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10 for 2015:
Generating value in a fragile market
January 2015
About Sustainalytics
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expertise and a thorough understanding of more than 40 industries. In 2012, 2013
and 2014, Sustainalytics was voted best independent responsible investment
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January 2015
10 for 2015
Foreword
2015 Staring down challenges, building on successes
Ive always believed in the motto Success Breeds Success, more from personal and
professional experience than from any logical or scientific explanation. Accordingly, I fully
expect the ESG business segment to build upon its successes of last year to achieve even
more significant accomplishments in 2015. Of course, the drivers of ESG success are both
complex and multi-dimensional. While capturing them all is too big a task for this foreword,
Im pleased to add my thoughts about what might be in store for the ESG industry in 2015,
ever wary of the investment industry mantra that past performance is no indication of
future results.
Michael Jantzi
Chief Executive Officer
michael.jantzi@sustainalytics.com
By all accounts 2014 was a good year for ESG globally. We saw increased ESG integration by
asset managers, some of it explicitly mandated by ESG-minded pension funds and high net
worth clients, but also a tangible increase in ESG adoption by traditional asset managers, as
evidenced by the 19% increase in PRI signatories. With the rise in the number of U.S.-based
asset owners and managers joining the PRI, including industry bellwether Vanguard with
over USD 3trn in assets under management, I expect ESG adoption to continue to gather
strength in the year ahead.
We also saw steady growth in ESG-associated assets under management in established
markets and across multiple asset classes. According to various published reports, U.S.domiciled assets under management using SRI strategies grew to USD 6.57trn in 2014, a
76% increase over 2012 levels. ESG integration in Europe and Australia grew by 38% and
51%, respectively. These are impressive statistics, given Europes and Australias early
adoption of ESG practices. Though U.S. institutional investors have been slower to embrace
ESG factors as an integral piece of the investment analysis process, I view these recent
milestones as ESG success indicators for the years to come.
Building on its tremendous growth in 2014, we believe the green bond market of USD
36.6bn will more than double in size in 2015. Forty-six percent of the market was driven by
corporates and municipalities last year, with a record corporate deal by GDF Suez, including
proceeds from its USD 3.4bn green bond (split into two bonds) earmarked for renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects.
Finally, I want to shine a spotlight on several important moves to strengthen regulatory
environments across several jurisdictions, which I believe will lead to more informed capital
markets and the continued push for ESG investment. Although it is difficult to see tangible
impact at this early juncture, I believe the U.K. Law Commissions report (in Fiduciary Duties
of Investment Intermediaries, July 2014) will serve to reinforce the concept that trustees
fiduciary duties encompass ESG. My optimism is high, in part, because a review of the
Stewardship Code, which received strong support in 2014 from the Chair of the Financial
Reporting Council, is on tap for later this year.
And, after years of discussion that seemed to span generations, Ontario (Canada) is making
changes to its Pensions Benefit Act that will require funds to reveal whether, and if so how,
ESG considerations are taken into account in investment policies. The amendment, which
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10 for 2015
takes effect at the beginning of 2016, is already raising ESG awareness among small- and
medium-sized pension plans across the province.
Regulatory reform is evident in a variety of Asian countries as well. The Korean National
Assembly passed two RI-related pieces of legislation in late December, one focused on the
mandatory disclosure of ESG information by listed companies and the other on the National
Pension Service (the fourth-largest pension fund in the world), which now has legislative
clarity with respect to taking ESG issues into consideration. In Japan, more than 175 asset
managers, asset owners and other market participants have signed onto the Japanese
Stewardship Code, which was put in place by the Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA)
in February 2014 to encourage institutional investors to engage with companies on their
sustainability practices.
Alas, it will not all be smooth sailing in the year ahead. Clearly, the political landscape means
sustainability issues generally, including ESG, will likely face increased scrutiny and
Congressional challenges in the U.S. There will be some tough going with a Republican
majority in Congress and James Inhofe, author of The Greatest Hoax: How the Global
Warming Conspiracy Threatens Your Future, as Chair of the Environment and Public Works
Committee.
First they ignore you, then they ridicule you, then they fight you, and then you win.
I also expect that our industry will face well-funded, better-organized and more ferocious
adversaries than in the past. I look to what happened in Australia at the end of last year as
the harbinger of things to come. As one might expect in a resource-focused economy, a
debate was ignited in response to several Australian institutions deciding to divest from
fossil fuels. Ill leave it to each of you to determine whether or not Rice Warners report
Analysis of Socially Responsible Investment Options1, undertaken at the behest of the
Minerals Council of Australia, provides insight like no other, as Rice Warner proclaims on
the first and last pages of the presentation.
However, the response to Australian National Universitys (ANU) decision to divest from
seven fossil fuel companies was unprecedented in its vitriol, as evidenced by Australian
Prime Minister Tony Abbotts comment that it was a stupid decision. Moreover, ASXlisted Sandfire Resources, one of the companies affected by ANUs decision, filed
proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against CAER, an Australian-based ESG
research house. I expect that the phrase if you cant stand the heat, get out of the kitchen
will apply to all of us, as some critics will not just turn up the heat but will try to burn the
kitchen down entirely. In order to stare down these and other challenges, our ability to
muster a collaborative response will become increasingly important. The Sustainalytics
team, more than 200 strong globally, looks forward to working together with others in the
ESG industry to ensure that we continue building upon our collective successes throughout
2015 and beyond.
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Contents
Executive Summary
Generating value in a fragile market
5
5
9
9
27
27
10 for 2015
A platform for ESG analysis
33
33
DuPont
Sowing seeds for African growth?
35
35
Intel
Progress on conflict-free target could pay reputational dividend in 2015
38
38
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
Company looks to rebound from record bribery charge
41
41
LafargeHolcim
Proposed merger offers intriguing ESG opportunities
44
44
Lonmin
Results of Marikana Commission could create business risks
47
47
49
49
Telenor
Advanced ESG performer poised to succeed in risky environment
52
52
55
55
59
59
Netflix
Questionable board practices at pivotal moment in companys evolution
62
62
Chartbook
65
Appendix
Report Parameters
Contributions
Glossary of Terms
Endnotes
66
66
66
66
67
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Executive Summary
Generating value in a fragile market
Analysts
Key Takeaways
hendrik.garz@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
Thomas Hassl
Analyst, Thematic Research
thomas.hassl@sustainalytics.com
With the ECBs EUR 1.1trn quantitative easing programme, financial and economic
imbalances are aggravated, and the risk of a new financial crisis has increased.
The economic and social costs of a new financial crisis could outstrip those of the
last one and may trigger fundamental systemic discussions.
Investors do not have many options to hedge themselves, due to already existing
or newly emerging bubble situations in many asset classes.
The good news is that investors can expect that the situation, which is
unsustainable over the mid- to long term, will probably be sustained over the
short term.
The slump in oil prices might lead to a positive growth surprise, which, ironically,
may exacerbate systemic risk when put into the above context.
The oil price drop has further lowered the probability for achieving a multilateral
climate agreement at the COP21 conference in Paris in December.
Generating value at the asset selection level in a fundamentally unsustainable
market environment is more than challenging, but analysis through an ESG lens
may assist in this process.
As the Danish physicist and Nobel laureate Niels Bohr once famously remarked,
prediction is very difficult, especially if its about the future. We could not agree
more. Hence, in this report we take the approach of discussing possible scenarios for
the global economy and their implications from an ESG perspective. In addition, we
provide a dedicated Asian view regarding the economic background and ESG trends in
the region.
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10 for 2015
In the spirit of a top-down approach, we finally shift from the asset allocation focused
macro view to the asset selection micro view by presenting 10 company stories to
watch in 2015, taken from our core coverage universe of roughly 4,500 corporates. In
our view, all of these stories address key ESG issues that are likely to have a material
impact on companies from a business perspective. Our portfolio of ideas contains
stories from different regions and sectors and is well balanced, providing five stories
with a positive tilt and five with a negative tilt.
Financial markets seem to be torn between hope and fear these days. Apparently, the
new historic highs for equity markets are not the result of conviction and confidence
on the part of investors, but rather appear to signal the lack of investment alternatives
and the hope of prolonged expansionary monetary policy. In this chapter we take a
look at the possible consequences of the recently announced quantitative easing (QE)
programme of the European Central Bank (ECB). We conclude that this programme is
trying to sustain the unsustainable, and that investors do not have many options to
hedge themselves, due to already existing and exacerbated or newly emerging bubble
situations in many asset classes. We also reflect on the possible default of Greece and
the risk of a breakup of the Eurozone becoming more tangible in 2015. Furthermore,
we elaborate on a contrarian, thought-provoking scenario that assumes an oil-priceinduced positive growth surprise and describe how this could eventually lead to a new
financial crisis with social unrest as a possible consequence.
Last but not least, we ponder the consequences of the new lower oil price world and
the current economic and political environment for the climate negotiations that will
culminate at the end of the year with the COP21 convention in Paris. We have doubts
that the odds are good to achieve an effective multilateral consensus. In the absence
of political leadership, we expect the focus to shift to companies and private
households, which will be moving ahead with climate-friendly technologies based on
economic self-interest.
We draw four basic conclusions: (1) Investors are probably well advised not to divest
from high-quality fixed income instruments as long as there is hope that the QE
programme is going to work and uncertainties around Greece and the Ukraine conflict
prevail, despite the massive bond bubble they are sitting on. (2) The risk profile of
equities seems to be still attractive only if the oil price continues to show weakness and
as long as the crisis situations in Greece and the Ukraine do not completely get out of
control. (3) At the sector level it is clear that a low or even further-falling oil price and
a new financial crisis situation certainly do not invite investors to overweight Oil & Gas
and Banks in their portfolios. (4) Over the mid- to long term, the financial risks for
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10 for 2015
investors are high and cannot be fully hedged, due to the bubble situations that have
been emerging in many asset classes and the empirical fact that asset prices tend to be
positively correlated in down-market situations. Should markets turn into crisis mode
again, cash will certainly be king, but negative overnight rates may well become the
rule, not the exception.
Overall, we do not expect Asia to become the worlds growth engine in 2015. Economic
momentum in China is likely to ease further due to continued structural reforms and
efforts to slow credit expansion. For Japan, we expect another round of Abenomics,
after the renewal of the prime ministers mandate in Decembers elections. A
continued aggressive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus will probably at least avoid
Japan drifting into the much-feared deflationary downward spiral. On the other hand,
growth in India is expected to recover further in 2015 from historically low rates in the
years before.
If our global and Asia-specific macro views form the basis of our conviction for asset
allocation, the 10 for 2015 move further into the investment process and provide
insight into asset selection. Covering eight countries and ten industries, the 10 for 2015
consist of ten salient mainstream business stories where ESG factors can be shown to
be driving potentially material financial impacts. Our analysis exemplifies the type of
enhanced risk and opportunity identification that is increasingly being used by
investors to either supplement existing security selection models or inform new and
innovative standalone investment strategies. In the summaries below, we outline the
key findings of our assessment.
Impact
Negative
DuPont. We take a contrarian view and argue that the companys business model in
the African seed market may be misaligned with the needs of smallholder farmers. We
also suggest that DuPonts focus on a limited array of hybrid seeds could contribute to
biodiversity loss and Monsanto-type reputational risks for investors.
Impact
Positive
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10 for 2015
Impact
Positive
Impact
Strongly positive
Lafarge and Holcim. We are bullish on the proposed merger of the worlds two largest
cement manufacturers, pointing to potential ESG synergies in energy and GHG
performance, as well as improved positioning in the growing market for sustainable
building materials.
Impact
Strongly negative
Impact
Negative
National Commercial Bank (NCB). We review the opening of Saudi Arabias equity
markets to foreign investors (beginning in 2015) and NCBs attractiveness as a vehicle
to play the market for Shariah-compliant financial products and services. We highlight
risk factors related to NCBs governance and project finance activities.
Impact
Positive
Telenor. We find that the companys advanced ESG practices may provide a hedge
against country risk in Myanmar, and argue that the lessons learned could potentially
be leveraged in future expansion to emerging markets in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Impact
Positive
Pemex. While we question the extent to which the recent slump in oil prices may
discourage foreign investment in Mexicos newly liberalised energy sector, we argue
that interaction with the worlds oil majors may ultimately lead to improvements in
Pemexs health and safety performance and exposure to corruption issues.
Impact
Negative
Coca-Cola. We show that the companys recent entry into the energy drinks and milk
niches creates new and potentially under-appreciated ESG risk exposure. We gauge the
companys strategic awareness of these risks to be low, although we find some pockets
of optimism.
Impact
Negative
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10 for 2015
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
Financial markets seem to be torn between hope and fear these days. Apparently,
the new historic highs for equity markets are not the result of conviction and
confidence on the part of investors, but rather appear to signal the lack of investment
alternatives and the hope of prolonged expansionary monetary policy. In this chapter
we take a look at the possible consequences of the recently announced quantitative
easing (QE) programme of the European Central Bank (ECB). We conclude that this
programme is trying to sustain the unsustainable, and that investors do not have
many options to hedge themselves, due to already existing and exacerbated or newly
emerging bubble situations in many asset classes. We also reflect on the possible
default of Greece and the risk of a breakup of the Eurozone becoming more tangible
in 2015. Furthermore, we elaborate on a contrarian, thought-provoking scenario that
assumes an oil-price-induced positive growth surprise and describe how this could
eventually lead to a new financial crisis, with social unrest as a possible consequence.
