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    67 vues87 pages

    Canguilhem Ideology and in The History of The Life Sciences

    Transféré par

    Cosmin Koszor
    ideology

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences Georges Canguilhem translated by Arthur Goldhammer Cambridge, Masachusers ‘London England ng wandeon copyright © #968 Mauachuners ate of ‘encogy Oriinaly plies unde ete dope rations dan hie Urrone desc: Now dade sede poeple dee ‘ens cope © 1977 Liat Plague) Vein, Pars, \ ‘All ngs sere No parol his book may be repro ia ny frm (roy any cece or technic men nny pepe ‘fcordng.ointrmanon aoe and eee wie! permanant ‘wig fo he use “Tito wat yest by GapieConpoon ne dae pnd td ound by Hala Lhopaph Ine Ud Sexe of Aerie brary of Congres Cataloging i Pubcon Dat Cana, George 2904~ Utlogy and asain nthe ary of he ie cnc ane ayy: p ade nd fife scenes—History. Lie senes—Pilosophy 1 Tie Qihorcaery 988 eee Bele BaN oaewoyss>x ian Contents anslator’s Preface vii Preface ix Introduction: The Role of Epistemology in Contemporary History of Science z Scientific and Medical Ideologies in the [Nineteenth Century ‘What Isa Scientific Ideology? » John Brown's System: An Example of Medical eology ” Bacteriology and the End of Nineteenth-Century “Medical Theory” sx Triumphs of Biological Rationality in the [Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries ‘The Development ofthe Concept of Biological Regulation inthe Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries a vi 5 On the History ofthe Life Sciences since Darwin 6 The Question of Normality in che History of Biological Thought Sources Index 103 as 47 149 ‘Translator’s Preface ‘Georges Canguilhem was born in 1904. He studied and began to teach philosophy but while eeaching decided 10 work toward @ medical degree. His reasons are worth noting leis not necessarily to learn more about mental illness that 4 professor of philosophy wil take an interest in medicine Nor sit necessarily to practice a scientific discipline. What expected from medicine was nothing other than an intro- ddution to concrete human problems. Medicine seemed 10 ime then, and stl seems to me now, technique ora art tthe crossroads of several sciences more than a science ia the strict sense of the word. Two problems —that of the felation between science and vechnology, and that of nocms and normality—could, | thought, be more precisely for ‘mulated and more fully elucidated by someone with med- ical waining...- The present work [his 1943 thesis, The [Normal and the Pathological is therefore an eore to in- tegrate some of the methods and results of medicine into Philosophical speculation. Canguilhem with his life's work has admirably fal filled this statement of intention. Along with Gaston Bach- clard he has been one of the primary influences in the ‘corientation of French philosophy in recent years. le was Bachelard who introduced the concept of an “epistemolog- ical break," a concept whose importance and usefulness CCanguihem has demonstrated in his own way. But Can- uilhem’s work also shows how philosophy ean span the coupure, so to speak, in order to reestablish continuity at ‘nother level. For Canguilhem, error isthe uth ofthe past transcended, and he is able to show in concrete detail why the history of science should be studied not as a steady march toward teuth but as a process of formation and re formation of concepts and models. His method is more ceasly grasped in acion than through description, and there is pechaps no better introduction to his work chan the essay (included here) ented “Bacteriology and the End of Nineteenth-Century ‘Medical Theory” In 2955 Canguilhem succeeded Bachelard as director of the Insiut d'Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques, position that he held until his retirement a few years ago. Perhaps che most noted ofthe younger philosopher inf ‘enced by his thought was the late Michel Foucault, who ‘wrote of his debt to Canguilhem’s pioneering work. Inet ‘sted readers may wish to consule Le Normal et le puro Togique (1966, containing the 1943 thesis and later essays and now available in English, La Formation du concept de réfexe (1955, reissued 1977), La Connassance de la vie L952, 1965), Etudes dhistomre et de philosophie des sci- ‘ences (1968), and the volume from which the present translation was made, Idéologie t rationaité dans Phis- foire des sclences de a vie (1977). Canguilhem also pro- vided a preface to a recent edition of Claude Bernards Lecons eur les phénomines dela vie commune aus ani uses et aux végetaus (1966). Preface ‘To err is human, to persist in eror is diabolical. Ie is not up to me to decide the degree of error embodied in the texts gathered here. Lam surely too old to make public confession of my mistakes, 10 proclaim my allegiance to nevsly instituted epistemological authorities atthe cost of renouncing methodological axioms tha I borrowed some forty years ago and subsequently exploited in my own way and at my own risk, not without emendation, revision, and In 1967-68, under the influence of work of Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser, I introduced the concept of Scientific ideology inco my lectures. This was not simply a mark of my interest in and acceptance ofthe original com- tributions of those two thinkers tothe canons of scientific history. Ie was also a way of refurbishing without ejecting the lessons ofa teacher whose books I read but whose lec- tures I was never able to attend. For whatever liberties my young collegues may have taken with the teachings of ston Bachelard, their work was inspired by and buile on is. 1 do not believe, therefore, thatthe reader of my frst Etudes dbistoire et de philosophie des sciences (Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Sciences) will ind in ‘these essays signs of change or evolution in my thinking.