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a. Single bids: 15-Minute bids for different price and quantity pairs
can be entered through this type of order. Partial execution of the
bids entered is possible.
b. Block bids: Relational Block Bid for any 15-min block or series of
15-min blocks during the same day can be entered. Although no
partial execution is possible i.e. either the entire order will be
selected or rejected.
5. The bids so entered are stored in the central order book. The bids entered
during this phase can be revised or cancelled till end of bid call period
(i.e.1200 hrs. of trading day)
Matching
At the end of the bidding session, bids for each 15 minute time block are
matched using the price calculation algorithm. (available in IEX byelaws)
All purchase bids and sale offers are aggregated in the unconstrained
scenario. The aggregate supply and demand curves are drawn on PriceQuantity axes. The intersection point of the two curves gives the market
clearing price (MCP) and market clearing volume (MCV) corresponding
to price and quantity of the intersection point.
MCP and MCV are determined for each block of 15 minutes as a function
of demand and supply which is common for the selected buyers and
sellers.
Selected members are intimated about their partially or fully executed
bids and other trade related information.
By 1300 hrs, transmission corridor required to fulfill successful
transactions are sent to NLDC.
The example below illustrates price calculation. Assume the price tick as below:
For the sake of simplicity we assume only 3 portfolios are entered. The quantity
entered by each portfolio A, B and C for the specific price tick is as shown
below:
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The algorithm will then add the entire purchase quantum and sell quantum after
the bidding session and look for a solution where the net transaction is zero i.e.
the buy quantum is equal to the sell quantum.
1.2.
On the other hand, energy and reserve may be simultaneously procured in the
same auction using a co-optimization algorithm that captures the strong
coupling between the supply of energy and the provision of reserve capacity.
The following illustrative example serves to get a more intuitive understanding
of this coupling.
2.1.
Sequential Settlement
Consider an electricity market that solely includes two power producers, A and
B. Each of these producers runs a power plant with a capacity of 100MW.
Producer A offers to sell energy at $10/MWh, while producer B does it at
$30/MWh. A demand of 130 MWh is to be supplied. Additionally, with the aim
of dealing with unforeseen events, the system operator estimates that 20 MW of
reserve capacity are required. Producer A is willing to provide reserve at no
cost, whereas producer B offers reserve capacity at $25/MW.
To start with, let us suppose that energy and reserve capacity are sequentially
settled in this order. Thus, the energy-only dispatch is first determined as
follows
10 P A +30 PB
Min.
P A + P B=130,
s.t.
0 P A 100,
0 P B 100,
where
PA
and
PB
P A =
PB =
0 R A +25 R B
R A +R B=20,
0 R A 100PA ,
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0 R B 100PB ,
Where
RA
and
RB
and B, respectively. Note that the reserve scheduling takes the energy dispatch
{PA , PB }
= 0 and
RB
capacity in the energy market, reserve needs are entirely covered by producer B.
seq
Thus, the total system operation costs TC , including both the procurement
= $2400
The clearing (marginal) price for reserve capacity is $25/MW, which is the
value taken by the dual variable associated with the reserve requirement
constraint. Therefore, the profits made by producers A and B, respectively,
under the sequential market organization are calculated as follows
profit seq
A =( 3010 ) P A + ( 250 ) R A=$ 2000
profit seq
B =( 3030 ) P B + ( 2525 ) R B =0
2.2.
Simultaneous Trading
Let us now consider that energy and reserve capacity are simultaneously traded
in the same auction. To this end, both commodities are jointly dispatched using
optimization problem below, which minimizes the total system operation costs.
Min.
10 P A +30 PB +0 R A +25 R B
s.t. P A + P B=130,
R A + R B=20 ,
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P A + R A 100, P A 0, R A 0
PB + R B 100, PB 0, R B 0
RB
PA
= 80 MWh,
RA
= 20 MW,
PB
= 50
are calculated as
TC =10 PA +30 PB + 0 R A +25 RB =1080+3050+ 0+0=$ 2300
Prices for energy and reserve capacity, defined as the dual variables of
constraints 1 and 2 respectively, are $30/MWh and $20/MW in that order.
Therefore, the profits made by producers A and B under the simultaneous
market clearing of energy and reserve are given by
profit A=( 3010 ) P A + ( 200 ) R A=2080+ 2020=$ 2000
profit B= (3030 ) PB + ( 2025 ) RB =05050=$ 0
Which turn out to be the same as the profits made by both producers in the
sequential setup However, the simultaneous dispatch of energy and reserve
captures the coupling existing between these two commodities, thus reducing
the total costs by $100 Actually, in this illustrative example, the interaction
between energy and reserve is inferred from the following results
1. Producer A cannot sell as much energy as it might do otherwise. Indeed, this
producer is committed to producing 80 MWh of energy, so that it can provide its
spare capacity (20 MW) as reserve. Reserve requirements are thus satisfied.
