The Presidents Rule

-Akshay Mankar

Introduction
The framers of the Constitution were aware that in a country of sub-continental dimensions,
enormous diversities, socio-economic disparities and multitudinous of people, with possibly
divided allegiances, security of the nation and stability of its polity could not be taken for
granted. The framers, therefore, recognised that in case of a grave emergency, the Union must
have adequate powers to deal quickly and effectively with a threat to the very existence of the
nation, on account of external aggression or internal disruption. They took care to provide
that, in a situation of such emergency, the Union shall have overriding powers to control and
direct all aspects of administration and legislation throughout the country. A violent
disturbance, paralysing the administration of a State, could pose a serious danger to the unity
and integrity of the country. Coping with such a situation of violent upheaval and domestic
chaos, may be beyond the capacity or resources of the State. Intervention and aid by the
Union will be necessary. A duty has, therefore, been laid by the Constitution upon the Union
to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
The Constitution-framers were well aware to the fact that several regions or areas of the
country had no past experience or deep-rooted tradition of Parliamentary form of
Government, and a failure or break-down of the constitutional machinery in a State could not
be ruled out. A further duty was, therefore, laid on the Union to ensure that the government of
every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 356, which empowers the President to impose Presidents rule in the States, has been
in controversy right from its inclusion in the Constitution. Constitutional issues are inherently
controversial but there is a striking unanimity of opinion on the persistent misuse of Article
356 of the Constitution, which empowers the President of India to impose Presidents rule in
states and dissolve (state) assemblies. Hence, it is rightly said that the power of "dissolution
of the state assemblies points to a deep-seated anomaly in the Indian federal structure. The
power of the President to dissolve state assemblies and to dismiss state governments under
Article 356 is intended to be used only in emergency situations when other constitutional
remedies fail to meet the threatening situation". Moreover, Article 356 comes under the
emergency provisions of the Constitution, which means that the extraordinary powers under
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this article are to be exercised rarely and only in extremely abnormal situations when the state
assembly and the government are unable to function according to the provisions of the
Constitution.
The Constitution (Thirty-eight Amendment) Act, 1975 and put proclamations under Articles
352 and 356 beyond the ken of judicial review in any court on any ground. The Fortyfourth Amendment revoked this impediment. Article 352 has not been invoked since the
Forty-fourth Amendment and, considering the adequacy of the safeguards provided by it,
apprehensions of its possible misuse are no longer rife. There has been persistent criticism, in
ever-mounting intensity, both in regard to the frequency and the manner of the use of Article
356. The essence of the criticism is that, more often than not, its provisions have been
misused, to promote the political interests of the party in power at the Union.

Historical Background
Historically, the proximate origin of these 'emergency' powers can be traced back to the
Government of India Act, 1935. Section 93 of the Act provided that if the Governor of a
Province was satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the Province
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation
assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a Provincial body or
authority, including the Ministry and the Legislature, and to discharge the functions thus
assumed in his discretion. The only exception was that he could not encroach upon the
powers of the High Court.
An important issue for consideration before the framers was, whether the President and the
Governor, or either of them, should be vested with special responsibilities to be discharged by
them in the exercise of their discretion, for purposes such as maintenance of peace and
tranquillity. It was decided at a very early stage of constitution-framing that the President
should have no such special powers and that he would exercise all his functions on the advice
of his Council of Ministers. However, the question of vesting the Governors with
discretionary powers remained under prolonged consideration. We have dealt with this in
detail in the Chapter on the Governor. It will be sufficient to say here that at a later stage, the
Constituent Assembly decided that the Governor should not be an elected, but be a nominated
functionary. Consequent upon this decision, the Constituent Assembly, departing from the
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provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, limited the Governor's powers to merely
furnishing a report to the President of the circumstances showing that a situation has arisen in
which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
Thus, finally, the Constituent Assembly decided that the responsibility of intervention in the
administration of a State, when it was faced with a threatened or actual break-down of the
Constitutional arrangements, would be exclusively that of the President, in effect, of the
Union Government, and the Governor would have no authority in such a situation to assume,
in his discretion, the powers of the State Government even for a short period. The provisions
so finalised, it was considered, would be broadly in accord with the basic principle of
Parliamentary democracy, the Union Government being accountable for all its actions to
Parliament.

