Reparations Commission v.

Visayan Packing

Agustin v. CA

Perez v. Scottish Union (and National Insurance Co.) [Canon 20]

Facts: Petitioner was seeking the payment of attorneys fees in the criminal
case of arson and other cases against defendant, who had in a written
contract, agreed to pay the same out of the proceeds of a fire insurance
policy issued by defendant insurance company. Defendant Mitre
acknowledged the professional services rendered by Perez but alleged that
the agreement as to the payment of attorneys fees out of the insurance
proceeds was only a simulation to bar other claims against the said policy.
The CFI of Albay rendered a judgment in favor Perez, from which Mitre now
appeals.
Issue:Whether or not a written contract for services shall be controlling.
Held: Yes. Exhibit D should be given its full force and effect. "A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid thereof unless found
by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable." (Rule of Court 127,
section 22.) The arson case required several days of trial. The gravity of the
situation
confronted
by
the
appellant
after
the
rendition
of
the judgment of the court of first instance is shown by the fact that he was s
entenced to undergo imprisonment for the period of from ten to twelve years
and
to
pay
an
indemnityof P101,115. That the plaintiff had handled appellant's defense wit

h competence and success cannot be gain said, it being enough to state that
the appellant was acquitted in the Court of Appeals before which the plaintiff
orally argued, in addition to a 78-page brief which had filed therein. We are
thus not prepared to rule that the amount of P6,000 is excessive or unjust,
especially because said fee is in a sense contingent upon the acquittal of the
appellant, since no insurance money (P6,000 of which was ceded to the
plaintiff under Exhibit
D) was
of course forthcoming if the
fire which destroyed the insured property could be proven to have resulted
from incendiarism for which the appellant was criminally liable.
Licudan v. CA
Facts: Atty. Teodoro Domalanta was the counsel of his sister and brother-inlaw. He represented them in two civil cases and in both, he obtained
judgment in favor of his clients.
He filed a petition for Attorneys Lien with Notification to his Clients which
provided that:
He is entitled to own 97.5 sq.m of his clients share of the lot in
question
He shall have usufructuary right for 10 years of his clients share of
the lot in question
All the damages accruing to his client if for the undersigned counsel
A series of hearings were made and the trial court ruled in favor of the
lawyer.
10 months after, the heirs of the lawyers (deceased) clients filed a motion
to set aside the orders of the trial court.
The lawyer stressed the fact that the payment of the professional services
was pursuant to a contract which could no longer be disturbed as it has
already been implemented and since then had become final
CA ruled in favor of the lawyer, dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.
Instant petition: The petitioners now fault the respondent court for its failure
to exercise its inherent power to review and determine the propriety of the
respondents lawyers fees
They also accuse their lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or
legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by him.
According to the petitioners, they may have won the cases (where the lawyer
represented them) but would lose the entire property won in the litigation to
their lawyer.
They would be deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages
since everything would just go to lawyers fees.

Furthermore, a portion of the land that they would recover would still go to
lawyers fees since it pertains to the lawyers son by way of usufruct for 10
years.
Issues:
W/N the attorneys fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of
contingent fees
Held:
No. The attorneys fees in this case is unconscionable and unreasonable.
a. The instant petition is granted, and the Court of Appeals
decisionreversed and set aside.
b. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonabl e attorneys fees in the
amount of P20,000

Director of Lands v. Ababa

Francisco v. Matias
IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF DOA GABINA RAQUEL. VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,
petitioner-appellee, vs. AUREA MATIAS, oppositor-appellant.
On July 16, 1952, said Aurea Matias named as executrix in the will engaged the services of
Atty. Vicente Francisco, who, with the assistance of Atty. Agbunag and of Attorneys Alberto J.
Francisco and J. Gonzales Orense, personally handled the case before three different judges
successively.
After the decision of this Court had become final, said attorney filed on October 7, 1958, in the
Cavite court, in this testate proceeding, motion to fix his attorney's fees on the basis of quantum
meruit. He alleged, among other things, that the Supreme Court had approved the probate of the
will of Gabina Raquel, that he had agreed to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00 under his
erroneous belief, due to misrepresentations of Aurea Matias, that Gabina Raquel had left

