Central Asia

Policy Brief
No. 20
January 2015

Russias new military doctrine:

NATO as the new threat?
Marcel de Haas

On 26 December 2014, Russias President Vladimir Putin finally endorsed

the new version of the Military Doctrine, which had been announced
months before.1 This brief explains the contents of this edition. Furthermore, it provides an analysis of the new doctrine and a forecast of its possible consequences. Finally, I discuss what the significance of this new
Russian security document might be for Central Asia.

Lieutenant Colonel (Royal

Netherlands Army, ret.) Dr
Marcel de Haas is Full Professor of Public Policy at Nazarbayev University, Astana,
Kazakhstan. His research areas
are defence, security and foreign policy of Russia, Central
Asia, the South Caucasus (CIS,
CSTO, SCO, Eurasian Union),
NATO and EU. Dr De Haas is a
regular commentator for Dutch
and international media outlets.

The opinions expressed here are

those of the author only and do
not represent the Central Asia
Program.

Structure

Key points

The Military Doctrine of December

2014 is divided into seven chapters.2
The first one deals with general principles. Here is described how this
security document is related to the
others, such as the National Security
Strategy and the Foreign Policy Concept. Furthermore, a number of doctrinal and security policy-related definitions are mentioned and explained.
In the second part, the doctrine explains the military dangers and
threats to the Russian Federation.
This chapter forms the core of the
document, when it comes to new
views, certainly with regard to the
changed relationship with the West.

Russias December 2014 military doctrine is to a large extent not different from the
previous edition of 2010.
This doctrine is not more antiNATO than its predecessors;
Russian military doctrines
have always contained a negative tone towards NATO and
the USA.
However, the anti-Western
tone of the doctrine and Moscows corresponding security
policy puts the security of
Central Asia at risk.

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No. 20, January 2015

This part describes the main foreign (external) and domestic (internal) military dangers, as well
as the main military threats. The third chapter clarifies Russias military policy. This is another
section of importance, since it mentions with whom states and organizations the Kremlin
cooperates, and what military means it intends to use in case of conflict or war. Moreover, this
chapter describes what the build-up and the tasks are of the military organization and of the
Armed Forces, Other Troops and Military Organs. The fourth chapter explains the mobilization
(preparedness) of the Russian Federation. The fifth chapter discloses the military-economic
guarantee for defence; i.e. the warranty of economic means allocated for defence. The sixth
chapter discusses the military-industrial complex, which is to provide the Armed Forces and
other military units with arms and equipment. The seventh and last chapter makes clear Moscows military-political and military-technical cooperation with other states and with organizations.
Military dangers and threats
The doctrine differentiates between dangers and threats. This difference is somewhat artificial.
This separation was introduced in the 2010 edition; before that, only threats were listed. As in
the previous version, the real dangers/threats are mentioned under the heading dangers, the
more general ones under threats.3
Not surprisingly, considering the deteriorated relations between Russia and the North Atlantic
Alliance because of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, NATO is mentioned as the first main external/foreign military danger to the Russian Federation. According to the new doctrine, the danger of NATO consists of the growth of its military force and of its global functions, in violation of
international law; of the approaching of the Alliances military infrastructure to Russias borders; as well as of the further enlargement of NATO. Another danger, connected to the deteriorated relations between Moscow and Brussels/Washington, brings up the deployment of military contingents of foreign states on the territory of countries neighbouring Russia and its allies,
for the purpose of putting political and military pressure on the Russian Federation. Next, although not as such stated but clearly also related to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, is the danger
of the establishment of regimes, in states contiguous with Russia, also as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate government bodies, with policies that threaten Moscows interests. One
more danger, although not explicitly mentioned as such, but also likely connected to NATO and
to the United States, is an old one, also listed in earlier editions of the doctrine. This is the danger of the development and deployment of a missile defence system. Related to this danger are
others that are obviously referring to the USA, i.e. the concept of Global Strike, the possible
dislocation of weapons in space, as well as the deployment of strategic conventional arms of
high precision.
Other, less pronounced external/foreign dangers that the doctrine states are destabilizing circumstances in neighbouring states or regions; interference in Russias domestic affairs; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; states violating international law and treaties; the use
of military force or the existence of tension and possible armed conflicts in states neighbouring
Russia; extremism, separatism; information warfare; as well as undermining actions by foreign
security services. The number of internal/domestic dangers is much smaller. They comprise the
violent change of Russias constitutional order; actions by terrorist organizations; influencing
the (younger) population with (manipulated) information; and (religious/ethnic) extremism.
The list of external/foreign dangers contains in total 18 dangers, 14 foreign and 4 domestic
dangers. Thus, the majority of the dangers are situated abroad. Of the 14 external dangers, four
can be considered the result of the deteriorated relationship between Russia and the West,
NATO and the USA in particular. The references to NATO, with its alleged global actions, deployment of forces near Russia and further expansion, are to a large extent related to the Rus-

