Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
versus
Present:
ANACLETO
L.
TAECA,
GEREMIAS S. TATO, JAIME N.
CAMPOS, MARTINIANO A.
MAGAYON,
JOSEPH
B.
BALGOA,
MANUEL
G.
ABUCAY,
MOISES
M.
ALBARAN, MARGARITO
G.
ALICANTE, JERRY ROMEO T.
AVILA, LORENZO D. CANON,
RAUL P. DUERO, DANILO Y.
ILAN, MANUEL M. MATURAN,
JR., LUISITO R. POPERA,
CLEMENTINO
C.
QUIMAN,
ROBERTO
Q.
SILOT,
CHARLITO
D.
SINDAY, REMBERT
B.
SUZON ALLAN J. TRIMIDAL,
and NAMAPRI-SPFL,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Section
membership.
6. Maintenance
of
Promulgated:
Respo
ndents.
August 9, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution [2] dated
October 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
71760, setting aside the Resolutions dated October 8,
2001[3] and April 29, 2002[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001 and reinstating
the Decision[5] dated March 16, 2001 of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On February 13, 2001, respondents Anacleto Taeca,
Loreto Uriarte, Joseph Balgoa, Jaime Campos, Geremias Tato,
Martiniano Magayon, Manuel Abucay and fourteen (14) others
filed a Complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
money
claims
against
petitioner
PICOP
Resources,
Incorporated (PRI), Wilfredo Fuentes (in his capacity as PRI's
Vice President/Resident Manager), Atty. Romero Boniel (in his
capacity as PRI's Manager of Legal/Labor), Southern
Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), Atty. Wilbur T. Fuentes
(in his capacity as Secretary General of SPFL), Pascasio
Trugillo (in his capacity as Local President of Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa PICOP Resources, Inc.- SPFL [NAMAPRI-
1 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
6.1
All employees within the
appropriate bargaining unit who are
members of the UNION at the time of
the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as
a condition of continued employment
by the COMPANY, maintain their
membership in the UNION in good
standing during the effectivity of this
AGREEMENT.
6.2
Any employee who may
hereinafter be employed to occupy a
position covered by the bargaining unit shall
be advised by the COMPANY that they are
required
to
file
an
application
for
membership with the UNION within thirty
(30) days from the date his appointment
shall have been made regular.
6.3
The COMPANY, upon the
written request of the UNION and after
compliance with the requirements of
the New Labor Code, shall give notice
of termination of services of any
employee who shall fail to fulfill the
condition provided in Section 6.1 and
6.2 of this Article, but it assumes no
obligation to discharge any employee if it
has reasonable grounds to believe either
that membership in the UNION was not
available to the employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than
voluntary resignation or non-payment of
regular union dues. Separation under the
Section is understood to be for cause,
consequently, the dismissed employee is not
entitled to separation benefits provided
2 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN HONEST ERROR IN
THE
INTERPRETATION
AND/OR
CONCLUSION OF LAW FALL WITHIN THE
AMBIT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, REVISED
RULES OF COURT.[10]
1.
Declaring
complainants dismissal illegal; and
2.
Ordering
respondents Picop Resources Inc. (PRI) and
NAMAPRI-SPFL to reinstate complainants to
their former or equivalent positions without
loss of seniority rights and to jointly and
solidarily pay their backwages in the total
amount of P420,339.30 as shown in the
said Annex A plus damages in the amount
of P10,000.00
each,
or
a
total
of P210,000.00
and
attorneys
fees
equivalent to 10% of the total monetary
award.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner is mistaken.
Unsatisfied,
respondents
filed
a
petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and
sought the nullification of the Resolution of the NLRC dated
October 8, 2001 which reversed the Decision dated March 16.
2001 of Labor Arbiter and the Resolution dated April 29,
2002, which denied respondents motion for reconsideration.
I
WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVELY (sic)
BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA) CAN BE
GIVEN ITS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL
as
3 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
Secondly, it is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRISPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PRI, in their
letters dated May 16 and 23, 2000, to terminate the
employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to
the Union.
However, as to the third requisite, we find that there
is no sufficient evidence to support the decision of PRI to
terminate the employment of the respondents.
