RAMOS VS.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.
FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered
as such.
Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government.
Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land
under color of title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of
title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?
HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of
ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of
another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious
possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land
was for his enjoyment.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the
premises consisted of agricultural public land.
On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if
the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes.
In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.
Banco Espanol Filipino v Peterson (1907)
Facts

On March 4, 1905, Banco Espanol Filipino (BEP) executed a contract of loan in favor of Francisco Reyes for P141
702.00. Reyes was already indebted to the bank for P84 415.00. His total debt was therefore P226 117.38.
To secure payment of the P141k and the P84k, Reyes executed a public instrument
1. Mortgaging several of his properties
2. Pledging part of his personal property to BEP (P90 591.75 worth of wines, liquors and canned goods), which were
stored at a warehouse he rented in Manila
BEP and Reyes agreed that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia(depositary) for safekeeping. Reyes turned
over the goods to R. Garcia by giving him the warehouse keys .On September 29, 1905, BEP and Reyes substituted
Luis Sierra in place of R. Garcia as the depositary.
On October 19, 1905, Juan Garcia (yes, related to Ramon) brought an action against Francisco Reyes and Ramon
Agtarat. CFI Manila ruled against Reyes and Agtarat for P15 000.00.
On the same day, Sheriff James Peterson entered the warehouse where the goods pledged to BEP were stored under the
custody of the depositary, Sierra. Peterson levied upon P30 000 worth of the goods pledged to the bank, depriving the
latter of possession of the same, as stipulated in the March 4contract of loan
.Issues
Was the contract of pledge between BEP and Reyes to secure a loan valid?
Was Reyes still in possession of the pledged property, thereby making the contract defective?
Held
The contract was valid. Reyes was no longer in possession of the pledged property. BEP had symbolic
possession of the same. The contract complies with all the requisites of a valid pledge contract, as
prescribed by the Civil Code
1. The property was pledged to secure a debt
2. The date of execution, the terms of the pledge, and the property pledged appeared in a public instrument
3. The property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person (in this case, Sierra) by common consent of the debtor
and creditor, under the supervision of an agent (in this case, Rodriguez) of the bank
Reyes, after the pledge, parted with the possession of his personal property, which was delivered to a third person (R.
Garcia, and subsequently, Sierra) who would take care of them for BEP.
Sierra was the third person appointed by common consent of BEP (creditor) and Reyes (debtor), to hold possession
over the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of Rodriguez, an agent specifically appointed
by the bank.
The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of the
Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee (BEP) took charge and possession of the goods pledged
through a depositary (Sierra) and a special agent (Rodriguez) appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to the
warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee (BEP), itself, received and collected the proceeds
of the goods as they were sold.
The legality of the pledge was not affected by the fact that the goods remained in the warehouse formerly
rented by Reyes the pledgor. This is because after the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository appointed
with common consent of the parties had taken possession of the said property, Reyes could no longer dispose of the
same because BEP was the only party allowed to do so through Sierra and Rodriguez.

The symbolic transfer of the goods through delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were
stored was sufficient evidence to show that Sierra, the depositary appointed by both BEP and Rodriguez, was legally
placed in possession of the goods.
Since the contract of pledge was valid, BEP had a better right to the goods compared to J. Garcia. The Court ordered
either the return of the improperly levied goods, or the payment of their value, P30 000.
Macasaet vs Macasaet

G.R. 154391 92

September 30, 2004

Facts:
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are firstdegree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.
The parents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated in Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by
way of a verbal lease agreement, their son and his wife occupied these lots in March 1992 and used
them as their residence and the situs of their construction business.
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that their
parents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots. They added that
it was the policy of their parents to allot the land owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of
their children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT no. T-103141 had been allotted to
Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT-78521 was allegedly given
to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of their parents house.
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against their
children for failure to pay the agreed rental despite repeated demands.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the parents and ordered the children to vacate the premises. It opined that
the children had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement but by tolerance of the
parents. As their stay was by mere tolerance, the children were necessarily bound by an implied
promise to vacate the lots upon demand. The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been
allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground that succcesional rights were inchoate. It disbelieved
that the other parcel had been given as payment for construction material.
On appeal, the RTC upheld the findings of the MTCC. RTC allowed the parents to appropriate the
building and other improvements introduced by the children, after payment by indemnity provided for
bt Article 448 in relation to Article 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
On an appeal by both parties to the CA which were consolidated, the CA sustained the finding of the
lower courts that the children had been occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of their parent.
Thus, possession of the subject lots by the children became illegal upon their receipt of letter to vacate
it. The CA modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was
inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, the children had the right to be
reimbursed for one half of the value of the improvements made.
Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, the children brought the case to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
WON the children can be ejected

