the records of the
case do not support this claim. The respondents claims that they were in "dire need for cash" and
that they would not be paid anything if they would not sign do not constitute the coercion nor
qualify as the undue influence contemplated by law sufficient to invalidate a waiver and
quitclaim,47 particularly in the circumstances attendant in this case. The records show that the
respondents, along with their other fellow seafarers, served as each others witnesses when they
agreed and signed their respective waivers and quitclaims.
Sixth, the respondents voluntary and knowing conformity to the settlement pay was proved not
only by the waiver and quitclaim, but by the letters of acceptance and the vouchers evidencing
payment. With these documents on record, the burden shifts to the respondents to prove coercion
and undue influence other than through their bare self-serving claims. No such evidence
appeared on record at any stage of the proceedings.
In these lights and in the absence of any evidence showing that fraud, deception or
misrepresentation attended the execution of the waiver and quitclaim, we are sufficiently
convinced that a valid transaction took place. Consequently, we find that the CA erroneously
imputed grave abuse of discretion in misreading the submitted evidence, and in relying on the
May 25, 2005 agreement and on Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
The respondents are entitled to
nominal damages for failure of Van
Doorn to observe the procedural
requisites for the termination of
employment under Article 283 of the
Labor Code

As a final note, we observe that while Van Doorn has a just and valid cause to terminate the
respondents employment, it failed to meet the requisite procedural safeguards provided under
Article 283 of the Labor Code. In the termination of employment under Article 283, Van Doorn,
as the employer, is required to serve a written notice to the respondents and to the DOLE of the
intended termination of employment at least one month prior to the cessation of its fishing
operations. Poseidon could have easily filed this notice, in the way it represented Van Doorn in
its dealings in the Philippines. While this omission does not affect the validity of the termination
of employment, it subjects the employer to the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal
damages.48
Consistent with our ruling in Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot,49 we deem it proper to
award the respondents nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
violation of the required statutory procedures. Poseidon shall be solidarily liable to the
respondents for the payment of these damages.50
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT in PART the petition and
accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated September 30, 2008 and the
Resolution dated February 11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98783. We
REINSTATE the Resolution dated December 29, 2006 of the National Labor Relations
Commission with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Poseidon International Maritime Services,
Inc. is ordered to pay each of the respondents nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Costs against the respondents.
SO ORD
G.R. No. 177103

June 3, 2013

ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC., ROSENDO C. HERRERA, and BENNET

SHIPPING SA LIBERIA, Petitioners,
vs.
RAINERIO N. NAZAL, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, seeking to nullify the
resolutions dated December 19, 20062 and March 23, 20073 rendered by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97180.
The Antecedents
On November 15, 2000, respondent Rainerio N. Nazal entered into a twelve-month contract of
employment4 as cook with Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. (agency) for its principal, Bennet

Shipping SA Liberia (collectively, petitioners). He was to receive US$500.00 plus other benefits.
He had two earlier contracts with the petitioners from January 25, 1999 to September 14, 1999
and from February 12, 2000 to August 2000.
Nazal boarded the vessel M/V Rover on November 22, 2000 and finished his contract on
November 24, 2001. Allegedly after his arrival in Manila, he reported to one Ding Colorado of
the agency about his health condition and work experience on board M/V Rover. He claimed that
the agency referred him to a company-designated physician who found him to be suffering from
high blood pressure and diabetes. He then asked for compensation and medical assistance, but
the agency denied his request. The agency allegedly advised him not to work again.
On May 18, 2002, Nazal consulted Dr. Virginia Nazal, an internal medicine and diabetes
specialist, of Clinica Nazal. Almost a year after, or on May 3, 2003, he underwent a medical
examination at Clinica Nazal, which included a random blood sugar test. His blood sugar
registered at 339. On September 8, 2004, more than a year later, Dr. Nazal certified Nazal to be
unfit to work as a seaman.
Claiming that his condition was getting worse, Nazal went to the Philippine Heart Center on
September 29, 2004 and underwent medical examination and treatment under the care of Dr.
Efren Vicaldo, an internistcardiologist. Dr. Vicaldo diagnosed Nazals condition as: hypertension,
uncontrolled; diabetes mellitus, uncontrolled; impediment grade X (20.15 %); and unfit to
resume work as a seaman in any capacity.5
Thereafter, Nazal demanded permanent total disability compensation from the petitioners,
contending that his ailments developed during his employment with the petitioners and while he
was performing his duties. As his demand went unheeded, he filed the present complaint.
The agency, for itself and for its principal, argued that Nazals claim is barred by laches as it was
filed at least two years and ten (10) months late; even if it were otherwise, it still cannot prosper
because of Nazals failure to submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a
company designated physician within three working days upon his disembarkation, as mandated
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC). This resulted, it added, in the forfeiture of his right to claim disability benefits.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
In his decision6 dated May 25, 2005, Labor Arbiter (LA) Eduardo J.Carpio dismissed the
complaint, principally on the ground that Nazal failed to comply with the mandatory reporting
requirement under his standard employment contract. LA Carpio gave no credence to Nazals
claim that he reported to Colorado, as there was no proof presented in this respect. LA Carpio
pointed out that while Nazal might have been complaining about his health condition while on