PRI alleged that respondents were terminated from
employment based on the alleged acts of disloyalty they
committed when they signed an authorization for the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a Petition for
Certification Election among all rank-and-file employees of
PRI. It contends that the acts of respondents are a violation
of the Union Security Clause, as provided in their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
We are unconvinced.
4 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
At
the
expiration
of
the
freedom period, the employer shall
continue to recognize the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining
agent
where
no
petition
for
certification election is filed. [19]
5 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
SO ORDERED.
Conclusiveness of Decision
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. Vs. John Melchor A.
Laurente,G.R. No. 158883. April 19, 2006
PHILIPPINE
TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,
INC.,
G. R. No. 158883
Present:
Petitioner,
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
JOHN
MELCHOR
A.
LAURENTE, substituted by
JUAN A. LAURENTE, JR.
and
NATIVIDAD
A.
AQUINO,
Respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
is
6 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
The 31 March
1994
amendment
that increased
the
disability
benefits
of
seamen should
apply
to
John Melchors
claim.
The NLRC ruled, and the Court of Appeals agreed,
that the 31 March 1994 amendment to the POEA Standard
Employment Contract increasing the disability benefits of
seamen from US$11,000 to US$50,000 should apply to
John Melchors claim. This is pursuant to Section 2 of the
primary contract between petitioner and John Melchor which
provides that the terms and conditions of the Revised
Employment
Contract
for
seafarers
governing
the
employment of all Filipino Seafarers approved by the
POEA/DOLE on July 14, 1989 under Memorandum Circular No.
41, series of 1989, and amending circulars relative thereto
shall be strictly and faithfully observed.[6]
The NLRC further ruled:
The employment contract of the
complainant was twelve (12) months (June
20, 1993 to June 1994). The illness of the
complainant was discovered on May 20,
1994, a date within the twelve-month
period of the employment contract and
already covered by the effectivityof the new
rate of disability benefits under the Revised
Employment Contract for seafarers. The
revision of the rate of disability benefits
under
the
amended
POEA
Standard
Employment Contract is corrective in nature
and favorable to the seafarers. To conform
with the prevailing rate, there is a need to
adjust the disability benefits awarded to the
complainant.[7]
Petitioner contests this ruling, asserting the
inapplicability of the 31 March 1994 amendment: (a) because
John Melchorscause of action, if any, arose at a time prior to
the effectivity of the amendment; and (b) because the
employment contract between John Melchor and petitioner
was no longer in force when the said amendment took effect.
[8]
7 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
G.R.
166363
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Sometime
in
June
1998,
complainants [herein respondents] were
contracted by respondent [herein petitioner]
Skippers [United Pacific, Inc.], to work on
board the vessel MV Hanjin Vancouver, as
Fitter for a contract period of nine (9)
months plus or minus one (1) month pay
[by] mutual consent. In a POEA contract of
employment,[6] complainant had to work
under the following terms and conditions:
No.
Petitioners,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J
.
Chairperson,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
- versus -
CALLEJO, SR.,
and
JERRY MAGUAD andPORFERIO CEUD
ADANO,
JERRY P. MAGUAD
POSITION
BASIC MO. SALARY
Respondents.
hours/week
Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
4th En
gineer
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
HOURS OF WORK
OVERTIME
FIXED
:
105/HRS
OT AFTER
:
US$3.22
PAY
LEAVE
:
8 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
US$160.80
US$107.20
US$536.00
:
48
OT (AFTER
:
105/HRS)
US$4.40
PORFERIO L. CIUDADANO
xxxx
POSITION
Bosu
US$451.00
HOURS OF WORK
48
hours/week
OVERTIME
FIXED
:
105/HRS
OT AFTER
:
US$2.71
PAY
LEAVE
:
US$135.30
US$90.20
xxxx
JERRY P. MAGUAD
US$915.00
OVERTIME
PAY
ALLOWANCE
OVERSEAS
:
105/HRS)
OT
:
US$214.00
US$126.00
(AFTER
US$6.61
JERRY P. MAGUAD
PORFERIO L. CIUDADANO
BASIC MO. SALARY
BASIC MO. SALARY
US$609.00
PAY
FIXED
OVERTIME
LEAVE
PAY
ALLOWANCE
:
OVERSEAS
:
6.00
US$142.00
FIXED OVERTIME
US$160.80
OT AFTER
:
US$3.22
LEAVE
PAY
US$126.00
9 | L A B O R R E L AT I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
US$107.20
US$53
PORFERIO L. CIUDADANO
US$45
1.00
PAY
105/HOURS
FIXED OVERTIME
US$135.30
OT AFTER
:
US$2.71
LEAVE
PAY
US$90.20
(a)
(b)
10 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
II
I.