properties worth only P167,000.00; that he learned, after the decision of the Supreme Court that
the said properties actually amounted to much more than that sum; and that, consequently, he
was not bound by his agreement to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00 only. Atty. Francisco
prayed that his compensation be fixed at 30% of the market value of the estate.
In deciding the main petition in view of the testimonial and documentary evidence, it brushed
aside, as immaterial, the alleged misrepresentation in the making of the written contract, since
"reasonable amount" had become the real issue.
It appears that the will of Gabina Raquel, who died without forced heirs, bequeathed the greatest
part of the estate to appellant, and the rest to Santos Matias, Rafael Matias (her brothers) and to
Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud and Policarpio Salud. Atty. Francisco said he contracted with her
as the executrix. The will (shown to him) designated her as such;. She later asked to be noted in
the estate proceedings, the amount of P15,000.00 (Francisco's fees) as a lien upon the estate (p.
103, R.A.); 3. In her motion ex-parte of July 20, 1959, she petitioned for authority to pay from
the estate, the sum of P2,000.00 as part of the retainer fees of Atty. Francisco; 4 She included in
her statement of accounts as executrix, Francisco's attorney's fees in the amount of P11,000.00;
and 5. The statement of assets and liabilities of the estate filed by her with the lower court on
January 10, 1959, listed appellee's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 as an item of estate liability.
Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract
fixing the compensation for the attorney, such contract is conclusive as to the amount of
compensation.
At any rate, we may take judicial notice of the general information that the market value of real
property in the provinces is usually three or more times the assessed valuation thereof. Citing
Section 22, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court which says that "an attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services". This
Supreme Court has held the following as the guidelines to be observed in determining the
compensation of an attorney: (a) the amount and character of the services rendered; (b) the labor,
time and trouble involved; (c) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (d) the responsibility imposed; (e) the amount of money or the value of
the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; (f) the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; (g) the professional character and
standing of the attorney; (h) the results secured; (i) and whether or not the fee is absolute or
contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee
when it is to be contingent than when it is not." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
III [1957 Ed.] pp. 644, 645, citing Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer.
The whole estate would have passed to the oppositor Basilia Salud, who is the first cousin of the
deceased Gabina Raquel to the exclusion of appellant and the other legatees named in the
will. Aurea Matias, whose father is a first cousin of the deceased, stands five degrees removed

from Gabina Raquel, whereas Basilia Salud is only four degrees removed from her; and under
our rules on succession 13 in case of intestate or legal succession, the relative nearer in degree
excludes the more remote ones and considering also, that in the collateral line, the right of
representation holds only where nephews and nieces survive with brothers and sisters of the
deceased. 14 Note incidentally, that the will favored Aurea because the latter lived with, and
rendered services to, her aunt Gabina for more than 32 years.
Indeed, the legal services rendered in the lower court were expectably quite exacting. The trial
alone covered almost a period of four years. The preparation and presentation of evidence called
for strenuous work. Thirty-one documents were presented as evidence for the proponent of the
will. The transcript of the stenographic notes consisted of more than a thousand pages.
Numberless motions were filed. After the closing of the evidence, a memorandum had to be filed
to answer the oppositor's motion to reject the will. And then, despite the extensive study,
research, and preparation of the evidence, and notwithstanding the skill and experience of Atty.
Francisco, the Cavite court denied the probate of the will.
Taking into account all the variables of the process, in the light of our several pronouncements on
the matter of contingent lawyer's fees, we feel that modifying the appealed resolution and
awarding 12.5% of the market value to the herein appellee would accomplish substantial justice.
This figure represents a compromise, some members having voted for a bigger amount, while
others voted for less. The Suntay and the Harden cases were specially mentioned, since they
belonged to the million-peso class. This award sets a higher ratio than the first, because the latter
involved over three million pesos and because Atty. Francisco rendered much greater services to
this estate. For one thing, he handled tedious trial work which lasted for about four years and
for another, the fee was contingent. The Harden ratio (20%) was not applied, because attorney
and client had entered therein into a valid written contract.
Several circumstances account for this drastic reduction, among them: (a) 25% of P1,236,993.46
equals P309,248.36; but Atty. Francisco expressed willingness to receive P100,000.00 only, in
his letter of September 15, 1958 (Record on Appeal, p. 132); (b) although admittedly the leading
legal counsel, he got the assistance of three other attorneys; (c) believing the estate amounted to
P167,000.00, he agreed to receive P15,000.00 as contingent fee, i.e. 9% only; and (d) he has
already received a total of P11,000.00.
Fernandez v. Hon. Bello
107 Phil 1140 Legal Ethics Strong Language by a Lawyer against a Judge
Facts: Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for Florentino Perreyras
however, Florentino died without paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted
the eldest child of Perreyras in a guardianship proceeding so that the eldest
may properly dispose of their property in order to pay their fathers
indebtedness. Eventually, Florentinos nipa land was sold for P1,000.00.
Thereafter, P200.00 was paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for

Florentino and his heirs. Judge Bello found out about said payment and so
directed Fernandez to explain (because under the guardianship, proceeds of
any sale must first be accounted for and no payment to creditors shall be
made without prior authorization from the court).
In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez
does not deserve the P200.00 attorneys fees because Fernandez is a below
average standard of a lawyer. Fernandez then responded with strong
language (which were not specified).
ISSUE: Whether or not the strong language used by Fernandez against the
judge is proper.
HELD: The Supreme Court seem to say yes. The Supreme Court stated that
the strong language used by Fernandez must have been impelled by the
same language used by Bello in characterizing the act of Fernandez as
anomalous and unbecoming and in charging him of obtaining his fee
through maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner. If anyone is
to blame for the language used by Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has
made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked Fernandez..
If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate
language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
On the issue of attorneys fees, the opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a
lawyer is not the basis of the right to a lawyers fee. It is the contract
between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services rendered.

Intestate Estate of A. Dalisay v. Marasigan