The purpose and rational behind article 356

The underlying principle and purpose of introducing Article 356 was explained by the
Chairman of the Drafting Committee in the Constituent Assembly. It was stressed that our
Constitution, notwithstanding that many of its provisions bestow overriding powers on the
Centre, nonetheless gives, on the federal principle, plenary authority to the Provinces to make
laws and administer the same in the field assigned to them. If the Centre is to interfere in the
administration of provincial affairs, it must be, by and under some obligation which the
Constitution imposes upon the Centre. It was emphasised that the 'invasion' by the Centre of
the Provincial field must not be an invasion which is wanton, arbitrary and unauthorised by
law.
The introduction of a provision casting a duty on the Union to protect the States against
'external aggression' and 'internal disturbance' and 'to ensure that the government of every
State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution' was therefore,
considered essential to prevent such an unprincipled invasion.

Article 356
Article 356 incorporated in the Constitution of India gives the President, the power to impose
Presidents rule in States. The 'Emergency Provisions4 of the Constitution form a fasciculus

of nine Articles giving the President overriding authority to assume and exercise powers to
deal with four types of extra-ordinary situations.
(a) A situation of grave emergency whereby the security of India or any part of its territory is
threatened by war or external aggression or armed rebellion. (Articles 352 and related
Articles: 353, Proviso to 83(2), 250, 354, 358 and 359).
(b) A situation involving breakdown of constitutional machinery in a State, i.e., where the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution (Articles 356 and 357).
(c) A situation of 'external aggression' and/or 'internal disturbance' which is not grave enough
to satisfy the requirements of either Article 352 or 356, but nevertheless, calls for other action
by the Union pursuant to the first part of Article 355.
(d) A situation where the financial stability or credit of India or any part thereof is threatened
enabling the Union to give suitable directions (Article 360).

Failure of Constitutional Machinery

The crux of the problem is that the Constitution has not specified the circumstances, which
can be construed to mean, The failure of the constitutional machinery in the State. The
expression had been left unexplained during its inception in the Constitution. Dr. Ambedkar
on being asked by Pandit Kunzaru about the meaning of this expression, had left it undefined
vaguely by comparing it the Government of India Act, 1935 1.This answer of Dr. Ambedkar
according to Seervai is an evasion of the difficulty pointed out by Pandit Kunzru. A heavy
price had to be paid for this evasion in the years to come 2, it seems that by not giving any
explanation about the meaning of this phrase, Dr. Ambedkar intended to keep it vague.

1 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX at 177

2 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India at 3089 (4th edn., 1996)
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Shri Santhanam in the Constituent Assembly had tried to categorize this expression into
physical breakdown, political breakdown and economic breakdown 3. The Sarkaria
Commission has categorized this under the following heads4.

Political crisis.

Internal subversion.

Physical break-down.

Non-compliance with constitutional directions of the Union Executive.

Political Crisis
According to the Sarkaria Commission, A constitutional break-down may be the outcome of
the political crisis or dead-lock. This may occur where
(i)

after a General Election no party or coalition of parties or groups is able to secure

an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, and, despite exploration of all
possible alternatives by the Governor, a situation emerges in which there is
complete demonstrated inability to form a government commanding confidence of

(ii)

the Legislative Assembly;

a Ministry resigns or is dismissed on loss of its majority support in the Assembly
and no alternative government commending the confidence of the Assembly can

(iii)

be formed;
The party having a majority in the Assembly refuses to form or continue the
Ministry and all possible alternatives explored by the Governor to find a coalition
Ministry commending a majority in the Assembly, have failed.