II.
III.
Whether
or
not
petitioner
Skippers
can
be
exempted from liability by the
execution
of
Affidavits
of
Assumption
of
Responsibility
executed by Sea Power Shipping
Enterprises, Inc. and Evic Human
Resources Management, Inc.
11 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
IV.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Whether
the
respondents
are
entitled
to
indemnity
equivalent
to
the
unexpired
portion
of
their
employment contract.
12 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
I.
II.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Commission of a crime or
offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative;
and
(e)
13 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
14 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
applicant:
xxx
15 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
SO ORDERED.
Strike
- versus -
G.R.
154591
No.
Present:
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 5, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision, [1]dated 31
October 2001, promulgated by the Court of Appeals, affirming
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), dated 5 April 2000, declaring that the strike held by
the petitioner Manila Hotel Employees Association (MHEA),
herein represented by Ferdinand Barles, is illegal. The Court
of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, modified the Decision
rendered by the NLRC and ruled that both incumbent officers
and members of MHEA involved in the illegal strike lost their
employment status.
On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) in its National Capital Region office against Manila
Hotel on the grounds of unfair labor practices.[2] Upon the
petition of Manila Hotel, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code on 24 November 1999. Specifically, the Order
enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to
cease and desist from committing any acts that may
exacerbate the situation.[3] The parties and their counsels
were served copies of the said Order.[4] MHEA filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the
validity of said Order.
The case was set for mandatory conference on 8
February 2000 before Presiding Commissioner Rogelio
I. Rayala. During the conference, the parties were advised of
the certification order, which prohibited them from taking any
action that would exacerbate the situation. At the instance of
the MHEA officers, the hearing of the case was reset to 29
February 2000 due to the absence of the counsel for MHEA.[5]
On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted a strike
despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE on 24
November 1999, and despite the repeated reminders thereof.
[6]
On the same day, Commissioner Rayala called for a
mandatory conference.[7]Thereafter, several conferences were
conducted by the NLRC, wherein both parties were warned
against aggravating the already volatile situation. During its
hearing on 8 March 2000, the NLRC sought to have both
16 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RESPONDENT
COMMISSION HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND THEY HAD
COMMITED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THEIR
QUESTIONED
DECISIONS
AND
RESOLUTIONS WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, BY LAW
AND
SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE,
THE
INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS, WHO ARE MERE
ORDINARY MEMBERS OF THE UNION, ARE
ENTITLED TO BE REINSTATED BACK (sic)
TO WORK WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY
OR OTHER EMPLOYEES RIGHTS AND
BENEFITS AND WITH FULL BACKWAGES
FROM DATE OF DISMISSAL UNTIL ACTUAL
REINSTATEMENT.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT BELOW
AND THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION HAD
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF STRAINED
RELATIONSHIP IN THE CASE AT BAR.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Before discussing the substantial issues of this case,
this
Court
takes
notice
of
a
serious
procedural
flaw. Ferdinand Barles is not authorized to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the
present case. The General Membership Resolution, dated 23
December 1998, affirmed that he was appointed as the
Chairman
of
MHEA,
in
place
of
Gonzalo Irabon.
[35]
Nevertheless, Barles failed to refute the facts that were
ascertained by the certification of the secretary-general of
MHEA: that at the time this petition was filed on 26
September 2002, and even at the time the petition was filed
before the Court of Appeals by Manila Hotel - on 10 July
2000, Ferdinand Barles was no longer the Chairman of
MHEA. The
certification
clearly
stated
that
Antonio Dumpit was the union Chairman from 5 July
2000 to 19 December 2000, and that he was succeeded by
Eduardo Saplan. Moreover, the SPAs that were submitted to
the Court in order to prove that Barles was authorized to sign
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in this
case failed to establish that crucial fact. The SPAs had in fact
authorized Barles to represent the 138 members who signed
the SPA to represent them in a different case, Manila Hotel
Employees
Association
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission, CA-G.R. S.P No. 59601, which was raised on
appeal before the Supreme Court under G.R. No.
