HSBC vs Catalan

Catalan filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages

against HSBank for its alleged wanton refusal to pay her the
value of the HSBank checks issued by Thomson who had
already instructed the bank to clear the said checks. When
Thomson died, Catalan forwarded her demand to HSBC
Trustee which also disapproved her claim without any reason.
Summons for HSBank was served at the Enterprise Tower in
Makati. HSBank filed a motion for extension of time to file
answer or motion to dismiss and then eventually filed a MTD
on the ground of lack jurisdiction on the person of the bank.
Summons for HSBC Trustee was also served at the Enterprise
Tower in Makati. HSBC then filed a Special appearance for
MTD questioning the courts jurisdiction. Both motions were
denied.
Issue: Did the court acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and
HSBC Trustee?
Held:
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. However,
since HSBank initially filed a Motion for extension of time to
file answer or motion to dismiss, it already invoked the
courts jurisdiction over it. The court has held that the filing
of motions seeking affirmative relief is considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In contrast, HSBC
Trustees filing of a MTD cannot be considered a voluntary
appearance for such was a conditional appearance entered
precisely to question the regularity of summons which was
tendered through HSBanks office. Summons was invalid
since it was served at a place where it does not hold office
and it has no resident agent upon whom summons may be
served because it does not transact business in the

Philippines. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over

it.

PCIB vs Spouses Dy Hong, Dy and Chuyaco

Spouses Amadeo are indebted to PCIB as sureties for SCDC.
Before their notes became due, they had nearly all their
properties sold to spouses Dy and Chuyaco. When the notes
became due and remained unpaid, PCIB believing that the
sale was done to defraud creditors, instituted an action for
rescission and damages. Summons was served to spouses
Amadeos. To implead spouses Dy and Chuyaco, PCIB filed a
motion to serve summons by publication but was denied
since the action is in personam and so instead filed an
amended complaint praying for a preliminary writ of
attachment which was granted. PCIB took quite some time to
locate properties against which the writ of attachment could
be enforced and so Spoused Dy and Chuyaco filed a MTD for
failure to prosecute. The court eventually ruled that they
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court and was ordered to file their answers.
Issue: WON there has been a voluntary appearance on the
part of the spouses Dy and Chuyaco as to confer jurisdiction
over their persons.
Held:
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
the only exception being special appearance which must be
done with the objection to the jurisdiction of the in an
explicitly and in an unequivocal manner. The spouses Dy and

Chuyaco have acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court

when they filed their motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute since they did it so without expressly raising the
issue of jurisdiction.

The petitioner is already stopped from questioning the

validity of the respondents motion by reason of his failure to
submit opposition to the said motion when he was given by
the court 5 days to oppose it. The order of the judge on the
said motion was purely interlocutory as it is not a decision on
the merits of the case which he can motu propio could have
rectified anytime.

Cledera vs Sarmiento
The respondents were employees of the government under
the plantilla of personeel of the road and bridge fund budget.
However, a board resolution which abolished the positions of
the respondents was passed and as a consequence they filed
a case for prohibition and/or mandamus seeking to be
reinstated. After the case was submitted for decision, the
respondents filed a motion to re-open the case to allow them
to present additional evidence but it was denied so they filed
a motion for reconsideration, which does not contain any
notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing. The
petitioner on the other hand, failed to comply with the order
of the judge to oppose said motion for reconsideration. Thus,
the case was re-opened and a decision in favor of the
respondents was rendered. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioners but was denied for being pro forma.
Issue: Whether the court erred in considering the motion of
the respondents despite being defective for want of notice
and hearing but denied the petitioners motion for being the
same.
Held:

Vette Industrial vs Cheng

Cheng filed an action for specific performance and damages
against Vette Industrial Sales Co. for breaching their
obligation contained in the Memorandum of Agreement, in
which Vette acknowledged owing Cheng a sum of money for
the company shares he transferred. On the day of the Pretrial, Cheng and his counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear
resulting to the dismissal of the case. It appeared that Atty.
Ferrer was only late for the trial so Cheng filed a motion for
reconsideration. Vette Industrial claims that the motion was
procedurally defective because it was not served three days
before the date of the hearing and that no proof of service
was given to the court, in violation of Sections 4 and 6 of
Rule 15. The trial court granted the motion. Vette Industrial
elevated the case to the CA.
Issue: Was the rule of notice required under Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court violated?
Held:

No. Although the Court has consistently held that a motion

which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece
of paper, there are exceptions to the strict application of this
rule: 1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice; 2. Where the interest of
substantial justice will be served; 3. Where the resolution of
the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; 4. Where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed." When the trial court received Chengs
Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not
immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed Vette
Industrial to file their comment and also leave to file a
rejoinder if Cheng files a reply. Petitioners admitted that they
received a copy of Suis Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration. In fact, they had the opportunity to oppose
the same. Under these circumstances, we find that the
demands of substantial justice and due process were
satisfied.
Sarmiento vs Zaratan
Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against Zaratan in the
MeTC which rendered its decision in favor of Sarmiento.
Respondent filed a motion for the extension of time within
which to submit the requisite memorandum for appeal but it
did not contain a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15.

indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the

Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.24 Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in
the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The
motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of
petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file
Memorandum. The required extension was due to
respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work
due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the
computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was
interposed to delay the appeal. Further, it has been held that
a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the
latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte
motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the
parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the
knowledge of the other party or parties." It has been said
that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in
procedural matters, and also in situations and under
circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule
requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the
resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the
motion."

Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for

extension of time to file memorandum on appeal is fatal.

Marcopper Mining vs Garcia

Held: As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a

party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and
principles of natural justice demand that his right be not
affected without an opportunity to be heard. There are,

Marcopper filed a complaint for quieting of title/reconveyance

and damages against Garcia. The petitioner admitted among
others that it did not file any action for the cancellation of
respondents OCT since they only had the knowledge of such

in 1975. With that admission, the respondent filed a MTD on

the ground among others that the petitioners action for
reconveyance has prescribed since the action should have
been filed within four years from the issuance of the OCT. The
court granted the MTD.
Issue: When the ground for asking dismissal is that the
complaint states no cause of action, must its sufficiency be
determined only from the allegations in the complaint?
Held:
The rule on a motion to dismiss cited by the petitioner, while
correct as a general rule is not without exceptions.
Even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of cause of action will be granted
if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing
facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go
beyond disclosure in the complaint.
In the present case, before the trial court issued the
questioned order dismissing petitioner's complaint, it had the
opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the
answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the
counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. It
was but logical for said court to consider all of these
pleadings in determining whether or not there was a
sufficient cause of action in the petitioner's complaint. The
order of dismissal was in the nature of a summary judgment.

Pacsports vs Niccolo Sports

Pacsports is an exclusive distributor of sports products which
they supply to Niccolo by virtue of their retail agreement.
However, when Niccolos obligation reached 1.5 million, it
pre-terminated the contract which prompted petitioner to file
a case for damages and an application for injunction with RTC
Makati. The respondent, for its part, filed an action for breach
of confirmation of termination of contracts and damages
against petitioner with RTC Quezon City. Both parties filed a
motion to dismiss the action filed against them due to the
pendency of another action filed with a different court.
Makati RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but CA reversed
the decision upon appeal by the respondent.
Issue: Which of the two cases should be dismissed by reason
of litis pendentia the Makati case or the Quezon City case?
Held:
The firmly established rule[1] is that one of two actions will be
dismissed on ground of litis pendentia if the following
requisites concur: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for; and (c) the identity in the two
(2) cases should be such that judgment in one would amount
to res judicata in the other. Undisputably, the parties in the
Makati case and the Quezon City case are the same. The
rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for by petitioner in the
Makati City case and the rights asserted and the reliefs
prayed for by respondent in the Quezon City case are all
based on the validity of the pre-termination of the
Exclusive Retail Agreements. In view of those similarities
in the two actions, a final judgment on the merits in one
would be a bar against the other on the ground of res
judicata.

This Court held in several cases [2] that when the elements
of litis pendentia exist, the action filed later should be abated
to avoid multiplicity of suits. This is based on the maxim Qui
prior est tempore, potior est jure (He who is before in time is
the better in right). This is the general rule.

Sempio vs CA
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land which was
mortgaged to DBP to secure a loan which petitioner failed to
fully pay. Hence, the mortgage was foreclosed and the bank
filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Possession ex-parte,
wherein Tuazon filed a complaint in intervention claiming that
she was the new owner of the land, having bought it from
DBP. Sempio, on its part, filed a complaint for the annulment
of the foreclosure. Tuazon filed a complaint for injunction and
damages to stop Sempio from digging the subject land which
was dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
Issue: Whether there is identity of parties and causes of
action in the petition for writ of possession, complaint for
annulment of foreclosure and the complaint for injuction to
warrant the dismissal of the latter.
Held:
Well-settled is the rule that only substantial, and not
absolute, identity of parties is required for lis pendens, or in
any case, res judicata, to lie.[20] There is substantial identity
of parties when there is a community of interest between a

party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit
the latter was not impleaded in the first case. [21]
It cannot be denied that the interests of respondent
Tuazon are inextricably intertwined with those of the DBP
such that the former's exercise of her rights as purchasertransferee of the land foreclosed by the DBP, is conditioned
on the latter's successful defense of the validity of its
foreclosure procedures. Thus, a community of interest, and
corollarily, substantial identity of parties, exist between
respondent Tuazon and the DBP. That respondent Tuazon was
a mere intervenor in Civil Case No. P-1787-89 should not
preclude us from appreciating the existence of identity of
parties as a requisite of lis pendens because no less
indubitable is the uniform interest of respondent Tuazon as
new owner of the land in both cases. Be it as intervenor
seeking to obtain possession of the land in Civil Case No. P1787-89 or as plaintiff seeking to enjoin others from using
the same and to collect the appropriate damages in Civil
Case No. 681-M-90, respondent Tuazon, in both cases,
asserted what she believed to be vested in her: that single,
indivisible right as exclusive owner of the land.

