boards have provided for the salary of a probation

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

officer at rates not lower than those now provided for

Posted by kaye lee on 1:31 PM

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non
Delegation

of

Legislative

Powers]

appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be

subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the
trial

provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be

court

of

Manila.

He

filed

motion

for

reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all

were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
of United States for review, which was also denied. The
SC denied the petition subsequently filed by CuUnjieng for a motion for new trial

and thereafter

remanded the case to the court of origin for execution

of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application
for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of
CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed
an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an
undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards

of

several

provinces

(sec.

1,

Art.

VI,

Constitution).

determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law

shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If
the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation

officer.

The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a

careful examination of the whole context, is to make
the application of the system dependent entirely upon
the affirmative action of the different provincial boards
through appropriation of the salaries for probation
officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not
one of the provinces and this is the actual situation
now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of
a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would
be illusory. There can be no probation without a
probation officer. Neither can there be a probation
officer without the probation system

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

FACTS:

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a

citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition

constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of

and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing

legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for

the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory

this

void.

Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11

the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in

assistants.

those provinces in which the respective provincial

on Constitutional

reason,

unconstitutional

and

The

Preparatory
Reform (PCCR)

Commission
was

created

by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue

its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds

of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to

of the Office of the President. Being that case,

study and recommend proposed amendmentsand/or

petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest -

revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of

that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the

implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the

judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the

constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds

suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume

that it is a public office which only the legislature can

to make such a representation.

create by way of a law.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS.
MONTE DE PIEDAD

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to
assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in

the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions

HELD:
petition.

provided $400,000 aid as received by the National

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that

Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The

The

Court

dismissed

the

he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a

the

government used the money as such but $80,000 was

government; the injury is fairly traceable to the

left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de

result

of

the

allegedly

illegal

conduct

of

challenged action; and the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining

any

personal

injury

attributable

Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries,

equivalent to the same amount.

to

the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,

not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon

the President has

the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from

encroached upon the legislatures powers to create

before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with

since,

according

to

petitioner,

a public office and to propose amendments to the

Charter

by

forming

the

PCCR. Petitioner

has

this order on the ground that the Governor-General of

indirect,

the Philippine Islands and not the Department of

injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or

Finance had the right to order the reimbursement

sustained

no

direct,

or

even

any

privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,

nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or

because the Philippine government is not the affected

burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,

party. On account of various petitions of the persons,

petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as

the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de

to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore,

a taxpayer is deemed

to

have

Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with

the

standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is

established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It

interest, for the benefit of those persons and their

heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence,
this appeal.

is readily apparent that there is no exercise by

Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR
was created by thePresident by virtue of E.O. No. 43,
as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O.
No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is

authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the
people deposited in respondent bank.

where

only

the

people

are

the

judge.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government

is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against

The people have accepted the Aquino

government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector

of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent

It is not merely a de facto government but in

fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the

legitimacy of the new government.

respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of

supreme power to enforce laws which promote public

The Court further held that:

interest. The government has the right to "take back"

the money intended fro people.

The government has

the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by

virtue of its general superintending authority over the
public interests, where no other person is entrusted
with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was

thereby GRANTED. The

Court

ordered

that

respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs

with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.
LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing

the

basis

of

the Aquino

government

assumption of power by stating that the "new

government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New

Armed

Forces

of

the

Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION

Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion
rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only
by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner
Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his
order
dated
October
23,
1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184,
which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot
1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on
July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of
Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the
lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot
1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing
Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and
Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with
"Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code,
Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3
par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D.

Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

LIANG VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC
of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an office of protocol from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the
case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he
is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the
mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned
provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly
on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the
plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March
6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the
decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil
Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was no longer the
subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to
the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of
this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the
Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been
abrogated because whenever there is a change in the
sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by
Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H,

Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot
partake in any business in connection with this office,
or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The
Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967
from the corporation and sold their respective shares to
3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not
benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as
there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of
the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on
March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9,
1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
USA VS. REYES

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with
immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation
was imperative.
(1)

HELD:
NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in official
capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in
cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.
The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
(1)

Hence, SC denied the petition.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of

CALLADO VS. IRRI

the IRRI as an international organization granted by

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a

Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be

driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI

invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the

vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the

same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on

IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D.

1620."

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary

investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in

Development Department Manager. In view of the

this dispute which arose from an employer-employee

findings, he was charged with:

relationship?

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official

Held: No.

duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

a problem with the car battery, and

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative

proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the

expressly waived by the Director-General of the

charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of

Institute or his authorized representatives.

Termination to petitioner.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor

law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by

Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and

the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI

indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and

enjoys

attorney's fees.

organizations, which determination has been held to be

immunities

accorded

to

international

a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the

not to embarass a political department of Government.

Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue

It is a recognized principle of international law and

of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that

under our system of separation of powers that

it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as

diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question

an international organization in the instant case filed by

and

petitioner, not having waived the same.

determination

courts

should
by

the

refuse

to

executive

look

beyond

branch

of

a
the

government, and where the plea of diplomatic

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor

immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive

Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the

branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is

Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination,

then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of

respondent

immunity," and,

immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal

accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no

law officer of the government or other officer acting

longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

under his direction.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance

and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,

of unimpeded performance of their functions by the

ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set

agencies concerned.

IRRI

waives

its

aside and the complaint dismissed.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal

and an express waiver by its Director-General is the
only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this

benefit things they have confiscated from Base

Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated
by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and

immunity.

food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention Auring

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute
may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.
*MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS. JUDGE
FIRME

*WYLIE VS. RARANG

RARANG

(28

May

1992)

Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams

Respondents:
Nature:

Aurora

I.

Rarang

Petition

Ponente:

for
Gutierrez,

and

the

IAC

review
Jr.

AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was

the assistant administrative officer and Capt. James
Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval
Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang
was employed as a merchandise control guard in the
Office

of

the

Provost

Marshal.

THE POD. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin.

officer, supervised the publication of the Naval Base
stations Plan of the Day (POD), which featured
important announcements, necessary precautions, and
general matters of interest to military personnel. One of
its regular features was the action line inquiry.

THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the

POD published, under the NAVSTA Action Line
Inquiry,

observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the

Merchandise

Control

Division

is

aware

of

this

Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other

wylie v. rarang 209 SCRA 357 (1992)

v.

Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this

malpractice?

*CITY OF ANGELES VS. CA

WYLIE

who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the

the

ff:

Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control

inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own

personnel

are

prohibited

from

appropriating

confiscated items for their own consumption or use.

Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate
area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM
evidence

custodian

controls

access

to

these

containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted

to eat their meals at their worksite due to heavy
workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control
guards procedure or actions may be made directly at
the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and
necessary

action.

Rarang was the Auring referred to here, as she was

the only one with that name in the Office of the Provost
Marshall, and Wylies letter of apology for the
inadvertent publication was also conclusive proof of
this.

AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang

against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval Base. She
prayed

for

damages,

P300K

moral

and

P50K

damages,
attorneys

exemplary
fees.

RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted

false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel

tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation

officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did not

exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule;

intentionally and maliciously cause the publication.

and that the libel was published and circulated in the

Rarang appealed as she wasnt satisfied with the

English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval

award.

Base

personnel.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION: Rarang

WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A

was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K

MOTION

exemplary

TO

DISMISS,

BASED

ON

THESE

damages.

GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their

WYLIE AND WILLIAMS ARGUMENT in this Petition

official functions as officers of the US Navy and are

for Review:

immune

suit;

performance of their official functions as administrative

2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US

assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer (Williams) of

government which cannot be sued without its consent;

the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for

and

their

from

they made the

publication

official

in

the

actions.

3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the

parties.

ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the

published article in the POD. Does the grant of rights,

MOTION

DENIED.

power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases

Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and

THE TCS DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams

torts?

werent official acts of the US government in the

HELD:

YES

and

NO

respectively.

operation and control of the Base but personal and

tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT,

that a sovereign country cant be sued in the court of

QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may

another country without its consent. Thus their acts

not be sued without its consent, now expressed in

werent imputable against the US government but were

Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one

done in their individual and personal capacities. They

of the generally accepted principles of international law

were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and

that we have adopted as part of the law of our land

exemplary damages, and P30K attorneys fees.

under Article II, Section 2Even without such

However, the suit against the US Naval Base was

affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally

dismissed.

accepted principles of international law under the

doctrine of incorporation As applied to the local

BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams

state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the

asserted that they are immune from suit since the

justification given by Justice Holmes that there can be

publication was made in their official capacities as

no legal right against the authority which makes the

law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v.

clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The

Polybank) There are other practical reasons for the

consent of the state to be sued may be manifested

enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign

expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be

state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction,

embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is

the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in

implied when the state enters into a contract it itself

parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign

commences litigationThe above rules are subject to

equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

qualification. Express consent is effected only by the

A contrary disposition would, in the language of a

will of the legislature through the medium of a duly

celebrated case, unduly vex the peace of nations. (Da

enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima) not all contracts

Haber

entered into by the government will operate as a

v.

Queen

of

Portugal)

waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits

between its sovereign and proprietary acts (US v.

against the state without its consent, it is also

Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the

applicable to complaints filed against officials of the

government, suability will result only where the

state for acts allegedly performed by them in the

government is claiming affirmative relief from the

discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the

defendant.

(Lim

v.

Brownell)

judgment against such officials will require the state

itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM

such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay

SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of the

the damages awarded against them, the suit must be

US, the customary rule of international law on state

regarded as against the state itself although it has not

immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-

been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In

US

Bases

Treaty

such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that it has been filed without

The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon to

its

support their position that they are not suable, the US

consent.

not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal

emphasized

that

in

Baer,

the

Court

held:

prerogative of dishonesty because of the privilege it

grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it

The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of

by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair,

a foreign state without its consent is appropriate

at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an

insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the

unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its

starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision.

citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does

In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release

not say the state may not be sued under any

of petitioners confined by American army authorities,

circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the

Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it

state may not be sued without its consent, which

was explicitly declared: It is well settled that a foreign

army, permitted to march through a friendly country or

the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim

to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or

that they are also insulated from suit in this country

sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal

merely because they have acted as agents of the US

jurisdiction of the place. Two years later, in Tubb and

in the discharge of their official functions. There is no

Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on Raquiza v.

question that the US, like any other state, will be

Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works

deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it

of the authoritative writers Accuracy demands the

has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private

clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-

capacity. It is only when the contract involves its

American

Military

Bases

Agreement,

treaty

sovereign or governmental capacity that no such

provision

should

control

on

the

waiver may be implied In the words of Justice

such

the
matter,

assumption being that there was a manifestation of the

Vicente

Abad

Santos:

submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign

power whenever appropriate. More to the point is

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from

Syquia v. Almeda Lopez It was the ruling that

being sued in the courts of another State without its

respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the

consent

action must be considered as one against the U.S.

consequence of the principles of independence and

Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor

equality of States. However, the rules of International

continued: It is clear that the courts of the Philippines

Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing

including the Municipal Court of Manila have no

and evolving. And because the activities of states have

jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer.

multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-

The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and

between sovereign and governmental acts (jure

interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.

imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts

Government has not given its consent to the filing of

(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now

this suit which is essentially against her, though not in

extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive

name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen

application of State immunity is proper only when the

filing a suit against his own Government without the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of

latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action

the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or

against

said

economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be

governments consent, which renders more obvious

said to have descended to the level of an individual

the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The

and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its

principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and

consent to be sued only when it enters into business

of

contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates

such

foreign

general

government

acceptance

that

without

we

deem

it

the

or

waiver.

exercise

of

This

its

rule

is

sovereign

necessary

unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.

to

functions.