144879. The MHEAs assertion that there were the same
parties and issues involved in the two cases is self-defeating,
not only because these are clearly two distinct cases, but
17 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
STRIKES,
PICKETING,
AND
xxxx
(g)
xxxx
18 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
19 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
Dear Madame:
I am tendering my irrevocable
resignation effective April 1, 2003 due to
personal and family reasons.
I would like to express my thanks
and gratitude for the opportunity, trust and
confidence given to me as an Acting
Principal in your prestigious school.
SO ORDERED.
- versus -
ADELAIDA P. MANALO,
Respondent.
Greetings of Peace!
The Board of Trustees of the Cario Group
of Companies, particularly that of Magis
Young Achievers Learning Center convened,
deliberated and came up with a Board
Resolution that will strictly impose all means
possible to come up with a cost-cutting
scheme. Part of that scheme is a
systematic reorganization which will entail
G.R. No. 178835
streamlining of human resources.
Present:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
(Signed)
Mrs. Violeta T. Cario
School Directress
NACHURA, J.:
Noted by:
(Signed)
Mr. Severo Cario
President[2]
On April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against
petitioner a Complaint [3] for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of 13th month pay, with a prayer for reinstatement, award of
full backwages and moral and exemplary damages.
20 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
II. THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
MANALO IS A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CONTRACT OF
EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT DID NOT STIPULATE A
PERIOD.[12]
21 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
Art.
281. Probationary
Employment. Probationary
employment
shall not exceed six (6) months from the
date the employee started working, unless
it is covered by an apprenticeship
agreement stipulating a longer period. The
services of an employee who has been
engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails
22 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
23 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
[43]
24 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
SO ORDERED.
(b)
PAL, Inc. vs. Enrique Ligan,
146408, February 29, 2008)
G.R.
Petitioner,
- versus -
No.
pay
respondent
BENEDICTO
AUXTERO salary
differential; backwages from
the
time of his dismissal until the finality
of this decision; and separation
pay, in lieu of reinstatement,
equivalent to one (1) month pay for
every year of service until the finality
of this decision.
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
CARPIO MORALES,
SO ORDERED.[1]
CORONA,
TINGA, and
Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) having been
VELASCO, JR.,
found to be a labor-only contractor, respondents were
consequently declared as petitioners regular employees who
are entitled to the salaries, allowances, and other
employment benefits under the pertinent Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Promulgated:
Petitioner prays for a reconsideration of the Decision,
maintaining its position that respondents were employed by
Synergy, and to reinstate respondents as regular employees
April 30, 2009
is iniquitous since it would be compelled to employ personnel
more than what its operations require. It adds that the Court
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - should declare that reinstatement is no longer an appropriate
-------------x
relief in view of the long period of time that had elapsed.
ENRIQUE LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE,
JOLITO OLIVEROS, RICHARD GONCER, NONILON
PILAPIL,
AQUILINO
YBANEZ,
BERNABE
SANDOVAL, RUEL GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS,
JR., ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES,
LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARISUSA, JEFFREY
LLENES, ROQUE PILAPIL, ANTONIO M. PAREJA,
CLEMENTE
R.
LUMAYNO,
NELSON
TAMPUS,
ROLANDO
TUNACAO,
CHERIE
ALEGRES,
BENEDICTO AUXTERO, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG,
NELSON M. DULCE and ALLAN BENTUZAL,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and respondents Motion for Clarification
and/or Reconsideration of the Courts February 29, 2008
Decision in light of incidents bearing on the present case
which were not brought to light by them before the Court
promulgated said Decision.