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No. 20, January 2015

sian-Ukrainian conflict. These doctrinal entries evidently hint at the Alliances actions in response to Moscows annexation of Crimea and its involvement with the separatists in Donetsk
and Lugansk. NATOs response has consisted of no longer considering Russia as a strategic
partner, renewed attention of its article 5 (military assistance when a member is attacked),
changes in its force structure (the formation of a very fast deployable task force), as well as regular exercises in the Baltics and Poland. Moscow turns things around, by calling NATOs answer
to Russian military action a danger to the Russian Federation. Furthermore, again not specifically stated as such, the entry on [a] regime, as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate government bodies, with policies that threaten Moscows interests is undoubtedly aimed at Ukraine,
considering the numerous times that the Russian media have pointed at the regime in Kiev.
Moreover, the new doctrine lists five main military threats. These are a sharp aggravation of the
military-political situation, possibly leading to military force; obstruction of the operation of
state and military control of Russia; activities of illegal armed groups; demonstration of military
force by exercises near the Russian border; as well as mobilization of armed forces by (groups
of) states and preparation for war. As mentioned before, these threats are very generally listed;
the real or actual threats are those recorded as dangers.
Military policy
This chapter explains that Moscows military policy is aimed at deterring and preventing military conflicts. Russias military power is to guarantee its defence and security, as well as to serve
the interests of the state and its allies. To accomplish these warranties, the military policy describes the organizations and states with whom Moscow cooperates: the United Nations (UN),
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the republics of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU, NATO, as well as with the Asia-Pacific region.
Furthermore, this chapter tells that Moscow regards the use of force legitimate to repel aggression against itself or its allies, by resolution of the Security Council of the UN, by decision of other structures/organizations of collective security, and to guarantee the rights of Russian citizens
living abroad. Moreover, Russia considers an attack on one of the CSTO member states as aggression against all CSTO states. Moscow shall use nuclear weapons in retaliation against the
use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, or against conventional aggression which puts the survival of the (Russian) state at risk. New and/or very
current entries of the Kremlins military policy update the fight against piracy, the guarantee of
Russias economic activities on the high seas, as well as of its interests in the Arctic region.
The entry on the use of military force to protect Russians abroad is a recurrent and therefore
consistent element, not only in the military doctrine, but also in the other main security documents, the national security strategy and the foreign policy concept. It is this entry which justified Russias invasion of Georgia in August 2008, after South Ossetians with Russian passports
had come under Georgian attack. Likewise, it now vindicates the Kremlins military action of
2014, by annexing Crimea, as well as Russias (formally hidden) military support for the separatists in East-Ukraines Donetsk and Lugansk. Thus, the pretext of protecting Russians abroad,
serves as a fruitful instrument of Moscows foreign security policy. Another significant point is
the (possible) use of military force in the Arctic region, in connection with the guarantee of Russias economic activities on the high seas. Since 2008 Russia has a dedicated strategy for the
Arctic. Moscow is well aware that climate change will release massive quantities of oil and gas in
this region. Moreover, without ice this area opens a new maritime transport route from Asia to
Europe. Here, we see the use of military power in support of (future) economic interests. Moscow is gradually increasing its military deployment in the Arctic to live up to its strategy.