The above observations do not confer on the US a

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver

blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in

they have acted in the discharge of their official

functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this

been the recipient of commendations by her superiors

is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may

for honesty in the performance of her duties.

not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion

that their acts are imputable to the US, which has not

PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams

given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants

actively participated in screening the features and

are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in

articles in the POD as part of their official functions.

which the US itself is not involved. If found liable, they

Under the rule that US officials in the performance of

and

their official functions are immune from suit, then it

they

alone

must

satisfy

the

judgment.

should follow that they may not be held liable for the
SUMMARY OF

THE

EVENTS.

The

POD

was

questioned

publication.

published under the direction and authority of the

commanding officer. The administrative assistant,

BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN

among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and

THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged

distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is

tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our

a regular feature of the POD , which was to provide

laws and, we presume, those of the US dont allow the

personnel access to the Commanding Officer on

commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and

matters they feel should be brought to his attention for

these arent covered by the immunity agreement.

correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the

action line naming Auring was received about 3

CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity

weeks prior to the articles publication. It was

from suit of public officials is applicable here: the

forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the

general rule is that public officials can be held

response included a short note stating that if the

personally accountable for acts claimed to have been

article was published, to remove the name. This note

performed in connection with official duties where they

was forwarded to the executive officer and to the

have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad

commanding officer for approval. The approval of the

faith A mere invocation of the immunity clause does

commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the

not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically

Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A

dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Pea, Chief Justice

clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant

Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity

prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the

accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Exec.

administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the

Order

No.

as

follows:

POD but failed to notice the reference to Auring in the

action

line

inquiry.

First, the main opinion does not claim absolute

immunity for the members of the Commission, The

As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and

cited section provides the Commissions members

appropriating confiscated items, she was investigated

immunity from suit thus: No civil action shall lie against

by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had

the Commission or any member thereof for anything

done or omitted in the discharge of the task

publication was sent to the commanding officer for

contemplated by this order. No absolute immunity like

approval and he approved it. Art. 2176 prescribes a

that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for

civil liability for damages caused by a persons act or

himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is

omission constituting fault or negligence. Fault or

understood that the immunity granted the members of

negligence in this Article covers not only acts not

the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable

punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,

magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth

whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.

and the States exercise of police power was immunity

Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that moral damages

from liability for damages in the official discharge of the

may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other

task granted the members of the Commission much in

form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in

the same manner that judges are immune from suit in

these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty

the official discharge of the functions of their office.

party moral damages for injury to his feelings and

reputation in addition

Immunity

from

suit

cannot

institutionalize

to punitive

or exemplary

damages

irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a

privileged status not claimed by any other official of the

ULTRA VIRES ACT CANT BE PART OF OFFICIAL

Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as

DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the

Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or maliciously

POD is a defamation against Rarangs character and

conspir(es)

in

reputation. Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the

persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an

Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion

evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latters

of the name if the article was published, but they were

constitutional rights and liberties, there can be no

negligent because under their direction they issued the

question that a complaint for damages does not confer

publication without deleting the name. Such act or

a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The

omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official

actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the

duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and

Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against

as a result she suffered besmirched reputation, serious

public

anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,

with

the

officers

or

PCGG

commissioners

private

citizens

alike.

specially so, since the article was baseless and false.

ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is

Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities,

far removed in the chain of command from the

are

liable

for

the

damages

they

caused.

offensive publication and it would be asking too much

to hold him responsible for everything which goes

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

wrong

questioned decision and resolution of the IAC are

on

the

base.

AFFIRMED.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS
CASE NO. The records show that the offensive

MERRIT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.

FACTS:

RULING:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant

that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an

No, the Government is not legally-liable for the

damages incurred by the plaintiff.

ambulance of the General Hospital struck the plaintiff

in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion,
the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to
Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the
left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in
the back part of his head, while blood issued from his
nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks
revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain had suffered
material injury.

It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate
to extend the Governments liability to any cause not
previously recognized.
That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case,
the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to

Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiffs leg

showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a
curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at
the point of the fracture. Examination of his head
revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the
brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got
from the collision disabled him to do this work as a
contractor and forced him to give up contracts he
recently had.

the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or

omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently,
the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the
said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an
official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort

committed

by

an

agent

or

employee

of

the

Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the

Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting
therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act
No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit
against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General
to appear in said suit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government is legally-liable
for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only

liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from

must be reversed, without costs in this instance.

given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the
causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p.
50.)

Whether the Government intends to make itself legally

liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued

the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but
to no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to

restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.
779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.

negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative

enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the
courts.
*USA VS. RUIZ
Doctrine: implied consent

Issue/s:

Date: May 22, 1985

Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United

States of America had a naval base in Subic,
Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States.

Held:

US invited the submission of bids for Repair

offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation,
submitted bids and complied with the requests based
on the letters received from the US.

respondent.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the

Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company
did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of

America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The
complaint is to order the defendants to allow the
plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the
event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The
company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the
projects.

WON the US naval base in bidding for said

contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity

The defendants entered their special

appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject
matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the
individual defendants as agents of defendant United
States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned

orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil
Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private

Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts
a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign &
governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they

are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or

business purposes.

community as a whole are largely benefited by the

correct test for the application of State

immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State
but the legal nature of the act

only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which

*FONTANILLA VS. MALIAMAN

services the agency renders, but these functions are

is the irrigation of lands.
The NIA is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the

Facts:

government. It is not a mere agency of the government

The National Irrigation Administration (NIA)

but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.

maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily

Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages

proprietary functions but

caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its

is an

agency of

the

government tasked with governmental functions, and is

therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo
Garcia, who was not its special agent.

whether NIA is performing governmental

functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its
special agent
Held:
No. The functions of government have been
into

governmental

or

constituent

and

proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the

exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory;
the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional. The
functions of providing water supply and sewerage
service are regarded as mere optional functions of
government even though the service rendered caters
to the community as a whole and the goal is for the
general interest of society.
The NIA was not created for purposes of
local government. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the government
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare,
such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely
a government-function corporation. NIA was created
for

the

*MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL VS. FERNANDEZ

*MINISTERIO VS. CFI

Issue:

classified

special agent.

purpose

of

constructing,

improving,

rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation

systems in the Philippines, including all communal and
pump irrigation projects. Certainly, the state and the

FACTS: Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with

the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13,
1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a
registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square
meters,
alleging
that
in
1927
the
NationalGovernment through
its
authorized
representatives took physical and material possession
of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue, a national road,Cebu City, without paying just
compensation and without any agreement, either
written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated
demands for the payment of its price or return of its
possession,
but
defendants
Public
Highway
Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to
restore its possession. It was further alleged that on
August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of
Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the
reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00
per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00.
Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30,
1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in
the alternative, either the restoration of possession or
the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents,
through the then Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied
upon was that the suit in reality was one against
the government and therefore should be dismissed, no
consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969,
the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect:
"That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot
647-B of the Banilad estate described in the

Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more

particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters;
That the National Government in 1927 took possession
of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the
widening
of
Gorordo
Avenue;
That
the Appraisal Committee of Cebu
City approved
Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price of Lot
No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No.
647-B is still in the possession of the
National Government the same being utilized as part of
the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the
National Government has not as yet paid the value of
the land which is being utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on January
30, 1969 stating that the case is undoubtedly against
the National Government and there is now showing
that theGovernment has not consented to be sued in
this case. The petitioners appealed by certiorari to
review the decision and contended that they are
entitled for just compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1
(2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of
Cebu
to
dismiss
the
complaint
by
reason Government immunity from suit correct?
HELD: NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot be an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely
there was a failure on what the law requires and the
petitioners has the right to demand from
the Government what is due to them. The Supreme
Court decided that the lower courts decision of
dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings
in accordance with law.

G.R. No. 147589 (Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party

v.s. Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party, et. al.)
and G.R. No. 147613 (Bayan Muna v.s. COMELEC)
were consolidated. Both petitioned under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court challenging Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785 issued by COMELEC on March 26, 2001,
which approved 154 party list organizations in the 2001
party list elections. Petitioners seek disqualification
because the respondents represented the mainstream
or overrepresented sectors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution 3785, a
mechanism to provide a proportional representation is
constitutional?
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held that under Sections 7
and 8, Article IX-C of the Constitution, (political) parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
However, these parties must be consistent with the
provisions laid down in the Constitution and RA 7944.
Proportional
Representation
refers
to
the
representation
of
the
marginalized
and
underrepresented sectors as exemplified in Section 5:
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, woman,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National

Board

of

Canvassers,

made

partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list

elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their

*SBMA VS. COMELEC

seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

*EVARDONE VS. COMELEC

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for

PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE
*ang bagong bayani-ofw labor party vs. comelec
FACTS:

legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall

come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI,
1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List

participate in the party-list elections or is the said

System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of

elections limited to sectoral parties.

the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be

entitled to one seat;

ISSUES:

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the

2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3

seats in the lower house?

seats

this

is

pursuant

to

the 2-4-6

rule or

the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans

Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list

representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a
seat valid.

for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

The Barangay Association for National Advancement

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to

and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,

participate in the party-list elections.

questioned the proclamation as well as the formula

being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit

invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its

Rule) is valid.

provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional

seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further,

the

2%

rule

creates

mathematical

impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed

by the Constitution.

HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner:
for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling

shall be not more than 250 members of the lower

or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%

house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from

qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would

legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list

be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-

representatives.

lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a

allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership

new computation(which shall be discussed in the

of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional

HELD portion of this digest).

legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can

However,

the

Constitution

also

be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list

district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule

candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule

or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for

(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of

party-list representatives.

whether or not major political parties are allowed to

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the

number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats

formula:

as long as the two percent threshold is present.

(Current

Number

of

Legislative

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold

DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of

presents

an

unwarranted

obstacle

to

the

full

Seats Available to Party-List Representatives

implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution and prevents the attainment of the

Hence,

broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or

group interests in the House of Representatives.

(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total
number of the members of the lower house. However,
it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list

garners 2% of the votes cast, then it isguaranteed a
seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists
garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional.

rules:

There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be

lists

ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the

which

garnered

2%

of

the

votes

cast

are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less

number of votes they garnered during the elections.

than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold

creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving

80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.

seat each.

Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100

participants in the party list elections. A party that has

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,

two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets

according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be

a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first

entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total

50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get

number of votes until all the additional seats are

a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of

allocated.

the operation of the two percent threshold, this

situation will repeat itself even if we increase the

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled

available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we

to not more than three (3) seats.

increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the

maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed

seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for

allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote

reserved under the Party List System less the

garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional

guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in

seat

the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing

for a rounding off of fractional seats.