* As for the question whether my indifference to the devel ‘opment of a history that would substitute for the distinc tion between science and philosophy (or, in other words, between science and literature) a notion of their mutual interpenetration should or should not earn me the distinc: tion of being a *conceptualist fossil” I must admit I do not rmuch care. When one's own insignificant research has led ‘one to recognize the existence of discontinuity in history, i would be inappropriate to refuse ro recognize discontnui ties inthe history of bistoy. To each his own discontinuity, his owa revolutions in the world of scholaship. (On the other hand I should ike very much to answer ‘question that has been raised by no one but myself. The author of The Archaeology of Knowledge, whose analysis of scientific ideology Ihave found quite useful, has dstin- fished several “dhresholds of tansfotmation” in the his tory of knowledge: a threshold of positivity, a threshold of epistemologiaation, a threshold of scientifity, and a threshold of formalization. In my published work I am not sure that I have distinguished as caretully as Miche! Foucaule might wish among the various thresholds crossed by the disciplines Ihave studied, Ie seems to me in any case that, the claims of certain geneticists notwithstanding, none of those dicipines has yet crossed the threshold of formalization? Unlike Foucault, however, Ido noc believe that experimental medicine as practiced by Claude Bernard and microbiology a5 practiced by Louis Pasteur were ‘equally inadequate in their contribution to making 2s: ‘ence of clinical medicine. I readily admit that I failed to pay adequate attention to the question of thresholds of [Etudes Phistoire et de philosophic des sciences was published by Libris Vin in 1968. The Pench eon o the preset work ‘ear the side Nowell eader Ubatte ete philoopbie os wnces—Teana) ‘transformation, But nineteenth-century medicine and bi ‘ology lend themselves less readily than, say, nineteenth century chemistry to dissection of the conditions that made “progres” possible, One can sill argue, I think, that Ber- ard’ physiological medicine exhibits a casein which “ep istemologization,” at the hands ofa Bernard himself in love with philosophizing, raced far in “advance” even of pos tive empirical results. By contrast, Pasteur, «chemist rather than a physician, was primarily interested in making a pos itive contibution to research and not unduly concerned with developing a consistent epistemology. Te may be, finaly that my analyses are not sufficiently subtle or rigorous. I eave eto the reader to decide whether this is 2 question of discretion, sloth, or incapacity Notes See Michel Foucault, L'Arehéloge du sav pp. 243-247. CH. Axiomatic Method in Biology (Cambridge 1947), and "Formation in Biology.” Logique et analyse Secs, August 1988). 3 ELF Dagogne, Méthode et doctrine dane Foouore de Patteur {Pan Pres Universes de rane, 1967), concasion, ce. June 1977 Ideology and Rationality in the History of the Life Sciences Introduction: The Role of Epistemology in Contemporary History of Science “To anyone who would examine the relations between eps temology and the history of science, one fact stands out above all others: namely that we possess at present more rmanifestoes and programs of research than we do hard facts, Statements of intention are numerous, concrete re- sults meagee. ‘Compared with the history of science, a discipline with a history ofits own, epistemology at Rest sight seems to find itself na false position. Chronologically he history ‘ofscience owes nothing tothe philosophical discipline that appears to have acquired the name epistemology in 854.1 ‘Monticl’s Histoire dee mathématiques (2758), Bailly Histoire de Vastronomie (1775-1783), and Kurt Sprengel’ Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzwcikunde (17921803) were all written withour reference v0 any sy$- tem of critical or normative concepts. No doubt all these works were informed, whether thei authors were aware of it oF not, by a period consciousness, impersonallyfor- mulated in the doctrine of infinite perfecibility ofthe hu- ‘man spirit and based on an almost unbroken series of revolutions in cosmology, mathematic, and physiology — revolutions astociated with the names Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Harvey, Newton, Leibniz, and Lavoisier. On grounds of continuity it was therefor legitimate to believe in further scientific progress to come. Although Sprengel (the date being #792) explicitly alludes to critical philoso- phy inthe introduction to his history of medicine, he men tions it simply as a doctrine in which certain physicians happen to be well verse, just ascertain of their predeces- sors were well versed in dogmatic, empirical, or skeptical philosophy, rather than as a new and effective instrument for judging the validity of scientific methods. Hence there is no point in reproaching cighteenth- and. nineteenth ‘entry historians of scence for not having employed any ‘of the epistemological concepts that today’s philosophers tempting t0 enforce as rules for writing scientific history ‘Among historians of science, those who dislike the scrutiny of their discipline by epistemologists have not been remiss in pointing out that epistemology, itself nour- ished by the history of science, cannot presume t0 give ‘more than it has ceceveds that ii cannot pretend to e- form the principles of a discipline from which i in fact derived. The acrimony of the controversy is not unseated, Ihowever vaguely or loosely, to the ancient view ofthe e- lation berween the disciplines and the faculties ofthe soul, according to which history corresponds to Memory. I it hard to say whose ambition is more exorbitant, the histor- ans