The latest example of application of such emergency is in Jharkhand. The President on 1801-2013 proclaimed the imposition of Presidents Rule in Jharkhand under Article 356(1) of
the Constitution. The Union Cabinet in its meeting held on January 17, 2013 approved the
proposal to issue a Proclamation imposing Presidents Rule in Jharkhand, keeping the State
Legislative Assembly under suspended animation.
Non-compliance with constitutional Directions of the Union Government
3 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX at 162
4 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX at 153
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The following are illustrations of a breakdown due to non-compliance by a State Government

with the directions of the Union Government:
(i) Where a direction issued by the Union in the exercise of its executive power under any
provision of the Constitution, such as, Articles 256, 257 and 339(2) or, during an Emergency
under Article 353, is not complied with by the State Government inspite of adequate warning
and opportunity, and the President thereupon holds under Article 365 that a situation, such as
that contemplated in Article 356, has arisen;
(ii) If public disorder of any magnitude endangering the security of the State, takes place, it is
the duty of the State Government to keep the Union Government informed of such disorder,
and if the State fails to do so, such failure may amount to impeding the exercise of the
executive power of the Union Government and justify the latter giving appropriate directions
under Article 257(1). If such a direction given to the State by the Union Executive under
Article 257(1) is not complied with inspite of adequate warning, the President thereupon may
hold that a situation such as contemplated in Article 356, has arisen.
The recent example of such a situation can be the state of Andhra Pradesh in 2013. There
were massive protests in Seemandhra region of Andhra Pradesh in context of reorganisation
of the state. The chief minister resigned in protest of the Andhra Pradesh reorganisation bill
2013. There was a situation of chaos in the state and the state government was unable to keep
up with. The cabinet then approved the imposition of the presidents rule.
Internal Subversion
As a corollary of Article 355, it follows that correlated to the duty of the Union to preserve
the democratic Parliamentary' form of government in the States contemplated by the
Constitution, the States are also under a liability not to carry on the government in a manner
contrary to or subversive of the provisions of the Constitution. In the light of these principles,
the following are some instances of a situation of constitutional break-down due to internal
subversion:
(i) Where the government of a State, although carried on by a Ministry enjoying majority
support in the Assembly, has been deliberately conducted for period of time in disregard of
the Constitution and the law;

(ii) Where the Government of the State deliberately creates a dead-lock, or pursues a policy
to bring the system of responsible government envisaged by the Constitution, to a stand till;
(iii) Where the State Government, although ostensibly acting within the constitutional forms,
designedly flouts principles and conventions of responsible Government to substitute for
them some form of dictatorship;
And in each of the situations (i), (ii) and (iii) the alternative steps, including other correctives
and warnings, fail to remedy the distortion or bring back the errant State Government to the
Constitutional path;
(iv)Where a Ministry, although properly constituted, violates the provisions of the
Constitution or seeks to use its constitutional powers for purposes not authorised by the
Constitution and other correctives and warnings fail;
(v) Where the State Government is fomenting a violent revolution or revolt with or without
the connivance of a foreign power.
No any case under the conditions given above has come to light in India yet.

Presidents rule in practice

Article 356 was brought into operation as early as 1951. In the initial years, there were not
many instances of its use. But, with passing of years, these provisions have been invoked
with increasing frequency. This is evident from the data given below5:
Period.......................................................................................................................... Frequency
1950-1954............................................................................................................................3
1955-1959..........................................................................................................................3
1960-1964.........................................................................................................................2
1965-1969.........................................................................................9 (7 cases in 1967-69)
1970-1974............................................................................................................................19
1975-1979 ..................................................................................................21 (9 cases in 1977)
5 The Sarkaria Commission Report
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1980-1987................................................................................................18 (9 cases in 1980)

1987-1999.......................................................................................................................20
2000-2013........................................................................................................................10
In Indian politics the period until 1967 has been described as the period of one dominant
party system. During this period the imposition of Presidents rule was not frequent. The
reason was that by and large the ruling party at the Centre and in the States was the same and
this act ensured that the tensions arising between them could very often be resolved through
the mechanism of the party set up. There was a sharp rise of these occasions from 1967
onwards. The fourth General Elections saw the emergence of a multiparty polity ending the
Congress monopoly of power. There was a sea change in the political scene. Coalition
ministries were formed in a number of States for the first time. Many of them were unstable
being based on convenience rather than principle. From here began the saga of frequent
misuse of Article 356 for political ends thereby disturbing the federal structure of our
Constitution and endangering democracy in our country.
The provision, which was thought of as a safety-valve, proved to be a political weapon of
the Centre against the States. The provision, which was intended to be a dead letter, has
proved to be a death letter for a number of State Governments. Different grounds, which
were never thought of by the framers of the constitution, have been used for the imposition of
Presidents rule in the States to suit the political interests of the party in power at the Centre.
Every party plays the game at its pleasure: when in opposition, ask for the amendment or
abrogation of Article 356 and when in power at the Centre, misuse the power for political
ends. Presidents rule has been imposed in the States mainly on the following grounds:
i.