2. On the contrary, producer B, which runs a more expensive power plant, has to
produce more energy in order to meet the electricity demand.
3. The price for reserve capacity in the simultaneous arrangement ($20/MW)
does not correspond to any of the reserve offer costs submitted by the
producers. It is, in fact, given by the difference between the marginal energy
costs of producer B ($30/MWh) and A($10/MWh). This is so because a 1-MW
increase of the reserve needs in constraint is covered by producer A. To this end,
this producer must decrease its energy production by 1 MWh, while producer B
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must increase it by the same amount. This action does not involve any
additional reserve cost, but increases the cost of the energy dispatch by $20.
2.3.
Probabilistic Approach
Consider again the electricity market described in Example. Recall that this
market is a duopoly made up of producers A and B, in which reserve
requirements are estimated by the system operator at 20 MW. The reason for
this estimate is that the electricity demand may increase from 130 MWh to 150
MWh without prior notice, and the system operator decides to protect the
electrical infrastructure against this unexpected growth of consumption by
scheduling 20 MW of reserve capacity in advance. The probability of this
happening is, though, relatively small, specifically 0.05. Let us now rethink this
problem using a probabilistic approach. For this purpose, note that, in response
to a sudden increase of load, three different balancing actions may be taken,
namely
1. Producer A may increase its production from
increase
rA
PA
to
RA
P A +r A
. The energy
scheduled beforehand
rB
PB
to
PB +r B
. The
RB
10
10
r A R A , rB R B ,
P A + R A 100,
PB + R B 100, Lshed 20,
P A , PB , R A , R B , r A , r B , L
PA
shed
0,
RA
= 80 MWh,
PB
= 20 MW,
= 50
shed
incurred at the balancing stage. This cost component is, in contrast, ignored in
previous dispatch model
2. The reserve dispatch yielded by market-clearing model is directly determined
based on how valuable this reserve is to consumers by including the cost of the
expected load not served in objective function, where this cost appears as
0.05 ( 10 r A +30 r B +1000 Ls h ed ) . For the particular instance solved above, this cost
s h ed
= 20
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and
s h ed
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positioned with respect to all the sets of input data, but not to any one of them
particularly. As a result of the uncertain input data being described by a
collection of different sets of data, the resulting objective function is uncertain
and needs to be characterized as a random variable. Since such objective
function is not a real-valued function but a random variable, the problem of
establishing a specific objective for the decision-making problem arises. One
alternative is to maximize the expected value of the objective function, other
one, to maximize the expected value of such function but limiting its variance,
etc. Implementing the solution obtained by solving the stochastic problem
above pre-positions the decision-maker in the best possible manner if
considering all possible input data sets duly weighted by their respective
probabilities. This solution is not the best for each individual set of input data
but it is the best if all of them, weighted with their probabilities of occurrence,
are simultaneously considered. The price to be paid for using a stochastic
programming approach is a dramatic increase in the size of the problem to be
solved, which if handled without care may lead to intractability.
Illustrative example from [5]:
An electricity consumer is facing both uncertain electricity demand and price
for next week. For simplicity, we consider that both price and demand are
uncertain but constant throughout the week. Scenario data pertaining to demand
and price are provided in Table. Additionally, this consumer has the possibility
of buying up to 90 MW at $45/MWh throughout next week, by signing a
bilateral contract before next week, i.e., before knowing the actual demand and
pool price it has to face. The decision-making problem of this consumer can be
formulated as a two-stage stochastic programming problem. At the first stage,
the consumer has to decide how much to buy from the contract, and the second
stage reproduces pool purchases for each of the three considered demand/price
realizations (scenarios).
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C
Variable P represents the power bought through the bilateral contract, while
variables
P1
P2
, and
P3
C
P
= 80, P1 = 30, P2 = 20, P3 = 0, which means that, before the week, the
consumer buys 80 MW using the bilateral contract, and during the week, 30, 20
or 0 MW for demands (prices) 110 (50), 100 (46) or 80 (44) MW ($/MWh),
respectively.
3.1.
The proposed pricing scheme is illustrated next using the three-node system
sketched in Fig. 1. Line reactances and capacities are all equal to 0.13 p.u. and
100 MW, respectively. The system includes three conventional generators (G1,
G2, and G3) and one wind power plant (WP). Data for the conventional units
are provided in Table I. Note that, comparatively speaking, unit G1 is cheap, but
inflexible; unit G2 is relatively cheap, but flexible; and unit G3 is expensive, but
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flexible. The wind plant is located at node 2. Its uncertain power output is
modeled by means of three scenarios, which are referred to as medium (35
MW), high (50 MW), and low (10 MW), with probabilities of occurrence equal
to 0.5, 0.2, and 0.3, in that order. The power block offered by the wind producer
is assumed to be equal to its forecasted power production (i.e., 30.5 MW). The
three-bus system also includes an inelastic load (L3) of 200 MW located at node
3, with a value of lost load equal to $1000/MWh [6].