or he epistemologss'. Which is more pretentious: to claim memory or judgment? Errors of judgment are acci- dental, bu alteration is of the essence of memory. About reconstructions in the history of science one must make a ‘point that ha repeatedly been made about reconstructions in other fields of history—political, diplomatic, miliary, and s0 on: namely that contrary to Leopold von Ranke's ‘dictum, the historian can never claim to represent things a¢ they really were wie ex eigentlich gewesen). Dijksteshus’s comment that “the history of science forms not only the memory of science but als is episte- ological laboratory" has frequently been commented ‘on: Since elaboration is different from restitution, one ‘may conclude that epstemology’s claim to give more than ithas received is legitimate. Epistemology shifts the focus ‘of interest from the history of science to science as seen in the light of history. To take as one's objec of inguiey noth- ing other than sources, inventions, influences, priorities, Simultaneities, and successions is at bottom to fail «0 distinguish between scence and ather aspects of culture, A history of science free of epistemological contamination would inevitably reduce the sate ofa scientific discipline — plane physiology in che eighteenth century, say—to a sum- ‘mary of chronological and logical connections among var- ious systems of propositions pertaining to various classes ‘of problems or solutions. The quality of historical work ‘would then be measured by breadth of erudition and shrewdness in analyzing the connections between the work of diferent scientists, by sill in ferreting out similis and diferences in their views. But the diverse quality of historiel works eannor conceal the fundamentally ident- ‘al relation of the historian to the object whose history i being told. A pure history of eighteenth-century botany ‘would consider “botanical” nothing but what botanists of the period took to be within their scope of inquiry. Pure historians are interested only in what scientists thought they were doing and how they went about doing it. Hut a fundamental question must be asked: Does this scence of the past constitute a past forthe science of today? “Taken in an absolute sense, the "past of a science” is a vulgar concept. The “past” isa catchall of retrospective inguiry. Whether the question isthe shape ofthe earth, the “hominization” of man, the social division of labor, a the alcoholic deiium of 2 particular individual, one turns to the “past” as required by present needs in search of more or less remote antecedents to some present state of afar. ‘The past, moreover, is conceived beforehand as a vessel of infinite capacity. Consider again che example of plant phys- ology. Inthe broad sense just defined, is past would in- clude everything that people called botanists, physicians, chemists, hortculursts, agronomists, or economists might have writen in regard to conjectures, observations, for experiments with a bearing on the relation between structure and function in objects variously termed herbs, plants, or vegetables. An idea of the abundance of such source material, even allowing for selection based on vanism or by raising metaphysical objections to the procedures of those who would assimilate medicine to me- chanics. Therapeutics, guided by pure empiricism, ale nated berween skeptical eclecticism and obstinate dogmatism. Tragically, medicine could not accomplish its goals, Ie remained an empty discourse about practices ‘often not very different from magic. Freud ssid of ancient medicine that peychic therapy was the only treatment it had to offer, and much the same thing could have been said about medicine in the cigh- teenth and most ofthe nineteenth centuries. By this | mean thatthe presence and personality ofthe physician were the primary remedies in many afctions of which anxiety was 1 major component. This accounts for that remarkable phenomenon of the mid- ‘ered with general problems of animal organization “as ‘one traverses thei entire series from the most perfect to the most imperfect” The idea of a hierarchical series of ‘animals, “chain of Being,” indicates thatthe object ofthe new biology was the same as that of Aristotle's Historia ‘animaliun and De partbus animal. Hence Lamarck’s ‘own invention—modification inthe organs through force fof habit and under the influence of changing environmen tal conditons—was explicitly intended to restablish “the very order of nature” beyond the lacunae and discontinui- ties in the system of classification proposed by naturalist, that is, to establish a clear progression and gradation in ‘organization that could not be overlooked despite any ‘As for the other inventor ofthe term and concept of biology, G. R. Teviranus the very tide ofthe book he pub lished in 1802, Biologie oder Philosophie der Lebenden Natur fr Naturforscher und Arete (volume 2 in a six- volume series, the last of which was published in 1822), naz indicates that he had no wish o separate or distinguish the ist from the physician a8 eo their philosophical or ‘conception of the phenomena of life, This, a the tum of the nineteenth century, anew way of looking at the study of living things, which entailed a new logic, was in fact limited by the traditional association of the standpoint ofthe naturalist with that of the physician, that ofthe in- vestigator with that ofthe healer. Cuvier in his History of ‘the Natural Sciences (sixth lecture) emphasized Aristotle's debt as naturalist to Asclepiades. In the same spirit Chales Singer has written that since Hippocrates was anointed the “iather of medicine,” he might also be called the “father of biology” Since the turn of che ninetenth century, however, de initions of biology’s specific object have been purged of value-laden concepts such as perfection or