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed

allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists

so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which

which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called

means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2

the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The

seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that

total number of seats given to these two-percenters are

BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats

then deducted from the total available seats for party-

because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having

lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%

more than 3 seats.

each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists

hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please
refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their

guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall

the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the

be

voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are

used

in

the

second

round,

particularly, in

determining, first, the additional seats for the twopercenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes
cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for
party-list representatives.
How is this done?

occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued
to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list
elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party

that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution

and multiply it against the remaining number of seats.

or from RA 7941 against major political parties from

The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the

participating in the party-list elections as the word

additional number of seats allotted for the party list

party was not qualified and that even the framers of

but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately

allowed major political parties to participate in the

Example:

party-list elections provided that they establish a

sectoral wing

which

represents

the

marginalized

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest

(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate

total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes

opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that

cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of

the Constitution precisely because it is the people who

ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the

people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the

2.

The factors to be considered by the court in

determining whether a case presents a political
question are:
1.

party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to

Is there a textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department (i.e. foreign
affairs or executive war powers)?

ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list

Is there a lack of judicially

discoverable and manageable standards for

system.

resolving the issue?

BAKER VS. CARR

2.

3.

without an initial policy determination of a

kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.

Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County,
Tennessee. Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the

4.

redistricting according to the federal census every 10

years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state,

The impossibility of a courts

undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect
coordinate branches of government.

Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint

alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn
its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the
Tennessee State Constitution which required

The impossibility of deciding the issue

5.

due

Is there an unusual need for

unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made?

6.

Would attempting to resolve the matter

asserted that the demographics of the state had

changed shifting a greater proportion of the population

create the possibility of embarrassment

from multifarious pronouncements by

to the cities, thereby diluting his vote in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

various departments on one question?

Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections,
and sought the remedy of reapportionment or at-large
elections. The district court denied relief on the
grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political
question and would therefore not be heard by the
court.
Issues
1.

Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a

constitutional
challenge
to
a
legislative
apportionment?

2.

What is the test for resolving whether a case

presents a political question?

Holding and Rule (Brennan)

1.

Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a

constitutional
challenge
to
a
legislative
apportionment.

The political question doctrine is based in the

separation of powers and whether a case is justiciable
is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to
foreign relations, if there has been no conclusive
governmental action regarding an issue then a court
can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding
the dates of the duration of hostilities, when there
needs to be definable clarification for a decision, the
court may be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did
not present a political question. The case did not
present an issue to be decided by another branch of
the government. The court noted that judicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause were well
developed and familiar, and it had been open to courts
since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to
determine if an act is arbitrary and capricious and
reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed with
any of the other two branches of the government, it
presents a political question and the Court will not

answer it without further clarification from the other

branches.

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby

empowered

to

make minor

adjustments of

the

reapportionment herein made.

*MONTEJO VS. COMELEC

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the

FACTS:

debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District

the transfer of one municipality in a district to another

of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of

district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a

Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting

substantive one. Minor adjustments does not allow the

certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the

change in allocations per district.

principle of equity of representation. Petitioner now

seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse

First District to the Second District of the province.

of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it

promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see

Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition

the below table for the population distribution, census

praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa

1990 and 1994:

from the First District to the Second District of the

province of Leyte is denied.
Census 1990

First District

303, 349

Second District

272, 167

Third District

214, 499

Fourth District

269, 347

Fifth District

309, 148

*MARCOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,

established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant

ISSUES:

Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her

college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now
Divine

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate

Resolution No. 2736

Word

University

also

in

Tacloban.

Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still

in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in

HELD/RULING:

his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954,

she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in

Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which
states:

was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was

registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,

when

Marcos

won

presidency,

they

lived

in

Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban

Miguel Manila.

became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law

She served as member of the

Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila

when her father brought them to Leyte;

during 1978.
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position

removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of

of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the

abandoning the former residence and establishing a

1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent

new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.

Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a

In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile

candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for

of origin should be deemed to continue.

Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission

on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands

constitutional

The

domicile because the term residence in Civil Law

petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven

does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When

months under residency, which she sought to rectify by

Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she

adding

kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new

the

requirement

words

"since

for

residency.

childhood"

in

her

Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on

home and not domicilium necessarium.

March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained

Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

She

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after

arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact

her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one

that she became a resident of the Municipality of

only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon

Tolosa in said months.

returning to the country clearly indicated that she

chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year

of choice.

To add, petitioner even obtained her

residency requirement to be eligible in running as

residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while

representative of the First District of Leyte.

living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the

domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept

HELD:

close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,

celebrating

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for

election purposes.
conclusion

her

birthdays

and

other

important

milestones.

The court are in favor of a

supporting

petitoners

claim

of

legal

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner

residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte

possesses the necessary residence qualifications to

despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in

run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the

the district for the following reasons:

First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned

Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May

25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for

quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial

Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who

became an American citizen, can still be considered a

*BENGZON VS. HRET

natural-born Filipino
Philippine citizenship.

upon

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue

HELD: petition dismissed

in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement

that no person shall be a Member of the House of

YES

his

reacquisition

of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may

however reacquire the same in the manner provided by

was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985,

however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and

law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which

Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former

without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,

took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a

citizen:
1.

Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under

CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which

2.
3.

Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired

(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his

**

citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or

accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by

by
by
by

direct

naturalization,
repatriation,
act
of

and
Congress.

country.

those
who
lost
their
citizenship
due
to:
1.
desertion
of
the
armed
forces;

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in

World
War
II;

Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization

as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at

any
other
time,

in the U.S. Marine Corps.

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship

through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who

Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,

or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the

lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as

a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he

United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as

the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in

was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his

Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former

the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson

who was then running for reelection.

status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A.

No.

2630

provides:

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto

Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine

citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting

was not qualified to become a member of the HOR

since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under

commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,

or after separation from the Armed Forces of the

Article

United States, acquired United States citizenship, may

VI,

section

of

the

Constitution.

reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of

In addition, the Court held that the Speech and

Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution did not protect respondents for
defamatory statements they made or might
make.

That meant that the libelous remarks made by

respondents in followup telephone calls to
executive agencies, and in the television and
radio interview, were not protected.

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and

registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in

CONCLUSION

accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is

deemed to have recovered his original status as a

The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment

and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth

as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine

*PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

citizenship.
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a
*HUTCHINSON VS. PROXMIRE

full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff research scientist appealed the grant of
summary judgment for defendants, a senator and his
assistant, from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in an action for libel, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, interference with
contractual relations, and infringement of plaintiff's
rights
of
privacy,
peace,
and
tranquility.

national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory

CASE
FACTS
Plaintiff was a research behavioral scientist who
studied emotional behavior in monkeys. Most of his
research was funded by government grants.
Respondents were a United States Senator and his
legislative assistant. Respondent senator awarded
plaintiff the Golden Fleece Award for presenting an
egregious example of wasteful governmental spending.
Respondents publicized the award through telephone
calls, radio and television interviews, and newsletters.
Plaintiff filed his action for libel, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with contractual
relations, and infringement of his rights to privacy,
peace,
and
tranquility.

been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable

DISCUSSION

rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The

accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed

to

fully

discharge

the

duties

of

Congressman, including attendance at legislative

sessions and committee meetings despite his having
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.

Reversing the district court and the appeals

court, the United States Supreme Court held
that plaintiff was not a "public figure," and
therefore the "actual malice" standard did not
apply to him.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and

members of the House of Representatives arises from
a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege

cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its

countered and they requested the said adjournment to

terms. It may not be extended by intendment,

be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and

implication or equitable considerations.

he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why

he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11,
Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime

followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then

stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was
so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the

punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is

session in order not to paralyze the functions of the

not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional

Senate.

foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend

deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads

congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5

Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the

days or more in a week will virtually make him a free

Senate President. This was unanimously approved and

man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.

was even recognized by the President of the

Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-

Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of

appellants status to that of a special class, it also

office

would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction

warrantoproceeding before the SC to declare him as

system.

the rightful Senate President.

*AVELINO VS. CUENCO

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada
invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next
session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session
for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by
Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other
Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory
and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering
his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were
being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out
of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the
session due to the disorder. Sanidad however

Taada was

thereafter.

subsequently

Avelino

then

recognized

filed

to

a quo

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of

the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they
cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of
the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the
Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case,

Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been

what will be the resolution?

elected just the same inasmuch as there would be

eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

There is unanimity in the view that the session under

Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino

session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et

on March 14, 1949)

al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other

(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the

resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

SC take cognizance of the case and that they are

The answer might be different had the resolution been

willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC

approved only by ten or less.

whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that

there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto

elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are

was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.

absentee senators; one being confined and the other

abroad but this does not change the number of

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a

senators nor does it change the majority which if

continuation of the morning session (presided by

mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half

Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was

of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12

there a quorum constituting such session?

senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there

The second session is a continuation of the morning

was no quorum.

session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to

journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in

assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of

session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).

subsequent events which justify its intervention. The

Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the

Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys

Senate

the

pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,

Constitution declares that a majority of each House

under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the

shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean

constitutional requirement in that regard has become a

all the members. Even a majority of all the members

mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that

constitute the House. There is a difference between a

any new session with a quorum would result in

majority of all the members of the House and a

Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the

majority of the House, the latter requiring less number

Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,

than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all

has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing

the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes

compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino

constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of

group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos

a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not

persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional

constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the

processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the

arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one

Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the

of

twenty

three

senators.

When

had been so arrested, there would be no doubt

requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys

Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were

ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with

twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a

the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco

majority.

has been legally elected as Senate President and the

petition is dismissed.

*SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

the

then

Commissioner

of

the

Commission

of

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided

Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the

that the majority of all the members of the National

application for legalization of the stay of about 32

Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the

aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted

fact

the

with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act

Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each

No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The

House shall constitute a quorum to do business,

legalization of such is also a violation of Executive

shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution

Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of

to base the majority, not on the number fixed or

disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago

provided for in the Constitution, but on actual

were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two

members or incumbents, and this must be limited

other criminal cases were filed against Santiago.

to actual members who are not incapacitated to

Pursuant to thisinformation, Francis Garchitorena, a

discharge

death,

presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a

incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the

warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned

house or for other causes which make attendance

for provisional liberty since she was just recovering

of

even

from a caraccident which was approved. In 1995, a

through coercive process which each house is

motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the

empowered to issue to compel its members to

suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by

attend the session in order to constitute a

then.

quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made

President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office

for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for

for 90 days.

that

the

said

provision

their

member

duties

was

by

concerned

amended

reason

of

impossible,

in

considering the use of the words of all the members

as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5
(5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so
as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of each House. Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the

The

Sandiganbayan

ordered

the

Senate

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order

suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that
each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings,

punish

its

Members

for

disorderly

behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all

its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty

of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still

days.

the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a

senator?

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent

that the public officer concerned must be suspended

public officer against whom any criminal prosecution

only in the office where he is alleged to have

under a valid information under this Act or under Title

committed the acts with which he has been charged.