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No. 20, January 2015

Military cooperation
This final chapter of the doctrine explicitly lists the priority-partners for Russia in cooperating
with states and organizations. For this matter, here the doctrine first mentions the member
states of the CSTO and the state-participants of the CIS. The republics of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are also included in this enumeration. Further on in this part, in addition to repeating
CSTO, CIS, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the doctrine specifies Belarus, the SCO, and the UN as
partners for military cooperation.
From the reiteration of CSTO, CIS, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as considering their listing in the chapter on military policy, can be concluded that at this moment these organizations
and (unrecognized) states are Moscows favorites. The emphasis on the CSTO is probably related to the withdrawal of most Western (US/NATO) forces from Afghanistan in 2014, thus increasing the threats of narcotics and (Taliban) terrorism for Russia and the Central Asian states
in particular. With regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, current Russian policies clearly give
evidence to the fact that these so-called states are more and more incorporated into the Russian
Federation, politically and economically. In due course, they may become Russian provinces,
just like Crimea.
Assessment and outlook
Overall, Putins Christmas 2014 doctrine is not as ugly as it was announced to be by the Russian media in the months preceding its publication. Yes, it does list NATO as a danger, just as in
the 2010 doctrine. However, any counter measures against this aggressive alliance remain absent. Even more important, the Kremlin deeming NATO as a danger or threat is nothing new. All
the editions of the military doctrine under Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin, since the Russian Federation became the successor state of the Soviet Union in 1991, have consistently regarded this
Western military alliance as a danger or threat. Even in the course of dtente and/or rapprochement and reset, such as in the early Yeltsin years (1991-1997), during Putins first term
in office (2000-2004) and throughout Medvedevs Presidency (2008-2012), the negative tone of
the military doctrine towards NATO and the USA remained unchanged.4 After Crimeas annexation and Moscows involvement in Eastern Ukraine, NATO concluded that Russia was not a
partner anymore. Moreover, NATOs Article 5 the collective defence clause, now against Russia
as the successor state of the Soviet Union was restored on its agenda. Consequently, what Moscow has always said was the case, but has not occurred so far, is now a reality NATO is reinforcing troops in Poland and the Baltic states and is putting up collective defence against Russia
again. Due to its own actions, Russia is creating the NATO that they were allegedly afraid of and
that they have always opposed.
Another point of consistency in doctrinal development is the incorporation of recent developments. Earlier versions of the doctrine made accusations against NATO/USA, for its military
action in the former Yugoslavia, for its attack against Serbia vis--vis Kosovo, under the pretence of humanitarian intervention, as well as for the US/UK invasion of Iraq, in violation of
international law (UN Charter).5 As aforementioned, the 2014 edition of the military doctrine
has obviously integrated the developments in and around Ukraine, for example the actions of
NATO and the sanctions by the USA and EU, [t]o put political and military pressure on the Russian Federation. The repeated mentioning in the newest doctrinal edition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, as conquered by Moscow in its August 2008 war with Georgia, is another evidence that recent geopolitical developments are often addressed in the newest doctrine.
In spite of the negative tone of the new Russian doctrine against the West, certain aspects of
cooperation between NATO/USA and Moscow that have a global impact should be continued.
Such as Irans nuclear program and the fight against Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, and the

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No. 20, January 2015

return of IS fighters to their home countries, including Russia and the Central Asian states.
Moreover, this also applies to the cooperation between NATO and Russia together with its CSTO
and SCO allies on the future of Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of the larger part of NATO/US
forces in 2014. Even without trust between Russia and NATO/US, there is a clear necessity to
cooperate on Afghanistan. Both Russia and the West are facing a threat of the Taliban and AlQaeda. The other threat is the production of narcotics and trafficking. Russia and Central Asia
are suffering heavily from Afghan drugs already. With narcotics and Taliban/Al-Qaeda, the West
and Russia, together with its partners in CSTO and SCO, are facing the same threats. Hence,
there is a clear necessity for both parties to cooperate and counter these threats, because the
danger goes beyond the current disputes that they have about Ukraine.6
In Russias 2014 military doctrine the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan, as part of the military alliance CSTO, and together with Uzbekistan in the political,
economic and security bloc SCO, receive a priority status in cooperation. That was also the case
in the 2010 version. However, the crisis around Ukraine might now be an obstacle for Central
Asias further cooperation with the West, considering Moscows negative attitude towards the
USA and NATO. The CSTO has already taken a distance of cooperating with the West, probably
instigated by Moscow, dominating this alliance.7 Considering the imminent danger of Afghanistan and the return of IS fighters home, such a result of Russias new doctrinal thinking could be
detrimental to Central Asias security.
Prezident utverdil novuyu redaktsiyu voyennoy doktriny, ITAR-TASS, President Rossii website,
December 26, 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/47334.
2
Novaya
voennaya
doktrina
Rossii,
Regnum,
January
1,
2015, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1882090.html.
3 Marcel de Haas, Russias Military Doctrine Development 2000-2010, , in: S.J. Blank, ed., Russian Military
Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine, Carlisle (PA), USA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2011, pp.
43-45.
4 Ibid., pp. 43, 51-52.
5 Ibid., p. 44.
6 Marcel de Haas, EU and NATO engagement with the SCO, Afghanistan as a pilot, Europes World, May 7,
2014.
7 Bordyuzha: ODKB priostanovit usiliya po nalazhivaniyu dialoga s NATO, TAR-TASS, November 6 2014,
http://itar-tass.com/politika/1554558.
1

The Central Asia Program (CAP) at George Washington

University aims to promote high-quality academic research on contemporary Central Asia, and to become an
interface for the policy, academic, diplomatic, and business communities by providing a forum for discussion.
The Program calls for a multidisciplinary approach combining the fields of political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, history, globalization studies, and security studies. Central Asia Program strives to bring together
counterparts from the United States, Europe, Russia, Asia,
and Central Asia by promoting various forms of interaction and initiating joint projects.
www.centralasiaprogram.org
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