imperfection, normality or abnormality. Therapeutic intentions, which ‘once informed or, more accurately, deformed, the biolo- ist’ view of laboratory work, have sine been limited 0 the applications of biological knowledge. Hence it would scem that the question of “normality” in the history of biology ought to be classed as a matter of historical rather than curren interest. shall attempt to prove the contrary. “To that end, I direct the reader's attention to the end of the historical process. For contemporary biochemiets, the functions of sel-preservation, slf-reproduction, and self regulation are characteristic properties of microorganisms such as bacteria, The model often proposed by scientists themselves and not just by popularizers of thie work is that of the “fully automated chemical factory”? The or sie functions are acknowledged to be superior to theit technological counterparts in reliability if not infallibilty and in the existence of mechanisms for detecting and cor- recting reproductive erors or flaws, These facts make it reasonable to ask whether there is not some principle of 18 thematic conservation at work in the historical constizu- tion of biology. On this view, which contrasts with an idea [Gf science elaborated by historisns and philosophers in the tera when physics dealt with macroscopic objects, biology {Sliferent from the other sciences, and the history of biol ‘gy ought to reflec chat fact in che questions it asks and the way in which ianrwers them. For the alleged principle fof chematic conservation inthe history of biology is per- haps only a reflection of the biologist’ acceptance in one ‘way or another ofthe indisputable fact that life, whatever Tort it may take, involves sel-preservation by means of self-regulation, Might this be what Fil Radl meant by 8 “biological idea”? Without a doubt the road from Aris: totes entelechy t0 the biochemis’s enzyme is long and winding. Bu sit really a road? SEESSR SSE See eeeR Sees “The fundamental concepts in Aristotle's definition of life are those of soul and organ. A living body is an animate land organized body Ie is animate because itis organize. Tes soul is in fat act, form, and end. “Suppose thatthe eve were an animal—sight would have been its soul. We Just now extend our consideration from the “pars to the ‘hole living body; for what the departmental sense is 10 the bodily part which is its organ, tha the whole faculty fof sense i to the whole sensitive body as such” (De anima TLr q1abs8, J. A. Smith, translator. The organs are the instruments of the soul's ends. “The body too must some how or other be made for the soul, and each par of it for some rubordinate function, to which itis adapted” (De Dartibus nimalire Ls 645b28, William Ogle translator. Its impossible to ovestae the influence of Aristotle's wse cof the ttm organon to designate a functional part (mo- 19 rion) of an animal or vegetal body such asa hand, beak, ‘wing, root, oF what have you, Until atleast the end ofthe cighteenth’ century anatomy and physiology preserved, ‘with all its ambiguities, a term that Aristotle borrowed from the lexicon of artians and musicians, whose use dicates implicit or explicit acceptance of some sor of anal ‘ogy between nature and at, ie and technics As is well known, Aristotle conceived of nature and life as the are of arts, by which he meant a process teeo Topical by its very nature, immanent, unpremeditated, and tundelberated—a process that every technique tends to im- inate and that the ar of medicine approaches most closely ‘when it heals by applying to itself rules inspired by the idea ‘of health, the telos and form ofthe living organism. Ari- totle, a physician’ son, thus subscribed to a. biological nnaturaiem that had ainities with che naturalism of Hippocrates. Lifes teleological process isnot perfectly efficient and infalible, however The existence of monsters (De genera tone animaliu We10) shows that nature does make mis- takes, which can be explained in terms of matters resistance to form. Forms or ends are not necessatily and universally exemplary; a certain deviation is tolerated. The form of an organism is expressed through a cough con- ancy i is whar the organism appears to be most of the time. Hence we can conser a form to be & norm, com: pared to which the exceptional can be characterized as abnormal Descartes contradicted Aristotle's propositions point by point. For him, nature was identical with the laws of ‘motion and conservation. Every ar, including medicine, was a kind of machine-building. Descartes preserved the anatomical and physiological concept of an organ but eliminated any distinction between organization and fa ication. A living body could serv as the model for an au 130 tomaton or vice versa. Yer there was an ambiguity in this reversibility. The intention bebind che construction of an ‘automaton was to copy nature, but in the Cartesian theory of life the automaton served as an intelligible equivalent of ature, In Cartesian physics there is no room for an onto logical diffrence between nature and art. “When a watch indicates the time by means of the wheels of which itis ‘made, that is no less natural than when a particular tree or seed produces a particular fruit” (Principes de la philoso- phie WV.203) Itis not surprising that some historians of biology and medicine place Descartes inthe same group 25 the Ktlian mathematician-physcians inspired by Galileo's mechanics and Sanorias’s medical statics. Yer other historians find this classifation paradoxical, since it makes the reduc- tionist enterprise & part of the history of biology even though its effect was to obliterate that sciences distinctive subject matter—what have been calling is specific objet. ‘To my mind, this rather scholastic distinction is unwork- able, for iis based on an incomplete reading