The Decision of the Court affirmed with modification
the appellate courts September 29, 2000 Decision and
directed petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to:
(a)
25 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
26 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
of
Appeals Decision of September 29, 2000 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., is ORDERED to recognize respondents
ENRIQUE LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN
PANQUE, JOLITO OLIVEROS, RICHARD
GONCER, NONILON PILAPIL, AQUILINO
YBANEZ,
BERNABE
SANDOVAL,
RUEL
GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS, JR.,
ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES,
LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARISUSA,
JEFFREY LLENES, ANTONIO M. PAREJA,
CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS,
ROLANDO TUNACAO, CHERIE ALEGRES,
EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG, NELSON M.
DULCE and ALLAN BENTUZAL as its regular
employees in their same or substantially
equivalent positions, and pay the wages and
benefits due them as regular employees
plus salary differential corresponding to the
difference between the wages and benefits
given them
and
those
granted
to
petitioners other regular employees of the
same or substantially equivalent rank, up to
June 30, 1998, without prejudice to the
resolution of the illegal dismissal case.
There being no data from which this
Court
may
determine
the
monetary
liabilities
of
petitioner,
the
case
isREMANDED to the Labor Arbiter solely for
that purpose.
SO ORDERED.
3.
4.
5.
6.
DECISION
2.
27 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
(a)
Petitioner
company's
Finance Manual Volume III
and
Appendix
XXVII
(Annexes A and B of
Petitioners' Memorandum and
Annexes A and B of
Petitioners' Reply to Private
Respondent's
Motion
for
Reconsideration filed with
public respondent NLRC)
(b) Admission of private
respondent himself on crossexamination
Established beyond doubt that only
documents like free tickets of airlines with interline
agreements with petitioner company are accepted
in the latter's flights and subjected to the approval
of the Area Manager.
II.
There is no evidence on record,
except for the self-serving claim of private
respondent, that would show that private
respondent previously granted a similar
accommodation on his own. On the other hand,
unrebutted evidence on record clearly established
that on matter of requests for accommodation of
free passage, the prior approval of the Area
Manager (private respondent's superior) is
required as private respondent may only
recommend.
III.
Contrary to the manifestly erroneous
finding of the Honorable Court of Appeals, the
matter subject of the present case is not private
respondent's first offense that his actions were not
tolerated as he had already been previously
issued a warning regarding several irregularities
pertaining to the grant of Meal Accommodation
Transport Order (MATO); lack of exercise of
proper judgment on operational decision and
close liaison with the Area Manager, as evidenced
by the Memo addressed to him dated May 17,
1989 (Annex E to the Petition for Certiorari).
IV.
Private
respondent
who
was
occupying a managerial position as Airport
Manager does not deserve any degree of
sympathy in that despite his long years of service,
the previous written warning given to him
regarding the use of MATO and the clear rules on
interline agreement of which he is fully aware, he
willfully breached the trust and confidence
demanded of his position.
V.
As managerial employee, private
respondent is subject to a stricter standard than
that applicable to rank and file employees in that a
slight breach of trust reposed in him or the mere
existence of a basis for believing that he has
breached the trust of his employer is sufficient to
dismiss him for loss of trust and confidence.
VI.
The Honorable Court of Appeals
grossly erred in awarding separation pay and
backwages to private respondent who had willfully
breached the trust and confidence reposed in him
as a managerial employee by his acts of gross
dishonesty.[29]
The petition is partly meritorious.
28 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
petitioner
Arevalo
that
Pascual
had
offered
to
reimburse petitioner Gulf Air for the costs of the travel and hotel
accommodation of Queroz.[36]
However, the authority of respondent to promote public
relations by accommodating requests of officials of government
agencies for free or discounted passage on board petitioner Gulf Air is
subject to limitations.
In the same incident involving the discounted passage of
Bautista,
respondent
admitted[37] that
he
first
made
a
recommendation to petitioner Abdulla for the grant of the request,
[38]
and it was only when petitioner Abdulla issued a Reduced Rate
Travel & Cargo Authorization that he (respondent) allowed the
discounted passage of Bautista.[39] The significance of this
documentary evidence is clear: the authority of respondent to grant
passage to officials of government agencies as a form of public
relations promotion is circumscribed by company policy.
Gulf Air claims that when it comes to acceptance for passage
of persons holding tickets issued by other airlines, the company policy
is provided in Gulf Air Finance Manual, to wit:
2.16.2
Interline Carriers and Airlines Acting as
Gulf Airs CSAs
xxxx
2.16.3
Philippine
29 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Q:
Now, what is the procedure when a
government official make a request to
you in particular for a free of charge
ticket?