Breakdown of law and order.

ii.

Where no ministry could be formed.

iii.

Political instability as a result of defections.

iv.

Popular agitation against the ministry.

v.

Complete paralysis of the State Administration.

vi.

Corruption and mal-administration.

vii.

To end party rivalry.

viii. To prevent

or facilitate the bifurcation of the State.

ix.

Pending elections in newly created States.

x.

Where the State government belongs to a party which has suffered an overwhelming
defeat in the election to the Lok Sabha.

xi.

Where a State government works against secularism.

It is submitted that the grounds (vii) and (x) are totally unjustified. Losing the Central
election does not per se amount to a situation where it could be concluded that the State
government has lost the mandate of the people of that State. The State government should
complete its full term if it is administering the State properly. Grounds (ii), (iii), (ix) and (xi)
are totally justified. In other cases it is for the President to be satisfied whether the situation
is so grave leading to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery. The remaining grounds
are vogue and can be used for political conspiracy.
The present situation in India shows that the 'dead-letter' provision - as Dr. Ambedkar hoped
it would be - has become a frequently invoked, not-so-dead Article; it has been activated
more than a hundred times till today.6 The National Commission to Review the Working of
the Constitution (NCRWC), which was established on February 22, 2000, on the basis of a
joint resolution of the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs
(Department of Legal Affairs), submitted its extensive report in March 2002. 7 In its analysis,
the NCRWC stated that in at least twenty out of the more than one hundred instances, the
invocation of Article 356 might be termed as a misuse.
It is difficult to believe that, during his tenure as the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh,
Romesh Bhandari made any real effort to install a popularly elected government or to
conduct a constitutionally mandated floor-test to test the strength of the Legislative Assembly
in the State for identifying a majority party before prompting the application of the Article by
the President.8 After the fall of the Mayawati Government in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it
might have been justifiable to impose President's Rule. But it was also necessary to hold fresh
6 Ahmadi J., S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1, 296-297, 434.
7 National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, supra note 3, at 1.1.1
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elections as soon as possible. The mala fides of the Union Executive in preventing the
assumption of office by an unfavorable political entity became clearly manifest in Governor
Bhandari's actions and the decision of the United Front Government at the Center, to reimpose President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh. The worst damage may possibly have been done
through the office of the Governor, because the Governor cannot be held responsible for his
or her actions. H. M. Seervai pointed out that the Governor can be removed only by the
President and that the President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers; hence the
Governor is in office pretty much at the pleasure of the Union Executive. 9 This may act as a
bias whenever the Governor's duty requires him to go against the desires of the Union
Executive. In its report, the NCRWC recommended that the President should appoint or
remove the Governor in consultation with the Chief Minister of the State. This may act as a
restraint on the misuse of power by the Office of the Governor.
Another example of misuse of Article 356 was the imposition of President's Rule in the State
of Gujarat from September1996 to October 1996, following the incidents of violence
indulged in by members of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly. Soli Sorabjee pointed out that
violence within the Assembly cannot be treated as an instance of failure of the constitutional
machinery; it would otherwise become very easy for malicious legislators to dissolve a duly
elected legislative body by creating pandemonium in the Assembly and thereby prompting
improper invocation of Article 356.10 The correct procedure to be followed in such a situation
is to pass suitable legislation for disqualifying the guilty legislators.