ofthe sources and inadequate attention to certain concepts. Descartes, L Shall argue, did not suoceed in winning adherens to his project or program because he was obliged to incorporate into his definition of le as an aspec of mechanics erin positive atributes that resisted assimilation ro tha view Te begin wit, the Cartesian watch is no less subject to the laws of mechanics if tells the time incorrectly than. if it ells the time correctly (Méiltations métaphysiques ‘Vp, Similarly se no less natural for aman to be sick than to be healthy, and sickness is not 2 corruption of nature {ibid Yet the thirst that drives the vitim of dropsy to Grink is a “veritable error of nature” even though i is an cffect ofthe substantial union of sosl and bods, whose sen- ‘ations, such a8 thitst oF pain, are statistically valid ind ‘ators of things or situations favorable or harmful “to the conservation af the hyman body when i is flly healthy” ar (i, hide is coined ah en of Comer ton uth armen ean whic he men of he Phys ac bel cn oud Caen mecha Script an nll infor ome fen tsa ar aia ew ese aon of ta Sincing brates “ey man cpa of bangs own pysan> Ever for Deca, ie Pesnaon tne pinay die charac Fhe hing ody Aer Deas enh eso the Stach dl ar fre aborted bythe odin Sir ncn et enon by Hoge iocronou pend (067) tothe spl og (tes), When Lionel he ony of See Itoh tial mache” he gy oe Pion and anna bet fa hi Pet Meme oe pati of tana 178, Cartan erp me Brogan ew pposec no ithe metaphor machin” co ay ol ace a oe wich shane cen” wa epee nth eh ‘ith Sry ie soe mayor cone of tlc pow sein ion fc natn a pa enomy pon se) war pc iad ook the well empress a feet ofthe ane fy Like Som ane omy th sn! caomy roe we overeat comple cy ino promt epee SB of ply he of mia ev wh pai fra pal fom te on oa It meine the anton of ori trea a 3 cghnth oma Now he cone of ec Soto nbn Ae Tp ofthe we coc peed byte lice tory of scientific ideas. e 7 aa cr for wired efor o workout ew cone fe er teocan be en ne ren a3 of derivatives ofthe word orgam in Latin, French, and En lish: organization, organized, organic, and organism, to name a few. These were used by both philosophers such as. Gassendi, Locke, Leibniz, and Bossuet and physicians such 5 Duncan and Stahl. Undoubtedly it was Stahl who most stubbornly defended the ireducibilty of the organism, that the ida that a certain order obtains in the relations of the parts of a mechanism to the whole (De diversitate organism et mecanismi, 1706). A living body is both in- steumented and instrumental Is effcient structure (struc- twa, constructio, ordinaio, distrbusio, pat. x9) reveals. cooperation on the part of mediate ot immediate agents. ‘The material constitution of the body is subject co rapid corruption. Stahl observes, however, that disease isan ex: ceptional condition. Hence there must be some power of ‘conservation, some immaterial power ofering active resis- ance to decomposition, permanent ae work in the bodies of living things. Selé-preservation of the organism is achieved as a result not of some mechanical bat of natural “autocracy” (De autocratia natarae, 1696). The importance of Stahlian animism is not to be gauged by the refutation of most of Stahl’ ideas as physi- logy progressed. Assuming that the identification of en- during characteristics of organisms isa lss fragile element of tah’ system than is che atibusion of supposed causes ‘of those characteristic, then Sta left his mark on more than one nineteenth-century biologist. He had his follow- ers in Scotland and England (such as Robert Whyet) and in Germany (suchas Flix Planer) but most of all in France, where the Stalian schoo! in Montpellier, led by T. de Bor- dew and P-J. Barther, inspieed the work of Xavier Bichat. Claude Bernards ertcism of Bichat’vitalsm didnot pre- vent him from acknowledging that is approach to physi- logy owed as much to the reading of Bichat as to the example of Magendie. Death, disease, and the capacity for recovery are the characteristics tha distinguish life from 133 mere existence. “Philosophical physicians and naturalists hhave been deeply struck by the tendency of organized beings to reestablish their form ... and thus to demon: strate their unity, their morphological individuality" (Le- cone sur les phénomones dela vie communs ate animancx ef aux vigétawe, 13t lecture, 1878). The causal theories proposed to explain the reglarty and consistency of oF- fanized phenomena mattered less to Berard than recog: nition of the fact of organization itself “Hence in the animate body there isan arrangement, a sort of ordering, that should not be overlooked, for its erly the most sa- lien trae of ving beings. I admit thatthe idea of this ae angment is ill expressed by the term force. But here the sword is of lte importance; sufce itt say that the reality ofthe fac is beyond dispute."* Ieis not only the history of anatomy and physiology that hogins with Aristotle but also the history of what was Jong called “natural history” including the classification of living things, ther orderly arrangement ina table of simi- lactis and differences, study of their kinship through ‘morphological comparison, and, finally, study of the com- patibility of diferent modes of existence. Natura history ought to explain the diversity of life forms able to coexist in given environment. Linnaeus (1749) referted to this coexistence asthe oeconomis natura ‘The dominant question in the history of natural his tory was that of species. What isthe status of the set of determinants that distinguishes the wolf from the jackal, the buttercup from the rose? Is it nominal or rel? The distinguishing featuees ate enduring traits, yt they do ad mit variations and differences. Hence natural historians were obliged to investigate the conditions under which tunity can subsist within diversity, and chus they were