Last but not least, we ponder the consequences of the new lower oil price world
and the current economic and political environment for the climate negotiations that
will culminate at the end of the year with the COP21 convention in Paris. We have
doubts that the odds are good to achieve an effective multilateral consensus. In the
absence of political leadership, we expect the focus to shift to companies and private
households, which will be moving ahead with climate-friendly technologies based on
economic self-interest.
Our readers may ask why we, as ESG and Responsible Investment specialists, feel called
upon to comment and elaborate on the current situation of the economy and financial
markets. The answer is simple: it is our conviction that the integration of ESG factors
into investment decision making has to take place at all levels. It needs to start at the
macro level (the economy and the markets) to primarily inform allocation decisions at
the asset class and sector level, and trickle down to the micro level (the companies) to
provide additional insights at the asset selection level. But why talk about valuations
and interest rates? It is all about providing and understanding the context against
which the integration of ESG factors needs to be debated.
That said, we are aware that it would be beyond the scope of this note to provide a
detailed analysis of the economy, the markets and ESG integration. Hence, what we do
is discuss the main drivers and catalysts that can decisively move the economy and
markets in one direction or the other, and analyse the implications of such
developments from a social and environmental perspective. We do this in a scenariobased manner and spirit, with sufficient humbleness regarding our ability to make
predictions, especially if its about the future.
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The decision of the ECB (announced on 22 January) to flood the markets with liquidity
via a QE programme with a volume of more than EUR 1.1trn (EUR 60bn to be spent
every month from March 2015 to September 2016) has provoked controversial debates
among investors, economists and policy makers. Some observers consider the QE to be
the silver bullet to avoid deflation, to save the Euro and the Eurozone and to enable
Europe to positively contribute to global economic growth again. Others stress that the
programme wont do the job and will create new risks for financial markets and longterm economic prospects while threatening the political cohesion of the Eurozone and
the EU member states.
Why now?
The programme had already been promised by Mario Draghi in August 2013. Why has
the decision to implement the programme been made now? Is it the recent drop in
Eurozone inflation below zero? Or is it because of the snap elections in Greece, and the
worries about a jump in risk premia not only for Greek debt but also for Spain and
France?
Closing the gap Balance sheet volume of ECB and Fed (in local currency, indexed)*
600
500
ECB Sep-2016f:
EUR 3,597bn
400
300
200
100
0
Fed
ECB
* f = forecast
Source: Bloomberg
The chart above shows the balance sheet volume (total assets) of the U.S. Federal
Reserve (Fed) and the ECB, reflecting the widening gap caused by the Feds QE
programme, launched to mitigate the consequences of the last financial crisis, over the
last couple of years. While the size of the Feds balance sheet has more than quintupled
since February 2008, the ECBs total assets have increased by just over 60%. With the
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10 for 2015
ECBs announced programme the gap will shrink going forward. If volumes turn out to
match the sums that were announced (the ECB has of course the option to upward or
downward adjust), its balance sheet would grow to EUR 3.6trn, which implies an
increase of 365% compared to February 2008.
Eurozone M3 money supply increased by
30.6% since January 2007
M3 in bn EUR
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Jan 00
Jan 07
Jan 09
Nov 14
Source: ECB2
We dont have a crystal ball to see and judge the ultimate effects of the ECBs QE
programme. But from a long-term economic sustainability perspective, we share some
of the major concerns. In particular we expect:
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10 for 2015
Bubbles: Since the additional liquidity will not flow into additional real investments
to a large extent, it will primarily further inflate existing bubbles or create new
ones. Equity markets, which soared after the announcement, and real estate are
obvious candidates for further inflation. Through the QE programme, the ECB is
paving the ground for a new financial crisis, which could potentially be enormously
destructive (from a financial, economic, political and societal perspective). Again,
the problem is not solved, but just postponed to the future, which is the opposite
of sustainable and responsible central bank policy.
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10 for 2015
The debate around the sustainability of the situation in Greece has heated up again
with the announcement of snap elections that became necessary after the failure of
the presidency vote in the Greek parliament in December. With the victory of the
radical left party Syriza, whose leader has already announced his intention not to pay
back the Greek debt in full, the odds of Greece leaving the Eurozone have suddenly
jumped. Giving further credence to this view, German chancellor Merkel and other
European politicians publicly pondered the ramifications of Greece leaving the EU,
despite having vigorously refused this possibility at the outset of the debt crisis.
Whether this was just a trick to manipulate Greek voters, as Greek leftists suspect, has
become an academic question now, as the outcome of the elections is known.
It is clear, however, that national governments in Europe would have a hard time
explaining a haircut or default of Greece to investors, their taxpayers and voters.
Market turmoil and political unrest could certainly not be ruled out, and the pressure
on Greece to leave the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), intended by
governments or not, would undoubtedly increase. Indeed, in itself the Grexit, as it is
frequently called in the press and on trading floors, would probably not be an
unmanageable challenge for the EMU and its other member states (though it certainly
could be for Greece). What makes it so risky are the unforeseeable consequences of
spillover effects that can be anticipated and that may eventually lead to a breakup of
the Eurozone and, even beyond that, have an influence on the future of the European
Union (for example, having the British referendum in 2016 in mind). Back to our
introductory thought, the QE programme of the ECB may well have been designed as
a hedge against the unfolding of such a scenario.
No doubt, 2015 will be a challenging year for the global economy and financial markets
from both a fundamental and an ESG perspective. And there is one factor that could
play a pivotal role in the overall equation: neglected for quite some time, but back once
again on investors radar screens, is the oil price, probably the single most significant
factor with the potential to determine where economies and markets will be heading
in 2015 and beyond.
Quite spectacularly, the price for a barrel of crude oil (WTI) dropped from a 2014 high
of USD 101 to a low of USD 43.4 at the beginning of 2015 (-57%). Over the past 30
years, this period therefore belongs to the handful of examples (six, including the
current one, to be precise) where prices declined by 30% or more within a six-month
time frame. All of these episodes were related to major global events. The spectacular
drop in oil prices observed in 2008, for instance, overlapped with the financial crisis of
2007-2008.
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10 for 2015
120
2500
100
2000
80
1500
60
1000
S&P 500
40
500
20
0
S&P 500
Source: Bloomberg
In principle, there is a lot of agreement among economists that lower oil prices help
the global economy via cost reduction and income effects and the reduction of
inflationary and fiscal pressures in oil-importing countries. This view already takes into
account that oil exporters will suffer from adverse shifts in real income and a slowdown
in economic activity.
As always, the disagreement arises when it comes to evaluating the net impact of a
single driver like the oil price for the overall picture, including concrete growth
forecasts. And, of course, the oil price slump entails risks as well, including the
Eurozone and/or Japan being eventually pushed into a deflationary spiral, or countries
with high oil export exposures facing significant capital outflows, currency
depreciations, rising credit spreads and financial market volatility.
Putting all of these pieces together into a single forecast is certainly a science, but it is
also an art, since the assumed transmission mechanisms are all based on assumptions
about how economic actors build expectations and accordingly adjust their behaviours.
Experience with cases in the past, like the effects of the 200708 financial crisis on
corporate and private households, should make us humble and also skeptical with
regard to consensus opinions, which often suffer from a conservatism bias.
As already said above, the slump in oil prices entails both opportunities and risks. These
have already been discussed intensively by economists (see recent World Bank and IMF
publications).4,5 We do not want to repeat these discussions here, but try to add value
for our readers by discussing a scenario that has not been covered sufficiently so far
but may constitute an enormous risk for the global economy. By doing this, we
explicitly take a view that is contrarian to the current mainstream view, in that it
assumes a significant upward surprise in GDP growth in 2015 and hypothesises that
this in turn could trigger an overreaction of monetary policy makers, eventually leading
to a burst of the apparent bubble on bond markets.
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10 for 2015
2012
2013
2014e
2015f
2016f
2017f
2.4
1.4
2.3
-0.7
5.4
3.4
4.7
7.7
2.5
1.4
2.2
-0.4
5.4
1.3
5.0
7.7
2.6
1.8
2.4
0.8
5.0
0.7
5.6
7.4
3.0
2.2
3.2
1.1
5.1
-2.9
6.4
7.1
3.3
2.4
3.0
1.6
5.5
0.1
7.0
7.0
3.2
2.2
2.4
1.6
5.6
1.1
7.0
6.9
1.0
-8.6
-0.9
-7.2
-7.7
-3.6
-31.9
-1.1
4.9
0.2
4.7
0.3
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10 for 2015
certainly be less of a problem, since the direction of its policy is pointing towards a
gradual tightening anyway. The ECB, on the other hand, would be caught on the wrong
foot, after just having launched its massive QE programme, as we have discussed
above.
Perceived comfort may turn out to be
elusive
Of course, over the short term, the drop in fuel prices gives central bankers some relief,
since inflation rates have not only dropped significantly of late (in the Eurozone even
below zero in December) but can also be expected to have an inflation-reducing effect
in 2015. The World Bank expects an oil-price-induced reduction of between 0.4 and 0.9
percentage points.10
But is the oil price drop really a blessing for those who support a continuation of loose
monetary policy regimes? In our view, the currently perceived comfort may turn out to
be elusive, as soon as the deflationary effects of the oil price drop begin to peter out
and the base effect begins to kick in. If the downward trend in oil prices does not
continue, and prices stabilise in the range of USD 4050, this will be felt in Q4 at the
latest. The inflationary risks of stronger-than-expected economic growth will come to
the fore, and monetary policy hawks will break cover again.
Monetary policy dilemma Risking the burst of the bond market bubble
For us, it appears questionable whether central bankers will find a loophole out of the
dilemma they have manoeuvred themselves into over the last few years in response to
the global financial crisis. They now have to move on very thin ice. And the tricky thing
is that it is not about fundamentals; small rate hikes from the close-to-zero levels would
certainly not make real investments significantly less attractive. It is all about sudden
adjustments of expectations on financial markets and the last straw that may break
the camels back. And in our scenario, this last straw is assumed to be an unexpected
change in monetary policy stance, driven by an oil-price-induced positive growth
surprise.
Driven by the surplus of liquidity and historically low rates, bond and equity markets
have rallied impressively over the past few years. While equity markets have reached
valuation levels that are still considered acceptable or at least not out of the range from
a historical perspective, bond markets have reached close to all-time-high valuation
levels after a long and historically unprecedented rally since the 1980s. Some call it the
mother of all bubbles, which may not be exaggerated if we take the possible
consequences of a sudden deflation of bond prices into account.
When we talk about a bubble here, were not saying that it has been inflated by
irrational exuberance, to quote Alan Greenspan in his famous speech addressing the
valuation situation on equity markets at the beginning of the millennium. This time,
the story is admittedly different, since the rally is anchored in monetary policy and low
current interest rates. In that sense, valuations are certainly not irrational, but they are
nevertheless exposed to the risk of a significant change in expectations, comparable to
the one that triggered a jump in U.S. long-term rates of eight percentage points
between August 1977 and August 1981, i.e. within just four years (see overleaf chart).
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10 for 2015
45
40
100
P/E Ratio
35
30
95
25
20
90
15
10
85
5
0
50
80
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10 for 2015
But where will the excessive liquidity end up, if the money flows out of fixed income
but not into equities? Real assets could be the answer. Coming back to the
sustainability angle, the great transition of our economies, for example, undoubtedly
has enormous financing requirements that still need to be covered. However, this is
certainly not a solution for the short term. First, despite the abundant long-term
investment needs, investors complain that direct investment opportunities with a
reasonable risk-return profile are scarce. Second, in the case of a bursting bubble on
the financial markets, risk aversion will jump, and investors will have a strong
preference for liquidity. Hence, it is unlikely that the proceeds from the bond market
sell-off will end up in real asset markets over the short term. It is a safer bet that
companies, institutional investors and private households would want to further
increase their cash positions, which are already much above normal levels.
Corporates, for example, have already increased their cash balances dramatically since
2007, as the example in the chart below shows. This increase reflects conservative debt
policies and massive de-leveraging that took place after the last financial crisis. While
these efforts may have made corporates more resilient, they also signal the lack of
profitable real investment alternatives (including M&A), despite record-low financing
costs. This shows that the usual transmission mechanism of monetary policy is not
working properly. Furthermore, it has to be doubted whether central bank measures
such as charging negative rates for short-term deposits of large financial or nonfinancial institutions, as introduced by the ECB in 2014, for example will break
investors wait-and-see attitudes.
Excessive cash positions on corporate balance sheets* High resilience, lack of
opportunities
1,800
1,500
1,200
900
600
300
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Jun-14
18 | P a g e
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The not-much-liked but obvious question is whether the excess liquidity that does not
find attractive investment opportunities will finally translate into an inflation of
consumer goods prices and then to the much feared inflation-wage spiral, triggering
even more significant steps of monetary tightening by the central banks. As a result,
we could face the dreaded combination of inflation and a stagnating economy over the
mid-term. But how likely is a stagflation scenario going forward? We certainly do not
want to bet on its impending emergence, just as we do not want to forecast the timing
of a bursting bond market bubble. We are aware that these are only scenarios, and
none of them has to materialise in 2015. And there are also scenarios that are much
more optimistic than the ones we discussed, with the one that can be characterised as
the maintenance of the current status quo, i.e. the sustaining of the unsustainable
current equilibrium, being the most likely one. But although the burst of the bubble
might well be postponed beyond 2015, we see many reasons to be seriously concerned
about the further development from a risk management perspective and hence view
the valuation levels achieved on equity markets with a healthy dose of skepticism.
A new debt crisis could spark enormous societal costs
A new financial crisis, triggered by a bond market crash, for example, would eventually
be a litmus test for the resilience of the banking sector and of public budgets globally.
As a consequence of the last financial crisis, national net debt levels have increased
over the last few years (in the U.S., from 50.4% of GDP in 2008 to an estimated 80.8%
in 2014; in the Eurozone, from 54.0% to 73.9%),13 albeit at a slower pace, due to the
historically low interest rates that dramatically lowered the costs of refinancing and
made debt levels appear more sustainable. This, however, may quickly prove to be
illusory, and a new round of bailouts may overstrain fiscal capacities.
But it is not only about the financial costs involved; the political and societal costs
would likely be high as well. The examples of Greece and Spain have shown that even
democratic/pluralistic societies can absorb economic shocks only to a certain extent
and only if a clear majority still believes that the consequences are fairly distributed
across societal groups. In cases like these, there could be a thin line between rescue
and complete failure, with the latter having far-reaching consequences for the idea of
a unified Europe, among other things.
The economic and political tensions that the next financial crisis would instigate could
not only lead to a breakup of the Eurozone but could also exert pressure on politicians
in the U.K. to make the final step and leave the EU even before 2017, the year of the
scheduled referendum.
January 2015
10 for 2015
debate around the decarbonisation of the global economy and global climate goals. Its
role, however, is double edged, with positive and negative effects at different levels
and winners and losers depending on the perspective.
High oil prices made investments in the exploitation of unconventional oil reserves
highly attractive over the last couple of years. In particular, the production of shale oil
in the U.S. soared and, with an overall oil production of now more than 9 million barrels
per day from just around 5 to 6 million just five years ago (see chart below), brought
the country back on the global map as a significant oil producer and even transformed
it into a net exporter.
10
160
140
120
100
80
6
60
40
20
Mn Barrels / day
Source: Bloomberg
A sustainable drop in oil prices below USD 50 would mean that investments in assets
linked to reserves with high production costs either become stranded (if capex made
already) or become unattractive going forward. For example, the International Energy
Agency (IEA) estimates that the average production cost for a barrel of oil produced
from North American shale reserves is USD 65. (We are aware of the differences in
available estimates, partly driven by the fact that some take transportation costs into
account, others not.) Producers may still be hedged, but these hedges will eventually
need to be rolled over, at which point producers will start to incur significant losses
with each barrel they get out of the ground. At current prices, only those producers
able to produce most efficiently will survive. Stock prices of shale oil producers have
already collapsed, and risk premia on bond markets have soared. The ability of these
companies to refinance their debt is at stake, and some banks have already pulled the
emergency break by refusing to provide fresh capital. Also, their suppliers are badly hit,
as the example of Schoeller-Bleckmann, an Austrian producer of drilling heads and
rods, shows.
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Schoeller-Bleckmann
We dont want to speculate here whether the oil price drop has been caused by a
strategy of OPEC countries to price unconventional oil reserves out of the market, or
whether the low-price environment is ultimately sustainable. But the situation, in any
case, shows what a burst of the often-cited carbon bubble could mean for investors.
Cynically, one could say that the current situation is a good learning opportunity for
them.
Oil production costs Global liquid supply cost curve (USD/bbl)
And for the shale industry itself? If the oil price remains at the current level sufficiently
long (6 months? 12 months?), it seems unavoidable that companies in the sector,
which are mostly heavily indebted, will start to default on their debt obligations, and
21 | P a g e
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this may well mean the demise of the industry for the foreseeable future. 15 The
appetite of investors to finance a comeback when oil prices swing back again to more
normal levels would certainly be limited, in light of the credible threat of OPEC to
repeat their punitive exercise once again. Surely, this scenario must sound like music
to the ears of environmental protagonists, who have long fought against fracking. On
the investors side, it will definitely strengthen the understanding of carbon bubble
risks, independent of the question of whether the outlined scenario will finally
materialise or not.
Another positive-side aspect of the oil price drop is that it gives governments (mainly
in emerging, oil-exporting countries) more room to reduce fuel subsidies, killing two
birds with one stone: reducing the bias towards energy-intensive economic activity and
improving fiscal sustainability in times of sluggish growth and a tightening of monetary
policies. According to an IMF estimate, subsidies for petroleum products, electricity,
natural gas and coal reached USD 480bn in 2011 (0.7% of global GDP or 2% of total
government revenues) on a pre-tax basis.16 The total effect, taking the negative
externalities created into account, is even much higher (USD 1.9trn, amounting to 2.5%
of global GDP or 8% of total government revenues). A number of developing countries
provide large fuel subsidies, in some cases exceeding 5% of GDP.17
The drop in oil prices now allows governments to reduce subsidies with little perceived
impact on consumer prices, lowering the political and social costs of such actions.
Several countries have already started slashing subsidies significantly in Q4 2014, like
Indonesia and India, for example. And there is much hope that others will follow in
2015. The resources released by lower fuel subsidies could either help to further
restore the fiscal resilience of these countries or be channeled to more sustainable
uses, like the improvement of critical infrastructure or investments in education.
With regard to the climate perspective in general, and the feasibility of global warming
caps in particular, the dramatic drop in oil prices also entails some negative effects.
First, it lowers the economic incentives to switch from fossil fuel based energy to
renewable energies, making it even more necessary that policy makers create a
regulated environment in which private actors are incentivised to move away from
climate-damaging energy sources. In itself, this is already a challenging situation, due
to the strongly diverging vested interests of the different parties involved, including
developed vs. emerging markets, and net energy producers vs. net energy consumers.
But with the economic and market scenario described above, the probability of a
meaningful and effective multilateral political agreement (with climate negotiations
culminating in the COP21 convention in Paris in December) is moving even closer to
zero.
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A failure of the Paris conference would probably also imply the end of climate policy
endeavours at the global level and would lead to a recalibration of expectations and
actions. Acceptance of the non-feasibility of the two-degree goal will probably cause a
significant shift in focus from: (1) mitigation to adaptation (companies and private
households preparing for an inevitable temperature increase); (2) a multilateral to a
national or regional perspective; and (3) a macro to a micro perspective. This does not
mean that the big transformation that climate change mitigation protagonists call for
will come to a complete halt. The energy transition in countries like Germany will
continue; weve no doubt about this. However, change will probably take much longer
than hoped for, at least as long as no game-changing technological breakthroughs
emerge unexpectedly.
The implications for investors are challenging and also inconvenient. For example, they
have to ask themselves even more intensely than before what a divestment from fossil
fuel sources means for their portfolios from a strategic perspective, i.e. beyond the
short-term advantage of being underweighted in Oil & Gas during periods of dropping
oil prices. Is there a critical level of oil prices that makes the tradeoff between risk and
return sufficiently attractive again to re-invest? Or at the geopolitical level, how
interested can the Western world be in a further decline in oil prices in light of the
challenging economic and political situation Russia has manoeuvred itself into? What
kind of reactions do we have to fear if economic pressures continue to increase in a
situation where Russian leaders feel cornered anyway? How will the West take this into
consideration while at the same time trying to credibly push for decarbonisation of the
global economy in Paris?
Decreasing carbon prices (EU ETS): Technical market failure or lack of conviction?
25
16
12
10
15
8
10
6
4
14
20
2
0
Source: Bloomberg
A failure in Paris would certainly not put an end to climate action, but investors need
to be prepared that change will be less driven by political consensus and regulatory
activity than previously thought. Rather, the responsibility for making climate-relevant
decisions will shift from the macro to the micro level, i.e. to companies and private
households. We expect this to have mainly two consequences. First, with the lack of
perceived government support, private economic actors will increasingly take the
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So the good news is that efforts to find cleaner but also cheaper alternatives to fossil
fuels will persist and continue to offer tremendous opportunities for investors.
However, we do not expect new national or regional windfall-type profit situations (e.g.
feed-in tariffs) to re-emerge. In the new political environment described above, the
time of non-market-induced gains would be over. New technologies will offer a
financial return to investors only if they are both cleaner and cheaper than fossil fuel
based solutions. In many sectors of the economy, alternative technologies are already
disrupting conventional patterns of energy use and consumption in the absence of any
meaningful multilateral climate agreement.
In a joint study by the World Bank and Ecofys published in 2013, 60 carbon pricing
systems were found to be in place or in development globally. This number is quite
impressive, and the progress made has raised hopes that carbon markets may have a
future, despite the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) struggling in recent years with
prices at historic lows, and despite the prospect of a possible failure of multilateral
climate negotiations. The report highlights cap and trade systems in the EU, California,
Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Quebec, Japan and the U.S. (through the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative), as well as South Korea, which launched the worlds secondlargest carbon market earlier this month. In addition, carbon taxes are cited in
Australia, British Columbia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, South Africa, Sweden,
Switzerland and the U.K.
Altogether, the carbon pricing mechanisms identified could cover up to 20% of global
emissions, which is certainly a material share. The core question now is how effectively
these mechanisms can be coordinated in order to sufficiently cap global emissions
before these reach important tipping points. The discussed linkages between the EU
and Australia and California and Quebec, and potentially the EU and China, certainly
have the potential to increase overall impact. However, as long as sufficient regulatory
arbitrage opportunities exist globally, the scope of these coordination efforts remains
limited in terms of impact. And hence, the main risk is that the progress made with
these incremental steps is probably much too slow when having a two-degree or even
a three-degree goal in mind.
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10 for 2015
The biggest merit of the diverse bottom-up initiatives from our point of view is that
they generate experience and knowledge about the function of carbon pricing
mechanisms. By doing this, they potentially help to reduce irrational fears about the
consequences of their introduction and thereby the resistance against more
comprehensive (ideally global) solutions.
Taking a step back and looking at the scenarios we described above, we must ask the
question whether these are too negatively biased, too much doom and gloom? Our
intention was to discuss the (downside) risks that recent events engender against the
background of longer-term developments that seem to drive our economies more and
more away from a sustainable equilibrium. But ultimately, these are scenarios only,
and they describe only one possible logic of how the pieces of the puzzle might fit
together. We are humble-minded enough to understand that even a small number of
unanticipated events can dramatically change the overall picture or at least the
trajectory of the unfolding scenario. So, what could a more positive scenario look like?
The core of such a scenario would have to be a combination of: (1) a revival of global
economic growth; and (2) a slow deflating of the fixed income market bubble governed
by masterful and coordinated monetary policies.
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10 for 2015
In this optimistic scenario, global economic growth would be triggered by the fall in oil
price, but would probably help to stabilise oil prices going forward, improving the
outlook for oil-exporting countries as well. On the political front, a stabilised oil price
could help to find solutions with regard to the Ukraine conflict, by taking away domestic
political pressure from Russian leaders. This brings us to two further components of a
positive scenario that we would not consider necessary, but sufficient for a positive
market development. The first one is that a further manifestation of a cold war scenario
can be avoided and steps towards a normalisation of the relationship between the
West and Russia undertaken (e.g. including a drop of sanctions against Russia). And,
the second one is that the risk of a new escalation of the sovereign debt crisis triggered
by political changes in Greece does not materialise.
As ESG analysts, we have neither the mandate nor the inclination to give
comprehensive investment recommendations. This is simply not our job and is done by
others. However, the macro picture we outlined above certainly has some obvious
implications at the strategic and tactical asset allocation level. To briefly repeat the
main points from our scenario analysis here: First, the QE programme of the ECB is
trying to sustain the unsustainable, increasing the likelihood of a new financial crisis,
with possibly far-reaching consequences. Second, we identified two straws that may
break the camels back, a default of Greece and/or an oil-price-fueled positive growth
surprise triggering an overreaction of monetary policy.
We draw four basic conclusions from this: (1) Investors are probably well advised not
to divest from high-quality fixed income instruments as long as there are hopes that
the QE programme is going to work and the uncertainties around Greece and the
Ukraine conflict prevail, despite the massive bond bubble they are sitting on. (2) The
risk profile of equities seems to be still attractive only if the oil price continues to show
weakness and as long as the crisis situations in Greece and the Ukraine do not
completely get out of control. (3) At the sector level it is clear that a low or even furtherfalling oil price and a new financial crisis situation certainly do not invite investors to
overweight Oil & Gas and Banks in their portfolios. (4) Over the mid- to long term, the
financial risks for investors are high and cannot be fully hedged, due to the bubble
situations that have been emerging in many asset classes and the empirical fact that
asset prices tend to be positively correlated in down-market situations. Should markets
turn into crisis mode again, cash will certainly be king, but negative overnight rates will
then be the rule, not the exception.
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10 for 2015
Overall, we do not expect Asia to become the worlds growth engine in 2015.
Economic momentum in China is likely to ease further due to continued structural
reforms and efforts to slow credit expansion. For Japan, we expect another round of
Abenomics, after the renewal of the prime ministers mandate in Decembers
elections. A continued aggressive monetary easing and fiscal stimulus will probably
at least avoid Japan drifting into the much-feared deflationary downward spiral. On
the other hand, growth in India is expected to recover further in 2015 from
historically low rates in the years before. With regard to these three countries ESG
agendas, we expect a focus on bribery and corruption (China and India), measures
against anti-competitive corporate behaviours (China), air pollution and water risk in
India, and nuclear safety and the building up of a renewable infrastructure in Japan.
We also expect China and India to uphold the principle of common but
differentiated responsibility in international climate negotiations. For Japan, we
foresee that the new Stewardship Code will make listed companies more active in
incorporating ESG factors into their business practices.
2012
2013
2014e
2015f
2016f
2017f
2.4
1.4
1.5
4.8
7.4
2.5
1.4
1.5
4.9
7.2
6.3
7.7
5.0
5.3
7.7
4.9
5.1
4.7
5.7
5.0
2.6
1.8
0.2
4.4
6.9
4.6
7.4
5.5
5.8
5.6
3.0
2.2
1.2
4.8
6.7
5.2
7.1
6.1
5.7
6.4
3.3
2.4
1.6
5.3
6.7
5.4
7.0
6.6
5.8
7.0
3.2
2.2
1.2
5.4
6.7
5.5
6.9
6.8
5.9
7.0
The drop in oil prices and overall soft commodity prices is a double-edged sword for
the region, with net exporters suffering and net importers benefitting. The oil price
situation will certainly help reduce energy bills for Japan, whose energy costs have
strongly increased after the shutdown of its nuclear power plants, and India, which may
additionally benefit from further reductions in fuel subsidies (see p. 22). Some of the
most significant risks for the region are contagion effects, originating from a new
27 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
financial crisis with high market volatility and a surge in risk aversion among global
investors. If the risk scenario discussed in the previous chapter should become a reality,
Asian markets would certainly not be isolated from that, but may disproportionately
suffer.
Focus on China, India and Japan
In the following, we briefly look at the three main determinants of economic growth in
the region, with China and India on the emerging market side and Japan on the highincome side, and the challenges these countries are facing (including the ESG
perspective).
China will experience a further easing of growth from 7.4 to 7.1%, according to World
Bank estimates, as a result of continued structural reforms and further efforts to slow
credit expansion. The government will move further away from a growth model based
on government-backed investment in infrastructure and heavy industries to supporting
strategic emerging industries such as energy-saving and environmental protection,
new-generation information technology and high-end equipment manufacturing. In
the rest of the East Asia-Pacific region, growth is expected to strengthen to 5.2% in
2015, partly offsetting Chinas slowdown.
Credit growth in China (credit in % of GDP)* Further efforts to slow expansion to
be expected
35
Private households
19
152
Non-financial corporate
100
55
General government
37
0
20
40
2013
60
80
100
120
140
160
2007
* data are for credit from the financial system to the government and the private sector
Source: World Bank (2015)
The Xi-Li administration is expected to push some key reforms in 2015. First, a
nationwide property tax is to be gradually implemented, in order to further cool down
the property market and also deepen the rural land and financial market reforms
(interest rate and exchange rate liberalisation) so as to release more market potential.
Second, the government is also aiming for more free-trade agreements such as the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
India, New Zealand and ASEAN countries. However, ongoing tensions with
28 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
neighbouring countries over maritime claims may impact trade negotiations. And,
third, the anti-corruption campaign launched in 2013 will continue, and those
disgraced ex-leaders such as Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou and Ling Jihua are expected to
face public trials this year. In that context, media censorship may also be further
tightened.
Chinas anti-graft battles are likely to widen in 2015. More companies, especially
foreign and state-owned enterprises, are expected to face more frequent probes and
tightened regulations. The recently initiated anti-monopoly campaign will continue,
and foreign firms involved in malpractices such as price fixing are at much higher risk
than their local peers.
To address climate change, China has pledged to ensure that carbon emissions peak in
2030 and also to increase the share of non-fossil fuels energy consumption to around
20% by 2030. However, as a developing country, China will continue to uphold the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility in future climate change
negotiations. In the wake of the 2015 climate change summit in Paris, China has called
for raised ambitions from rich countries on pre-2020 emissions cuts.
2011
2012
2013
2014e
2015f
2016f
2017f
-1.5
-1.6
-1.6
0.0
-1.0
-0.8
-1.3
-2.0
-2.5
-3.0
-4.0
-3.4
-5.0
-5.0
-6.0
Source: World Bank (2015)
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In 2015, prime minister Modis government will face the daunting task of reviving the
economy along with improving the ease of doing business in India (the country ranks
142nd out of 189 countries in World Banks ease of doing business rankings18) by
implementing structural reforms. Lacking domestic funds to invest in growing
infrastructure needs of the country, the government will have to take necessary steps
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) like delicensing, deregulation, stable tax
regimes and faster project approvals. While some initiatives, like toning down the
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) guidelines to alleviate the green hurdle and
easing the FDI norms in certain strategic sectors, have been taken, most experts feel
that it is going to be a long road towards making India the easiest place to do
business,19 a goal announced by Modi at the recently concluded Vibrant Gujarat 2015
investment summit, where Indian and global companies have pledged to invest USD
400bn20 in Gujarat. Although the initial responses to the governments reforms agenda
have been positive, tackling corruption is one of the major bottlenecks facing the
government, as the country ranks 85th out of 175 countries in the 2014 Corruption
Perceptions Index.21
Indias World Bank doing business ranking Still a lot to do
Resolving Insolvency
137
Enforcing Contracts
186
126
Paying Taxes
156
Getting Credit
36
Registering Property
121
Getting Electricity
137
184
Starting a Business
158
142
0
50
100
150
200
Indias economic growth in the recent past has failed to have the necessary impact on
job creation. With this in mind, Modi has launched the Make in India campaign23 in
order to promote India as a destination for manufacturing to global corporates. The
government has set a deadline of April 2016 for implementing the long-awaited goods
and services tax (GST) that will simplify taxes while broadening the tax base, leading to
an increase in internal trade.24
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As per a recent World Health Organization (WHO) report, 13 of the 20 most polluted
cities in the world are in India, with its capital New Delhi sitting on top of this infamous
list.25 The government has taken initial steps to limit vehicular emissions, like banning
vehicles more than 15 years old, but the countrys rapidly growing vehicle numbers will
continue to pose a major threat in 2015.
According to the World Resource Institutes,26 a majority of the country faces high
baseline water stress. With an economy that is heavily dependent on agriculture,
efficient water use will continue to remain a key success factor both for the
agribusinesses and for the industries highly exposed to water risk, like power
generation, mining and steel production. The governments goal of providing improved
access to clean water and sanitation for all by 2019 will lead to stronger regulations
against water pollution due to industrial effluent discharges in 2015.
Since the Modi government has come to power, there has been an impetus towards
transparency and a crackdown on corruption and black money. However, it will take a
few years to change the countrys mindset, and tackling corruption, which is ingrained
in Indias business culture, is one of the biggest challenges facing the Modi government
in 2015.
In 2015, the growth rate should reach a meagre 1.2%, according to World Bank
estimates, as the Japanese economy continues its struggle to bounce back from a rise
in the sales tax in 2014. The role of the significantly lower oil price is double edged. On
the one hand, the country benefits strongly from the reduced energy bill. On the other
hand, it puts the central banks strategy at risk to fuel the inflation expectations of
economic actors and financial markets. Hence, more Abenomics the so-called
three-part economic plan defined by Mr. Abe, comprising fiscal spending, monetary
easing and structural reforms can be expected going forward in order to tackle the
recession-hit economy.
The main uncertainty in 2015 is whether Mr. Abe will use his mandate, renewed in
December 2014, to implement the necessary structural reforms. The long-debated
reforms of the two-tier labor market and of the inefficient agriculture sector could
boost confidence in the Japanese economy significantly and can be seen as
prerequisites for more sustainable growth for the medium to long term.
In order to mitigate the rising geopolitical tensions with China, Japan is likely to seek a
further strengthening of economic ties with its major trading partners, especially the
U.S. and other Asia-Pacific countries, via free trade agreements. Steps towards a TransPacific Partnership would certainly be welcomed by Japan.
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10 for 2015
115
111
107
103
99
95
Source: Bloomberg
ESG agenda Revival of nuclear energy (?) and the Stewardship Code
Government aims to reopen two nuclear
reactors in response to increased energy
bill
Since the countrys nuclear reactors were shut down following the Fukushima disaster,
Japan has been heavily relying on imported natural gas and coal to power the country.
Facing an increasing energy bill, the Japanese government aims to reopen two reactors
in 2015 and has already started examining the eligibility of reopening other ones,
despite strong public opposition. The plunge in oil prices, however, will probably not
induce the government to reconsider its plans at this time, since oil-fueled plants are
old and more expensive to operate relative to coal- and LNG-powered ones.27
Investors should closely monitor how the government and the countrys nine utilities
companies, which operate all of the nuclear plants in the country, will ensure effective
implementation of stronger operational policies and be held accountable for the local
communities safety. In the long run, we expect to see growth in large-scale renewable
energy production in the country, especially since access to part of the energy market,
which has been dominated by the nine domestic players, will be opened up to outside
players in April 2016.
The Japanese Stewardship Code was put in place by the Japanese Financial Services
Agency (FSA) in March 2014. As of December 2014, more than 175 institutional
investors and proxy voting advisory firms have become signatories, a number that is
expected to grow in 2015. Although not legally binding, the Stewardship Code
encourages investors to take into consideration non-financials in their investment
decisions. As a result, we expect Japans listed companies to become more active in
incorporating ESG factors into their business practices and to improve on
communicating such practices with investors in 2015.
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10 for 2015
10 for 2015
A platform for ESG analysis
Analyst(s)
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
Drawn from our coverage universe of 4,500 global stocks, the 10 for 2015 consist of
ten major business stories that will unfold over the next year. The stories are salient
and thought provoking, and are likely to be heavily followed in mainstream media.
But beyond their financial relevance, the 10 for 2015 also share a connection to ESG
factors. Indeed, the stories demonstrate that analysing business events and
corporate decision making through an ESG lens can reveal risks and opportunities
that are difficult to capture in conventional valuation models. The ultimate impact of
these risks and opportunities on both corporate financial and share price
performance is difficult to gauge, but in many cases the link to materiality can
scarcely be doubted. In any case, it is not often said these days that less information
is better. From this epistemic perspective, the 10 for 2015 offer unique company
analysis and potentially actionable insights for investors.
In the pages that follow, we analyse ten business stories that are likely to be included
in those that grab mainstream headlines in 2015. The stories include one of the largest
proposed mergers in the history of the global construction industry (Lafarge and
Holcim), where we find hidden and potentially material synergies in energy
management and product development. We discuss the second-largest IPO of 2014
(Saudi Arabias National Commercial Bank), the opening of Saudi Arabias equity
markets to foreign investors and the rise of Shariah-compliant financial products. In a
story on Telenor, we assess the companys recent entry into Myanmar, one of the
worlds last Internet and cellphone holdouts.
Focusing on the pharmaceuticals industry, we find upside potential in a
groundbreaking remuneration model for pharmaceutical sales representatives
recently introduced by GlaxoSmithKline. And to leverage our growing expertise in
corporate governance, we evaluate the effect of questionable board practices at
Netflix, one of the darlings of the Nasdaq.
What makes the 10 for 2015 unique is that, in addition to displaying genuinely
intriguing business characteristics, they also reveal the potential value-add of ESG
analysis. Without exception, the ten vignettes discuss risk and opportunity drivers that
are difficult to identify using traditional financial tools and analysis. We do not expect
that all of the ESG-driven risks and opportunities we have uncovered will necessarily
come to influence companies share prices. Stock prices are obviously multifactorial,
33 | P a g e
January 2015
10 for 2015
and the signal from even momentous ESG risks and opportunities can sometimes be
drowned out by other factors.
Our stories offer insight into asset
selection
At the same time, the 10 for 2015 exemplify the type of robust and comprehensive
analysis that is increasingly being used by asset managers to either supplement existing
security selection procedures or construct long-term, standalone investment
strategies. Indeed, if our Macro View (p. 9) offers a prescription for asset allocation,
the 10 for 2015 deliver insight into asset selection.
For instance, we argued that forces coalescing at the macro level do not currently invite
an overweighting of the Oil & Gas and Banks sectors within an investors equity
allocation. We also found that investors would be well advised to keep their highquality bonds (despite the obvious temptation to sell). Layering our findings from the
10 for 2015 on top of these recommendations, investors might consider taking a closer
look at Intel, GSK, Lafarge and Holcim and Telenor. At the same time, we see negative
ESG-driven financial impacts at DuPont, Lonmin, National Commercial Bank, CocaCola and Netflix. Investors can participate in Pemex, which we reviewed favourably,
only through the companys debt offerings.
Country
Industry
Theme
DuPont
United States
Chemicals
Intel
United States
Semiconductors &
Semiconductor Equipment
Conflict-free electronics
GSK
United Kingdom
Pharmaceuticals
Construction Materials
Lonmin
South Africa
Banks
Telenor
Norway
Diversified
Telecommunication Services
Pemex
Mexico
Coca Cola
United States
Beverages
Netflix
United States
34 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
DuPont
Sowing seeds for African growth?
Impact
Negative
57
* as of Dec. 31/2014
Overview
Stock price performance
DuPont vs. S&P 500, 20092014
350
300
Indexed
250
200
150
DuPont
100
S&P500
50
Source: Bloomberg
Scores
Env
Soc
65
82
60
55
54
50
51
69
48
60
Overall
75
64
57
62
55
Gov
82
78
72
69
58
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
19
12
33
n.a.
18
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Deniz Horzum
Analyst, Research Products
deniz.horzum@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
DuPont is betting big on Africa. In 2013, the companys agricultural research subsidiary,
DuPont Pioneer, acquired South Africas Pannar Seed, one of the largest field crop seed
producers in Africa. The acquisition, one of the biggest transactions in DuPonts history,
dramatically improved the companys position in the African seed market. This market
is increasingly seen by U.S. and European seed companies as an important growth
opportunity, as grain yields in Africa are about one fifth of those currently achieved in
developed markets. Demand for improved agricultural productivity is rising across
Africa as a result of rapid population growth and the declining stock of arable land due
to urbanisation, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
While the fundamentals of the deal seem to make sense for DuPont, we are skeptical
about the companys claims that the acquisition will enable them to improve Africas
food security. Taking a contrarian view, we find that aspects of the deal may expose
DuPont shareholders to long-term downside risk, on the back of challenges related to
potential biodiversity loss and DuPonts generally weak policy stance on genetic
engineering.
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
35 | P a g e
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While DuPont Pioneer has the necessary tools to reach this large but historically
underserved market niche, we expect a steep learning curve and revenue capture that
may proceed more slowly than expected. The challenge stems from a misalignment
between the existing farming practices of smallholders, which have traditionally
planted open pollinating crops, and DuPont Pioneers products, which are hybrid and
genetically modified seeds that have to be repurchased annually. DuPont Pioneer
recognises that even incremental increases in the cost of farming may be difficult for
this market to absorb and is exploring different types of pricing solutions. But the
companys calculus that increased costs to farmers will be more than offset by
productivity gains may not be enough to sway the market. Even in the face of an
ostensible yield benefit, some smallholder farmers may be reluctant to switch to hybrid
seeds due to their familiarity with long-standing local farming practices.
Biodiversity loss?
G.1.4.5 Genetic Engineering Policy,
Chemicals Industry
Weak Strong
policy policy
5%
General 3%
statement
3%
No policy
90%
Source: Sustainalytics
January 2015
10 for 2015
the previous page, DuPont is one of two companies in the industry with a weak policy
on genetic engineering, characterised by the absence of detailed measures to reduce
societal and environmental risks related to genetically engineered products. Six
industry peers, including Syngenta, BASF and Dow Chemical, take a stronger stance that
demonstrates greater risk awareness. DuPonts weak policy may be preferable to no
policy at all, but in our view there is room for improvement in the companys approach
for managing business risks related to genetic engineering.
Overall, we take a moderately negative view of DuPont in the context of its acquisition
of Pannar Seed and the possible long-term financial effects. While the acquisition has
undoubtedly improved DuPonts positioning in the growing African seed market, we
are concerned that the companys business model may conflict with the needs of
smallholder farmers. Moreover, the possibility that DuPonts operations could lead to
biodiversity loss and attract Monsanto-type reputational risks cannot be completely
discounted.
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10 for 2015
Intel
Progress on conflict-free target could pay reputational dividend in 2015
Impact
Positive
86
Overview
Stock price performance
Intel vs. Nasdaq, 20092014
350
Indexed
300
250
200
150
Intel
Nasdaq
100
50
Source: Bloomberg
Scores
Env
Soc
83
89
89
88
88
86
76
85
81
84
Gov
87
79
77
79
71
Source: Sustainalytics
Intel is one of many global electronics companies whose products contain minerals
originating in DRC, but it is distinguished by sweeping efforts to eliminate conflict
minerals from its supply chain. In a recent speech, Intel CEO Brian Krzanich indicated
that Intel will strive to make all of its products conflict free by 2016.
Although we are not convinced that consumers will necessarily pay more for conflictfree electronics, we see upside potential in Intels ahead-of-the-curve conflict
minerals strategy. The major risk that we can discern that Intels process for
determining conflict-free products is found to lack credibility is mitigated by NGO
collaboration and the companys history of strong ESG performance.
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Bowen Gu
Analyst, Research Products
bowen.gu@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
Conflict minerals
Conflict minerals may not be a part of most investors lexicon, but in the global
electronics industry the phrase is driving a virtually unprecedented examination of
corporate supply chains. Much of the momentum stems from the 2010 U.S. DoddFrank Act and a follow-up directive published in 2012 by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission that requires companies listed in the U.S. to disclose the extent
to which their products contain tantalum, tungsten, tin or gold mined in the DRC and
38 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
nine surrounding countries. The rule does not prohibit the use of conflict minerals by
U.S. companies; it rather seeks to improve transparency and catalyse voluntary
corporate efforts to switch to conflict-free suppliers. Conflict-free products are
functional equivalents to regular or non-conflict-free electronics, but they are
distinguished by a verification that their component parts do not come from mines
controlled by militia groups in the DRC.
No system
58%
No formal
system
22%
Source: Sustainalytics
Source: Sustainalytics
Intel has staked out a commanding leadership position on the conflict minerals issue.
It was the first semiconductor company to establish an internal conflict minerals
team, which it set up in 2008 (two years before the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act). The
company built a comprehensive bottom-up system to trace the minerals used in its
products, including the smelters and refiners that sit at the beginning of its supply
chain. Moreover, as shown in the graph to the left, Intel is one of only two
semiconductor companies (out of a global universe of 113) that have developed a
comprehensive conflict minerals policy. Intel also played a lead role in setting up
independent auditing and certification protocols, including the Conflict-Free Sourcing
Initiative, which offers a widely used third-party audit to validate a smelters conflictfree status.
These efforts allowed Intel to make the claim in early 2014 that all of its
microprocessors were conflict free. Building off of this achievement, the company
declared in September 2014 that it would move to expand the conflict-free
designation to all product lines, including motherboards, chipsets and servers, by the
end of 2016.
From a more technical standpoint, the systems that Intel has built over the past six
years to investigate conflict minerals in its supply chain could potentially be leveraged
in other traceability regimes, thereby reducing compliance costs. The EU, for instance,
is currently reviewing a conflict minerals proposal similar to U.S. Dodd-Frank that
could have implications for Intel.
There is a final quality to Intels conflict minerals strategy which, in our view, has not
been fully priced into the companys store of reputational capital. This relates to
Intels proposed decision to open source its methods for supply chain investigation
and verification. This move, which could help reduce Dodd-Frank and SEC compliance
39 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
costs for small and mid-sized U.S. electronics companies, would be a progressive
expression of Intels commitment to the conflict minerals issue.
One major risk is the possible lack of
credibility
Taking a critical view, one could argue that Intel might be exposed to reputational and
brand risk if its process for identifying conflict-free minerals were found to lack
credibility. If, for instance, some of the companys conflict-free microprocessors were
found through audit procedures to contain minerals from militia-controlled mines in
DRC, the company would likely face blowback from certain stakeholders. We think
this is a remote possibility although not an entirely unimaginable one, given the
complexity of the companys supply chain and continued changes in the DRCs longrunning civil war.
In our view, the reputational fallout from such an occurrence would be strongly
mitigated by a number of factors. The first is Intels exceptional overall ESG
positioning. Intel is currently the number one ranked semiconductor company in
Sustainalytics coverage universe, which speaks to the companys genuine
commitment to address ESG risk through well-intentioned environmental, social and
governance policies. The second is the collaborative effort that characterises Intels
involvement in the conflict minerals issue. Intel works alongside established NGOs,
including the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition, Global e-Sustainability
Initiative Extractives Working Group, the Solutions for Hope project and the ConflictFree Sourcing Initiative, which are responsible for third-party certifications.
We expect that Intels forward-looking conflict minerals strategy will ultimately have
a positive impact on the companys financial performance. While Intels target to
make all of its products conflict free by 2016 is clearly ambitious even the companys
CEO puts their chance of success at 75% we believe the companys pioneering
efforts on an issue of obvious industry and humanitarian importance will have
positive reputational and brand effects. It is still unclear if customers may be willing
to pay more for conflict-free electronics we are skeptical about this claim but Intel
would be ideally positioned to capitalise on a consumer trend towards ethical
electronics, should one materialise.
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January 2015
10 for 2015
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
Company looks to rebound from record bribery charge
Impact
Positive
72
* as of Dec. 31/2014
After paying USD 490m over bribery charges in 2014, GSK now faces financial
penalties from ongoing bribery investigations in the U.K. and the U.S.
In early 2015 GSK is expected to report on progress made to substantial changes
in its marketing and sales remuneration practices.
We expect GSKs strong management of its bribery and corruption exposure to
lead to an improvement in the companys controversy ranking by mid-2016.
Overview
Stock price performance
GSK vs. FTSE 100, 20092014
190
Indexed
170
150
130
110
90
GlaxoSmithKline
FTSE 100
70
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
78
78
78
72
63
Scores
Env
Soc
82
75
82
81
82
75
80
69
51
71
Gov
81
70
79
69
61
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
47
10
19
61
41
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Teodora Blidaru
Associate Analyst, Governance Research
teodora.blidaru@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
In September 2014, a Chinese court fined GSK CNY 3bn (USD 490m), the largest
corporate fine in Chinas history, in connection with bribery charges. GSK and five
executives were found guilty of masterminding a kickback scheme to artificially boost
the use and sale of GSK medicines. GSK promptly admitted its guilt and paid the fine
through cash resources. The company also issued a formal apology to the Chinese
people and committed to become a model for reform in Chinas healthcare industry.
Reports in mainstream media, including the BBC and The Wall Street Journal, have
rightly focused on the lapses in GSKs compliance procedures and continued
investigations carried out by U.S. and U.K. authorities. But relatively little attention
has been paid to the substantive changes in GSKs marketing and sales remuneration
practices that were announced by management in early 2014, or the extent to which
they may be expected to curb future ethical lapses. In our view, these changes could
help GSK rebuild investor and regulator trust in the wake of its recent reputational
fallout. Though the announced policy modifications are not without disadvantages,
they could be beneficial in reducing the companys exposure to future legal,
reputational and financial risks in connection to bribery and corruption issues.
January 2015
10 for 2015
The first significant change involves a new remuneration scheme for the companys
sales representatives. Under the revised programme, GSK compensates sales and
marketing professionals based on their knowledge of improving patient care and on
their contribution to general business performance. GSK has not announced details
about how this policy works in practice, and obvious questions remain about
performance metrics. But the spirit of the new regime contrasts sharply with the
dominant industry model, where compensation is correlated with prescriptionrelated targets. Already in effect across GSKs U.S. operations, the new policy is
expected to be rolled out globally in 2015.
Similarly, GSK announced in 2014 that it would end its practice of remunerating
doctors and other healthcare professionals for attending conferences or speaking
about GSK products to audiences who can influence drug prescriptions. GSK expects
to completely phase out this policy by early 2016, thereby distancing itself from
improperly influenced healthcare personnel.
Demonstrating leadership
Remediation time for severe bribery and
corruption controversies, 20082014
Average duration of
controversy
Mode duration of
controversy
10
15
20
25
Months
Source: Sustainalytics Global Compact Compliance Service
It is simply too early to say if these innovations will help GSK reduce its exposure to
future bribery and corruption cases or recover lost reputational capital from the
incident in China. Policies alone are often insufficient for reshaping corporate
behaviours. However, our analysis of remediation time for companies caught up in
severe bribery and corruption controversies suggests that active, well-prepared
companies typically manoeuvre their way out of such controversies within 1218
months from the events onset (through remediation practices including new policy,
programme and compliance developments). In light of GSKs proactive response to
the China bribery incident, our analysis suggests that GSK could clear the
controversy by mid-2016.
GSKs recently announced strategic revisions are among the most far-reaching anticorruption measures taken to date in the global pharmaceuticals industry. While
more information is needed about the oversight mechanisms that will support policy
42 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
We expect 2015 to be a bellwether year for GSK and GSK investors, as the first
progress reports about implementation of the announced policy changes are
expected. Successful implementation of these policies could directly contribute to the
companys rebuilding of customer, regulator and investor trust and ultimately to its
growth prospects, particularly in emerging markets. Our outlook is tempered by the
recognition that the announced changes may put pressure on short-term margins and
by the possibility that GSK will encounter operational difficulties in rolling out its
revised remuneration policy globally.
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January 2015
10 for 2015
LafargeHolcim
69
9
Domicile: France**
Industry: Construction Materials
Ticker: ENXTPA: LG
ISIN: FR0000120537
Employees: 64,000
MCap (USD m): 19,946*
* as of Dec. 31/2014
** all characteristics refer to Lafarge
Overview
Stock price performance
Lafarge vs. CAC 40, 20092014
250
Indexed
200
150
LaFarge
CAC 40
100
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
76
72
69
69
68
Scores
Env
Soc
73
72
76
60
75
56
75
57
77
52
Gov
86
82
78
74
78
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
-7
5
6
4
21
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Andrada Nitoiu
Analyst, Research Products
andrada.nitoiu@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
In April 2014, Lafarge and Holcim, the worlds two largest cement manufacturers by
revenue, announced their intention to merge. The deal, which has received clearance
from the European Commission but still hinges on approval in other jurisdictions and
the successful divestment of overlapping businesses, is expected to be completed by
mid-2015. The prospective merger has been generally celebrated by investors, with
shareholders standing to benefit from an estimated USD 1.9bn in annual cost savings,
including USD 475m from improved purchasing power with suppliers. While the
fundamentals of the merger have been widely discussed and analysed, important
questions remain about how LafargeHolcim will be governed, and whether ESG
synergies between the two companies can be captured. Our analysis on these fronts
provides further support that the merger offers long-term benefits for shareholders.
44 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
While Lafarge and Holcim announced the composition of the new entitys executive
board on 23 December 2014, the composition of the board of directors has not been
fully disclosed. It has been reported that Holcims existing Chairman, Dr. Wolfgang
Reitzle, will serve as Chairman of the new entity, while Bruno Lafont, Lafarges current
CEO and Chairman, will serve as CEO and Executive Director on the board of
LafargeHolcim. While the remaining board members are likely to be drawn from the
existing pool of Lafarge and Holcim directors, we expect that each companys
strategic shareholders will have representation on the new board. (Frere and
Schmidheiny have a 20% stake in Lafarge and Holcim, respectively, while NNS and
Eurocement own 1011% of Lafarge and Holcim, respectively.) However, it remains
to be seen whether the strategic shareholders will accept reduced representation on
the combined board.
The combined board may also leverage the strengths of each companys existing pool
of directors. In our view, Lafarges board benefits from superior gender and national
diversity as well as industry experience, while Holcims board is more independent
and offers an attractive mix of skill sets. Depending on the selected mix of directors,
LafargeHolcims board could potentially capture the board-level strengths of both
founding companies, with implied long-term governance benefits.
Both Lafarge and Holcim have developed advanced programmes to manage energy
use and GHG emissions, and neither company can be said to be strategically unaware
of the benefits of energy efficiency. Careful analysis of the companies energy profiles,
however, suggests that Holcim enjoys a moderate efficiency advantage. Holcim uses
approximately 3,500 megajoules of energy per tonne of clinker (the main ingredient
in cement) compared to 4,860 for Lafarge. We put at least part of this performance
gap down to Holcims innovative waste-for-fuel, kiln efficiency and equipment
upgrade practices, as well as its new energy management module, which improves
energy use optimisation. It is of course difficult to say which companys
environmental management system will prevail in the post-merger world, but any
improvement in Lafarges energy management as a result of best practice transfer
could possibly lead to a reduction in overall operating expenses. Energy is among the
most significant costs in the cement industry, typically occupying 1230% of a
45 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
companys total operating spend, and even modest improvements in energy practices
can have material impacts on profitability.
Forced divestment could reduce EU ETS
exposure
The announced merger of Lafarge and Holcim was one of the marquee corporate
actions of 2014. Our analysis of the deal from an ESG standpoint reveals a number of
potential benefits, including attractive prospects for board membership, energy and
GHG improvements and expanded product innovation. As with other mega
mergers, we raise the invariable concern that a clash of cultures could drag on the
new entitys short-term results. But the similar ESG profiles of Lafarge and Holcim
bode well for long-term integration.
46 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
Lonmin
Results of Marikana Commission could create business risks
Impact
Strongly negative
78
* as of Dec. 31/2014
Overview
Stock price performance
Lonmin vs. FTSE 250, 20092014
300
Indexed
250
200
150
Lonmin
FTSE 250
100
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
79
78
77
48
70
Scores
Env
Soc
84
73
82
70
77
73
36
55
83
61
Gov
80
85
82
53
66
Source: Sustainalytics
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Kate Marshall
Analyst, Research Products
kate.marshall@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
47 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
officials. Arguments were completed in November 2014, and the Commissions final
report will be delivered in March 2015.
Impact on Lonmin
The extent to which Lonmin was complicit in the Marikana massacre is one of the
major questions before the Commission, but an analysis of the testimony presented
suggests that Lonmin will almost certainly be heavily criticised. There is some
evidence to show collusion between Lonmin and SAPS, as the testimony of numerous
witnesses suggests the company had pre-existing knowledge of SAPSs plan to engage
striking workers with gunfire. The Commission has also heard demands for at least
two past Lonmin board members and six Lonmin executives to be prosecuted as
accomplices to murder.
We foresee potentially long-lasting effects
on Lonmins brand
If, on the other hand, the Commissions report takes a stronger view and points to
collusion between Lonmin and SAPS, we would expect to see short-term pressure on
Lonmins share price as a result of the increased risk of the prosecution of Lonmin
executives in both criminal and civil courts. In this scenario we would also expect
longer-term negative reputational effects and challenges to the companys brand.
While the Commissions findings will not impact the market price of platinum,
probably the single most important driver of the companys share price, the
recommendation of criminal prosecution could also negatively affect Lonmins ability
to recruit top talent, particularly in executive management.
Short-term pressures
Impact
Strongly negative
48 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
60
* as of Dec. 31/2014
The opening of Saudi Arabia to foreign investors could be one of the landmark
developments in the global investment landscape in 2015.
NCB represents a unique opportunity for investors to play the rapidly growing
market for Shariah-compliant financial products and services.
NCB is exposed to a variety of ESG-related risks that could ultimately dampen
the companys competitiveness and discourage interest among some investors.
Overview
ESG performance Peer analysis
Peers
CaixaBank, S.A.
Credit Agricole S.A.
National Commercial Bank
China CITIC Bank Corp Ltd
BOC Hong Kong Holdings Ltd
Overall
81
77
60
58
57
Scores
Env
Soc
81
90
84
75
49
73
47
61
58
65
Gov
73
74
57
64
48
Source: Sustainalytics
Source: Bloomberg
The National Commercial Bank (NCB) is the largest bank by assets in Saudi Arabia. The
company recently went public, with a 25% stake sold in a USD 6bn IPO in November
2014. While shares in NCBs IPO were restricted to Saudi Arabian retail investors, the
company will be available to global asset managers when Saudi Arabia opens its
equity markets to foreigners for the first time in 2015. For investors looking to play
the rapidly growing global market for Shariah-compliant financial products and
services, NCB stands out as a unique investment vehicle. However, NCBs
attractiveness is tempered by the companys exposure to several ESG risks, its modest
ESG policy framework and concerns related to NCBs governance structure.
Analysts
Emily Lambert
Junior Analyst, Research Products
emily.lambert@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
NCB is distinguished from other financial institutions trading in Saudi Arabia by its
strategic focus on Islamic banking. Partly due to criticisms levied against the bank
from religious scholars in the wake of its IPO, NCB announced its intention in
November 2014 to become a fully Islamic bank within the next five years. This
directive essentially translates to a focus on Shariah-compliant financial products and
services. Demand for Shariah-compliant banking, credit and investment products is
rising across the Islamic world as customers move to align their religious beliefs with
their banking practices. According to Ernst & Young, Islamic banking assets in highgrowth markets are expected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of nearly
49 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
1,400
USD m
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Actual
Forecast
20% between 2013 and 2018. While critics point to high conversion costs and forced
divestments NCB recently disclosed that it would need to divest about USD 38bn in
assets in order to become Shariah-compliant the fundamentals of the market for
Shariah-compliant financial products are attractive.
While shares in NCBs IPO were restricted to Saudi Arabian retail investors, the
company will soon be available to foreign investors as Saudi Arabia moves to liberalise
its capital markets in 2015. With an initial focus on qualified foreign financial
institutions, foreign asset managers are expected to be able to buy securities trading
on Saudi Arabias only stock exchange, the Tadawul Exchange, in the first half of 2015.
Non-resident investors can currently access these securities through equity swaps,
mutual funds and exchange traded funds, but direct ownership is prohibited.
While we do not wish to overemphasise the implications of this development, it is
clear that the opening of Saudi Arabia could potentially be one of the landmark
developments in the global investment landscape in 2015. According to Reuters, the
Tadawul Exchange has a market capitalisation of approximately USD 430bn (about
the same as all other Persian Gulf markets combined) and includes about 160 listed
companies, ranging from blue chips to speciality chemical firms.
69%
Post-IPO
10%
44%
0%
20%
10%
40%
10%
60%
21%
36%
80%
100%
While NCB could attract significant interest from foreign investors once Saudi Arabias
financial markets are opened in early 2015, an analysis of the companys risk profile
from an ESG standpoint gives rise to areas of legitimate concern. While some of these
risks are shared by financial sector peers in the Saudi Arabian market, investors
should understand that these risks could put pressure on NCBs competitiveness
going forward.
The first concern relates to governance. Even after its IPO, NCB is still nearly 65%
owned by various organs of the Saudi Arabian government, including a public
investment fund, a public pension agency and the General Organisation for Social
Insurance. Moreover, of NCBs nine directors, two directors and the chair of the board
represent governmental organisations. The high involvement of the Saudi
government in the companys ownership and oversight may undermine the
companys ability to act independently. NCB is at risk of being too strongly tied to
governmental aims, and may have to balance priorities of appeasing such aims with
its financial performance and strategic development. Additionally, the concerns of
minority shareholders may not be heard as the government ultimately controls the
outcome of any shareholder votes.
Second, NCB has been accused of funnelling money through Islamic charities to alQaeda and of previously holding a controlling stake in the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International, known for money laundering and fraudulent activities. In
June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by the families and
estates of victims of the September 11 attacks against NCB, as the case lacked direct
50 | P a g e
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10 for 2015
evidentiary support and did not demonstrate a firm financial link to Osama bin Laden.
Ongoing business ethics risks related to corruption, money laundering and terrorist
financing are a product of the companys geographic operating region. Although NCB
has a money laundering policy, it does not report any outcomes of its practices or
details of policy implementation. This gap may leave the company vulnerable to
terrorism financing, an increasingly material risk in light of recent acts of terrorism.
NCB has not signed the Equator Principles
NCB also faces risks in its lending activities. The bank has not signed on to the Equator
Principles, an accord to encourage companies to integrate ESG-related factors in
project finance decisions, despite reporting that it considers such factors in its project
finance practices. The companys exposure to ESG issues is high due to loan provisions
for major non-government infrastructure and industrial projects, such as
independent power projects, a petrochemical factory and a chemical facility. Without
a firm commitment to assimilate ESG issues in its lending process, or additional
disclosure regarding its consideration of these risks, the company remains highly
exposed to ESG risks through the financing of high impact and environmentally
intensive projects.
NCB is likely to pique the interest of foreign investors looking for exposure to Saudi
Arabia and the regional market for Shariah-compliant financial products and services.
The company is poised for growth, as it recently announced its conversion to become
a fully Islamic bank, and is well established in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two countries
with strong projections in the demand for Shariah-compliant offerings. The
attractiveness of NCB as an investment opportunity, however, is moderated by NCBs
significant ESG risk exposure and its generally underdeveloped ESG policy framework.
The companys close ties to the Saudi government, coupled with its alleged
involvement in terrorist financing and risky project finance activities could discourage
the participation of some investors.
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Telenor
Advanced ESG performer poised to succeed in risky environment
Impact
Positive
73
Domicile: Norway
Industry: Diversified Telecommunication
Services
Ticker: OB: TEL
ISIN: NO0010063308
Employees: 33,399
MCap (USD m): 34,431*
* as of Dec. 31/2014
Telenor started the rollout of its mobile phone service in Myanmar in September
2014, with the company anticipating EBITDA breakeven by early 2017.
Telenors advanced ESG policies and practices may provide a hedge against
country and operational risks in Myanmar.
The lessons learned by Telenor from its Myanmar project could potentially be
leveraged in future expansion to other emerging markets.
Overview
Stock price performance
Telenor vs. Stoxx 600 Europe, 20092014
350
Normalized price
300
250
200
150
Telenor
Stoxx 600 Europe
100
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
81
75
73
71
70
Scores
Env
Soc
84
79
84
68
79
66
89
60
75
62
Gov
80
78
78
71
79
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
8
12
14
n.a.
17
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Kyuwon Kim
Analyst, Research Products
kyuwon.kim@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
Following the end of military rule in 2011, Myanmar began a process of political, social
and economic reform and started to open its borders to foreign investment. As part
of this initiative, Myanmar invited international telecom companies in January 2013
to bid on a contract to develop the countrys mobile phone infrastructure. With one
of the lowest mobile penetration rates in the world (11%) and less than 1% of its
population connected to the Internet, Myanmars telecom sector offers substantial
growth potential. However, the risks of doing business in Myanmar are myriad and
stem from the countrys history of military rule, relatively immature regimes
regarding data privacy rights and the threat of corruption. Telenor, which launched
its mobile service in Myanmar in September 2014, is highly exposed to these risk
categories.
While the potential for these risks to adversely affect Telenors financial performance
should not be ignored by investors, our analysis suggests the companys
comprehensive ESG management systems should mitigate the bulk of its risk
exposure. Perhaps more importantly from a revenue growth standpoint, the lessons
learned by Telenor from its challenging Myanmar operation could potentially be
leveraged in other emerging markets. While many Western companies continue to
adopt a wait-and-see attitude regarding Myanmar, Telenors experience in the
country, while not without challenges, is likely to pay dividends for patient investors.
January 2015
10 for 2015
stems from Myanmars mobile penetration rate of 11% and Internet penetration rate
of 1%, among the lowest in the world. Myanmar has a population of 53 million people
and, according to the Asian Development Bank, its economy is expected to grow by
7.8% in 2015. Telenor aims to offer a coverage area that spans 90% of the country
and to establish 100,000 retail stores by 2019.
Source: ITU31
Source: ITU32
53 | P a g e
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their licences, which typically limit recourse to protect user privacy or freedom of
expression in the face of government data and network requests. Telenor also has a
strong human rights policy that explicitly commits the company to respecting users
privacy rights. This policy applies to all of the companys business segments, including
its Myanmar operations.
Telenor learning valuable on-the-ground
lessons that could be exported
While many Western companies, particularly U.S. firms, continue to sit on the
sidelines, pointing to sporadic episodes of violence as evidence of the countrys still
nascent transition to democracy, Telenor is learning valuable on-the-ground lessons
that could potentially be exploited in other markets. The global telecom industry is
increasingly looking to emerging markets with low mobile penetration rates as future
growth opportunities. These markets, including Sub-Saharan African countries that
have similar political and social challenges to Myanmar, could attract considerable
interest going forward, and Telenor may be positioned ahead of its competitors.
The finalisation of the countrys telecom laws in 2015 will clarify the Myanmar
governments expectation of Telenor as it relates to network shutdowns or data
requests to support surveillance activities. We gauge Telenors strategic awareness
of these risks to be high, and we expect the company will have a successful year of
operations in Myanmar. We in turn expect positive impacts on the companys longterm financial performance and increased opportunity in other emerging markets,
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
54 | P a g e
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56
Domicile: Mexico
Industry: Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels
Ticker: N/A
ISIN: SUST569474F2
Employees: 155,000
MCap (USD m): N/A
Foreign oil and gas companies will soon be able to tap Mexicos long-isolated
energy sector, with the first round of bids expected by June 2015.
Pemex will need to quickly attract capital and rapidly modernise in order to
compete against, and partner with, foreign firms.
An ESG catch-up process will also be required to bring Pemex in line with global
industry norms, with priority issues found in Health and Safety and Corruption.
Overview
ESG performance Peer analysis
Peers
Pemex
Statoil
Rosneft
Royal Dutch Shell
Exxon Mobil
Overall
56
82
53
71
65
Scores
Env
Soc
57
43
72
83
51
51
55
75
51
73
Gov
76
93
61
85
69
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
19
13
22
n.a.
17
The Mexican state has used Pemex since 1938 to exercise a state monopoly in the
production of hydrocarbons from Mexican soil. As a state-owned company, Pemex
has had to give away large parts of its revenue stream to the Mexican government.
This situation is set to change as Mexico moves to reform its energy market. Beginning
in 2015, foreign investors will be able to bid on oil and gas exploration and production
assets, effectively ending Pemexs 77-year monopoly. At the same time, controls on
Pemex have been relaxed, with the company enjoying more autonomy over its
revenues. As Pemex looks to stay relevant and participate with Western integrated
oil majors in joint ventures, we expect that a rapid catch-up process will be
necessary in terms of both technological modernisation and ESG management.
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Alberto Serna Martin
Senior Analyst, Research Products
alberto.serna@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
In an interrelated development, the reform also included a new fiscal regime for
Pemex, which had been unable to make key technological investments and keep pace
with industry trends due to heavy revenue and tax controls. As one illustration, in
2012, Pemex paid USD 69.4bn in taxes on USD 69.6bn in pre-tax profits, for a tax rate
of 99.7%. This compares to a tax rate of 69% for PDVSA, Venezuelas state-owned oil
company, 25% for Brazils Petrobras and 31% for Royal Dutch Shell. Under the new
regime, Pemex will still have to pay an adjustable dividend to the government, but
profit sharing taxes are lowered (from 72% to 65% of the spot oil price), and other
55 | P a g e
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cost deductions are capped. Moreover, Pemex will have autonomy to allocate profits
without the authorisation of the Ministry of Finance.
Foreign oil companies to complete first
round of bidding by June 2015
These measures will improve Pemexs ability to compete against, and partner with,
foreign oil companies, which are expected to complete the first round of bidding on
contracts offered by the Mexican government in June 2015. Early indications are that
ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Repsol and Pacific Rubiales will be submitting proposals.
Pemex CEO Emilio Lozoya recently argued that USD 60bn in annual investment will
be needed to realise Mexicos oil and gas potential, which is more than twice the
investment (USD 24bn) made by Pemex in 2012. Increased participation by foreign oil
companies which Mexico is clearly expecting will likely instigate a catch-up process
in terms of modernisation and investment at Pemex.
Of course, a continued slump in oil prices may threaten this situation. As we observe
in our Macro View (p. 9), a sustainable drop in oil prices below USD 50 could mean
that investments in assets linked to reserves with high production costs become
stranded (if capex made already) or become unattractive going forward. While much
of Mexicos current production is conventional some estimates put average
production costs at Mexicos existing fields as low as USD 10 per barrel future
production consists of onshore shale reserves and high-cost deepwater projects in
the Gulf of Mexico. Massive technological investment will be required to exploit these
assets. And even among Mexicos existing fields, production is slowing and costs are
climbing, and enhanced recovery techniques are increasingly required.
In summary, the recent drop in oil prices may have modest effects on Pemexs oil
output over the short run, but it could discourage future foreign investment (one of
the core objectives of Mexicos energy sector reform) and put pressure on mid- and
long-term Pemex revenues. The bond market has certainly reacted to this concern,
with the yield on ten-year Pemex bonds climbing to 4.8% in December 2014, up from
3.8% the month before, as investors demand extra yield to hold Pemex debt.
The forthcoming (if potentially delayed) entry of foreign oil companies into Mexicos
energy sector could instigate a wave of modernisation at Pemex. But among the
benefits we see from this interaction are the possibility of substantive improvements
in Pemexs ESG strategy and performance.
Strategic awareness about the long-term financial benefits of advanced ESG
management is high in the Oil and Gas industry, and this contrasts sharply with
Pemexs generally lacklustre (although far from terrible) ESG performance. From a
competitive standpoint, we expect Pemex will need to shore up its performance in
order to attract foreign companies in possible joint ventures. Based on our
assessment of Pemexs ESG profile, we expect the companys initial efforts will
concentrate on two key areas.
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Pemex has a poor track record of injuries and fatalities among its employees and
contractors as result of explosions in the mid- and downstream segments. A total of
65 people (including employees, contractors and residents of adjacent communities)
were killed in three separate incidents between 2010 and 2014, a level well above
industry norms. The company remains under investigation by the Mexican Attorney
General Office for these infractions. While part of the challenge is Mexicos ageing
refinery and pipeline network, the lack of strong corporate policies and programmes
on health and safety and Pemexs generally flawed safety culture are problematic.
It is difficult to overstate the emphasis being placed right now on employee health
and safety by the worlds integrated majors. Especially since the Deepwater Horizon
spill of 2010, oil companies have been targeting health and safety performance as a
top-level operational priority. It is of course unclear how heavily foreign oil companies
will weight Pemexs poor health and safety track record in their joint venture decision
making, but these partnerships could potentially transfer valuable health and safety
knowledge that Pemex could ultimately apply at its troubled mid- and downstream
segments.
While many of the corruption allegations before Pemex have not been proved in
court, the companys overall exposure to the issue is high. Pemex may have a policy
on bribery and corruption, but it is obvious that it is not closely followed or strictly
enforced. The extent to which the companys 77-year legacy as a government-owned
monopoly and the rash of corruption challenges may affect its competitiveness going
forward is difficult to predict, but we expect it could cause short-term friction with
potential foreign partners. Having said that, we expect that Pemexs performance in
this area will improve over the long run, in much the same way that we expect to see
57 | P a g e
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long-term gains in the companys health and safety performance. Mexicos energy
sector reform brings 50 anti-corruption-related changes, strengthens Pemexs
corporate governance and gives the company budgetary independence to hire talent.
A new board structure with seven independent directors (up from the current five)
could also foster an improvement in internal policies and controls in the area of
combatting bribery and corruption.
The extent to which foreign investment in Mexicos freshly liberalised energy sector
may be delayed or put off entirely from the recent decline in oil prices remains to be
seen. We will be in a better position to assess this trend in June 2015, when bids for
the first round of contracts are expected to be completed. Eventual interaction with
the worlds oil majors, particularly in a joint venture structure, is likely to transfer
important ESG benefits to Pemex, which would, in our view, improve the companys
long-term competitiveness and financial performance. We expect initial upgrades in
corporate health and safety and corruption issues. These developments could serve
as a precursor to a more substantive ESG overhaul, which would likely be necessary
before Pemex could follow in the footsteps of former state-owned oil companies such
as Ecopetrol and Statoil that ultimately went public.
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73
* as of Dec. 31/2014
Overview
Stock price performance
Coca-Cola vs. S&P 500, 20092014
300
Normalized price
250
200
150
Coca Cola
S&P500
100
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
77
75
73
70
64
Scores
Env
Soc
76
76
79
69
65
79
71
70
68
60
Gov
82
78
74
68
65
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
33
17
29
17
n.a.
Source: Bloomberg
Analysts
Larysa Metanchuk
Associate Analyst, Research Products
larysa.metanchuk@sustainalytics.com
Doug Morrow
Associate Director, Thematic Research
Coke is no stranger to product diversification. The company offers over 500 brands
globally beyond its namesake cola beverage, including flavoured tea (Nestea), sports
beverages (Powerade), fruit drinks (Fruitopia), orange juice (Minute Maid) and water
(Dasani). However, Cokes recent push into the energy drinks segment and, beginning
in 2015, the high-end milk market exposes the company to an entirely new set of ESG
issues and business drivers. Over time, this exposure could lead to increased
reputational risks and litigation costs. While Coke is a historically strong ESG
performer, we question the extent to which management is aware of these risks and
managements ability to mitigate the companys downside exposure.
doug.morrow@sustainalytics.com
59 | P a g e
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It is too early to say if these policies are a harbinger of things to come, but Coke, with
approximately 70% of its global sales coming from sparkling beverages, would be
highly exposed to concerted policy action on this front. It is against this backdrop that
Cokes recent moves into the energy drink and milk segments should be viewed.
Indeed, with the company reporting a 2% decline in consolidated year-to-date
revenue in its most recent communication with shareholders (10-Q for Q3 2014), the
company will increasingly rely on these new products to meet its company-wide goal
of doubling company revenue by 2020. While the rationale for Cokes latest round of
diversification makes sense from a fundamentals standpoint, our analysis of the
companys strategy reveals a series of ESG risk exposures that merit attention.
In August 2014, Coke acquired a 17% stake in Monster Beverage Corporation for USD
2.15bn. The deal significantly expanded Cokes presence in the energy drinks niche,
which the company had originally entered in 2004 through its Fuze Beverage
subsidiary. Energy drinks typically contain large amounts of caffeine or taurine and
are marketed as being able to boost customer energy and alertness. While Cokes
investment in Monster Beverage Corporation solidifies the companys interest in the
energy drinks market, it also exposes the company to reputational risks from growing
health concerns about energy drink products. In 2012 the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) began investigating five deaths possibly linked to Monster
Energy, the flagship product of Monster Beverage Corporation. While the FDA
ultimately backed down from regulation, instead issuing non-binding guidance
documents in January 2014 following pressure from the U.S. Congress, the risk of
future policy action cannot be ruled out. At least one country, Lithuania, has taken
concrete steps to prohibit the sale of energy drinks to minors, for example.
60 | P a g e
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250
240
230
220
210
200
190
180
170
1975
1979
1983
1987
1991
1995
1999
2003
At a November 2014 press conference, Coke executives said the company expects
that Fairlife will rain money, pointing to the fragmented nature of the U.S. milk
industry and the absence of brand name recognition. Coke may deliver on this
promise, but trends in U.S. dairy consumption since the 1970s are far from
favourable. Per capita consumption of milk and cream in the U.S. dropped from 261
pounds in 1975 to 189 pounds in 2013. The weight of Cokes marketing machinery
and sterling brand may be successful in arresting this trend, but we see other reasons
to be concerned about Cokes latest diversification effort. Cokes investment in
Fairlife exposes the company to a host of new ESG issues with which the company
has little to no experience. These include animal welfare issues, such as growth
hormones and access to pasture, and the environmental impacts of animal husbandry
(including runoff to groundwater and CO2 emissions). To Cokes credit, the Fairlife
website offers sections on animal care and traceability, but the disclosures lack depth
and are, in any case, not part of Cokes reporting structure. We have doubts that
Fairlifes limited ESG systems will be able to manage attendant controversies and risks
once the product hits scale.
Overall, we take a negative view of Coke in the context of the ESG risks that
accompany its recent investments in the energy drinks and premium milk markets.
The impact that this risk exposure could potentially have on Cokes financial
performance is of course difficult to estimate, but we do not believe the exposure is
trivial. An analysis of the companys latest financial and sustainability disclosures
demonstrates generally poor strategic awareness around the growing health
concerns of energy drinks, and the multitude of ESG challenges embedded in
commercial dairy farming. Public attention towards animal welfare has never been
higher, and the spotlight that will soon fall on Coke will illuminate the companys lack
of policies and oversight mechanisms in this area. Overall, we have doubts that the
companys recent expansion spree is a strategic decision to harness the global trend
towards wellness and health. More pragmatically, we see it as an attempt to diversify
profits in the face of growing challenges to the companys mainstay cola business.
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Netflix
Questionable board practices at pivotal moment in companys evolution
Impact
Negative
43
* as of Dec. 31/2014
Takeover rumours have chased the company, and stock price volatility provides
ongoing opportunities for potential acquirers.
Substantial takeover defences remain in place, disempowering shareholders in
the face of a possible hostile offer.
Investors have repeatedly opposed the companys takeover defences and will
likely wish to hold directors accountable for ignoring shareholders.
Overview
Stock price performance
Netflix vs. Nasdaq, 20092014
1450
Normalized price
1250
1050
850
Netflix
Nasdaq
650
450
250
50
Source: Bloomberg
Overall
66
65
61
45
43
Scores
Env
Soc
60
66
53
74
54
72
39
46
37
39
Gov
74
65
55
51
57
Source: Sustainalytics
ROE *
17
20
20
15
34
Source: Bloomberg
Analyst
Gary Hewitt
Director, Governance Research
gary.hewitt@sustainalytics.com
Netflix has largely redefined itself in the past half-decade, from a technology company
that mailed DVDs, to a full-fledged Internet television network that operates an
industry-leading media streaming platform, distributing both licensed and original
content to more than 50 million subscribers worldwide. As such it has pivoted from a
technology company with a web platform and a major capability in DVD warehouse
logistics, to a media company that competes not only with other streaming providers
(e.g. Google/YouTube, Apple, Amazon) but also with traditional media companies as
content producers (e.g. 21st Century Fox, Disney), media redistributors (e.g. Starz)
and, of course, the very telecommunications providers that are Netflixs conduit to
customers homes (e.g. Comcast).
This competitive landscape itself is undergoing significant change. For example, the
merger of Comcast/NBC Universal/Time Warner brought together a cable provider,
media distributor and cable company, while Amazon has echoed Netflixs move into
both content creation and media streaming. Netflixs business position is buffeted on
all sides by these changes. The company relies on media partners to license the bulk
of its content but simultaneously competes with these companies as a content
producer itself. Netflixs content travels on fibre optic cables owned in many cases by
its competitors, which has yielded fierce public disputes highlighting the practical
meaning of net neutrality.
Netflix would be a tempting takeover target regardless of these shifts. It has a strong
brand, solid strategy and generally strong execution over time. Each of the usual
technology giant suspects (Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook) have been rumoured
acquirers, but its pivot into the media space has expanded the range of possible
acquirers to cable companies (AT&T, Verizon, Comcast) and media giants (Fox,
Viacom, Disney). Its valuation has been volatile, based on shifting investor enthusiasm
62 | P a g e
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The companys strategic direction towards streaming culminated in 2011 with an illfated decision to raise prices (to reflect increasing content costs) and spin off the DVDmailing business into a separate entity, Quixster. Customers and the markets reacted
poorly, to say the least, with a (temporary) loss of subscribers and a 50% stock price
decline. To its credit, Netflix quickly admitted its misstep and retracted the plan.
The depressed stock price provided a short-term opportunity for Carl Icahns
investment vehicles to accumulate a substantial stake in Netflix, which he intended
to use to press for a sale of the company. Netflix countered with a short-term poison
pill, further supported by the companys substantial takeover defences, including a
classified board, supermajority voting provisions, the inability to remove directors
without cause and the ability of the board to unilaterally amend bylaws and expand
the board. While Icahn predictably blasted the pill as a corporate governance
travesty, it was likely the right thing to do at the time and gave the board space during
a period where the stock was depressed. Icahn subsequently concluded that the
company should not be sold, and later liquidated his position (at considerable profit).
The pill has since expired though the board can reinstitute it quickly if desired.
The Quixster fiasco and precipitous 2011 stock price decline have yielded significant
and ongoing discontent among shareholders regarding Netflixs corporate
governance. Shareholders have, not surprisingly, focused in large part on takeover
defences. Majority-approved shareholder proposals since 2012 include:
Proposals to separate the CEO and Chairman positions had mixed results, passing
with a comfortable 73% majority at the 2013 annual meeting but falling short at 47%
in 2014. Beyond these, in 2013 a confidential voting proposal received 38% support
in 2013, with only a proxy access proposal failing to gain any traction with 4% support.
At no time has Netflix made a meaningful response to these majority-approved
proposals, which in turn has yielded significant and repeated votes against directors
beginning in 2013. All three directors in 2013 were opposed by nearly half (48%) of
votes, with one failing to get majority support. In 2014 both independent nominees
63 | P a g e
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received more than 40% opposition, and even CEO Reed Hastings garnered 25%
opposition, an unusual result for a sitting CEO.
A picture of shareholder discontent
This history raises two basic questions for shareholders. First, did the board play the
right role as CEO and Chairman Hastings led Netflix to a separation plan so quickly
and roundly rejected by customers and the market? Second, does the companys
reaction to Icahns challenge signify board entrenchment, or does it signify a need for
time to let the companys long-term strategy play out?
The latter question seems more straightforward to answer. The Quixster spinoff may
have been premature, but it has effectively played out regardless: the products have
been split, and DVD mailing now comprises less than 20% of company revenue. Even
Icahn came to agree with the strategy, dropping the call to sell and holding the
company through its 20132014 run-up (largely exiting before the late 2014 decline).
On the other hand, the boards response to shareholder challenges has been to ignore
them and leave investors disempowered. To its credit, the company has clearly
articulated its strategy to investors. But specific concerns notably, three consecutive
80% resolutions to declassify the board have been ignored to date, leaving
shareholders potentially unable to benefit from takeover interest in the firm.
Board constitution has improved as of late. Two new additions in Leslie Kilgore (2010),
who comes with retail experience, and Ann Mather (2012), with both media and
international experience, reflect Netflixs evolution from a technology company to a
broader consumer media play. It appears unlikely, however, that this board will shift
its corporate governance approach, which will be a complicated affair if a takeover
attempt or activist situation mounts.
If no takeover offer emerges, we expect some annual-meeting fireworks: directors
will face down shareholders angry with three consecutive years of ignoring a
shareholder proposal. Netflix is also likely to receive a proxy access shareholder
proposal as part of NY City Comptroller Scott Stringers 2015 campaign, which may
get more traction after another year of board recalcitrance.
If a takeover offer does emerge, shareholders face a difficult choice. Investors have
been rewarded (so far, for the most part) for sticking with the boards strategy. The
board has corrected missteps in the past and has diversified to align with the
companys strategic evolution. Yet the board has also removed shareholders ability
to even respond to an offer and has repeatedly waived off accountability.
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Chartbook
Universe analysed:
Updated:
Source company data:
Source financial data:
Company Overview
Sustainalytics Rating
Company
Industry
Country
Impact
Total
YOY
Environment
Social
Governance
DuPont
Chemicals
United States
Negative
Intel
Semiconductors &
Semiconductor Equipment
57
2.5%
54
50
72
United States
Positive
86
-0.1%
83
88
87
GSK
Pharmaceuticals
United Kingdom
Positive
72
-2.0%
80
69
69
Lafarge
Construction Materials
France
Strongly positive
69
11.9%
75
57
74
Lonmin
United Kingdom
Strongly negative
78
-1.6%
82
70
85
NCB
Banks
Saudi Arabia
Negative
60
n.a.
49
73
57
Telenor
Diversified Telecommunication
Norway
Services
Positive
73
-0.4%
79
66
78
Pemex
Mexico
Positive
56
32.7%
57
43
76
Coke
Beverages
United States
Negative
73
11.5%
65
79
74
Netflix
United States
Negative
43
-0.5%
37
39
57
100
90
90
80
86
60
60
60
57
50
69
61
57
100
70
78
72
70
73
60
56
58
59
56
60
73
60
61
50
51
43
40
ROE (%)
Rating Score
80
120
30
80
40
60
30
40
20
20
10
20
10
-10
-20
DuPont
Intel
GSK
Max
Lafarge
Lonmin
Min
Company
NCB
Telenor
Pemex
Coke
Netflix
P/E Ratio
-20
DuPont
Intel
GSK
Lafarge Lonmin
Industry average
Company
ROE (%)
Company
Avg
NCB
Telenor
Industry average
Pemex
Coke
Netflix
P/E ratio
Company
Industry
Company
Avg
Score
E
Company
Industry
DuPont
Chemicals
57
60
54
50
72
Negative
DuPont
Chemicals
21.3
19.4
21.7
-0.6
18.6
23.7
Negative
Intel
S&SE
86
60
83
88
87
Positive
Intel
S&SE
20.3
9.3
49.7
12.1
15.9
18.7
Positive
GSK
Pharmaceuticals
72
57
80
69
69
Positive
GSK
Pharmaceuticals
76.0
31.7
-4.8
15.7
17.0
29.8
Positive
Lafarge
Construction Materials
69
61
75
57
74
Strongly positive
Lafarge
Construction Materials
3.3
-2.5
10.6
23.3
34.8
65.2
Strongly positive
Lonmin
78
58
82
70
85
Strongly negative
Lonmin
-10.5
-3.1
-44.3
-0.7
n.a.
298.6
Strongly negative
NCB
Banks
60
56
49
73
57
Negative
NCB
Banks
20.3
9.7
n.a.
-6.7
13.2
19.9
Negative
Telenor
DTS
73
60
79
66
78
Positive
Telenor
DTS
15.7
16.0
22.3
18.0
23.0
38.1
Positive
Pemex
O,G&CF
56
59
57
43
76
Positive
Pemex
O,G&CF
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
-3.7
n.a.
11.9
Positive
Coke
Beverages
73
61
65
79
74
Negative
Coke
Beverages
23.9
24.2
12.6
10.0
22.0
42.6
Negative
Netflix
I&CR
16.7
14.0
25.0
-0.6
96.3
262.0
Negative
Netflix
I&CR
43
51
37
39
57
Impact
Negative
Impact
Avg
65 | P a g e
January 2015
10 for 2015
Appendix
Report Parameters
R EFERENCE U NIVERSE
20 January 2015, company data sourced from Capital IQ, financial data from Bloomberg
P UBLICATION DATE
30 January 2015
Contributions
T HEMATIC R ESEARCH TEAM
Dr. Hendrik Garz (Managing Director), Doug Morrow (Associate Director), Dr. Niamh OSullivan (Associate
Analyst), Thomas Hassl (Analyst), Madere Olivar (Editor)
Loic Dujardin (Director), Sun Xi (Senior Analyst), Hardik Sanjay Shah (Manager), Yumi Fujita (Manager)
Deniz Horzum (Analyst), Bowen Gu (Analyst), Andrada Nitoiu (Analyst), Kate Marshall (Analyst), Emily
Lambert (Junior Analyst), Kyuwon Kim (Analyst), Alberto Serna Martin (Senior Analyst), Larysa Metanchuk
(Associate Analyst)
Glossary of Terms
Collection of observation points reflecting the controversial behaviour of a company regarding environment,
social and governance issues. A controversy is measured by the associated controversy indicator, which is
defined at the sub-theme level. Controversies are rated from Category 0 (no controversy) to Category 5
(severe). Each controversy indicator consists of a bundle of event indicators.
I MPACT
The expected directional impact of the event analysed on the company's long-term financial performance.
Categories include: strongly positive; positive; negative; and strongly negative.
Evaluates a companys overall ESG performance on a scale of 0100, based on generic and sector-specific
ESG indicators that are grouped in three (ESG) themes and four dimensions (Disclosure, Preparedness,
Qualitative Performance and Qualitative Performance), derived by multiplying the raw scores for the
relevant indicators with their respective weights.
R ELATIVE P OSITION
Classification of companies into five distinct performance groups, based on a companys score (overall ESG
score, theme score or dimension score), according to its relative position within the reference universe,
assuming a normal distribution of the scores:
# companies in % of universe
CONTROVERSY
68%
11%
5%
0%
5%
11%
16%
84%
5%
95%
Underperformer
Industry Leader
Average Perfomer
100%
Industry Leader:
Outperformer:
Average Performer:
Underperformer:
Industry Laggard:
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January 2015
10 for 2015
Endnotes
1
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European Central Bank (2014), Monetary developments in the euro area, ECB, accessed (21.1.15) at:
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Ibid.
World Bank (2015), Global Economic Prospects: Having Fiscal Space and Using It, World Bank, accessed at (21.1.15) at:
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Ibid.
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10
11
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12
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13
International Monetary Fund (2014), World Economic Outlook: Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven, April 2014, IMF,
accessed (21.1.15) at: http://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf
14
A series of defaults in this area would also be a drag for the U.S. junk bond market, on which bonds of companies in the shale
industry have a significant share. Also, regional banks partly have high stakes in the industry
15
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16
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https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf
17
18
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67 | P a g e
January 2015
10 for 2015
19
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20
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21
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at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
22
23
24
The Times of India (2014), GST to be implemented from April 2016: Sinha, The Times of India, accessed (21.1.15) at:
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25
Iyengar, R. (2014), New Delhi, the Worlds Most Polluted City, Is Even More Polluted Than We Realized, Time Inc., accessed
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26
World Resources Institute (n.d.), Aqueduct Atlas, World Resources Institute, accessed (21.1.15) at: http://www.wri.org/ourwork/project/aqueduct/aqueduct-atlas
27
Wang, Y. and Tsukimori, O. (2014), Japan nuclear restart to hit oil usage hardest: Survey, Reuters, accessed (21.1.15) at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/us-nuclear-japan-restart-idUSKCN0HW02E20141007
28
Pannar company website (2015), accessed (21.1.15) at: http://www.pannar.com/change_country/contact_us and Dupont Pioneer
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29
EY (2013), World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report, 201314, EY, accessed (21.1.15) at:
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30
National Commercial Bank (2014), The National Commercial Bank Prospectus, NCB, accessed (21.1.15) at:
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31
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32
Ibid.
33
United States Department of Agriculture (2014), Dairy Data, USDA, accessed (21.1.15) at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/dairy-data.aspx
68 | P a g e
Thematic Research