board the vessel, there was no evidence showing that he reported his ailments to the vessels
authorities.
Nazal appealed from LA Carpios decision. On September 20, 2005, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a decision7 in Nazals favor. It set aside LA Carpios
ruling and awarded Nazal US$10,075.00 as partial disability benefit, plus 5% attorneys fees.
The NLRC declared that contrary to LA Carpios conclusion, Nazal presented substantial proof
that his ailments had been contracted during his employment with the petitioners. The NLRC
relied on Dr. Vicaldos disability rating of Grade X (20.15%) pursuant to the POEA-SEC.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. For his part, Nazal pleaded with the NLRC that
he be granted permanent total disability benefits as he would not be able to resume his
employment as a seaman anymore. On the other hand, the agency insisted that laches barred
Nazals claim, but in any event, he failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment
reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC.8 Further, it stressed that a higher degree of proof
should have been required by the NLRC because of the badges of suspicion/fraud apparent in the
case. It explained in this regard that Nazal submitted proof that he had taken another overseas
employment after he disembarked from the vessel M/V Rover.
By a resolution dated November 30, 2005,9 the NLRC denied both motions, stressing that they
were based on the same arguments presented to the LA. The agency filed an urgent motion for
reconsideration on grounds of newly-discovered evidence and pending motions/incidents. It
argued that the new evidence showed that Nazal had entered into another overseas contract after
his stint with the petitioners for which reason, his disability could not have been due to his work
on board the vessel M/V Rover.
The NLRC denied the motion in its resolution10 of October 31, 2006, declaring as "superfluous
and immaterial" the claimed newly-discovered evidence. It emphasized that Nazals subsequent
voyage did not prove that he had not been sick or that his sickness had not been aggravated by
his work on board the vessel M/V Rover. Thereafter, the agency elevated the case to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Decision
The CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed out of time.11 It pointed out that the
assailed NLRC resolution of October 31, 2006 the subject of the petition is a ruling on the
agencys urgent motion for reconsideration of the NLRC resolution dated November 30, 2005
which, in turn, denied the agencys motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision of
September 30, 2005. The second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party, the CA
declared, is expressly prohibited by Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. The agency moved
for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.12

The Petition
The agency now asks the Court to set aside the CA resolutions, contending that the appellate
court committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in holding that it filed a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. It argues that the two motions
alluded to dealt with different subject matters; the first one (dated November 11, 2005) dealt with
the merits of the case while the second one (dated March 21, 2006) was based on newlydiscovered evidence.
The NLRC denied the agencys urgent motion for reconsideration in its resolution of October 31,
2006, copy of which the agency allegedly received on November 15, 2006.13 It maintains that it
had until January 10, 2007 to file the petition for certiorari which it did on time, or on December
11, 2006.
The agency bewails the CAs resort to technicalities to "thwart substantial justice," insisting that
it has proven the merits of its case. It submits that Nazals claim may even be fraudulent
considering that he filed it after he disembarked from the vessel M/V Rover and, subsequently,
obtained employment with another vessel and kept silent about it. It argues that the fact that
Nazal was able to secure a subsequent posting shows that he was fit and able when he left his
employment with the petitioners. In any event, it adds that Nazal is disqualified from claiming
disability benefits because of his failure to comply with the mandatory post-employment medical
examination under the POEA-SEC.
The Case for Nazal and Related Incidents
On July 4, 2007, the Court required Nazal to comment on the petition.14 Instead of filing his
comment, however, Nazal petitioned15 the CA to convert his "disability to permanent total
disability" (G.R. No. SP No. 104246). This prompted the petitioners to file a "motion for leave to
file manifestation and admission of manifestation"16 in relation with the petition for conversion.
The petitioners submitted a brief chronology of events showing that Nazal appeared to be "forum
shopping" with the filing of the petition with the CA, subsequent to the filing of the present case.
The CA, for its part, promptly dismissed the petition.
By a Resolution dated June 22, 2009,17 the Court granted the petitioners motion and required
Nazal to comment. Nazal submitted his comment on the motion on July 23, 200918 under his own
signature. It appeared that he no longer had legal representation at the time. He informed the
Court in this respect that he sought the help of RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services
Corporation (RODCO) for legal and financial assistance regarding his claim for disability
benefits.