MR. REYES:
A:
We request him to write a letter to Gulf
Air of his request to issue free ticket.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Q:
Supposed this was addressed to you,
what do you do first?
MR. REYES:
A:
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Q:
At the time you accommodated
this, not a Gulf Air ticket, an Astro
Airlines free of charge ticket was
there a list or listing of airlines in
our office, Gulf Air Office, which
have an interline agreement with
Gulf Air?
MR. REYES:
A:
Yes.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Q:
Now, a request by a Government
official or by a guest dignitary, to say,
was addressed to you, would you know
if that request was later approved or
disapproved, would you know that?
A:
In most cases it is always approved,
based on the strength of my
recommendation.[44] (Emphasis added)
Moreover, that a mere photocopy of the manual was
presented does not make said evidence any less significant. Labor
proceedings are non-litigious in nature; hence, the technicalities of law
and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law do not strictly
apply. Rather, the hearing officer is given much leeway to ascertain
for himself the facts of the case.[45]
ALBERTO
152991
SANTIAGO, J.,
P.
OXALES,
G.R.
No.
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-
- versus
ISUMBING*
QU
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
AZCUNA,**
and
REYES, JJ.
UNITED
INC.,
Promulgated:
LABORATORIES,
Respondent.
July
21,
2008
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
30 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
should have included in his basic pay the following, to wit: (a)
cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days service
incentive leave; (b) 1/12th of 13th month pay; and (c) all
other benefits he has been receiving.
Efforts were exerted for a possible amicable
settlement. As this proved futile, the parties were required to
submit their respective pleadings and position papers.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions
The Facts
Sometime in 1959, UNILAB established the United
Retirement Plan (URP).[4] The plan is a comprehensive
retirement program aimed at providing for retirement,
resignation, disability, and death benefits of its members. An
employee of UNILAB becomes a member of the URP upon his
regularization in the company. The URP mandates the
compulsory retirement of any member-employee who reaches
the age of 60.
Both UNILAB and the employee contribute to the
URP. On one hand, UNILAB provides for the account of the
employee an actuarially-determined amount to Trust Fund
A. On the other hand, the employee chips in 2% of his
monthly salary to Trust Fund B. Upon retirement, the
employee gets both amounts standing in his name in Trust
Fund A and Trust Fund B.
As retirement benefits, the employee receives (1)
from Trust Fund A a lump sum of 1 months pay per year of
service based on the members last or terminal basic
monthly salary,[5] and (2) whatever the employee has
contributed to Trust Fund B, together with the income minus
any losses incurred. The URP excludes commissions,
overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations in the
computation of the basic salary for purposes of retirement.
Oxales joined UNILAB on September 1, 1968. He
was compulsorily retired by UNILAB when he reached his 60th
birthday on September 7, 1994, after having rendered service
of twenty-five (25) years, eleven (11) months, and six (6)
days. He was then Director of Manufacturing Services Group.
In computing the retirement benefits of Oxales
based on the 1 months for every year of service under the
URP, UNILAB took into account only his basic monthly
salary. It did not include as part of the salary base the
permanent and regular bonuses, reasonable value of food
allowances, 1/12 of the 13th month pay, and the cash
equivalent of service incentive leave.
Thus,
Oxales
received
from
Trust
Fund
A P1,599,179.00,
instead
of P4,260,255.70. He
also
received P176,313.06, instead ofP456,039.20 as cash
equivalent
of
his
unused
sick
leaves. Lastly,
he
received P397,738.33 from his contributions to Trust Fund
B. In
sum,
Oxales
received
the
total
amount
of P2,173,230.39 as his retirement benefits.
31 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA also
held that R.A. No. 7641 is applicable only in the absence of a
retirement plan or agreement providing for the retirement
benefits of employees in an establishment.[16]
Finally, the CA denied the claim of Oxales to moral
and exemplary damages. According to the appellate court, he
failed to prove the presence of bad faith or fraud on the part
of UNILAB. His mere allegations of having suffered sleepless
nights, serious anxiety, and mental anguish are not
enough. No premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.[17]
Issues
32 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
ATTORNEYS
supplied)
FEES.[20] (Underscoring
Our Ruling
The
clear
langua
ge of
the
URP
should
be
respect
ed.