7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office

offense involving fraud upon government or public

would indicate that it applies to any office which the

funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex

officer charged may be holding, and not only the

offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode

particular office under which he stands accused.

of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended

from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment,

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged

he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under

crime, can she still be suspended?

any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to

reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused

he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the

must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding

meantime administrative proceedings have been filed

before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it

against him.

contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength

of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA.

gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his

3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to

continuance in office could influence the witnesses or

discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The

pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records

suspension contemplated in the above constitutional

another evidence before the court could have a valid

provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon

basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the

determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as

trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is

the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite

adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or

distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of

regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that

RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,

he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary

preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the

investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not

latter

constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory

is

not

being

imposed

on

petitioner

for

misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic

Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its

quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3,

coverage

Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

the

members

of

Congress

and

that,

therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus

decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

*CASCO CHEMICAL VS. GIMENEZ

Facts

of

the

Case:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the

In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the

SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the

manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding

lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood

LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect

producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation

of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw

COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of

materials in the production of the said glues. They paid

P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and

in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the

three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)

Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of

P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner

sought the refund of the first and second sum relying

the 6 senator members from partaking in the said

upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of

said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the

interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that

separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is

exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro

play and due process imperatively require the mass

Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the

said refund on the ground that the exemption granted

election protest on the ground that all of them are

considerations of public policy and the norms of fair

disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed

disqualification,

Abbas

suggested

the

following

by the board in not in accord with the provision of

section
2
of
RA
2609.

amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring

Issue

Case:

resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that

Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by

law from the payment of the margin fee.

where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the

of

the

Held:

the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of

remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not

less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.

No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee.

Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the

Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which

is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners

petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of

contends that the bill approved in Congress contained

the conjunction and between the terms urea and

only three Members who would remain, all Justices of

that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the

formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the

manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter.

this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and

the intent of the House of Representatives in passing

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be

the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of

the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.

given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost

against the petitioner.
*ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its

composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec.

17.

The

Senate

and

the

House

of

Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal

which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of their

Sampayan vs. Daza

213 SCRA 807

respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be

composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction

election contests and
qualifications
members of Congress

Remedies against a disqualified House of

Representative candidate: (1) cancellation
of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC
before election; (2) quo warranto case filed
with HRET after proclamation

Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members

of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the

over
of

party-list system represented therein. The senior

Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

FACTS:

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed

Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza,

then incumbent congressman of their congressional
district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the
functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza
has not by any act or declaration renounced his status
as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution
(section
18,
Article
III).

by both Justices of the SC and Members of the

Senate, the Constitution intended that both those
judicial and legislative components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to
the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be
misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of
the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a
case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is

Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying

the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United
States as evidenced by a letter order of the
US Immigration
and
Naturalization
Service,
Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status
when he returned to the Philippines on August 12,
1985.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Daza should be

disqualified as a member of the House of
Representatives for violation of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code

that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot

legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
*SAMPAYAN VS. DAZA

RULING:
The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case,
first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident
from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his
position asCongressman for the duration of his term of
office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,

1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully

pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section
17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification
of
its
members.

the basis of the rule on proportional representation of

each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no
other manner of application. The problem is what to do
with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the

The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been

to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate
ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case
with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days
after Dazasproclamation.
*GUINGONA VS. GONZALES

parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was

composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD

senators,

and

LP-PDP-LABAN

senator. To suffice the requirement that each house

must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators
of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce
7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LPPDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,
nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDPLABAN should represent the same party to the CoA.
This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by
Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members
of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-

Commission on Appointments to less than their

proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission

be

based

on

the

proportional

representation of the political parties. The election of

Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS

NUCD or the NPC. A party should

have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senatorsmembers in the CoA. Where there are more than 2
parties in Senate, a party which has only one member
senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to
resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other
in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with
the other party.

LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

member

of

compromise.

LAKAS-NUCD,

opposed

the

said

He alleged that the compromise is

against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in
determining a partys representation in the CoA.

*GUINGONA VS. GONZALES

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was
composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD

senators,

and

LP-PDP-LABAN

senator. To suffice the requirement that each house

must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that

agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators

each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on

of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators

elected. The results of such a formula would produce

and reduced the representation of one political party

7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5

either the LAKAS

members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-

have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-

PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader,

members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2

nominated 8 senators from their party because he

parties in Senate, a party which has only one member

rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-

senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to

LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA.

resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other

This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by

in order to come up with proportional representation

Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members

especially since one party may have affiliations with

of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-

the other party.

NUCD or the NPC. A party should

LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

member

of

compromise.

LAKAS-NUCD,

opposed

the

said

He alleged that the compromise is

against proportional representation.

*GUZMAN VS. COMELEC

*CHONGBIAN VS. ORBOS
*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in

determining a partys representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that
each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no
other manner of application. The problem is what to do
with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other
partys fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latters representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer
in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission

be

based

on

the

proportional

representation of the political parties. The election of

Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP

*IMMIGRATION SERVICE VS. CHADHA

Brief Fact Summary. Chadha was
student who had overstayed his
deportable. The Attorney General
deportation. The House passed a
Chadha should be deported because
the
hardship

an East Indian
visa and was
suspended his
resolution that
he did not meet
requirement.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The one-house veto

violated Article I, Section: 7, the Presentment Clause,
because a bill must be presented to the President to
sign or veto, and it violated Article I, Section:Section: 1
and 7, bicameralism.
Facts. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of a
provision in Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act authorizing one House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive
Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The Immigration Naturalization Service (INS)
suspended Chadhas deportation. A year and a half
later the House passed a resolution to veto the
suspension. Because the resolution was passed
pursuant to Section 244(c)(2) it was not treated as an
Article I legislative act. As a result, it was not submitted
to the Senate nor was it presented to the President for
action. Chadha appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The INS agreed with
Chadhas position before the court of appeals and

joined him in arguing that Section 244(c)(2) was

unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order
Chadhas
deportation.
Issue. Is it constitutional for Congress to statutorily
authorize a one-house veto of a decision the Attorney
General made, under authority delegated to him by
Congress, to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States?
Held. Chief Justice Burger opinion. No. The court of
appeals
decision
is
affirmed.
Congress first argued that Section 244(c)(2) was not
severable. Therefore, if that provision was
unconstitutional than the whole statute was, and then
the Attorney General could not suspend Chadhas
deportation order. He would lack standing because he
would receive no relief from an order declaring Section
244(c)(2) invalid. The Court pointed out that Congress
itself had provided for severability in Section 406 of the
Act.
Even if this law or procedure were efficient, convenient
and useful in facilitating functions of government, that
alone would not save it if it is contrary to the United
States Constitution. The very structure of Articles I, II,
and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers.
The Framers ranked other values higher than
efficiency. They sought to define and limit the exercise
of the newly created federal powers affecting the states
and
the
people.
The one-house veto violated Article I, Section: 7, the
Presentment Clause, because a bill must be presented
to the President to sign or veto. The Presentment
Clause is an effort to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident
or
ill-considered
measures.
The one-house veto was unconstitutional because it
violated Article I, Section:Section: 1 and 7,
Bicameralism. The Framers were trying to balance the
legislative process. The Presidents participation was to
protect the Executive branch from Congress and to
protect the whole people from improvident laws. The
Attorney General is part of the executive branch. When
Congress is vetoing his decision, they are encroaching
upon territory reserved for the Executive branch. Both
Houses had to vote on the bill because splitting the
legislative power means it will be exercised only after
opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings.
This action was legislative in character and effect
because it was to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization, it altered the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons, including the Attorney General,

executive

Branch

officials

and

Chadha.

Dissent. Justice White and Justice Rehnquist

dissenting.
J. White: Todays decision eliminates over 200
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a
legislative veto which is more efficient. The Courts
decision fails to recognize that the legislative veto is
not the type of action subject to the bicameralism and
presentment
requirements
of
Article
I.
J. Rehnquist: Congress could not have intended the
one-house veto provision to be severable from the rest
of the statute. They never intended to permit
suspensions of deportation unless they could retain
some
sort
of
veto.
Concurrence. Justice Powell concurring. The case
should be decided on a narrower ground. For example,
Congress may not encroach the Judicial branch
because it is a judicial function to determine whether a
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria
for permanent residence.
Discussion.
J. Burger presents the same argument that J. Black did
in Youngstown, just because something is useful, does
not
mean
it
is
constitutional
The Court in Mistretta v. United States held that the
Court would uphold statutory provisions that to some
degree commingle the functions of the branches, but
that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or
encroachment.
The dissent by Justice Scalia in Mistretta stated that
the Commissions guidelines are laws, since any judge
that disregards them will be reversed. Congress cannot
create an agency that has no governmental power
other than to make laws, because only Congress can
make laws under the Constitution. The court upholding
a pure delegation of legislative power has encouraged
Congress to delegate its lawmaking powers frequently
in the future, particularly over no-win political issues.
Congress could have said that they are giving the
Attorney General a discretionary power and because
discretionary
powers
are
really
Congresss
responsibility, they are putting strings on that power. If
Congress does not like what the Attorney General does
in a given case then they can override it. So, the case
can either be that Congress is giving the executive
power, creating a power which would have a life of its
own, but the nature of the power is limited. Therefore
they are not really taking anything away from the
Attorney General and it is not aggrandizement. If
Congress could not use a legislative veto, then they
might not pass on the power at all.

*GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount
to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD
No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds
For
The
Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of
the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being
higher than the budget for education, therefore it is
against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority
to
education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget
for
education.

process Congress appropriated an amount for debt

service bigger than the share allocated to education,
the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
*MCCULLOCH VS. MARYLAND
Facts
Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all
banks operating in Maryland not chartered by the state.
The statute provided that all such banks were
prohibited from issuing bank notes except upon
stamped paper issued by the state. The statute set
forth the fees to be paid for the paper and established
penalties for violations.
The Second Bank of the United States was established
pursuant to an 1816 act of Congress. McCulloch (D),
the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the
United States, issued bank notes without complying
with the Maryland law. Maryland sued McCulloch for
failing to pay the taxes due under the Maryland statute
and McCulloch contested the constitutionality of that
act. The state court found for Maryland and McCulloch
appealed.
Issues
1.

Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though

that power is not specifically enumerated within
the Constitution?
2.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided

only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation,
that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is
not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit
standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the

Does the State of Maryland have the power to

tax an institution created by Congress pursuant
to its powers under the Constitution?

HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV
of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign
the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Does Congress have the power under the

Holding and Rule (Marshall)

1.

Yes.

Congress

has

power

under

the

Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the

Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section
8).
2.

No. The State of Maryland does not have the

power to tax an institution created by Congress
pursuant to its powers under the Constitution.

The Government of the Union, though limited in its

powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its
laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in

the Constitution which excludes incidental or implied

the possible violation of the law in the case with regard

powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope

of the Constitution, all the means which are appropriate

to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

and plainly adapted to that end, and which are not

prohibited, may be employed to carry it into effect

Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its

pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on

investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before

The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct

sovereign power or end of Government, but only the

it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of

means of carrying into effect other powers which are

sovereign. It may be exercised whenever it becomes

Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their

an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers

granted to the federal government under the U.S.

unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case

36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez.

rights to due process, and that their testimony may
before the Sandiganbayan.

Constitution. If a certain means to carry into effect of

any of the powers expressly given by the Constitution
to the Government of the Union be an appropriate
measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from

of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion,

not of judicial cognizance.

the matter.

testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of

The Bank of the United States has a right to establish

its branches within any state. The States have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to impede or in any

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for

manner control any of the constitutional means

employed by the U.S. government to execute its

requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in

powers under the Constitution. This principle does not

extend to property taxes on the property of the Bank of

The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for

the United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary

interest which the citizens of that State may hold in this

TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in

excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the
civil case.

institution, in common with other property of the same

description throughout the State.
*BENGZON
COMMITTEE

VS.

SENATE

BLUE

RIBBON

FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin
Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes
and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a
speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the
case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid
legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is
beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners'
right to due process.

"takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First

Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by
Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into

RULING:

investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives

of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the

Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Constitution provided for an elaborate system of

Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the

checks and balances to secure coordination in the

province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

workings

of

the

various

departments

of

the

government. The Court has provided that the allocation

of constitutional boundaries is a task which the

3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry

judiciary

Constitution.

on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan

Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political

Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39)

question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to

corporations

judicial

The

Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted

jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has

pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly,

been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that

Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,

obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although

neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are

said provision by no means does away with the

connected with the government but are private citizens.

must

perform

determination

of

under

the

the

rival

claims.

belonging

to

Benjamin

"Kokoy"

applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."

The Court is thus of the considered view that it has
jurisdiction over the present controversy for the

4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the

purpose of determining the scope and extent of the

rights of persons appearing in or affected by such

power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to

inquiries shall be respected.

conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of

It should be emphasized that the constitutional

legislation.

restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of

investigations where a violation of a basis rights is
claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket

2. No.

prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations

because he is already facing charges before the

is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate

Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows

Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of

him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating

Legislation.

the

question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal

implementation or re-examination of any law or in

his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness

connection with any proposed legislation or the

stand completely.

Such

inquiries

may

refer

to

formulation of future legislation. They may also extend

to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in

*ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of

Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress

Administration,
and

bought

two

Tambobong

estates
for

the

known

as

sums

of

legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within

Buenavista

the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the

P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000

was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt

sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,

aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the

thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as

afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date

represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates

he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.

respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the

Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he

original owner of the estate. He bought the first from

deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and

San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the

that on the same occasion he drew on said account

Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was

two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to

not able to pay the necessary amount of money to

the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the

complete his payments. As such, his contract with said

Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000

owners were cancelled.

payable to cash, which he himself cashed.

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company

It was the desire of the committee to determine the

sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate

ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave

to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute

rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name

deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000.

the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a

The

the

resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this

Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of

resolution which brought him to jail and is being

Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as

contested in this petition.

Philippine

Government

then,

through

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine

National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,

ISSUES:

accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the

1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for

latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person

to

whom

he

gave

the

P440,000.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its

2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for

Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to

contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative

investigate the transactions surrounding the estates.

session,

The special committee created by the resolution called

3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects

and examined various witnesses, among the most

the petitioner from being questioned.

which

ended

on

May

18,

1950.

important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing

question which the committee sought to resolve was

HELD:

the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the

1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to

Governments paying to Burt the total sum of

be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,

P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in

the investigating committee has the power to require a

the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited

witness to answer any question pertinent to that

anyway long before October, 1949. The committee

inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right

sought to determine who were responsible for and who

against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the

benefited from the transaction at the expense of the

jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be

Government.

material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it

vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to

transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000

expel a Member; and every question which the

to a representative of Burt in compliance with the

investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to

latters verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon

answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of

which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of

the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the

that person might incriminate him.

question must be determined by its direct relation to

the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation
to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself
are determined by the sum total of the information to
be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by
a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is
no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt

in

cases

where

that

power

may

constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond
its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the
witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the
witness to the important question, which is the name of
that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were
obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the
Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew
the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave
P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony
which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a
refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so
punishable. Since according to the witness himself the

*THE PRIZE CASES

Brief Fact Summary. Union ships pursuant to
President Lincolns April 1861 Order declared a
blockade of southern ports seized ships carrying goods
to
the
Confederate
States.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. It is the Congressional
prerogative to declare war under Article , Section: 8,
Clause 11. However, the President has the ability to
take action when attacked.
Facts. In April 1861 President Lincoln declared a
blockade of southern ports. Pursuant to this blockade
in May and July 1861, Union ships seized Confederate
merchant vessels and cargoes of foreign neutrals and
residents of the southern states. The ships were
condemned by federal court order. The owners of the
ships
and
cargo
appealed.
Issue. Did President Lincoln have the authority to
institute a blockade of southern ports?
Held. Justice
Grier.
Yes.
By the Acts of Congress of 1795 and 1807, the
President is authorized to call out the militia and use
the military and naval forces of the United States in
case of invasion by foreign nations and to suppress
insurrection against the government of a state or of the
United
States.
Even if it was necessary to get Congressional sanction
for the existence of war Congress did approve of the
Presidents actions by the Acts they passed in 1861,
which allowed the government to prosecute the war
with vigor and efficiency. In 1861, Congress approved,
legalized and made valid all acts, proclamations and
orders of the President as if they had been done under
the previous express authority and direction of the
Congress. Therefore even if he needed Congress to
ratify his actions, they did so and therefore cured any
defect.
Discussion. The majority opinion held that the
President could resist an attack by a foreign nation.
The fact that the attack in this case came from an
internal part of the Union rather than from a foreign
power does not eliminate the Presidents power to take
action.

*TECSON VS. COMELEC

also drawn from the presumption that having died in

1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification
in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino
citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was
a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of
the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court
may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions
qualification

of

candidate

for the

presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are

held.
"Rules of

the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in

connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution, refers

to

contests relating

to

Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954

was presumed to be the place of residence prior his
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan--respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son
to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the
respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent

Ruling:
regarding

in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence,

the

election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or

"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme
Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in
holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondents birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

was born only before the assailed marriage had no

bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
*POE VS. ARROYO
Facts: During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections,
Arroyo was declared as the candidate who garnered
the most number of votes for the presidency while FPJ
followed in the second place. July 23, 2004 FPJ filed

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather

Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was

an election protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal

contesting the votes of Arroyo. On December 14, 2004,
the Protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment

at

St.

Lukes

Hospital.

E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the

referred to as the incumbent president.

protestant who died during the pendency of the latters

presidential
Held:

protest

NO.Rule

14.

case?
Election

ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.

Protest.

HELD: No. Bermudezs allegation of ambiguity or

Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-

vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly

President of the Philippines who received the second

gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and

or third highest number of votes may contest the

election of the President or the Vice-President, as the
case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)

common public knowledge that the Constitutional

Commission refers therein to incumbent President
Aquino and Vice-President Laurel, and to no other

winner.

persons, and provides for the extension of their term to

Since in this case, no real parties such as the vice-

noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization

presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come

of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited

forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the

section provides for the holding on the second Monday

deceased protestant, the petition must be dismissed.

of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the

days

after

the

proclamation

of

the

President
*IN RE: BERMUDEZ

and

Vice-President

under

said

1986

Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the

government of President Aquino was likewise sought to

Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the

validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article
XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which

be questioned with the claim that it was not established

pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were
dismissed outright by the Supreme Court which held
that: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their

provides in full as follows:

petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of

the incumbent

the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It

President and Vice-President elected in the February

belongs to the realm of politics where only the people

7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of

of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have

elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

made

Sec.

5.

The

six-year

term

of

the

judgment;

they

have

accepted

the

government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-

effective control of the entire country so that it is not

President under this Constitution shall be held on the

merely a de facto government but in fact and in law a

second Monday of May, 1992.

de jure government. Moreover, the community of

nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present

Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear

government.

as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court to declare

and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President

Corazon

Aquino

and

Vice

President

Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand

*US VS. NIXON

Brief Fact Summary. The special prosecutor in the

Watergate scandal subpoenaed tape recordings made
of President Nixon (the President) discussing the
scandal with some of his advisers. The President
claimed executive privilege as his basis for refusing to
turn

over

the

tapes.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although a President

deserves great deference regarding his Article II
constitutional privilege, that privilege is not absolute
and must be balanced against other constitutional
interests.
Facts. The
scandal

special prosecutor

subpoenaed

the

in

the

tape

Watergate

recordings

of

conversations involving the President and his advisers

regarding the scandal. The Presidents counsel moved
to quash the subpoena citing Article II of the United
States Constitution (the Constitution) and its grant of
privilege to the President. The Presidents counsel also
argued it was a non-justiciable question because it was
a disagreement between parts of the executive branch.
Issue. Is

the

Presidents Article

II

constitutional

privilege absolute?
Held. The

Presidents executive

privilege

is

not

between the President and Congress, something the

Supreme Court is loath to do.
*CLINTON VS. JONES
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones
Corbin (Respondent), filed a complaint containing four
counts

against

the

Petitioner,

President

Clinton

(Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted

sexual advances towards her when he was the
Governor
Synopsis

of
of

Rule

of

Arkansas.

Law. The

United

States

Constitution (Constitution) does not automatically grant

the President of the United States immunity from civil
lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to
his official duties as President.
Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the
Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted
sexual advances towards her when he was the
Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions
asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds
of presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent
from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential
immunity argument, but held that no trial would take
place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme
Court),
which
granted
certiorari.

Amendment 5 requirements of speedy and fair trials

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a

lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred
before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?

and of the ability of defendants to face their accusers.

Held. Affirmed.

Courts are not required to proceed against the

The President of the United States can be involved in a

President as if the President was any other individual.

lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his

absolute and must bend to Amendment 4 and

Courts should review communications claimed to be

privileged in camera (by the judge only in chambers).
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) had to balance the executive
privilege against the rights of citizens to face their
accusers and to have a speedy and fair trial. The Court
made the point that the President is not a normal
citizen, and therefore should receive great deference
regarding executive claims of privilege. However,
executive privilege is not absolute and must be
balanced against the right of the accused in criminal
proceedings. The Court took great care to limit its
opinion because it was delving into a political dispute

official

duties

as

President.

It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to

order a stay of this lawsuit until after the Presidents
tenure. The District Courts decision to order a stay
was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay
takes no account whatsoever of the Respondents
interest

in

bringing

the

suit

to

trial.

Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil

lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public
duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that
ordinary case-management principles were likely to

prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits,

unless supplemented with a constitutionally based
requirement that district courts schedule proceedings
so as to avoid significant interference with the
Presidents

ongoing

discharge

of

his

official

responsibilities.
Discussion. A sitting President of The United States
does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on
the Presidents private actions unrelated to his public
actions as President. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all
private actions against the President until he leaves
office. The doctrine of separation of powers is
concerned with the allocation of official power among
the three co-equal branches of government.
*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
*MYERS, ADMINISTRATRIX VS. UNITED STATES
Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of
the first class in Oregon was forced to resign.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution grants to
the President the executive power of the governmenti.e., the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment
and removal of executive officers-a conclusion
confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed; that article 2 excludes the
exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide
for appointments and removals, except only as granted
therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that
Congress is only given power to provide for
appointments and removals of inferior officers after it
has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their
appointment in other authority than the President with
the Senates consent; that the provisions of the second
section of article 2, which blend action by the
legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the
executive, are limitations to be strictly construed, and
not to be extended by implication; that the Presidents
power of removal is further established as an incident
to his specifically enumerated function of appointment
by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such
incident does not by implication extend to removals the
Senates power of checking appointments.
Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get
the Senates permission to remove the postmaster of
Portland, Oregon. That individual had been appointed
with the Senates advice and consent. The President
asked for the individuals resignation without consulting
the Senate first, and the Senate refused the President
permission
to
do
so.
Issue. [W]hether under the Constitution the President
has the exclusive power of removing executive officers

of the United States whom he has appointed by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States
(the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded opinion,
examining the legislative and adjudicative history of
executive appointments, including Marbury v. Madison.
It concluded that Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far
as it attempted to prevent the President from removing
executive officers who had been appointed by him by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was
invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same
effect was equally so. Dissent. Justice McReynolds
found that it is impossible for me to accept the view
that the President may dismiss, as caprice may
suggest, any inferior officer whom he has appointed
with consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive
inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review of
precedent.
Justice Brandeis felt that the central issue was May
the President, having acted under the statute in so far
as it creates the office and authorizes the appointment,
ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision
which prescribes the condition under which a removal
may take place? Justice Holmes emphasized the fact
that the office was created by Congress.
Discussion. To hold [an opposite rule] would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or
other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.