a. Based on the parents love reasons for gratuitously allowing the children to use the lots, it can be
safely concluded that the agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children benefitted
from the arrangement. Effectively, there is a resolutory condition existing between the parties
occurs like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or
animosity the agreement maybe deemed terminated. When persistent conflict and animosity
overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and the children, the purpose of the
agreement ceased. The children had any cause for continued possession of the lots. Their right to
use became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they
refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them.
b. The children had no right to retain possession. The right of the children to inherit from their
parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise. Rights of succession are
transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that there was an
allotment of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with the parents.
c. The childrens allegation that the indebtness of their parent to them has been paid through
dation cannot be given credence as there were no sufficient proof of a settlement or contract of
dation to settle the alleged debt, and is inconsistent of the separate action by the children to
recover the same debt.
d. As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.
Rights of a Builder in Good faith
a. As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of owner to everything that is
incorporated or attached to the property. Accession industrial building, planting and
sowing on an immovable is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code.
b. As the court found that the children possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance,
the applicable rule would be Article 448. This article has been applied to cases wherein a
builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner.

WONG v CARPIO
203 SCRA 118 Civil Law Property Possession; cant be recognized in two persons at the same
time
Ejectment Force, Intimidation, Threat, Strategy, or Stealth
In 1972, a pacto de retro sale was executed by William Giger in favor of Manuel Mercado. Giger
failed to repurchase the land within the agreed period hence Mercado was able to consolidate the title
unto himself and the sale was notarized in 1973. Since then, Mercado paid the taxes on the land and he
would periodically go to the said parcel of land and gather coconut products for his business.
However, in July 1976, Giger again sold the same land to Ignacio Wong. Giger then delivered the title
of the land to Wong. In August 1976, Wong started deploying his laborers to the said farmland; he
built a farmhouse thereon; he fenced the boundary; and he also put up a signboard which indicates that
the land is his.
In September 1976, Mercado learned of the presence of Wong within the disputed land. In November
1976, Mercado filed an ejectment case (forcible entry) against Wong.
In his defense, Wong insists that a forcible entry case is not proper because, in possessing the land, he
never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; that he entered the said land without
issue after he purchased the same from Giger.
The trial court agreed with Wong as it ruled that Wong had a better title because it was he who
had prior, actual and continuous physical possession of the disputed property as opposed to Mercados
only acts of going to said land periodically.
On appeal, Judge Lucas Carpio reversed the decision of the municipal trial court in the ejectment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong has a better title over the disputed property.
HELD: No. Mercado had prior possession. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper
acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right. The execution of a sale thru a public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary.In this case,
the notarized sale made by Giger in favor of Mercado transferred the possession of said land from
Giger to Mercado.
The second sale made by Giger to Wong did not transfer possession to Wong because in the first place,
by that time, Giger is not in possession of the land anymore. Further, possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession, which
is not the case here.
Anent the argument of Wong that he never acted with force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth
(FISTS), the Supreme Court held that if a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very
eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there
plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and
detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than
such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the
other party.
The Supreme Court also noted the rules regarding questions regarding the fact of possession:
a. Present possessor shall be preferred;
b. If there are two (or more) current possessors, the one longer in possession is preferred;
c. If possessors acquired possession at the same time; the possessor who can present a title is
preferred;

d. If all possessors present the foregoing conditions equally, then the property in question shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
Cordero v. Cabral
G.R. No. L-36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532
FACTS:
the thrust of the Complaint is that a piece of land covered by T.C.T. No. 14513 in the name of
Gregorio Z. Ocampo was illegally possessed by the defendants. Upon the other hand, the thrust of the
Answer is that "the defendant Victoria P. Cabral is the real owner of Lot No. 5-B, plan Psd-11496,
with an area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, erroneously or fraudulently included in the property
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14513 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Bulacan, registered in the name of the deceased Gregorio Z. Ocampo and now claimed by the herein
plaintiffs."
Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of the plaintiff Felipa Cordero and father of the other Corderos
surnamed Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958. Mr. Gregorio left several properties, which were inherited
by the Corderos including the land in question which parcel of land was originally registered in
accordance with the Land Registration Act on December 14, 1933, and was registered and/or
transferred in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo on July 31, 1934.
After the death of the said Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the Corderos herein took possession of the said
parcel of land which is a riceland, but they found out that the southern portion of the same with an area
4,303 square meters, more or less, upon verification, was possessed by the Cabrals, et al herein,
Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos. Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the
owner of said portion while her co-Cabrals, et al co-possessed the same as her tenants.
Corderos alleged that because of the Cabrals, et al' occupancy of the aforementioned Corderos' portion
of land with the area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to the exclusion of the latter, the said
Corderos failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cabrals, et al must reimburse the fruits receive.
HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the
predecessor of the Corderos. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not
vitiated by error or fraud.
The Cabrals, et al, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence
that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served
with summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons
they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and
from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully. (435a)