To prevent the articles arbitrary use, several institutional safeguards were set in place. First,
the president of India, who makes the official proclamation of central rule in the states, can
return the central cabinets recommendation for the imposition of central rule back to the
cabinet for reconsideration if he or she finds the invocation of the emergency provision
unreasonable. Such a presidential response is seen in India as politically embarrassing to the
8 http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980226/05750654.html
9 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, vol. 3, 3103 ( 4th edn. 1996)
10 Soli Sorabjee, Constitutional Morality Violated in Gujarat, Indian Express, Pune, India,
Sept. 21, 1996
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central governmentit signals to the wider public that federal officials are misusing
constitutional provisions.11 Second, the government, having secured presidential assent, must
get the proclamation of central rule passed in both houses of Parliament within two months,
failing which the proclamation ceases to be effective. This provision gives parliamentarians
an opportunity to question the governments decision and, if they find it arbitrary, vote down
the proclamation. Finally, a government decision to impose central rule in any state can be
challenged in the courts. None of these safeguards, however, prevented successive central
governments from imposing Article 356 in the states 103 times over nearly six decades.
In a large number of these cases, invocation of the emergency provision was arbitrary.12
Curiously, these central government transgressions have declined states during 17 central
governments since 1952. It reveals that until the mid-1990s, the institutional safeguards
against the central governments usurpation of state governancei.e., the president, the
federal legislature, and the courtshad failed. However, from the mid-1990s, we see a sharp
decline in the imposition of direct central rule in Indian states. Intriguingly, the most
opportune condition for the central government to intervene, political instability in a given
state, has since the mid-1990s increased, not declined, while coinciding with the decrease in
federal rule. In 38% of the 69 state elections held between 1996 and 2009, no political party
or pre-electoral coalition was able to secure an outright majority, whereas only 22% of
elections held prior to 1996 yielded such a result. Despite the most inviting circumstances for
direct central rule in states, successive central governments since the mid-1990s have
exercised restraint.
Failure to invoke emergency provisions
On the other extreme of misuse of Article 356 was the failure of the Union Executive - which
was of the same political belief as the Government of Narendra Modi in Gujarat - to invoke
Article 356 during the carnage following the Godhra train incident on February 27, 2002, in
the State of Gujarat. To quote the words of Fali Nariman, noted lawyer and nominated
member of the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) of the Indian Parliament during a parliamentary
debate: Vital statistics tells us that there are more than 100000 persons in refugee camps and
11 The Success of Indias Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 143.
12 Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations (New Delhi: Governmentof India, 1988), p. 177.

11

more than 30,000 people have been chargesheeted. Are these figures not enough to compel
the Government to take action under articles 355 and 356? 13 Fali Nariman also rightly
pointed out in an interview with a newspaper correspondent that the Constitution may not
have envisaged a situation where an emergency has arisen in a State where the ruling party is
of the same political persuasion as the one at the Center and, hence, the Center might be
biased against dissolving that government by invoking Article 356. He also pointed out that
the word 'otherwise' in the text of Article 356 becomes instrumental in such a situation to
allow the President to act without waiting for the 'Governor's Report.14
Judicial review
The only safeguard against the abuse of power under Article 356 is the judicial review. The
Supreme Courts judgement in 1977 in the case of State of Rajasthan v Union of India
brought by some state governments against the Janata governments dissolution of state
legislatures broke new ground. It upheld the courts right to strike down a proclamation
imposing Presidents rule if the action was mala fide or based on extraneous or irrelevant
considerations, but, ordinarily court would keep away from political questions, in particular
substituting its own judgement for that of executive.
There are two fallouts of the 1977 judgement. First, that even though the dead could not be
revived, that is, a dissolved state assembly could not be brought to life, the court would not
read into the presidential powers limitations that did not clearly exist. This means that by
issuing proclamations the Centre has committed no constitutional wrong. Second, that even if
the presidential proclamation was not approved by Parliament, actions taken during the
period of initial two months could not be invalidated.
In the Bommai judgment the scope of Article 356 was discussed at length some of the
conclusion of the judgment are as follows:

Strength of the ministry should be tested on the floor of the House, which is the sole
constitutionally ordained forum. The assessment of the strength of the Ministry is not
a matter of private opinion of any individual, be he the Governor or the President.