*OPLE VS. TAGLE

lawmaker. Congress has the exclusive constitutional

*THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE

power to make laws necessary and proper to carry out

the powers vested by the constitution in any officer

Facts: In the latter part of the Korean war, labor

thereof. Thus, this order is unconstitutional.

disputes led to a threatened strike by the steel workers.

President Truman issued an executive order directing

7. Concurrence Reasoning: [Frankfurter] felt that the

the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills and

situation was more complicated and flexible. However,

keep them running. The Secretary issued orders to the

in view of the Taft-Hartley act, congress has expressed

presidents of the steel companies, directing them to

its will to withhold this power from the president in

keep the mills open. The next morning, the President

cases like this. In effect, the Congress has said, ask

sent a message to Congress reporting his action and

for seizure power from us if you feel it is needed in a

promising to abide by their decision either way.

specific situation. [Jackson] felt that the presidential

Congress took no action. However, there was evidence

powers were not fixed, but rather fluctuate, depending

that Congress disapproved of allowing the President to

on their congruence with Congress. There are three

exercise such power because a few years prior, they

categories: 1. where the president is acting pursuant to

removed a clause from the Taft-Hartley act that would

an express or implied authorization of Congress -

have given the President power to seize an industry in

broadest powers, limited only by the Constitution, 2.

case of national emergency.

where

the

president

is acting in

the

face of

Congressional silence - more narrow powers limited by

3. Procedural Posture: The trial court issued a

the zone of twilight where there may be overlap with

preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from

congressional powers, and 3. where the president is

continuing possession. The court of appeals stayed the

acting in opposition to Congress - most narrow powers,

injunction. The Supreme Court accepted the case

supported only by his expressly granted constitutional

promptly due to the importance of the subject matter.

powers, and then still limited by any overlap Congress

may have [Congress will is dominant in case of

4. Issue: Whether the president had the power under

overlap]. This order falls into the third category, and

these circumstances to seize the steel mills of the

since there is no express authority, it must fall, even

country.

when it may be otherwise justified by emergency.

5. Holding: No.

8. Dissent Reasoning: The president has some power

6. Majority Reasoning: There is no express power in

the Constitution supporting the presidents actions. The
government claims that the power should be implied
from the aggregate of the presidential powers under
the Constitution. However, the order can not be
sustained under the power of the Commander in Chief
of the armed forces because that power is reserved for
military commanders in the theater of war and is not

under the constitution to meet a critical situation in the

absence of express statutory authorization. Looking at
history

(particularly

WWII),

there

were

several

instances when the president made similar orders. The

fact that Congress and the courts have consistently
recognized and given their support to such executive
action indicates that such a power of seizure has been
accepted throughout our history.

broad enough to cover the situation here. This is a job

for the nations lawmakers, not the military authorities.

*GONZALES VS. NARVASA

Also, the presidents power to see that the laws are

FACTS:

faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a

citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition

and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing

is readily apparent that there is no exercise by

the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory

Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR

Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of

was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43,

the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and

as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O.

assistants.

The

Constitutional

Preparatory

Reform

on

No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for

was

by

its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds

President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of

of the Office of the President. Being that case,

Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study

petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest -

and

and/or

that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the

revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of

judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the

implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the

suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume

constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds

to make such a representation.

recommend

(PCCR)

Commission

proposed

created

amendments

that it is a public office which only the legislature can

create by way of a law.

*GORDON VS. JUDGE SANTOS

ISSUE:

*LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to

assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office

of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The

HELD:

appointment was described as permanent but the

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires

CSC approved it as temporary, subject to the final

standing only if he can establish that he has suffered

action taken in the protest filed by the private

some actual or threatened injury as a result of the

respondent and another employee.

allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury

is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the

Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent

injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

better qualified than the petitioner for the contested

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in

position and, accordingly directed that the latter be

danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to

the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case
since, accordingto

petitioner,

the

President

has

encroached upon the legislatures powers to create

a public office and to propose amendments to the
Charter
sustained

by

forming
no

direct,

the
or

PCCR. Petitioner
even

any

has

indirect,

injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or

privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,
nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or
burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as
to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

appointed to said position in place of the petitioner

whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private
respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor
Duterte, the new mayor.
The

petitioner,

invoking

his

earlier

permanent

appointment, questions the order and the validity of the

respondents appointment.
Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

the

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not

standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is

temporary but permanent and was therefore protected

established that public funds have been disbursed in

by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that

alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It

it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it

Furthermore,

a taxpayer is deemed

to

have

was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and

Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison

call it temporary.

due to the unconstitutionality of Misonsappointment.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides

that the Commission shall have inter alia the power
to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service .and

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of

bureaus

neededconfirmation by

the

Commission

on Appointment.

disapprove those where the appointees do not

possess

appropriate

eligibility

or

required

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers

removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers

qualifications.

needing confirmation by
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing

the

appointment

in

the

light

of

the

the

Commission

on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there

are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups are:

requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is

qualified and all the other legal requirements are

First, the heads of the executive departments,

satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,

the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

naval

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment

because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the city mayor.

captain,

whoseappointments are

and

other

vested

in

officers

him

in

this

Constitution;
Second,

all

other

officers

of

the

Government

whose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by

SARMIENTO VS. MISON

law;

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution.

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by

In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the

law to appoint;

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then

president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the

Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers,

Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

and

professors

of

constitutional

law

questioned

the appointment of Mison because it appears that

Misonsappointment was
Commission

not

submitted

on Appointments(COA)

for

to

the

approval.

Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads

of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.

The first group above are the only public officers

appointed

by

the

president

which

requireconfirmation by the COA. The second, third,

and fourth group do not require confirmation by the
COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau
of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he

Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo

does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of

*DRILON VS. LIM

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality

of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.

The

requirements

are

upon

approval

of

local

development plans and public investment programs of

LGU not to tax ordinances.

7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions

1.

contrary to law and public policy.

*LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO

RTCs Ruling:

Facts:

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and

sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of
the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution.
Petitioners Argument:

1.

The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that

the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code
had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified
true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

2.

Grounds of non-compliance of procedure

a.

No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of

Local Government Code

b.
c.

Not published
Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Courts Argument:

1.

found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control
but supervision.
Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if
not followed order the act undone or re-done.
Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3.

occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land

was a forest zone which was later declared as an
agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer
who asserted his claim over the same piece of land.
The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The
Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition
hence it was elevated to the Office of the President.
Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred
that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already
conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that
the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue
delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts,
does

Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null

and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions

not

contain

any

provision

whereby

the

presidential power of control may be delegated to the

Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act personally
upon the matter.
Issue:

Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the

constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What he

2.

Magallanes was permitted to use and

whether or not the power of control may be

delegated to the Executive Secretary and whether it
can be further delegated by the Executive Secretary
Held:
The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all
executive departments. Thus it is, that department

(2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its

heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to

enactment but were followed.

appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them

at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,

modify or reverse the action taken by his department

President and take- over reigns of government as clear

secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the

and present danger.

President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision

of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be

On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017.

stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes

upon the President's power of control over the

Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP

executive departments. And control simply means "the

1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give

power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set

full

aside what a subordinate officer had done in the

determining the necessity of calling out the AFP.

discretionary

powers

to

the

President

in

performance of his duties and to substitute the

judgment of the former for that of the latter."

However despite the contentions of the Solicitor

General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood

It is correct to say that constitutional powers

there are which the President must exercise in person.

mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms

to show disgust.

Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief

Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary

At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered,

acts which the Constitution does not command that he

which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on

perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view.

PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event

The President is not expected to perform in person all

where the President was invited. The next morning

the multifarious executive and administrative functions.

after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was

The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary

found inside the campus.

unit which assists the President. The rule which has

thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional
setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in
behalf and by authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even
reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands,
may issue.

PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information

that PNP- SAF members are planning to defect from
the

administration,

while

on

the

same

view

Congressman Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring

down the Arroyo Administration.
Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide
critical mass and armed component to Anti- Arroyo
protests.

*DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell

sites in Bulacaan and Bataan was also considered as

During the celebration of People Power I, President

an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP

Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP

1017 and GO 5.

1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national

emergency. The President also issued General Order

Because of these incidental series of events which

(G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

clearly presents a critical situation, President Arroyo

cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I.

The President stated that over the past months,

Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced

elements in political opposition have conspired with

that warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be

extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and

implemented.

military adventurists, which caused her to declare such

order. The President considered aims to oust the

Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of

Congress, which is entirely different from the martial

Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor

law.

due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in

the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and

As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of

Abante-- all local news publication, took place which,

Randy David, the Court considers those actions

according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong

unlawful based on the fact that it violates the

presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do

constitutional mandate of freedom of expression.

anything that would help rebels in bringing down the

government.

Police

also

arrested

Congressman

Crispin Beltran, who then represented the Anakpawis

Party.

*OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by

Issue:

military personnel and they were placed in Camp

Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians.
Presidential

They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of

Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional? Whether or

explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to

not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily

assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy

Whether

or

not

the

issuance

of

Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional?

to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,

Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to

Ruling of the court:

assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and

Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)

Respondents claim that such petition is moot and

academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the

attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro

Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver;

Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic

and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,

case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the

controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that

petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition

the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which

for prohibition and habeas corpus.

calls for military aid.

Most people then equate it to martial law, but such
case is different wherein the basis then was the 1973
Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus

be granted.

President may summon armed forces to aid him in

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become

supporting lawless violence.

moot and academicbecause by the time the case

reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were

The President's declaration of state rebellion was

merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a
public moment of interest. State of national emergency,
however, is the prerogative of the President. Her

already released from military confinement. When the

release

of

the

persons

in

whose

behalf the

application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is

exercise of emergency powers such as the taking over

effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ

of privately owned utility requires delegation from the

becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the

herein petitioners have been released from their

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint

confinement in military detention centers, the instant

visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on

Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus

should

be

dismissed

for

having

become

moot

and academic. But the military court created to try the

civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1,

case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still

Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

continues to subsist.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a

established by law.

military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice

the civil courts are open and functioning.

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all

whether or not there has been grave abuse of

decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

during the period of martial law in all cases involving

civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial

period of martial law, over civilians for offenses

review only if the following requisites are complied

allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts

with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and

are open and functioning, and that any judgment

appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial

rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and

interest of the party raising the constitutional question;

void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military

tribunal concerned.

(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question
is the lis mota of the case.

*IBP VS. ZAMORA

FACTS:

3. The deployment of the Marines does not

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under

constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy

Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada,

clause. The calling of the Marines in this case

in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and

constitutes permissible use of military assets

PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper

for civilian law enforcement. The participation

deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.

The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.

of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility

patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility

to

direct

and

manage

the

deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their

ISSUE:

duty to provide the necessary equipment to the

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the

Marines and render logistical support to these

necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to

soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be

judicial review.

properly argued that military authority is

supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the

no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was

deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP

w/o due process. The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al

does not unmake the civilian character of the

acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in

police force. Neither does it amount to an

1905 which suspended the privilege of the writ of

insidious incursion of the military in the task

habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The

of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),

Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no

Article XVI of the Constitution.

rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest

hence he should be set free.