RODCO provided Nazal with a lawyer under contract with the firm for one year in the
person of Atty. Oliver C. Castro. Atty. Castros contract with RODCO expired on February 13,
2005, prompting him to withdraw as Nazals counsel; RODCO then sent Attys. Constantino
Reyes and Rodrigo Ceniza to represent Nazal. They were also under contract with RODCO and
their sevices were terminated as of July 2007, around which time, the partial disability award to
Nazal was enforced,19 as evidenced by a notice of garnishment20 and acknowledgment receipt by
the NLRC of the garnished amount.21
Nazal contends in the same comment that he is entitled not only to partial disability benefits but
to permanent total disability compensation since he had already lost the capacity to earn a living.
This is the reason, he tells the Court, why even without a counsel, he petitioned the CA for the
conversion of his disability to permanent total disability. He submits that his receipt of the
amount of P484,046.31, corresponding to the award of partial disability benefits, does not bar
him from demanding what is legally due him and that it cannot be considered as forum shopping.
In a Resolution dated August 17, 2009,22 the Court noted Nazal's comment on the forum
shopping issue. Nazal died in October 2010,23 without any comment on the petitioners appeal
having been filed.
Our Ruling
The procedural issue
We first resolve the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari for having been filed out of time. Obviously, the appellate court counted the 60-day
period for the filing of the petition24 from March 13, 2006,25 the date the petitioners claimed they
received a copy of the NLRC resolution (dated November 30, 2005) denying their partial motion
for reconsideration (first motion) and not from November 15, 2006,26 the day they received the
NLRC resolution (dated October 31, 2006) denying their urgent motion for reconsideration
(second motion).
The CA considered the agencys urgent motion for reconsideration as a second motion for
reconsideration which is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court27 and also
under Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure.28 The agency takes
exception to the CA ruling, reiterating its position that the two motions dealt with two different
subject matters, the first motion addressed the merits of the case and the urgent motion was filed
on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. It adds that even the NLRC did not consider the
urgent motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading.
We find merit in the agencys argument. Technicalities of law and procedure are interpreted very
liberally and are not considered controlling in labor cases. Article 221 of the Labor Code

provides that "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In keeping with the spirit and intent of the law and in the interest of fairplay, we find it both
necessary and appropriate to review the present labor controversy. For the same reason, we rule
out laches as a bar to the filing of the complaint.
The merits of the case
Contrary to the conclusions of the NLRC and of the CA, we find no substantial evidence
supporting the ruling that the agency and its principal are liable to Nazal by way of temporary or
partial total disability benefits. The labor tribunal and the appellate court grossly misappreciated
the facts and even completely disregarded vital pieces of evidence in resolving the case.
First. Nazal disembarked from the vessel M/V Rover for a "finished contract," not for medical
reasons. This notwithstanding, he claims that immediately after his disembarkation, he reported
to Colorado about his health condition and work experience on board the vessel. He further
claimed that Colorado referred him to a company-designated physician who found him afflicted
with high blood pressure and diabetes. Thereupon, he asked for compensation and medical
assistance, but the agency denied his request and allegedly advised him not to work again.
Except for his bare allegations, nothing on record supports Nazals claim that he contracted his
supposed ailments on board the vessel. As the LA aptly observed, if indeed a companydesignated physician examined Nazal, why did the physician not issue a medical report
confirming Nazals supposed ailments? And why did Nazal not ask for a certification of the
physicians findings if he really intended to ask for disability compensation from the petitioners?
Under the standard employment contract, the employer is under obligation to furnish the
seafarer, upon request, a copy of all pertinent medical reports or any records at no cost to the
seafarer.29
The absence of a medical report or certification of Nazals ailments and disability only signifies
that his post-employment medical examination did not take place as claimed. We thus cannot
accept the NLRC reasoning that the absence of a medical report does not mean that Nazal was
not examined by the company-designated physician as the medical reports are normally in the
custody of the manning agency and not with the seaman. In UST Faculty Union v. University of
Santo Tomas,30 the Court declared: "a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation
with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it
will offend due process."

Second. While we have ruled out laches as a bar to Nazals claim, the inordinate delay in the
institution of the complaint casts a grave suspicion on Nazals true intentions against the
petitioners. It took him two years and 10 months to file the complaint (on September 16, 2004)31
since he disembarked from the vessel M/V Rover on November 24, 2001. Why it took him that
long a time to file the complaint only Nazal can answer, but one thing is clear: he obtained
another employment as a seaman for three months (from March 1, 2004 to June 11, 2004), long
after his employment with the petitioners. He was deployed by manning agent Crossocean
Marine Services, Inc. (Crossocean) on board the vessel Kizomba A FPSO, for the principal
Eurest Shrm Far East Pte., Ltd.32 Nazal admitted as much when he submitted in evidence before
the LA photocopies of the visa section of his passport showing a departure on March 1, 200433
and an arrival on June 11, 2004.341wphi1
If Nazal was able to secure an employment as a seaman with another vessel after his
disembarkation in November 2001, how can there he a case against the petitioners, considering
especially the lapse of time when the case was instituted? How could Nazal be accepted for
another ocean-going job if he had not been in good health? How could he be engaged as a
seaman after his employment with the petitioners if he was then already disabled?
Surely, before he was deployed by Crossocean, he went through a pre-employment medical
examination and was found fit to work and healthy; otherwise, he would not have been hired.
Under the circumstances, his ailments resulting in his claimed disability could only have been
contracted or aggravated during his engagement by his last employer or, at the very least, during
the period after his contract of employment with the petitioners expired. For ignoring this glaring
fact, the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion; for upholding the NLRC, the CA
committed the same jurisdictional error.
As a final word, it is unfortunate that Nazal died before the case could be resolved, but his death
cannot erase the fact that his claim for disability benefits was brought against the wrong party,
nor the reality that his claim against the petitioners suffered from fatal defects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the
Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.