A retirement plan in a company partakes the
nature of a contract, with the employer and the employee as
the contracting parties. It creates a contractual obligation in
which the promise to pay retirement benefits is made in
consideration of the continued faithful service of the employee
for the requisite period.[21]
The employer and the employee may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem
convenient.[22] In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,[23] New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge,[24] Coppage v. Kansas,[25] Adair v. United States,
[26]
Lochner v. New York,[27] and Muller v. Oregon,[28] the United
States Supreme Court held that the right to contract about
ones affair is part and parcel of the liberty of the individual
which is protected by the due process of law clause of the
Constitution.
The obligations arising from the agreement between
the employer and the employee have the force of law
between them and should be complied with in good faith.
[29]
However, though the employer and the employee are
given the widest latitude possible in the crafting of their
contract, such right is not absolute. There is no such thing as
absolute freedom of contract. A limitation is provided for by
the law itself. Their stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.[30] Indeed, the law
respects the freedom to contract but, at the same time, is
very zealous in protecting the contracting parties and the
public in general. So much so that the contracting parties
need not incorporate the existing laws in their contract, as the
law is deemed written in every contract. Quando abest,
proviso parties, adest proviso legis. When the provision of
the party is lacking, the provision of the law supplies
it. Kung may kulang na kondisyon sa isang kasunduan,
ang batas ang magdaragdag dito.
Viewed from the foregoing, We rule that Oxales is
not entitled to the additional retirement benefits he is
asking. The URP is very clear: basic monthly salary for
purposes of computing the retirement pay is the basic
monthly salary, or if daily[,] means the basic rate of pay
converted
to
basic
monthly
salary
of
the
employee excluding any commissions, overtime, bonuses, or
extra
compensations.[31] Inclusio
unius
est
exclusio
33 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
34 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
As
an
illustration, Complainant
claims that his monthly salary as the
multiplicand of his number of years in the
service should include the value of the food
benefits and other allowances he was
entitled
while
in
the
employ
of
respondent. However, he did not even, by
implication, intend to reduce the 1 month
salary as multiplier under the URP to
under the law he invoked. This is a sign of
covetousness, unfair both to the employer
and those employees who have earlier
retired under said plan.[58]
Oxales is not entitled to the reinstatement of his
medical benefits, which are not part of the
URP. Corollarily, he is not also entitled to moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Oxales claims that UNILAB unilaterally revoked his
medical benefits, causing him humiliation and anxiety. This,
he argues, entitles him to moral damages, exemplary
damages, plus attorneys fees.
We cannot agree. The records bear out that after
Oxales retired from UNILAB, he chose to join a rival company,
Lloyds Laboratories, Inc. As UNILAB correctly puts it, [i]f
any employer can legally and validly do the supreme act of
dismissing a disloyal employee for having joined or
sympathized with a rival company, with more reason may it
do the lesser act of merely discontinuing a benefit unilaterally
given to an already-retired employee.[59] As a retired
employee, Oxales may not claim a vested right on these
medical benefits. A careful examination of the URP would
show that medical benefits are not included in the URP.
Indeed, while there is nothing wrong in the act of
Oxales in joining a rival company after his retirement, justice
and fair play would dictate that by doing so, he cannot now
legally demand the continuance of his medical benefits from
UNILAB. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd situation
where Oxales would continue to receive medical benefits from
UNILAB while working in a rival company. We note that these
medical benefits are merely unilaterally given by UNILAB to
its retired employees.
We are not unaware of this Courts pronouncement
in Brion v. South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day
Adventist
Church.[60] However,
Oxales
plight differs from Brion because the URP does not expressly
cover medical benefits to retirees. In contrast, the retired
employee in Brion had acquired a vested right to the withheld
benefits.
The claim of Oxales to moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees must also be denied for want of
basis in law or jurisprudence. On this score, We echo the
pronouncement of the Court in Audion v. Electric Co., Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[61] to wit:
35 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T
the
appealed
Decision
SO ORDERED.
36 | L A B O R R E L A T I O N S C A S E T O D I G E S T