MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN RWANDA

1. Windows of opportunities. The situation in Rwanda exhibited four particular windows of opportunity
where the violence could have been prevented or stopped. (1) The Arusha process had the potential to prevent
new outbreaks of violence by including all relevant parties, fostering a win-win solution, providing methods to
solve conflict, and starting disarmament and reconciliation processes (Scorgie). (2) Although flawed, the final
Arusha Accords called for a Neutral International Force (NIF) that would oversee the implementation of the
accords and ensure overall security in Rwanda (Eriksson et al.). Such a force could have given a strong signal to
the Rwandan government (RG) about the international communitys commitment and willingness to enforce the
agreements if violence broke out (Suhrke and Jones). (3) An opportunity appeared when UNAMIR received
information about the Interahamwes plans (Frontline). An assertive response could have reduced the number of
weapons available and reminded the RG of UNAMIRs ability to enforce the Arusha Accords. This would have
delayed or limited the outbreak of violence. (4) When the intentions of the perpetrators became apparent during
the first weeks of the genocide, the situation called for an intervention to stop the atrocities (Frontline).
2. Stakeholder-opportunity matching. The different windows of opportunities prompted different
stakeholders to act. (1) In addition to the parties to the Arusha Accords, the proponents of the agreements,
including Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, France, and the US, acted as stakeholders and had an interest in successful
negotiations (Scorgie). (2) The members of the Security Council were involved through their responsibility for
mandating a NIF. (3) The UN Peacekeeping office and UNAMIR were also responsible for responding to
Interahamwes plans together with the United States, France, and Belgium after being notified (Meisler). (4)
During the first week of the genocide, many additional actors could have acted to stop the violence. Because of
their proximity (Burundi, Tanzania, and former Zaire), close relationship to the parties involved (Uganda), and
central role in the region (Kenya), these states had an interest in regional stability and stopping violence in
Rwanda. As the organ responsible for preserving international peace and stability the SC and in extension PKO
had clear incentives to act. As a superpower with superior military capacity, the US could also have intervened,
while Belgium and France had interests in Rwanda as former colonizing powers.
3. Projection. (1) The facilitators of the Arusha Accords could have ensured i.e. that the process

balanced the power asymmetry between the parties, and established disarmament and reconciliation processes
(Suhrke and Jones). This would have facilitated de-escalation and an outcome all the parties were satisfied as
well as underline the facilitators commitment to the process. As the militias drew their support from Hutus
dissatisfied with the process, this intervention could have limited their recruitment. (2) The SC members could
have approved a stronger and clearer mandate for UNAMIR (Scorgie). This would have enabled UNAMIR to
enforce the overall security in Rwanda as envisaged in the Arusha Accords by arresting perpetrators, seizing
weapon caches, shutting down radio stations that incited violence and protecting civilians efficiently. (3)
Likewise, in lieu of UNAMIRs unclear mandate, the PKO could have authorized such actions and asked for
more troops. Dallaires troops could also have disregarded the orders from NY and i.e. seized weapons and shut
down the radio which on short term could have reduced weapons available and limited incitement to violence,
but could also have triggered more violence against UN personnel. (4) When the genocide had started the
informed actors could have notified the SC while the SC could promptly have upgraded UNAMIRs mandate
and called for more troops. States who evacuated own citizens from Rwanda could have contributed their troops
to stopping the genocide while the US could have jammed the radio stations. The mentioned stakeholders could
also have contributed with troops within or outside a UN mandate. If the stakeholders had seized the
opportunities mentioned in these four points the genocide would most likely have been prevented, halted, and
stopped respectively, but could also have caused losses on allied forces.
4. Gap analysis. The opportunities identified do not match the responses from the stakeholders for many
reasons. Overall, the stakeholders did not intervene because of lack of: inability to understand the magnitude of
strategic interests in Rwanda, political costs of interventions, and concerns that the incidents in Somalia would
be repeated (Power). All the mentioned interventions were sufficiently visible and for the most part accessible.
However, while the neighboring and European states have direct interests in Rwanda, the US did not. With a
few exceptions, the mentioned states focused on the potential legal, political and monetary costs of the
mentioned interventions and overlooked the positive political benefits as well as the cost of non-intervention.
Considering the limited political cost for states such as the US, France, and Belgium compared to the potential
cost of intervention, these concerns were mostly justified. Moreover, the public interest and support in these

countries were minimal (Frontline). However, the neighboring countries Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire have
continued to suffer from the regional instability, and may have gained more by intervening in Rwanda or
invoking the intervention by regional actors and brokers such as the Organisation for African Unity.

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