13 rajyasabha.nic.in/rsdebate/synopsis/195/s02052002.htm
14 http://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsdebate/synopsis/195/s02052002.htm
12

If the Court strikes down the Proclamation, it has the power to restore the dismissed
Government in office and revive and reactivate the Legislative Assembly wherever it
may have been dissolved or kept under suspension. In such a case, the Court has the
power to declare that the period the Proclamation was in force shall remain unaffected
and be treated as valid.

The dissent of Ramaswamy,J. is worth mentioning . He observed that there is no express

provision in the Constitution to revive the Assembly dissolved under the Presidential
Proclamation or to reinduct the removed Government of the State. He further observed that
the political parties must seek a fresh mandate from the electorates and establish their
credibility by winning majority seats. The possibility of reinduction creates functional hiatus.
Regarding the floor test, he observed that a floor test may provide impetus for corruption
and rank force and violence by musclemen or wrongful confinement or vocational capacity of
legislators. It is submitted that the only purpose of the floor test is to test the majority in the
legislature. It is not the sole test for negating the Presidential Proclamation. The government
in power may have majority support in the legislature and yet there may be a breakdown of
the constitutional machinery.
Referring the suggestions made by the Administrative Reforms Commission 15 to suo motu
summon the Assembly to obtain the verdict if the Chief Minister does not advise him to
convene the Assembly was refused by the Central Government to endorse as it saw the
suggestion not in its favour.
Since 1977, the Judiciary has been trying to put check on the political behaviour of the
Governor, but still it cannot be termed as complete code.

Conclusion
It is evident from this study that Article 356, which was incorporated in the Constitution for a
noble cause of ensuring the governance in the States according to the provisions of the
15 Report on Centre-State Relationship, 28. 73.

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Constitution has been frequently misused by the parties at the Centre to achieve their political
ends. The hopes and expectations of Dr. Ambedkar that this provision would remain a dead
letter are belied and the apprehensions of many others have been proved true. Since the
coming into force of the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950, Presidents rule has been
imposed on more than 100 occasions and on all these occasions it was seldom used and often
misused. The Union Government has not adopted a uniform pattern in accepting the causes
and circumstances which may warrant the invocation of Article 356. The expression failure
of constitutional machinery in the State has been liberally used by the parties at the Centre at
their pleasure taking undue advantage of the vagueness of this expression.
Following are some instances which draw our attention. The Rajamanar Committee report
and the memorandum of the West Bengal government on Centre-state relations have
demanded the repeal of Article 356. DMK in its manifesto for Lok Sabha elections 2014
promised the removal of article 356.
Such instances brings us to raise the question whether we need Art 356 six decades after
functioning as a democratic republic. Circumstances that prevailed in the initial years after
independence no longer exist. Three factors stand out. First, India is now a stable democracy
as is evident from the successful conduct of elections from time to time. Secondly, the
emergence of regional parties has ensured that national parties cannot be certain of ruling in
states all the time or on their own. Thirdly, the emergence of regional leaders even within
national parties, as in Karnataka, shows that the central leadership of national parties cannot
ignore them and impose their will on the states.
It is clear that states have now evolved into strong entities and are capable of governing
themselves politically. This is not to say there will always be good governance. For that
matter, one can point out instances of bad governance in the central government too. It is not
just the state institutions but the Central institutions that have failed in many respects. We
need to develop proper safeguards against misuse of state power and that is a process that
must go on continuously.
It is quite clear that power under Article 356 has been misused due to vagueness of the
expression failure of constitutional machinery. If there is a constitutional breakdown in a
state, the remedy lies in going to the people and seeking a fresh mandate and not in the
Centre assuming the powers of the state authorities. This will also make the legislators,
particularly the defectors more responsible. After all, when there is a national emergency, the
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President does not assume the powers of the central government or parliament. There is no
need to apply a different norm at the state level. Dr. Ambedkar himself affirmed that the
states are supreme, sovereign in the field allotted to them and in our system no single entity
can claim superiority. Ours is a federation and as pointed out by several constitutional
scholars, it is only the spirit of cooperative federalism that can preserve the balance between
the Centre and the states.
Hence, the time has come for us to do away with this failure of constitutional machinery
clause of Article 356 of the Constitution and hence the Presidents rule.

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