*LACSON VS. PEREZ

Facts: On May 1, 2001, Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued a Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was
a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region
because of the fact that she was faced by an "angry
and violent mob armed with explosives, firearm, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones, and other deadly weapons".
She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP
and PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrest of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. The
petitioners filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus,
and habeas corpus with an urgent application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary investigation. The petitioners assails the
declaration of a state of rebellion by the President and
the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue
hereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. They
also contend that they are allegedly faced with unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued
against them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of state of
rebellion is constitutional?
Ruling:
Yes, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
provides that "the President shall be the Commanderin-chief of all armed forces of the phil. and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due

process.
HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political
question. Only the president can determine the
existence of the grounds specified in the Constitution
for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas
corpus. This power is discretionary and therefore not
justiciable. The president has superior competence to
assess the peace and order condition of the country.
Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of
the Philippines of the existence of any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that
the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources
available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better
position than the SC to ascertain the real state of
peace and order in the country.

*LANSANG VS. GARCIA

*BARCELON VS. BAKER
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal
In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained
by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned
before the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding
Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain
why Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is

Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people,

Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is
a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups.
Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC

headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation.

On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky

Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension

Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of

of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet

murder and destructive arson before the RTC of

the constitutional requisites.

Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of

Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on

ISSUE: Whether

or

not

the

suspension

is

March 24, 1993.

constitutional.
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
HELD: The

doctrine established

Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida

subsequently

May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)

in Barcelon and Montenegro was

abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it

to verify the voluntariness of the motion.

had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no
legal

ground

could

be

established. Accordingly,

hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this

matter, including two closed-door sessions in which
relevant classified information was

divulged

by

the

government to the members of the SC and 3 selected

lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying

Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion

without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression
that the motion was necessary for his early release
from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a
conditional pardon by the President on December 9,
1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted
conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his
province without consulting her. She prayed that the
Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.

itself that there was actually a massive and systematic

Communist-oriented

campaign

to

overthrow

the

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.

government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC

unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of

privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

the Constitution which provides that the President may,

except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise

*PEOPLE VS. SALLE

provided

in

the

Constitution,

grant

pardon after

conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending

Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-

appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality,

appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of

as in the instant case, executiveclemency may not

the enforceability of the conditional pardon and

yet be granted to the appellant.

(2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,

Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as

recommended to the President the grant of the

anabandonment or waiver of the appeal.

conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General

Facts:

maintains that the conditional pardon granted to

appellant

Mengote

is

unenforceable

because

thejudgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the

extended before a judgment of conviction becomes

pendency in this Court of his appeal.

final.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o,

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no

submits that the conditional pardon extended to

appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused

Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs.

commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right

Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not

to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where

file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to

the death penalty was imposed by the trial court,

have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the

and (d) when the accused applies for probation,

conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his

thereby

conviction.

the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and

waiving

his

right

to

appeal. Where

has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant

Issue:

case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to

the appellant.

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during

the

pendency

of

his

appeal

from

a judgment

of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under

Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits

Held:

the

grant

of

pardon,

whether

full

or

conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his

appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

application therefor, if one is made, should not be

acted upon or the process toward its grant should not

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

be

begun

unless

the

appeal

is

withdrawn.

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant

Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the

reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines

Government concerned must require proof from the

and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

accused that he has not appealed from his conviction

or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the

be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court

concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the

or the appellate court, as the case may be.

Congress.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation

an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the

of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after

release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,

conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of

commutation of sentence, or parole before the

course, entirely different where the requirement is

withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible

" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original

therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in

provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973

custody of the accused must not solely rely on the

Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as

pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from

presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the

confinement.

1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky

pardon

Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days

reinstatement because the offender has to apply for

from notice hereof within which to secure from the

does

not

generally

result

in

automatic

reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to

this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said
appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the
grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections must exert every possible effort to take
back into his custody the said appellant, for which
purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the

individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a
new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given
pardon because he did not truly commit the offense,
the pardon relieves the party from all punitive

of

consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to

Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and

him his clean name, good reputation and unstained

Ricky Mengote, G.R. No. 103567, December 4,

character prior to the finding of guilt.

National

Police

or the

National Bureau

1995)
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial
court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
*GARCIA VS. CHAIRMAN , COA

commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding

him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended

FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV
Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena
City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against
him. The president grated him an executive clemency.
The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service
on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show
whether petitioners reinstatement was to the same
position

of

Supervising

Lineman.

petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public

servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary
reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his
reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no
longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment;
he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance
of

the

clemency.

Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government

service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of

back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to
the grant of executive clemency.

afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start

and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a
result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right
to back wages is afforded to those with have been

HELD:

illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or

The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for

to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against

appointment to public office which was forfeited by

them.

reason of the conviction of the offense. But since

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from

April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to

Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be

March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for

the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to

*PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

which said transfer is to be made.

Facts: Petitioners assail validity of RA 7663: The

As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief of

General Appropriations Act for 1994.

Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those who may

be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP-

The GAA contains a special provision applicable to

Chief of Staff may not be given such authority.

Congress. It allowed any member of congress the

REALIGNMENT

OF

ALLOCATION

FOR

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES, provided that the total of

*FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS VS. CA

said allocation is not exceeded.

Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and
the

Speaker

Constitution to

are

the
realign

ones authorized under the

savings,

not the

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as

amended provided that appeals from decisions of the
Board of

Investments

(BOI)

shall

be

the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months

individual members of Congress themselves.

after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987),

Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOED
certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized to
use savings to augment the pension funds under the
Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the

the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was

promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such
appeals be directly filed with the SC. The SC later
promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No.
1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over
appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second

AFP.

Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained

Issue: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art

the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present case.

Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the

6. Whether the enumeration is exclusive?

Second Divisions ruling which provided:

Held: YES. Under the special provision applicable to
Congress, the members of Congress are given the
power to determine the necessity of realignment of the
savings in the allotment for their operating expenses.
They are in the best position to do so because hey are
the ones who know whether there are savings, or
deficiencies in appropriation. HOWEVER, ONLY THE

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO

226 is a substantive right which cannot be modified by
a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning
where and in what manner the appeal can be brought
are only matters of procedure which this Court hast he
power to regulate.

SENATE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE

HOUSE

ARE

REALIGNMENT.

ALLOWED

TO

APPROVE

THE

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of

procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded Art
82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the

appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the
Board of Investments?

Held: The practice is unconstitutional; the court held

that the phrase a representative of congress should
be construed as to having only one representative that

Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the

would come from either house, not both. That the

1987 Constitutiontook effect February 2, 1987. Thus,

framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of

Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the

the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion

appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is invalid and therefore

was denied.

never became effective for the concurrence of the

Court was no sought in its enactment. Thus, the

*DOLALAS VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still

stands. The exclusivejurisdiction on appeals from

*PEOPLE VS. EPRASAS

decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

*VIVARES VS. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE
In the Vivares case, several high school students of the
St. Theresas College were not allowed to graduate

*CHAVEZ VS. JBC

because they were seen drinking liquor in public places

Facts: The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by

and wearing revealing outfit in public places in violation

the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that

of the schools rules. The evidence consisted of photos

JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the

shown by the friends of the students to the school

congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional

authorities. They claimed that their right to privacy was

Respondent

contends

that

the

phrase

representative of congress refers that both houses of

violated, pointing out that they limited access to their

photos to their Friends.

congress should have one representative each, and

The Supreme Court ruled against the students, stating

that these two houses are permanent and mandatory

that setting a posts or profile details privacy to

components of congress as part of the bicameral

Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be

system

their

viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends

respective powers in performance of their duties. Art

with the source of the content. The users own

VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the

Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or

of

legislature.

Both

houses

have

component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only

one representative from congress.
Issue: W/N the JBCs practice of having members from
the Senate and the House of Representatives to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.

her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of

whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at Friends.

The court added: To illustrate, suppose A has 100

is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition

Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not

must be made in good faith.

Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in

As post, which is set at Friends, the initial audience of
100 (As own Facebook friends) is dramatically
increased to 300 (As 100 friends plus Bs 200 friends
or the public, depending upon Bs privacy setting). As a
result, the audience who can view the post is
effectively expandedand to a very large extent.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by

virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there
is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of

*DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA

strict law, the question of any impairment of security of

tenure does not arise.

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the
Minister

of

the

Budget,

the

Chairman

of

the

Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from

taking

any

action

implementing

BP 129

*PEOPLE VS. GACOTT

Facts:

which

mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts

from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for

violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was
filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against
respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending

considered separated from the judiciary. It is the

that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively

termination of their incumbency that for petitioners

in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130,

justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that

the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or

thereby the security of tenure provision of the

authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an

Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has

already been abolished by Letter of Implementation

ISSUE:

No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition,

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security

however,

of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under

the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or

espousing

respondent
the

judge

position

granted
that

the

the

motion

Letter

Of

Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the

law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code
which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus,
respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18,
1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or

separation of the judges and justices from their

authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered

services. What is important is the validity of the

that the case be quashed.

abolition of their offices.

Issue:
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent

whether or not respondent judge in granting

the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as

Indeed,

Section

3,

Article

XVII

of

the

to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari

Constitution explicitly ordains:

Held:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,

proclamations,
Yes. The error committed by respondent

executive

letters

of

issuances

not

instructions,

and

inconsistent

other

with

this

judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the

Constitution shall remain operative until amended,

light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275

repealed, or revoked.

aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy

Board could not have been expressed more clearly

*ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the

City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1
in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere
perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal

Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor

immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact

Endencias and

that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D.

pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which provides that

No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:

SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public

Pursuant

to

Presidential

Decree

No.

1 dated

September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive

Justice

Fernando

Jugos salary

officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be

considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of

Branch of the National Government, the following

which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his

agencies

compensation

of

the

Department

of

Justice

are

herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the

applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis
supplied).

fixed

by

the

Constitution

or

by

law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on

behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our
decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was
not

received

favorably

by

Congress,

because

General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D

immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted

No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his

Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the

martial law powers have the same force and effect as

the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62
SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees,

Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the

pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill
No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by

the former President are part of the law of the land,

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is

and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective,

constitutional.

unless

modified,

subsequent

revoked

proclamations,

or

superseded
orders,

by

decrees,

instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is

one such legal order issued by former President

HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13,

Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the

Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to

salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of

implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1

compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation

nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised,

or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which

revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force

and effect of law.

shall not be diminished during their continuance in

*ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ

office, found in section 9, Article VIII of the

Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-

Facts:
1.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all

members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the

defined and established province and jurisdiction of the

Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for

Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the

the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution

legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act

and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the

declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so

Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good

as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A

Government. The Committee found the complaint not

legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is

sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further

not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;

consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the

charges contained in the complaint attached. It then

otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial

submitted its report which was duly noted by the

function in defining a term. ** The reason behind the

Batasan and sent to the archives.

exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the

United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court,

2.

On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with

is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not

the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the

only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose

archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified

present membership number more than 990 judicial

complaint

officials. The independence of the judges is of far

disapproved by the Batasan.

attached

thereto.

Said

motion

was

greater importance than any revenue that could come

from taxing their salaries.

3.