The market is cleared based on this information. Market outcomes related to
dispatched quantities and deployed reserve are collated in Table II. The
scheduled wind power production
balancing prices are shown in Table III. Note that electricity prices are the same
at all nodes in the system, because the network does not become congested in
any of the three considered wind power scenarios. Given the energy and
balancing prices in Table III and the dispatched quantities in Table II, the
payments to market participants per scenario can be computed. For instance, the
payment to generator G3 in scenario low is given by
variable
whose
expected
Generator G3 can be seen then as the marginal unit in a stochastic sense. The
randomness of its profit is inherited from the uncertain character of the reserve
deployment service, which in turn depends on the actual wind power
realization. The proposed market settlement guarantees cost recovery for
generating units in expectation, but this does not prevent generator G3 from
incurring economic losses in scenarios medium and low (see Table IV).
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To reduce the risk of negative profits faced by market participants that are
willing to make real-time adjustments, reserve capacity bids can be introduced
in the proposed market settlement as stated in Section II-A. Consider that
generator G2 offers both downward and upward reserve capacity at a cost of
$1/MW, while generator G3 does it at a cost of $2/MW. Table V shows the dayahead schedule and the real-time redispatch in this case. The wind power
production scheduled at the day-ahead stage is 20 MW again. Likewise, Tables
VI and VII list, respectively, the clearing prices and the profit made by market
participants per scenario and in expectation when the aforementioned reserve
capacity bids are taken into account to clear the market. As an example, observe
that the benefit of generator G3 in scenario low is now given by
40 3040 30=$ 0
capacity bids inasmuch as the provision of reserve capacity does not entail
specific costs to generators. Note, indeed, that generator G3 does not incur
economic losses in any of the three considered scenarios. Furthermore, its
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expected profit is equal to 60, i.e., greater than 0. Therefore, the possibility of
bidding reserve capacity serves to competitively reward the capability of and
the willingness to make real-time adjustments, thus promoting the flexibility of
market participants in an efficient manner.
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4. Case Study 1
The pricing scheme described in Section II-B is further illustrated using a 24bus system based on the single-area version of the IEEE Reliability Test System
1996 [8]. For simplicity, the generating units of this well-known system are
grouped by node and type. The only purpose behind this grouping is to facilitate
the presentation and analysis of the simulation results. Thus, the simplified
system consists of 34 lines, 12 generating units, and 17 loads. On the
assumption of a perfectly competitive electricity market, the energy offers
submitted by generating units represent their marginal costs of energy
production, which are indicated in [8, Table VI]. We assume that nuclear and
hydro power producers offer their energy production at zero prices. The amount
of reserve capacity that each generating unit is willing to provide, either
downward or upward, is listed in Table IX. We assume that the nuclear and
hydro generators are not technically able to provide reserve. No reserve capacity
costs are considered.
Two wind farms comprising 2.5-MW wind turbines Nordex N80/2500 with a
hub height of 105 m are located at nodes 7 and 8. The power curve of this
turbine model is publicly available in [9]. Wind speeds at both wind sites are
described by means of the same Weibull distribution with scale and shape
parameters equal to 9.7 and 1.6, respectively. This probability distribution for
wind speeds, in combination with the considered wind turbine model, results in
a capacity factor for both wind farms of approximately 40%. This capacity
factor has been estimated using the Wind Turbine Power Calculator provided in
[9]. Besides, wind speeds at both wind sites are assumed to be correlated with a
correlation coefficient of 0.5. Correlated samples are then obtained by using the
sampling procedure described in [10]. An original set of 10 000 samples is first
generated and subsequently reduced to 100 by applying the scenario reduction
technique proposed in [11] and [12]. Selecting the right number of scenarios
constitutes a tradeoff between model accuracy and tractability. We believe that
current computational machinery allows considering a large enough number of
scenarios. Note that the number of scenarios should be large enough so that
adding any additional scenario does not change the market outcomes
(preferably) or minimally changes them. We assume that wind power producers
offer their forecast production at zero prices. Note that nowadays this offering
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n w
w
and
n w / w
in that order, irrespective of the node under consideration. These probabilityremoved balancing prices are obtained by dividing each dual variable
its associated probability
nw
by
removed balancing prices are of the same order of magnitude. Further, the
balancing prices so transformed are dual optimal for the real-time market model
that results from problem (1) once the wind power uncertainty is disclosed and
first-stage variables (scheduled quantities) are fixed to their optimal values. On
the contrary, for high enough wind penetration levels, e.g., 26.3%, network
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Observe that all the participants recover their production costs in expectation,
thus making an expected profit greater than or equal to zero. In general, the
Expected profits of conventional producers decrease as they are displaced from
the energy supply by an increasing wind power penetration. Only generating
units 3 and 4 see their expected profit increased due to the fact that they get
more involved in the deployment of reserve with the increment in wind power
penetration.