Peregrina vs Panis
Spouses Sanchez filed a Civil Action for Damages against
Petitioners Peregrina for alleged disrespect for the dignity,
privacy and peace of mind of the Spouses and for alleged
defamation. The parties are neighbors in the same barangay
but no conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon,
for which reason the petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the Complaint.

Before filing an Opposition, Spouses applied for a Writ of

Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, Spouses presented their
Opposition claiming that under Sec.6(3), PD 1508, the parties
may go directly to the Courts if the Action is coupled with
a provisional remedy such as a Preliminary Attachment. The
judge initially dismissed the Complaint for Spouses failure to
comply with the precondition for amicable settlement under
PD 1508. However, on Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge denied the Petitioners Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that under Rule 57, Sec.1 of the Rules of Court,
the application for attachment can be made at the
commencement of the action or any time thereafter.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure

to comply with PD 1508.

Held:
Sec.3 of PD 1508 specifically provides that disputes
between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
Lupon of said barangay. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause
of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The
condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative
remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits
between family members, lacking which, the case can be
dismissed.The parties therein fall squarely within the ambit of
PD 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay and
their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases.
Respondent Judge erred in reconsidering his previous Order
of Dismissal on the ground that the provisional remedy of
attachment was seasonably filed. Not only was the

application for that remedy merely an afterthought to

circumvent the law, but also, a writ of attachment is not
available in a suit for damages where the amount, including
moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated.
Yuvienco vs Dacuycuy
Petitioners own a property in Tacloban City which they intend
to sell for 6.5M. Through a letter, petitioners gave the
respondents the right to purchase the property. Respondents
replied that they agree to buy the property and they will
negotiate for details. Petitioner sent another telegram
informing respondents that their proposal is accepted and a
contract will be prepared. However, respondents filed a
complaint for specific performance because the petitioner
altered the mode of payment of the balance from 90 days to
30 days. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action. The
respondent however, contended that a motion to dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action is deemed an
admission of the factual allegations of the complaint, hence,
petitioner cannot deny, for purposes of their motion, that
such term of payment had indeed been agreed upon.

Issue: Whether a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of

action is deemed to admit the factual allegations of the
complaint.

Held: While such is the rule, it is not applicable where no

absolute acceptance of prospective buyer to buy the
property. The allegations do not detract from the fact that
offer must be certain and acceptance must be absolute and
judging in the light of the telegram reply of the respondents,

there was not an absolute acceptance, hence, petitioners

contention that the complaint of respondents states no cause
of action is correct.

Litonjuas filed a complaint for the accounting of revenues

and damages against the Bank of America for allegedly
inducing them to increase the number of their ships in
operation offering them easy loans to acquire the vessels but
the operations and the funds derived therefrom were placed
under the complete and exclusive control of the bank which
as trustees did not fully render an account of all the income
derived from the operation of the vessels. The defendant
bank filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause
of action because the respondents are mere stockholders of
the corporation which has separate and distinct juridical
personality. The motion was denied by the court. Instead of
filing an answer, the defendant bank went to CA for a petition
for review on certiorari which was also denied. The bank
elevated their petition to the SC.

Issue: Does the denial of the MTD constitute a patent grave

abuse of discretion to warrant the petition for certiorari.

Held:

Bank of America vs CA

It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to

dismiss cannot be the subject of petition for certiorari.
Petitioners should have filed an answer to the complaint,
proceed to trial and await judgment before making an
appeal. As repeatedly held by this Court: An order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject
of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus
except under certain situations such as (a) when the trial
court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b)
where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and
adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly

relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently

mistaken order.
Records show that the trial court acted within its jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed Order denying petitioners motion
to dismiss. In the case at bar, the complaint contains the
three elements of a cause of action. It alleges that: (1)
plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to
demand for an accounting from defendants (herein
petitioners), as trustees by reason of the fiduciary

relationship that was created between the parties involving

the vessels in question; (2) petitioners have the obligation, as
trustees, to render such an accounting; and (3) petitioners
failed to do the same.