led to explain morphology in terms of genealogy, forms in terms of their modes of reproduction, Accordingly, they showed keen interest in questions of ferry and interfer- tity, hybridization and intersteriy. Inthe eighteenth century the status of species was the foremost problem of the naturalists, as can be seen most clearly of al inthe work of Bulfon and Linnacus. The lat- ter did not experience as much difculty asthe former in Folding thatch species were fixed at creation and perpet- uated from generation to generation. Buffon attempted 10 resolve the problem with hie theory of “internal molds” and “organic molecules” Organic molecules, he main- tained, were indestructible; they survived the proces of = production from generation to generation, accumulating in ‘the bodies of living things in specific forms shaped by in- ternal molds. Te later, determined by the form ofthe or- anism, dictated the way in which the parts had to be arranged in order to form a whole. ‘Consider for a moment the internal mold metaphor. ‘Molds are used in smeling and masonry to impose a cet- tain three-dimensional shape. Erymologically the word is related to modulus and model. In common usage it indi- cates a structural norm, In living organisms, however, the structural norm can accommodate irregularities, to which Bufo refers on more than one occasion as anomalies (étresanomaue). An organie anomaly isnot the same a physical irregularity, however. Inially Buffon conceived of feneration a5 analogous to crystallization, but ultimately he came to think of erystalization as a form of organiza~ tion. He was unable ro avoid associating anomalies with degeneration, hence with the problem of the mutability of species. On this point Buffon was never able to achieve cer- tainty. He did not regard the idea of derivative species as absurd on its face, but he believed or professed to believe that observation confirmed the teachings of the Bible (see his article “The Ass” in the Natural History of Animals). “Maupertuis was bolder in theorizing, perhaps because 13s hae possessed less extensive empirical information. For him, structural variation was the rule of organic progression. In the System of Nature (1751) he set forth a theory of gen- ration based on the existence of elementary particles of mater endowed with appetite and memory, whose “at rangement” reproduces the possibly miraculous structare of the firs individuals (pat. xxi). The phenomena of re- semblance, miscegenation, and monstrosity could be ex- plained, he argued, in terms of the compatibility or incompatibility of arrangements” in seeds mingled through copulation. “Can we nor explain in this way how from just ewo individuals the most disimilar species could have multiplied? Originally chey may have stemmed from fortuitous productions in which the elementary parts did not retain the order they occupied inthe father and mother animals, Each degree of error could have produced 2 new species, and repeated errors could have given rise r0 the infinite diversity of animals that we see today” (par. xlv). Ie is tempting to read this text with spectacles pro- vided by contemporary biochemical and genetic theory. (Order and error occur both here and in contemporary ac- counts of hereditary biochemical defecs as ground and cause of both normality and abnormality. But today bio- chemistry and genetis ofer us a way of interpreting of- zanic abnormalities that was worked out in cooperation with the Darwinian explanation of the origin of species and the adaptation of organisms, Hence Maupertuies propositions should be regarded more as fictions than as Anticipations of scientific theories come. He was unable ‘ocorereome the difculty posed by the natural mechanism for nocmalizing differences. Both he and Buffon believed that human intervention—through techniques of hus Dandry or agronomy—was the only way to stabilize vari ations within species: “Wha i certsin is that any variety ‘that might indicate a new species of animal or plant tends 136 1 die out There ate some deviations in which Natute per- sists only through art or government. Her own works al- ‘ways tend to regain the upper hand” (Venus physique, 2745, part 2, chapter 5, conclsion). It was left to Darwin to discover variation, thats, a natural mechanism for nor smalizing minor anomalies. “The publication of On the Origin of Species by Means lof Natwral Selection; or the Preseration of Favoured Races inthe Struggle for Life (859) occasioned doubts in ‘the minds of some early readers because ofthe traditional meaning of certain concepts mentioned inthe tile and fe- ‘quently alluded to in the body of the work. The theory of ‘natural selection states that certain deviations from the norm can be seen a posteriori to provide a tenuous advan- tage for survival in novel ecological situations. Darwin ‘thus subsiuted a random fi fora preordained adaptation. [Natural selection is eliminative. Disadvantaged organisms dic the survivors ar all dtferen in one degree of another. ‘The reader who takes literally such Darseinian terms a¢ selection, advantage, adaptation, favor, and disfavor may parilly overlook the fact that teleology has been excluded fom Darwin's theory. Does this mean that al value-laden terms have been exchided from the idea of life? Life and deat, success of failure in the struggle for survival—are these value-neural concepts, even if sucess i reduced 10 nothing more than continued existence? Does Darwin's language reveal his thought or does it suggest that even for Darwin a causal explanation of adaptation could not abol- ish the “vital meaning” of adaptation, a meaning deter- mined by comparison of the living with the dead? As Darwin observed, variations in nature would have re- mained without elec, had it not been for natural slec- tion, What could limit the ability of this law, operating cover a long period of time and rigorously scratiizing the structure, overall organization, and habits of every crea- 7 rue, 10 promote good and reject evil? (See Origin of Spe- cies, chapter 14, "Recaptulation, ee) ‘And Darwin's work ends with a contrast “that while this planet has gone circling on according to the fixed law ‘of gravity, from so simple a beginning codless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and ate being evolved.” In suggesting that individual variations, deviations in structure oF instinct, are useful because they yield a sur vival advantage ina world in which relations of organi ‘o organism are the most important of al causes of change in living beings, Darwin introduced a new criterion of nor- malty into biology, a criterion based on the living crea- ture’ relation to life and death. By no means did he eliminate morality from consideration in determining the ‘object of biology. Before Darwin, death was considered to be the regulator ofthe quantity of life (Buffon) or the sane: ‘ion imposed for infractions of Nature’ order, the instru: ment of her equilibrium (Linnaeus). According to Darwin, ‘cording to Schrédinge, “Life is a behavior of matter « based upon the maintenance of a preexisting order” (What Is Lifer, 1945); and according to A. Lwolf, “The biological ‘order has no source other than the biological order” (L’Ordre biologique, 1962). Living systems are open, non- sulibrium systems that maintain their organization both because they are open to the external world and in spite of. being open to the external world.” Organization by what- ever mame one wishes to call it—neyentropy, information, systemic improbabilty —expreses the quality ofa certain physical quantity. That alone slices to distinguish biology from physics, even though the former now seems to have maa linked its destiny to the later. The biologist cannot help continuing to use the concept of normality. Suppose, for ‘example, that one base in the genetic sequence is substi- tuted for another. Lwoff points out that “for che physics, cven ifthe mutation is lethal, nothing has changed. The quantity of negative entropy has not varied. Bur since the ‘mutation is lethal, the transformed organism cannot func tion normally oF reproduce itself. Ie has ceased to live” (ibid). Or think of Léon Brillouin’ related example of a skilful surgeon who is able to separate the organs of an mal, kep them alive, and then reasemble them to cre- ate either a viable being or a monstrous creature that can fot sustain life: *The two reconstrucions ate equally Improbable, but the value ofthe frst is higher than that of the second. Should the definition of total negentcopy be associated with improbabilty or value? Shall we consider 1 monster the equivalent of a ‘well-balanced’ being? Only the notion of vale seems to fi this new problem, but how are we to define i properly? w Perhaps the epistemologist may now be allowed to remain skeptical about dogmatic reductionist views, given what can be learned if we look a the history of biology without any simplifying a priori assumptions and in light of the ‘various manifestations of what Ihave proposed calling the principle of thematic conservation. ‘anticipate one possible objection, however. In look- ing fora distinctive concept of normality in biology, have | not confused the isue by considering different orders of biological objects? Astronomers from Herschel to Hubble “ISoucet Vie, mative, et obsenation (Pars Albin Michel, 195phep.105-—"Teas) 143, revolutionized their dipine by magnifying eee objet to an unimaginable degree, revealing galanes beyond the Solar system and metals beyond the palais. By Seat, biologists have dncovered the nature of ie by Inaking their objets smaller and smal: bacterium, gene, non nthe preceding acusion am eating with ob Servations at on level and explanations at another? Nor tality appears to bea propery ofthe organism, But it disappears when welook a the ements hat make up hat oreanism eal eves howeer, biologi have Henifid onde: ing stroctaes that while generally elable sometimes fal ‘Te concept of normaly i intended to refer to these oF dering stracares, No soch concept needed in the eit mology of physic. By introducing ia hase done hee 1 in no way intend to deny that broly i based on physics td chemist. do intend to preven the coalescing of to propery disincapproachs to history. Inthe history of Erotony the poudothcoreial content of prescient con- ceptulzatons of strtural and fnctonal normality was SBandonedy but the coceptaiatons themseey have icen pressed, in “placed form, a indices of he ob jecve uniqueness ofthe living organ. Mendler e- odie able docs ne jsify Democrtss ition a Posterior, but the dvoding of the genetic rogram does Droid» posterior jsifasion of Clause Berard’ met {hos Even within th terms ofa moms ndeed a mate- ast epistemology physics remain eatialy erent from biology. Physics was produced sometimes a isk of ean iby ving things subject sickness and death, bu sickness and death are not problems of physics. They are problems of biology etween the bacteria in laboratory care andthe biotite who observe them thee 2 whole range of i= ing things pereined vo exit by the fle of narra sl tion Ther lives are governed by conan norms of Behavior 44 and adaptation. Questions about the vital meaning of those norms, though not directly matters of chemistry and physics, are questions of biology. As Marjorie Greene points out, alongside the biochemiss there is room in bil- ‘ogy fora Buytendijk or a Kurt Goldstein? History shows that she ie rght My purpose in this essay was in part 0 show how philosophy can influence the statement of a historical problem, inthis ase a question in the history of biology Ie ‘may be that Iailed to achieve this goal. But Falso wanted to challenge