Hence,

this

petition for

prohibition

to

restrain

respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of

The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, to the effect that the collection of income tax on
the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. The interpretation
and application of the Constitution and of statutes is

the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to recall from the archives and report out
the resolution together with the verified complaint for
the

impeachment

of

the

President

of

the

within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the

Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are

judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the

unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article

Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be

XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with

interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a

the mandatory amendatory process provided for under

Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of

Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a

the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,

smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to

especially when the interpretation sought and provided

in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation
already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the

members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said
questioned
proceedings

provisions
at

various

derail
stages

the
by

impeachment
vesting

the

Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not

to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to

compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial

Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan

itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for

4.

Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the

impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority

Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an

the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good

unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order

Government had acted.

that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial

5.

before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall

the members of the Batasan for the approval of the

from the Archives said resolution and complaint for

resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the

impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action

Rules impose a condition not required by the

of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall

Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is

(which of course it had no authority to do and,

the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The

therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply

members

of

with any order from the Court for said recall) such an

impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial

order addressed to the Committee would actually be a

to proceed.

direct order to the Batasan itself.

of

the

Batasan

for

the

initiation

Respondents Speaker and the Members of the

3.

The Court held that if it has no authority to control the

Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa

Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority

contend that that the petition should be dismissed

to control the actions of subordinate employees acting

because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over

under the direction of the Senate. The secretary,

which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises

sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate

questions which are political in nature; (3) the

are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act

Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the

independently of the will of that body. Should the Court

Constitution and even supposing without admitting that

do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented

the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify

of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-

the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the

arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine

Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has

Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate

the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even

ordering them to do another thing.

without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court

cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due
course to the impeachment complaint.

4.

The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless

it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed
has the absolute power to execute it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with

1.

the Batasans power of impeachment

*DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

NO.

*ACOP VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

The dismissal by the majority of the members of the

Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of

*ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ

the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that

have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond
the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot

Facts:

Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of

to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB)

salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve

to produce all documents relating to Personal Service

state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the

Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla

circumstances of the case that there is reasonable

of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was

danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose

issued in connection with the investigation of funds

military matters without compelling production, no

representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB

similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on

which

other considerations.

were

legally

disbursed.

Almonte

and

Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is

around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the

directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents

subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an

be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman,

agency of the Government.

and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner

of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the

*HONASAN VS. DOJ PANEL OF INVESTIGATING

EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The

PROSECUTORS

subpoena

duces

tecum

was

issued

by

the

Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations

anonymous letter alleging that funds representing

(persons),

savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been

concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ

illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been

to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

Powers

of

the

Ombudsman

(consti),

written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned

citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance,

Law Applicable:

with copies furnished several government offices,

Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

Section

13,

Article

XI

of

the

including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the
petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating tWhether or not an
Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of
subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating
to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB
employers.o personal service and salary vouchers of
EIIB employers.
Ruling:

Facts:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo

Matillano
Department

filed

an

affidavit-complaint

of Justice (DOJ)

which

with

the

contains

the

following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator
Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or

and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located

diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production

in San Juan, Metro Manila

of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo

Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation

Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying

of intelligence reports and information. "illegal activities

Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national

affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited

television, stating their withdrawal of support to the

chain of command of the AFP and the Government of

part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their

of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his

lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA)

respective

of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only

evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no

program that would solve the ills of society.

jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil

counter-affidavits

and

controverting

Issues:

stated that:

1.

Whether

in

regards

to

Ombudsman-

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo

DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the

Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP

Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of

meeting where they concluded the use of force,

the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of

2.

Whether

the

Ombudsman-DOJ

NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the

Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the

new government. They had a blood compact and that

ground that it was not published

he only participated due to the threat made by Senator

3.

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to

Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa

conduct the preliminary investigation because

ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga

the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade

kasamahang magtataksil.

31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio

Trillanes, Captain Gerardo

the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Gambala, CaptainAlejano

and some others who were present during the NRP

Held:

Wherefore,

the

petition

meeting he attended, having a press conference about

DISMISSED for lack of merit

for

certiorari

is

their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that

the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the
same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood

1.

No.

compact wound.

may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1)

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with

those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2)

counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification

those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular

questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the

courts. The difference between the two, aside

imputed acts were committed in relation to his public

from the category of the courts wherein they are

office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade

filed,

31 which should be handled by the Office of the

distinguished from the authority to prosecute

Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses

is

on

theauthority to

investigate

as

The power to investigate or conduct a

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari

preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ

case may be exercised by an investigator or

Panel

prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by

Eduardo

and

its

Matillano

members,
and

CIDG-PNP-P/Director

Ombudsman

Simeon

V.

Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the

any

Provincial

or

City

Prosecutor

or

their

assistance, either in their regular capacities or as

administrative agency and not the public, need not be

deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

published. Neither is publication required of the so

circular supports the view of the respondent

called

letters

of instructions issued

by

the

Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement

administrative superiors concerning the rules on

between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of

performance of their duties.

1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely

Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and

an internal circular between the DOJ and the

under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and

All

concurrent

responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to

and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct

conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed

of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate

against public officers and employees.

the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

recognize

and

uphold

the

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor

deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the

3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive

preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it

jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition

because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal

so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation

law agency of the government and investigate the

conducted by the DOJ Panel.

commission of crimes under the Revised Penal

*AGBAY VS. DEPUTY SECRETARY

Code is derived from the Revised Administrative

Code which had been held in the Natividad

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations

case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution.

(persons),

Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the

first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert

Law Applicable:

its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640

(1954). The only circulars and regulations which
prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective.

In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453

(1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the

Ombudsman

(consti),

Section

13,

Article

XI

of

the

Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

investigation.

the

to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the

No.

of

concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ

conduct of the preliminary investigation to an

2.

Powers

Facts:

August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo

Matillano
Department

filed

an

affidavit-complaint

of Justice (DOJ)

which

with

the

contains

the

following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by
military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator
Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held

31 which should be handled by the Office of the

and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located

Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo

Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ

Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying

Panel

Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national

Eduardo

television, stating their withdrawal of support to the

Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the

chain of command of the AFP and the Government of

part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their

of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his

lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA)

respective

of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only

evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no

program that would solve the ills of society.

jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil

and

its

members,

Matillano

and

CIDG-PNP-P/Director

Ombudsman

counter-affidavits

and

Simeon

V.

controverting

Issues:

stated that:

1.

Whether

in

regards

to

Ombudsman-

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo

DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the

Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP

Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of

meeting where they concluded the use of force,

the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of

2.

Whether

the

Ombudsman-DOJ

NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the

Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the

new government. They had a blood compact and that

ground that it was not published

he only participated due to the threat made by Senator

3.

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to

Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa

conduct the preliminary investigation because

ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga

the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade

kasamahang magtataksil.

31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio

Trillanes, Captain Gerardo

the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Gambala, CaptainAlejano

and some others who were present during the NRP

Held:

Wherefore,

the

petition

meeting he attended, having a press conference about

DISMISSED for lack of merit

for

certiorari

is

their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that

the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the
same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood
compact wound.

1.

No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses

may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1)

August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with

those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2)

counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification

those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular

questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the

courts. The difference between the two, aside

imputed acts were committed in relation to his public

from the category of the courts wherein they are

office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade

filed,

is

on

theauthority to

investigate

as

distinguished from the authority to prosecute

(1954). The only circulars and regulations which

The power to investigate or conduct a

prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published

preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman

case may be exercised by an investigator or

before becoming effective.

prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by

any

Provincial

or

City

Prosecutor

or

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640

In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453

(1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

their

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in

assistance, either in their regular capacities or as

nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the

deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

administrative agency and not the public, need not be

circular supports the view of the respondent

published. Neither is publication required of the so

Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement

called

between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

administrative superiors concerning the rules on

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of

letters

of instructions issued

by

the

guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in

1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the

performance of their duties.

Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely

under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

an internal circular between the DOJ and the

All

concurrent

office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and

jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to

responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ

conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed

and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct

against public officers and employees.

of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate

recognize

and

uphold

the

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor

the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the

preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it

3.

No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive

because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal

jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition

law agency of the government and investigate the

so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation

commission of crimes under the Revised Penal

conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Code is derived from the Revised Administrative

Code which had been held in the Natividad
case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution.

*CARINO VS. CHR

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a

Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the

class day, some 800 public school teacher, among

conduct of the preliminary investigation to an

them the 8 herein private respondents who were

agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the

members of the Manila Public School Teachers

first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert

its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.

Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned

Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to

2.

No.

the latters attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the

or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely,

Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be

provided

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged

by

law. This

function,

to

repeat,

the

Commission does not have.

human rights violations

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to
RULING: No.

investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the

merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate,

Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced

that is to say, determine with the character of finality

it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a

and definiteness, the same issues which have been

claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings

passed upon and decided by the Secretary of

against

Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court

conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or

having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the

political rights had been transgressed.

the

teachers

in

question,

initiated

and

teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said

matter, if still timely.

*CHR EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. CHR

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has

1. RA 8522 or the General Appropriations Act of

the power under the constitution to do so; whether or

1998 provided special provisions applicable to

not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial

all Constitutional Offices.

agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,

or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine,

2. The Commission on Human Rights through

certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights

then its Chair, Aurora P. Navarette Recina

violations involving civil or political rights.

and Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic,

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such

power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to
be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions

Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo and

Jorge R. Coquia upgraded or raised the
salaries (A98-0555 October 1998) reclassified
selection positions (Resolution No. A98-047
September,

of the latter.

1998)

and

collapsed

vacant

positions (A98-062 November 1998) without

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in

the approval of the Department of Budget and

the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,

Management (DBM)

i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as

petitioners

Commission

on Human

and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,

Rights Employees

Association

(CHREA)

and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of

through its then President Marcial A. Sanchez,

justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The

Jr. filed a petition before the Court of Appeals

function

alleging that they have locus standi because

regards claimed human rights violations involving civil

of

receiving

evidence

and

ascertaining

therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial

function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided

3. The

the reorganization demoralizes the rank and

file employees and will only benefit those in top
positions; but, the Court of Appeals (CA)
exempted

the

CHR

Standardization Law.

from

the

Salary

Issue: Whether the fiscal autonomy enjoyed the CHR

emp0wers them to reclassify, adjust salaries and
collapse vacant positions without the approval of
DBM?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the duty of DBM is to
ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits
and other incentives be given in adherence to the
policies and guidelines in accordance with applicable
laws. The mandate of the DBM under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, Section 4, Chapter 1,
Title XVII to wit: shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures
budget, preparation, execution and control of
the NationalBudget, preparation and maintenance
of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency
in the management of government operations,
administration
of
compensation
and
position
classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications. Furthermore, Administrative Code, in
Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on
Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy.
*COJUANGCO VS. ROXAS
*ROMUALDEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: People of the Philippines, through PCGG, filed
a petition charging the accused with violation of
Section 5, RA. 3019 as amended. Said petitioner,
brother-in-law of former President Marcos and
therefore, related by affinity within the third civil degree,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, and with
evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-

interested sic and/or that of others, intervene directly or

indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a governmentowned and controlled corporation and the Bataan
Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a
private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Marcos, whereby the
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the
BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests
over all equipment and facilities including structures,
buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and
expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at
the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island
Shops including some of its equipment and
machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair
program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Issue: whether or not petitioner enjoys derivative
immunity from suit.
Ruling: In Estrada vs. Desierto, the SC exhaustively
traced the origin of executive immunity in order to
determine the extent of its applicability. Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a
President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting
President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts
done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner
must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from
one who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the
felonious acts of public officials and their close
relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the
same footing as any other trespasser.
*REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN