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Facts:
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that
since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been
duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared
that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality
of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912"
where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An
ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a
wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even
have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his
ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out
to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does
not only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in
his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the
substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in
this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice
through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of
law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the
end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy
to set in.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and
Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal
effect.
Altarejos vs COMELEC
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the
decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that
petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had
complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner
submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the
requirements of repatriation only during his motion for
reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer
consider said evidence.
Petition is Denied. Appendix:
Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of
independent component cities, component cities or municipalities
must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.[SEC.
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any electiveposition:]xxx.(d) Those with dual
citizenship.xxx.(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
o
When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Barangay 6), for
one year before 14 May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.
o
While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his
Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for
a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of LGC
o
He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as
required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003
-Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has
therefore the mandate of the electorate to serve
o
Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically
establish his domicile at Barangay 6.
o
Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6
(Oct 2005)
o
2.
Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a
residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding offices as
governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in
Cagayan de Oro City and having a house therein where he had
stayed during his tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in
2.An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms
and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his
fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had aninterruption in
the continuity of the officials service. For, hehad become in the
interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a
private citizen ( Adormeo vs Comelec, 2002 andSocrates vs
Comelec, 2002).
Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City
3.The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of
a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt
theincumbent officials continuity of service (Latasavs
Comelec,2003).
Re: Period of Preventive Suspension
4.Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the
elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is
barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period
( Aldovino, Jr.vs Comelec, 2009)
Re: Election Protest
broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived
of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an
office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared
to have been the rightful choice of the electorate. The three-term
limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly: Sec. 43.
Term of Office
. x x x x (b)No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of theoffice for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption inthe continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective officialconcerned was elected. To
constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office
pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions,
the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the
Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official
for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three
consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected. In Aldovino, Jr.,however, the Court stated the
observation that the law does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not
affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes of
thethree-term limit rule.
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle
behind the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and
that what the Constitution prohibits is amconsecutive fourth term.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive
terms of the official after his or her third term. Of course, the basic
law is unequivocal that a voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected . This qualification wasmade as a deterrent
against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term
limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends.
This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary
interruption which may be brought about by certain events or
causes. The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting
consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption are the
following:
The Case of Abundo presents a different factual backdrop than
those cases whose doctrines are cited above. Unlike in other protest
cases, , Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was
declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Also, Abundo
was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had assumed the
remainder of the term. The intention behind the three-term limit
rule was not only to abrogate the monopolization of political
power and prevent elected officials from breeding proprietary
interest in their position but also to enhance the peoples
freedom of choice.
In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,while people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly ofpower may bring
about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
unduly curtailed.
thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than
theinvoluntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for
an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strictintent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office
to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not
constitute aninterruption.Strict adherence to the intent of the threeterm limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in
office beyond three terms.
A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
because the suspended official continues to stay in office although
he is barredfrom exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is
the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists .
THE FACTS
the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional
elections, should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM
elections.
2.
NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on
separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The
Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of
the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill
has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of
the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our
Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit
as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent]
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until
those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1.
1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would
extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered
and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms.
Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an
interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
TALAGA CASE
ADORMEO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927)
Facts:Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in
1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections.
Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections,
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June
30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001
sp
FACTS: A permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the Vice
Mayor of San Isidro, Isabella when incumbent Vice-Mayor Nelia
Tumamao died on December 2, 2004. Pursuant to Sec. 44 of RA
7160, Ligaya Alonzo, the highest ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position.
To fill the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguinang Bayan, Mayor Lim
recommended to Governor Padaca the appointment of Oscar
Tumamao, also a member of LDP. Tumamao was appointed, took
his oath and attended sessions.
On May 2005, Atty. Lucky Damasen, became a member of LDP
and got hold of a letter of nomination to the Sanggunian Bayan
from provincial chairman of LDP Balauag addressed to Governor
Padaca. He was appointed to SB and took his oath. Damasen
attended sessions but he was not recognized.
He filed a petition for quo warranto with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against Tumamao with the RTC, seeking to
be declared the rightful member of the SB.
As part of his defense, Tumamao presented Atty. Ernest Soberano
who identified a letter dated June 14, 2005, signed by LDP
Provincial Chairman Balauag, which states that the latter was
revoking her nomination of Damasen, and that she was confirming
Tumamaos nomination made by Mayor Lim. Later, Tumamao
presented Provincial Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents
of her letter revoking the nomination of Damasen.
RTC ruled in favor of Damasen.
Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The
CA held that Damasen was not entitled to assume the vacant
position in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Issue: Who, between Damasen and Tumamao, is entitled to the
contested position?
Held: Tumamao is entitled to the contested position.
It is undisputed that the law applicable to herein petition is Sec. 45
(b) of RA 7160, which provides for the rule on succession in cases
of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. As can be gleaned from
Sec. 45, the law provides for conditions for the rule of succession
to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political
party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy.
Second, the appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of
Membership from the highest official of the political party
concerned. The reason behind the right given to a political party to
nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the
people in the election.
Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred because
of the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor, it follows
that the person to succeed her should also belong to the LDP so as
to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court cannot
countenance Damasens insistence in clinging to an appointment
when he is in fact not a bona fide member of the LDP. While the
revocation of the nomination given to Damasen came after the fact
of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in his favor, because the
very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is that the appointee must
come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member