the view tha there is no point in asking such ‘questions, which only complicate matters needlessly. For 1 ‘maintain that the proper function of philosophy is pre- cisely to complicate mane, not only for the historian of Science but for man in general. Geschichte der biologiechen Thorion in de Newel, vl 2.0 2 tered eon (Leng and Beta, 915), peetace, pv uch von den Bologen wurde ein Galle, er Descartes ns Be fguder der neuen Autassung des Leben pepriesn,obwohl 20 Aielbes eine beachtenswerere bilopsche Ide snakes Francois Jacob, La Lopgue du vivant (ats: Gallimard, 1970), pesom 4 GFE Aina Shaner, Le Médecin de soimime (ase: Presse Univcsaiees de eater.) chap ibid. Myton ‘he Unfinished Experiment, 197. Kener me See my Le Normal ele pathologique (acs: Pees Univers $ 45 Though normally 1 would ress che tempeation to read old texts vrih todays eye as sntputions of tims to come, cannot fe isting ow passages from Cuviers Hise des progres des {Goncee manures de ro jsgu' ce jour, 1810 (Nelle edition, ‘Hsah Lifes aconstn turbulence, whose drezion, however Complex ceasne consany, at does the species of molecules ‘Solved, though nr the indvadual molecules themselves. On the “onwarythe matter that presenti const the ving body wll Soon ets to dos, yet the repository ofthe fore that wll nscioin the fare matter to move inthe same direction. Thus the form ofthese Bodies i more essential vo them than thee ma {es forthe later constantly changes, wile the forme I pe ‘ved, and Bocuse rr forms that comstete the dferences ‘tween specs and ne combinations of matte which ate prac ‘aly the same all™(p. 187; aad further: "One mtconstruts te ro ey ning fi Sd a together the element ofthe ving Body. On the conary 82 Spring that constantly moves and tanspre those elements” Bel 3 Jarproaches to Philosophical Biology (New York: Basic Books, 1965) Sources “The essays collected hete originally appeared inthe fellow: ing locations: “The Role of Fpistemology in Contemporary History of Science ‘This text was fst published in alin as “role de episemo logia nella" sorograéa scenes contemporanea® Scinaa + ‘Teinica 76, Aromaro deli Enciclopedia dela Scenes ¢ de ‘Technica Mila Mandadon, 1976) Pps 427438 What Scene cology? Lectre given in October 1969 at Warsaw and Cracow to the astute forthe History of Sclece and Technology andthe Posh ‘Academy of Science. I was published i the oul Organon 7970). John Brown's Sytem: An Exemplary Medical colony ‘This esay expands on brie paper delivered ro che Thirteenth Intemational Congress onthe History of Science m Motsow (13 24 August 1971] under the le "John Brown (1735-1788) La there de Tinablicé de Porgansme et vom importance histo ‘ue Thi prlisinaryveon was pblaed ne proceedings (ofthe Congas section 9 Morse 1974 Bacteriology and the End of Nineteenth Century “Medical Theory” Lecture given in Api 1975 at the Autonomous University of Bat elon, Insitute forthe History of Medic, ected by Prt Felipe Cid 18 “The Development ofthe Concept of Biological Regulation the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Paper delivered tse Colle de France Colloguium in December 19P4 ented “The Ides of Regulason in Contemporary So: nce organized by Mess. Ande Lichnerowie, Jacque Lions, Frans Peroux, and Gilbert Gadolie. fe was peeve pubs lthed in Lite de regulation dans es sciences (Pas: Malone Bn, 7h he fex he At ee expan wih fer fest coacepual advances ia German physiology and sd Sonal nots, (0 the History ofthe Life Science since Darwin Address delivered a he inaugural session ofthe Thiers In- ternational Congress onthe Histor of Since (Moscow, 18-24 ‘August 1972), Ie wae not include in the published congress proceeding ‘The Question of Normal in the Histor of Biological Thought ‘This ee, who opie was sagged tome, i revised version ofa paper Severed tothe jywastys(Fnlnd) Collogui or tamaed in Jone and July of 1975 bythe Fistory and Philos Biristons ofthe Intemational Union forthe Hor and Pos: phy oF Since Index Ackerkneche Es 54 Animal magnetism, 43 ‘con, concep, 6 ‘Animales 35 Adepration ‘imal feoncept of 910 ‘Magendie’s use of 59 Darwte on, 136-257 seganization of, 128 Darwi's theory of to4-205 Animes, 90) 152 Asisew bologieal concep Antotopy, 8x 7, Aoomaber research on, 13 ‘tfon on, 134 ‘Adsiph, EF, nom" genet 49 ‘Alchemy history of 28 Aiens, 6 ‘Alisrnsymbesi of 67 noses Alvomer Coan i ‘Arago, Fangs, #8 ‘Ampere, A.M. 82 Araote ‘Analyt philosophy, x2 ‘holopcal naturals of ‘Ancient medicine concep of economy ad, fcompared with modem, s2 “131 Freudon, $3 dehntion of ie of, 128 Andecony (General, $9 ‘om hierarchies ent of ani Anethona, 60 ‘mals 126 ‘nin Konzen, 67 inoee of, 35,16 Aine, 67.14 ‘on maul soy 33 ‘imal economy, 8788, x52 Aromaticcompounds, 67 ‘imal factory, 88. See aso Aspe 137 “Animal econony ‘athena 3 Animal galenioy 43 ‘athenie dese, 43 Animal machine See alio Asymmetry, 70 “Ania econgery ‘omitm, 3334 loc st mode for, 84 ‘din Roar (Dr), 74 Fepulatos of Lavoisier on, Anenbriget 54 Bn ‘Automata, 1h at regulators governing, 9x Antomats, Cartesian, 96 150 Autopis, 72 ‘Astorepulatr. 98-99 ‘Arey Orwald Theodore, 123 cil Gaon ad concept of “epitemo- ogi break” mathemati framework of ot oso. valid scene, np science, 8 ‘on atonal of color, 68 ‘on seni wath 1 ‘Simmary of eachiags of, ‘Bochelard, Suzanne, 4-5 Bacteology 52-77 Badiache Aral und Soda Fabel (BASF), 67 Bae, Kas Est 90, 36, Balance of nature, 98 Sanichment, 27 Barter, P32 Baten, Wiliam, 105,012 Bayi, Pree, 83 8 Beddoes, Thomas 44 Bee, Gavin de, 9 Eeinog tient Behring EA von, 6 Baldor Berard, 88 Ball Chad, 58 Benen, J.vans 114 Berle Rickard 03, Berard, Claude, 4797-99, oe Bihae, 132 cella state, 24 Concepts in wating of = con diese, 72-73 on mcreetpy, 7 ‘on organization, 133 fn Pasteur 63-64 cn ploehslony, Aa oly of 37 wept by sickest 60-

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