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4.1.
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2. This pricing scheme is marginal and results in both cost recovery for
producers and revenue reconciliation, both in expectation.
3. Two sets of marginal prices are derived: pool prices that reflect energy
scheduling and balancing prices that reflect system operation.
4. The proposed prices are derived from the solution of an LP problem.
Thus, they are obtained in an easy and robust manner.
5. The pricing scheme described in this paper does not embody nonconvexities (e.g., start-up costs or minimum power output constraints).
Future work is needed to incorporate such non-convexities.
5. Case study 2
Results from a case study based on the single-area version of the IEEE
Reliability Test System1996 [8] are discussed in this section. For simplicity,
generating units are grouped by type and node. This way, just one binary
variable is required to determine the on/off status of each group of units.
Further, the nuclear and hydro generators are considered must-run units. These
simplifications have no purpose other than to alleviate the computational burden
involved in obtaining the results presented in this case study. By appealing to
the assumption that the electricity market is perfectly competitive, offers
submitted by generating units correspond to their marginal costs of energy
production, which are listed in [8, Table 6]. The generation mix of the power
system also includes two wind farms located at nodes 7 and 8. The same
Weibull distribution, with scale and shape parameters, and, equal to 9.7 and 1.6,
respectively, is used to model wind speed at both sites. The two wind farms are
comprised of 2.5-MW wind generators, model Nordex N80/2500 with a hub
height of 105 m. The power curve of this turbine model can be found in [9].
According to the Wind Turbine Power Calculator provided in this reference, the
estimated capacity factor of both wind farms is approximately 40%. We
consider a system demand of 2850 MW, distributed among nodes as indicated in
[32, Table 5]. Loads are assumed to be inelastic. Therefore, the maximization of
the social welfare in the market-clearing formulation [7] boils down to the
minimization of the operating costs.
Next, we suppose a correlation coefficient between wind farms equal to 0.8 and
we assess the impact of the wind power penetration level on LMPs in terms of
means and standard deviations. For this purpose, we use 10000 samples of the
wind farm power outputs in the simulation process. This number of samples is
high enough to provide estimates for means and variances (the square of
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supplied by free wind energy increases, with the consequent sharp decrease in
the means of the corresponding LMPs; on the other hand, the energy supply
from wind sources is inherently uncertain and such an uncertainty is passed on
to the LMPs in the form of a considerable increase of their standard deviations.
In general terms, the impact of a growing wind generation on LMPs translates
into a decrease of their means, but an increase of their standard deviations. For
instance, the coefficients of variation of LMPs at nodes 7, 8, and 20 (defined as
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) go from 0 for a 0% wind
penetration level to 96, 77, and 21%, respectively, for a 50% wind penetration
level.
This subsection is intended to illustrate that correlation among wind sites can
have a significant impact on LMPs and therefore should not be ignored when
assessing the economic repercussions of wind integration. To this end, we
consider that the number of 2.5-MW turbines installed in the wind farms at
nodes 7 and 8 is 140 and 200, respectively. Therefore, the total wind capacity
connected to the power grid is 850 MW, which represents a wind penetration
level of almost 30%. Fig. 3(a) and (b) represents, respectively, the means and
the standard deviations of LMPs at nodes 7, 8, and 20 as a function of the
correlation coefficient between wind farms. The dashed lines have been
obtained by linear regression, and their only purpose is to stress the general
trends exhibited by the simulation outcomes. In accordance with the results
provided in the previous subsection, a wind penetration level of 30% is high
enough to produce eventual network bottlenecks and hence the remarkable
differences existing among means and standard deviations of different LMPs.
Note that the correlation between wind farms has a minor impact on the means
and standard deviations of LMPs at nodes 7 and 20, but a considerable effect on
the mean and standard deviation of the LMP at node 8. In numbers, if the
correlation coefficient is augmented from 0 to 0.95, the mean of such an LMP
experiences a reduction of 10.3%, whereas its standard deviation suffers an
increase of 30.7%. Logically, power output fluctuations from wind farms fed
with uncorrelated winds cancel out and as a result, the overall wind generation
variability diminishes.
Moreover, due to the occurrence of network congestion, which particularly
affects the transmission line connecting buses 7 and 8, the impact of the
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to 23.36% (
=0.95
to 87.7 MW ( =0.95 .
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5.1.
Conclusion
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References
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electricity_market
[2] http://www.iexindia.com
[3]
https://www.borzen.si/en/Home/menu2/Power-Market
Balancing-Market/2Izravnalni-trg-en-US
Operator/The
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